SEABOARD OPERATIONS IN 1814. WASHINGTON, BALTIMORE, AND
MAINE
The British command of the water on Lake Ontario was obtained too late
in the year 1814 to have any decisive effect upon their operations.
Combined with their continued powerlessness on Lake Erie, this caused
their campaign upon the northern frontier to be throughout defensive
in character, as that of the Americans had been offensive. Drummond
made no attempt in the winter to repeat the foray into New York of the
previous December, although he and Prevost both considered that they
had received provocation to retaliate, similar to that given at Newark
the year before. The infliction of such vindictive punishment was by
them thrown upon Warren's successor in the North Atlantic command, who
responded in word and will even more heartily than in deed. The
Champlain expedition, in September of this year, had indeed offensive
purpose, but even there the object specified was the protection of
Canada, by the destruction of the American naval establishments on the
lake, as well as at Sackett's Harbor;[348] while the rapidity with
which Prevost retreated, as soon as the British squadron was
destroyed, demonstrated how profoundly otherwise the spirit of a
simple defensive had possession of him, as it had also of the more
positive and aggressive temperaments of Drummond and Yeo, and how
essential naval control was in his eyes. In this general view he had
the endorsement of the Duke of Wellington, when his attention was
called to the subject, after the event.
Upon the seaboard it was otherwise. There the British campaign of 1814
much exceeded that of 1813 in offensive purpose and vigor, and in
effect. This was due in part to the change in the naval
commander-in-chief; in part also to the re-enforcements of troops
which the end of the European war enabled the British Government to
send to America. Early in the year 1813, Warren had represented to the
Admiralty the impossibility of his giving personal supervision to the
management of the West India stations, and had suggested devolving the
responsibility upon the local admirals, leaving him simply the power
to interfere when circumstances demanded.[349] The Admiralty then
declined, alleging that the character of the war required unity of
direction over the whole.[350] Later they changed their views. The
North Atlantic, Jamaica, and Leeward Islands stations were made again
severally independent, and Warren was notified that as the American
command, thus reduced, was beneath the claims of an officer of his
rank,--a full admiral,--a successor would be appointed.[351]
Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane accordingly relieved him, April 1,
1814; his charge embracing both the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. At the
same period the Lakes Station, from Champlain to Superior inclusive,
was constituted a separate command; Yeo's orders to this effect being
dated the same day as Cochrane's, January 25, 1814.
Cochrane brought to his duties a certain acrimony of feeling,
amounting almost to virulence. "I have it much at heart," he wrote
Bathurst, "to give them a complete drubbing before peace is made,
when I trust their northern limits will be circumscribed and the
command of the Mississippi wrested from them." He expects thousands of
slaves to join with their masters' horses, and looks forward to
enlisting them. They are good horsemen; and, while agreeing with his
lordship in deprecating a negro insurrection, he thinks such bodies
will "be as good Cossacks as any in the Russian army, and more
terrific to the Americans than any troops that can be brought
forward." Washington and Baltimore are equally accessible, and may be
either destroyed or laid under contribution.[352] These remarks,
addressed to a prominent member of the Cabinet, are somewhat
illuminative as to the formal purposes, as well as to the subsequent
action, of British officials. The sea coast from Maine to Georgia,
according to the season of the year, was made to feel the increasing
activity and closeness of the British attacks; and these, though
discursive and without apparent correlation of action, were evidently
animated throughout by a common intention of bringing the war home to
the experience of the people.
As a whole, the principal movements were meant to serve as a
diversion, detaining on the Chesapeake and seaboard troops which might
otherwise be sent to oppose the advance Prevost was ordered to make
against Sackett's Harbor and Lake Champlain; for which purpose much
the larger part of the re-enforcements from Europe had been sent to
Canada. The instructions to the general detailed to command on the
Atlantic specified as his object "a diversion on the coast of the
United States in favor of the army employed in the defence of Upper
and Lower Canada."[353] During the operations, "if in any descent you
shall be enabled to take such a position as to threaten the
inhabitants with the destruction of their property, you are hereby
authorized to levy upon them contributions in return for your
forbearance." Negroes might be enlisted, or carried away, though in no
case as slaves. Taken in connection with the course subsequently
pursued at Washington, such directions show an aim to inflict in many
quarters suffering and deprivation, in order to impress popular
consciousness with the sense of an irresistible and ubiquitous power
incessantly at hand. Such moral impression, inclining those subject to
it to desire peace, conduced also to the retention of local forces in
the neighborhood where they belonged, and so furthered the intended
diversion.
