CHAPTER XVII

LAKE CHAMPLAIN AND NEW ORLEANS

General Brown's retirement within the lines of Fort Erie, July 26,

1814, may be taken as marking the definitive abandonment by the United

States of the offensive on the Canada frontier. The opportunities of

two years had been wasted by inefficiency of force and misdirection of

effort. It was generally recognized by thoughtful men that the war had

now become one of defence against a greatly superior enemy,

disembarrassed of the other foe which had hitherto engaged his

attention, and imbued with ideas of conquest, or at least of extorting

territorial cession for specific purposes. While Brown was

campaigning, the re-enforcements were rapidly arriving which were to

enable the British to assume the aggressive; although, in the absence

of naval preponderance on the lakes, their numbers were not sufficient

to compel the rectification of frontier by surrender of territory

which the British Government now desired. Lord Castlereagh, Secretary

for Foreign Affairs, and the leading representative of the aims of the

Cabinet, wrote in his instructions to the Peace Commissioners, August

14, 1814: "The views of the Government are strictly defensive.

Territory as such is by no means their object; but, as the weaker

Power in North America, Great Britain considers itself entitled to

claim the use of the lakes as a military barrier."[394] The

declaration of war by the United States was regarded by most

Englishmen as a wanton endeavor to overthrow their immemorial right to

the services of their seamen, wherever found; and consequently the

invasion of Canada had been an iniquitous attempt to effect annexation

under cover of an indefensible pretext. To guard against the renewal

of such, the lakes must be made British waters, to which the American

flag should have only commercial access. Dominion south of the lakes

would not be exacted, "provided the American Government will stipulate

not to preserve or construct any fortifications upon or within a

limited distance of their shores." "On the side of Lower Canada there

should be such a line of demarcation as may establish a direct

communication between Quebec and Halifax."[395]

Such were the political and military projects with which the British

ministry entered upon the summer campaign of 1814 in Canada. Luckily,

although Napoleon had fallen, conditions in Europe were still too

unsettled and volcanic to permit Great Britain seriously to weaken her

material force there. Two weeks later Castlereagh wrote to the Prime

Minister: "Are we prepared to continue the war for territorial

arrangements?" "Is it desirable to take the chances of the campaign, and

then be governed by circumstances?"[396] The last sentence defines the

policy actually followed; and the chances went definitely against it

when Macdonough destroyed the British fleet on Lake Champlain. Except at

Baltimore and New Orleans,--mere defensive successes,--nothing but

calamity befell the American arms. To the battle of Lake Champlain it

was owing that the British occupancy of United States soil at the end of

the year was such that the Duke of Wellington advised that no claim for

territorial cession could be considered to exist, and that the basis of

_uti possidetis_, upon which it was proposed to treat, was

untenable.[397] The earnestness of the Government, however, in seeking

the changes specified, is indicated by the proposition seriously made to

the Duke to take the command in America.

Owing to the military conditions hitherto existing on the American

continent, the power to take the offensive throughout the lake

frontier had rested with the United States Government; and the

direction given by this to its efforts had left Lake Champlain

practically out of consideration. Sir George Prevost, being thrown on

the defensive, could only conform to the initiative of his adversary.

For these reasons, whatever transactions took place in this quarter up

to the summer of 1814 were in characteristic simply episodes; an

epithet which applies accurately to the more formidable, but brief,

operations here in 1814, as also to those in Louisiana. Whatever

intention underlay either attempt, they were in matter of fact almost

without any relations of antecedent or consequent. They stood by

themselves, and not only may, but should, be so considered. Prior to

them, contemporary reference to Lake Champlain, or to Louisiana, is

both rare and casual. For this reason, mention of earlier occurrences

in either of these quarters has heretofore been deferred, as

irrelevant and intrusive if introduced among other events, with which

they coincided in time, but had no further connection. A brief

narrative of them will now be presented, as a necessary introduction

to the much more important incidents of 1814.

At the beginning of hostilities the balance of naval power on Lake

Champlain rested with the United States, and so continued until June,

1813. The force on each side was small to triviality, nor did either

make any serious attempt to obtain a marked preponderance. The

Americans had, however, three armed sloops, the "President,"

"Growler," and "Eagle," to which the British could oppose only one.

Both parties had also a few small gunboats and rowing galleys, in the

number of which the superiority lay with the British. Under these

relative conditions the Americans ranged the lake proper at will; the

enemy maintaining his force in the lower narrows, at Isle aux Noix,

which was made a fortified station.

On June 1, 1813, a detachment of British boats, coming up the lake,

passed the boundary line and fired upon some small American craft. The

"Eagle" and "Growler," being then at Plattsburg, started in pursuit on

the 2d, and by dark had entered some distance within the narrows,

where they anchored. The following morning they sighted three of the

enemy's gunboats and chased them with a fair south wind; but, being by

this means led too far, they became entangled in a place where

manoeuvring was difficult. The officers of the royal navy designated

for service on Lake Champlain had not yet arrived, and the flotilla

was at the disposition of the commanding army officer at Isle aux

Noix. Only one sloop being visible at first to the garrison, he sent

out against her the three gunboats; but when the second appeared he

landed a number of men on each bank, who took up a position to rake

the vessels. The action which followed lasted three hours. The

circumstances were disadvantageous to the Americans; but the fair wind

with which they had entered was ahead for return, and to beat back was

impossible in so narrow a channel. The "Eagle" received a raking shot,

and had to be run ashore to avoid sinking. Both then surrendered, and

the "Eagle" was afterwards raised. The two prizes were taken into the

British service; and as this occurrence followed immediately after the

capture of the "Chesapeake" by the "Shannon," they were called "Broke"

and "Shannon." These names afterwards were changed, apparently by

Admiralty order, to "Chub" and "Finch," under which they took part in

the battle of Lake Champlain, where they were recaptured.

Although not built for war, but simply purchased vessels of not over

one hundred tons, this loss was serious; for by it superiority on the

lake passed to the British, and with some fluctuation so remained for

a twelvemonth,--till May, 1814. They were still too deficient in men

to profit at once by their success; the difficulty of recruiting in

Canada being as great as in the United States, and for very similar

reasons. "It is impossible to enlist seamen in Quebec for the lakes,

as merchants are giving twenty-five to thirty guineas for the run to

England. Recruits desert as soon as they receive the bounty."[398]

After some correspondence, Captain Everard, of the sloop of war

"Wasp," then lying at Quebec, consented to leave his ship, go with a

large part of her crew to Champlain, man the captured sloops, and raid

the American stations on the lake. A body of troops being embarked,

the flotilla left Isle aux Noix July 29. On the 30th they came to

Plattsburg, destroyed there the public buildings, with the barracks at

Saranac, and brought off a quantity of stores. A detachment was sent

to Champlain Town, and a landing made also at Swanton in Vermont,

where similar devastation was inflicted on public property. Thence

they went up the lake to Burlington, where Macdonough, who was

alarmingly short of seamen since the capture of the "Eagle" and

"Growler," had to submit to seeing himself defied by vessels lately

his own. After seizing a few more small lake craft, Everard on August

3 hastened back, anxious to regain his own ship and resume the regular

duties, for abandoning which he had no authority save his own. The

step he had taken was hardly to be anticipated from a junior officer,

commanding a ship on sea service so remote from the scene of the

proposed operation; and the rapidity of his action took the Americans

quite by surprise, for there had been no previous indication of

activity. As soon as Macdonough heard of his arrival at Isle aux Noix,

he wrote for re-enforcements, but it was too late. His letter did not

reach New York till the British had come and gone.[399]

Upon Everard's return both he and Captain Pring, of the royal navy,

who had been with him during the foray and thenceforth remained

attached to the fortunes of the Champlain flotilla, recommended the

building of a large brig of war and two gunboats, in order to preserve

upon the lake the supremacy they had just asserted in act. With the

material at hand, they said, these vessels could all be afloat within

eight weeks after their keels were laid.[400] This suggestion appears

to have been acted upon; for in the following March it was reported

that there were building at St. John's a brig to carry twenty guns, a

schooner of eighteen, and twelve 2-gun galleys. However, the Americans

also were by this time building, and at the crucial moment came out a

very little ahead in point of readiness.

Nothing further of consequence occurred during 1813. After the British

departed, Macdonough received a re-enforcement of men. He then went in

person with such vessels as he had to the foot of the lake, taking

station at Plattsburg, and advancing at times to the boundary line,

twenty-five miles below. The enemy occasionally showed themselves, but

were apparently indisposed to action in their then state of

forwardness. Later the American flotilla retired up the lake to Otter

Creek in Vermont, where, on April 11, 1814, was launched the ship

"Saratoga," which carried Macdonough's pendant in the battle five

months afterwards. On May 10, Pring, hoping to destroy the American

vessels before ready for service, made another inroad with his

squadron, consisting now of the new brig, called the "Linnet," five

armed sloops, and thirteen galleys. On the 14th he was off Otter Creek

and attacked; but batteries established on shore compelled him to

retire. Macdonough in his report of this transaction mentions only

eight galleys, with a bomb vessel, as the number of the enemy engaged.

The new brig was probably considered too essential to naval control to

be risked against shore guns; a decision scarcely to be contested,

although Prevost seems to have been dissatisfied as usual with the

exertions of the navy. The American force at this time completed, or

approaching completion, was, besides the "Saratoga," one schooner,

three sloops,[401] and ten gunboats or galleys. Of the sloops one

only, the "Preble," appears to have been serviceable. The "President"

and another called the "Montgomery" were not in the fight at

Plattsburg; where Macdonough certainly needed every gun he could

command. A brig of twenty guns, called the "Eagle," was subsequently

laid down and launched in time for the action. Prevost reported at

this period that a new ship was building at Isle aux Noix, which would

make the British force equal to the American.

[Illustration: CAPTAIN THOMAS MACDONOUGH.

_From the painting by Gilbert Stuart in the Century Club, New

York, by permission of Rodney Macdonough, Esq._]

Before the end of May, 1814, Macdonough's fleet was ready, except the

"Eagle"; and on the 29th he was off Plattsburg, with the "Saratoga,"

the schooner "Ticonderoga," the sloop "Preble," and ten galleys. The

command of the lake thus established permitted the transfer of troops

and stores, before locked up in Burlington. The "Saratoga" carried

twenty-six guns; of which eight were long 24-pounders, the others

carronades, six 42-pounders, and twelve 32's. She was so much superior

to the "Linnet," which had only sixteen guns, long 12-pounders, that

the incontestable supremacy remained with the Americans, and it was

impossible for the British squadron to show itself at all until their

new ship was completed. She was launched August 25,[402] and called

the "Confiance."[403] The name excited some derision after her defeat

and capture, but seems to have had no more arrogant origin than the

affectionate recollection of the Commander-in-Chief on the lakes, Sir

James Yeo, for the vessel which he had first and long commanded, to

which he had been promoted for distinguished gallantry in winning her,

and in which he finally reached post-rank. The new "Confiance," from

which doubtless much was hoped, was her namesake. She was to carry

twenty-seven 24-pounders. One of these, being on a pivot, fought on

either side of the ship; thus giving her fourteen of these guns for

each broadside. In addition, she had ten carronades, four of them

32-pounders, and six 24's.

