CHAPTER XIV

MARITIME OPERATIONS EXTERNAL TO THE WATERS OF THE UNITED

STATES, 1813-1814

In broad generalization, based upon analysis of conditions, it has

been said that the seacoast of the United States was in 1812 a

defensive frontier, from which, as from all defensive lines, there

should be, and was, opportunity for offensive returns; for action

planned to relieve the shore-line, and the general military situation,

by inflicting elsewhere upon the opponent injury, harassment, and

perplexity. The last chapter dealt with the warfare depending upon the

seaboard chiefly from the defensive point of view; to illustrate the

difficulties, the blows, and the sufferings, to which the country was

exposed, owing to inability to force the enemy away from any large

portion of the coast. The pressure was as universal as it was

inexorable and irresistible.

It remains still to consider the employment and effects of the one

offensive maritime measure left open by the exigencies of the war; the

cruises directed against the enemy's commerce, and the characteristic

incidents to which they gave rise. In this pursuit were engaged both

the national ships of war and those equipped by the enterprise of the

mercantile community; but, as the operations were in their nature more

consonant to the proper purpose of privateers, so the far greater

number of these caused them to play a part much more considerable in

effect, though proportionately less fruitful in conspicuous action.

Fighting, when avoidable, is to the privateer a misdirection of

energy. Profit is his object, by depredation upon the enemy's

commerce; not the preservation of that of his own people. To the ship

of war, on the other hand, protection of the national shipping is the

primary concern; and for that reason it becomes her to shun no

encounter by which she may hope to remove from the seas a hostile

cruiser.

The limited success of the frigates in their attempts against British

trade has been noted, and attributed to the general fact that their

cruises were confined to the more open sea, upon the highways of

commerce. These were now travelled by British ships under strict laws

of convoy, the effect of which was not merely to protect the several

flocks concentrated under their particular watchdogs, but to strip the

sea of those isolated vessels, that in time of peace rise in irregular

but frequent succession above the horizon, covering the face of the

deep with a network of tracks. These solitary wayfarers were now to be

found only as rare exceptions to the general rule, until the port of

destination was approached. There the homing impulse overbore the

bonds of regulation; and the convoys tended to the conduct noted by

Nelson as a captain, "behaving as all convoys that ever I saw did,

shamefully ill, parting company every day." Commodore John Rodgers has

before been quoted, as observing that the British practice was to rely

upon pressure on the enemy over sea, for security near home; and that

the waters surrounding the British Islands themselves were the field

where commerce destruction could be most decisively effected.

The first United States vessel to emphasize this fact was the brig

"Argus," Captain William H. Allen, which sailed from New York June 18,

1813, having on board a newly appointed minister to France, Mr.

William H. Crawford, recently a senator from Georgia. On July 11 she

reached L'Orient, having in the twenty-three days of passage made but

one prize.[217] Three days later she proceeded to cruise in the chops

of the English Channel, and against the local trade between Ireland

and England; continuing thus until August 14, thirty-one days, during

which she captured nineteen sail, extending her depredations well up

into St. George's Channel. The contrast of results mentioned, between

her voyage across and her occupancy of British waters, illustrates the

comparative advantages of the two scenes of operations, regarded in

their relation to British commerce.

On August 12 the British brig of war "Pelican," Captain Maples,

anchored at Cork from the West Indies. Before her sails were furled

she received orders to go out in search of the American ship of war

whose depredations had been reported. Two hours later she was again at

sea. The following evening, at half-past seven, a burning vessel to

the eastward gave direction to her course, and at daybreak, August 14,

she sighted a brig of war in the northeast, just quitting another

prize, which had also been fired. The wind, being south, gave the

windward position to the "Pelican," which stood in pursuit; the

"Argus" steering east, near the wind, but under moderate sail to

enable her opponent to close (positions 1). The advantage in size and

armament was on this occasion on the British side; the "Pelican" being

twenty per cent larger, and her broadside seventeen per cent heavier.

At 5.55 A.M., St. David's Head on the coast of Wales bearing east,

distant about fifteen miles, the "Argus" wore, standing now to the

westward, with the wind on the port side (2). The "Pelican" did the

same, and the battle opened at six; the vessels running side by side,

within the range of grapeshot and musketry,--probably under two

hundred yards apart (2). Within five minutes Captain Allen received a

wound which cost him his leg, and in the end his life. He at first

refused to be taken below, but loss of blood soon so reduced him that

he could no longer exercise command. Ten minutes later the first

lieutenant was stunned by the graze of a grapeshot along his head, and

the charge of the ship devolved on the second. By this time the

rigging of the "Argus" had been a good deal cut, and the "Pelican"

bore up (3) to pass under her stern; but the American brig, luffing

close to the wind and backing her maintopsail (3), balked the attempt,

throwing herself across the enemy's path, and giving a raking

broadside, the poor aim of which seems to have lost her the effect

that should have resulted from this ready and neat manoeuvre. The main

braces of the "Argus" had already been shot away, as well as much of

the other gear upon which the after sails depended; and at 6.18 the

preventer (duplicate) braces, which formed part of the preparation for

battle, were also severed. The vessel thus became unmanageable,

falling off before the wind (4), and the "Pelican" was enabled to work

round her at will. This she did, placing herself first under the stern

(4), and then on the bow (5) of her antagonist, where the only reply

to her broadside was with musketry.

In this helpless situation the "Argus" surrendered, after an

engagement of a little over three quarters of an hour. The British

loss was two killed and five wounded; the American, six killed and

seventeen wounded, of whom five afterwards died. Among these was

Captain Allen, who survived only four days, and was buried with

military honors at Plymouth, whither Captain Maples sent his

prize.[218] After every allowance for disparity of force, the injury

done by the American fire cannot be deemed satisfactory, and suggests

the consideration whether the voyage to France under pressure of a

diplomatic mission, and the busy preoccupation of making, manning, and

firing prizes, during the brief month of Channel cruising, may not

have interfered unduly with the more important requirements of

fighting efficiency. The surviving officer in command mentions in

explanation, "the superior size and metal of our opponent, and the

fatigue which the crew of the 'Argus' underwent from a very rapid

succession of prizes."

[Illustration: Diagram of the Argus vs. Pelican battle]

From the broad outlook of the universal maritime situation, this rapid

succession of captures is a matter of more significance than the loss

of a single brig of war. It showed the vulnerable point of British

trade and local intercommunication; and the career of the "Argus,"

prematurely cut short though it was, tended to fix attention upon

facts sufficiently well known, but perhaps not fully appreciated. From

this time the opportunities offered by the English Channel and

adjacent waters, long familiar to French corsairs, were better

understood by Americans; as was also the difficulty of adequately

policing them against a number of swift and handy cruisers, preying

upon merchant vessels comparatively slow, lumbering, and undermanned.

The subsequent career of the United States ship "Wasp," and the

audacious exploits of several privateers, recall the impunity of Paul

Jones a generation before, and form a sequel to the brief prelude, in

which the leading part, though ultimately disastrous, was played by

the "Argus."

While the cruise of the "Argus" stood by no means alone at this time,

the attending incidents made it conspicuous among several others of a

like nature, on the same scene or close by; and it therefore may be

taken as indicative of the changing character of the war, which soon

began to be manifest, owing to the change of conditions in Europe. In

general summary, the result was to transfer an additional weight of

British naval operations to the American side of the Atlantic, which

in turn compelled American cruisers, national and private, in pursuit

of commerce destruction, to get away from their own shores, and to

seek comparative security as well as richer prey in distant waters. To

this contributed also the increasing stringency of British convoy

regulation, enforced with special rigor in the Caribbean Sea and over

the Western Atlantic. It was impossible to impose the same strict

prescription upon the coastwise trade, by which chiefly the

indispensable continuous intercourse between the several parts of the

United Kingdom was maintained. Before the introduction of steam this

had a consequence quite disproportionate to the interior traffic by

land; and its development, combined with the feeling of greater

security as the British Islands were approached, occasioned in the

narrow seas, and on the coasts of Europe, a dispersion of vessels not

to be seen elsewhere. This favored the depredations of the light,

swift, and handy cruisers that alone are capable of profiting by such

an opportunity, through their power to evade the numerous, but

necessarily scattered, ships of war, which under these circumstances

must patrol the sea, like a watchman on beat, as the best substitute

for the more formal and regularized convoy protection, when that

ceases to apply.

From the end of the summer of 1813, when this tendency to distant

enterprise became predominant, to the corresponding season a year

later, there were captured by American cruisers some six hundred and

fifty British vessels, chiefly merchantmen; a number which had

increased to between four and five hundred more, when the war ended in

the following winter.[219] An intelligible account of such

multitudinous activities can be framed only by selecting amid the mass

some illustrative particulars, accompanied by a general estimate of

the conditions they indicate and the results they exemplify. Thus it

may be stated, with fair approach to precision, that from September

30, 1813, to September 30, 1814, there were taken six hundred and

thirty-nine British vessels, of which four hundred and twenty-four

were in seas that may be called remote from the United States. From

that time to the end of the war, about six months, the total captures

were four hundred and fourteen, of which those distant were two

hundred and ninety-three. These figures, larger actually and in

impression than they are relatively to the total of British shipping,

represent the offensive maritime action of the United States during

the period in question; but, in considering them, it must be

remembered that such results were possible only because the sea was

kept open to British commerce by the paramount power of the British

navy. This could not prevent all mishaps; but it reduced them, by the

annihilation of hostile navies, to such a small percentage of the

whole shipping movement, that the British mercantile community found

steady profit both in foreign and coasting trade, of which the United

States at the same time was almost totally deprived.

The numerous but beggarly array of American bay-craft and oyster

boats, which were paraded to swell British prize lists, till there

seemed to be a numerical set-off to their own losses, show indeed that

in point of size and value of vessels taken there was no real

comparison; but this was due to the fact, not at once suggested by the

figures themselves, that there were but few American merchant vessels

to be taken, because they did not dare to go to sea, with the

exception of the few to whom exceptional speed gave a chance of

immunity, not always realized. In the period under consideration,

September, 1813, to September, 1814, despite the great falling off of

trade noted in the returns, over thirty American merchant ships and

letters of marque were captured at sea;[220] at the head of the list

being the "Ned," whose hair-breadth escapes in seeking to reach a

United States port have been mentioned already.[221] She met her fate

near the French coast, September 6, 1813, on the outward voyage from

New York to Bordeaux. Privateering, risky though it was, offered a

more profitable employment, with less chance of capture; because,

besides being better armed and manned, the ship was not impeded in her

sailing by the carriage of a heavy cargo. While the enemy was losing a

certain small proportion of vessels, the United States suffered

practically an entire deprivation of external commerce; and her

coasting trade was almost wholly suppressed, at the time that her

cruisers, national and private, were causing exaggerated anxiety

concerning the intercourse between Great Britain and Ireland, which,

though certainly molested, was not seriously interrupted.

