THE NIAGARA CAMPAIGN, AND EVENTS ON THE GREAT LAKES, IN
1814
Active operations in the field for the winter of 1813-14 came to an
end with the successful incursion of the British army upon the
territory of the State of New York, before narrated.[266] This had
resulted in the capture of Fort Niagara and in the wasting of the
frontier, with the destruction of the villages of Lewiston,
Manchester, Buffalo, and others, in retaliation for the American
burning of Newark. Holding now the forts on both banks of the Niagara,
at its entrance into Lake Ontario, the British controlled the harbor
of refuge which its mouth afforded; and to this important accession of
strength for naval operations was added an increased security for
passing troops, at will and secretly, from side to side of the river.
From a military standpoint each work was a bridge-head, assuring
freedom of movement across in either direction; that such transit was
by boats, instead of by a permanent structure, was merely an
inconvenient detail, not a disability. The command of the two forts,
and of a third called Mississaga, on the Canadian side, immediately
overlooking the lake, appears to have been vested in a single officer,
to whom, as to a common superior, were issued orders involving the
action of the three.
This disposition recognized implicitly the fact that the forts, taken
together, constituted a distinct element in the general British scheme
of operations. Fort Niagara by position threatened the line of
communications of any American army seeking to act on the Canadian
side. An effective garrison there, unless checked by an adequate force
stationed for the particular purpose, could move at any unexpected
moment against the magazines or trains on the American side; and it
was impossible to anticipate what number might be thus employed at a
given time, because intercourse between Niagara and George was open.
If by original or acquired superiority of numbers, as had been the
case in 1813, the American general should push his opponent back
towards the head of the lake, Fort George would in turn become an
additional menace to his communications. Therefore, properly to
initiate a campaign for the command of the Niagara peninsula, in 1814,
it would be necessary either to reduce both these works, which, if
they were properly garrisoned, meant an expenditure of time; or else
to blockade them by a large detachment of troops, which meant a
constant expenditure of force, diminishing that available for
operations in the field. The British military situation thus comprised
two factors, distinct but complementary; the active army in the field,
and the stationary fortifications which contributed to its support by
sheltering its supplies and menacing those of the enemy. The British
commander of the district, Lieutenant-General Drummond, estimated that
the blockaders before either fort, being ever on the defensive against
a sortie which they could not foresee, must in numbers considerably
exceed the besieged, covered as these were by their works, and able to
receive re-enforcement from the opposite shore. Consequently, when the
officer in immediate local control, Major-General Riall, embarrassed
by the smallness of his field force, suggested the destruction of Fort
Niagara, except a citadel of restricted extent, needing a less
numerous garrison, his superior replied that not only would such
smaller work be much more easily taken, but that in every event the
loss through holding the place was more than compensated by the
danger and the precautions entailed upon the enemy.[267]
The inactivity, substantially unbroken, which prevailed throughout the
winter of 1813-14, was due principally to the unusual mildness of the
weather. This impeded movement in all quarters, by preventing the
formation of ice and of the usual hard snow surface, which made winter
the most favorable season for land transportation. Chauncey at
Sackett's Harbor chafed and fretted over the detention of the stores
and guns for his new ships then building, upon which he was reckoning
for control of the lake. "The roads are dreadful," he wrote on
February 24, "and if the present mild weather continues we shall
experience difficulty." A week later, "I have the mortification to
inform you that all our heavy guns are stopped at and below
Poughkeepsie in consequence of the badness of the roads, and that the
teamsters have abandoned them there." He has given up hopes of a
frost, and counts now only upon water communication; but the delay and
change of route were the cause of two smart affairs with which the
lake operations opened, for on March 29 he announces that the guns are
still below Albany, and now must come by way of Oswego and the
lake,[268] instead of securely inland by sleds. Yeo reported a like
delay on his side in the equipment of his new ships, owing to the
unusual scarcity of snow.
The same conditions imposed similar, if less decisive, limitations
upon the movements of bodies of men. The most important instance of
purpose frustrated was in an enterprise projected by Drummond against
Put-in Bay, where were still lying the "Detroit" and "Queen
Charlotte", the most powerful of the prizes taken by Perry the
previous September, the injuries to which had prevented their removal
to the safer position of Erie. On January 21 he communicated to
Governor-General Prevost the details of an expedition of seventeen
hundred and sixty men,[269] two hundred of them seamen, who were to
start from the Niagara frontier by land against Detroit, and from
there to cross on the ice to the Bass Islands, where it was hoped they
could seize and burn the vessels. The occupation of Fort Niagara, and
other dispositions made of his division on the peninsula, had so
narrowed his front of defence, and thereby strengthened it, as to
warrant this large detachment.
This project was one of several looking to regaining control of Lake
Erie, which during the remainder of the war occupied unceasingly the
attention of British officers. Although the particular destination was
successfully concealed, the general fact of preparations for some
offensive undertaking did not escape the observation of the Americans,
who noted that in the recent raid and destruction care had been taken
to spare a great number of sleighs, and to collect them within the
British lines. From this it was inferred that, when Lake Erie froze
over, a dash would be made against the naval station and ships at
Erie.[270] This would be undoubtedly a more valuable achievement, but
the enemy knew that the place was in some measure defended, with ample
re-enforcements at call; whereas a descent upon Put-in Bay could
encounter no other resistance than that of the small permanent
garrison of seamen. The mildness of the weather, leaving the lake open
on January 17, relieved the apprehension of the United States
authorities, and on February 3 Drummond had to report that his scheme
must be abandoned, as after that late period of the winter better
conditions could not be expected.[271]
In default of the control of Lake Erie, measures were taken by the
British to supply the remote and isolated posts of Mackinac and St.
Joseph's by land carriage from Toronto to Lake Simcoe, a distance of
only forty miles, and thence across the ice to Matchedash Bay, on Lake
Huron; where also were being built batteaux and gunboats, to transport
the stores to their destination when navigation opened. As far as
Huron this land route was out of reach of probable molestation, but
from there it was necessary to proceed at the earliest moment; for,
although there was no American naval force then on that lake, one
might be expected to arrive from Erie early in the season. To this
cross-country line there was an alternative one still more remote,
from Montreal up the Ottawa River, and thence by other water
communication, striking Lake Huron much higher up. It was practicable
only for canoes with light lading, and in other respects not
satisfactory. The maintenance of Mackinac therefore must depend upon
armed control of the upper lakes; and to this the destruction of the
prizes at the islands would doubtless have contributed, morally and
materially.
On the American side as little was accomplished during the winter.
Wilkinson's army, which at the end of 1813 was cantoned at French
Mills, on the Salmon River, just within the New York boundary, was
withdrawn from that position February 13. The greater part marched to
Lake Champlain, where they again took winter quarters in two
divisions; one at Burlington, Vermont, the other at Plattsburg. The
third contingent, under the command of General Brown, was sent to
Sackett's Harbor, where it arrived February 24.
The Secretary of War, General Armstrong, despite his vacillating
course the previous year, had never lost sight of his perfectly
accurate conviction that Kingston, if not Montreal, was the true
objective for the northern army. Convinced that he had been misled in
the spring of 1813 by the opinions of the commanders on the spot,
Chauncey and Dearborn, he was again anxious, as he had been in the
intervening autumn, to retrieve the error. On February 28 he issued to
Brown two sets of instructions;[272] the one designed to transpire, in
order to mislead the enemy, the other, most secret, conveying the real
intention of the Department. In the former, stress was laid upon the
exposure of western New York, and the public humiliation at seeing
Fort Niagara in the hands of the British. Brigadier-General Scott
accordingly had been sent there to organize a force for the capture of
the fort and the protection of the frontier; but, as his numbers were
probably insufficient, Brown was directed to march to Batavia, and
thence to Buffalo, with the two thousand troops he had just brought
from French Mills. This letter was meant to reach the enemy's ears.
The other, embodying the true object aimed at, read thus: "It is
obviously Prevost's policy, and probably his intention, to
re-establish himself on Lake Erie during the ensuing month. But to
effect this other points of his line must be weakened, and these will
be either Kingston or Montreal. If the detachment from the former be
great, a moment may occur in which you may do, with the aid of
Commodore Chauncey, what I last year intended Pike should have done
without aid, and what we now all know was very practicable, viz.: to
cross the river, or head of the lake, on the ice, and carry Kingston
by a _coup de main_." The letter ended by making the enterprise depend
upon a concurrence of favorable conditions; in brief, upon the
discretion of the general, with whom remained all the responsibility
of final decision and action.
These instructions were elicited, immediately, by recent information
that the effective garrison in Kingston was reduced to twelve
hundred, with no prospect of increase before June, when
re-enforcements from Europe were expected. Certainly, Drummond at this
time thought the force there no stronger than it should be, and early
in April was apprehensive on that account for the safety of the
place.[273] Brown and Chauncey, however, agreed that less than four
thousand men was insufficient for the undertaking. Singularly enough,
this number was precisely that fixed upon by Yeo and Drummond, in
consultation, as necessary for the reduction of Sackett's Harbor;
which they concurred with Prevost in considering the quickest and
surest solution of the difficulty attending their situation about
Niagara, owing to the exhaustion of local resources upon the
peninsula.[274] The scarcity thus experienced was aggravated by the
number of dependent Indian warriors, who with their families had
followed the British retreat from Malden and Detroit, and now hung
like lead upon the movements and supplies of the army. "Nearly twelve
hundred barrels of flour monthly to Indians alone," complained the
commanding officer, who had long since learned that for this
expenditure there was no return in military usefulness. In the felt
necessity to retain the good-will of the savages, no escape from the
dilemma was open, except in the maintenance of a stream of supplies
from Lower Canada by keeping command of the Lake;[275] to secure which
nothing was so certain as to capture Sackett's and destroy the
shipping and plant.
Having decided that the enterprise against Kingston was not feasible,
Brown fell into the not unnatural mistake of construing the
Secretary's other letter to present not merely a ruse, but an
alternative line of action, more consonant to his active martial
temper than remaining idle in garrison. Accordingly, he left
Sackett's with his two thousand, an event duly chronicled in a letter
of Drummond's, that on Sunday, March 13, three thousand five hundred
left Sackett's for Niagara; a statement sufficiently characteristic of
the common tendency of an enemy's force to swell, as it passes from
mouth to mouth. The division had progressed as far as the present city
of Syracuse, sixty miles from Sackett's, and Brown himself was some
forty miles in advance of it, at Geneva, when one of his principal
subordinates persuaded him that he had misconstrued the Department's
purpose. In considerable distress he turned about, passing through
Auburn on the 23d at the rate of thirty miles a day, so said a
contemporary newspaper,[276] and hurried back to Sackett's. There
further consultation with Chauncey convinced him again that he was
intended to go to Niagara, and he resumed his march. Before April 1 he
reached Batavia, where his instructions read he would receive further
orders. General Scott was already at Buffalo, and there the troops
were placed under his immediate charge for organization and drill;
Brigadier-General Gaines being sent back to command at Sackett's,
where he arrived April 10.