On July 12, 1814, Prevost had reported the arrival at Montreal of the

first of four brigades from Wellington's Peninsular Army. These had

sailed from Bordeaux at the same period as the one destined for the

Atlantic coast operations, under General Ross, already related. He

acknowledged also the receipt of instructions, prescribing the

character of his operations, which he had anxiously requested the year

before. Among these instructions were "to give immediate protection to

his Majesty's possessions in America," by "the entire destruction of

Sackett's Harbor, and of the naval establishments on Lake Erie and

Lake Champlain."[404] They will be obeyed, he wrote, as soon as the

whole force shall have arrived; but defensive measures only will be

practicable, until the complete command of Lakes Ontario and

Champlain shall be obtained, which cannot be expected before

September.[405] The statement was perfectly correct. The command of

these lakes was absolutely essential to both parties to the war, if

intending to maintain operations in their neighborhood.

On August 14, Prevost reported home that the troops from Bordeaux had

all arrived, and, with the exception of a brigade destined for

Kingston, would be at their points of formation by the 25th; at which

date his returns show that he had under his general command, in Upper

and Lower Canada, exclusive of officers, twenty-nine thousand four

hundred and thirty-seven men. All these were British regulars, with

the exception of four thousand seven hundred and six; of which last,

two thousand two hundred belonged to "foreign" regiments, and the

remainder to provincial corps. Of this total, from eleven thousand to

fourteen thousand accompanied him in his march to Plattsburg. Under

the same date he reported that the "Confiance" could not be ready

before September 15; for which time had he patiently waited, he would

at least have better deserved success. His decision as to his line of

advance was determined by a singular consideration, deeply mortifying

to American recollection, but which must be mentioned because of its

historical interest, as an incidental indication of the slow progress

of the people of the United States towards national sentiment.

"Vermont has shown a disinclination to the war, and, as it is sending

in specie and provisions, I will confine offensive operations to the

west side of Lake Champlain."[406] Three weeks later he writes again,

"Two thirds of the army are supplied with beef by American

contractors, principally of Vermont and New York."[407]

That this was no slander was indignantly confirmed by a citizen of

Vermont, who wrote to General Izard, June 27, "Droves of cattle are

continually passing from the northern parts of this state into Canada

for the British." Izard, in forwarding the letter, said: "This

confirms a fact not only disgraceful to our countrymen but seriously

detrimental to the public interest. From the St. Lawrence to the ocean

an open disregard prevails for the laws prohibiting intercourse with

the enemy. The road to St. Regis [New York] is covered with droves of

cattle, and the river with rafts destined for the enemy. On the

eastern side of Lake Champlain the high roads are insufficient for the

cattle pouring into Canada. Like herds of buffaloes they press through

the forests, making paths for themselves. Were it not for these

supplies, the British forces in Canada would soon be suffering from

famine."[408] The British commissary at Prescott wrote, June 19, 1814,

"I have contracted with a Yankee magistrate to furnish this post with

fresh beef. A major came with him to make the agreement; but, as he

was foreman of the grand jury of the court in which the Government

prosecutes the magistrates for high treason and smuggling, he turned

his back and would not see the paper signed."[409] More vital still in

its treason to the interests of the country, Commodore Macdonough

reported officially, June 29, that one of his officers had seized two

spars, supposed from their size to be for the fore and mizzen masts of

the "Confiance," on the way to Canada, near the lines, under the

management of citizens of the United States; and eight days later

there were intercepted four others, which from their dimensions were

fitted for her mainmast and three topmasts.[410] By this means the

British ship was to be enabled to sail for the attack on the American

fleet, and by this only; for to drag spars of that weight up the

rapids of the Richelieu, or over the rough intervening country, meant

at least unendurable delay. "The turpitude of many of our citizens in

this part of the country," wrote Macdonough, "furnishes the enemy with

every information he wants."[411]

On August 29, four days after Prevost's divisions were expected to be

assembled at their designated rendezvous, Izard, in the face of the

storm gathering before him, started with his four thousand men from

Plattsburg for Sackett's Harbor, in obedience to the intimation of the

War Department, which he accepted as orders. Brigadier-General Macomb

was left to hold the works about Plattsburg with a force which he

stated did not exceed fifteen hundred effectives.[412] His own brigade

having been broken up to strengthen Izard's division, none of this

force was organized, except four companies of one regiment. The

remainder were convalescents, or recruits of new regiments; soldiers

as yet only in name, and without the constituted regimental framework,

incorporation into which so much facilitates the transition from the

recruit to the veteran. On September 4 seven hundred militia from the

neighborhood joined, in response to a call from Macomb; and before the

final action of the 11th other militia from New York, and volunteers

from Vermont, across the lake, kept pouring in from all quarters, in

encouraging contrast to their fellow citizens who were making money by

abetting the enemy.

Prevost's army, which had been assembled along the frontier of Lower

Canada, from the Richelieu River to the St. Lawrence, began its

forward march August 31; the leading brigade entering the State of

New York, and encamping that night at Champlain Town, a short distance

south of the boundary. By September 4 the whole body had reached to

the village of Chazy, twenty-five miles from Plattsburg. Thus far, to

the mouth of the Little Chazy River, where the supplies of the army

were to be landed, no opposition was experienced. The American

squadron waiting on the defensive at Plattsburg, the left flank of the

British received constant support from their flotilla of gunboats and

galleys under the command of Captain Pring, who seized also the

American Island La Motte, in the narrows of the lake, abreast the

Little Chazy. The following day, September 5, delays began to be met

through the trees felled and bridges broken by Macomb's orders. On the

6th there was some skirmishing between the advanced guards; but the

American militia "could not be prevailed on to stand, notwithstanding

the exertions of their officers, although the fields were divided by

strong stone walls, and they were told that the enemy could not

possibly cut them off."[413] Deprived of this support, the small body

of regulars could do little, and the British Peninsulars pushed on

contemptuously, and almost silently. "They never deployed in their

whole march," reported Macomb, "always pressing on in column." That

evening they entered Plattsburg. Macomb retreated across the Saranac,

which divided the town. He removed from the bridges their planking,

which was used to form breastworks to dispute any attempt to force a

passage, and then retired to the works previously prepared by Izard.

These were on the bluffs on the south side of the Saranac, overlooking

the bay, and covering the peninsula embraced between the lake and the

river.

From the 7th to the 11th, the day of the battle, the British were

employed in preparations for battering the forts, preliminary to an

assault, and there was constant skirmishing at the bridges and fords.

Macomb utilized the same time to strengthen his works, aided by the

numbers of militia continually arriving, who labored night and day

with great spirit. Prevost's purposes and actions were dominated by

the urgency of haste, owing to the lateness of the season; and this

motive co-operated with a certain captiousness of temper to

precipitate him now into a grave error of judgment and of conduct. At

Plattsburg he found the small American army intrenched behind a

fordable river, the bridges of which had been made useless; and in the

bay lay the American squadron, anchored with a view to defence. The

two were not strictly in co-operation, in their present position.

Tactically, they for the moment contributed little to each other's

support; for the reason that the position chosen judiciously by

Macdonough for the defence of the bay was too far from the works of

the army to receive--or to give--assistance with the guns of that day.

The squadron was a little over a mile from the army. It could not

remain there, if the British got possession of the works, for it would

be within range of injury at long shot; but in an engagement between

the hostile fleets the bluffs could have no share, no matter which

party held them, for the fire would be as dangerous to friend as to

foe.

The question of probability, that the American squadron was within

long gunshot of the shore batteries, is crucial, for upon it would

depend the ultimate military judgment upon the management of Sir

George Prevost. That he felt this is evident by letters addressed on

his behalf to Macdonough; by A.W. Cochran, a lawyer of Quebec, to whom

Prevost, after his recall to England for trial, left the charge of

collecting testimony, and by Cadwalader Colden of New York.[414] Both

inquire specifically as to this distance, Colden particularizing that

"it would be all important to learn that the American squadron were

during the engagement beyond the effectual range of the batteries." To

Colden, Macdonough replied guardedly, "It is my opinion that our

squadron was anchored one mile and a half from the batteries." The

answer to Cochran has not been found; but on the back of the letter

from him the Commodore sketched his recollection of the situation,

which is here reproduced. Without insisting unduly on the precision of

such a piece, it seems clear that he thought his squadron but little

more than half way towards the other side of the bay. Cumberland Head

being by survey two miles from the batteries, it would follow that the

vessels were a little over a mile from them. This inference is adopted

as more dependable than the estimate, "a mile and a half." Such eye

reckoning is notoriously uncertain; and this seemingly was made by

recollection, not contemporaneously.[415]

The 24- and 32-pounder long gun of that day ranged a sea mile and a

half, with an elevation of less than fifteen degrees.[416] They could

therefore annoy a squadron at or within that distance. The question

is not of best fighting range. It is whether a number of light built

and light draught vessels could hold their ground under such a

cannonade, knowing that a hostile squadron awaited them without. Even

at such random range, a disabling shot in hull or spars must be

expected. At whatever risk, departure is enforced.

[Illustration: Tracing from pencil sketch of Battle of L.

Champlain, made by Com. Macdonough on back of a letter of

inquiry, addressed to him within a year of the action.

The names are not in the sketch; but with the letters, express

the author's understanding of the Commodore's meaning.]

To a similar letter from Colden, General Macomb replied that he did

not think the squadron within range. There is also a statement in

Niles' Register[417] that several British officers visited Macomb at

Plattsburg, and at their request experiments were made, presumably

trial shots, to ascertain whether the guns of the forts could have

annoyed the American squadron. It was found they could not. Macomb's

opinion may have rested upon this, and the conclusion may be just; but

it is open to remark that, as the squadron was not then there, its

assumed position depended upon memory,--like Macdonough's sketch.

Macomb said further, that "a fruitless attempt was made during the

action to elevate the guns so as to bear on the enemy; but none were

fired, all being convinced that the vessels were beyond their reach."

The worth of this conviction is shown by the next remark, which he

repeated under date of August 1, 1815.[418] "This opinion was

strengthened by observations on the actual range of the guns of the

'Confiance'--her heaviest metal [24-pounders] falling upwards of five

hundred yards short of the shore." The "Confiance" was five hundred

yards further off than the American squadron, and to reach it her guns

would be elevated for that distance only. Because under such condition

they dropped their shot five hundred yards short of three thousand

five hundred yards, it is scarcely legitimate to infer that guns

elevated for three thousand could not carry so far.

