CHAPTER XVIII_Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812. Volume 2

THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

The Government of the United States had been honestly loath to declare

war in 1812, and had signalized its reluctance by immediate advances

looking to a restoration of peace. These were made through Jonathan

Russell, the _chargé d'affaires_ in London when hostilities began. To

use the expression of Monroe, then Secretary of State, "At the moment

of the declaration of war, the President, regretting the necessity

which produced it, looked to its termination, and provided for

it."[473] The two concessions required as indispensable, in the

overture thus referred to, dated June 26, 1812, were the revocation of

the Orders in Council, and the abandonment of the practice of

impressing from American merchant ships. Should these preliminary

conditions be obtained, Russell was authorized to stipulate an

armistice, during which the two countries should enter upon

negotiations, to be conducted either at Washington or in London, for

the settlement of all points of difference.

Russell made this communication to Castlereagh August 24, 1812. Before

this date Admiral Warren had sailed from England for the American

command, carrying with him the propositions of the British Government

for a suspension of hostilities, consequent upon the repeal of the

Orders in Council.[474] In view of Warren's mission, and of the fact

that Russell had no powers to negotiate, but merely to conclude an

arrangement upon terms which he could not alter, and which his

Government had laid down in ignorance of the revocation of the Orders,

Castlereagh declined to discuss with him the American requirements. "I

cannot, however," he wrote, "refrain on one single point from

expressing my surprise, namely, that as a condition preliminary even

to a suspension of hostilities, the Government of the United States

should have thought fit to demand that the British Government should

desist from its ancient and accustomed practice of impressing British

seamen from the merchant ships of a foreign state, simply on the

assurance that a law shall hereafter be passed to prohibit the

employment of British seamen in the public or commercial service of

that state."[475] "The Government could not consent to suspend the

exercise of a right upon which the naval strength of the empire mainly

depends," until fully convinced that the object would be assured by

other means. To a subsequent modification of the American

propositions, in form, though not in tenor, the British minister

replied in the same spirit, throwing the weight of his objections upon

the question of impressment, which indeed remained alone of the two

causes of rupture.[476]

Commendable as was its desire for peace, the American Government had

made the mistake of being unwilling to insure it by due and timely

preparation for war. In these advances, therefore, its adversary

naturally saw not magnanimity, but apprehension. Russell, in reporting

his final interview, wrote, "Lord Castlereagh once observed somewhat

loftily, that if the American Government was so anxious _to get rid of

the war_,[477] it would have an opportunity of doing so on learning

the revocation of the Orders in Council." The American representative

rejoined with proper spirit; but the remark betrayed the impression

produced by this speedy offer, joined to the notorious military

unreadiness of the United States. Such things do not make for peace.

The British ministry, like a large part of the American people, saw in

the declaration of war a mere variation upon the intermittent policy

of commercial restrictions of the past five years; an attempt to

frighten by bluster. In such spirit Monroe, in this very letter of

June 26 to Russell, had dwelt upon the many advantages to be derived

from peace with the United States; adding, "not to mention the

injuries which cannot fail to result from a prosecution of the war."

In transcribing his instructions, Russell discreetly omitted the

latter phrase; but the omission, like the words themselves, betrays

consciousness that the Administration was faithful to the tradition of

its party, dealing in threats rather than in deeds. Through great part

of the final negotiations the impression thus made remained with the

British ministers.

On September 20, 1812, the Chancellor of the Russian Empire requested

a visit from the American minister resident at St. Petersburg, Mr.

John Quincy Adams. In the consequent interview, the next evening, the

Chancellor said that the Czar, having recently made peace and

re-established commercial intercourse with Great Britain, was much

concerned that war should have arisen almost immediately between her

and the United States. Hostilities between the two nations, which

together nearly monopolized the carrying trade of the world, would

prevent the economical benefits to Russia expected from the recent

change in her political relations. The question was then asked,

whether a proffer of Russian mediation would be regarded favorably by

the United States. Adams had not yet received official intelligence

even of the declaration of war, and was without information as to the

views of his Government on the point suggested; but he expressed

certainty that such an advance would be cordially met, and he could

foresee no obstacle to its entertainment. The proposal was accordingly

made to the President, through the customary channels, and on March

11, 1813, was formally accepted by him. James A. Bayard and Albert

Gallatin were nominated commissioners, conjointly with Mr. Adams, to

act for the United States in forming a treaty of peace under the

mediation of the Czar. They sailed soon afterwards.

The American acceptance reached St. Petersburg about June 15; but on

that day Adams was informed by the Chancellor that his despatches from

London signified the rejection of the Russian proposition by the

British Government, on the ground that the differences with the United

States involved principles of the internal government of Great

Britain, which could not be submitted to the discussion of any

mediation.[478] As the Russian Court was then in campaign, at the

headquarters of the allied armies, in the tremendous operations of the

summer of 1813 against Napoleon, much delay necessarily ensued. On

September 1, however, the British ambassador, who was accompanying the

Court in the field, presented a formal letter reaffirming the

unwillingness of his Government to treat under mediation, but offering

through the Czar, whose mediatorial advance was so far recognized, to

nominate plenipotentiaries to meet those of the United States in

direct consultation. In the backward and forward going of despatches

in that preoccupied and unsettled moment, it was not till near

November 1 that the British Foreign Office heard from the ambassador

that the American commissioners were willing so to treat, and desirous

to keep their business separate from that of the continent of Europe;

but that their powers were limited to action through the mediation of

Russia. Castlereagh then, on November 4, addressed a note to the

United States Government, offering a direct negotiation. This was

accepted formally, January 5, 1814;[479] and Henry Clay with Jonathan

Russell were added to the commission already constituted, raising the

number of members to five. The representatives of Great Britain were

three: Admiral Lord Gambier, Henry Goulburn, and William Adams. Ghent

was fixed upon for the place of meeting.

The instructions issued to the American commissioners were voluminous.

They contained not only the requirements of the Government, but

arguments from every point of view, and alternatives of several

descriptions, to meet anticipated objections. Such elaboration was

perhaps necessary when negotiation was to take place so remote from

communication with home. On one point, however, as originally issued

in contemplation of Russian mediation, demand was peremptory.