The general purpose of the British Government is further shown by some
incidental mention. Gallatin, who at the time of Napoleon's abdication
was in London, in connection with his duties on the Peace Commission,
wrote two months afterwards: "To use their own language, they mean to
inflict on America a chastisement which will teach her that war is not
to be declared against Great Britain with impunity. This is a very
general sentiment of the nation; and that such are the opinions of the
ministry was strongly impressed on the mind of ---- by a late
conversation he had with Lord Castlereagh. Admiral Warren also told
Levett Harris, with whom he was intimate at St. Petersburg, that he
was sorry to say the instructions given to his successor on the
American station were very different from those under which he acted,
and that he feared very serious injury would be done to America."[354]
Thus inspired, the coast warfare, although more active and efficient
than the year before, and on a larger scale, continued in spirit and
in execution essentially desultory and wasting. As it progressed, a
peculiar bitterness was imparted by the liberal construction given by
British officers to the word "retaliation." By strict derivation, and
in wise application, the term summarizes the ancient retribution of
like for like,--an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth; and to destroy
three villages for one, as was done in retort for the burning of
Newark, the inhabitants in each case being innocent of offence, was an
excessive recourse to a punitive measure admittedly lawful. Two
further instances of improper destruction by Americans had occurred
during the campaign of 1814. Just before Sinclair sailed for Mackinac,
he suggested to a Colonel Campbell, commanding the troops at Erie,
that it would be a useful step to visit Long Point, on the opposite
Canada shore, and destroy there a quantity of flour, and some mills
which contributed materially to the support of the British forces on
the Niagara peninsula.[355] This was effectively done, and did add
seriously to Drummond's embarrassment; but Campbell went further and
fired some private houses also, on the ground that the owners were
British partisans and had had a share in the burning of Buffalo. A
Court of Inquiry, of which General Scott was president, justified the
destruction of the mills, but condemned unreservedly that of the
private houses.[356] Again, in Brown's advance upon Chippewa, some
American "volunteers," despatched to the village of St. David's,
burned there a number of dwellings. The commanding officer, Colonel
Stone, was ordered summarily and immediately by Brown to retire from
the expedition, as responsible for an act "contrary to the orders of
the Government, and to those of the commanding general published to
the army."[357]
In both these cases disavowal had been immediate; and it had been
decisive also in that of Newark. The intent of the American Government
was clear, and reasonable ultimate compensation might have been
awaited; at least for a time. Prevost, however, being confined to the
defensive all along his lines, communicated the fact of the
destruction to Cochrane, calling upon him for the punishment which it
was not in his own power then to inflict. Cochrane accordingly issued
an order[358] to the ships under his command, to use measures of
retaliation "against the cities of the United States, from the Saint
Croix River to the southern boundary, near the St. Mary's River;" "to
destroy and lay waste," so he notified the United States Government,
"such towns and districts upon the coast as may be found
assailable."[359] In the first heat of his wrath, he used in his order
an expression, "and you will spare merely the lives of the unarmed
inhabitants of the United States," which he afterwards asked Prevost
to expunge, as it might be construed in a sense he never meant;[360]
and he reported to his Government that he had sent private
instructions to exercise forbearance toward the inhabitants.[361] It
can easily be believed that, like many words spoken in passion, the
phrase far outran his purposes; but it has significance and value as
indicating the manner in which Americans had come to be regarded in
Great Britain, through the experience of the period of peace and the
recent years of war.
However the British Government might justify in terms the impressment
of seamen from American ships, or the delay of atonement for such an
insult as that of the Chesapeake, the nation which endured the same,
content with reams of argument instead of blow for blow, had sunk
beneath contempt as an inferior race, to be cowed and handled without
gloves by those who felt themselves the masters. Nor was the matter
bettered by the notorious fact that the interference with the freedom
of American trade, which Great Britain herself admitted to be outside
the law, had been borne unresisted because of the pecuniary stake
involved. The impression thus produced was deepened by the confident
boasts of immediate successes in Canada, made by leading members of
the party which brought on the war; followed as these were by a
display of inefficiency so ludicrous that opponents, as well native as
foreign, did not hesitate to apply to it the word "imbecility." The
American for a dozen years had been clubbed without giving evidence of
rebellion, beyond words; now that he showed signs of restiveness,
without corresponding evidence of power, he should feel the lash, and
there need be no nicety in measuring punishment. Codrington, an
officer of mark and character, who joined Cochrane at this time as
chief of staff, used expressions which doubtless convey the average
point of view of the British officer of that day: President Madison,
"by letting his generals burn villages in Canada again, has been
trying to excite terror; but as you may shortly see by the public
exposition of the Admiral's orders, the terror and the suffering will
probably be brought home to the doors of his own fellow citizens. I am
fully convinced that this is the true way to end this Yankee war,
whatever may be said in Parliament against it."[362]
It is the grievous fault of all retaliation, especially in the heat of
war, that it rarely stays its hand at an equal measure, but almost
invariably proceeds to an excess which provokes the other party to
seek in turn to even the scale. The process tends to be unending; and
it is to the honor of the United States Government that, though
technically responsible for the acts of agents which it was too
inefficient to control, it did not seriously entertain the purpose of
resorting to this means, to vindicate the wrongs of its citizens at
the expense of the subjects of its opponent. Happily, the external
brutality of attitude which Cochrane's expression so aptly conveyed
yielded for the most part to nobler instincts in the British officers.
There was indeed much to condemn, much done that ought not to have
been done; but even in the contemporary accounts it is quite possible
to trace a certain rough humanity, a wish to deal equitably with
individuals, for whom, regarded nationally, they professed no respect.
Even in the marauding of the Chesapeake, the idea of compensation for
value taken was not lost to view; and in general the usages of war, as
to property exempt from destruction or appropriation, were respected,
although not without the rude incidents certain to occur where
atonement for acts of resistance, or the price paid for property
taken, is fixed by the victor.