Further evidence of the control exerted by the British Navy, and of

the consequent difficulty under which offensive action was maintained

by the United States, is to be found in the practice, from this time

largely followed, of destroying prizes, after removing from them

packages of little weight compared to their price. The prospect of a

captured vessel reaching an American port was very doubtful, for the

same reason that prevented the movement of American commerce; and

while the risk was sometimes run, it usually was with cargoes which

were at once costly and bulky, such as West India goods, sugars and

coffees. Even then specie, and light costly articles, were first

removed to the cruiser, where the chances for escape were decidedly

better. Recourse to burning to prevent recapture was permissible only

with enemy's vessels. If a neutral were found carrying enemy's goods,

a frequent incident of maritime war, she must be sent in for

adjudication; which, if adverse, affected the cargo only. Summary

processes, therefore, could not be applied in such cases, and the

close blockade of the United States coast seriously restricted the

operations of her cruisers in this particular field.

[Illustration: THE BURNING OF A PRIVATEER PRIZE.

_Drawn by Henry Reuterdahl._]

Examination of the records goes to show that, although individual

American vessels sometimes made numerous seizures in rapid succession,

they seldom, if ever, effected the capture or destruction of a large

convoy at a single blow. This was the object with which Rodgers

started on his first cruise, but failed to accomplish. A stroke of

this kind is always possible, and he had combined conditions unusually

favorable to his hopes; but, while history certainly presents a few

instances of such achievement on the large scale, they are

comparatively rare, and opportunity, when it offers, can be utilized

only by a more numerous force than at any subsequent time gathered

under the American flag. In 1813 two privateers, the "Scourge" of New

York and "Rattlesnake" of Philadelphia, passed the summer in the North

Sea, and there made a number of prizes,--twenty-two,--which being

reported together gave the impression of a single lucky encounter;

were supposed in fact to be the convoy for which Rodgers in the

"President" had looked unsuccessfully the same season.[222] The logs,

however, showed that these captures were spread over a period of two

months, and almost all made severally. Norway being then politically

attached to Denmark, and hostile to Great Britain, such prizes as were

not burned were sent into her ports. The "Scourge" appears to have

been singularly fortunate, for on her homeward trip she took, sent in,

or destroyed, ten more enemy's vessels; and in an absence extending a

little over a year had taken four hundred and twenty prisoners,--more

than the crew of a 38-gun frigate.[223]

At the same time the privateer schooner "Leo," of Baltimore, was

similarly successful on the coast of Spain and Portugal. By an odd

coincidence, another of the same class, bearing the nearly identical

name, "Lion," was operating at the same time in the same waters, and

with like results; which may possibly account for a contemporary

report in a London paper, that an American off the Tagus had taken

thirty-two British vessels. The "Leo" destroyed thirteen, and took

four others; while the "Lion" destroyed fifteen, having first removed

from them cargo to the amount of $400,000, which she carried safely

into France. A curious circumstance, incidental to the presence of the

privateers off Cape Finisterre, is that Wellington's troops, which had

now passed the Pyrenees and were operating in southern France, had for

a long time to wait for their great-coats, which had been stored in

Lisbon for the summer, and now could not be returned by sea to Bayonne

and Bordeaux before convoy was furnished to protect the transports

against capture. Money to pay the troops, and for the commissariat,

was similarly detained. Niles' Register, which followed carefully the

news of maritime capture, announced in November, 1813, that eighty

British vessels had been taken within a few months in European seas by

the "President," "Argus," and five privateers. Compared with the

continuous harassment and loss to which the enemy had become hardened

during twenty years of war with France, allied often with other

maritime states, this result, viewed singly, was not remarkable; but

coming in addition to the other sufferings of British trade, and

associated with similar injuries in the West Indies, and disquiet

about the British seas themselves, the cumulative effect was

undeniable, and found voice in public meetings, resolutions, and

addresses to the Government.

Although the United States was not in formal alliance with France, the

common hostility made the ports of either nation a base of operations

to the other, and much facilitated the activities of American cruisers

in British seas. One of the most successful of the privateers, the

"True Blooded Yankee," was originally equipped at Brest, under

American ownership, though it does not appear whether she was American

built. On her first cruise her prizes are reported at twenty-seven.

She remained out thirty-seven days, chiefly off the coast of Ireland,

where she is said to have held an island for six days. Afterwards she

burned several vessels in a Scotch harbor. Her procedure illustrates

the methods of privateering in more respects than one. Thus, two large

ships, one from Smyrna and one from Buenos Ayres, were thought

sufficiently valuable to attempt sending into a French port, although

the enemy watched the French coast as rigorously as the American. The

recapture of a third, ordered to Morlaix, received specific mention,

because one of the prize crew, being found to be an Englishman, was

sentenced to death by an English court.[224] Eight others were

destroyed; and, when the privateer returned to port, she carried in

her own hold a miscellaneous cargo of light goods, too costly to risk

in a less nimble bottom. Among these are named eighteen bales of

Turkey carpets, forty-three bales of raw silk, seventy packs of skins,

etc.[225] The "True Blooded Yankee" apparently continued to prefer

European waters; for towards the end of 1814 she was taken there and

sent into Gibraltar.

While there were certain well-known districts, such as these just

mentioned, and others before specified, in which from causes constant

in operation there was always to be found abundant material for the

hazardous occupation of the commerce-destroyer, it was not to them

alone that American cruisers went. There were other smaller but

lucrative fields, into which an occasional irruption proved

profitable. Such were the gold-coast on the west shore of Africa, and

the island groups of Madeira, the Canaries, and Cape Verde, which

geographically appertain to that continent. Thither Captain Morris

directed the frigate "Adams," in January, 1814, after first escaping

from his long blockade in the Potomac. This voyage, whence he returned

to Savannah in April, was not remunerative; his most valuable prize,

an East India ship, being snatched out of his hands, when in the act

of taking possession, by an enemy's division in charge of a convoy of

twenty-five sail, to which probably she had belonged, and had been

separated by the thick weather that permitted her capture.[226] A year

before this the privateer "Yankee," of Bristol, Rhode Island, had had

better success. When she returned to Narragansett Bay in the spring of

1813, after a five months' absence, she reported having scoured the

whole west coast of Africa, taking eight vessels, which carried in the

aggregate sixty-two guns, one hundred and ninety-six men, and property

to the amount of $296,000. In accordance with the practice already

noticed, of distributing the spoil in order better to insure its

arrival, she brought back in her own hold the light but costly items

of six tons of ivory, thirty-two bales of fine goods, and $40,000 in

gold-dust.[227] This vessel was out again several times; and when the

war closed was said to have been the most successful of all American

cruisers. Her prizes numbered forty, of which thirty-four were ships

or brigs; that is, of the larger classes of merchantmen then used. The

estimated value of themselves and cargoes, $3,000,000, is to be

received with reserve.[228]

It was in this neighborhood that the privateer schooner "Globe,"

Captain Moon, of Baltimore, mounting eight 9-pounder carronades and

one long gun, met with an adventure illustrative of the fighting

incidental to the business. To this the privateersmen as a class were

in no wise loath, where there was a fair prospect of the gain for

which they were sent to look. Being off Funchal, in the island of

Madeira, November 1, 1813, two brigs, which proved to be English

packets, the "Montague" and "Pelham," were seen "backing and filling;"

that is, keeping position in the open roadstead which constitutes the

harbor, under sail, but not anchored. Packets, being in government

service, were well armed for their size, and as mail carriers were

necessarily chosen for speed; they therefore frequently carried

specie. In one taken by the "Essex," Captain Porter found $55,000,

which as ready cash helped him much to pay his frigate's way in a long

and adventurous career. It does not appear that the "Globe" at first

recognized the character of these particular vessels; but she lay-by

during the night, watching for their quitting the shelter of neutral

waters. This they did at 9 P.M., when the privateer pursued, but lost

sight of them in a squall. The next morning they were seen in the

southwest, and again chased. At 10.15 A.M. the "Montague" began firing

her stern guns. The schooner replied, but kept on to board, knowing

her superiority in men, and at 12.30 ran alongside (1). The attack

being smartly met, and the vessels separating almost immediately, the

attempt failed disastrously; there being left on board the packet the

two lieutenants of the "Globe" and three or four seamen. Immediately

upon this repulse, the "Pelham" crossed the privateer's bow and raked

her (P 2), dealing such destruction to sails and rigging as to leave

her unmanageable. The "Montague" and "Globe" now lay broadside to

broadside (2), engaging; and ten minutes later the "Montague" by her

own report was completely disabled (M 3). Captain Moon claimed that

she struck; and this was probably the case, if his further incidental

mention, that the mailbags were seen to be thrown overboard, is not a

mistake. The action then continued with the "Pelham," within

pistol-shot (3), for an hour or so, when the schooner, being found in

a sinking condition, was compelled to haul off; "having seven shot

between wind and water, the greater part of our standing and running

rigging shot away, and not a sail but was perfectly riddled and almost

useless." After separating, the several combatants all steered with

the tradewinds for the Canaries; the British going to Teneriffe, and

the American to the Grand Canary.[229]

From the injuries received, it is apparent that, for the armaments of

the vessels, this was a very severe as well as determined engagement.

The British had six killed and twelve wounded; the American five

killed and thirteen wounded, besides the prisoners lost in boarding.

All three captains were severely hurt, that of the "Montague" being

killed. The figures given are those reported by each side; how

exaggerated the rumors current about such encounters, and the

consequent difficulty to the historian, is shown by what each heard

about the other's casualties. A Spanish brig from Teneriffe told Moon

that the enemy had twenty-seven men killed; while the British were

equally credibly informed that the "Globe" lost thirty-three killed

and nineteen wounded.

Near about this time, in the same neighborhood of Madeira, the

privateer schooner "Governor Tompkins," of New York, captured in rapid

succession three British merchant vessels which had belonged to a

convoy from England to Buenos Ayres, but after its dispersal in a gale

were pursuing their route singly. Two of these reached an American

port, their bulky and heavy ladings of dry goods and hardware not

permitting transfer or distribution. The sale of one cargo realized

$270,000.[230] At about the same moment came in a brig of like

value, not improbably another wanderer from the same group, captured

near Madeira by the ship "America," of Salem. This vicinity, from the

islands to the equator, between 20° and 30° west longitude, belongs

essentially to the thronged highway and cross-roads of commerce, which

has been noted as a favorite cruising ground of American ships of war.

Hereabouts passed vessels both to and from the East Indies and South

America. The bad luck of several frigates, and the rough handling of

the "Globe" by the packets, illustrate one side of the fortune of war,

as the good hap of the "America" and "Governor Tompkins" shows the

other.

[Illustration: Diagram of the Montague, Pelham, Globe battle]

It is, however, the beginnings and endings of commercial routes,

rather than the intermediate stretch, which most favor enterprises

against an enemy's trade. In the thronging of vessels, the Caribbean

Sea, with its teeming archipelago, was second only, if second, to the

waters surrounding the United Kingdom. England was one extremity, and

the several West India Islands the other, of a traffic then one of the

richest in the world; while the tropical articles of this exchange, if

not absolute necessaries of life, had become by long indulgence

indispensable to the great part of civilized mankind. Here, therefore,

the numbers, the efforts, and the successes of American privateers

most nearly rivalled the daring achievements of their fellows in the

Narrow Seas and the approaches to Great Britain and Ireland. The two

regions resembled each other in another respect. Not only was there

for both an external trade, mainly with one another, but in each there

was also a local traffic of distribution and collection of goods, from

and to central ports, in which was concentrated the movement of import

and export. As has been remarked concerning the coastwise carriage of

the United Kingdom, this local intercourse, to be efficient, could not

be regulated and hampered to the same extent as the long voyage,

over-sea, transportation. A certain amount of freedom and

independence was essential, and the risk attendant upon such separate

action must be compensated, as far as might be, by diminishing the

size of the vessels engaged; a resource particularly applicable to the

moderate weather and quiet seas prevalent in the tropics.