Impressment must cease, by stipulation. "If this encroachment of Great

Britain is not provided against, the United States have appealed to

arms in vain." At that moment, April 15, 1813,[480] the flush of

expectation was still strong. "Should improper impressions have been

taken of the probable consequences of the war, you will have ample

means to remove them. It is certain that from its prosecution Great

Britain can promise to herself no advantage, while she exposes herself

to great expenses and to the danger of still greater losses." Nine

months later, looking to direct negotiation, the same confident tone

is maintained. "On impressment, the sentiments of the President have

undergone no change. This degrading practice must cease.... No

concession is contemplated on any point in controversy;"[481] and

three weeks afterwards, February 14, 1814, "Should peace be made in

Europe, it is presumed that the British Government would have less

objection to forbear impressment for a specified term, than it would

have should the war continue. In concluding a peace, even in case of a

previous general peace in Europe, it is important to obtain such a

stipulation."[482] On June 27, the note was lowered. "If found

indispensably necessary to terminate the war, you may omit any

stipulation on the subject of impressment." This was in pursuance of

the Cabinet determination of June 27, already quoted.[483] It

abandoned the only ground for war that had existed since August, 1812,

when the Orders in Council were known to have been repealed. The

commissioners were indeed to do their best to obtain from the British

Government the demanded concessions, not in the matter of impressment

only, but on the whole subject of irregular blockades, which underlay

the Orders in Council, as well as on other maritime questions in

dispute; but in pressing such demands they were under orders to fall

back before resistance. From the opening of the colloquy they were on

the defensive.

Quite different was the position assumed at first by the British

Government and people. The events of the critical year 1813, both in

Europe and America, had changed the entire outlook. Alexander Baring,

whose general attitude towards the United States was friendly, wrote

to Gallatin, October 12, 1813, "We wish for peace, but the pressure of

the war upon our commerce and manufactures is over. They have ample

relief in other quarters; indeed, the dependence of the two countries

on each other was overrated." He was positive that there would be no

concession on impressment. Again, on December 14, "The pressure of

the war is diminished. Commerce is now abundantly prosperous."[484]

Gallatin himself had occasion to spend some time in London during the

succeeding spring,--1814. Quotation from his observations has been

made already.[485] In a letter of April 21,--after Napoleon's

abdication,--"The prosecution of war with the United States would

afford a convenient pretext for preserving a more considerable

standing force."[486] This would be a useful element in the

troublesome diplomacy to be foreseen, in settling the disturbed

affairs of Europe; and the Government stood in need of reasons for

maintaining the pressure of taxation, which was already eliciting, and

later in the year still more elicited, symptoms of great discontent

and dangerous Parliamentary opposition. Yet in its conduct towards

America the Cabinet had the people behind it. Two months later,

Gallatin wrote to the Secretary of State, "You may rest assured of the

general hostile spirit of this nation, and of its wish to inflict

serious injury on the United States; that no assistance can be

expected from Europe; and that no better terms will be obtained than

the _status ante bellum_."[487]

At the time of this writing, June 13, the British Foreign Secretary,

Lord Castlereagh, returned from Paris, where he had been spending the

two months succeeding the first abdication of Napoleon. During this

period formal peace with France had been established, and the Bourbons

reseated on her throne. His instructions to the British commissioners

at Ghent, issued July 28, were framed on lines which showed

consciousness of mastery.[488] The question of abandoning the

practice of impressment would not be so much as entertained. The Rule

of 1756 should "rest on its own clear and well established

authority."[489] The commissioners were not even to discuss it.

Equally decisive was the position taken with regard to questions of

irregular blockades, and of compensation for seizures under the Orders

in Council. When these were presented by the American commissioners,

the first was waived aside, as one on which there was no difference of

abstract principle; while as to the second, "you cannot be too

peremptory in discouraging, at the outset, the smallest expectation of

any restitution of captures made under the Orders in Council."[490]

Military and naval weakness, combined with the changed conditions in

Europe, made the United States powerless when thus confronted with

refusal. The British Secretary stood on far less sure ground, as to

success, when he began to formulate his own demands. These were

essentially two: suitable arrangements for the Indians, and a

rectification of the frontiers. There was a third question, concerning

the fisheries on the Great Banks of Newfoundland. As to these, the

general right of all nations to frequent the Banks, being open sea,

was explicitly admitted; but the subjects of a foreign state had no

right to fish within the maritime jurisdiction of Great Britain, much

less to land with their catch on coasts belonging to her. The

provisions of the Treaty of 1783 therefore would not be renewed,

unless for an equivalent.

As regarded the Indians, an adequate arrangement of their interests

was a _sine quâ non_ of peace; nor would a full and express

recognition of present limits by itself alone fulfil this demand.

There must be security for its future observance. The particular

method by which this observance should be maintained was not made

indispensable; but it was plainly stated in the instructions that the

best means was "a mutual guarantee of the Indian possessions, as they

shall be established upon the peace, against encroachment on the part

of either State." The suggestion, in its logical consequence and in

its intent, went to establishing the communities of Indians as a

sovereign state, with boundaries guaranteed by Great Britain and the

United States,--a most entangling alliance. In support of this,

Castlereagh alleged that such a barrier of separation possessed a

distinct advantage over a line of contact between the two guaranteeing

states, such as now existed in their common boundary. The collisions

incident to intercourse between red and white men were easily

transferred from side to side of such a conventional line, causing

continual disputes. The advantages of a buffer state, to use the

modern term, would be secured by the proposed arrangement. Writing to

the prime minister, the Earl of Liverpool, he said, "The question is

one of expediency; and not of principle, as the American commissioners

have endeavored to make it. It does not follow, because, in the year

1783, the two States, not perhaps very justly, took a common boundary,

thereby assuming a sort of sovereignty over the Indians, that they may

not mutually recede from that boundary, if a frontier conterminous

with that of the Indians is preferable to one with each other."[491]

However plausible reasoning based upon such premises might seem to the

party advancing it, it could not qualify the fact that it required

from the United States a large cession of territory, to be

surrendered to the Indians under British guarantee. Such a demand was

a dangerous diplomatic weapon to put within reach of a commission, of

which Adams and Gallatin were members. In presenting it, also, the

British representatives went beyond the letter of their instructions,

issued by Castlereagh on July 28, and enlarged August 14. Not only was

the inclusion of the Indians in the peace to be a _sine quâ non_, but

they wrote, "_It is equally necessary_" that a definite boundary be

assigned, and the integrity of their possessions mutually

guaranteed.[492] This paper was submitted to Castlereagh as he passed

through Ghent to Paris, on his way to the Vienna Conference. "Had I

been to prepare the note given in on our part, I should have been less

peremptory;" but, like many superiors, he hesitated to fetter the men

in immediate charge, and "acquiesced in the expression, 'It is equally

necessary, etc.,' which is very strong."[493] The prime minister was

still more deprecatory. He wrote Castlereagh, "Our commissioners had

certainly taken a very erroneous view of our policy. If the

negotiations had been allowed to break off upon the two notes already

presented, ... I am satisfied the war would have become popular in

America."[494]

The American commissioners could see this also, and were quick to use

the advantage given by the wording of the paper before them, to

improve the status of the United States in the negotiation; for one of

the great weaknesses, on which Great Britain reckoned, was the

disunion of American sentiment on the subject of the war. Of their

reply, dated August 24, Castlereagh wrote, "It is extremely material

to answer the American note, as it is evidently intended to rouse the

people upon the question of their independence."[495] Besides the

Indian proposition, the British note of August 19 had conveyed also

the explicit views of the ministry as to rectification of frontier.