The arguments having been stated, it is to be remarked that, whatever

the truth, it is knowledge after the fact as far as Prevost was

concerned. In his report dated September 11, 1814, the day of the

action, he speaks of the difficulties which had been before him; among

them "blockhouses armed with _heavy_ ordnance." This he then believed;

and whether this ordnance could reach the squadron he could only know

by trying. It was urgently proper, in view of his large land force,

and of the expectations of his Government, which had made such great

exertions for an attainable and important object, that he should storm

the works and try. After a careful estimate of the strength of the two

squadrons, I think that a seaman would certainly say that in the open

the British was superior; but decidedly inferior for an attack upon

the American at anchor. This was the opinion of the surviving British

officers, under oath, and of Downie. General Izard, who had been in

command at Plattsburg up to a fortnight before the attack, wrote

afterwards to the Secretary of War, "I may venture to assert that

without the works, Fort Moreau and its dependencies, Captain

Macdonough would not have ventured to await the enemy's attack in

Plattsburg Bay, but would have retired to the upper part of Lake

Champlain."[419] The whole campaign turning upon naval control, the

situation was eminently one that called upon the army to drive the

enemy from his anchorage. The judgment of the author endorses the

words of Sir James Yeo: "There was not the least necessity for our

squadron giving the enemy such decided advantages by going into their

bay to engage them. Even had they been successful, it could not in the

least have assisted the troops in storming the batteries; whereas,

had our troops taken their batteries first, it would have obliged the

enemy's squadron to quit the bay and given ours a fair chance."[420]

At the Court Martial two witnesses, Lieutenant Drew of the "Linnet,"

and Brydone, master of the "Confiance," swore that after the action

Macdonough removed his squadron to Crab Island, out of range of the

batteries. Macdonough in his report does not mention this; nor was it

necessary that he should.

In short, though apparently so near, the two fractions of the American

force, the army and the navy, were actually in the dangerous military

condition of being exposed to be beaten in detail; and the destruction

of either would probably be fatal to the other. The largest two

British vessels, "Confiance" and "Linnet," were slightly inferior to

the American "Saratoga" and "Eagle" in aggregate weight of broadside;

but, like the "General Pike" on Ontario in 1813, the superiority of

the "Confiance" in long guns, and under one captain, would on the open

lake have made her practically equal to cope with the whole American

squadron, and still more with the "Saratoga" alone, assuming that the

"Linnet" gave the "Eagle" some occupation.

It would seem clear, therefore, that the true combination for the

British general would have been to use his military superiority, vast

in quality as in numbers, to reduce the works and garrison at

Plattsburg. That accomplished, the squadron would be driven to the

open lake, where the "Confiance" could bring into play her real

superiority, instead of being compelled to sacrifice it by attacking

vessels in a carefully chosen position, ranged with a seaman's eye for

defence, and prepared with a seaman's foresight for every contingency.

Prevost, however, became possessed with the idea that a joint attack

was indispensable,[421] and in communicating his purpose to the

commander of the squadron, Captain Downie, he used language

indefensible in itself, tending to goad a sensitive man into action

contrary to his better judgment; and he clenched this injudicious

proceeding with words which certainly implied an assurance of assault

by the army on the works, simultaneous with that of the navy on the

squadron.

Captain Downie had taken command of the Champlain fleet only on

September 2. He was next in rank to Yeo on the lakes, a circumstance

that warranted his orders; the immediate reason for which, however, as

explained by Yeo to the Admiralty, was that his predecessor's temper

had shown him unfit for chief command. He had quarrelled with Pring,

and Yeo felt the change essential. Downie, upon arrival, found the

"Confiance" in a very incomplete state, for which he at least was in

no wise responsible. He had brought with him a first lieutenant in

whom he had merited confidence, and the two worked diligently to get

her into shape. The crew had been assembled hurriedly by draughts from

several ships at Quebec, from the 39th regiment, and from the marine

artillery. The last detachment came on board the night but one before

the battle. They thus were unknown by face to their officers, and

largely to one another. Launched August 25, the ship hauled from the

wharf into the stream September 7, and the same day started for the

front, being towed by boats against a head wind and downward current.

Behind her dragged a batteau carrying her powder, while her magazine

was being finished.

The next day a similar painful advance was made, and the crew then

were stationed at the guns, while the mechanics labored at their

fittings. That night she anchored off Chazy, where the whole squadron

was now gathered. The 9th was spent at anchor, exercising the guns;

the mechanics still at work. In fact, the hammering and driving

continued until two hours before the ship came under fire, when the

last gang shoved off, leaving her still unfinished. "This day"--the

9th--wrote the first lieutenant, Robertson, "employed setting-up

rigging, scraping decks, manning and arranging the gunboats. Exercised

at great guns. Artificers employed fitting beds, coins, belaying pins,

etc;"[422]--essentials for fighting the guns and working the sails. It

scarcely needs the habit of a naval seaman to recognize that even

three or four days' grace for preparation would immensely increase

efficiency. Nevertheless, such was the pressure from without that the

order was given for the squadron to go into action next day; and this

was prevented only by a strong head wind, against which there was not

channel space to beat.

As long as Prevost was contending with the difficulties of his own

advance he seems not to have worried Downie; but as soon as fairly

before the works of Plattsburg he initiated a correspondence, which on

his part became increasingly peremptory. It will be remembered that he

not only was much the senior in rank,--as in years,--but also

Governor-General of Canada. Nor should it be forgotten that he had

known and written a month before that the "Confiance" could not be

ready before September 15. He knew, as his subsequent action showed,

that if the British fleet were disabled his own progress was hopeless;

and, if he could not understand that to a ship so lately afloat a day

was worth a week of ordinary conditions, he should at least have

realized that the naval captain could judge better than he when she

was ready for battle. On September 7 he wrote to urge Downie, who

replied the same day with assurances of every exertion to hasten

matters. The 8th he sent information of Macdonough's arrangements by

an aid, who carried also a letter saying that "it is of the highest

importance that the ships, vessels, and gunboats, under your command,

should combine a co-operation with the division of the army under my

command. I only wait for your arrival to proceed against General

Macomb's last position on the south bank of the Saranac." On the 9th

he wrote, "In consequence of your communication of yesterday I have

postponed action until your squadron is prepared to co-operate. I need

not dwell with you on the evils resulting to both services from

delay." He inclosed reports received from deserters that the American

fleet was insufficiently manned; and that when the "Eagle" arrived, a

few days before, they had swept the guard houses of prisoners to

complete her crew. A postscript conveyed a scarcely veiled intimation

that an eye was kept on his proceedings. "Captain Watson of the

provincial cavalry is directed to remain at Little Chazy until you are

preparing to get underway, when he is instructed to return to this

place with the intelligence."[423]

Thus pressed, Downie, as has been said, gave orders to sail at

midnight, with the expectation of rounding into Plattsburg Bay about

dawn, and proceeding to an immediate attack. This purpose was

communicated formally to Prevost. The preventing cause, the head wind,

was obvious enough, and spoke for itself; but the check drew from

Prevost words which stung Downie to the quick. "In consequence of your

letter the troops have been held in readiness, since six o'clock this

morning, to storm the enemy's works at nearly the same moment as the

naval action begins in the bay. I ascribe the disappointment I have

experienced to the unfortunate change of wind, and shall rejoice to

learn that my reasonable expectations have been frustrated by no other

cause." The letter was sent by the aid, Major Coore, who had carried

the others; and both he and Pring, who were present, testified to the

effect upon Downie. Coore, in a vindication of Prevost, wrote, "After

perusing it, Captain Downie said with some warmth, 'I am surprised Sir

George Prevost should think necessary to urge me upon this subject. He

must feel I am as desirous of proceeding to active operations as he

can be; but I am responsible for the squadron, and no man shall make

me lead it into action before I consider it in fit condition.'"[424]

Nevertheless, the effect was produced; for he remarked afterward to

Pring, "This letter does not deserve an answer, but I will convince

him that the naval force will not be backward in their share of the

attack."[425]

It was arranged that the approach of the squadron should be signalled

by scaling the guns,--firing cartridges without shot; and Downie

certainty understood, and informed his officers generally, that the

army would assault in co-operation with the attack of the fleet. The

precise nature of his expectation was clearly conveyed to Pring, who

had represented the gravity of this undertaking. "When the batteries

are stormed and taken possession of by the British land forces, which

the commander of the land forces has promised to do at the moment the

naval action commences, the enemy will be obliged to quit their

position, whereby we shall obtain decided advantage over them during

their confusion. I would otherwise prefer fighting them on the lake,

and would wait until our force is in an efficient state; but I fear

they would take shelter up the lake and would not meet me on equal

terms."[426] The following morning, September 11, the wind being fair

from northeast, the British fleet weighed before daylight and stood up

the narrows for the open lake and Plattsburg Bay. About five o'clock

the agreed signal was given by scaling the guns, the reports of which

it was presumed must certainly be heard by the army at the then

distance of six or seven miles, with the favorable air blowing. At

7.30, near Cumberland Head, the squadron hove-to, and Captain Downie

went ahead in a boat to reconnoitre the American position.

For defence against the hostile squadron, Macdonough had had to rely

solely on his own force, and its wise disposition by him. On shore, a

defensive position is determined by the circumstances of the ground

selected, improved by fortification; all which gives strength

additional to the number of men. A sailing squadron anchored for

defence similarly gained force by adapting its formation to the

circumstances of the anchorage, and to known wind conditions, with

careful preparations to turn the guns in any direction; deliberate

precautions, not possible to the same extent to the assailant

anchoring under fire. To this is to be added the release of the crew

from working sails to manning the guns.

Plattsburg Bay, in which the United States squadron was anchored, is

two miles wide, and two long. It lies north and south, open to the

southward. Its eastern boundary is called Cumberland Head. The British

vessels, starting from below, in a channel too narrow to beat, must

come up with a north wind. To insure that this should be ahead, or

bring them close on the wind, after rounding the Head,--a condition

unfavorable for attack,--Macdonough fixed the head of his line as far

north as was safe; having in mind that the enemy might bring guns to

the shore north of the Saranac. His order thence extended southward,

abreast of the American works, and somewhat nearer the Cumberland than

the Plattsburg side. The wind conditions further made it expedient to

put the strongest vessels to the northward,--to windward,--whence they

would best be able to manoeuvre as circumstances might require. The

order from north to south therefore was: the brig "Eagle," twenty

guns; the ship "Saratoga," twenty-six; the "Ticonderoga" schooner,

seven, and the sloop "Preble," seven.

Macdonough's dispositions being perfectly under observation, Captain

Downie framed his plan accordingly.[427] The "Confiance" should engage

the "Saratoga;" but, before doing so, would pass along the "Eagle,"

from north to south, give her a broadside, and then anchor head and

stern across the bows of the "Saratoga." After this, the "Linnet,"

supported by the "Chub," would become the opponent of the "Eagle,"

reduced more nearly to equality by the punishment already received.

Three British vessels would thus grapple the two strongest enemies.

The "Finch" was to attack the American rear, supported by all the

British gunboats--eleven in number. There were American gunboats, or

galleys, as well, which Macdonough distributed in groups, inshore of

his order; but, as was almost invariably the case, these light vessels

exerted no influence on the result.