Both the exposure of trade under such relaxed conditions, and the

relative security obtained by the convoy system, rigidly applied, are

shown by a few facts. From September 1, 1813, to March 1, 1814, six

months, the number of prizes taken by Americans, exclusive of those on

the Lakes, was reported as two hundred and seventy. Of these, nearly

one third--eighty-six--were to, from, or within the West Indies. Since

in many reports the place of capture is not given, nor any data

sufficient to fix it, it is probable that quite one third belonged to

this trade. This evidences the scale, both of the commerce itself and

of its pursuers, justifying a contemporary statement that "the West

Indies swarm with American privateers;" and it suggests also that many

of the seizures were local traders between the islands, or at least

vessels taking their chance on short runs. On the other hand, the

stringency with which the local officials enforced the Convoy Act was

shown, generally, by the experience at this time of the United States

naval vessels, the records of which, unlike those of most privateers,

have been preserved by filing or publication; and, specifically, by a

number of papers found in a prize by the United States frigate

"Constitution," Captain Charles Stewart, while making a round of these

waters in the first three months of 1814. Among other documents was a

petition, signed by many merchants of Demerara, praying convoy for

fifty-one vessels which were collected and waiting for many weary

weeks, as often had to be done. In one letter occurs the following:

"With respect to procuring a license for the "Fanny" to run it, in

case any other ships should be about to do so, we do not believe that,

out of forty vessels ready to sail, any application has been made for

such license, though out of the number are several out-port vessels

well armed and manned. Indeed, we are aware application would be

perfectly useless, as the present Governor, when at Berbice, would not

permit a vessel from that colony to this [adjoining] without convoy.

If we could obtain a license, we could not justify ourselves to

shippers, who have ordered insurance with convoy."[231]

The expense and embarrassment incident to such detentions are

far-reaching, and the effects are as properly chargeable as are

captures themselves to the credit of the cruisers, by the activity of

which they are occasioned. The "Constitution" could report only four

prizes as the result of a three months' cruise, necessarily shortened

by the approach of spring. This made it imperative for a vessel,

denied admission to most home ports by her draught of water, to

recover the shelter of one of them before the blockade again began,

and the exhaustion of her provisions should compel her to attempt

entrance under risk of an engagement with superior force. As it was,

she was chased into Salem, and had to lighten ship to escape. But

Stewart had driven an enemy's brig of war into Surinam, chased a

packet off Barbados, and a frigate in the Mona Passage; and the report

of these occurrences, wherever received, imposed additional

precaution, delay, and expense.

At the same time that the "Constitution" was passing through the

southern Caribbean, the naval brigs "Rattlesnake" and "Enterprise"

were searching its northern limits. These had put out from Portsmouth,

New Hampshire, when the winter weather drove the blockaders from

there, as from Boston, whence the "Constitution" had sailed. Starting

early in January, 1814, these two light cruisers kept company, passing

east of Bermuda to the island of St. Thomas, at the northeast corner

of the Caribbean. Thence they turned west, skirting the north shores

of Porto Rico and Santo Domingo as far as the Windward Passage.

Through this they entered the Caribbean, followed the south coast of

Cuba, between it and Jamaica, rounded Cape San Antonio, at its western

extremity, and thence, traversing the Straits of Florida, returned

along the coast of the United States. Having already been chased twice

in this cruise, they were compelled by a third pursuer to separate,

February 25. The stranger chose to keep after the "Enterprise," which

being a very dull sailer was obliged in a flight of seventy hours to

throw overboard most of her battery to escape. The two put into

Wilmington, North Carolina, a port impracticable to a frigate.[232]

In this long round the brigs overhauled eleven vessels, two only of

which were under the British flag. Two were Americans; the rest

neutrals, either Swedes or Spaniards. Of the two enemies, only one was

a merchant ship. The other was a privateer, the chase of which gave

rise to a curious and significant incident. Being near the Florida

coast, and thinking the brigs to be British, twenty or thirty of the

crew took to the boats and fled ashore to escape anticipated

impressment. As Marryat remarks, a British private vessel of that day

feared a British ship of war more than it did an enemy of equal force.

Of the neutrals stopped, one was in possession of a British prize

crew, and another had on board enemy's goods. For these reasons they

were sent in for adjudication, and arrived safely. Judged by these

small results from the several cruises of the "Enterprise,"

"Rattlesnake," and "Constitution," the large aggregate of captures

before quoted, two hundred and seventy, would indicate that to effect

them required a great number of cruisers, national and private. That

this inference is correct will be shown later, by some interesting and

instructive figures.

While the making of prizes was the primary concern of the American

privateers, their cruises in the West Indies, as elsewhere, gave rise

to a certain amount of hard fighting. One of the most noted of these

encounters, that of the schooner "Decatur," of Charleston, with the

man-of-war schooner "Dominica," can hardly be claimed for the United

States; for, though fought under the flag, her captain, Diron, was

French, as were most of the crew. The "Dominica" was in company with a

King's packet, which she was to convoy part of the way to England from

St. Thomas. On August 5, 1813, the "Decatur" met the two about three

hundred miles north of the island. The British vessel was superior in

armament, having fifteen guns; all carronades, except two long sixes.

The "Decatur's" battery was six carronades, and one long 18-pounder.

For long distances the latter was superior in carrying power and

penetration to anything on board the "Dominica;" but the American

captain, knowing himself to have most men, sought to board, and the

artillery combat was therefore mainly at close quarters, within

carronade range. It began at 2 P.M. At 2.30 the schooners were within

half-gunshot of one another; the "Dominica" in the position of being

chased, because of the necessity of avoiding the evident intention of

the "Decatur" to come hand to hand. Twice the latter tried to run

alongside, and twice was foiled by watchful steering, accompanied in

each case by a broadside which damaged her rigging and sails, besides

killing two of her crew. The third attempt was successful, the

"Decatur's" bow coming against the quarter of the "Dominica," the

jib-boom passing through her mainsail. The crew of the privateer

clambered on board, and there followed a hand-to-hand fight equally

honorable to both parties. The British captain, Lieutenant Barretté, a

young man of twenty-five, who had already proved his coolness and

skill in the management of the action, fell at the head of his men, of

whom sixty out of a total of eighty-eight were killed or wounded

before their colors were struck. The assailants, who numbered one

hundred and three, lost nineteen. The packet, though armed, took no

part in the fight, and when it was over effected her escape.[233] The

"Decatur" with her prize reached Charleston safely, August 20;

bringing also a captured merchantman. The moment of arrival was most

opportune; two enemy's brigs, which for some time had been blockading

the harbor, having left only the day before.

In March, 1814, the privateer schooner "Comet," of Baltimore, not

being able to make her home port, put into Wilmington, North Carolina.

She had been cruising in the West Indies, and had there taken twenty

vessels, most of which were destroyed after removing valuables. In the

course of her operations she encountered near St. Thomas the British

ship "Hibernia;" the size of which, and her height above the water, by

preventing boarding, enabled her successfully to repel attack, and the

privateer was obliged to haul off, having lost three men killed and

thirteen wounded. The American account of this affair ascribes

twenty-two guns to the "Hibernia." The British story says that she had

but six, with a crew of twenty-two men; of whom one was killed and

eleven wounded. The importance of the matter in itself scarcely

demands a serious attempt to reconcile this discrepancy; and it is

safer to accept each party's statement of his own force. The two agree

that the action lasted eight or nine hours, and that both were much

cut up. It is evident also from each narrative that they lay alongside

most of the time, which makes it probable that the ship's height

saved her from being overborne by superior numbers.

The "Saucy Jack," of Charleston, passed through several severe

combats, in one of which she was even worse mauled than the "Comet" in

the instance just cited. On April 30, 1814, off St. Nicolas Mole, in

the Windward Passage between Cuba and Santo Domingo, she met the

British ship "Pelham," a vessel of five hundred and forty tons, and

mounting ten guns, bound from London to Port au Prince. The "Pelham"

fought well, and the action lasted two hours, at the end of which she

was carried by boarding. Her forty men were overpowered by numbers,

but nevertheless still resisted with a resolution which commanded the

admiration of the victors. She lost four killed and eleven wounded;

among the latter her captain, dangerously. The privateer had two

killed and nine wounded. Both vessels reached Charleston safely, and

the "Saucy Jack" at once fitted out again. It is told that, between

daylight and dark of the day she began to enlist, one hundred and

thirty able-bodied seamen had shipped; and this at a time when the

navy with difficulty found crews.[234]

The "Saucy Jack" returned to the West Indies for another cruise, in

which she encountered one of those rude deceptions which privateers

often experienced. She had made already eight prizes, for one of

which, the ship "Amelia," she had had to fight vigorously, killing

four and wounding five of the enemy, while herself sustaining a loss

of one killed and one wounded, when on October 31, 1814, about 1 A.M.,

being then off Cape Tiburon at the west end of Haïti, she sighted two

vessels standing to the westward. Chase was made, and an hour later

the privateer opened fire. The strangers replied, at the same time

shortening sail, which looked ominous; but the "Saucy Jack," willing

to justify her name, kept on to close. At 6 A.M., having arrived

within a few hundred yards, the enemy were seen to be well armed, but

appeared not to be well manned. At seven, by which time it was

daylight, the "Saucy Jack" began an engagement with the nearer, and

ten minutes later ran her alongside, when she was found to be full of

soldiers. The privateer sheered off at once, and took to her heels,

followed by an incessant fire of grape and musketry from those whom

she had recently pursued. This awkward position, which carried the

chance of a disabling shot and consequent capture, lasted till eight,

when the speed of the schooner took her out of range, having had in

all eight men killed and fifteen wounded; two round shot in the hull,

and spars and rigging much cut up. It was afterwards ascertained that

her opponent was the "Volcano" bombship, convoying the transport

"Golden Fleece," on board which were two hundred and fifty troops from

Chesapeake Bay for Jamaica. The "Volcano" lost an officer and two men

killed, and two wounded; proving that under somewhat awkward

circumstances the "Saucy Jack" could give as well as take.[235]

A little later in this season a group of nine sail, from the West

Indies for Europe, was encountered by the privateer "Kemp," of

Baltimore, broad off the coast of North Carolina. Excluded, like the

"Comet" and others, from return to the port where she belonged, the

"Kemp" had been in Wilmington, which she left November 29, 1814; the

strangers being sighted at 8 A.M. December 1. One was a convoying

frigate, which, when the "Kemp" pursued, gave chase and drove her off

that afternoon. The privateer outran her pursuer, and during the night

by devious courses gave her the slip; thereupon steering for the

position where she judged she would again fall in with the merchant

vessels. In this she was successful, at daylight discovering

them,--three ships, three brigs, and two schooners. At 11 A.M. one

ship was overtaken, but proving to be Spanish, from Havana to Hamburg,

was allowed to proceed, while the "Kemp" again followed the others. At

noon they were five miles to windward, drawn up in a line to fight;

for in those days of war and piracy most merchant ships carried at

least a few guns for defence, and in this case their numbers, combined

in mutual support, might effect a successful resistance. At two they

took the initiative, bearing down together and attacking. The "Kemp"

engaged them all, and in half an hour the untrained squadron was

naturally in confusion. One after the other, six of the seven were

boarded, or without waiting to be attacked struck their colors as the

schooner drew up; but while four were being taken into possession, the

two others seized the opportunity and made off. Two ships and two

brigs remained in the hands of the captor. All were laden with sugar

and coffee, valuable at any time, but especially so in the then

destitute condition of the United States. After this unusual, if not

wholly unique, experience, the "Kemp" returned to port, having been

absent only six days. Her prisoners amounted to seventy-one, her own

crew being fifty-three. The separation of the escort from the convoy,

the subsequent judicious search for the latter, and the completeness

of the result, constitute this a very remarkable instance of good

management accompanied by good fortune; success deserved and

achieved.[236]