Stated briefly, the chain of the Great Lakes was asserted to be a

military barrier essential to the security of Canada, as the weaker

community in North America. To assure it, no territorial cession was

required; but the lakes should be in the sole military tenure of Great

Britain. The United States might use them freely for commercial

purposes, but should maintain on them no ship of war, nor build any

fortification on their shores, or within a certain distance, to be

fixed by agreement. In addition to this, on the side of the lower St.

Lawrence, there was to be such a cession of the northern part of Maine

as would establish a direct communication between Quebec and Halifax.

The American reply of August 24[496] discussed these questions,

patiently but instructively. The matters involved were made plain for

the American reader, and the paper closed with the clear intimation

that before such terms were accepted there must be a great deal more

fighting. "It is not necessary to refer such demands to the American

Government for instructions. They will only be a fit subject of

deliberation when it becomes necessary to decide upon the expediency

of an absolute surrender of national independence." So far as the

British proposals went, the question was military, not diplomatic; for

soldiers and seamen to decide, not for negotiators.

So it stood, and so in the solution it proved. The American

commissioners held firm to this ground; while on the part of the British

there was thenceforth a continual effort to escape from a false

position, or to temporize, until some favorable change of circumstances

might enable them to insist. "The substance of the question," wrote

Castlereagh to the prime minister, "is, are we prepared to continue the

war for territorial arrangements. If not, is this the best time to make

peace, or is it desirable to take the chances of the campaign and then

to be governed by circumstances?"[497] "If our campaign in Canada should

be as successful as our military preparations would lead us to expect,"

... replied Liverpool, "if our commander does his duty, I am persuaded

we shall have acquired by our arms every point on the Canadian frontier,

which we ought to insist on keeping."[498]

By these considerations the next British note was dictated, and

presented September 4.[499] It simply argued the question, with

dilatory design, in a somewhat minatory tone. "I think it not

unlikely," Liverpool had written with reference to it, "that the

American commissioners will propose to refer the subject to their

Government. In that case, the negotiation may be adjourned till the

answer is received, and we shall know the result of the campaign

before it can be resumed." But the Americans did not refer. They too

needed time for their people to learn what now was the purpose of

hostilities, which the British envoys had precipitately stated as an

indispensable concession, and to manifest the national temper under

the changed circumstances; but they did not choose that the matter

should be stated as one open to discussion. They knew well enough the

harassment of maintaining a land warfare three thousand miles from

Great Britain, as well as the dangers threatening the European

situation and embarrassing the British ministry. They in turn

discussed at length, scrutinizing historically the several arguments

of their opponents; but their conclusion was foregone. The two

propositions--first, of assigning "a definite boundary to the Indians

living within the limit of the United States, beyond which boundary

they [the United States] should stipulate not to acquire any

territory; secondly, of securing the exclusive military possession of

the lakes to Great Britain--are both inadmissible. We cannot subscribe

to, and would deem useless to refer to our Government, any arrangement

containing either of these propositions." The British Government was

not permitted any subterfuge to escape from the premature insistence

upon cession of territory made by their envoys, which would tend to

unite the people in America; nor was it to be anticipated that

prolonged hostilities for such an object would be acceptable in Great

Britain.

The pre-eminence given to the Indian question by Great Britain in

these negotiations was due to the importance attached by British local

officials to the aid of the savages in war, and to a sensitive

conviction that, when thus utilized, they should not be abandoned in

peace. Their military value was probably over-estimated. It consisted

chiefly in numbers, in which the British were inferior, and in the

terror produced by their cruelties; doubtless, also, in some degree to

their skill in woodcraft; but they were not dependable. Such as it

was, their support went usually to the weaker party; not because the

Indian naturally sided with the weaker, but because he instinctively

recognized that from the stronger he had most to fear. Therefore in

colonial days France, in later days Great Britain, in both cases

Canada, derived more apparent profit from their employment than did

their opponent, whose more numerous white men enabled him to dispense

with the fickle and feebler aid of the aborigines.

Before the firm attitude of the note of September 9, the British

Government again procrastinated, and receded from demands which sound

policy should from the first have recognized as untenable, unless

reposing upon decisive military success and occupation. On September

19, their commissioners replied[500] that while the exclusive military

possession of the lakes would be conducive to a good understanding,

without endangering the security of the United States, it had not been

advanced as a _sine quâ non_. A final proposition on the subject of

the Canadian boundaries would be made, when the Indian question was

settled. Concerning this, they were "authorized distinctly to declare

that they are instructed not to sign a treaty of peace, unless the

Indian nations are included in it, and restored to all the rights,

privileges, and territories, which they enjoyed in the year 1811," by

treaties then existing. "From this point the British plenipotentiaries

cannot depart." They were instructed further to _offer for discussion_

an article establishing Indian boundaries, within which the two

countries should bind themselves not to make acquisitions by purchase

during a term of years. To the absence of Lord Castlereagh, and

consequent private correspondence between him and his colleagues in

London, we owe the knowledge that the question of purchasing Indian

lands, and the guarantee, would no longer be insisted on; and that the

military control of the lakes was now reduced in purpose to the

retention of Forts Michilimackinac and Niagara.[501] The intention

remained, however, to insist upon the Indian provisions as just

stated.

On September 26, the American commission replied that, as thus

presented, there was no apparent difference in the purposes of the two

nations as regarded the substantial welfare of the Indians themselves.

The United States meant towards them peace, and the placing them in

the position in which they stood before the war. "The real difference

was" in the methods proposed. Great Britain "insisted on including the

Indians, as allies, in the treaty of peace between her and the United

States." But the Indians concerned dwelt within the acknowledged

bounds of the United States, and their political relations towards her

were no concern of Great Britain; nor could any arrangement be

admitted which would constitute them independent communities, in whose

behalf Great Britain might hereafter claim a right to interfere. The

error underlying the British demand was the assumption that the Indian

tribes were independent; whereas, in their relation to foreign

countries, they were merely dwellers in the United States, who had

made war upon her in co-operation with Great Britain. The upshot was a

mutual agreement, drawn up by the British plenipotentiaries, that upon

the conclusion of peace each state would put an end to hostilities in

which it might be engaged with the Indians, and would restore them to

the rights enjoyed before 1811. The Americans accepted this, subject

to ratification at home, on the ground that, while it included the

Indians in the peace, it did not do so as parties to the treaty, and

left the manner of settlement in the hands of each Government

interested. The agreement thus framed formed one of the articles of

the treaty.