At this moment Chauncey was undergoing his turn of qualms. "The
enemy," he wrote the following day, "have prepared a force of three
thousand troops, with gunboats and a number of small craft, to attack
the harbor the moment the fleet leaves it. They may, however, be
determined to make the attack at all hazards, and I am sorry to say
our force is but little adapted to the defence of the place. There are
not a thousand effective men besides the sailors and marines."[277]
His information was substantially correct. Drummond had arranged to
concentrate three thousand men from the north shore of the lake; but
he wanted besides eight hundred from the peninsula, and for lack of
these the project was abandoned.
The movement of Brown's small contingent to Buffalo, though contrary
to the intention of the Government, may be considered to have opened
the campaign of 1814; destined to prove as abortive in substantial
results as that of the year before, but not so futile and inglorious
to the American arms. The troops engaged had been formed under the
skilful organization and training of Scott. Led by Brown, who, though
not an educated soldier nor a master of the technicalities of the
profession, was essentially an aggressive fighting man of masculine
qualities, they failed indeed to achieve success, for which their
numbers were inadequate; but there was no further disgrace.
Wilkinson, indeed, in his district, contrived to give to the beginning
of operations the air of absurdity that ever hung round his path.
Although he was the senior officer on the whole frontier, the Department
had not notified him of Brown's orders. This vicious practice of
managing the campaign from a point as distant as Washington then was,
ignoring any local centre of control, drew subsequently the
animadversion of the President, who in a minute to the Secretary
remarked that "it does not appear that Izard,"--Wilkinson's
successor,--"though the senior officer of the district, has been made
acquainted with the plan of operations under Brown."[278] On the present
occasion Wilkinson explained that, hearing of Brown's march by common
report, and having ascertained that the enemy was sending
re-enforcements up the St. Lawrence, he undertook an incursion into
Lower Canada as a diversion against such increase of the force with
which Brown must contend.[279] His enterprise was directed against La
Colle, a few miles from Plattsburg, within the Canada boundary; but
upon arriving before the position it was found that the garrison were
established in a stone mill, upon which the guns brought along could
make no impression. After this somewhat ludicrous experience, the
division, more than three thousand strong, retreated, having lost over
seventy men. The result was scarcely likely to afford Brown much relief
by its deterrent influence upon the enemy.
This affair happened March 30, and in the course of the following
month Wilkinson was finally superseded. He was succeeded by General
Izard, who assumed command May 4, and remained in the neighborhood of
Champlain, while Brown continued immediately responsible for Sackett's
Harbor and for the force at Buffalo. On April 14 Yeo launched two new
ships, the "Prince Regent" of fifty-eight guns and the "Princess
Charlotte" of forty; and he at the same time had under construction
one destined to carry one hundred and two heavy guns, superior
therefore in size and armament to most of the British ocean navy, and
far more formidable than any in which Nelson ever served. Fortunately
for the Americans, this vessel, which Yeo undertook without authority
from home, was not ready until October; but the former two, added to
his last year's fleet, gave him for the moment a decided preponderance
over Chauncey, who also was building but had not yet completed.
Under these circumstances the project of attacking Sackett's in force
was again most seriously agitated among the British officials,
military and naval, upon whom the destitution of the Niagara peninsula
pressed with increasing urgency. Such an intention rarely fails to
transpire, especially across a border line where the inhabitants on
either side speak the same tongue and are often intimately acquainted.
Desertion, moreover, was frequent from both parties. The rumor brought
Brown back hastily to the place, where he arrived April 24. The
enemy, however, again abandoned their purpose, and after embarking a
considerable body of troops turned their arms instead against Oswego.
It will be remembered that the mildness of the winter had prevented
the transport of guns and stores by land, and made necessary to
accumulate them by water carriage at Oswego, whence there remained the
lake voyage to Sackett's Harbor. This, though a coasting operation,
involved much danger while the enemy possessed naval control.
Meanwhile Oswego became a somewhat congested and much exposed
intermediate station, inviting attack. Chauncey therefore had taken
the precaution of retaining the most important articles, guns and
their equipment, at the falls of the Oswego River, some twelve miles
inland. The enemy's change of plan becoming suspected, Brown detached
a small party--two hundred and ninety effectives--to defend the place,
in conjunction with the few seamen already there. The British fleet
appeared on May 5, but the attack was not made until the following
day, weather conditions being unfavorable. Despite the unprepared
state of the defences characteristic of the universal American
situation, on both lakes and seaboard, in this singular war, the
officer in command offered a spirited resistance, inflicting
considerable loss; but the urgency to preserve his force, for the
superior necessity of protecting under more favorable circumstances
the valuable property in the rear, compelled him to retreat, to escape
the risk of being surrounded and captured. He accordingly drew off in
good order, having lost six killed and thirty-eight wounded; besides
twenty-five missing, probably prisoners. The casualties of the
British, by their official reports, were eighteen killed and
seventy-three wounded. They kept possession of the town during the
night, retiring next day with two small schooners, over two thousand
barrels of provisions, and a quantity of cordage.[280] The most
serious loss to the Americans was that of nine heavy cannon; but the
bulk of the armament for the fleet remained safe at the falls.
After this Yeo took position with his squadron off Sackett's Harbor,
where the Americans on May 1 had launched a new big ship, the
"Superior", to carry sixty-two guns, thirty-two long 32-pounders, and
thirty carronades of the same calibre. Besides her there was building
still another, of somewhat smaller force, without which Chauncey would
not consider himself able to contend with the enemy.[281] On the 20th
of the month he reported that "five sail were now anchored between
Point Peninsula and Stoney Island, about ten miles from the harbor,
and two brigs between Stoney Island and Stoney Point, completely
blocking both passes." He added, "This is the first time that I have
experienced the mortification of being blockaded on the lakes."[282]
The line thus occupied by the enemy covered the entire entrance to
Black River Bay, within which Sackett's Harbor lies. This situation
was the more intolerable under the existing necessity of bringing the
guns by water. Drummond, whose information was probably good, wrote at
this period that not more than fifteen of the heavy cannon needed for
the new ships had arrived, and that they could come from Oswego only
by the lake, as the roads were impassable except for horsemen.
Carronades, cordage, and other stores were going on by wagon from
Utica, but the long guns which were imperatively required could not do
so.[283]
American contrivance proved equal to the dilemma, and led to a marked
British misadventure. A few miles south of Black River Bay, and
therefore outside the line of the British blockade, there was an inlet
called Stoney Creek, from the head of which a short land carriage of
three miles would strike Henderson's Bay. This, like Sackett's, is an
indentation of Black River Bay, and was well within the hostile ships.
The transit from Oswego to Stoney Creek, however, remained open to an
enemy's attack, and to be effected without loss required address,
enterprise, and rapidity of movement. The danger was lessened by the
number of streams which enter Mexico Bay, the deep bight formed by the
southern and eastern shores of Lake Ontario, between Oswego and
Sackett's. These, being navigable for batteaux, constituted a series
of harbors of refuge.
Chauncey directed all the lighter equipment to be turned back from
Oswego River to North Bay, on Lake Oneida, and the long guns to be
placed in batteaux, ready to move instantly, either up or down, as the
movements of the enemy or a favorable opportunity might determine.
Discretionary power to act according to circumstances was then given
to Captain Woolsey, in local command on the Oswego. Woolsey made great
parade of his preparations to send everything, guns included, back
across the portage from the river, to North Bay. The reports reached
Yeo, as intended, but did not throw him wholly off his guard. On May
27 Woolsey despatched an officer in a fast pulling boat to reconnoitre
the coast, while he himself went with the requisite force to the
falls. On the 28th the batteaux, nineteen in number, carrying
twenty-one long 32-pounders, and thirteen lighter pieces, besides ten
heavy cables, were run over the rapids, reaching Oswego at sunset. The
lookout boat had returned, reporting all clear, and after dark the
convoy started. Besides the regular crews, there were embarked one
hundred and fifty riflemen from the army. The next morning at sunrise
one batteau was missing, but the other eighteen entered the Salmon
River, over twenty miles from Oswego. The nights were short at that
season, and the boats heavy; moreover there had been drenching rain.
At Salmon River, a party of one hundred and twenty Oneida Indians
joined, who were to move along the coast on the flank of the convoy
through the next stage of the journey, by day, to support the defence
should the approach of an enemy compel refuge to be sought in one of
the creeks. As soon as they had taken up their march the batteaux also
started, and at noon, May 29, reached Big Sandy Creek, ten miles
further on, but eight miles short of the final destination at Stoney
Creek. Here greater care became necessary, on account of the nearness
of the enemy's fleet; and while awaiting information the division
moved two miles up the Big Sandy, where it anchored.
The missing batteau, carrying two long 24's and a cable, had been
captured; having wandered away from the rest of the detachment,
despite the watchful care exerted to keep them together. Her crew
betrayed the extent of the operation of which they formed part, and a
division of boats was sent in quest, in charge of two captains of the
blockading vessels; the senior officer of the whole being Commander
Popham. On his way Popham fell in with another group of armed boats,
which he took under his command, raising his total to three
gun-vessels and four smaller boats, with near two hundred seamen and
marines. Certain intelligence being received that the convoy had
entered the Big Sandy, he steered thither, arriving off its mouth soon
after daylight of May 30. A reconnaissance on shore discovering the
masts of the batteaux plainly visible over a marsh, with apparently no
intervening forest, an immediate attack was decided. Having landed a
party of flankers on either bank, the expedition proceeded up stream
with due caution, firing an occasional round into the brush to
dislodge any possible ambush. It was not known that an escort, beyond
the usual crews, had accompanied the movement. Such a precaution might
indeed have been inferred from the importance of the object; but the
same reason naturally, and not improperly, decided Popham that
considerable risk was justifiable in order to frustrate his enemy's
purpose.
Woolsey was already forewarned of his coming. At 2 A.M. of the same
day, May 30, he had received from Chauncey an express, in accordance
with which an officer was sent out upon the lake, to reconnoitre
towards the entrance of Black River Bay. At six o'clock he returned,
having been seen and pursued by some of Popham's division. The
riflemen and Indians were now advanced half a mile below the batteaux,
where they found cover and concealment in the woods. At eight the
British guns were heard. At nine a re-enforcement of cavalry and light
artillery arrived from Sackett's Harbor, but it was decided that they
should remain by the batteaux, the force already below being best
adapted for bush fighting. Towards ten o'clock the riflemen and
Indians attacked; a circumstance attributed by Captain Popham to an
accident befalling the 68-pounder carronade in the bow of the leading
gunboat, which compelled her to turn round, to bring into action her
stern gun, a 24-pounder. "The enemy thought we were commencing a
retreat, when they advanced their whole force, one hundred and fifty
riflemen, near two hundred Indians, and a numerous body of militia and
cavalry, who soon overpowered the few men I had.... The winding of the
creek, which gave the enemy a great advantage in advancing to
intercept our retreat, rendered further resistance unavailing." The
entire detachment surrendered, having had fourteen killed and
twenty-eight wounded; besides whom two captains, six lieutenants, and
one hundred and thirty-three seamen and marines remained prisoners.