This being the plan, when the wind came northeast on the morning of

September 11, the British stood up the lake in column, as follows:

"Finch," "Confiance," "Linnet," "Chub." Thus, when they rounded

Cumberland Head, and simultaneously changed course towards the

American line, they would be properly disposed to reach the several

places assigned. As the vessels came round the Head, to Downie's

dismay no co-operation by the army was visible. He was fairly

committed to his movement, however, and could only persist. As the

initial act was to be the attack upon the "Eagle" by the "Confiance,"

she led in advance of her consorts, which caused a concentration of

the hostile guns upon her; the result being that she was unable to

carry out her part. The wind also failed, and she eventually anchored

five hundred yards from the American line. Her first broadside is said

to have struck down forty, or one fifth of the "Saratoga's" crew. As

in the case of the "Chesapeake," this shows men of naval training,

accustomed to guns; but, as with the "Chesapeake," lack of

organization, of the habit of working together, officers and men, was

to tell ere the end. Fifteen minutes after the action began Captain

Downie was killed, leaving in command Lieutenant Robertson.

[Illustration: BATTLE OF LAKE CHAMPLAIN]

The "Linnet" reached her berth and engaged the "Eagle" closely; but

the "Chub," which was to support her, received much damage to her

sails and rigging, and the lieutenant in charge was nervously

prostrated by a not very severe wound. Instead of anchoring, she was

permitted to drift helplessly, and so passed through the American

order, where she hauled down her colors. Though thus disappointed of

the assistance intended for her, the "Linnet" continued to fight

manfully and successfully, her opponent finally quitting the line; a

result to which the forward battery of the "Confiance" in large

measure contributed.[428] The "Finch," by an error of judgment on the

part of her commander, did not keep near enough to the wind. She

therefore failed to reach her position, near the "Ticonderoga;" and

the breeze afterwards falling, she could not retrieve her error.

Ultimately, she went ashore on Crab Island, a mile to the southward.

This remoteness enabled her to keep her flag flying till her consorts

had surrendered; but the credit of being last to strike belongs really

to the "Linnet," Captain Pring. By the failure of the "Finch," the

"Ticonderoga" underwent no attack except by the British gunboats.

Whatever might possibly have come of this was frustrated by the

misbehavior of most of them. Four fought with great gallantry and

persistence, eliciting much admiration from their opponents; but the

remainder kept at distance, the commander of the whole actually

running away, and absconding afterwards to avoid trial. The

"Ticonderoga" maintained her position to the end; but the weak

"Preble" was forced from her anchors, and ran ashore under the

Plattsburg batteries.

The fight thus resolved itself into a contest between the "Saratoga"

and "Eagle," on one side, the "Confiance" and "Linnet" on the other.

The wind being north-northeast, the ships at their anchors headed so

that the forward third of the "Confiance's" battery bore upon the

"Eagle," and only the remaining two thirds upon the "Saratoga." This

much equalized conditions all round. It was nine o'clock when she

anchored. At 10.30 the "Eagle," having many of her guns on the engaged

side disabled, cut her cable, ran down the line, and placed herself

south of the "Saratoga," anchoring by the stern. This had the effect

of turning towards the enemy her other side, the guns of which were

still uninjured. "In this new position," wrote Lieutenant Robertson,

"she kept up a destructive fire on the "Confiance," without being

exposed to a shot from that ship or the "Linnet." On the other hand,

Macdonough found the "Saratoga" suffer from the "Linnet," now relieved

of her immediate opponent."[429]

By this time the fire of both the "Saratoga" and "Confiance" had

materially slackened, owing to the havoc among guns and men. Nearly

the whole battery on the starboard side of the United States ship was

dismounted, or otherwise unserviceable. The only resource was to

bring the uninjured side towards the enemy, as the "Eagle" had just

done; but to use the same method, getting under way, would be to

abandon the fight, for there was not astern another position of

usefulness for the "Saratoga." There was nothing for it but to

"wind"[430] the ship--turn her round where she was. Then appeared the

advantage attendant upon the defensive, if deliberately utilized. The

"Confiance" standing in had had shot away, one after another, the

anchors and ropes upon which she depended for such a manoeuvre.[431]

The "Saratoga's" resources were unimpaired. A stern anchor was let go,

the bow cable cut, and the ship winded, either by force of the wind,

or by the use of "springs"[432] before prepared, presenting to the

"Confiance" her uninjured broadside--for fighting purposes a new

vessel. The British ship, having now but four guns that could be used

on the side engaged,[433] must do the like, or be hopelessly

overmatched. The stern anchor prepared having been shot away, an

effort was made to swing her by a new spring on the bow cable; but

while this slow process was carrying on, and the ship so far turned as

to be at right angles with the American line, a raking shot entered,

killing and wounding several of the crew. Then, reported Lieutenant

Robertson, the surviving officer in command, "the ship's company

declared they would stand no longer to their quarters, nor could the

officers with their utmost exertions rally them." The vessel was in a

sinking condition, kept afloat by giving her a marked heel to

starboard, by running in the guns on the port side, so as to bring the

shot holes out of water.[434] The wounded on the deck below had to be

continually moved, lest they should be drowned where they lay. She

drew but eight and a half feet of water. Her colors were struck at

about 11 A.M.; the "Linnet's" fifteen minutes later. By Macdonough's

report, the action had lasted two hours and twenty minutes, without

intermission.

[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF LAKE CHAMPLAIN.

_Drawn by Henry Reuterdahl._]

Few combats have been more resolutely contested. The "Saratoga" had

fifty-five round shot in her hull; the "Confiance," one hundred and

five.[435] Of the American crew of two hundred and ten men,

twenty-eight were killed and twenty-nine wounded. The British loss is

not known exactly. Robertson reported that there were thirty-eight

bodies sent ashore for interment, besides those thrown overboard in

action. This points to a loss of about fifty killed, and James states

the wounded at about sixty; the total was certainly more than one

hundred in a ship's company of two hundred and seventy.

There was reason for obstinacy, additional to the natural resolution

of the parties engaged. The battle of Lake Champlain, more nearly than

any other incident of the War of 1812, merits the epithet "decisive."

The moment the issue was known, Prevost retreated into Canada;

entirely properly, as indicated by the Duke of Wellington's words

before and after. His previous conduct was open to censure, for he had

used towards Captain Downie urgency of pressure which induced that

officer to engage prematurely; "goaded" into action, as Yeo wrote.

Before the usual naval Court Martial, the officers sworn testified

that Downie had been led to expect co-operation, which in their

judgment would have reversed the issue; but that no proper assault was

made. Charges were preferred, and Prevost was summoned home; but he

died before trial. There remains therefore no sworn testimony on his

side, nor was there any adequate cross-examination of the naval

witnesses. In the judgment of the writer, it was incumbent upon

Prevost to assault the works when Downie was known to be approaching,

with a fair wind, in the hope of driving the American squadron from

its anchors to the open lake, where the real superiority of the

British could assert itself.[436]

Castlereagh's "chances of the campaign" had gone so decidedly against

the British that no ground was left to claim territorial adjustments.

To effect these the war must be continued; and for this Great Britain

was not prepared, nor could she afford the necessary detachment of

force. In the completeness of Napoleon's downfall, we now are prone to

forget that remaining political conditions in Europe still required

all the Great Powers to keep their arms at hand.

* * * * *

The war was practically ended by Prevost's retreat. What remained was

purely episodical in character, and should be so regarded.

Nevertheless, although without effect upon the issue, and indeed in

great part transacted after peace had been actually signed, it is so

directly consecutive with the war as to require united treatment.

Very soon after reaching Bermuda, Vice-Admiral Cochrane, in pursuance

of the "confidential communications with which he was charged," the

character of which, he intimated to Warren,[437] was a reason for

expediting the transfer of the command, despatched the frigate

"Orpheus" to the Appalachicola River to negotiate with the Creek and

other Indians. The object was to rouse and arm "our Indian allies in

the Southern States," and to arrange with them a system of training by

British officers, and a general plan of action; by which, "supporting

the Indian tribes situated on the confines of Florida, and in the back

parts of Georgia, it would be easy to reduce New Orleans, and to

distress the enemy very seriously in the neighboring provinces."[438]

The "Orpheus" arrived at the mouth of the Appalachicola May 10, 1814,

and on the 20th her captain, Pigot, had an interview with the

principal Creek chiefs. He found[439] that the feeling of their people

was very strong against the Americans; and from the best attainable

information he estimated that twenty-eight hundred warriors were ready

to take up arms with the British. There were said to be as many more

Choctaws thus disposed; and perhaps a thousand other Indians, then

dispersed and unarmed, could be collected. The negroes of Georgia

would probably also come over in crowds, once the movement started.

With a suitable number of British subalterns and drill sergeants, the

savages could be fitted to act in concert with British troops in eight

or ten weeks; for they were already familiar with the use of

fire-arms, and were moreover good horsemen. The season of the year

being still so early, there was ample time for the necessary training.

With these preparations, and adequate supplies of arms and military

stores, Pigot thought that a handful of British troops, co-operating

with the Creeks and Choctaws, could get possession of Baton Rouge,

from which New Orleans and the lower Mississippi would be an easy

conquest. Between Pensacola, still in the possession of Spain, and New

Orleans, Mobile was the only post held by the United States. In its

fort were two hundred troops, and in those up country not more than

seven hundred.

When transmitting this letter, which, with his own of June 20, was

received at the Admiralty August 8, Cochrane endorsed most of Pigot's

recommendations. He gave as his own estimate, that to drive the

Americans entirely out of Louisiana and the Floridas would require not

more than three thousand British troops; to be landed at Mobile, where

they would be joined by all the Indians and the disaffected French and

Spaniards.[440] In this calculation reappears the perennial error of

relying upon disaffected inhabitants, as well as savages. Disaffection

must be supported by intolerable conditions, before inhabitants will

stake all; not merely the chance of life, but the certainty of losing

property, if unsuccessful. Cochrane took the further practical step of

sending at once such arms and ammunition as the fleet could spare,

together with four officers and one hundred and eight non-commissioned

officers and privates of the marine corps, to train the Indians. These

were all under the command of Major Nicholls, who for this service was

given the local rank of Colonel. The whole were despatched July 23, in

the naval vessels "Hermes" and "Carron," for the Appalachicola. The

Admiral, while contemplating evidently a progress towards Baton Rouge,

looked also to coastwise operations; for he asked the Government to

furnish him vessels of light draught, to carry heavy guns into Lake

Ponchartrain, and to navigate the shoal water between it and Mobile,

now called Mississippi Sound.