On September 27 the Gazette account of the capture of Washington was

published in London. Lord Bathurst, who in the absence of Castlereagh

was acting as Foreign Secretary, despatched the news the same day to

the commissioners at Ghent, instructing them to assure the Americans

that it made no difference in the British desire for peace, nor would

modify unfavorably the requirements as to frontier, as yet

unstated.[502] Liverpool wrote coincidently to Castlereagh, suggesting

that he should communicate to the sovereigns and ministers at Vienna

the moderation with which the Government was acting, as well as the

tone assumed by the American commissioners, "so very different from

what their situation appears to warrant." "I fear the Emperor of

Russia is half an American, and it would be very desirable to do away

any prejudices which may exist in his mind, or in that of Count

Nesselrode, on this subject."[503] The remark is illuminating as to

the reciprocal influence of the American contest and the European

negotiations, and also as to the reasons for declining the proposed

Russian mediation of 1813. The continent generally, and Russia

conspicuously, held opinions on neutral maritime rights similar to

those of the United States. Liverpool had already[504] expressed his

wish to be well out of the war, although expecting decided military

successes, and convinced that the terms as now reduced would be very

unpopular in England; "but I feel too strongly the inconvenience of a

continuance not to make me desirous of concluding it at the expense of

some popularity."

It was in this spirit, doubtless, that Bathurst instructed the envoys

that, if the Americans wished to refer the very modified proposals, or

to sign them conditional upon ratification at home, either proposition

would be accepted; an assurance repeated on October 5.[505] Were

neither alternative embraced as to the Indian settlement, the

negotiation should be closed and the commission return to England.

British military anticipation then stood high. Not only was the

capture of Washington over-estimated, but Ross and Cochrane had

impressed their Government with brilliant expectations. "They are very

sanguine about the future operations. They intend, on account of the

season, to proceed in the first instance to the northward, and to

occupy Rhode Island, where they propose remaining and living upon the

country until about the first of November. They will then proceed

southward, destroy Baltimore, if they should find it practicable

without too much risk, occupy several important points on the coast

of Georgia and the Carolinas, take possession of Mobile in the

Floridas, and close the campaign with an attack on New Orleans."[506]

This was a large programme for a corps of the size of Ross', after all

allowance made for the ease with which Washington had fallen. It is

probably to be read in connection with the project of sending to

America very large re-enforcements; so numerous, indeed, that Lord

Hill, Wellington's second in the Peninsula, had been designated for

the command. This purpose had been communicated to Ross and Cochrane;

and at the time of the capture of Washington they had not received the

letters notifying them that "circumstances had induced his Majesty's

Government to defer their intention of employing so considerable a

force in that quarter."[507] For this change of mind America doubtless

was indebted to European considerations. Besides the expectations

mentioned, the British Government had well-founded reasons to hope for

control of Lake Ontario, and for substantial results from the handsome

force placed at the disposal of Sir George Prevost, to which the

triumphant expedition of Cochrane and Ross had been intended only as a

diversion.

Under these flattering anticipations were formulated the bases upon

which to treat, now that the Indian question was out of the way. On

October 18 and 20 Bathurst instructed the commissioners to propose, as

a starting point, the principle that each party should hold what it

had, subject to modifications for mutual accommodation. "Considering

the relative situation of the two countries, the moderation evinced by

his Majesty's Government in admitting this principle, (thereby

surrendering claim to the future conquests), in the present state of

the contest, must be manifest." When this was accepted, but not

before, the mutual accommodations were to be suggested. The present

captured possessions were stated to be: British, Fort Michilimackinac,

Fort Niagara, and all the country east of the Penobscot; the American,

Fort Erie and Fort Malden. Upon the surrender of the two latter, Great

Britain would restore the forts at Castine and Machias. She would

retain Mackinac and Fort Niagara, the latter with a surrounding strip

of five miles of territory; and in exchange (apparently) for "all the

country east of the Penobscot," would accept that part of Maine which

lies north of the Aroostook River, thus insuring between Quebec and

Halifax a direct communication, wholly under British jurisdiction.

There were some further minor matters of detail, unnecessary to mention;

the more so that they did not come formally before the American

commissioners, who immediately rejected the proposed principle of _uti

possidetis_, and replied, October 24, that they were not empowered to

yield any territory, and could treat only on the basis of entire mutual

restitution. This Liverpool testily likened to the claim of the French

revolutionary Government[508] that territory could not be ceded because

contrary to the fundamental law of the Republic. In the American case,

however, it was substantially an affirmation that the military

conditions did not warrant surrender. Meanwhile, on October 21, the news

of Macdonough's victory reached London from American sources. Although

the British official accounts did not arrive until some time later,

Liverpool, writing to Castlereagh on that day, admitted that there could

be no doubt of the defeat of the flotilla.[509] Despite this check, the

Cabinet still cherished hopes of further successes, and were unwilling

yet to abandon entirely the last inches of the ground heretofore

assumed. "Had it not been for this unfortunate adventure on Lake

Champlain," wrote Bathurst to Castlereagh, "I really believe we should

have signed a peace by the end of this month. This will put the enemy in

spirits. The campaign will end in our doing much where we thought we

should have done little, and doing nothing where we expected

everything."[510] He announced the intention to send Pakenham in Ross'

place for the New Orleans expedition, and to increase his force in the

spring, should the war last till then. Meanwhile, it might be well to

let the Powers assembled at Vienna understand that, whatever the success

in Louisiana, the inhabitants would be distinctly told that in no case

would the country be taken under British protection. They might be

granted independence, but preferably would be urged to place themselves

again under the Spanish Crown; but they must know that, in treating with

the United States, neither of these solutions would be made by Great

Britain a _sine quâ non_. The Government had probably taken a distaste

to that peremptory formula by the unsatisfactory result of the

proposition about the Indians.

This care concerning the effect produced upon the course of events at

Vienna appears forcibly in the letters of Liverpool. After the receipt

of the American commission's refusal to accept the basis of the _uti

possidetis_, he wrote to Castlereagh, October 28, that he feared it

put an end to any hopes of bringing the American war to a conclusion.