The American loss was but two wounded; a result showing clearly
enough the disadvantage under which the British labored.
This affair has been related in detail,[284] because, although on a
small scale, it was actually one of great consequence; but yet more
because it illustrates aptly one kind of those minor operations of
war, upon the success of which so much greater matters turn. The
American management throughout was admirable in its detailed foresight
and circumspection. To this was due the trivial loss attending its
final success; a loss therefore attesting far greater credit than
would the attaining of the same result by lavish expenditure of blood.
To Captain Popham must be attributed both enterprise and due
carefulness in undertaking an advance he knew to be hazardous, but
from which, if successful, he was entitled to expect nothing less than
the capture of almost the entire armament of a very large ship. In
such circumstances censure because of failure is unjust, unless the
risk is shown to be taken reckless of due precautions, which was not
the case in this instance. Yeo, whose deficiency in seamen was
reported at two hundred and seventy-nine,[285] three days after this
affair, appears to have been more exasperated by the loss of the men
than sensible of the merit of his subordinate. He had charged him not
to enter any creek in the endeavor to capture the stores, and
apparently laid the disaster to disregard of this order. The
subsequent customary court martial decided that Popham, having greatly
re-enforced himself by junction with a division of vessels, in a
manner which Yeo could not have contemplated, was fully justified by
the importance of preventing the convoy from reaching Sackett's
Harbor. The court regretted that Sir James Yeo should have used such
reproachful expressions in his letter to the Admiralty communicating
Captain Popham's capture. Popham, and his second, Spilsbury, were
included in the promotions of a year later.
Soon after this mishap Yeo abandoned the immediate blockade of
Sackett's Harbor, returning to Kingston June 6. The recent experience
demonstrated that it would be impossible to prevent the forwarding of
supplies by the mere presence of the fleet at the mouth of the port.
The armament of the "Superior" had arrived despite his efforts, and
her speedy readiness to take the lake was assured. An exchange of
letters between himself and Drummond as to his proper course[286] led
to the conclusion that the blockade had not had all the effect
expected; and that, in view of the large re-enforcements of men coming
forward from England, the true policy was to avoid battle until the
third new ship, the "St. Lawrence" of one hundred and two guns, should
be ready. "The enemy," wrote Yeo, "are not in sufficient force to
undertake any expedition in the face of our present squadron, but any
disaster on our side might give them a serious ascendancy." Drummond,
who had rejoiced that the blockade "assures us a free intercourse
throughout the lake," concurred in this view. "I have no hesitation in
saying that there exists at present no motive or object, connected
with the security of Upper Canada, which can make it necessary for you
to act otherwise than cautiously on the defensive," until the large
ship is ready or other circumstances arise.
On June 7 the Cabinet of the United States held a meeting, in which
was settled the plan of campaign on the northern frontier;[287] where
alone, and for a brief period only, an expected superiority of numbers
would permit offensive operations. As in the year before, the
decision, in general terms, was to direct the main effort against the
enemy's right and centre, Mackinac and the Niagara peninsula, instead
of against his left, at Montreal or Kingston. The principal movement
was to be by a concentration near Buffalo of forces from New York and
the western territory, which the Secretary of War estimated might
place under Brown's command five thousand regular troops and three
thousand volunteers. He had proposed that these, with the assistance
of the Erie navy, should be landed on the coast between Fort Erie, at
the entrance of the Niagara River, and Point Abino, ten miles to the
westward. Thence they were to act against Burlington Heights, at the
head of Lake Ontario, the tenure of which by Vincent in 1813, had
baffled, on two occasions, the advance of the Americans, and
maintained the land communications of the British with York (Toronto)
despite their enemy's control of the water. The Secretary's
anticipation was that, after gaining this position, the force could
proceed along the north shore of the lake towards York, receiving its
supplies by the fleet, which was expected to be ready by June 15.
Chauncey himself stated June 8 that he would be ready by July 1, if
men were sent him.[288] On the 11th was launched a second new ship,
the "Mohawk," to carry forty-two guns. The crew of the "Congress" was
ordered up from Portsmouth, and part of them, with other
re-enforcements, were reported to have arrived before June 20. June 24
Chauncey wrote, "I shall sail the first week in July to offer the
enemy battle."[289] He did not, however, take the Lake until August 1.
The Cabinet had approved the Secretary's suggestion, but extended the
place of debarkation to be between Fort Erie and Long Point, eighty
miles from the Niagara River, and well west of Burlington Heights.
Subsidiary to this main attack, General Izard at Plattsburg was to
make a diversion towards Montreal. Coincidently with these movements
an expedition of four or five of the Erie fleet, with eight hundred to
one thousand troops, should go against Mackinac; their first object,
however, being Matchedash Bay, on Lake Huron, which was the seat of an
incipient naval establishment, and the point of deposit for supplies
proceeding to Mackinac from York by way of Lake Simcoe. This attempt
to choke the communications of Mackinac, by holding a vital point upon
their line, was to have its counterpart in the east by the provision
of fifteen armed boats on the St. Lawrence, supported by posts on the
river garrisoned by detachments from Izard's army, so as to intercept
the water transport between Montreal and Kingston. It may be mentioned
that this particular method had specially commended itself to both Yeo
and Chauncey, as most suited to embarrass the British situation
throughout the upper province. In a subsequent report to the
Admiralty, Yeo characterized the failure of the Americans to do this
as an extreme stupidity, which had lost them the war, but upon a
repetition of which in future hostilities Great Britain should not
rely.[290] The importance of this intercourse is indicated by a
mention of Chauncey's, that in the week before June 15 more than two
hundred boats passed Ogdensburg for Kingston.[291]
All this, however, simply emphasizes the fact that the decisive point
of attack was Montreal or Kingston; not the line between them, which
would become useless if either fell. Still less could the Niagara
peninsula, though a valuable link in a chain of communication from the
lower to the upper lakes, compare in importance with either of the
places named. It matters not that a chain is complete in itself, if it
is severed from one of the extremities which it is designed to
connect. As regards any attempt on the part of the Americans to
interrupt the traffic, Drummond appears to have been satisfied with
Yeo's promise that "every brigade of batteaux should have a suitable
convoy of gunboats."
The Secretary of War, in his communication to the President before the
Cabinet met, had indicated plainly his preference for leaving Mackinac
alone and concentrating upon the central point of effort, Niagara or
Burlington. "Burlington and York carried, a barrier is interposed
which completely protects Detroit and Malden, makes doubtful and
hazardous the enemy's intercourse with the western Indians, reduces
Mackinac to a possession perfectly useless, renders probable the
evacuation of Fort Niagara, and takes from the enemy half his motive
for continuing the naval conflict on Lake Ontario. On the other hand,
take Mackinac, and what is gained but Mackinac itself?"[292] The
reasoning was indisputable, although Armstrong acquiesced in the
decision of the Cabinet. The main feature of the plan adopted, the
reduction of Burlington Heights and a successful advance on York, was
of doubtful issue; but, if successful, the vital end of the chain upon
which Mackinac depended for existence dropped useless to the ground.
All side enterprise that did not directly contribute to this decisive
movement should have been discarded in favor of concentration upon
Brown's army, to which its execution was committed, and the actual
strength of which was insufficient for the task. At the opening of the
campaign its total strength was four thousand seven hundred and
eighty, of whom eight hundred and thirty were militia.[293] On July 1
there were present for duty three thousand five hundred. There were
also six hundred Indians of the Six Nations. In this impotent
conclusion resulted the Secretary's estimate of five thousand regulars
and three thousand volunteers.
On July 2 Brown announced to his troops that he was authorized by the
Government to put them in motion against the enemy.[294] He had
decided to leave Fort Niagara, with its menace to his communications,
in his rear, unguarded, and to throw his command directly upon the
enemy on the west bank of the river. The crossing was made that night
in two divisions; one landing opposite Black Rock, below Fort Erie,
the other above that post, which surrendered July 3, at 5 P.M. The
garrison numbered one hundred and thirty-seven. From there Brown
proposed to turn north and advance towards Ontario, where he hoped to
join hands with the navy, which was expected by him, and by the
Government, to be on hand to co-operate. This expectation was based on
Chauncey's own assurance that he would take the lake on July 1, if
supplied with men, who were known since to have arrived. It does not
appear, however, that he had received specific instructions as to the
course he was intended to follow; and, in assuming that he would go to
the head of the lake, for direct co-operation, the Government and the
general were reckoning without their host, and in ignorance of his
views. He was as loath to leave Kingston and Sackett's in his rear,
unwatched, as Brown was willing to take the same risk with regard to
Niagara. It was a profound difference of temperament in two capable
men, to whom the Government failed to impart the unifying element of
orders.
On July 4 Scott's brigade, which had crossed below the fort, advanced
from Fort Erie fifteen miles, to Street's Creek, a small stream,
bridged near its mouth, entering the Niagara two miles south of the
Chippewa River, the defensive line selected by the British, who now
fell back upon it. The Chippewa is of respectable size, one hundred
and fifty yards wide, and from twelve to twenty feet deep, running
from west to east. In general direction it is parallel to Street's
Creek; both entering the Niagara at right angles to its course. In the
belt separating the two the ground is flat, and was in great part
open; but midway between them there was a strip of thick wood
extending down to within a few hundred feet of the Niagara. This
formed a dense curtain, hiding movements on either side from the
other. The British forces under Riall were now north of the Chippewa,
Scott's brigade south of Street's; each having a bridge by which to
advance into the space between. The other American brigade, Ripley's,
was in rear of Scott--to the south.
In this relative situation, Scott's pickets on the left being
disquieted by the British and Indians in the intervening woods, Brown
ordered up the militia and American Indians under General Porter to
expel them. This was done; but upon reaching the clearing on the
further side, the Indians, who were in the lead, encountered a heavy
fire, which drove them back upon the militia, and the whole body
retreated in a confusion which ended in a rout.[295] Riall had crossed
the Chippewa, and was advancing in force, although he believed Brown's
army much to outnumber his own now on the field, which in fact it did.
Gordon Drummond, in his instructions to him some months before, (March
23), had remarked that with the Americans liberties might be taken
which would seem hazardous "to a military man unacquainted with the
character of the enemy he had to contend with, or with the events of
the last two campaigns on that frontier."[296] This unflattering, but
not unreasonable, deduction from the performances of Dearborn and
others in 1813, as of Smyth and Van Rensselaer in 1812, was misplaced
in the present instance; but it doubtless governed Riall's action, and
justified it to himself and his superiors. He had not been engaged
since he drove the militia of New York before him like sheep, in the
preceding December; and he would have attacked on the very night after
the crossing, but that a regiment from York, which he had reason to
expect twenty-four hours before, did not arrive until the morning of
the 5th. The instant it came he made his dispositions to move at 4
P.M. of the same day.