If retaliation upon any but the immediate culprit is ever permissible,
which in national matters will scarcely be contested, it is logically
just that it should fall first of all upon the capital, where the
interests and honor of the nation are centred. There, if anywhere, the
responsibility for the war and all its incidents is concrete in the
representatives of the nation, executive and legislative, and in the
public offices from which all overt acts are presumed to emanate. So
it befell the United States. In the first six months of 1814, the
warfare in the Chesapeake continued on the same general lines as in
1813; there having been the usual remission of activity during the
winter, to resume again as milder weather drew on. The blockade of the
bay was sustained, with force adequate to make it technically
effective, although Baltimore boasted that several of her clipper
schooners got to sea. On the part of the United States, Captain Gordon
of the navy had been relieved in charge of the bay flotilla by
Commodore Barney, of revolutionary and privateering renown. This local
command, in conformity with the precedent at New York, and as was due
to so distinguished an officer, was made independent of other branches
of the naval service; the commodore being in immediate communication
with the Navy Department. On April 17, he left Baltimore and proceeded
down the bay with thirteen vessels; ten of them being large barges or
galleys, propelled chiefly by oars, the others gunboats of the
ordinary type. The headquarters of this little force became the
Patuxent River, to which in the sequel it was in great measure
confined; the superiority of the enemy precluding any enlarged sphere
of activity. Its presence, however, was a provocation to the British,
as being the only floating force in the bay capable of annoying them;
the very existence of which was a challenge to their supremacy. To
destroy it became therefore a dominant motive, which was utilized also
to conceal to the last their purpose, tentative indeed throughout, to
make a dash at Washington.
The Patuxent enters Chesapeake Bay from the north and west, sixty
miles below Baltimore, and twenty above the mouth of the Potomac, to
the general direction of which its own course in its lower part is
parallel. For boats drawing no more than did Barney's it is navigable
for forty miles from its mouth, to Pig Point; whence to Washington by
land is but fifteen miles. A pursuit of the flotilla so far therefore
brought pursuers within easy striking distance of the capital,
provided that between them and it stood no obstacle adequate to impose
delay until resistance could gather. It was impossible for such a
pursuit to be made by the navy alone; for, inadequate as the militia
was to the protection of the bay shore from raiding, it was quite
competent to act in conjunction with Barney, when battling only
against boats, which alone could follow him into lairs accessible to
him, but not to even the smaller vessels of the enemy. Ships of the
largest size could enter the river, but could ascend it only a little
way. Up the Patuxent itself, or in its tributaries, the Americans
therefore had always against the British Navy a refuge, in which they
might be blockaded indeed, but could not be reached. For all these
reasons, in order to destroy the flotilla, a body of troops must be
used; a necessity which served to mask any ulterior design.
In the course of these operations, and in support of them, the British
Navy had created a post at Tangier Island, ten miles across the bay,
opposite the mouth of the Potomac.[363] Here they threw up
fortifications, and established an advanced rendezvous. Between the
island and the eastern shore, Tangier Sound gave sheltered anchorage.
The position was in every way convenient, and strategically central.
Being the junction of the water routes to Baltimore and Washington, it
threatened both; while the narrowness of the Chesapeake at this point
constituted the force there assembled an inner blockading line, well
situated to move rapidly at short notice in any direction, up or down,
to one side or the other. At such short distance from the Patuxent,
Barney's movements were of course well under observation, as he at
once experienced. On June 1, he left the river, apparently with a view
to reaching the Potomac. Two schooners becalmed were then visible, and
pursuit was made with the oars; but soon a large ship was seen under
sail, despatching a number of barges to their assistance. A breeze
springing up from southwest put the ship to windward, between the
Potomac and the flotilla, which was obliged to return to the Patuxent,
closely followed by the enemy. Some distant shots were exchanged, but
Barney escaped, and for the time was suffered to remain undisturbed
three miles from the bay; a 74-gun ship lying at the river's mouth,
with barges plying continually about her. The departure of the
British schooners, however, was construed to indicate a return with
re-enforcements for an attack; an anticipation not disappointed. Two
more vessels soon joined the seventy-four; one of them a brig. On
their appearance Barney shifted his berth two miles further up,
abreast St. Leonard's Creek. At daylight of June 9, one of the ships,
the brig, two schooners, and fifteen rowing barges, were seen coming
up with a fair wind. The flotilla then retreated two miles up the
creek, formed there across it in line abreast, and awaited attack. The
enemy's vessels could not follow; but their boats did, and a skirmish
ensued which ended in the British retiring. Later in the day the
attempt was renewed with no better success; and Barney claimed that,
having followed the boats in their retreat, he had seriously disabled
one of the large schooners anchored off the mouth of the creek to
support the movement.
There is no doubt that the American gunboats were manfully and
skilfully handled, and that the crews in this and subsequent
encounters gained confidence and skill, the evidences of which were
shown afterwards at Bladensburg, remaining the only alleviating
remembrance from that day of disgrace. From Barney would be expected
no less than the most that man can do, or example effect; but his
pursuit was stopped by the ship and the brig, which stayed within the
Patuxent. The flotilla continued inside the creek, two frigates lying
off its mouth, until June 26, when an attack by the boats, in concert
with a body of militia,--infantry and light artillery,--decided the
enemy to move down the Patuxent. Barney took advantage of this to
leave the creek and go up the river. We are informed by a journal of
the day that the Government was by these affairs well satisfied with
the ability of the flotilla to restrain the operations of the enemy
within the waters of the Chesapeake, and had determined on a
considerable increase to it. Nothing seems improbable of that
Government; but, if this be true, it must have been easily satisfied.