The expectation of some favorable change in the aspect of affairs,

however, decided the ministry to gain a little more time before

bringing the negotiation to a close; and the envoys at Ghent were

therefore to be instructed to demand a full _projet_ of all the

American conditions before entering on further discussion. The same

day Liverpool sent a second letter,[511] in which he said distinctly

that, in viewing the European settlement, it was material to consider

that the war with America would probably be of some duration; that

enemies should not be made in other quarters by holding out too long

on the questions of Poland, Naples, and Saxony, for he was

apprehensive that "some of our European allies will not be indisposed

to favor the Americans; and, if the Emperor of Russia should be

desirous of taking up their cause, we are well aware from some of Lord

Walpole's late communications that there is a most powerful party in

Russia to support him. Looking to a continuance of the American war,

our financial state is far from satisfactory. We shall want a loan for

the ensuing year of £27,000,000 or £28,000,000. The American war will

not cost us less than £10,000,000, in addition to our peace

establishment and other expenses. We must expect, therefore, to have

it said that the property tax is continued for the purpose of securing

a better frontier for Canada." Castlereagh himself had already spoken

of the financial conditions as "perfectly without precedent in our

financial history."[512]

The renewal of the European war, avowedly dreaded by Liverpool,[513]

was thought not impossible by Castlereagh and Wellington; while

conditions in France already threatened an explosion, such as

Bonaparte occasioned in the succeeding March. "It is impossible,"

wrote Wellington, "to conceive the distress in which individuals of

all descriptions are. The only remedy is the revival of Bonaparte's

system of war and plunder; and it is evident that cannot be adopted

during the reign of the Bourbons."[514] Neither he nor Castlereagh

doubted the imminence of the danger. "It sounds incredible," wrote the

latter, "that Talleyrand should treat the notion of any agitation at

Paris as wholly unfounded."[515] A plot was believed to exist, which

embraced as one of its features the seizing of the Duke, and holding

him as a hostage. He himself thought it possible, and saw no means in

the French Government's hands adequate to resist. "You already know my

opinion of the danger at Paris.... The event may occur any night, and

if it should occur, I don't think I should be allowed to depart. My

safety depends upon the King's;"[516] but he was characteristically

averse to any step which bore the appearance of precipitate

withdrawal.

While the American negotiators were drawing up the _projet_ which they

had decided to present in response to the British demand, the

combination of circumstances just stated led the British ministry to

resolve on removing Wellington from Paris on some pretext, lest his

services should be lost to them in the emergency now momentarily

dreaded. The urgency for peace with America co-operated to determine

the ostensible reason, which was almost a true one. The American

command was offered to him. "The Duke of Wellington would restore

confidence to the army, place the military operations on a proper

footing, and give us the best chance of peace. I know he is very

anxious for the restoration of peace with America, if it can be made

upon terms at all honorable. It is a material consideration, likewise,

that if we shall be disposed for the sake of peace to give up

something of our just pretensions, we can do this more creditably

through him than through any other person."[517] Liverpool voiced the

conclusions of the Cabinet, and it would be difficult for words to

manifest more forcibly anxiety to escape from a situation. Wellington

himself drew attention to this. "Does it not occur to your lordship

that, by appointing me to go to America at this moment, you give

ground for belief, all over Europe, that your affairs there are in a

much worse situation than they really are? and will not my nomination

at this moment be a triumph to the Americans, and their friends here

and elsewhere?"[518] Conditions were alarming, but the action

resembled panic.

The offer, which was really a request, brought Wellington by a side

wind into the American negotiations, and enabled him to give the

Government the weight of his name and authority in concluding a peace

otherwise than on their "just pretensions." The war, he said, has been

honorable to Great Britain; meaning doubtless that, considering the

huge physical mass and the proximity of the United States, it was well

done to have escaped injury, as it was militarily disgraceful to the

American Government, with such superiority, to have been so impotent.

But, he continued, neither I nor any one else can achieve success, in

the way of conquests, unless you have naval superiority on the lakes.

That was what was needed; "not a general, nor general officers and

troops. Till that superiority is acquired, it is impossible, according

to my notion, to maintain an army in such a situation as to keep the

enemy out of the whole frontier, much less to make any conquest from

the enemy, which, with those superior means, might, with reasonable

hopes of success, be undertaken.... The question is, whether we can

obtain this naval superiority on the lakes. If we cannot, I shall do

you but little good in America; and I shall go there only to prove the

truth of Prevost's defence, and to sign a peace which might as well be

signed now." This endorsed not only Prevost's retreat, but also the

importance of Macdonough's victory. The Duke then added frankly that,

in the state of the war, they had no right to demand any concession of

territory. He brushed contemptuously aside the claim of occupying the

country east of the Penobscot, on the ground of Sherbrooke's few

companies at Castine, ready to retreat at a moment's notice. "If this

reasoning be true, why stipulate for the _uti possidetis_?"[519]

Penned November 9, the day before the American negotiators at Ghent

handed in their requested _projet_, this letter may be regarded as

decisive. November 13, Liverpool replied that the ministry was waiting

anxiously for the American _projet_, ... and, "without entering into

particulars, I can assure you that we shall be disposed to meet your

views upon the points on which the negotiation appears to turn at

present;" the points being the _uti possidetis_, with the several

details of possession put forward by Bathurst. The American paper was in

London before the 18th, when Liverpool wrote to Castlereagh, "I think we

have determined, if all other points can be satisfactorily settled, not

to continue the war for the purpose of obtaining, or securing, any

acquisition of territory. We have been led to this determination by the

consideration of the unsatisfactory state of the negotiations at Vienna,

and by that of the alarming situation of the interior of France." "Under

such circumstances, it has appeared to us desirable to bring the

American war, if possible, to a conclusion."[520] The basis of the

_status quo ante bellum_, sustained all along by the American

commission, was thus definitely accepted, and so stated formally by

Bathurst.[521]

This fundamental agreement having been reached, the negotiations ran

rapidly to a settlement without further serious hitch; a conclusion to

which contributed powerfully the increasing anxiety of the British

ministry over the menacing aspect of the Continent. The American

_projet_,[522] besides the customary formal stipulations as to

procedure for bringing hostilities to a close, consisted of articles

embodying the American positions on the subjects of impressment and

blockade, with claims for indemnity for losses sustained by irregular

captures and seizures during the late hostilities between France and

Great Britain; a provision aimed at the Orders in Council. These

demands, which covered the motives of the war, and may be regarded as

the offensive side of the American negotiation, were pronounced

inadmissible at once by the British, and were immediately abandoned.