The privateer brig "Chasseur," of Baltimore, Captain Thomas Boyle, was

one of the typically successful and renowned cruisers of the time. She

carried a battery of sixteen 12-pounder carronades, and in the course

of the war thirty prizes are credited to her. In the late summer of

1814 she cruised off the coast of Great Britain and Ireland,

returning at the end of October; having made eighteen captures during

an absence of three months. From these she paroled and sent in by

cartels one hundred and fifty prisoners, bringing back with her

forty-three, of whom she had not been able thus to rid herself.[237]

After refitting she went to the West Indies for a winter cruise, which

extended from the Windward Islands to the neighborhood of Havana. Here

she signalized the approaching end of her career by an action, fought

after peace not only had been concluded at Ghent, but already was

known in the United States. On February 26, 1815, at 11 A.M., being

then twenty miles east of Havana, and six miles from the Cuban coast,

a schooner was seen in the northeast (1), running down before the

northeast trade-wind. Sail was made to intercept her (2), there being

at the time visible from the "Chasseur's" masthead a convoy lying-to

off Havana, information concerning which probably accounts for her

presence at this spot. The chase steered more to the northward (2),

bringing the wind on her starboard side, apparently wishing to avoid a

meeting. The "Chasseur" followed her motions, and when within about

three miles the stranger's foretopmast went over the side, showing the

press of sail she was carrying. After clearing the wreck she hauled

close on the wind, heading northerly. At 1 P.M., she began to fire her

stern gun and showed British colors; but only three port-holes were

visible on her port side,--towards the "Chasseur."

Believing from appearances that he had before him a weakly armed

vessel making a passage, and seeing but few men on her deck, Captain

Boyle pressed forward without much preparation and under all sail. At

1.26 P.M. the "Chasseur" had come within pistol-shot (3), on the port

side, when the enemy disclosed a tier of ten ports and opened his

broadside, with round shot, grape, and musket balls. The American

schooner, having much way on, shot ahead, and as she was to leeward in

doing so, the British vessel kept off quickly (4) to run under her

stern and rake. This was successfully avoided by imitating the

movement (4), and the two were again side by side, but with the

"Chasseur" now to the right (5). The action continued thus for about

ten minutes, when Boyle found his opponent's battery too heavy for

him. He therefore ran alongside (6), and in the act of boarding the

enemy struck. She proved to be the British schooner "St. Lawrence,"

belonging to the royal navy; formerly a renowned Philadelphia

privateer, the "Atlas." Her battery, one long 9-pounder and fourteen

12-pounder carronades, would have been no very unequal match for the

sixteen of her antagonist; but the "Chasseur" had been obliged

recently to throw overboard ten of these, while hard chased by the

Barrosa frigate, and had replaced them with some 9-pounders from a

prize, for which she had no proper projectiles. The complement allowed

the "St. Lawrence" was seventy-five, though it does not seem certain

that all were on board; and she was carrying also some soldiers,

marines, and naval officers, bound to New Orleans, in ignorance

probably of the disastrous end of that expedition. The "Chasseur" had

eighty-nine men, besides several boys. The British loss reported by

her captain was six killed and seventeen wounded; the American, five

killed and eight wounded.[238]

[Illustration: Diagram of the Chasseur vs. St. Lawrence battle]

This action was very creditably fought on both sides, but to the

American captain belongs the meed of having not only won success, but

deserved it. His sole mistake was the over-confidence in what he could

see, which made him a victim to the very proper ruse practised by his

antagonist in concealing his force. His manoeuvring was prompt, ready,

and accurate; that of the British vessel was likewise good, but a

greater disproportion of injury should have resulted from her superior

battery. In reporting the affair to his owners, Captain Boyle said,

apologetically: "I should not willingly, perhaps, have sought a

contest with a King's vessel, knowing that is not our object; but my

expectations at first were a valuable vessel, and a valuable cargo

also. When I found myself deceived, the honor of the flag intrusted to

my care was not to be disgraced by flight." The feeling expressed was

modest as well as spirited, and Captain Boyle's handsome conduct

merits the mention that the day after the action, when the captured

schooner was released as a cartel to Havana, in compassion to her

wounded, the commander of the "St. Lawrence" gave him a letter, in the

event of his being taken by a British cruiser, testifying to his

"obliging attention and watchful solicitude to preserve our effects,

and render us comfortable during the short time we were in his

possession;" in which, he added, the captain "was carefully seconded

by all his officers."[239]

These instances, occurring either in the West Indies, or, in the case

of the "Kemp," affecting vessels which had just loaded there, are

sufficient, when taken in connection with those before cited from

other quarters of the globe, to illustrate the varied activities and

fortunes of privateering. The general subject, therefore, need not

further be pursued. It will be observed that in each case the cruiser

acts on the offensive; being careful, however, in choosing the object

of attack, to avoid armed ships, the capture of which seems unlikely

to yield pecuniary profit adequate to the risk. The gallantry and

skill of Captain Boyle of the "Chasseur" made particularly permissible

to him the avowal, that only mistake of judgment excused his

committing himself to an encounter which held out no such promise; and

it may be believed that the equally capable Captain Diron, if free to

do as he pleased, would have chosen the packet, and not her escort the

"Dominica," as the object of his pursuit. This the naval schooner of

course could not permit. It was necessary, therefore, first to fight

her; and, although she was beaten, the result of the action was to

insure the escape of the ship under her charge. These examples define

exactly the spirit and aim of privateering, and distinguish them from

the motives inspiring the ship of war. The object of the privateer is

profit by capture; to which fighting is only incidental, and where

avoidable is blamable. The mission of a navy on the other hand is

primarily military; and while custom permitted the immediate captor a

share in the proceeds of his prizes, the taking of them was in

conception not for direct gain, personal or national, but for injury

to the enemy.

It may seem that, even though the ostensible motive was not the same,

the two courses of operation followed identical methods, and in

outcome were indistinguishable. This is not so. However subtle the

working of the desire for gain upon the individual naval officer,

leading at times to acts of doubtful propriety, the tone and spirit of

a profession, even when not clearly formulated in phrase and

definition, will assert itself in the determination of personal

conduct. The dominating sense of advantage to the state, which is the

military motive, and the dominating desire for gain in a mercantile

enterprise, are very different incentives; and the result showed

itself in a fact which has never been appreciated, and perhaps never

noted, that the national ships of war were far more effective as

prize takers than were the privateers. A contrary impression has

certainly obtained, and was shared by the present writer until he

resorted to the commonplace test of adding up figures.

Amid much brilliant achievement, privateering, like all other business

pursuits, had also a large and preponderant record of unsuccess. The

very small number of naval cruisers necessarily yielded a much smaller

aggregate of prizes; but when the respective totals are considered

with reference to the numbers of vessels engaged in making them, the

returns from the individual vessels of the United States navy far

exceed those from the privateers. Among conspicuously successful

cruisers, also, the United States ships "Argus," "Essex," "Peacock,"

and "Wasp" compare favorably in general results with the most

celebrated privateers, even without allowing for the evident fact that

a few instances of very extraordinary qualities and record are more

likely to be found among five hundred vessels than among twenty-two;

this being the entire number of naval pendants actually engaged in

open-sea cruising, from first to last. These twenty-two captured one

hundred and sixty-five prizes, an average of 7.5 each, in which are

included the enemy's ships of war taken. Of privateers of all classes

there were five hundred and twenty-six; or, excluding a few small

nondescripts, four hundred and ninety-two. By these were captured

thirteen hundred and forty-four vessels, an average of less than

three; to be exact, 2.7. The proportion, therefore, of prizes taken by

ships of war to those by private armed vessels was nearly three to

one.

Comparison may be instituted in other ways. Of the twenty-two national

cruisers, four only, or one in five, took no prize; leaving to the

remaining eighteen an average of nine. Out of the grand total of five

hundred and twenty-six privateers only two hundred and seven caught

anything; three hundred and nineteen, three out of five, returned to

port empty-handed, or were themselves taken. Dividing the thirteen

hundred and forty-four prizes among the two hundred and seven more or

less successful privateers, there results an average of 6.5; so that,

regard being had only to successful cruisers, the achievement of the

naval vessels was to that of the private armed nearly as three to two.

These results may be accepted as disposing entirely of the extravagant

claims made for privateering as a system, when compared with a regular

naval service, especially when it is remembered with what difficulty

the American frigates could get to sea at all, on account of their

heavy draft and the close blockade; whereas the smaller vessels,

national or private, had not only many harbors open, but also

comparatively numerous opportunities to escape. The frigate "United

States" never got out after her capture of the "Macedonian," in 1812;

the "Congress" was shut up after her return in December, 1813; and the

"Chesapeake" had been captured in the previous June. All these

nevertheless count in the twenty-two pendants reckoned above.

The figures here cited are from a compilation by Lieutenant George F.

Emmons,[240] of the United States Navy, published in 1853 under the

title, "The United States Navy from 1775 to 1853." Mr. Emmons made no

analyses, confining himself to giving lists and particulars; his work

is purely statistical. Counting captures upon the lakes, and a few

along the coast difficult of classification, his grand total of

floating craft taken from the enemy reaches fifteen hundred and

ninety-nine; which agrees nearly with the sixteen hundred and

thirty-four of Niles, whom he names among his sources of information.

From an examination of the tables some other details of interest may

be drawn. Of the five hundred and twenty-six privateers and

letters-of-marque given by name, twenty-six were ships, sixty-seven

brigs, three hundred and sixty-four schooners, thirty-five sloops,

thirty-four miscellaneous; down to, and including, a few boats putting

out from the beach. The number captured by the enemy was one hundred

and forty-eight, or twenty-eight per cent. The navy suffered more

severely. Of the twenty-two vessels reckoned above, twelve were taken,

or destroyed to keep them out of an enemy's hands; over fifty per

cent. Of the twelve, six were small brigs, corresponding in size and

nautical powers to the privateer. Three were frigates--the

"President," "Essex," and "Chesapeake." One, the "Adams," was not at

sea when destroyed by her own captain to escape capture. Only two

sloops of war, the first "Wasp" and the "Frolic,"[241] were taken; and

of these the former, as already known, was caught when partially

dismasted, at the end of a successful engagement.