It was this advance which met Porter and threw his division back,
uncovering the wood on the west. Scott at the same moment was marching
his brigade into the open space between Street's Creek and the
Chippewa; not to meet the enemy, whom he did not expect, but for some
drill in the cool of a hot summer's afternoon. As he went forward, the
Commander-in-Chief, who had been reconnoitring in front, rode by,
galloping to the rear to bring up his remaining force; for, while the
army in the aggregate was superior to Riall, the one brigade was
inferior. In passing, he called to Scott, "You will have a battle";
and the head of the latter's column, as it crossed the bridge, came at
once under the enemy's guns.
Although inferior, exposed, and in a sense surprised, both commander
and men were equal to the occasion. The division deployed steadily
under fire, and its leader, sending hastily one battalion to check the
enemy in the wood, formed front with the remainder of his force to
meet those in the plain. These, being yet unopposed, advanced beyond
the line of the wood, passing their own detachment within it, which
was held in check by the Americans charged with that duty. Losing thus
their support on that side, the British presented a new right flank,
to use Scott's expression. Thereupon he extended his two wings as far
as he dared, leaving between them a considerable interval, so as to
overlap his opponent at either extremity; which done, he threw his
left forward. His brigade thus formed an obtuse angle, the apex to the
rear, the bullets therefore converging and crossing upon the space in
front, into which it and the enemy were moving. In the approach both
parties halted several times to fire, and Scott says that the
superiority of aim in his own men was evident. When within sixty paces
a mutual rush, or charge, ensued; but the overlapping of the Americans
crowded the flanks of the enemy in upon his centre and produced
confusion, to which the preceding fire doubtless had contributed.
Scott's own description is that "the wings of the enemy being
outflanked, and in some measure doubled upon, were mouldered away like
a rope of sand."[297] In this brief and brilliant struggle only the
one brigade was engaged.
Riall's account agrees substantially with that of Scott, mentioning
particularly "the greatest regularity" with which his opponents
"deployed and opened fire."[298] He directed a charge by the three
regiments in line, "but I am sorry to say that they suffered so
severely that I was obliged to withdraw them, finding their further
efforts against the superior numbers of the enemy would be
unavailing." He was right in believing that the aggregate of Brown's
army, although much short of the six thousand he estimated, was
superior to that which he could bring together without abandoning
posts he had to hold; but he was mistaken in thinking that in the
actual collision his opponents were more numerous than the fifteen
hundred regulars at which he states his own force, besides three
hundred militia. Scott's brigade, with its supporting artillery, when
it crossed four days before, was less than fifteen hundred; and the
militia and Indians were routed before he began to fight. His
artillery also was of lighter weight. The superiority of the American
fire was shown by the respective losses. They were: British, one
hundred and forty-eight killed, two hundred and twenty-one wounded,
forty-six missing; American, fifty-six killed, two hundred and
thirty-nine wounded, thirty-six missing. Of this total, there fell to
Scott's command forty-four killed, and two hundred and twenty-four
wounded; demonstrating conclusively that it alone was seriously
engaged. Not a man was reported missing. The other brigade lost only
three killed and three wounded. At the end of the action it was coming
up on Scott's left, where he was most exposed, but it did not arrive
until he had wrought his own deliverance. The remaining casualties
were among the militia and Indians.
After the battle of Chippewa, Riall fell back towards Fort George, and
subsequently to the creek called Twenty Mile, west of Niagara, on Lake
Ontario. Brown followed as far as Queenston, where he arrived July 10.
On the 13th he wrote to Chauncey, begging for the fleet to meet him on
the lake shore, west of Fort George, to arrange a plan of operations;
in which case he had no doubt of breaking the power of the enemy in
Upper Canada in a short time. "All accounts," he said, "represent the
force of the enemy at Kingston as very light. Sir James Yeo will not
fight,"--which was certain. "For God's sake, let me see you. I have
looked for your fleet with the greatest anxiety since the 10th."[299]
Chauncey had not left Sackett's Harbor, nor did he do so; to the utter
consternation, not of Brown only, but of the Government. On July 7 he
chronicled the burning of an enemy's schooner on the north shore of
the lake,[300] an exploit creditable enough in itself, but utterly
trivial in relation to pending issues; and on the 8th he wrote that
some changes of officers and crews, incidental to the absence of a
particular captain, would detain him a few days longer.[301] These
were flimsy reasons for inactivity at a moment of great national
interest, and when the operations in progress had been begun
absolutely upon the presupposition of naval control and co-operation,
for which he had undertaken to provide the means, even if not pledged
as to the manner. Then followed a silence of over two weeks; after
which, on July 25, he wrote again by his second to say that "the
squadron had been prevented being earlier fitted for sea, in
consequence of the delay in obtaining blocks and ironwork."[302] He
himself was too unwell to write, and had been so for some days. It is
probable that lapse of energy consequent upon illness had something to
do with this remarkable paralysis of action, in a man usually bustling
and efficient; and there may naturally have been unwillingness to
relinquish command,--which would have been his proper course,--after
the mortifications of the previous year, when he was just flattering
himself with the prospect of a new opportunity.
This inaction, at the critical moment of Brown's advance, caused the
Government extreme perplexity and distress. In Chauncey was reposed a
confidence expressed by the Secretary of the Navy to Congress the year
before, when the resolution of thanks to Perry was pending. He then
"intimated the propriety of noticing in an appropriate manner the
commander-in-chief of the naval force upon the lakes, under whose
immediate command Captain Perry acted;" and spoke of the "zeal,
talent, constancy, courage, and prudence of the highest order, which
appears to me to merit particular distinction."[303] Such preconceived
opinion was hard to shake; but as day succeeded day of expectation
and suspense, the patience of the Administration gave way. Letters
bearing those elaborated phrases of assurance which most clearly
testify uneasiness were sent him, but did not arrive till after Brown
had retreated and he himself taken the lake. On July 24 the Secretary
writes, "I have expressed the solicitude which has produced this
letter, but my confidence in your patriotism, skill, judgment, and
energy is entire." On August 3, however, he says the explanation about
blocks and ironwork--apparently just received--is so extraordinary at
such a moment that "I cannot withhold from you the extreme anxiety and
astonishment which the protracted and fatal delay of the squadron has
excited in the mind of the President;" and on the 5th, "the known
detention of the squadron at Sackett's Harbor until the 27th ultimo,
the very feeble and precarious state of your health, the evils which
have already resulted from delay," etc., "have induced the President,
though with extreme reluctance, and undiminished confidence in your
zeal and capacity, to order Commodore Decatur to proceed to Sackett's
Harbor and take upon himself the naval command on Lake Ontario."
The proposed change did not take place, the squadron having already
resumed active cruising. The Secretary repeated his expressions of
confidence, but does not appear to have renewed his recommendations to
Congress. Chauncey, stung by the reflections, open and implied, upon
his conduct, retorted with a defence and definition of his course, as
proposed and realized, which raises the whole question of the method
of naval co-operation under the circumstances, and of its probable
effectiveness. Replying to Brown's letter of July 13, quoted above, he
said positively that he had never given the general ground to expect
him at the head of the lake.[304] This assertion he repeated to the
Secretary, whose letters to him demonstrate that the Government had
left him entire discretion as to his particular method of procedure.
Acting therefore upon his own judgment, he justified his course by
alleging that direct co-operation at the Niagara end of the lake was
impossible, because the heavy ships could not get within two miles of
the forts, and Brown's army had never advanced to the lake shore;
consequently, the fleet could neither have acted directly by itself,
nor yet in support of a land force, with which it could not
communicate. So much for the negative side of the argument.
Positively, he said, the mission of the navy was to seek and fight the
enemy's squadron; and this duty was emphasized by the fact that to go
westward to Niagara, while the enemy was at Kingston, would expose to
capture Sackett's Harbor, the safety of which had remained a dominant
anxiety with Chauncey since its narrow escape the previous year.
The protection of his own base, and the controlling or beating the
organized force of the enemy, are unquestionably two leading
considerations which should govern the general conduct of a general
officer, land or sea. In these particulars Chauncey's statement was
unassailable; but, whether well or ill, he seems to have been
incapable of rising to the larger estimate of naval control, to which
the rules enunciated, conduce simply as a formulation of principles,
giving to action preciseness and steadiness of direction. The
destruction of the enemy's fleet is the means to obtain naval control;
but naval control in itself is only a means, not an object. The object
of the campaign, set by the Government, was the acquirement of mastery
upon the Niagara peninsula, to the accomplishment of which Brown's
army was destined. Naval control would minister thereto, partly by
facilitating the re-enforcement and supply of the American army, and,
conversely, by impeding that of the British. Of these two means, the
latter was the more efficacious, because, owing to the thoroughly
denuded condition of the Canadian territory, from the Niagara to
Detroit, local resources were exhausted, and dependence was wholly
upon the water; whereas the United States forces, near a fruitful
friendly region, and in possession of Lake Erie, had other independent
and sufficient streams of maintenance.
To weaken the British was by so much to strengthen Brown, even though
direct communication with him were impossible. It was of this that the
British stood in continual anxious terror, as shown by their letters;
and this it was that Chauncey gives no sign of recognizing. Of support
to his own colleague he spoke with ill-timed scorn: "That you might
find the fleet somewhat of a convenience in the transportation of
provisions and stores for the use of the army, and an agreeable
appendage to attend its marches and countermarches, I am ready to
believe; but, Sir, the Secretary of the Navy has honored us with a
higher destiny--we are intended to seek and to fight the enemy's
fleet. This is the great purpose of the Government in creating this
fleet; and I shall not be diverted in my efforts to effectuate it by
any sinister attempt to render us subordinate to, or an appendage of,
the army." It would be difficult to cite an apter instance of wresting
sound principles to one's own destruction. Whatever the antecedent
provocation, this is no temper in which to effect military objects. It
is indeed hard to believe that an army so little numerous as that of
Brown could have accomplished the ambitious designs confided to it;
but that does not affect the clear duty of affording it the utmost
assistance that ingenuity could devise and energy effect. The words
quoted were written August 10, but ignore entirely an alternative
suggested in a letter received that day from the Secretary, dated July
24, itself the repetition of one made July 20: "To destroy the enemy's
fleet, or to blockade his force _and cut off his entire communication
with the head of the lake_." The civilian here indicated clearly what
the naval officer should have known from the very first moment.
As before said, the contemporary correspondence of British officers
abundantly shows their anxiety lest Chauncey, in these important
weeks, should do what he did not do. Sir James Yeo had deliberately
formulated the policy of remaining inactive in Kingston until the
completion of the 102-gun ship, which would give him command of the
lake beyond chance of dispute. To occupy the American fleet meanwhile
with a local blockade, which he intended not to contest, was precisely
what he wanted. To distress the army at Niagara to the point of
evacuating the peninsula was the one only thing that might impel--or
compel--him to come out and fight, despite his deliberate intention.