The Admiralty in reply[441] reminded Cochrane of the former purpose

of the Government to direct operations against New Orleans, with a

very large force under Lord Hill, Wellington's second in the

Peninsular War. Circumstances had made it inexpedient to send so many

troops from Europe at this moment; but, in view of the Admiral's

recommendation, General Ross would be directed to co-operate in the

intended movement at the proper season, and his corps would be raised

to six thousand men, independent of such help in seamen and marines as

the fleet might afford. The re-enforcements would be sent to Negril

Bay, at the west end of Jamaica, which was made the general

rendezvous; and there Cochrane and Ross were directed to join not

later than November 20. The purpose of the Government in attempting

the enterprise was stated to be twofold. "First, to obtain command of

the embouchure of the Mississippi, so as to deprive the back

settlements of America of their communication with the sea; and,

secondly, to occupy some important and valuable possession, by the

restoration of which the conditions of peace might be improved, or

which we might be entitled to exact the cession of, as the price of

peace." Entire discretion was left with the two commanders as to the

method of proceeding, whether directly against New Orleans, by water,

or to its rear, by land, through the country of the Creeks; and they

were at liberty to abandon the undertaking in favor of some other,

should that course seem more suitable. When news of the capture of

Washington was received, two thousand additional troops were sent to

Bermuda, under the impression that the General might desire to push

his success on the Atlantic coast. These ultimately joined the

expedition two days before the attack on Jackson's lines. Upon the

death of General Ross, Sir Edward Pakenham was ordered to replace him;

but he did not arrive until after the landing, and had therefore no

voice in determining the general line of operations adopted.

These were the military instructions. To them were added certain

others, political in character, dictated mainly by the disturbed state

of Europe, and with an eye to appease the jealousies existing among

the Powers, which extended to American conditions, colonial and

commercial. While united against Napoleon, they viewed with distrust

the aggrandizement of Great Britain. Ross was ordered, therefore, to

discountenance any overture of the inhabitants to place themselves

under British dominion; but should he find a general and decided

disposition to withdraw from their recent connection with the United

States, with the view of establishing themselves as an independent

people, or of returning under the dominion of Spain, from which they

then had been separated less than twenty years, he was to give them

every support in his power. He must make them clearly understand,

however, that in the peace with the United States neither independence

nor restoration to Spain could be made a _sine quâ non_;[442] there

being about that a finality, of which the Government had already been

warned in the then current negotiations with the American

commissioners. These instructions to Ross were communicated to Lord

Castlereagh at Vienna, to use as might be expedient in the discussions

of the Conference.

No serious attempt was made in the direction of Baton Rouge, through

the back countries of Georgia and Florida; nor does there appear any

result of consequence from the mission of Colonel Nicholls. On

September 17 the "Hermes" and "Carron," supported by two brigs of war,

made an attack upon Fort Bowyer, a work of logs and sand commanding

the entrance to Mobile Bay. After a severe cannonade, lasting between

two and three hours, they were repulsed; and the "Hermes," running

aground, was set on fire by her captain to prevent her falling into

the hands of the enemy. Mobile was thus preserved from becoming the

starting point of the expedition, as suggested by Cochrane; and that

this object underlay the attempt may be inferred from the finding of

the Court Martial upon Captain Percy of the "Hermes," which decided

that the attack was perfectly justified by the circumstances stated at

the trial.[443]

In October, 1810, by executive proclamation of President Madison, the

United States had taken possession of the region between Louisiana and

the River Perdido,[444] being the greater part of what was then known

as West Florida. The Spanish troops occupying Mobile, however, were

not then disturbed;[445] nor was there a military occupation, except

of one almost uninhabited spot near Bay St. Louis.[446] This

intervention was justified on the ground of a claim to the territory,

asserted to be valid; and occasion for it was found in the danger of a

foreign interference, resulting from the subversion of Spanish

authority by a revolutionary movement. By Great Britain it was

regarded as a usurpation, to effect which advantage had been taken of

the embarrassment of the Spaniards when struggling against Napoleon

for national existence. On May 14, 1812, being then on the verge of

war with Great Britain, the ally of Spain, an Act of Congress declared

the whole country annexed, and extended over it the jurisdiction of

the United States. Mobile was occupied April 15, 1813. Pensacola, east

of the Perdido, but close to it, remained in the hands of Spain, and

was used as a base of operations by the British fleet, both before and

after the attack of the "Hermes" and her consorts upon Fort Bowyer.

From there Nicholls announced that he had arrived in the Floridas for

the purpose of annoying "the only enemy Great Britain has in the

world"[447]; and Captain Percy thence invited the pirates of Barataria

to join the British cause. Cochrane also informed the Admiralty that

for quicker communication, while operating in the Gulf, he intended to

establish a system of couriers through Florida, between Amelia Island

and Pensacola, both under Spanish jurisdiction.[448] On the score of

neutrality, therefore, fault can scarcely be found with General

Jackson for assaulting the latter, which surrendered to him November

7. The British vessels departed, and the works were blown up; after

which the place was restored to the Spaniards.

In acknowledging the Admiralty's letter of August 10, Cochrane said

that the diminution of numbers from those intended for Lord Hill would

not affect his plans; that, unless the United States had sent very

great re-enforcements to Louisiana, the troops now to be employed were

perfectly adequate, even without the marines. These he intended to

send under Rear-Admiral Cockburn, to effect a diversion by occupying

Cumberland Island, off the south coast of Georgia, about November 10,

whence the operations would be extended to the mainland. It was hoped

this would draw to the coast the American force employed against the

Indians, and so favor the movements in Louisiana.[449] While not

expressly stated, the inference seems probable that Cochrane

still--October 3--expected to land at Mobile. For some reason

Cockburn's attack on Cumberland Island did not occur until January 12,

when the New Orleans business was already concluded; so that, although

successful, and prosecuted further to the seacoast, it had no

influence upon the general issues.

Cochrane, with the division from the Atlantic coast, joined the

re-enforcements from England in Negril Bay, and thence proceeded to

Mississippi Sound; anchoring off Ship Island, December 8. On the 2d

General Jackson had arrived in New Orleans, whither had been ordered a

large part of the troops heretofore acting against the Creeks. The

British commanders had now determined definitely to attack the city

from the side of the sea. As there could be little hope for vessels

dependent upon sails to pass the forts on the lower Mississippi,

against the strong current, as was done by Farragut's steamers fifty

years later, it was decided to reach the river far above those works,

passing the army through some of the numerous bayous which intersect

the swampy delta to the eastward. From Ship Island this desired

approach could be made through Lake Borgne.

For the defence of these waters there were stationed five American

gunboats and two or three smaller craft, the whole under command of

Lieutenant Thomas ap Catesby Jones. As even the lighter British ships

of war could not here navigate, on account of the shoalness, and the

troops, to reach the place of debarkation, the Bayou des Pêcheurs, at

the head of Lake Borgne, must go sixty miles in open boats, the

hostile gun vessels had first to be disposed of. Jones, who from an

advanced position had been watching the enemy's proceedings in

Mississippi Sound, decided December 12 that their numbers had so

increased as to make remaining hazardous. He therefore retired, both

to secure his retreat and to cause the boats of the fleet a longer and

more harassing pull to overtake him. The movement was none too soon,

for that night the British barges and armed boats left the fleet in

pursuit. Jones was not able to get as far as he wished, on account of

failure of wind; but nevertheless on the 13th the enemy did not come

up with him. During the night he made an attempt at further

withdrawal; but calm continuing, and a strong ebb-tide running, he was

compelled again to anchor at 1 A.M. of the 14th, and prepared for

battle. His five gunboats, with one light schooner, were ranged in

line across the channel way, taking the usual precautions of springs

on their cables and boarding nettings triced up. Unluckily for the

solidity of his order, the current set two of the gunboats, one being

his own, some distance to the eastward,--in advance of the others.

At daylight the British flotilla was seen nine miles distant, at

anchor. By Jones' count it comprised forty-two launches and three

light gigs.[450] They soon after weighed and pulled towards the

gunboats. At ten, being within long gunshot, they again anchored for

breakfast; after which they once more took to the oars. An hour later

they closed with their opponents. The British commander, Captain

Lockyer, threw his own boat, together with a half-dozen others, upon

Jones' vessel, "Number 156,"[451] and carried her after a sharp

struggle of about twenty minutes, during which both Lockyer and Jones

were severely wounded. Her guns were then turned against her late

comrades, in support of the British boarders, and at the end of

another half-hour, at 12.40 P.M., the last of them surrendered.

That this affair was very gallantly contested on both sides is

sufficiently shown by the extent of the British loss--seventeen killed

and seventy-seven wounded.[452] They were of course in much larger

numbers than the Americans. No such attempt should be made except with

this advantage, and the superiority should be as great as is permitted

by the force at the disposal of the assailant.

This obstacle to the movement of the troops being removed, debarkation

began at the mouth of the Bayou des Pêcheurs;[453] whence the

British, undiscovered during their progress, succeeded in penetrating

by the Bayou Bienvenu and its tributaries to a point on the

Mississippi eight miles below New Orleans. The advance corps, sixteen

hundred strong, arrived there at noon, December 23, accompanied by

Major-General Keane, as yet in command of the whole army. The news

reached Jackson two hours later.

Fresh from the experiences of Washington and Baltimore, the British

troops flattered themselves with the certainty of a quiet night. The

Americans, they said to each other, have never dared to attack. At

7.30, however, a vessel dropped her anchor abreast them, and a voice

was heard, "Give them this for the honor of America!" The words were

followed by the discharge of her battery, which swept through the

camp. Without artillery to reply, having but two light field guns,

while the assailant--the naval schooner "Caroline," Lieut. J.D.

Henley--had anchored out of musket range, the invaders, suffering

heavily, were driven to seek shelter behind the levee, where they lay

for nearly an hour.[454] At the end of this, a dropping fire was heard

from above and inland. Jackson, with sound judgment and characteristic

energy, had decided to attack at once, although, by his own report, he

could as yet muster only fifteen hundred men, of whom but six hundred

were regulars. A confused and desperate night action followed, the men

on both sides fighting singly or in groups, ignorant often whether

those before them were friends or foes. The Americans eventually

withdrew, carrying with them sixty-six prisoners. Their loss in killed

and wounded was one hundred and thirty-nine; that of the British, two

hundred and thirteen.

The noise of this rencounter hastened the remainder of the British

army, and by the night of December 24 the whole were on the ground.

Meantime, the "Caroline" had been joined by the ship "Louisiana,"

which anchored nearly a mile above her. In her came Commodore

Patterson, in chief naval command. The presence of the two impelled

the enemy to a slight retrograde movement, out of range of their

artillery. The next morning, Christmas, Sir Edward Pakenham arrived

from England. A personal examination satisfied him that only by a

reconnaissance in force could he ascertain the American strength and

preparations, and that, as a preliminary to such attempt, the vessels

whose guns swept the line of advance must be driven off. On the 26th

the "Caroline" tried to get up stream to Jackson's camp, but could not

against a strong head wind; and on the 27th the British were able to

burn her with hot shot. The "Louisiana" succeeded in shifting her

place, and thenceforth lay on the west bank of the stream, abreast of

and flanking the entrenchments behind which Jackson was established.

These obstacles gone, Pakenham made his reconnaissance. As described

by a participant,[455] the British advanced four or five miles on

December 28, quite unaware what awaited them, till a turn in the road

brought them face to face with Jackson's entrenchments. These covered

a front of three fourths of a mile, and neither flank could be turned,

because resting either on the river or the swamp. They were not yet

complete, but afforded good shelter for riflemen, and had already

several cannon in position, while the "Louisiana's" broadside also

swept the ground in front. A hot artillery fire opened at once from

both ship and works, and when the British infantry advanced they

were met equally with musketry. The day's results convinced Pakenham

that he must resort to the erection of batteries before attempting an

assault; an unfortunate necessity, as the delay not only encouraged

the defenders, but allowed time for re-enforcement, and for further

development of their preparations. While the British siege pieces were

being brought forward, largely from the fleet, a distance of seventy

miles, the American Navy was transferring guns from the "Louisiana" to

a work on the opposite side of the river, which would flank the

enemies' batteries, as well as their columns in case of an attempt to

storm.