Contemporary with the career of the "Argus," the advantage of a sudden

and unexpected inroad, like hers, upon a region deemed safe by the

enemy, was receiving confirmation in the remote Pacific by the cruise

of the frigate "Essex." This vessel, which had formed part of

Commodore Bainbridge's squadron at the close of 1812, was last

mentioned as keeping her Christmas off Cape Frio,[242] on the coast of

Brazil, awaiting there the coming of the consorts whom she never

succeeded in joining. Captain Porter maintained this station, hearing

frequently about Bainbridge by vessels from Bahia, until January 12,

1813. Then a threatened shortness of provisions, and rumors of enemy's

ships in the neighborhood, especially of the seventy-four "Montagu"

combined to send him to St. Catherine's Island, another appointed

rendezvous, and the last upon the coast of Brazil. In this remote

and sequestered anchorage hostile cruisers would scarcely look for

him, at least until more likely positions had been carefully examined.

[Illustration: CAPTAIN DAVID PORTER.

_From the painting by Charles Wilson Peale, in Independence Hall,

Philadelphia._]

At St. Catherine's Porter heard of the action between the

"Constitution" and "Java" off Bahia, a thousand miles distant, and

received also a rumor, which seemed probable enough, that the third

ship of the division, the "Hornet," had been captured by the

"Montagu." He consequently left port January 26, for the southward,

still with the expectation of ultimately joining the Commodore off St.

Helena, the last indicated point of assembly; but having been unable

to renew his stores in St. Catherine's, and ascertaining that there

was no hope of better success at Buenos Ayres, or the other Spanish

settlements within the River La Plata, he after reflection decided to

cut loose from the squadron and go alone to the Pacific. There he

could reasonably hope to support himself by the whalers of the enemy;

that class of vessel being always well provided for long absences.

This alternative course he knew would be acceptable to the Government,

as well as to his immediate commander.[243] The next six weeks were

spent in the tempestuous passage round Cape Horn, the ship's company

living on half-allowance of provisions; but on March 14, 1813, the

"Essex" anchored in Valparaiso, being the first United States ship of

war to show the national flag in the Pacific. By a noteworthy

coincidence she had already been the first to carry it beyond the Cape

of Good Hope.

Chile received the frigate hospitably, being at the time in revolt

against Spain; but the authority of the mother country was still

maintained in Peru, where a Spanish viceroy resided, and it was

learned that in the capacity of ally of Great Britain he intended to

fit out privateers against American whalers, of which there were many

in these seas. As several of the British whalers carried

letters-of-marque, empowering them to make prizes, the arrival of the

"Essex" not only menaced the hostile interests, but promised to

protect her own countrymen from a double danger. Her departure

therefore was hastened; and having secured abundant provision, such as

the port supplied, she sailed for the northward a week after

anchoring. A privateer from Peru was met, which had seized two

Americans. Porter threw overboard her guns and ammunition, and then

released her with a note for the viceroy, which served both as a

respectful explanation and a warning. One of the prizes taken by this

marauder was recaptured March 27, when entering Callao, the port of

Lima.

The "Essex" then went to the Galapagos Islands, a group just south of

the equator, five hundred miles from the South American mainland.

These belong now to Ecuador, and at that day were a noted rendezvous

for whalers. In this neighborhood the frigate remained from April 17

to October 3, during which period she captured twelve British whalers

out of some twenty-odd reported in the Pacific; with the necessary

consequence of driving all others to cover for the time being. The

prizes were valuable, some more, some less; not only from the

character of their cargoes, but because they themselves were larger

than the average merchant ship, and exceptionally well found. Three

were sent to Valparaiso in convoy of a fourth, which had been

converted into a consort of the "Essex," under the name of the "Essex

Junior," mounting twenty very light guns. September 30 she returned,

bringing word that a British squadron, consisting of the 36-gun

frigate "Phoebe," Captain James Hillyar, and the sloops of war

"Cherub" and "Raccoon," had sailed for the Pacific. The rumor was

correct, though long antedating the arrival of the vessels. In

consequence of it, Porter, considering that his work at the Galapagos

was now complete, and that the "Essex" would need overhauling before a

possible encounter with a division, the largest unit of which was

superior to her in class and force, decided to move to a position then

even more remote from disturbance than St. Catherine's had been. On

October 25 the "Essex" and "Essex Junior" anchored at the island of

Nukahiva, of the Marquesas group, having with them three of the

prizes. Of the others, besides those now at Valparaiso, two had been

given up to prisoners to convey them to England, and three had been

sent to the United States. That all the last were captured on the way

detracts nothing from Porter's merit, but testifies vividly to the

British command of the sea.

At the Marquesas, by aid of the resources of the prizes, the frigate

was thoroughly overhauled, refitted, and provisioned for six months.

Porter had not only maintained his ship, but in part paid his officers

and crew from the proceeds of his captures. On December 12 he sailed

for Chile, satisfied with the material outcome of his venturous

cruise, but wishing to add to it something of further distinction by

an encounter with Hillyar, if obtainable on terms approaching

equality. With this object the ship's company were diligently

exercised at the guns and small arms during the passage, which lasted

nearly eight weeks; the Chilean coast being sighted on January 12, far

to the southward, and the "Essex" running slowly along it until

February 3, when she reached Valparaiso. On the 8th the "Phoebe" and

"Cherub" came in and anchored; the "Raccoon" having gone on to the

North Pacific.

The antagonists now lay near one another, under the restraint of a

neutral port, for several days, during which some social intercourse

took place between the officers; the two captains renewing an

acquaintance made years before in the Mediterranean. After a period of

refit, and of repose for the crews, the British left the bay, and

cruised off the port. The "Essex" and "Essex Junior" remained at

anchor, imprisoned by a force too superior to be encountered without

some modifying circumstances of advantage. Porter found opportunities

for contrasting the speed of the two frigates, and convinced himself

that the "Essex" was on that score superior; but the respective

armaments introduced very important tactical considerations, which

might, and in the result did, prove decisive. The "Essex" originally

had been a 12-pounder frigate, classed as of thirty-two guns; but her

battery now was forty 32-pounder carronades and six long twelves.

Captain Porter in his report of the battle stated the armament of the

"Phoebe" to be thirty long 18-pounders and sixteen 32-pounder

carronades. The British naval historian James gives her twenty-six

long eighteens, fourteen 32-pounder carronades, and four long nines;

while to the "Cherub" he attributes a carronade battery of eighteen

thirty-twos and six eighteens, with two long sixes. Whichever

enumeration be accepted, the broadside of the "Essex" within carronade

range considerably outweighed that of the "Phoebe" alone, but was much

less than that of the two British ships combined; the light built and

light-armed "Essex Junior" not being of account to either side. There

remained always the serious chance that, even if the "Phoebe" accepted

single combat, some accident of wind might prevent the "Essex"

reaching her before being disabled by her long guns. Hillyar,

moreover, was an old disciple of Nelson, fully imbued with the

teaching that achievement of success, not personal glory, must dictate

action; and, having a well established reputation for courage and

conduct, he did not intend to leave anything to the chances of fortune

incident to engagement between equals. He would accept no provocation

to fight apart from the "Cherub."

Forced to accept this condition, Porter now turned his attention to

escape. Valparaiso Bay is an open roadstead, facing north. The high

ground above the anchorage provides shelter from the south-southwest

wind, which prevails along this coast throughout the year with very

rare intermissions. At times, as is common under high land, it blows

furiously in gusts. The British vessels underway kept their station

close to the extreme western point of the bay, to prevent the "Essex"

from passing to southward of them, and so gaining the advantage of the

wind, which might entail a prolonged chase and enable her, if not to

distance pursuit, at least to draw the "Phoebe" out of support of the

"Cherub." Porter's aim of course was to seize an opportunity when by

neglect, or unavoidably, they had left a practicable opening between

them and the point. In the end, his hand was forced by an accident.

On March 28 the south wind blew with unusual violence, and the "Essex"

parted one of her cables. The other anchor failed to hold when the

strain came upon it, and the ship began to drift to sea. The cable was

cut and sail made at once; for though the enemy were too nearly in

their station to have warranted the attempt to leave under ordinary

conditions, Porter, in the emergency thus suddenly thrust upon him,

thought he saw a prospect of passing to windward. The "Essex"

therefore was hauled close to the wind under single-reefed topsails,

heading to the westward; but just as she came under the point of the

bay a heavy squall carried away the maintopmast. The loss of this spar

hopelessly crippled her, and made it impossible even to regain the

anchorage left. She therefore put about, and ran eastward until within

pistol-shot of the coast, about three miles north of the city. Here

she anchored, well within neutral waters; Hillyar's report stating

that she was "so near shore as to preclude the possibility of passing

ahead of her without risk to his Majesty's ships." Three miles, then

the range of a cannon-shot, estimated liberally, was commonly accepted

as the width of water adjacent to neutral territory, which was under

the neutral protection. The British captain decided nevertheless to

attack.

The wind remaining southerly, the "Essex" rode head to it; the two

hostile vessels approaching with the intention of running north of

her, close under her stern. The wind, however, forced them off as they

drew near; and their first attack, beginning about 4 P.M. and lasting

ten minutes, produced no visible effect, according to Hillyar's

report. Porter states, on the contrary, that considerable injury was

done to the "Essex"; and in particular the spring which he was trying

to get on the cable was thrice shot away, thus preventing the bringing

of her broadside to bear as required. The "Phoebe" and her consort

then wore, which increased their distance, and stood out again to sea.

While doing this they threw a few "random shots;" fired, that is, at

an elevation so great as to be incompatible with certainty of aim.

During this cannonade the "Essex," with three 12-pounders run out of

her stern ports, had deprived the "Phoebe" of "the use of her

mainsail, jib and mainstay." On standing in again Hillyar prepared to

anchor, but ordered the "Cherub" to keep underway, choosing a position

whence she could most annoy their opponent.

At 5.35 P.M., by Hillyar's report,--Porter is silent as to the

hour,--the attack was renewed; the British ships both placing

themselves on the starboard--seaward--quarter of the "Essex." Before

the "Phoebe" reached the position in which she intended to anchor, the

"Essex" was seen to be underway. Hillyar could only suppose that her

cable had been severed by a shot; but Porter states that under the

galling fire to which she was subjected, without power to reply, he

cut the cable, hoping, as the enemy were to leeward, he might bring

the ship into close action, and perhaps even board the "Phoebe." The

decision was right, but under the conditions a counsel of desperation;

for sheets, tacks, and halliards being shot away, movement depended

upon sails hanging loose,--spread, but not set. Nevertheless, he was

able for a short time to near the enemy, and both accounts agree that

hereupon ensued the heat of the combat; "a serious conflict," to use

Hillyar's words, to which corresponds Porter's statement that "the

firing on both sides was now tremendous." The "Phoebe," however, was

handled, very properly, to utilize to the full the tactical advantages

she possessed in the greater range of her guns, and in power of

manoeuvring. In the circumstances under which she was acting, the sail

power left her was amply sufficient; having simply to keep drawing to

leeward, maintaining from her opponent a distance at which his guns

were useless and her own effective.

Under these conditions, seeing success to be out of the question, and

suffering great loss of men, Porter turned to the last resort of the

vanquished, to destroy the vessel and to save the crew from captivity.