"Several small vessels," wrote the Commissary-General a month
later[305] to Sir George Prevost, "were despatched while the enemy's
squadron were unable to leave Sackett's Harbor; but since the enemy
commands the lake, that resource for the moment is cut off, and only
batteaux can be employed. These are [not][306] a very useful
conveyance, not only from the danger of the enemy's small vessels,
which can approach the shore without difficulty, but also from want of
proper steersmen, pilots, and middlemen.... This feeble means of
transport will never effect the forming of a sufficient depot at York,
Burlington Heights, and Niagara; and, unless the commissariat can be
aided to a great extent by the Royal Navy, the most disastrous
consequences must ensue."
At the date this was written, August 27, Chauncey's force was that
which he had promised should be ready July 1, but with which he did
not sail until August 1,--too late. The very efficiency of his action
in August condemns therefore his inaction in July. Besides his two new
big ships, which matched Yeo's two, he had added to the fleet of the
previous year, then superior to the British, two brigs of the armament
and tonnage of the ocean sloops of war,--the "Peacock" and class.
Against these Yeo had nothing to show. It was therefore open to
Chauncey to blockade Kingston with an equal force, thus covering
Sackett's, and to despatch to the head of the lake vessels adequate to
embarrass Riall and Drummond most seriously. From York to Niagara by
land was eighty miles of road impassable to laden wagons; by lake
thirty miles of water facility. From Kingston to York, an additional
distance of a hundred and fifty miles, the same relative difficulty of
transportation obtained. Yet as late as July 13, Drummond could write
from Kingston, "As troops cannot be forwarded without provisions, I
have requested Sir James Yeo to send his two brigs immediately, with
as much flour and pork as they can carry to York and Burlington." On
the 16th, "The 'Charwell' sailed yesterday for the head of the lake
with provisions and ammunition. I have strong hopes she will arrive
safe, as the enemy's whole squadron are lying in Sackett's with their
sails bent, and apparently ready for sea, though no guns forward of
the foremast could be perceived on board the 'Mohawk.'"[307]
Yeo, holding both York and the mouth of the Niagara, ventured thither
two brigs and two schooners, under Captain Dobbs, one of his officers.
"Without their valuable aid in the transport of troops and stores,"
wrote Drummond, August 12, "I certainly should not have been able to
attempt offensive operations so soon after my arrival." By that time,
when Brown had of necessity abandoned the offensive, "Commodore
Chauncey has left three of his brigs to watch our vessels in the
Niagara. They continue cruising off that place."[308] Chauncey, in
his letter of vindication to the Secretary, had maintained that "if
our whole fleet were at the head of the lake, it would not detain a
regiment from [York to] Fort George more than twenty-four hours....
Any one who knows anything of the navigation of this lake knows that
boats may cross the head of the lake, from York to the opposite shore,
unobserved by any fleet during the night."[309] Admitting that there
is no literal exaggeration in this statement, it takes no account of
the enemy's apprehensions, nor of the decisive difficulty of running
vessels of a size to transport the heavy stores, without which the
army could not remain. No one familiar with maritime affairs will deny
the impossibility of wholly suppressing all furtive movement of small
coasters, but it is equally certain much can be done to impede that
full course of supplies which constitutes security of communication.
To Chauncey's affirmation, Drummond gives an incidental reply,
September 2: "The enemy's blockading squadron not having been seen for
some days, I sent the 'Vincent' across to York, where she has arrived
in safety, and Captain Dobbs has directed the 'Charwell' to push
across the first morning the wind is fair. By their aid I got rid of
many encumbrances (prisoners and sick), and shall receive the supplies
that are waiting at York for this division."[310]
It is needless to multiply quotations from the utterances, and
frequent outcries, that run throughout this correspondence. Chauncey,
from early July, had it in his hand seriously to molest the British
communications, and at the same time to contain the British squadron
in Kingston. Such action would subject Yeo to the just and humiliating
imputation of suffering the harassment of the army without an attempt
at relief, or else would compel him to come out and fight under
conditions which, "whatever the result," to use Nelson's words, "would
leave his squadron in a state to do no further harm," till the big
ship was ready. Thus also Chauncey would cover his base; for, as
Prevost wrote, "while Kingston is blockaded, no movement against
Sackett's Harbor can take place." It was Chauncey's misfortune himself
to demonstrate his own shortcoming by the profound distress he
inflicted, when sounder measures were instituted after the censure of
the Government,--too late.
One of the most conspicuous instances of the effect of this neglect
was realized in the desperate and sanguinary engagement of Lundy's
Lane, the occurrence of which, at the time and in the manner it did,
as stated by one of the chief actors, Winfield Scott, was due directly
to the freedom of the lake to the British. Brown had remained at
Queenston for some days after July 10, in painful suspense. A
reconnaissance in force was made on the 15th by the militia brigade
under General Porter, accompanied by two pieces of artillery, which
moved round Fort George as far as Lake Ontario, whence the general
reported "we had an opportunity to examine the _northern_ face of
Forts Riall and Niagara, about two miles distant."[311] Beyond a few
random shots, no opposition was experienced. On the 20th the army as a
whole advanced to the neighborhood of Fort George, and made a
demonstration of throwing up siege works; not without serious
intention, for Brown had not yet abandoned hope of receiving the
cannon of necessary weight, 24-pounders, from Sackett's Harbor. He had
with him only eighteens. Riall was greatly alarmed, exaggerating the
force before him, and receiving reports of re-enforcements expected by
the lake. On July 22 he sent hasty and pressing word of the impending
emergency to Drummond, who arrived the same evening at York from
Kingston; but in the afternoon of the day he was able to give better
tidings. The Americans were falling back again upon Queenston,
abandoning the positions recently assumed.[312]
Brown had hoped that by his advance, blowing up the works at
Queenston, and leaving his rear evidently much exposed, Riall might be
induced to attack. The British general was much disposed to do so; but
refrained, fearing for his own communications. On the morning of the
23d an express from General Gaines, commanding at Sackett's Harbor,
reached Brown at Queenston, informing him that Chauncey was sick, that
no one knew when the fleet would sail, and that an endeavor had been
made to send forward by batteaux, coasting the south shore, the
24-pounder guns needed for besieging Fort George; but the officer in
command had stopped at the mouth of Black River Bay, thinking himself
in danger from the British squadron.[313] A contemporary account
reads: "July 20, Morgan with the riflemen and cannon prevented from
sailing by Yeo's blockade of the harbor."[314] Apparently, Yeo had
even come out of port, in order by menace of attack to arrest the
forwarding of this essential succor. Chauncey's incidental mention is
positive that he approached no nearer than the Ducks, some large
islands thirty miles south of Kingston, and forty west of
Sackett's;[315] but it is obvious that in the quiescence of the
American squadron such a position was prohibitive of movement by
batteaux. It may readily be conceived that had Brown's demonstration
against the fort been coupled with an attempt to land the guns from a
naval division, Riall might have felt compelled to come out of his
lines.
Neither guns nor naval division appeared, and Drummond, able to move
troops freely across the lake, concerted now a plan for striking a
dangerous blow from Fort Niagara, against Brown's communications on
the New York side; the exposed condition of which was known to him.
This was the immediate offensive of which he had spoken; his ability
to undertake which he attributed to naval aid. He had as
adjutant-general Lieutenant-Colonel Harvey, the same who suggested and
executed the brilliant stroke that disconcerted Dearborn's campaign in
1813; and who on the present occasion drew up the instructions to
Riall, and to Lieutenant-Colonel Tucker, the officer in charge of the
forts, with a delightful lucidity which characterizes all papers
signed by him.[316] The brigs "Star" and "Charwell" left York July 23,
with a re-enforcement of four hundred men for Fort Niagara, in which
post the officer commanding was directed to concentrate so many more
as would enable him to carry a full regiment of regulars against
batteries that were being put up at Youngstown. This movement was to
be made at daylight of Monday, July 25, and General Riall was
instructed to support it by a threatening demonstration on his side of
the river. On the evening of the 24th, Drummond himself sailed from
York in one of Yeo's schooners, and by daybreak reached Niagara.
Upon his arrival,--or possibly before,--he learned that the Americans
had retired further, to the Chippewa. The motive for this backward
step was to draw necessary supplies across the river, from the
magazines at Fort Schlosser, and to leave there all superfluous
baggage, prior to a rush upon Burlington Heights, which Brown had now
substituted as the point of attack, in consequence of his
disappointment about the siege guns.[317] It had been his intention
to rest over the 25th, in order to start forward fresh on the 26th.
This retrograde movement, inducing Riall to advance, changed the
situation found by Drummond. He decided therefore to apply his
re-enforcements to the support of Riall directly, and to have the
enterprise from Niagara proceed with somewhat smaller numbers towards
Lewiston,--opposite Queenston,--where a body of Americans were posted.
This advance appears to have been detected very soon, for Drummond
writes, "Some unavoidable delay having occurred in the march of the
troops up the right bank, the enemy had moved off previous to Colonel
Tucker's arrival." Brown, in his report of this circumstance, wrote,
"As it appeared that the enemy with his increased force was about to
avail himself of the hazard under which our baggage and stores were on
our [American] side of Niagara, I conceived the most effectual method
of recalling him from the object was to put myself in motion towards
Queenston. General Scott with his brigade were accordingly put in
march on the road leading thither." The result was the battle of
Lundy's Lane.
Scott in his autobiography attributes the report of an advance towards
Schlosser to a mistake on the part of the officer making it. It was
not so. There was an actual movement, modified in detail from the
original elaborate plan, the execution of which was based by the
British general upon the local control of the lake, enabling him to
send re-enforcements. The employment of Dobbs' four vessels, permitted
by Chauncey's inaction, thus had direct effect upon the occurrence and
the result of the desperately contested engagement which ensued, upon
the heights overlooking the lower torrent of the Niagara. From the
Chippewa to the Falls is about two miles, through which the main road
from Lake Erie to Ontario follows the curving west bank of the stream.
A half mile further on it was joined at right angles by the
crossroad, known as Lundy's Lane. As Scott's column turned the bend
above the Falls there were evidences of the enemy's presence, which at
first were thought to indicate only a detachment for observation; but
a few more paces disclosed the Lane held by a line of troops, superior
in number to those encountered with equal unexpectedness on the
Chippewa, three weeks before.
Scott hesitated whether to fall back; but apprehensive of the effect
of such a step upon the other divisions, he sent word to Brown that he
would hold his ground, and prepared for battle, making dispositions to
turn the enemy's left,--towards the Niagara. It was then near sundown.
A hot engagement followed, in the course of which the pressure on the
British left caused it to give ground. In consequence, the American
right advancing and the British left receding, the two lines swung
round perpendicular to the Lane, the Americans standing with their
backs to the precipices, beneath which roar the lower rapids of
Niagara. At this period General Riall, who had received a severe
wound, was captured while being carried to the rear.