[Illustration: MAP

SHOWING THE LANDING OF THE

BRITISH ARMY

its several Encampments and Fortifications on the Mississippi and

the Works they erected on their Retreat; also the different

Posts, Encampments and Fortifications made by the several Corps

of the American Army during the whole Campaign

by Major A. LACARRIERE LATOUR Late Principal Engineer 7th

Military District U.S. Army 1815]

When the guns had arrived, the British on the night of December 31

threw up entrenchments, finding convenient material in the sugar

hogsheads of the plantations. On the morning of January 1 they opened

with thirty pieces at a distance of five hundred yards; but it was

soon found that in such a duel they were hopelessly overmatched, a

result to which contributed the enfilading position of the naval

battery. "To the well-directed exertions from the other side of the

river," wrote Jackson to Patterson, after the close of the operations,

"must be ascribed in great measure that harassment of the enemy which

led to his ignominious flight." The British guns were silenced, and

for the moment abandoned; but during the night they were either

withdrawn or destroyed. It was thus demonstrated that no adequate

antecedent impression could be made on the American lines by

cannonade; and, as neither flank could be turned, no resource

remained, on the east shore at least, but direct frontal assault.

But while Jackson's main position was thus secure, he ran great risk

that the enemy, by crossing the river, and successful advance there,

might establish themselves in rear of his works; which, if effected,

would put him at the same disadvantage that the naval battery now

imposed upon his opponents. His lines would be untenable if his

antagonist commanded the water, or gained the naval battery on his

flank, to which the crew of the "Louisiana" and her long guns had now

been transferred. This the British also perceived, and began to

improve a narrow canal which then led from the head of the bayou to

the levee, but was passable by canoes only. They expected ultimately

to pierce the levee, and launch barges upon the river; but the work

was impeded by the nature of the soil, the river fell, and some of the

heavier boats grounding delayed the others, so that, at the moment of

final assault, only five hundred men had been transported instead of

thrice that number, as intended.[456] What these few effected showed

how real and great was the danger.

The canal was completed on the evening of January 6, on which day the

last re-enforcements from England, sixteen hundred men under

Major-General Lambert, reached the front. Daylight of January 8 was

appointed for the general assault; the intervening day and night being

allowed for preparations, and for dragging forward the boats into the

river. It was expected that the whole crossing party of fifteen

hundred, under Colonel Thornton, would be on the west bank, ready to

move forward at the same moment as the principal assault, which was

also to be supported by all the available artillery, playing upon the

naval battery to keep down its fire. There was therefore no lack of

ordinary military prevision; but after waiting until approaching

daylight began to throw more light than was wished upon the advance of

the columns, Pakenham gave the concerted signal. Owing to the causes

mentioned, Thornton had but just landed with his first detachment of

five hundred. Eager to seize the battery, from which was to be feared

so much destructive effect on the storming columns on the east bank,

he pushed forward at once with the men he had, his flank towards the

river covered by a division of naval armed boats; "but the ensemble of

the general movement," wrote the British general, Lambert, who

succeeded Pakenham in command, "was thus lost, and in a point which

was of the last importance to the [main] attack on the left bank of

the river."

Not only was Thornton too weak, but he was eight hours[457] late,

though not by his own fault. Commodore Patterson, whose duties kept

him on the west bank, reported that the naval battery was actively and

effectively employed upon the flank of the storming columns, and it

was not until some time after the engagement opened that he was

informed of the near approach of the British detachment on that side.

In prevision of such an attempt, a line of works had been thrown up at

the lower end of the naval battery, at right angles to it, to cover

its flank. This was weak, however, at the extremity farthest from the

river, and thither the British directed their attack. The defenders

there, some very newly joined Kentucky militia, broke and fled, and

their flight carried with them all the other infantry. The seamen of

the battery, deprived of their supports, retreated after spiking their

guns, which fell into the enemy's hands; and Thornton, who was

severely wounded, was able to date his report of success from the

"Redoubt on the right bank of the Mississippi."[458] He advanced

actually, and without serious opposition, a mile above--that is, in

rear of--Jackson's lines and the "Louisiana's" anchorage. "This

important rout," wrote Jackson, "had totally changed the aspect of

affairs. The enemy now occupied a position from which they might annoy

us without hazard, and by means of which they might have been enabled

to defeat, in a great measure, the effects of our success on this side

of the river. It became, therefore, an object of the first consequence

to dislodge him as soon as possible."

Jackson himself attributed his success in this desirable object as

much to negotiation as to the force he would be able to apply. The

story of the main assault and its disastrous repulse is familiar. In

itself, it was but an instance of a truth conspicuously illustrated,

before and after, on many fields, of the desperate character of a

frontal attack upon protected men accustomed to the use of

fire-arms--even though they be irregulars. Could Thornton's movement

have been made in full force assigned, and at the moment intended,--so

that most of the advance on both sides the river could have been

consummated before dawn,--a successful flanking operation would have

been effected; and it is far from improbable that Jackson, finding the

naval guns turned against him, would have been driven out of his

lines. With raw troops under his command, and six thousand veterans

upon his heels, no stand could have been made short of the town, nor

in it.

As it was, the failure of the two parts of the British to act

coincidently caused them to be beaten in detail: for the disastrous

and bloody repulse of the columns on the east bank led to the

withdrawal of the tiny body on the west.[459] No further attempt was

made. On the 18th of January the British withdrew. In pursuance of the

full discretionary power given by their orders as to any further

employment upon the American coast of the forces under their command,

General Lambert and the Admiral then concerted an attack upon Fort

Bowyer, at the entrance to Mobile Bay. This surrendered February 11,

the day that the news of the Peace reached New York.

* * * * *

The ocean as well as the land had its episodes of fighting after peace

had been signed. The United States frigate "President," which during

the first two years of the war had been commanded continuously by

Commodore John Rodgers, was in May, 1814, transferred to Decatur, who

took to her with him the crew of his old ship, the "United States,"

irretrievably shut up in New London. The "President" remained in New

York throughout the year, narrowly watched by the enemy. In a letter

of August 10, Decatur speaks of the unfavorable conditions of the

season for sailing; that four British ships kept close to Sandy Hook,

at times even anchored. He then mentions also "the great apprehension

and danger" which New York was undergoing, in common with the entire

seaboard, and the wish of the city government that the crew of the

ship should remain for defence of the port.[460] It will be remembered

that this was in the anxious period preceding the development of the

British menace to the coast, which issued in the capture of Washington

and Alexandria, and the attack on Baltimore. Philadelphia also

trembled; and Decatur received an order to carry the "President's"

crew to her protection, if threatened.[461]

On New Year Day, 1815, the "President" was still in the bay, awaiting

a chance to sail. She was deeply laden for a long absence, and was to

be accompanied by a merchant brig, the "Macedonian," carrying further

stores. The sloops "Hornet" and "Peacock," and brig "Tom Bowline,"

were likewise watching to slip out. On the night of January 14, 1815,

in a heavy northwester, the "President's" attempt was made; the

pilots for the occasion having undertaken to mark the channel by boats

suitably stationed. Despite these precautions the ship grounded, and

beat heavily on the bottom for an hour and a half. By this she was

seriously injured, and would have gone back had the wind permitted. As

it was, she had to be forced over, and at 10 P.M. went clear; but with

loss of a large part of that speed for which she was known, and which

had been among Decatur's chief reasons for preferring her to the new

"Guerrière."[462] The "Macedonian" was in company.

The British blockading division was under the command of Captain John

Hayes, of the razee[463] "Majestic," and consisted, besides that ship,

of the forty-gun 24-pounder frigate "Endymion," and the

thirty-eight-gun 18-pounder frigates "Pomone" and "Tenedos"; the

latter of which had joined on the 13th. The vessels were driven off

shore by the violence of the gale; but Hayes, reasoning as a seaman,

anticipated both Decatur's sailing that night and his probable course.

After clearing the bar, the "President" steered nearly due east, along

the south shore of Long Island, for fifty miles, when she headed off,

southeast by east, for the open sea. At 5 A.M. three of the British

squadron were seen ahead on the new course; the fourth, the "Tenedos,"

being then out of sight to the southward, either detached for a wider

sweep of watchfulness, or separated by the gale.

The "President," on seeing the enemy, hauled up again along shore, and

a stern chase began, which lasted till near nightfall of the 15th;

the "Endymion" leading the British squadron. The "Tenedos" being

sighted soon after daybreak, Hayes detached the "Pomone" to ascertain

what ship it was; a step which for the time threw the "Pomone," as

well as the "Tenedos," out of the running. At 5 P.M. the "Endymion"

had got well within point-blank shot of the "President." It must be

appreciated that, with the whole hostile squadron at her heels, the

American frigate could not delay, or turn her side with its battery

towards an assailant behind; for to do so enabled the others to gain

on her. On the other hand, the pursuer could so deflect--yaw--at

frequent intervals, and having the greater speed could continually

recover the ground thus lost. This was what Captain Hope of the

"Endymion" did, with sound judgment. He took a position on the

off-shore quarter of the "President," where neither her broadside nor

stern guns could bear upon him, so long as she held her course.

Thence, yawing continually, the "Endymion" poured in her successive

broadsides, practically unopposed, mistress of the situation.

Decatur endured this for a time; but it was the military merit of his

antagonist's conduct that it must eventually force him to turn aside,

and so convert the stern chase of the British squadron to the more

hopeful attempt to cut him off on a new course. After half an hour the

"President's" helm was put to port, and the ship headed abruptly

south, threatening to cross the "Endymion's" bow, and rake. The

British frigate had to follow this movement of her opponent, and the

two ran off on parallel lines, exchanging broadsides. The object of

Decatur was to dismantle this enemy, strip him of his motive power,

and so increase his own chance of escape. In this he was successful.

After two hours and a half, between 8 and 8.30 P.M., the "Endymion's"

sails were stripped from the yards. She dropped astern, and the

"President" again steered east, bringing the other enemy's ships once

more in her wake,--a stern chase.