Barney had secured a longer line of retreat, up the river; but the
situation was not materially changed. In either case, creek or river,
there was but one way out, and that was closed. He could only abide
the time when the enemy should see fit to come against him by land and
by water, which would seal his fate.[364]
On June 2 there had sailed from Bordeaux for America a detachment from
Wellington's army, twenty-five hundred strong, under Major-General
Ross. It reached Bermuda July 25, and there was re-enforced by another
battalion, increasing its strength to thirty-four hundred. On August 3
it left Bermuda, accompanied by several ships of war, and on the 15th
passed in by the capes of the Chesapeake. Admiral Cochrane had
preceded it by a few days, and was already lying there with his own
ship and the division under Rear-Admiral Cockburn, who hitherto had
been in immediate charge of operations in the bay. There were now
assembled over twenty vessels of war, four of them of the line, with a
large train of transports and store-ships. A battalion of seven
hundred marines were next detailed for duty with the troops, the
landing force being thus raised to over four thousand. The rendezvous
at Tangier Island gave the Americans no certain clue to the ultimate
object, for the reason already cited; and Cochrane designedly
contributed to their distraction, by sending one squadron of frigates
up the Potomac, and another up the Chesapeake above Baltimore.[365] On
August 18 the main body of the expedition moved abreast the mouth of
the Patuxent, and at noon of that day entered the river with a fair
wind.
The purposes at this moment of the commanders of the army and navy,
acting jointly, are succinctly stated by Cochrane in his report to the
Admiralty: "Information from Rear-Admiral Cockburn that Commodore
Barney, with the Potomac flotilla, had taken shelter at the head of
the Patuxent, afforded a pretext for ascending that river to attack
him near its source, above Pig Point, while the ultimate destination
of the combined force was Washington, should it be found that the
attempt might be made with any prospect of success."[366] August 19,
the troops were landed at Benedict, twenty-five miles from the mouth
of the river, and the following day began their upward march, flanked
by a naval division of light vessels; the immediate objective being
Barney's flotilla.
For the defence of the capital of the United States, throughout the
region by which it might be approached, the Government had selected
Brigadier-General Winder; the same who the year before had been
captured at Stoney Creek, on the Niagara frontier, in Vincent's bold
night attack. He was appointed July 2 to the command of a new military
district, the tenth, which comprised "the state of Maryland, the
District of Columbia, and that part of Virginia lying between the
Potomac and the Rappahannock;"[367] in brief, Washington and
Baltimore, with the ways converging upon them from the sea. This was
just seven weeks before the enemy landed in the Patuxent; time enough,
with reasonable antecedent preparation, or trained troops, to concert
adequate resistance, as was shown by the British subsequent failure
before Baltimore.
The conditions with which Winder had to contend are best stated in the
terms of the Court of Inquiry[368] called to investigate his conduct,
at the head of which sat General Winfield Scott. After fixing the
date of his appointment, and ascertaining that he at once took every
means in his power to put his district in a proper state of defence,
the court found that on August 24, the day of the battle of
Bladensburg, he "was enabled by great and unremitting exertions to
bring into the field about five or six thousand men, all of whom
except four hundred were militia; that he could not collect more than
half his men until a day or two previously to the engagement, and six
or seven hundred of them did not arrive until fifteen minutes before
its commencement; ... that the officers commanding the troops were
generally unknown to him, and but a very small number of them had
enjoyed the benefit of military instruction or experience." So far
from attributing censure, the Court found that, "taking into
consideration the complicated difficulties and embarrassments under
which he labored, he is entitled to no little commendation,
notwithstanding the result; before the action he exhibited industry,
zeal, and talent, and during its continuance a coolness, a
promptitude, and a personal valor, highly honorable to himself."
The finding of a court composed of competent experts, convened shortly
after the events, must be received with respect. It is clear, however,
that they here do not specify the particular professional merits of
Winder's conduct of operations, but only the general hopelessness of
success, owing to the antecedent conditions, not of his making, under
which he was called to act, and which he strenuously exerted himself
to meet. The blame for a mishap evidently and easily preventible still
remains, and, though of course not expressed by the Court, is
necessarily thrown back upon the Administration, and upon the party
represented by it, which had held power for over twelve years past. A
hostile corps of less than five thousand men had penetrated to the
capital, through a well populated country, which was, to quote the
Secretary of War, "covered with wood, and offering at every step
strong positions for defence;"[369] but there were neither defences
nor defenders.