As this change of front was taking place Brown arrived, with Ripley's
brigade and Porter's militia, which were brought into line with Scott;
the latter occupying the extreme right, Ripley the centre, and Porter
the left. When this arrangement had been completed the attack was
resumed, and a hill top, which was the key of the British position,
was carried; the artillery there falling into the hands of the
Americans. "In so determined a manner were these attacks directed
against our guns," reported Drummond, "that our artillery men were
bayoneted by the enemy in the act of loading, and the muzzles of the
enemy's guns were advanced within a few yards of ours.... Our troops
having for a moment been pushed back, some of our guns remained for a
few minutes in the enemy's hands."[318] Upon this central fact both
accounts agree, but on the upshot of the matter they differ. "Not only
were the guns quickly recovered," continued Drummond, "but the two
pieces which the enemy had brought up were captured by us." He admits,
however, the loss as well as gain of one 6-pounder. Brown, on the
contrary, claimed that the ground was held and that the enemy retired,
leaving his guns. "He attempted to drive us from our position and to
regain his artillery; our line was unshaken and the enemy repulsed.
Two other attempts having the same object had the same issue."[319] By
this time both Brown and Scott had been severely wounded and carried
off the field. In this situation the Commander-in-Chief directed the
officer now in command to withdraw the troops to the camp, three miles
behind, for refreshment, and then to re-occupy the field of battle.
Whether this was feasible or not would require an inquiry more
elaborate than the matter at stake demands. It is certain that the
next day the British resumed the position without resistance, and
continued to hold it.
To Americans the real interest and value of this action, combined with
its predecessor at Chippewa, and with the subsequent equally desperate
fighting about Fort Erie, were that the contest did not close without
this conspicuous demonstration that in capable hands the raw material
of the American armies could be worked up into fighting quality equal
to the best. Regarded as an international conflict, the war was now
staggering to its end, which was but a few months distant; and in
every direction little but shame and mortification had befallen the
American arms on land. It would have been a calamity, indeed, had the
record closed for that generation with the showing of 1812 and 1813.
Nothing is gained by explaining or excusing such results; the only
expiation for them is by the demonstration of repentance, in works
worthy of men and soldiers. This was abundantly afforded by Brown's
brief campaign of 1814, otherwise fruitless. Not only the regular
troops, fashioned by Scott in a few brief months from raw recruits to
disciplined fighters, proved their mettle; the irregulars associated
with them, though without the same advantage of training and concert
of movement, caught their enthusiasm, gained confidence from their
example, and emulated their deeds. The rabble which scarcely waited
for a shot before scattering at the approach of Riall's columns in
December, 1813, abandoning their homes to destruction, had earned the
discriminating eulogium of General Brown before the year 1814 closed.
In August, after Lundy's Lane, he, a New Yorker himself, wrote to the
Governor of New York:[320] "This state has suffered in reputation in
this war; its militia have done nothing, or but little, and that, too,
after the state had been for a long time invaded." On September 20,
after the sanguinary and successful sortie from Fort Erie, he wrote
again: "The militia of New York have redeemed their character--they
behaved gallantly. Of those called out by the last requisition,
fifteen hundred have crossed the state border to our support. This
re-enforcement has been of immense importance to us; it doubled our
effective strength, and their good conduct cannot but have the
happiest effect upon the nation."[321]
The American losses at Lundy's Lane were, killed one hundred and
seventy-one, wounded five hundred and seventy-two, missing one hundred
and seventeen; total, eight hundred and sixty. Those of the British
were, killed eighty-four, wounded five hundred and fifty-nine,
missing one hundred and ninety-three, prisoners forty-two; total,
eight hundred and seventy-eight. Of the British missing and prisoners,
one hundred and sixty-nine were reported by the Americans as in their
hands; among them nineteen officers. This substantial equality in
casualties corresponds to a similar equality in the numbers engaged.
The Americans had present for duty two thousand six hundred and
forty-four, including over four hundred militia; Drummond in his
report states that first and last he had upon the field not more than
two thousand eight hundred. That he estimates the force opposed to him
to have been at least five thousand, may be coupled with his mention
of "the reiterated and determined attacks which the enemy made upon
our centre," as showing the impression produced upon his mind during
the progress of the struggle. The comparison of numbers engaged with
injuries sustained justifies the inference that, in result, the actual
contest upon the ground was at least a drawn battle, if not the
positive success claimed by Brown and Scott. Colonel Hercules Scott,
of the British 103d Regiment, who to be sure shows somewhat of the
malcontent ever present in camps, but who afterwards fell well at the
front in the assault upon Fort Erie, was in this action; and in a
private letter uses an expression which practically corroborates the
American assertion that they held the ground at the end, and withdrew
afterwards. "In the last attack they gained possession of five out of
seven of our guns, but the fire kept upon them was so severe that it
afterwards appeared they had not been able to carry them off; _for we
found them next morning_ on the spot they had been taken. No [We?]
boast of a 'Great Victory,' but in my opinion it was nearly equal on
both sides."[322]
Equality of loss, or even a technical victory, does not imply equality
of subsequent conditions. Brown had at the front all his available
force; he had no reserves or depots upon which to draw. He had
expended the last shot in the locker. Drummond not only had been
receiving re-enforcements, absolutely small, yet considerable in
proportion to the contending numbers, but he was continuing to receive
them. Lundy's Lane was July 25; Chauncey did not take the lake until
August 1, and it was the 5th when he came off Niagara, where he at
once intercepted and drove ashore one of the British brigs, which was
fired by her captain. He thus had immediate ocular demonstration of
what had been going on in his absence; but it was already too late for
the American squadron to turn the scales of war. If this could have
been accomplished at all, it would have been by such intervention as
in this instance; by injuring the enemy rather than by helping the
friend. But this would have been possible only in the beginning. Brown
felt himself unable longer to keep the field; and the army, now under
General Ripley, withdrew the following day, July 26, to Fort Erie,
where it proceeded to strengthen the work itself, and to develop a
fortified line depending upon it, covering the angle of ground made by
the shores of the Niagara River and Lake Erie. Brown was carried to
Buffalo to recover of his wounds, which were not dangerous, though
severe. He subsequently resumed chief command, but Scott was unable to
serve again during the campaign. General Gaines was summoned from
Sackett's Harbor, and on August 5 took charge at Fort Erie.
From this time the operations on either side were limited to the
effort to take or to hold this position. Drummond's experience at
Lundy's Lane, and the extent of his loss, made him cautious in
pursuit; and time was yielded to the enemy to make good their
entrenchment. On the early morning of August 15 the British assaulted,
and were repelled with fifty-seven killed, three hundred and nine
wounded, and five hundred and thirty-nine missing.[323] The Americans,
covered by their works, reported a loss of less than one hundred. "I
am now reduced to a most unpleasant predicament with regard to force,"
wrote Drummond to Prevost.[324] "I have ordered the 6th and 82d from
York to this frontier. I had intended to order another regiment from
Kingston, but from the badness of the roads since the recent rains I
could not calculate upon their arrival here before our squadron will
be able to take the lake, and as even at present the diminution of
stores and provisions is beginning to be felt, I intreat your
excellency will impress upon the Commodore the necessity of conveying
to this division, the very moment the squadron can leave harbor, a
full supply of each, as well as a re-enforcement of troops."
After this sharp reverse Drummond settled down to a siege, in the
course of which he complained frequently and grievously of the
annoyance caused him by Chauncey's blockade, established August 6,
with three vessels competent seriously to interrupt transportation of
supplies, or of men in large detachments. The season was still
propitious for marching; but as early as August 21 Drummond was afraid
"that relief by control of the lake may not reach us in time."
September 11, "Our batteries have almost been silent for several days
from the reduced state of the ammunition." September 14, "The sudden
and most unlooked for return to the head of Lake Ontario of the two
brigs, by which the Niagara has been so long blockaded, _and my
communication with York cut off_, has had the effect of preventing the
junction of the 97th regiment, which arrived at York the 10th, and
probably would have been here the following day but for this unlucky
circumstance."[325] September 24, "The deficiency of provisions and
transport is the difficulty attending every operation in this country,
as it prevents the collection at any one point of an adequate force
for any object. These difficulties we must continue to experience,
until our squadron appears superior on the lake." It would be
impossible to depict more strongly the course incumbent upon Chauncey
in July, or to condemn more severely, by implication, his failure then
to do what he could, taking the chance of that chapter of accidents,
"to be in the way of good luck," which it is the duty of every
military leader to consider as among the clear possibilities of war.
"The blockade of Kingston," wrote Prevost on October 11 to Lord
Bathurst,[326] "has been vigorously maintained for the last six weeks
by the enemy's squadron. The vigilance of the American cruisers on
Lake Ontario was felt even by our batteaux creeping along the shore
with provisions for Drummond's division. In consequence, I found that
the wants of that army had grown to an alarming extent."[327]
In pushing his siege works, Drummond by September 15 had erected three
batteries, the last of which, then just completed, "would rake
obliquely the whole American encampment."[328] Brown determined then
upon a sortie in force, which was made on the afternoon of September
17, with entire success. It was in this attack that the New York
militia, of whom fifteen hundred had crossed to the fort, bore an
honorable and distinguished part. Brown states the actual force
engaged in the fighting at one thousand regulars and one thousand
militia, to whose energy and stubbornness Drummond again pays the
compliment of estimating them at five thousand. The weight of the
onslaught was thrown on the British right flank, and there doubtless
the assailants were, and should have been, greatly superior. Two of
the three batteries were carried, one of them being that which had
directly incited the attack. "The enemy," reported Drummond, "was
everywhere driven back; not however before he had disabled the guns in
No. 3 battery, and exploded its magazine;"[329] that is, not before he
had accomplished his purpose.
Nor was this all. The stroke ended the campaign. Drummond had nearly
lost hope of a successful issue, and this blow destroyed what little
remained. The American navy still held the lake; the big ship in
Kingston still tarried; rains torrential and almost incessant were
undermining the ramparts of Forts George and Niagara, causing serious
alarm for the defence, and spreading sickness among his troops,
re-enforcements to which could with difficulty be sent. The British
returns of loss in repelling the sortie gave one hundred and fifteen
killed, one hundred and forty-eight wounded, three hundred and sixteen
missing; total, five hundred and seventy-nine. The Americans, whose
casualties were five hundred and eleven, reported that they brought
back three hundred and eighty-five prisoners; among whom the roll of
officers tallies with the British list. Four days afterwards,
September 21, Drummond abandoned his works, leaving his fires burning
and huts standing, and fell back secretly by night to the Chippewa.