At 11 P.M. the "Pomone" and "Tenedos" overtook her. These were of the

class of the "Guerrière," "Macedonian," and "Shannon," very much

lighter, singly, than the "President," which had a heavier battery than

the "Constitution." Had the American ship retained her normal speed, she

probably would have escaped; but the "Pomone," the first to arrive,

outsailed her without using studdingsails, which the "President" was

still able to carry alow and aloft, despite her engagement with the

"Endymion." This fresh British ship luffed to port, and fired her

starboard broadside. The "President" imitated the manoeuvre, heading up

to north; but she did not fire. At this point the historian is met by a

direct contradiction of evidence. Decatur says that the "Pomone" was now

on the port bow, within musket-shot,[464] the "Tenedos" five hundred

yards astern, "taking up a raking position on our quarter, and the rest

(with the exception of the 'Endymion') within gunshot."[465] These

statements are confirmed by the sworn testimony before the American

Court of Inquiry. The log of the "Pomone," published with intention,

reads that the "Tenedos" was not more than three miles off,--a distance

to which no gun on shipboard of that day could carry,--and the

"Endymion" and "Majestic" so far away that they did not come on the

scene until 12.45 and 3 A.M., respectively, of the 16th. The "Pomone"

fired a second broadside, and hauling still further to port was about to

discharge a third, from a raking position ahead, when the "President"

struck. She had not fired a gun at either the "Pomone" or the "Tenedos."

The log of the "Pomone" is clear on this point, and Decatur's elaborate

report makes no mention of having done so. The witnesses before the

Court of Inquiry are equally silent.

Between the "Endymion" and the "President," in point of battery, the

proportion of force was as four to three, in favor of the American

ship. Against that must fairly be weighed the power of the "Endymion"

to maintain for half an hour a quartering and raking position, owing

to the necessity to escape laid on the "President." A quantitative

estimate of this advantage would be largely guess; but it may safely

be said that the disproportion of killed and wounded[466] can probably

be laid to this, coupled with the very proper endeavor of Decatur to

throw off his immediate enemy by aiming at her spars. After two and a

half hours' fighting, the sails of the "Endymion" were "stripped from

the yards," Captain Hayes reported; while the "President," by the

"Pomone's" log, "continued to stand east under a press of sail," all

studdingsails set, from lower to royal. This result accounts for where

the "President's" shot went, and under the circumstances should have

gone, and for why the "Endymion" lost fewer men; and it was not the

sole reason for the last. There is, in the writer's judgment, no

ground whatever for the assumption that the "Endymion" did, or singly

would, have beaten the "President." The disparity of material force

was counterbalanced by the circumstance that the "President" had the

other vessels to take into account. From the legal point of view ships

merely in sight contribute, and are therefore entitled to prize money.

In the present instance they necessarily affected the manoeuvring and

gunnery of the "President."

There is a good deal of human nature, and some food for quiet

entertainment, in the British accounts. There were several to share,

and apparently the glory was not quite enough to go round. With

Admiral Hotham, not present in the action, but in immediate command of

the station during Cochrane's absence at New Orleans and Cockburn's in

Georgia, it was "the force which I had collected off the bar of New

York." Captain Hayes had much to say on his calculations of the

enemy's movements: "What is a little singular, at the very instant of

arriving at the point of the supposed track of the enemy, Sandy Hook

west-northwest fifteen leagues, we were made happy by the sight of a

ship and a brig, not more than two miles on the weather bow." The

published report of Captain Hope, of the "Endymion," is simple and

modest; but some of his followers apparently would have all the glory.

The "Endymion" had done the whole business. This drew forth the

publication of the "Pomone's" log, concerning which the Naval

Chronicle remarks, "It appears that some differences have taken place

between the British frigates engaged, as to the honor of having

captured the 'President.'"[467]

Had Decatur appreciated at the moment that his speedy surrender to the

"Pomone" would be attributed to the subjection to which the "Endymion"

was supposed to have reduced his ship, he very probably would have

made a second fight of it. But he was convinced that ultimate escape

was impossible. "Two fresh," though much weaker, ships of the enemy at

hand, his own having fought for two hours and a half; "about one fifth

of my crew killed and wounded, my ship crippled, and a more than

fourfold force opposed to me, without a chance of escape left, I

deemed it my duty to surrender." Physical and mental fatigue, the

moral discomfiture of a hopeless situation, are all fairly to be taken

into account; nor should resistance be protracted where it means

merely loss of life. Yet it may be questioned whether the moral tone

of a military service, which is its breath of life, does not suffer

when the attempt is made to invest with a halo of extraordinary

heroism such a resistance as Decatur made, by his own showing. Unless

the "President" was really thrashed out by the "Endymion," which was

the British assertion,[468] she might have put one of his Majesty's

thirty-eight-gun frigates, the "Pomone," out of commission for a long

time; and that, in addition to the "Endymion,"--the two fastest

British vessels,--would have been no light matter in the then state of

the New York blockade. If the finding of the American Court of

Inquiry,[469] that "the 'Endymion' was conquered, while the

'President' in the contest with her had sustained but little injury,"

be admitted, there seems no reply to the comment that the "President"

surrendered within musket-shot of a thirty-eight-gun frigate which

with three or four broadsides she should have nearly annihilated. She

was out to destroy commerce and enemy's cruisers, and she struck

before her powers in that respect--by the Court's finding--were

exhausted. Escape was impossible; one object of her cruise--the

enemy's commerce--had become impracticable; was it justifiable to

neglect the last opportunity for the other? Decatur's personal

gallantry is beyond question; but, if the defence of the "President"

is to be considered "glorious," and "heroic," it is difficult to know

what term can be applied to that of the "Essex." War is violence,

wounds, and death. Needless bloodshed is to be avoided; but even more,

at the present day, is to be deprecated the view that the objects of a

war are to be sacrificed to the preservation of life.

After a long detention, through the closeness of the Boston blockade,

the "Constitution," still commanded by Captain Charles Stewart,

effected her escape to sea towards the end of December. On February

20, 1815, two hundred miles east-northeast from Madeira, she fell in

with two British ships of war, the "Cyane," and the "Levant," then on

their way from Gibraltar to the Azores, and thence to the American

coast. The "Cyane," a frigate-built ship, carried a battery of

carronades: thirty 32-pounders, two 18-pounders. She had also two long

9-pounders; making a total of thirty-four guns, throwing a broadside

weight of five hundred and seven pounds.[470] The "Levant" was a sloop

of war, of the American "Hornet" class, carrying eighteen 32-pounder

carronades and two long 9-pounders; giving two hundred and

ninety-seven as her broadside weight. Between the two they therefore

threw eight hundred and four pounds of metal. The "Constitution's"

broadside was seven hundred and four pounds; but of this three hundred

and eighty-four were in long 24-pounders. Supposing both parties

willing to fight under such circumstances, the game would be all in

the "Constitution's" hands. Her problem rather was so to conduct the

contest that neither enemy should escape. Captain Stewart, in

reporting his success, dwelt upon the advantages derived by the enemy

"from a divided and more active force, as also their superiority in

the weight and numbers of guns." One cannot but feel the utmost

diffidence in differing from a seaman of the time, and one so skilful

as Stewart; but the advantage of a divided force is as difficult to

see as the superiority in battery power.

Though consorts, the enemy when first seen were separated by a

distance of ten miles; and were sighted successively between 1 and 2

P.M. The wind was easterly and light. The "Constitution" was unable to

prevent their junction, which was effected at 5.45. They then formed

in line on the starboard tack, the "Levant" leading; with an interval

between them of three hundred feet. At six the "Constitution" drew up

on the weather side of the "Cyane," and five minutes later the action

began at a distance of three hundred yards. After a quarter of an

hour, noting the enemy's fire to slacken, Stewart stopped his own, to

allow the smoke to lift. When he could see, he found the

"Constitution" abreast the "Levant," with the "Cyane" astern, luffing

up for his port quarter. He gave his port broadside to the "Levant,"

then braced aback his after-sails, and so went astern towards the

"Cyane," bringing her abeam under cover of the renewed cannonade. At

6.35--about ten minutes later--the enemy's fire again weakened, and

the "Levant" was seen to be bearing up before the wind. Stewart made

sail ahead, raked her twice from astern with the port guns, and then

saw the "Cyane" also wearing. The "Constitution" immediately wore

short round, and caught this opponent before she had completed her

manoeuvre, so that she raked her also from astern with the starboard

battery. The "Cyane" then came to the wind on the port tack, and fired

that broadside, to which the "Constitution," having reloaded after

raking, was about to reply, when, at 6.50 this enemy struck, and fired

a lee gun,--the signal of submission. A prize crew, with a party of

marines to guard prisoners, was hastily thrown on board, and at eight

the "Constitution" made sail again after the "Levant." At 8.30 this

plucky little ship was met returning to the conflict. At 8.50 the two

passed on opposite tacks, and exchanged broadsides, after which the

"Constitution" kept away under the enemy's stern and raked again. The

"Levant" could now run with a clear conscience. Whatever argument can

be based on the united batteries of the two British ships, and the

advantage of divided force, eighteen 32-pounder carronades were no

match for the "Constitution." The "Levant" took to her heels, but at

10 P.M. was overtaken and surrendered.[471]

The losses as reported by Stewart were: "Constitution," killed three;

wounded twelve; "Cyane," killed twelve; wounded twenty-six; "Levant,"

killed twenty-three; wounded sixteen. Captain Stewart's management of

his vessel was strikingly clever and prompt. The advantages which he

attributed to the enemy, an aggregate of guns, slightly superior in

total weight, divided between two smaller ships, the author has never

been able to recognize.[472]

The sloops of war "Hornet," Commander James Biddle, and "Peacock,"

Commander Lewis Warrington, and the brig "Tom Bowline," which were

waiting their opportunity in the lower bay of New York when the

"President" sailed, got to sea five days after her, January 20. When

two days out, the "Hornet" separated in chase. The vessels had a

rendezvous at the lonely island of Tristan d'Acunha, in the South

Atlantic, some fifteen hundred miles west of the Cape of Good Hope.

The "Hornet" arrived first, and was about to anchor, at 10.30 in the

morning of March 23, when a sail was seen to the southeast, steering

west. As it soon passed behind the island, the "Hornet" made sail to

the westward, and the two shortly came within sight. The stranger was

the British sloop of war "Penguin," Captain Dickinson. By the report

of Captain Biddle, based on examination after the action, she carried

sixteen 32-pounder carronades, two long 12-pounders in broadside, and

one long twelve on a pivot, fighting either side. The "Hornet" had

eighteen 32-pounder carronades, and two long twelves.

The wind being south-southwest, the "Penguin" was to windward, and

bore up to close. At 1.40 P.M., being nearly within musket-shot, she

hauled to the wind on the starboard tack, a movement which the

"Hornet" at once imitated, and the battle began; the "Hornet" to

leeward, the two running on parallel courses,--an artillery duel. The

"Penguin" drew gradually nearer, and at 1.55 put her helm hard up, to

run her antagonist on board. The American crew were called to repel

boarders, and so were on hand when the enemy's bowsprit came in

between the main and mizzen rigging; but, while ready to resist an

attempt to board, the course of the action had so satisfied Biddle of

the superiority of his ship's gunnery that he would not throw his men

away in a hand-to-hand contest upon the enemy's decks. The small arms

men and marines, however, distributed along the "Hornet's" side kept

up a lively musketry fire, which the British endured at great

disadvantage, crowded upon the narrow front presented by a ship's

forecastle. The "Penguin" finally wrenched clear with the loss of her

foremast and bowsprit, and in this crippled state surrendered

immediately. From the first gun to hauling down the flag was

twenty-two minutes. The British ship had lost fourteen killed and

twenty-eight wounded, her captain being among the slain. The "Hornet"

had one killed and ten wounded. The comparative efficiency of the two

vessels is best indicated by the fact that the "Hornet" had not a

single cannon-ball in her hull, nor any serious injury even to her

lower masts; yet that her rigging and sails were very much cut proves

that her opponent's guns were active. By the ready skill of the seamen

of that day she was completely ready for any service forty-eight hours

later. The "Penguin" was scuttled.