Their presentation had been merely formal; the United States

Government, within its own council chamber, had already recognized

that they could not be enforced. The _projet_ included the agreement

previously framed concerning the Indians; who were thus provided for

in the treaty, though excluded from any recognition as parties to it,

or as independent political communities. This was the only demand

which Great Britain can be said fairly to have carried, and it was so

far a reduction from her original requirement as to be unrecognizable.

An American proposition, pledging each of the contracting parties not

again to employ Indians in war, was rejected.

The remaining articles of the _projet_, although entirely suitable to

a treaty of peace, were not essentially connected with the war. The

treaty merely gave a suitable occasion for presenting them. They

provided for fixing, by mixed commissions, the boundary lines between

the British possessions and the United States. These the Treaty of

1783 had stated in terms which had as yet received no proper

topographical determination. From the mouth of the St. Croix River,

and the islands within it and in the adjacent sea, around, north and

west, as far as the head of Lake Superior, the precise course of the

bounding line needed definition by surveyors. These propositions were

agreed to; but when it came to similar provision for settling the

boundary of the new territories acquired by the Louisiana purchase, as

far as the Rocky Mountains, difficulties arose. In the result it was

agreed that the determination of the boundary should be carried as far

as the most northwestern point of the Lake of the Woods, "in

conformity with the true intent of the said Treaty of Peace of one

thousand seven hundred and eighty-three." The treaty was silent on the

subject of boundary westward of the Lake of the Woods, and this

article of the _projet_ was dropped. It differed indeed from its

associates, in providing the settlement for a new question, and not

the definition of an old settlement. In conclusion, the British

commissioners obtained the adoption of an agreement that both parties

"would use their best endeavors to promote the entire abolition of the

slave trade." In Great Britain the agitation for this measure had

reached proportions which were not the least among the embarrassments

of the ministry; and at this critical juncture the practical

politicians conducting affairs found themselves constrained by a

popular demand to press the subject upon the less sympathetic

statesmen of the Cabinet.

The American commissioners had made a good fight, and shown complete

appreciation of the factors working continuously in their behalf. To

the end, and even more evidently at the end, was apparent the

increasing anxiety of the British Government, the reasonable cause for

it in European conditions, and the immense difficulty under such

circumstances of accomplishing any substantial military successes in

America. The Duke of Wellington wrote that "all the American armies

of which I ever read would not beat out of a field of battle the

troops that went from Bordeaux last summer;"[523] but still, "his

opinion is that no military advantage can be expected if the war goes

on, and he would have great reluctance in undertaking the command

unless we made a serious effort first to obtain peace, without

insisting upon keeping any part of our conquests."[524] On December

23, Liverpool sent a long and anxious letter to Castlereagh, in reply

to his late despatches. The fear of a renewal of war on the Continent

is prominent in his consideration, and it was recognized that the size

of the European armaments, combined with the pecuniary burden of

maintaining them, tended of itself to precipitate an outbreak. Should

that occur, France could scarcely fail to be drawn in; and France, if

involved, might direct her efforts towards the Low Countries, "the

only object on the continent which would be regarded as a distinct

British interest of sufficient magnitude to reconcile the country to

war," with its renewed burden of taxation. "We are decidedly and

unanimously of opinion that all your efforts should be directed to the

continuance of peace. There is no mode in which the arrangements in

Poland, Germany, and Italy, can be settled, consistently with the

stipulations of the Treaty of Paris, which is not to be preferred,

under present circumstances, to a renewal of hostilities between the

Continental Powers." Coincidently with this, in another letter of the

same day, he mentions the meetings which have taken place on account

of the property tax, and the spirit which had arisen on the subject.

"This, as well as other considerations, make us most anxious to get

rid of the American war."[525]

The Treaty of Ghent was signed December 24, 1814, by the eight

commissioners. The last article provided for its ratification, without

alteration, at Washington, within four months from the signature. A

_chargé d'affaires_ to the United States was appointed, and directed

to proceed at once in a British ship of war to America, with the

Prince Regent's ratification, to be exchanged against that of the

President; but he was especially instructed that the exchange should

not be made unless the ratification by the United States was without

alteration, addition, or exclusion, in any form whatsoever.

Hostilities were not to cease until such action had taken place. The

British Government were apparently determined that concessions wrung

from them, by considerations foreign to the immediate struggle, should

not be subjected to further modification in the Senate.

Mr. Baker, the British _chargé_, sailed in the British sloop of war

"Favorite," accompanied by Mr. Carroll bearing the despatches of the

American commissioners. The "Favorite" arrived in New York on

Saturday, February 11. The treaty was ratified by the President, as it

stood, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, on the 17th

of February, 1815.

* * * * *

A year after the conclusion of peace, a weighty opinion as to the

effect of the War of 1812 upon the national history was expressed by

one of the commissioners, Mr. Albert Gallatin. For fifteen years past,

no man had been in closer touch with the springs of national life,

national policy, and national action; as representative in Congress,

and as intimate adviser of two consecutive Presidents, in his position

as Secretary of the Treasury. His experience, the perspicuity of his

intellect, and his lucidity of thought and expression, give particular

value to his conclusions; the more so that to some extent they are the

condemnation, regretfully uttered, of a scheme of political conduct

with the main ideas of which he had been closely identified. He wrote:

"The war has been productive of evil and of good, but I think the good

preponderates. Independent of the loss of lives, and of the property

of individuals, the war has laid the foundations of permanent taxes

and military establishments, which the Republicans[526] had deemed

unfavorable to the happiness and free institutions of the country. But

under our former system we were becoming too selfish, too much

attached exclusively to the acquisition of wealth, above all, too much

confined in our political feelings to local and state objects. The war

has renewed and reinstated the national feelings and character which

the Revolution had given, and which were daily lessening. The people

have now more general objects of attachment, with which their pride

and political opinions are connected. They are more Americans; they

feel and act more as a nation; and I hope that the permanency of the

Union is thereby better secured."[527]

Such, even at so early a date, could be seen to be the meaning of the

War of 1812 in the progress of the national history. The people, born

by war to independence, had by war again been transformed from

childhood, absorbed in the visible objects immediately surrounding it,

to youth with its dawning vision and opening enthusiasms. They issued

from the contest, battered by adversity, but through it at last fairly

possessed by the conception of a national unity, which during days of

material prosperity had struggled in vain against the predominance of

immediate interests and local prepossessions. The conflict, indeed,

was not yet over. Two generations of civic strife were still to

signalize the slow and painful growth of the love for "The Union";

that personification of national being, upon which can safely fasten

the instinct of human nature to centre devotion upon a person and a

name. But, through these years of fluctuating affections, the work of

the War of 1812 was continuously felt. Men had been forced out of

themselves. More and more of the people became more Americans; they

felt and acted more as a nation; and when the moment came that the

unity of the state was threatened from within, the passion for the

Union, conceived in 1812, and nurtured silently for years in homes and

hearts, asserted itself. The price to be paid was heavy. Again war

desolated the land; but through war the permanency of the Union was

secured. Since then, relieved from internal weakness, strong now in

the maturity of manhood, and in a common motive, the nation has taken

its place among the Powers of the earth.