Brown was in no condition to follow. In a brief ten weeks, over which
his adventurous enterprise spread, he had fought four engagements,
which might properly be called general actions, if regard were had to
the total force at his disposal, and not merely to the tiny scale of
the campaign. Barring the single episode of the battle of New
Orleans, his career on the Niagara peninsula is the one operation of
the land war of 1812 upon which thoughtful and understanding Americans
of the following generation could look back with satisfaction. Of how
great consequence this evidence of national military character was, to
the men who had no other experience, is difficult to be appreciated by
us, in whose memories are the successes of the Mexican contest and the
fierce titanic strife of the Civil War. In truth, Chippewa, Lundy's
Lane, and New Orleans, are the only names of 1812 preserved to popular
memory,[330] ever impatient of disagreeable reminiscence. Hull's
surrender was indeed an exception; the iron there burned too deep to
leave no lasting scar. To Brown and his distinguished subordinates we
owe the demonstration of what the War of 1812 might have accomplished,
had the Government of the United States since the beginning of the
century possessed even a rudimentary conception of what military
preparation means to practical statesmanship.
Shortly after the sortie which decided Drummond to retire, the
defenders of Fort Erie were brought into immediate relation with the
major part of the forces upon Lake Champlain, under General Izard.
Both belonged to the same district, the ninth, which in Dearborn's
time had formed one general command; but which it now pleased the
Secretary of War, General Armstrong, to manage as two distinct
divisions, under his own controlling directions from Washington. The
Secretary undoubtedly had a creditable amount of acquired military
knowledge, but by this time he had manifested that he did not possess
the steadying military qualities necessary to play the role of a
distant commander-in-chief. Izard, at the time of his appointment,
reported everything connected with his command, the numbers and
discipline of the troops, their clothing and equipment, in a
deplorable state of inefficiency.[331] The summer months were spent in
building up anew the army on Champlain, and in erecting
fortifications; at Plattsburg, where the main station was fixed, and
at Cumberland Head, the promontory which defines the eastern side of
Plattsburg Bay. Upon the maintenance of these positions depended the
tenure of the place itself, as the most suitable advanced base for the
army and for the fleet, mutually indispensable for the protection of
that great line of operations.
On July 27, before the Secretary could know of Lundy's Lane, but when
he did anticipate that Brown must fall back on Fort Erie, he wrote to
Izard that it would be expedient for him to advance against Montreal,
or against Prescott,--on the St. Lawrence opposite Ogdensburg,--in
case large re-enforcements had been sent from Montreal to check
Brown's advance, as was reported. His own inclination pointed to
Prescott, with a view to the contingent chance of an attack upon
Kingston, in co-operation with Chauncey and the garrison at
Sackett's.[332] This letter did not reach Izard till August 10. He
construed its somewhat tentative and vacillating terms as an order. "I
will make the movement you direct, if possible; but I shall do it
with the apprehension of risking the force under my command, and with
the certainty that everything in this vicinity, save the lately
erected works at Plattsburg and Cumberland Head, will, in less than
three days after my departure, be in possession of the enemy."[333]
Izard, himself, on July 19, had favored a step like this proposed;
but, as he correctly observed, the time for it was when Brown was
advancing and might be helped. Now, when Brown had been brought to a
stand, and was retiring, the movement would not aid him, but would
weaken the Champlain frontier; and that at the very moment when the
divisions from Wellington's army, which had embarked at Bordeaux, were
arriving at Quebec and Montreal.
On August 12, Armstrong wrote again, saying that his first order had
been based upon the supposition that Chauncey would meet and beat Yeo,
or at least confine him in port. This last had in fact been done; but,
if the enemy should have carried his force from Montreal to Kingston,
and be prepared there, "a safer movement was to march two thousand men
to Sackett's, embark there, and go to Brown's assistance."[334] Izard
obediently undertook this new disposition, which he received August
20; but upon consultation with his officers concluded that to march by
the northern route, near the Canada border, would expose his
necessarily long column to dangerous flank attack. He therefore
determined to go by way of Utica.[335] On August 29 the division,
about four thousand effectives, set out from the camp at Chazy, eight
miles north of Plattsburg, and on September 16 reached Sackett's. Bad
weather prevented immediate embarkation, but on the 21st about two
thousand five hundred infantry sailed, and having a fair wind reached
next day the Genesee, where they were instantly put ashore. A
regiment of light artillery and a number of dragoons, beyond the
capacity of the fleet to carry, went by land and arrived a week later.
In this manner the defence of Lake Champlain was deprived of four
thousand fairly trained troops at the moment that the British attack
in vast superiority of force was maturing. Their advance brigade, in
fact, crossed the frontier two days after Izard's departure. At the
critical moment, and during the last weeks of weather favorable for
operations, the men thus taken were employed in making an unprofitable
march of great length, to a quarter where there was now little
prospect of successful action, and where they could not arrive before
the season should be practically closed. Brown, of course, hailed an
accession of strength which he sorely needed, and did not narrowly
scrutinize a measure for which he was not responsible. On September
27, ten days after the successful sortie from Fort Erie, he was at
Batavia, in New York, where he had an interview with Izard, who was
the senior. In consequence of their consultation Izard determined that
his first movement should be the siege of Fort Niagara.[336] In
pursuance of this resolve his army marched to Lewiston, where it
arrived October 5. There he had a second meeting with Brown,
accompanied on this occasion by Porter, and under their
representations decided that it would be more proper to concentrate
all the forces at hand on the Canadian bank of the Niagara, south of
the Chippewa, and not to undertake a siege while Drummond kept the
field.[337]
Despite many embarrassments, and anxieties on the score of supplies
and provisions while deprived of the free use of the lake, the British
general was now master of the situation. His position rested upon the
Chippewa on one flank, and upon Fort Niagara on the other. From end
to end he had secure communication, for he possessed the river and the
boats, below the falls. By these interior lines, despite his momentary
inferiority in total numbers, he was able to concentrate his forces
upon a threatened extremity with a rapidity which the assailants could
not hope to rival. Fort Niagara was not in a satisfactory condition to
resist battery by heavy cannon; but Izard had none immediately at
hand. Drummond was therefore justified in his hope that "the enemy
will find the recapture of the place not to be easily effected."[338]
His line of the Chippewa rested on the left upon the Niagara. On its
right flank the ground was impassable to everything save infantry, and
any effort to turn his position there would have to be made in the
face of artillery, to oppose which no guns could be brought forward.
Accordingly when Izard, after crossing in accordance with his last
decision, advanced on October 15 against the British works upon the
Chippewa, he found they were too strong for a frontal attack, the
opinion which Drummond himself entertained,[339] while the
topographical difficulties of the country baffled every attempt to
turn them. Drummond's one serious fear was that the Americans, finding
him impregnable here, might carry a force by Lake Erie, and try to
gain his rear from Long Point, or by the Grand River.[340] Though they
would meet many obstacles in such a circuit, yet the extent to which
he would have to detach in order to meet them, and the smallness of
his numbers, might prove very embarrassing.
Izard entertained no such project. After his demonstration of October
15, which amounted to little more than a reconnaisance in force, he
lapsed into hopelessness. The following day he learned by express that
the American squadron had retired to Sackett's Harbor and was
throwing up defensive works. With his own eyes he saw, too, that the
British water service was not impeded. "Notwithstanding our supremacy
on Lake Ontario, at the time I was in Lewiston [October 5-8] the
communication between York and the mouth of the Niagara was
uninterrupted. I saw a large square-rigged vessel arriving, and
another, a brig, lying close to the Canada shore. Not a vessel of ours
was in sight."[341] The British big ship, launched September 10, was
on October 14 reported by Yeo completely equipped. The next day he
would proceed up the lake to Drummond's relief. Chauncey had not
waited for the enemy to come out. Convinced that the first use of
naval superiority would be to reduce his naval base, he took his ships
into port October 8; writing to Washington that the "St. Lawrence" had
her sails bent, apparently all ready for sea, and that he expected an
attack in ten days.[342] "I confess I am greatly embarrassed," wrote
Izard to Monroe, who had now superseded Armstrong as Secretary of War.
"At the head of the most efficient army the United States have
possessed during this war, much must be expected from me; and yet I
can discern no object which can be achieved at this point worthy of
the risk which will attend its attempt." The enemy perfectly
understood his perplexity, and despite his provocations refused to
play into his hands by leaving the shelter of their works to fight. On
October 21, he broke up his camp, and began to prepare winter quarters
for his own command opposite Black Rock, sending Brown with his
division to Sackett's Harbor. Two weeks later, on November 5, having
already transported all but a small garrison to the American shore, he
blew up Fort Erie and abandoned his last foothold on the peninsula.
During the operations along the Niagara which ended thus fruitlessly,
the United States Navy upon Lake Erie met with some severe mishaps.
The Cabinet purpose, of carrying an expedition into the upper lakes
against Michilimackinac, was persisted in despite the reluctance of
Armstrong. Commander Arthur Sinclair, who after an interval had
succeeded Perry, was instructed to undertake this enterprise with such
force as might be necessary; but to leave within Lake Erie all that he
could spare, to co-operate with Brown. Accordingly he sailed from Erie
early in June, arriving on the 21st off Detroit, where he was to
embark the troops under Colonel Croghan for the land operations. After
various delays St. Joseph's was reached July 20, and found abandoned.
Its defences were destroyed. On the 26th the vessels were before
Mackinac, but after a reconnaisance Croghan decided that the position
was too strong for the force he had. Sinclair therefore started to
return, having so far accomplished little except the destruction of
two schooners, one on Lake Huron, and one on Lake Superior, both
essential to the garrison at Mackinac; there being at the time but one
other vessel on the lakes competent to the maintenance of their
communications.
This remaining schooner, called the "Nancy," was known to be in
Nottawasaga Bay, at the south end of Georgian Bay, near the position
selected by the British as a depot for stores coming from York by way
of Lake Simcoe. After much dangerous search in uncharted waters,
Sinclair found her lying two miles up a river of the same name as the
bay, where she was watching a chance to slip through to Mackinac. Her
lading had been completed July 31, and the next day she had already
started, when a messenger brought word that approach to the island was
blocked by the American expedition. The winding of the river placed
her present anchorage within gunshot of the lake; but as she could
not be seen through the brush, Sinclair borrowed from the army a
howitzer, with which, mounted in the open beyond, he succeeded in
firing both the "Nancy" and the blockhouse defending the position. The
British were thus deprived of their last resource for transportation
in bulk upon the lake. What this meant to Mackinac may be inferred
from the fact that flour there was sixty dollars the barrel, even
before Sinclair's coming.
Having inflicted this small, yet decisive, embarrassment on the enemy,
Sinclair on August 16 started back with the "Niagara" and "Hunter" for
Erie, whither he had already despatched the "Lawrence"--Perry's old
flagship--and the "Caledonia." He left in Nottawasaga Bay the
schooners "Scorpion" and "Tigress," "to maintain a rigid blockade
until driven from the lake by the inclemency of the weather," in order
"to cut the line of communications from Michilimackinac to York."
Lieutenant Daniel Turner of the "Scorpion," who had commanded the
"Caledonia" in Perry's action, was the senior officer of this
detachment.
After Sinclair's departure the gales became frequent and violent.