The sequence of events which terminated in this humiliating manner is
instructive. The Cabinet, which on June 7 had planned offensive
operations in Canada, met on July 1 in another frame of mind, alarmed
by the news from Europe, to plan for the defence of Washington and
Baltimore. It will be remembered that it was now two years since war
had been declared. In counting the force on which reliance might be
placed for meeting a possible enemy, the Secretary of War thought he
could assemble one thousand regulars, independent of artillerists in
the forts.[2] The Secretary of the Navy could furnish one hundred and
twenty marines, and the crews of Barney's flotilla, estimated at five
hundred.[2] For the rest, dependence must be upon militia, a call for
which was issued to the number of ninety-three thousand, five
hundred.[370] Of these, fifteen thousand were assigned to Winder, as
follows: From Virginia, two thousand; from Maryland, six thousand;
from Pennsylvania, five thousand; from the District of Columbia, two
thousand.[371] So ineffective were the administrative measures for
bringing out this paper force of citizen soldiery, the efficiency of
which the leaders of the party in power had been accustomed to vaunt,
that Winder, after falling back from point to point before the enemy's
advance, because only so might time be gained to get together the
lagging contingents, could muster in the open ground at Bladensburg,
five miles from the capital, where at last he made his stand, only the
paltry five or six thousand stated by the court. On the morning of the
battle the Secretary of War rode out to the field, with his colleagues
in the Administration, and in reply to a question from the President
said he had no suggestions to offer; "as it was between regulars and
militia, the latter would be beaten."[372] The phrase was Winder's
absolution; pronounced for the future, as for the past. The
responsibility for there being no regulars did not rest with him, nor
yet with the Secretary, but with the men who for a dozen years had
sapped the military preparation of the nation.
Under the relative conditions of the opposing forces which have been
stated, the progress of events was rapid. Probably few now realize
that only a little over four days elapsed from the landing of the
British to the burning of the Capitol. Their army advanced along the
west bank of the Patuxent to Upper Marlborough, forty miles from the
river's mouth. To this place, which was reached August 22, Ross
continued in direct touch with the navy; and here at Pig Point, nearly
abreast on the river, the American flotilla was cornered at last.
Seeing the inevitable event, and to preserve his small but invaluable
force of men, Barney had abandoned the boats on the 21st, leaving with
each a half-dozen of her crew to destroy her at the last moment. This
was done when the British next day approached; one only escaping the
flames.
The city of Washington, now the goal of the enemy's effort, lies on
the Potomac, between it and a tributary called the Eastern Branch.
Upon the east bank of the latter, five or six miles from the junction
of the two streams, is the village of Bladensburg. From Upper
Marlborough, where the British had arrived, two roads led to
Washington. One of these, the left going from Marlborough, crossed the
Eastern Branch near its mouth; the other, less direct, passed through
Bladensburg. Winder expected the British to advance by the former; and
upon it Barney with the four hundred seamen remaining to him joined
the army, at a place called Oldfields, seven miles from the capital.
This route was militarily the more important, because from it branches
were thrown off to the Potomac, up which the frigate squadron under
Captain Gordon was proceeding, and had already passed the
Kettle-bottoms, the most difficult bit of navigation in its path. The
side roads would enable the invaders to reach and co-operate with this
naval division; unless indeed Winder could make head against them.
This he was not able to do; but he remained almost to the last moment
in perplexing uncertainty whether they would strike for the capital,
or for its principal defence on the Potomac, Fort Washington, ten
miles lower down.[373]
[Illustration: SKETCH _of the_ MARCH OF THE BRITISH ARMY Under
Gen. Ross _From the 19th. to the 29th. August 1814_]
For the obvious reasons named, because the doubts of their opponent
facilitated their own movements by harassing his mind, as well as for
the strategic advantage of a central line permitting movement in two
directions at choice, the British advanced, as anticipated, by the
left-hand road, and at nightfall of August 23 were encamped about
three miles from the Americans. Here Winder covered a junction; for at
Oldfields the road by which the British were advancing forked. One
division led to Washington direct, crossing the Eastern Branch of the
Potomac where it is broadest and deepest, near its mouth; the other
passed it at Bladensburg. Winder feared to await the enemy, because of
the disorder to which his inexperienced troops would be exposed by a
night attack, causing possibly the loss of his artillery; the one arm
in which he felt himself superior. He retired therefore during the
night by the direct road, burning its bridge. This left open the way
to Bladensburg, which the British next day followed, arriving at the
village towards noon of the 24th. Contrary to Winder's instruction,
the officer stationed there had withdrawn his troops across the
stream, abandoning the place, and forming his line on the crest of
some hills on the west bank. The impression which this position made
upon the enemy was described by General Ross, as follows: "They were
strongly posted on very commanding heights, formed in two lines, the
advance occupying a fortified house, which with artillery covered the
bridge over the Eastern Branch, across which the British troops had to
pass. A broad and straight road, leading from the bridge to
Washington, ran through the enemy's position, which was carefully
defended by artillerymen and riflemen."[374] Allowing for the tendency
to magnify difficulties overcome, the British would have had before
them a difficult task, if opposed by men accustomed to mutual support
and mutual reliance, with the thousand-fold increase of strength which
comes with such habit and with the moral confidence it gives.