FOOTNOTES:

[473] Monroe to Russell, Aug. 21, 1812. American State Papers, Foreign

Relations, vol. iii. p. 587.

[474] Ante, vol. i. p. 390.

[475] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 590.

[476] Correspondence between Russell and Castlereagh, Sept. 12-18, 1812;

and Russell to Monroe, Sept. 17. American State Papers, Foreign

Relations, vol. iii. pp. 591-595.

[477] Russell's italics.

[478] The correspondence relating to the Russian proffer of mediation is

to be found in American State Papers, vol. iii. pp. 623-627.

[479] American State Papers, vol. iii. pp. 621-622.

[480] Ibid., pp. 695-700.

[481] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 701.

[482] Ibid., p. 703.

[483] Ante, p. 266, and note.

[484] Writings of Albert Gallatin, edited by Henry Adams, vol. i. pp.

586, 592.

[485] Ante, p. 332.

[486] Writings of Albert Gallatin, vol. i. p. 603.

[487] Ibid., vol. i. p. 629.

[488] A similar consciousness appears to the writer discernible in a

letter of Wellington to Castlereagh, of May 25, 1814. To procure "the

cession of Olivenza by Spain to Portugal, we could promise to _bind_

North America, by a secret article in our treaty of peace, to give no

encouragement, or _countenance_, or assistance, to the Spanish colonies"

(then in revolt). Memoirs and Correspondence of Lord Castlereagh, series

iii. vol. ii. p. 44. The italics are mine.

[489] Castlereagh to the British commissioners, July 28, 1814.

Castlereagh's Memoirs and Correspondence, series iii. vol. ii. p. 69.

[490] Ibid., Aug. 14, 1814, pp. 88, 89.

[491] Castlereagh to Liverpool, Paris, Aug. 28, 1814. Castlereagh

Memoirs, p. 101.

[492] Note of the British commissioners, Aug. 19, 1814. American State

Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 710. My italics.

[493] Castlereagh to Liverpool, Aug. 28, 1814. Castlereagh Memoirs,

series iii. vol. ii. p. 100.

[494] Liverpool to Castlereagh, Sept. 2, 1814. Castlereagh Papers MSS.

[495] Castlereagh Memoirs, etc., series iii. vol. ii. p. 101.

[496] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. pp. 711-713.

[497] Castlereagh to Liverpool, August 28. Memoirs, etc., series iii.

vol. ii. p. 102.

[498] Liverpool to Castlereagh, September 2, Castlereagh Papers MSS.

[499] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 713.

[500] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 717.

[501] Bathurst to Castlereagh, Sept. 16, 1814. Castlereagh Papers MSS.

[502] Castlereagh Memoirs, series iii. vol. ii. p. 138.

[503] Liverpool to Castlereagh, September 27. Castlereagh Papers MSS.

[504] September 23. Ibid.

[505] Castlereagh Memoirs, series iii. vol. ii. p. 148.

[506] Liverpool to Castlereagh, Sept. 27, 1814. Castlereagh Papers MSS.

[507] Ante, p. 385; and 384, note.

[508] Liverpool to Castlereagh, Oct. 28. Castlereagh Papers MSS.

[509] Liverpool to Castlereagh, Oct. 21, 1814. Ibid.

[510] Bathurst to Castlereagh, Oct. 21, 1814. Castlereagh Papers MSS.

[511] Castlereagh Papers MSS.

[512] Castlereagh to Sir H. Wellesley, Sept. 9, 1814. Memoirs, series

iii. vol. ii. p. 112.

[513] Liverpool to Castlereagh, Nov. 2, 1814. Castlereagh Papers MSS.

[514] Wellington to Liverpool, Nov. 9, 1814. Castlereagh Memoirs, series

iii. vol. ii. p. 187.

[515] Castlereagh to Wellington, Nov. 21, 1814. Castlereagh Memoirs,

series iii. vol. ii. p. 205.

[516] Wellington to Liverpool, Nov. 7 and 9, 1814. Ibid., pp. 186, 190.

[517] Liverpool to Castlereagh, Nov. 4, 1814. Castlereagh MSS.

[518] Wellington to Liverpool, Nov. 18, 1814. Castlereagh Letters,

series iii. vol. ii. p. 203.

[519] Wellington to Liverpool, Nov. 9, 1814. Castlereagh Memoirs, series

iii. vol. ii. p. 189.

[520] Liverpool to Castlereagh, Nov. 18, 1814. Castlereagh MSS.

[521] Bathurst to the commissioners, Dec. 6, 1814. Castlereagh Memoirs,

series iii. vol. ii. p. 214.

[522] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 735.

[523] Castlereagh Memoirs, series iii. vol. ii. p. 188.

[524] Liverpool to Castlereagh, Nov. 18, 1814. Castlereagh MSS.

[525] Ibid., Dec. 23, 1814. Castlereagh MSS.

[526] The contemporary name of the political party to which Jefferson,

Madison, and Gallatin belonged.

[527] Writings of Gallatin, May 7, 1816, vol. i. p. 700.

INDEX

_Actions, Land._

i.:

Detroit, 346;

Queenston, 357;

Niagara, 358;

Frenchtown, 370.

ii.:

York [Toronto], 36, 55;

Fort George, 38;

Sackett's Harbor, 42;

Stony Creek, 46;

Beaver Dam, 47;

Fort Meigs, 68;

Fort Stephenson, 73;

The Thames, 103;

Chrystler's Farm, 115;

Chippewa, 295;

Lundy's Lane, 306;

Fort Erie, 314, 316;

Bladensburg, 346;

Plattsburg, 366;

New Orleans, 394.

_Actions, Naval._

i.:

Elliott's capture of "Caledonia" and "Detroit," 354;

"Constitution" and "Guerrière," 330;

"Frolic" and "Wasp," 412;

"Macedonian" and "United States," 416.

ii.:

"Constitution" and "Java," 3;

"Hornet" and "Peacock," 7;

squadron engagements on Lake Ontario, 1813, August 10, 56;

September 11, 60;

September 28, 107;

battle of Lake Erie, 76;

"Chesapeake" and "Shannon," 135;

"Boxer" and "Enterprise," 188;

"Argus" and "Pelican," 217;

"Essex" with "Phoebe" and "Cherub," 249;

"Wasp" and "Reindeer," 254;

"Wasp" and "Avon," 256;

"Epervier" and "Peacock," 259;

battle of Lake Champlain, 377;

gunboat squadron on Lake Borgne, 389;

"President" with British squadron, 398;

"Constitution" with "Cyane" and "Levant," 405;

"Hornet" and "Penguin," 407.