The "Essex" was pointed for the shore; but when within a couple of

hundred yards the wind, which had so far favored her approach, shifted

ahead. Still clinging to every chance, a kedge with a hawser was let

go, to hold her where she was; perhaps the enemy might drift

unwittingly out of range. But the hawser parted, and with it the

frigate's last hold upon the country which she had honored by an

heroic defence. Porter then authorized any who might wish to swim

ashore to do so; the flag being kept flying to warrant a proceeding

which after formal surrender would be a breach of faith. At 6.20 the

"Essex" at last lowered her colors.[244] Out of a ship's company of

two hundred and fifty-five, with which she sailed in the morning,

fifty-eight were killed, or died of their wounds, and sixty-five were

wounded. The missing were reported at thirty-one. By agreement between

Hillyar and Porter, the "Essex Junior" was disarmed, and neutralized,

to convey to the United States, as paroled prisoners of war, the

survivors who remained on board at the moment of surrender. These

numbered one hundred and thirty-two. It is an interesting particular,

linking those early days of the United States navy to a long

subsequent period of renown, and worthy therefore to be recalled, that

among the combatants of the "Essex" was Midshipman David G. Farragut,

then thirteen years old. His name figures among the wounded, as well

as in the list of passengers on board the "Essex Junior."

The disaster to the "Essex" is connected by a singular and tragical

link with the fate of an American cruiser of like adventurous

enterprise in seas far distant from the Pacific. After the defeat at

Valparaiso, Lieutenant Stephen Decatur McKnight and Midshipman James

Lyman of the United States frigate were exchanged as prisoners of war

against a certain number of officers and seamen belonging to one of

the "Essex's" prizes; which, having continued under protection of the

neutral port, had undergone no change of belligerent relation by the

capture of her captor. When the "Essex Junior" sailed, these two

officers remained behind, by amicable arrangement, to go in the

"Phoebe" to Rio Janeiro, there to give certain evidence needed in

connection with the prize claims of the British frigate; which done,

it was understood they would be at liberty to return to their own

country by such conveyance as suited them. After arrival in Rio, the

first convenient opportunity offering was by a Swedish brig sailing

for Falmouth, England. In her they took passage, leaving Rio August

23, 1814. On October 9 the brig fell in with the United States sloop

of war "Wasp," in mid-ocean, about three hundred miles west of the

Cape Verde Islands, homeward bound. The two passengers transferred

themselves to her. Since this occurrence nothing further has ever been

heard of the American ship; nor would the incident itself have escaped

oblivion but for the anxiety of friends, which after the lapse, of

time prompted systematic inquiry to ascertain what had become of the

missing officers.

The captain of the "Wasp" was Master-Commandant, or, as he would now

be styled, Commander Johnstone Blakely; the same who had commanded the

"Enterprise" up to a month before her engagement with the "Boxer,"

when was demonstrated the efficiency to which he had brought her

ship's company. He sailed from Portsmouth, New Hampshire, May 1, 1814.

Of his instructions,[245] the most decisive was to remain for thirty

days in a position on the approaches to the English Channel, about one

hundred and fifty miles south of Ireland, in which neighborhood

occurred the most striking incidents of the cruise. On the outward

passage was taken only one prize, June 2. She was from Cork to

Halifax, twelve days out; therefore probably from six to eight hundred

miles west of Ireland. The second, from Limerick for Bordeaux, June

13, would show the "Wasp" on her station; on which, Blakely reported,

it was impossible to keep her, even approximately, being continually

drawn away in pursuit, and often much further up the English Channel

than desired, on account of the numerous sails passing.[246] When

overhauled, most of these were found to be neutrals. Nevertheless,

seven British merchant vessels were taken; all of which were

destroyed, except one given up to carry prisoners to England.

While thus engaged, the "Wasp" on June 28 sighted a sail, which proved

to be the British brig of war "Reindeer," Captain Manners, that had

left Plymouth six days before. The place of this meeting was latitude

48-½° North, longitude 11° East; therefore nearly in the cruising

ground assigned to Blakely by his instructions. The antagonists were

unequally matched; the American carrying twenty 32-pounder carronades

and two long guns, the British sixteen 24-pounders and two long; a

difference against her of over fifty per cent. The "Reindeer" was to

windward, and some manoeuvring took place in the respective efforts to

keep or to gain this advantage. In the end the "Reindeer" retained it,

and the action began with both on the starboard tack, closehauled, the

British sloop on the weather quarter of the "Wasp,"--behind, but on

the weather side, which in this case was to the right (1). Approaching

slowly, the "Reindeer" with great deliberation fired five times, at

two-minute intervals, a light gun mounted on her forecastle, loaded

with round and grape shot. Finding her to maintain this position, upon

which his guns would not train, Blakely put the helm down, and the

"Wasp" turned swiftly to the right (2), bringing her starboard battery

to bear. This was at 3.26 P.M. The action immediately became very hot,

at very close range (3), and the "Reindeer" was speedily disabled. The

vessels then came together (4), and Captain Manners, who by this time

had received two severe wounds, with great gallantry endeavored to

board with his crew, reduced by the severe punishment already

inflicted to half its originally inferior numbers. As he climbed into

the rigging, two balls from the "Wasp's" tops passed through his head,

and he fell back dead on his own deck. No further resistance was

offered, and the "Wasp" took possession. She had lost five killed and

twenty-one wounded, of whom six afterwards died. The British

casualties were twenty-three killed and forty-two wounded. The brig

herself, being fairly torn to pieces, was burned the next day.[247]

[Illustration: Diagram of the Wasp vs. Reindeer battle]

The results of this engagement testify to the efficiency and

resolution of both combatants; but a special meed of praise is

assuredly due to Captain Manners, whose tenacity was as marked as his

daring, and who, by the injury done to his stronger antagonist,

demonstrated both the thoroughness of his previous general preparation

and the skill of his management in the particular instance. Under his

command the "Reindeer" had become a notable vessel in the fleet to

which she belonged; but as equality in force is at a disadvantage

where there is serious inferiority in training and discipline, so the

best of drilling must yield before decisive superiority of armament,

when there has been equal care on both sides to insure efficiency in

the use of the battery. To Blakely's diligence in this respect his

whole career bears witness.

After the action Blakely wished to remain cruising, which neither the

condition of his ship nor her losses in men forbade; but the number of

prisoners and wounded compelled him to make a harbor. He accordingly

went into L'Orient, France, on July 8. Despite the change of

government, and the peace with Great Britain which attended the

restoration of the Bourbons, the "Wasp" was here hospitably received

and remained for seven weeks refitting, sailing again August 27. By

September 1 she had taken and destroyed three more enemy's vessels;

one of which was cut out from a convoy, and burnt under the eyes of

the convoying 74-gun ship. At 6.30 P.M. of September 1 four sails

were sighted, from which Blakely selected to pursue the one most to

windward; for, should this prove a ship of war, the others, if

consorts, would be to leeward of the fight, less able to assist. The

chase lasted till 9.26, when the "Wasp" was near enough to see that

the stranger was a brig of war, and to open with a light carronade on

the forecastle, as the "Reindeer" had done upon her in the same

situation. Confident in his vessel, however, Blakely abandoned this

advantage of position, ran under his antagonist's lee to prevent her

standing down to join the vessels to leeward, and at 9.29 began the

engagement, being then on her lee bow. At ten the "Wasp" ceased firing

and hailed, believing the enemy to be silenced; but receiving no

reply, and the British guns opening again, the combat was renewed. At

10.12, seeing the opponent to be suffering greatly, Blakely hailed

again and was answered that the brig had surrendered. The "Wasp's"

battery was secured, and a boat was in the act of being lowered to

take possession, when a second brig was discovered close astern.

Preparation was made to receive her and her coming up awaited; but at

10.36 the two others were also visible, astern and approaching. The

"Wasp" then made sail, hoping to decoy the second vessel from her

supports; but the sinking condition of the one first engaged detained

the new-comer, who, having come within pistol-shot, fired a broadside

which took effect only aloft, and then gave all her attention to

saving the crew of her comrade. As the "Wasp" drew away she heard the

repeated signal guns of distress discharged by her late adversary, the

name of which never became known to the captain and crew of the

victorious ship.[248]

The vessel thus engaged was the British brig "Avon," of sixteen

32-pounder carronades, and two long 9-pounders; her force being to

that of the "Wasp" as four to five. Her loss in men was ten killed

and thirty-two wounded; that of the "Wasp" two killed and one wounded.

The "Avon" being much superior to the "Reindeer," this comparatively

slight injury inflicted by her testifies to inferior efficiency. The

broadside of her rescuer, the "Castilian," of the same weight as her

own, wholly missed the "Wasp's" hull, though delivered from so near; a

circumstance which drew from the British historian, James, the caustic

remark that she probably would have done no better than the "Avon,"

had the action continued. The "Wasp" was much damaged in sails and

rigging; the "Avon" sank two hours and a half after the "Wasp" left

her and one hour after being rejoined by the "Castilian."

The course of the "Wasp" after this event is traced by her captures.

The meeting with the "Avon" was within a hundred miles of that with

the "Reindeer." On September 12 and 14, having run south three hundred

and sixty miles, she took two vessels; being then about two hundred

and fifty miles west from Lisbon. On the 21st, having made four

degrees more southing, she seized the British brig "Atalanta," a

hundred miles east of Madeira. This prize being of exceptional value,

Blakely decided to send her in, and she arrived safely at Savannah on

November 4, in charge of Midshipman David Geisinger, who lived to

become a captain in the navy.[249] She brought with her Blakely's

official despatches, including the report of the affair with the

"Avon." This was the last tidings received from the "Wasp" until the

inquiries of friends elicited the fact that the two officers of the

"Essex" had joined her three weeks after the capture of the

"Atalanta," nine hundred miles farther south. Besides these, there

were among the lost two lieutenants who had been in the "Constitution"

when she took the "Guerrière" and the "Java," and one who had been in

the "Enterprise" in her action with the "Boxer."

Coincident in time with the cruise of the "Wasp" was that of her

sister ship, the "Peacock"; like her also newly built, and named after

the British brig sunk by Captain Lawrence in the "Hornet." The finest

achievement of the "Wasp," however, was near the end of her career,

while it fell to the "Peacock" to begin with a successful action.

Having left New York early in March, she went first to St. Mary's,

Georgia, carrying a quantity of warlike stores. In making this passage

she was repeatedly chased by enemies. Having landed her cargo, she

sailed immediately and ran south as far as one of the Bahama Islands,

called the Great Isaac, near to which vessels from Jamaica and Cuba

bound to Europe must pass, because of the narrowness of the channel

separating the islands from the Florida coast. In this neighborhood

she remained from April 18 to 24, seeing only one neutral and two

privateers, which were pursued unsuccessfully. This absence of

unguarded merchant ships, coupled with the frequency of hostile

cruisers met before, illustrates exactly the conditions to which

attention has been repeatedly drawn, as characterizing the British

plan of action in the Western Atlantic. Learning that the expected

Jamaica convoy would be under charge of a seventy-four, two frigates,

and two sloops, and that the merchant ships in Havana, fearing to sail

alone, would await its passing to join, Captain Warrington next stood

slowly to the northward, and on April 29, off Cape Canaveral, sighted

four sail, which proved to be the British brig "Epervier" of eighteen

32-pounder carronades,[250] also northward bound, with three merchant

vessels under her convoy; one of these being Russian, and one Spanish,

belonging therefore to nations still at war with France, though

neutral towards the United States. The third, a merchant brig, was the

first British commercial vessel seen since leaving Savannah.