The American line had been formed before Winder came on the ground. It
extended across the Washington road as described by Ross. A battery on
the hill-top commanded the bridge, and was supported by a line of
infantry on either side, with a second line in the rear. Fearing,
however, that the enemy might cross the stream higher up, where it was
fordable in many places, a regiment from the second line was
reluctantly ordered forward to extend the left; and Winder, when he
arrived, while approving this disposition, carried thither also some
of the artillery which he had brought with him.[375] The anxiety of
the Americans was therefore for their left. The British commander was
eager to be done with his job, and to get back to his ships from a
position militarily insecure. He had long been fighting Napoleon's
troops in the Spanish peninsula, and was not yet fully imbued with
Drummond's conviction that with American militia liberties might be
taken beyond the limit of ordinary military precaution. No time was
spent looking for a ford, but the troops dashed straight for the
bridge. The fire of the American artillery was excellent, and mowed
down the head of the column; but the seasoned men persisted and forced
their way across. At this moment Barney was coming up with his seamen,
and at Winder's request brought his guns into line across the
Washington road, facing the bridge. Soon after this, a few rockets
passing close over the heads of the battalions supporting the
batteries on the left started them running, much as a mule train may
be stampeded by a night alarm. It was impossible to rally them. A part
held for a short time; but when Winder attempted to retire them a
little way, from a fire which had begun to annoy them, they also broke
and fled.[376]
The American left was thus routed, but Barney's battery and its
supporting infantry still held their ground. "During this period,"
reported the Commodore,--that is, while his guns were being brought
into battery, and the remainder of his seamen and marines posted to
support them,--"the engagement continued, the enemy advancing, and our
own army retreating before them, apparently in much disorder. At
length the enemy made his appearance on the main road, in force, in
front of my battery, and on seeing us made a halt. I reserved our
fire. In a few minutes the enemy again advanced, when I ordered an
18-pounder to be fired, which completely cleared the road; shortly
after, a second and a third attempt was made by the enemy to come
forward, but all were destroyed. They then crossed into an open field
and attempted to flank our right; he was met there by three
12-pounders, the marines under Captain Miller, and my men, acting as
infantry, and again was totally cut up. By this time not a vestige of
the American army remained, except a body of five or six hundred,
posted on a height on my right, from whom I expected much support from
their fine situation."[377]
In this expectation Barney was disappointed. The enemy desisted from
direct attack and worked gradually round towards his right flank and
rear. As they thus moved, the guns of course were turned towards them;
but a charge being made up the hill by a force not exceeding half that
of its defenders, they also "to my great mortification made no
resistance, giving a fire or two, and retired. Our ammunition was
expended, and unfortunately the drivers of my ammunition wagons had
gone off in the general panic." Barney himself, being wounded and
unable to escape from loss of blood, was left a prisoner. Two of his
officers were killed, and two wounded. The survivors stuck to him till
he ordered them off the ground. Ross and Cockburn were brought to him,
and greeted him with a marked respect and politeness; and he reported
that, during the stay of the British in Bladensburg, he was treated by
all "like a brother," to use his own words.[378]
The character of this affair is sufficiently shown by the above
outline narrative, re-enforced by the account of the losses sustained.
Of the victors sixty-four were killed, one hundred and eighty-five
wounded. The defeated, by the estimate of their superintending
surgeon, had ten or twelve killed and forty wounded.[379] Such a
disparity of injury is usual when the defendants are behind
fortifications; but in this case of an open field, and a river to be
crossed by the assailants, the evident significance is that the party
attacked did not wait to contest the ground, once the enemy had gained
the bridge. After that, not only was the rout complete, but, save for
Barney's tenacity, there was almost no attempt at resistance. Ten
pieces of cannon remained in the hands of the British. "The rapid
flight of the enemy," reported General Ross, "and his knowledge of the
country, precluded the possibility of many prisoners being
taken."[380]
That night the British entered Washington. The Capitol, White House,
and several public buildings were burned by them; the navy yard and
vessels by the American authorities. Ross, accustomed to European
warfare, did not feel Drummond's easiness concerning his position,
which technically was most insecure as regarded his communications. On
the evening of June 25 he withdrew rapidly, and on that of the 26th
regained touch with the fleet in the Patuxent, after a separation of
only four days. Cockburn remarked in his official report that there
was no molestation of their retreat; "not a single musket having been
fired."[381] It was the completion of the Administration's disgrace,
unrelieved by any feature of credit save the gallant stand of Barney's
four hundred.
The burning of Washington was the impressive culmination of the
devastation to which the coast districts were everywhere exposed by
the weakness of the country, while the battle of Bladensburg crowned
the humiliation entailed upon the nation by the demagogic prejudices
in favor of untrained patriotism, as supplying all defects for
ordinary service in the field. In the defenders of Bladensburg was
realized Jefferson's ideal of a citizen soldiery,[382] unskilled, but
strong in their love of home, flying to arms to oppose an invader; and
they had every inspiring incentive to tenacity, for they, and they
only, stood between the enemy and the centre and heart of national
life. The position they occupied, though unfortified, had many natural
advantages; while the enemy had to cross a river which, while in part
fordable, was nevertheless an obstacle to rapid action, especially
when confronted by the superior artillery the Americans had. The
result has been told; but only when contrasted with the contemporary
fight at Lundy's Lane is Bladensburg rightly appreciated. Occurring
precisely a month apart, and with men of the same race, they
illustrate exactly the difference in military value between crude
material and finished product.
Coincident with the capture of Washington, a little British
squadron--two frigates and five smaller vessels--ascended the Potomac.