_Actions, Privateer._

ii.:

"Globe" with British packets, 226;

"Decatur" and "Dominica," 233;

"Comet" and "Hibernia," 234;

"Saucy Jack" and "Pelham," 235;

"Saucy Jack" with "Volcano" and "Golden Fleece," 235;

"Kemp" with seven British merchantmen, 237;

"Chasseur" and "St. Lawrence," 238.

_Acts of Congress._

To protect American shipping, i. 76, 80;

Non-Importation Act, against Great Britain, April, 1806, 113, 131, 183;

Embargo Act, December 22, 1807, 182;

Act for the better Enforcement of the Embargo, January 9, 1809, 208;

partial repeal of Embargo Act--"Non-Intercourse" Act against Great

Britain and France, March 1, 1809, 210, 211, 213, 214;

Act repealing Non-Intercourse Act, with a substitute, May 1, 1810,

234, 235;

supplementary Act, reviving Non-Intercourse against Great Britain

alone, March 2, 1811, 248, 249;

Embargo Act for ninety days, war measure, April 4, 1812, 263;

Declaration of War, June 18, 1812, 279.

_Adams, John._ Minister to Great Britain.

French colonial principles, i. 28;

British interest in navigation, 11, 30 (and note);

public opinion in England, as observed by him, 47, 63, 64, 69, 79;

remonstrates against impressment of American seamen, 119;

President of United States, instructs against impressment, 121;

care for the navy, ii. 213.

_Adams, John Quincy._ Senator from Massachusetts.

Opinions as to Orders in Council, i. 178-181;

opinions on a navy, 186;

Minister to Russia, ii. 411;

commissioner to treat for peace, 412.

"_Adams._" American frigate.

Blockaded in Potomac, ii. 162, 169-170, 174;

escapes, 178;

cruise of, 226, 261;

runs ashore on Isle au Haut, 353;

takes refuge in Penobscot, and destroyed to escape capture, 354.

_Allen, William H._ Commander, U.S.N.

Commands "Argus," ii. 216;

killed in action, 218.

"_America._"

Private armed ship, i. 398; ii. 229.

"_Argus._"

American brig of war, i. 314-415;

captured by "Pelican," ii. 217.

_Armstrong, John._

U.S. Minister to France at the time of the Berlin Decree, i. 172-174,

181, 182, 236-238, 240, 244.

Advice to Eustis, Secretary of War, before the outbreak of

hostilities, 309, 339.

Secretary of War, 31, 33, 39, 45, 104-106, 110-112, 117, 120, 122,

266 (note), 278, 291-293, 319, 343, 344.

"_Avon._" British brig of war.

Sunk by U.S.S. "Reindeer," ii. 256.

_Bainbridge, William._ Captain, U.S.N.

Applies for furlough, because of the condition of the navy, i. 257;

opinion as to employment of navy in war, 318;

mentions public opinion in Boston, 393;

commands squadron, 407;

his plans for the cruise, ii. 2;

captures Java, 4;

instructions to Lawrence for cruise of "Hornet," 7;

returns to the United States, 7;

commands Boston navy yard, 135, 153, 186.

_Barclay, Robert H._ Commander, R.N.

Sent to lakes by Warren, ii. 28;

ordered by Yeo to command on Lake Erie, 29;

difficulty in reaching his command, 39;

operations prior to battle of Lake Erie, 41, 69-74;

battle of Lake Erie, 76;

merits of his conduct, 94.

_Barclay, Thomas._ British Consul-General at New York.

On impressment question, i. 118, 122;

on effects of embargo on seamen, 192.

_Barlow, Joel._

U.S. Minister to France, in succession to Armstrong, i. 176, 193,

264, 271-273.

_Barney, Joshua._ Commodore by courtesy.

Commands privateer "Rossie," i. 395-398;

commands Chesapeake flotilla, ii. 336-344;

gallant conduct of himself and men at Bladensburg, 347, 348.

_Bassano, Duke of._ French Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Presents to the American minister the spurious Decree of April 28,

1811, i. 272.

_Bathurst, Earl._ British Secretary for War and Colonies.

Quoted, ii. 100, 331 (note), 383, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 431.

_Berkeley, George C._ Vice-Admiral, R.N., commanding North American

station.

Issues the order to search the U.S.S. "Chesapeake," i. 156;

recalled from his command in consequence, 167,

but given within a year the important command at Lisbon, 168;

British Government refuses further punishment for his action, 168.

_Biddle, James._ Commander, U.S.N.

Commands "Hornet" when she captures "Penguin," ii. 407.

_Black Rock._

Selected by Elliott as American naval station on Lake Erie, i. 355, 374;

changed by Chauncey, 375;

mentioned in operations, 355, 358, 374, 377; ii. 34, 40, 41, 62, 71, 121.

_Blakely, Johnstone._ Commander, U.S.N.

Commands "Enterprise," ii. 187;

commands "Wasp," 253;

captures "Reindeer," 254;

sinks "Avon," 256;

lost at sea, 257.

_Blockades._

General principle determining legality of, i. 99, 110, 145;

position of United States concerning, defined, 110;

that of May 16, 1806, illustrates difference between United States

and Great Britain, 111;

Napoleon's definition of the right of blockade, 142-144;

Marshall, in 1800, and Pinkney, 1811, incidentally support Napoleon's

view, 146, 147;

effect of this view upon sea power, and upon Great Britain, 147;

effect upon the Civil War of the United States, had it been

conceded, 148;

the Orders in Council of 1807 are admitted by Great Britain to usurp

the privileges of, without complying with the obligations, 177;

though modelled on the general plan of, 179;

distinction between military and commercial, 286;

in essence and effect, a form of commerce destruction, 287;

as such, the weapon of the stronger, 288;

of Chesapeake and Delaware,--commercial,--by British, notified,

December 26, 1812, ii. 9;

extended to coast south of Narragansett Bay, March 30 and November

16, 1813, 10;

to whole United States coast, April and May, 1814, 11;

the last a defiance in form of the United States claim concerning, 11;

effects of the British commercial, upon United States, 177-187, 193-208;

American definition of, rejected as inadmissible at the treaty of

peace, 432.

"_Boxer._" British brig of war.

Captured by "Enterprise," ii. 188.