As usual and proper, the "Epervier," seeing that the "Peacock" would

overtake her and her convoy, directed the latter to separate while she

stood down to engage the hostile cruiser. The two vessels soon came to

blows. The accounts of the action on both sides are extremely meagre,

and preclude any certain statement as to manoeuvres; which indeed

cannot have been material to the issue reached. The "Epervier," for

reasons that will appear later, fought first one broadside and then

the other; but substantially the contest appears to have been

maintained side to side. From the first discharge of the "Epervier"

two round shot struck the "Peacock's" foreyard nearly in the same

place, which so weakened the spar as to deprive the ship of the use of

her foresail and foretopsail; that is, practically, of all sail on the

foremast. Having thenceforth only the jibs for headsail, she had to be

kept a little off the wind. The action lasted forty-five minutes, when

the "Epervier" struck. Her loss in men was eight killed, and fifteen

wounded; the "Peacock" had two wounded.

In extenuation of this disproportion in result, James states that in

the first broadside three of the "Epervier's" carronades were

unshipped; and that, when those on the other side were brought into

action by tacking, similar mishaps occurred. Further, the moment the

guns got warm they drew out the breeching bolts. Allowing full force

to these facts, they certainly have some bearing on the general

outcome; but viewed with regard to the particular question of

efficiency, which is the issue of credit in every fight,[251] there

remains the first broadside, and such other discharges as the

carronades could endure before getting warm. The light metal of those

guns indisputably caused them to heat rapidly, and to kick nastily;

but it can scarcely be considered probable that the "Epervier" was not

able to get in half a dozen broadsides. The result, two wounded,

establishes inefficiency, and a practical certainty of defeat had all

her ironwork held; for the "Peacock," though only three months

commissioned, was a good ship under a thoroughly capable and attentive

captain. A comical remark of James in connection with this engagement

illustrates the weakness of prepossession, in all matters relating to

Americans, which in him was joined to a painstaking accuracy in

ascertaining and stating external facts. "Two well-directed shot," he

says, disabled the "Peacock's" foreyard. It was certainly a capital

piece of luck for the "Epervier" that her opponent at the outset lost

the use of one of her most important spars; but the implication that

the shot were directed for the point hit is not only preposterous but,

in a combat between vessels nearly equal, depreciatory. The shot of a

first broadside had no business to be so high in the air.

James alleges also poor quality and a mutinous spirit in the crew, and

that at the end, when their captain called upon them to board, they

refused, saying, "She is too heavy for us." To this the adequate reply

is that the brig had been in commission since the end of

1812,--sixteen months; time sufficient to bring even an indifferent

crew to a very reasonable degree of efficiency, yet not enough to

cause serious deterioration of material. That after the punishment

received the men refused to board, if discreditable to them under the

conditions, is discreditable also to the captain; not to his courage,

but to his hold upon the men whom he had commanded so long. The

establishment of the "Epervier's" inefficiency certainly detracts from

the distinction of the "Peacock's" victory; but it was scarcely her

fault that her adversary was not worthier, and it does not detract

from her credit for management and gunnery, considering that the

combat began with the loss of her own foresails, and ended with

forty-five shot in the hull, and five feet of water in the hold, of

her antagonist.

By dark of the day of action the prize was in condition to make sail,

and the "Peacock's" yard had been fished and again sent aloft. The two

vessels then steered north for Savannah. The next evening two British

frigates appeared. Captain Warrington directed the "Epervier" to keep

on close along shore, while he stood southward to draw away the enemy.

This proved effective; the "Epervier" arriving safely May 2 at the

anchorage at the mouth of the Savannah River, where the "Peacock"

rejoined her on the 4th. The "Adams," Captain Morris, was also there;

having arrived from the coast of Africa on the day of the fight, and

sailing again a week after it, May 5, for another cruise.

On June 4 the "Peacock" also started upon a protracted cruise, from

which she returned to New York October 30, after an absence of one

hundred and forty-seven days.[252] She followed the Gulf Stream,

outside the line of British blockaders, to the Banks of Newfoundland,

thence to the Azores, and so on to Ireland; off the south of which,

between Waterford and Cape Clear, she remained for four days. After

this she passed round the west coast, and to the northward as far as

Shetland and the Faroe Islands. She then retraced her course, crossed

the Bay of Biscay, and ran along the Portuguese coast; pursuing in

general outline the same path as that in which the "Wasp" very soon

afterwards followed. Fourteen prizes were taken; of which twelve were

destroyed, and two utilized as cartels to carry prisoners to England.

Of the whole number, one only was seized from September 2, when the

ship was off the Canaries, to October 12, off Barbuda in the West

Indies; and none from there to the United States. "Not a single vessel

was seen from the Cape Verde to Surinam," reported Warrington; while

in seven days spent between the Rock of Lisbon and Cape Ortegal, at

the northwest extremity of the Spanish peninsula, of twelve sail seen,

nine of which were spoken, only two were British.

In these conditions were seen, exemplified and emphasized, the alarm

felt and precautions taken, by both the mercantile classes and the

Admiralty, in consequence of the invasion of European waters by

American armed vessels, of a class and an energy unusually fitted to

harass commerce. The lists of American prizes teem with evidence of

extraordinary activity, by cruisers singularly adapted for their work,

and audacious in proportion to their confidence of immunity, based

upon knowledge of their particular nautical qualities. The impression

produced by their operations is reflected in the representations of

the mercantile community, in the rise of insurance, and in the

stricter measures instituted by the Admiralty. The Naval Chronicle, a

service journal which since 1798 had been recording the successes and

supremacy of the British Navy, confessed now that "the depredations

committed on our commerce by American ships of war and privateers have

attained an extent beyond all former precedent.... We refer our

readers to the letters in our correspondence. The insurance between

Bristol and Waterford or Cork is now three times higher than it was

when we were at war with all Europe. The Admiralty have been

overwhelmed with letters of complaint or remonstrance."[253] In the

exertions of the cruisers the pace seems to grow more and more

furious, as the year 1814 draws to its close amid a scene of

exasperated coast warfare, desolation, and humiliation, in America; as

though they were determined, amid all their pursuit of gain, to make

the enemy also feel the excess of mortification which he was

inflicting upon their own country. The discouragement testified by

British shippers and underwriters was doubtless enhanced and

embittered by disappointment, in finding the movement of trade thus

embarrassed and intercepted at the very moment when the restoration of

peace in Europe had given high hopes of healing the wounds, and

repairing the breaches, made by over twenty years of maritime warfare,

almost unbroken.

In London, on August 17, 1814, directors of two insurance companies

presented to the Admiralty remonstrances on the want of protection in

the Channel; to which the usual official reply was made that an

adequate force was stationed both in St. George's Channel and in the

North Sea. The London paper from which this intelligence was taken

stated that premiums on vessels trading between England and Ireland

had risen from an ordinary rate of less than one pound sterling to

five guineas per cent. The Admiralty, taxed with neglect, attributed

blame to the merchant captains, and announced additional severity to

those who should part convoy. Proceedings were instituted against two

masters guilty of this offence.[254] September 9, the merchants and

shipowners of Liverpool remonstrated direct to the Prince Regent,

going over the heads of the Admiralty, whom they censured. Again the

Admiralty alleged sufficient precautions, specifying three frigates

and fourteen sloops actually at sea for the immediate protection of

St. George's Channel and the western Irish coast against depredations,

which they nevertheless did not succeed in suppressing.[255]

At the same time the same classes in Glasgow were taking action, and

passing resolutions, the biting phrases of which were probably

prompted as much by a desire to sting the Admiralty as by a personal

sense of national abasement. "At a time when we are at peace with all

the rest of the world, when the maintenance of our marine costs so

large a sum to the country, when the mercantile and shipping interests

pay a tax for protection under the form of convoy duty, and when, in

the plenitude of our power, we have declared the whole American coast

under blockade, it is equally distressing and mortifying that our

ships cannot with safety traverse our own channels, that insurance

cannot be effected but at an excessive premium, and that a horde of

American cruisers should be allowed, unheeded, unmolested, unresisted,

to take, burn, or sink our own vessels in our own inlets, and almost

in sight of our own harbours."[256] In the same month the merchants of

Bristol, the position of which was comparatively favorable to

intercourse with Ireland, also presented a memorial, stating that the

rate of insurance had risen to more than twofold the amount at which

it was usually effected during the continental war, when the British

Navy could not, as it now might, direct its operations solely against

American cruisers. Shipments consequently had been in a considerable

degree suspended. The Admiralty replied that the only certain

protection was by convoy. This they were ready to supply but could not

compel, for the Convoy Act did not apply to trade between ports of

the United Kingdom.

This was the offensive return made by America's right arm of national

safety; the retort to the harrying of the Chesapeake, and of Long

Island Sound, and to the capture and destruction of Washington. But,

despite the demonstrated superiority of a national navy, on the whole,

for the infliction of such retaliation, even in the mere matter of

commerce destroying,--not to speak of confidence in national prowess,

sustained chiefly by the fighting successes at sea,--this weighty blow

to the pride and commerce of Great Britain was not dealt by the

national Government; for the national Government had gone to war

culpably unprepared. It was the work of the people almost wholly,

guided and governed by their own shrewdness and capacity; seeking,

indeed, less a military than a pecuniary result, an indemnity at the

expense of the enemy for the loss to which they had been subjected by

protracted inefficiency in administration and in statesmanship on the

part of their rulers. The Government sat wringing its hands, amid the

ruins of its capital and the crash of its resources; reaping the

reward of those wasted years during which, amid abounding warning, it

had neglected preparation to meet the wrath to come. Monroe, the

Secretary of State, writing from Washington to a private friend, July

3, 1814, said, "Even in this state, the Government shakes to the

foundation. Let a strong force land anywhere, and what will be the

effect?" A few months later, December 21, he tells Jefferson, "Our

finances are in a deplorable state. The means of the country have

scarcely yet been touched, yet we have neither money in the Treasury

nor credit."[257] This statement was abundantly confirmed by a

contemporary official report of the Secretary of the Treasury. At the

end of the year, Bainbridge, commanding the Boston navy yard, wrote

the Department, "The officers and men of this station are really

_suffering_ for want of pay due them, and articles now purchased for

the use of the navy are, in consequence of payment in treasury notes,

enhanced about thirty per cent. Yesterday we had to discharge one

hundred seamen, and could not pay them a cent of their wages. The

officers and men have neither money, clothes, nor credit, and are

embarrassed with debts."[258] No wonder the privateers got the seamen.

The decision to abandon the leading contention of the war had been

reached long before.[259] In an official letter, dated June 27, 1814,

to the commissioners appointed to treat for peace, after enumerating

the threatening conditions confronting the country, now that the

European conflict was at an end, Monroe wrote, "On mature

consideration it has been decided that, under all the circumstances

above alluded to, incident to a prosecution of the war, _you may omit

any stipulation on the subject of impressment_, if found indispensably

necessary to terminate it. You will of course not recur to this

expedient until all your efforts to adjust the controversy in a more

satisfactory manner have failed."[260] The phraseology of this

instruction disposes completely of the specious plea, advanced by

partisans of the Administration, that the subject was dropped because

impressment was no longer a live issue; the maritime war of Europe

being over. It was dropped because it had to be dropped; because the

favorable opportunities presented in 1812 and 1813 had been lost by

the incompetency of the national Government, distributed over a period

of nearly a dozen years of idle verbal argumentation; because in 1814

there stood between it and disastrous reverse, and loss of territory

in the north, only the resolution and professional skill of a yet

unrecognized seaman on the neglected waters of Lake Champlain.