The action between the "Hornet" and "Penguin" was the last naval

combat of the War of 1812. The day after it, March 24, the "Peacock"

and "Tom Bowline" arrived, in time to see the "Penguin" before her

captor sunk her. The brig "Macedonian," which had sailed in company

with the "President," but escaped her fate, also came to Tristan

d'Acunha, which would seem to have been intended as a fresh starting

point for some enterprise in common.

FOOTNOTES:

[394] Memoirs and Correspondence of Lord Castlereagh. Series iii. vol.

ii. pp. 86-91.

[395] Castlereagh Memoirs, series iii. vol. ii. pp. 86-91.

[396] Castlereagh to Liverpool (Prime Minister), Aug. 28, 1814. Ibid.,

pp. 100-102.

[397] Wellington to Liverpool, Nov. 9, 1814. Castlereagh Memoirs, series

iii. vol. ii. pp. 186-189.

[398] Canadian Archives, C. 680, p. 46. The date is Sept. 10, 1813.

[399] Letter of Captain Evans, commanding N.Y. Navy Yard, Aug. 6, 1813.

[400] Canadian Archives, C. 679, pp. 348, 362.

[401] Izard says two. Official Correspondence of the Department of War

with Major-General Izard, 1814 and 1815, p. 7.

[402] British Court Martial Record.

[403] Confidence.

[404] Account of the Public Life of Sir George Prevost, p. 136.

[405] Prevost to Bathurst, July 12, 1814. Report on Canadian Archives,

1896. Lower Canada, p. 31.

[406] Prevost to Bathurst, Aug. 5, 1814. Ibid., p. 35.

[407] Prevost to Bathurst, Aug. 27.

[408] Official Correspondence of General Izard with the Department of

War, pp. 56, 57. Philadelphia, 1816.

[409] Ridout, Ten Years in Upper Canada, p. 282.

[410] Niles' Register, vol. vi. p. 357.

[411] June 8, 1814. Navy Department MSS.

[412] Macomb's Report, Brannan's Military and Naval Letters, p. 415.

Izard (Correspondence, p. 98) says, "There were at or about the works at

Plattsburg not less than three thousand regulars, of whom fifteen

hundred were fit for duty in the field. In the number were three

companies of artillery."

[413] General Benjamin Mooers, who was in command of the New York State

militia during these operations, in a letter to Governor Tompkins, dated

Sept. 16, 1814 (Gov. Tompkins MSS. vol. ix. pp. 212-217, State Library,

Albany, N.Y.), claims that Macomb was here less than just to the

militia, "many of whom stood their ground as long as it was tenable"

during the first day. In a general order issued by him Sept. 8 (Niles'

Register, vol. vii. p. 70), he spoke of some "who fled at the first

approach of the enemy, and afterwards basely disbanded themselves, and

returned home." Macomb himself wrote that after the first day, when the

army had retired to the works, "the militia behaved with great spirit."

[414] For copies of these letters, and of Macdonough's reply and

endorsement, I am indebted to Mr. Rodney Macdonough, the Commodore's

grandson. Cochran's is dated March 22, and Colden's June 26, 1815;

Macdonough's reply July 3. It is well to note that all these preceded

the British naval court martial, held in Portsmouth, Aug. 18-21, 1815,

where the testimony that the squadron was within range was unanimous and

accepted by the Court.

[415] The first lieutenant of the "Confiance" in his evidence said that

it was not more than ten minutes after the ship rounded Cumberland Head

that the enemy began firing at her, and that the shot at first fell

short. As far as it goes, this would show that the American squadron was

over a mile from the Head; and, if so, scarcely more than a mile from

the batteries.

[416] For information as to ranges, the author applied to Professor

Philip R. Alger, U.S. Navy, whose intimate acquaintance with questions

of ordnance and gunnery is known throughout his service.

[417] Vol. viii. p. 70, April 1, 1815.

[418] These two letters of Macomb are given in the "Account of the

Public Life of Sir George Prevost," p. 165.

[419] Izard's Correspondence, p. 98.

[420] Yeo to the Admiralty, Sept. 24, 1814. From a copy in the Court

Martial Record.

[421] In his Narrative, submitted to the Court Martial, Captain Pring

stated that Prevost wished a joint attack, because, in the advance along

the head of Cumberland Bay, the left flank of the army, when crossing

Dead Creek, had been much annoyed by the American gunboats. He feared

the same in crossing the Saranac to the assault of the works, and wanted

the navy to draw off the gunboats.

[422] Robertson's Narrative before the Court Martial.

[423] The correspondence between Prevost and Downie, Sept. 7-10, is in

the Canadian Archives, M. 389.6. pp. 176-183.

[424] This letter of Major Coore, published in a Canadian paper, Feb.

26, 1815, is to be found in the Canadian Archives MSS., M. 389.6. p.

287.

[425] Court Martial Evidence.

[426] Evidence of Pring, and of Brydone, master of the "Confiance,"

before the Court Martial. Robertson in his narrative is equally positive

and explicit on this point.

[427] Robertson's Narrative.

[428] Robertson's Narrative.

[429] Macdonough's Report.

[430] Pronounced "wynd."

[431] Robertson's Narrative.

[432] A spring is a rope taken from the stern of a ship to the anchor,

by hauling on which the ship is turned in the direction desired.

[433] Brydone's Evidence.

[434] Evidence of Sailing Master Brydone.

[435] Macdonough's Report.

[436] For the battle of Lake Champlain much the most complete and

satisfactory evidence is the Record of the British Court Martial. There

having been no dispute on the American side, as between Perry and

Elliott at Lake Erie, there has not been the same output of conflicting

statements, tending to elucidate as well as to confuse. Commander Henley

of the "Eagle" was apparently dissatisfied with Macdonough's report, as

the Commodore (apparently) was with his action. This drew from him a

special report. Navy Department MSS. Niles' Register, vol. vii.

Supplement, p. 135, contains this letter with many verbal changes, which

do not materially affect its purport.

[437] Cochrane arrived at Bermuda March 6; but, despite his urgency and

evident annoyance, Warren, who was senior, and had had ample notice of

his supersession, took his own leisurely time about giving over the

command, which he did not do till April 1, sailing for England April 8.

[438] Bathurst to Ross, Sept. 6, 1814. War Office, Entry Book.

[439] Pigot's Report to Cochrane, June 8, 1814. Admiralty In-Letters

MSS.

[440] Cochrane to the Admiralty, June 20, 1814. Admiralty In-Letters

MSS.

[441] Admiralty to Cochrane, Aug. 10, 1814. The reference in the text

depends upon a long paper near the end of vol. 39, British War Office

Records, which appears to the writer to have been drawn up for the use

of the ministry in parliamentary debate. It gives step by step the

procedure of the Government in entering on the New Orleans undertaking.

[442] Bathurst to Ross, Sept. 6, 1814. British War Office Records.

[443] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxiii. p. 429.

[444] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 397.

[445] Ibid., p. 572.

[446] Niles' Register, vol. iii. p. 182.

[447] Ibid., vol. vii. pp. 133-135.

[448] Cochrane to the Admiralty, Oct. 3, 1814. Admiralty In-Letters.

[449] Ibid.

[450] Neither Cochrane nor Lockyer gives the number of the British

boats; but as there were three divisions, drawn from five ships of the

line and three or four frigates, besides smaller vessels, Jones' count

was probably accurate. He had ample time to observe.

[451] The gunboats of Jefferson's building had no names, and were

distinguished by number only.

[452] Jones' Report of this affair is found in Niles' Register, vol.

viii. p. 126; those of Cochrane and Lockyer in the Naval Chronicle, vol.

xxxiii. pp. 337-341.

[453] So styled in Cochrane's Report, which also speaks of it as Bayou

Catalan. The name does not appear on the map of Major Latour, chief of

engineers to Jackson, who in his report calls the whole bayou Bienvenu.

[454] Gleig, Narrative of the Campaign of Washington, Baltimore, and New

Orleans, pp. 282-288.

[455] Gleig, pp. 308-309.

[456] Gleig's Narrative, p. 321. Cochrane's Report, Naval Chronicle,

vol. xxxiii. p. 341. Report of Major C.R. Forrest, British Assistant

Quarter-master-General, War Office Records.

[457] Thornton's Report. James' Military Occurrences of the War of 1812,

vol. ii., p. 547.

[458] James' Military Occurrences, vol. ii. p. 547.

[459] Niles' Register, vols. vii. and viii., gives a large number of the

official reports, as well British as American, concerning the New

Orleans Expedition. So also does James in his "Military Occurrences" and

"Naval Occurrences" of the War of 1812. Regarded in outline, as is

attempted in the text, the operations are of a simple character,

presenting no difficulties.

[460] Captains' Letters. Navy Department MSS.

[461] Ibid., Sept. 26, 1814.

[462] Decatur to Navy Department, April 9, 1814. Captains' Letters.

[463] A razee is a ship cut down, and reduced from her original rate.

The "Majestic" had been a seventy-four, and probably was the same vessel

which under that name and rate took part in the battle of the Nile. The

expedient of razeeing had been adopted by the British Government, in

order rapidly to prepare vessels superior to the American forty-fours,

yet less costly in crews than ships of the line. These razees were rated

as carrying fifty-six guns.

[464] Deposition of Commodore Decatur at Bermuda. Naval Chronicle, vol.

xxxiii. p. 371.

[465] Decatur's Report. Niles' Register, vol. viii. p. 8. In his

deposition Decatur says "the 'Tenedos' did not fire at the time of such

surrender."

[466] The loss of the "President" was twenty-four killed, fifty-five

wounded. (Decatur's Report.) That of the "Endymion," eleven killed and

fourteen wounded. (Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxiii. p. 262.)

[467] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxiii. p. 370.

[468] Captain Hayes' Report. Niles' Register, vol. viii. p. 175. Naval

Chronicle, vol. xxxiii. p. 261.

[469] Niles' Register, vol. viii. p. 147.

[470] The armament of the "Cyane" is that reported by Lieut. Hoffman,

U.S. Navy, who brought her to the United States. Niles' Register, vol.

viii. p. 134.

[471] The "Cyane" reached a United States port, but the "Levant" was

recaptured by a British squadron. Both names remained in the United

States Navy till the Civil War. A "Levant," built in succession to the

one captured, was lost at sea in 1860--never heard from.

[472] The account given in the text depends upon Stewart's "minutes of

the action" (Niles' Register, vol. viii. p. 219), compared with the

"Constitution's" log (Navy Department MSS.), of which the minutes are a

development.