Fort Washington, a dozen miles below the capital, was abandoned August
27 by the officer in charge, removing the only obstacle due to the
foresight of the Government. He was afterwards cashiered by sentence
of court martial. On the 29th, Captain Gordon, the senior officer,
anchored his force before Alexandria, of which he kept possession for
three days. Upon withdrawing, he carried away all the merchantmen that
were seaworthy, having loaded them with merchandise awaiting
exportation. Energetic efforts were made by Captains Rodgers, Perry,
and Porter, of the American Navy, to molest the enemy's retirement by
such means as could be extemporized; but both ships and prizes
escaped, the only loss being in life: seven killed and forty-five
wounded.
After the burning of Washington, the British main fleet and army moved
up the Chesapeake against Baltimore, which would undoubtedly have
undergone the lot of Alexandria, in a contribution laid upon shipping
and merchandise. The attack, however, was successfully met. The
respite afforded by the expedition against Washington had been
improved by the citizens to interpose earthworks on the hills before
the city. This local precaution saved the place. In the field the
militia behaved better than at Bladensburg, but showed, nevertheless,
the unsteadiness of raw men. To harass the British advance a body of
riflemen had been posted well forward, and a shot from these mortally
wounded General Ross; but, "imagine my chagrin, when I perceived the
whole corps falling back upon my main position, having too credulously
listened to groundless information that the enemy was landing on Back
River to cut them off."[383]
The British approached along the narrow strip of land between the
Patapsco and Back rivers. The American general, Stricker, had
judiciously selected for his line of defence a neck, where inlets from
both streams narrowed the ground to half a mile. His flanks were thus
protected, but the water on the left giving better indication of being
fordable, the British directed there the weight of the assault. To
meet this, Stricker drew up a regiment to the rear of his main line,
and at right angles, the volleys from which should sweep the inlet.
When the enemy's attack developed, this regiment "delivered one random
fire," and then broke and fled; "totally forgetful of the honor of the
brigade, and of its own reputation," to use Stricker's words.[384]
This flight carried along part of the left flank proper. The remainder
of the line held for a time, and then retired without awaiting the
hostile bayonet. The American report gives the impression of an
orderly retreat; a British participant, who admits that the ground was
well chosen, and that the line held until within twenty yards, wrote
that after that he never witnessed a more complete rout. The invaders
then approached the city, but upon viewing the works of defence, and
learning that the fleet would not be able to co-operate, owing to
vessels sunk across the channel, the commanding officer decided that
success would not repay the loss necessary to achieve it. Fleet and
army then withdrew.
The attacks on Washington and Baltimore, the seizure of Alexandria,
and the general conduct of operations in the Chesapeake, belong
strictly to the punitive purpose which dictated British measures upon
the seaboard. Similar action extended through Long Island Sound, and
to the eastward, where alarm in all quarters was maintained by the
general enterprise of the enemy, and by specific injury in various
places. "The Government has declared war against the most powerful
maritime nation," wrote the Governor of Massachusetts to the
legislature, "and we are disappointed in our expectations of national
defence. But though we may be convinced that the war was unnecessary
and unjust, and has been prosecuted without any useful or practicable
object with the inhabitants of Canada, while our seacoast has been
left almost defenceless, yet I presume there will be no doubt of our
right to defend our possessions against any hostile attack by which
their destruction is menaced." "The eastern coast," reports a journal
of the time, "is much vexed by the enemy. Having destroyed a great
portion of the coasting craft, they seem determined to enter the
little outports and villages, and burn everything that floats."[385]
On April 7, six British barges ascended the Connecticut River eight
miles, to Pettipaug, where they burned twenty-odd sea-going
vessels.[386] On June 13, at Wareham, Massachusetts, a similar
expedition entered and destroyed sixteen.[387] These were somewhat
large instances of an action everywhere going on, inflicting
indirectly incalculably more injury than even the direct loss
suffered; the whole being with a view to bring the meaning of war
close home to the consciousness of the American people. They were to
be made to realize the power of the enemy and their own helplessness.
An attempt looking to more permanent results was made during the
summer upon the coast of Maine. The northward projection of that
state, then known as the District of Maine,[388] intervened between
the British provinces of Lower Canada and New Brunswick, and imposed a
long détour upon the line of communications between Quebec and
Halifax, the two most important military posts in British North
America. This inconvenience could not be remedied unless the land in
question were brought into British possession; and when the end of the
war in Europe gave prospect of a vigorous offensive from the side of
Canada, the British ministry formulated the purpose of demanding there
a rectification of frontier. The object in this case being
acquisition, not punishment, conciliation of the inhabitants was to be
practised; in place of the retaliatory action prescribed for the
sea-coast elsewhere.