Finding no good anchorage in Nottawasaga Bay, Turner thought he could
better fulfil the purpose of his instructions by taking the schooners
to St. Joseph's, and cruising thence to French River, which enters
Georgian Bay at its northern end. On the night of September 3, the
"Scorpion" being then absent at the river, the late commander of the
"Nancy," Lieutenant Miller Worsley, got together a boat's crew of
eighteen seamen, and obtained the co-operation of a detachment of
seventy soldiers. With these, followed by a number of Indians in
canoes, he attacked the "Tigress" at her anchors and carried her by
boarding. The night being very dark, the British were close alongside
when first seen; and the vessel was not provided with boarding
nettings, which her commander at his trial proved he had not the
cordage to make. Deprived of this essential defence, which in such an
exposed situation corresponds to a line of intrenched works on shore,
her crew of thirty men were readily overpowered by the superior
numbers, who could come upon them from four quarters at once, and had
but an easy step to her low-lying rail. The officer commanding the
British troops made a separate report of the affair, in which he said
that her resistance did credit to her officers, who were all severely
wounded.[343] Transferring his men to the prize, Worsley waited for
the return of the "Scorpion," which on the 5th anchored about five
miles off, ignorant of what had happened. The now British schooner
weighed and ran down to her, showing American colors; and, getting
thus alongside without being suspected, mastered her also. Besides the
officers hurt, there were of the "Tigress'" crew three killed and
three wounded; the British having two killed and eight wounded. No
loss seems to have been incurred on either side in the capture of the
"Scorpion." In reporting this affair Sir James Yeo wrote: "The
importance of this service is very great. Had not the naval force of
the enemy been taken, the commanding officer at Mackinac must have
surrendered."[344] He valued it further for its influence upon the
Indians, and upon the future of the naval establishment which he had
in contemplation for the upper lakes.
When Sinclair reached Detroit from Nottawasaga he received news of
other disasters. According to his instructions, before starting for
the upper lakes he had left a division of his smaller vessels, under
Lieutenant Kennedy, to support the army at Niagara. When Brown fell
back upon Fort Erie, after Lundy's Lane, three of these, the "Ohio,"
"Somers," and "Porcupine," anchored close by the shore, in such a
position as to flank the approaches to the fort, and to molest the
breaching battery which the British were erecting. As this interfered
with the besiegers' plans for an assault, Captain Dobbs, commanding
the naval detachment on Ontario which Yeo had assigned to co-operate
with Drummond, transported over land from below the falls six boats or
batteaux, and on the night of August 12 attacked the American
schooners, as Worsley afterwards did the "Tigress" and "Scorpion." The
"Ohio" and "Somers," each with a crew of thirty-five men, were carried
and brought successfully down the river within the British lines.
Dobbs attributed the escape of the "Porcupine" to the cables of the
two others being cut, in consequence of which they with the victorious
assailants on board drifted beyond possibility of return.[345] To
these four captures by the enemy must be added the loss by accident of
the "Caledonia"[346] and "Ariel," reported by Sinclair about this
time. Perry's fleet was thus disappearing by driblets; but the command
of the lake was not yet endangered, for there still remained, besides
several of the prizes, the two principal vessels, "Lawrence" and
"Niagara."[347]
With these Sinclair returned to the east of the lake, and endeavored
to give support to the army at Fort Erie; but the violence of the
weather and the insecurity of the anchorage on both shores, as the
autumn drew on, not only prevented effectual co-operation, but
seriously threatened the very existence of the fleet, upon which
control of the water depended. In an attempt to go to Detroit for
re-enforcements for Brown, a gale of wind was encountered which
drifted the vessels back to Buffalo, where they had to anchor and lie
close to a lee shore for two days, September 18 to 20, with topmasts
and lower yards down, the sea breaking over them, and their cables
chafing asunder on a rocky bottom. After this, Drummond having raised
the siege of Fort Erie, the fleet retired to Erie and was laid up for
the winter.
FOOTNOTES:
[266] Ante, pp. 118-121.
[267] Documentary History of the Campaign on the Niagara Frontier in
1814, by Ernest Cruikshank, Part I. p. 5.
[268] Captains' Letters, Feb. 24, March 4 and 29, 1814.
[269] Canadian Archives, C. 682, p. 32.
[270] Niles' Register, Feb. 5, 1814, vol. v. pp. 381, 383.
[271] Canadian Archives. C. 682, p. 90.
[272] Armstrong, Notices of the War of 1812, vol. ii. p. 213.
[273] Canadian Archives, C. 683, p. 10.
[274] Ibid., pp. 53, 61-64.
[275] Ibid., C. 682, p. 194.
[276] Niles' Register, April 9, 1814, vol. vi. p. 102.
[277] Captains' Letters, April 11, 1814.
[278] Writings of Madison, Edition of 1865, vol. ii. p. 413.
[279] Wilkinson's letter to a friend, April 9, 1814. Niles' Register,
vol. vi. p. 166. His official report of the affair is given, p. 131.
[280] Yeo's Report, Canadian Archives, M. 389.6, p. 116.
[281] The armaments of the corresponding two British vessels were:
"Prince Regent", thirty long 24-pounders, eight 68-pounder carronades,
twenty 32-pounder carronades; "Princess Charlotte", twenty-four long
24-pounders, sixteen 32-pounder carronades. Canadian Archives, M. 389.6,
p. 109.
[282] Captains' Letters.
[283] Canadian Archives, C. 683, p. 157.
[284] Woolsey's Report, forwarded by Chauncey June 2, is in Captains'
Letters. It is given, together with several other papers bearing on the
affair, in Niles' Register, vol. vi. pp. 242, 265-267. For Popham's
Report, see Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxii. p. 167.
[285] Canadian Archives, C. 683, p. 225.
[286] Cruikshank's Documentary History, 1814, pp. 18-20.
[287] Writings of Madison (Edition of 1865), vol. iii. p. 403.
[288] Captains' Letters.
[289] Ibid.
[290] Yeo to Admiralty, May 30, 1815. Canadian Archives, M. 389.6, p.
310. For Chauncey's opinion to the same effect, see Captains' Letters,
Nov. 5, 1814.
[291] Captains' Letters, June 15, 1814.
[292] Armstrong to Madison, April 31 (_sic_), 1814. Armstrong's Notices
of War of 1812, vol. ii. p. 413.
[293] These official returns are taken by the present writer from Mr.
Henry Adams' History of the United States.
[294] Cruikshank's Documentary History of the Niagara Campaign of 1814,
p. 37.
[295] Cruikshank, Documentary History.
[296] Ibid., p. 4.
[297] Scott's Autobiography, vol. i. pp. 130-132.
[298] Cruikshank's Documentary History, p. 31.
[299] Niles' Register, vol. vii. p. 38.
[300] Captains' Letters.
[301] Secretary of the Navy to Chauncey, July 24, 1814, Secretary's
Letters.
[302] Secretary to Chauncey, Aug. 3, 1814. Ibid.
[303] Ibid., Dec. 29, 1813.
[304] Chauncey to Brown, Aug. 10, 1814. Niles' Register, vol. vii. p.
38.
[305] August 27. Cruikshank's Documentary History, pp. 180-182. The
whole letter has interest as conveying an adequate idea of the
communications difficulty.
[306] This word is wanting; but the context evidently requires it.
[307] Cruikshank's Documentary History, 1814, pp. 58, 60.
[308] Cruikshank's Documentary History, 1814, p. 134.
[309] Captains' Letters. Aug. 19, 1814.
[310] Cruikshank's Documentary History, 1814, p. 191.
[311] Cruikshank's Documentary History, 1814, p. 68.
[312] Cruikshank's Documentary History, 1814. Riall to Drummond, July
20, 21, 22, pp. 75-81.
[313] Ibid., p. 87.
[314] Ibid., p. 78.
[315] "Sir James Yeo has not been nearer Sackett's Harbor than the Ducks
since June 5." Captains' Letters, Aug. 19, 1814.
[316] Cruikshank's Documentary History, 1814, pp. 82, 84.
[317] Brown's Report of Lundy's Lane to Secretary of War, Aug. 7, 1814.
Ibid., p. 97.
[318] Drummond's Report of the Engagement, July 27. Cruikshank, pp.
87-92.
[319] Brown's Report. Ibid., p. 99.
[320] Brown to Governor Tompkins, Aug. 1, 1814. Cruikshank, p. 103.
[321] Ibid., p. 207.
[322] Cruikshank's Documentary History, 1814, p. 131. Author's italics.
[323] The American account of this total is: killed, left on the field,
222; wounded, left on the field, 174; prisoners, 186. Total, 582.
Two hundred supposed to be killed on the left flank (in the water) and
permitted to float down the Niagara.
[324] Aug. 16. Cruikshank, pp. 146-147.
[325] Cruikshank's Documentary History, 1814, pp. 199, 200. Author's
italics.
[326] Bathurst was Secretary of State for War and the Colonies.
[327] Cruikshank's Documentary History, 1814, pp. 229, 245.
[328] Ibid., p. 207. Brown to Tompkins, Sept. 20, 1814.
[329] Cruikshank's Documentary History, p. 205.
[330] An interesting indication of popular appreciation is found in the
fact that two ships of the line laid down by Chauncey in or near
Sackett's Harbor, in the winter of 1814-15, were named the "New Orleans"
and the "Chippewa." Yeo after the peace returned to England by way of
Sackett's and New York, and was then greatly surprised at the rapidity
with which these two vessels, which he took to be of one hundred and
twenty guns each, (Canadian Archives, M. 389.6, p. 310), had been run
up, to meet his "St. Lawrence" in the spring, had the war continued. The
"New Orleans" remained on the Navy List, as a seventy-four, "on the
stocks," until 1882, when she was sold. For years she was the exception
to a rule that ships of her class should bear the name of a state of the
Union. The other square-rigged vessels on Ontario were sold, in May,
1825. (Records of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, Navy
Department.)
[331] Izard to Secretary of War, May 7, 1814. Official Correspondence of
the Department of War with Major-General Izard, 1814 and 1815.
[332] Izard Correspondence, p. 64.
[333] Izard Correspondence, p. 65.
[334] Ibid., p. 69.
[335] Ibid., p. 63.
[336] Izard Correspondence, p. 93.
[337] Ibid., p. 98.
[338] Oct. 6, 1814. Cruikshank's Documentary History, 1814, p. 240.
[339] Izard Correspondence, p. 102; Cruikshank, p. 242.
[340] Cruikshank, p. 240.
[341] Izard Correspondence, p. 103.
[342] Captains' Letters.
[343] Canadian Archives, C. 685, pp. 172-174.
[344] Ibid., M. 389.6, p. 222.
[345] The Reports of Captain Dobbs and the American lieutenant,
Conkling, are in Cruikshank's Documentary History, p. 135.
[346] Captains' Letters, Sept. 12, 1814.
[347] This account of naval events on the upper lakes in 1814 has been
summarized from Sinclair's despatches, Captains' Letters, May 2 to Nov.
11, 1814, and from certain captured British letters, which, with several
of Sinclair's, were published in Niles' Register, vol. vii. and
Supplement.