Moose Island, in Passamaquoddy Bay, though held by the United States,
was claimed by Great Britain to have been always within the boundary
line of New Brunswick. It was seized July 11, 1814; protection being
promised to persons and property. In August, General Sherbrooke, the
Governor of Nova Scotia, received orders "to occupy so much of the
District of Maine as shall insure an uninterrupted communication
between Halifax and Quebec."[389] His orders being discretional as to
method, he decided that with the force available he would best comply
by taking possession of Machias and the Penobscot River.[390] On
September 1, a combined naval and army expedition appeared at the
mouth of the Penobscot, before Castine, which was quickly abandoned. A
few days before, the United States frigate "Adams," Captain Charles
Morris, returning from a cruise, had run ashore upon Isle au Haut, and
in consequence of the injuries received had been compelled to make a
harbor in the river. She was then at Hampden, thirty miles up. A
detachment of seamen and soldiers was sent against her. Her guns had
been landed, and placed in battery for her defence, and militia had
gathered for the support necessary to artillery so situated; but they
proved unreliable, and upon their retreat nothing was left but to fire
the ship.[391] This was done, the crew escaping. The British
penetrated as far as Bangor, seized a number of merchant vessels, and
subsequently went to Machias, where they captured the fort with
twenty-five cannon. Sherbrooke then returned with the most of his
force to Halifax, whence he issued a voluminous proclamation[392] to
the effect that he had taken possession of all the country between the
Penobscot and New Brunswick; and promised protection to the
inhabitants, if they behaved themselves accordingly. Two regiments
were left at Castine, with transports to remove them in case of attack
by superior numbers. This burlesque of occupation, "one foot on shore,
and one on sea," was advanced by the British ministry as a reason
justifying the demand for cession of the desired territory to the
northward. Wellington, when called into counsel concerning American
affairs, said derisively that an officer might as well claim
sovereignty over the ground on which he had posted his pickets. The
British force remained undisturbed, however, to the end of the war.
Amicable relations were established with the inhabitants, and a brisk
contraband trade throve with Nova Scotia. It is even said that the
news of peace was unwelcome in the place. It was not evacuated until
April 27, 1815.[393]
FOOTNOTES:
[348] "Some Account of the Life of Sir George Prevost." London, 1823,
pp. 136, 137. The author has not been able to find the despatch of June
3, 1814, there quoted.
[349] Warren to Croker, Feb. 26, 1813. Admiralty In-Letters MSS.
[350] Croker to Warren, March 20, 1813. Admiralty Out-Letters.
[351] Warren to Croker, Jan. 28, 1814. Canadian Archives MSS.
[352] Cochrane to Bathurst, July 14, 1814. War Office In-Letters MSS.
[353] Bathurst's Instructions to the officer in command of the troops
detached from the Gironde. May 20, 1814. From copy sent to Cochrane.
Admiralty In-Letters, from Secretary of State.
[354] Gallatin to Monroe, London, June 13, 1814. Adams' Writings of
Gallatin, vol. i. p. 627.
[355] Sinclair, Erie, May 13, 1814. Captains' Letters.
[356] Cruikshank's Documentary History of the Campaign of 1814, p. 18.
[357] Ibid., p. 74.
[358] Cruikshank's Documentary History, pp. 414, 415.
[359] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. pp. 693, 694.
[360] Cochrane to Prevost, July 26, 1814. Canadian Archives MSS., C.
684, p. 231.
[361] Report on Canadian Archives, 1896, p. 54.
[362] Life of Sir Edward Codrington, vol. i. p. 313.
[363] See Map of Chesapeake Bay, ante, p. 156.
[364] This account of Barney's movements is summarized from his letters,
and others, published in Niles' Register, vol. vi. pp. 244, 268, 300.
[365] Report of Admiral Cochrane, Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxii. p. 342.
[366] Report of Admiral Cochrane, Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxii. p. 342.
[367] American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. i. p. 524.
[368] The finding of the Court of Inquiry was published in Niles'
Register for Feb. 25, 1815, from the official paper, the National
Intelligencer. Niles, vol. vii. p. 410.
[369] Report of Secretary Armstrong to a Committee of the House of
Representatives. American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. i. p.
526.
[370] Ibid., pp. 538, 540, 524.
[371] Ibid., p. 524.
[372] Works of Madison (Ed. 1865), vol. iii. p. 422.
[373] Winder's Narrative. American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol.
i pp. 552-560.
[374] Ross's Despatch, Aug. 30, 1814. Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxii. p.
338.
[375] Narrative of Monroe, the Secretary of State. American State
Papers, Military Affairs, vol. i. p. 536.
[376] Winder's Narrative.
[377] Barney's Report, Aug. 29, 1814. State Papers, Military Affairs,
vol. i. p. 579.
[378] Barney's Report.
[379] American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. i. p. 530.
[380] Ross's Despatch.
[381] Report of Rear-Admiral Cockburn, Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxii. p.
345.
[382] Ante, p. 213.
[383] Report of Brigadier-General Stricker of the Maryland militia.
Niles' Register, vol. vii. pp. 27, 28.
[384] Ibid.
[385] Niles' Register, vol. vi. p. 317.
[386] Ibid., pp. 118, 133, 222.
[387] Ibid., p. 317.
[388] Maine was then attached politically to Massachusetts.
[389] Sherbrooke to Prevost, Aug. 2, 1814. Canadian Archives MSS., C.
685, p. 28.
[390] Sherbrooke to Prevost, Aug. 24, 1814. Ibid., p. 147.
[391] Morris' reports (Captains' Letters, Navy Dept.) are published in
Niles' Register, vol. vii. pp. 62, 63; and Supplement, p. 136.
[392] Sept. 21, 1814. Niles' Register, vol. vii. p. 117.
[393] Ibid., p. 347, and vol. viii. pp. 13, 214.