Before concluding finally the subject of the offensive maritime

operations against the enemy's commerce, it may be mentioned that in

the last six months of the war, that is within one fifth of its

duration, were made one third of the total captures. Duly to weigh

this result, regard must be had to the fact that, when the navy is

adequate, the most numerous seizures of commercial shipping are

usually effected at the beginning, because the scattered merchantmen

are taken unawares. The success of the last few months of this war

indicates the stimulus given to privateering, partly by the conditions

of the country, imperiously demanding some relief from the necessity,

and stagnancy of occupation, caused by the blockade; partly by the

growing appreciation of the fact that a richer harvest was to be

reaped by seeking the most suitable fields with the most suitable

vessels. In an energetic and businesslike people it will be expected

that the experience of the two preceding twelvemonths would have

produced decided opinions and practical results in the construction of

privateers, as well as in the direction given them. It is one thing to

take what is at hand and make the most of it in an emergency; it is

another to design thoughtfully a new instrument, best qualified for

the end in view. The cruiser needed speed and handiness,--that is the

first and obvious requirement; but, to escape the numerous enemies

gradually let loose to shorten her career, it became increasingly

requisite that she should have also weight of armament, to fight, and

weight of hull--tonnage--to hold her way in rough and head seas. These

qualities were not irreconcilable; but, to effect the necessary

combination, additional size was inevitable.

Accordingly, recognition of these facts is found in the laying down of

privateers for the particular business. Niles' Register, a Baltimore

weekly, notes with local pride that, although the port itself is

bolted and barred by the blockade of the Chesapeake, the Baltimore

model for schooners is in demand from Maine to Georgia; that they are

being built, often with Baltimore capital, in many places from which

escape is always possible. In Boston, there are in construction three

stout hulls, pierced for twenty-two guns; clearly much heavier in

tonnage, as in armament, than the schooner rate, and bearing the

linked names of "Blakely," "Reindeer," and "Avon." Mention is made of

one vessel of twenty-two long, heavy guns, which has already sailed,

and of two others, to carry as many as thirty to thirty-six, nearly

ready.[261]

Between the divergent requirements of size and numbers, there is

always a middle term; a mean, not capable of exact definition, but

still existent within certain not very widely separated extremes. For

commerce destroying by individual cruisers, acting separately, which

was the measure that commended itself to the men of 1812, vessels

approaching the tonnage of the national sloops of war seemed, by their

successes and their immunity from capture, to realize very nearly the

best conditions of advantage. The national brigs which put to sea were

all captured, save one; and she was so notoriously dull of sailing

that her escape was attributed to mere good luck, experienced on

several critical occasions. Nearly all the sloops escaped; while the

three frigates lost, the "Chesapeake," "Essex," and "President," were

taken under circumstances that offered no parallel to the exigencies

to which the privateer was liable. They were not run down, uninjured,

in a fair race. The only sloop so lost was the "Frolic," of the class

of the "Wasp" and "Peacock;" and the circumstances under which she was

caught by a frigate are not sufficiently known to pronounce whether

she might have been saved, as her sister ship, the "Hornet," was, from

the hot pursuit of a seventy-four. Under some conditions of wind and

sea, inferiority of bulk inflicts irredeemable disadvantage of speed;

but, taking one thing with another, in a system of commerce destroying

which rejected squadron action, and was based avowedly upon

dissemination of vessels, the gain of the frigate over the sloop due

to size did not counterbalance the loss in distribution of effort

which results from having only one ship, instead of two, for a first

outlay.

That some such convictions, the fruit of rude experience in actual

cruising, were gradually forming in men's understanding, is probable

from the particulars cited; and they would receive additional force

from the consideration that, to make a profit out of privateering

under existing conditions, it would be necessary, not only to capture

vessels of weak force, but to return safely to port with at least some

notable salvage from their cargoes. In other words, there must be

power to fight small cruisers, and to escape large ones under all

probable disadvantage of weather. Whatever the conclusions of

practical seamen and shipowners in this respect, they found no

reflection in the dominant power in the Administration and Congress.

The exploits of the "Comet," the "Chasseur," and a few other fortunate

privateer schooners or brigs of small size, among them being cited

specifically the "Mammoth," which in the autumn of 1814 made

twenty-one prizes in three months, produced a strong popular

impression; and this was diligently but somewhat thoughtlessly

deepened by the press, as such popular movements are apt to be,

without thorough mastery of all facts, _contra_ as well as _pro_. It

was undeniable, also, that in the threatening aspect of affairs, when

Great Britain's whole strength was freed to be exerted against the

country, want of time to prepare new means was a weighty element in

decision, and recourse must be had to resources immediately at hand

for the retaliatory depredation upon the enemy's commerce, from the

effect of which so much was expected then, as it is now. For this

reason the scheme had naval backing, prominent in which was Captain

Porter, who had reached home in the July after the capture of the

"Essex."

Under these circumstances, the Secretary of the Navy addressed a

letter, October 22, 1814,[262] to the naval committees of both houses

of Congress, enlarging on the greater attention of the enemy drawn to

the heavy frigates, and the increased difficulty of their getting to

sea. He recommended an appropriation of $600,000 for the purchase of

fast-sailing schooners for preying on the hostile commerce. In

consequence, a bill was introduced to build or purchase for the navy

twenty vessels, to carry not less than eight nor more than fourteen

guns; in short, of privateer class, but to be under naval control, not

only as regarded discipline and organization but direction of effort.

It was intended that a squadron of them should be intrusted to Captain

Porter, another to Captain Perry;[263] and Porter drew up a plan of

operations, which he submitted to the Department, providing for the

departure of the vessels, their keeping together for support in one

quarter, scattering in another, and again reuniting at a fixed

rendezvous.[264] Both officers reported great difficulty in procuring

suitable vessels, owing to the extent of privateering, the lack of

necessary funds, and the depreciation of Government credit, which

caused its drafts to be refused.

When introducing the bill into the lower House, the Chairman of the

Naval Committee, after paying some compliments to the military

achievements of the naval vessels, said that in regard to depredation

on the commerce of the enemy, he believed their efficiency could not

be compared to that of vessels of a smaller class. This note dominated

the brief discussion; the speakers in favor being significantly enough

from Maryland, prepossessed doubtless by local pride in their justly

celebrated schooners. Mr. Ingersoll, of Pennsylvania, moved an

amendment to allow vessels of twenty-two guns; an increase of fifty

per cent. The limitation to fourteen guns, he remarked, was inserted

in the Senate by a gentleman from Maryland; but it was not the fact

that the best privateers were limited to fourteen guns. One or two

which had arrived lately, after reaping a rich harvest, carried

sixteen. Mr. Lowndes, of South Carolina, seconded this amendment,

hoping that the Senate limitation would be rejected. He quoted Captain

Perry, who had "never known an instance in which a brig of the United

States had failed to overtake a schooner." One member only, Mr. Reed,

of Massachusetts, spoke against the whole scheme. Though opposed to

the war, he said, he wished it conducted on correct principles. He

"was warranted by facts in saying that no force would be half as

efficient, in proportion to its expense; none would be of so much

service to the country; none certainly would touch the enemy half so

much as a naval force of a proper character;" which, he affirmed, this

was not. Ingersoll's amendment was rejected, obtaining only

twenty-five votes. The bill went again to conference, and on November

11, 1814, was reported and passed, fixing the limits of armament at

from eight to sixteen guns; a paltry addition of two. Forty years

later the editor of the "Debates of Congress," Senator Benton, wrote,

"This was a movement in the right direction. Private armed vessels,

and the success of small ships of war cruising as privateers, had

taught Congress that small vessels, not large ships, were the

effective means of attacking and annoying the enemy's commerce."[265]

The final test was not permitted, to determine what success would have

attended the operations of several Baltimore schooners, united under

the single control of a man like Porter or Perry, and limited strictly

to the injury of the enemy's commerce by the destruction of prizes,

without thought of profit by sending them in. The advent of peace put

a stop to an experiment which would have been most instructive as well

as novel. Looking to other experiences of the past, it may be said

with confidence little short of certainty that, despite the

disadvantage of size, several schooners thus working in concert, and

with pure military purpose, would effect vastly more than the same

number acting separately, with a double eye to gain and glory. The

French privateer squadrons of Jean Bart and Duguay Trouin, in the

early eighteenth century, the example of the celebrated "Western"

squadrons of British frigates in the war of the French Revolution, as

protectors and destroyers of commerce, demonstrated beyond

peradventure the advantage of combined action in this, as in all

military enterprise; while the greater success of the individual

United States cruiser over the average privateer, so singularly

overlooked by the national legislators, gives assurance that Porter's

and Perry's schooners would collectively have done incomparable work.

This, however, is far from indicating that divisions of larger

vessels,--sloops or frigates,--under officers of their known energy,

could not have pushed home into the English Channel, or elsewhere

where British commerce congregated, an enterprise the results of which

would have caused the ears of those that heard them to tingle.

FOOTNOTES:

[217] Captain Allen to Navy Department. Niles' Register, vol. v. p. 46.

[218] The American official report of this action can be found in Niles'

Register, vol. viii. p. 43. The British is in the Naval Chronicle, vol.

xxx. p. 247. Niles also gives it, vol. v. p. 118.

[219] The prize data have been taken from the successive volumes of

Niles' Register.

[220] Data concerning American vessels captured by British ships have

been drawn chiefly from prize lists, or official reports, in the Naval

Chronicle.

[221] Ante, p. 19.

[222] Niles' Register, vol. v. p. 175.

[223] Niles gives an abstract of the log of the "Scourge," vol. vi. p.

269.

[224] Niles' Register, vol. v. p. 90.

[225] Ibid., vol. vi. p. 69.

[226] For Morris' letter see Niles' Register, vol. vi. p. 180.

[227] Ibid., vol. iv. p. 86.

[228] Ibid., vol. vii. p. 366.

[229] Niles' Register, vol. v. p. 413. Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxi. p.

25.

[230] Niles' Register, vol. v. p. 414; vol. vi. p. 151.

[231] Stewart's Letter is dated April 4, 1814, and, with the enclosures

mentioned, will be found among the Captains' Letters, Navy Department

MSS.

[232] For the official reports of this cruise, and list of prizes, see

Niles, vol. vi. pp. 69-71.

[233] Niles' Register, vol. v. pp. 14, 15. Naval Chronicle, vol. xxx. p.

348.

[234] Niles' Register, vol. vi. pp. 225, 371.

[235] Niles' Register, vol. vii. p. 293, gives both the American and

British accounts.

[236] Niles' Register, vol. vii. p. 293.

[237] Niles' Register, vol. vii. pp. 128, 290.

[238] Niles' Register, vol. viii. p. 61.

[239] It may not be amiss here to quote an incident similarly creditable

to privateersmen, a class usually much abused, and too often with good

cause. It was told by a British colonel to Colonel Winfield Scott, while

a prisoner in Canada. This gentleman with his wife had been passengers

from England in a transport captured near Halifax by an American

privateer. Although there was no fighting, the wife, who was in a

critical state of health, was dangerously affected by the attendant

alarm. As soon as the circumstances were mentioned to the captain of the

cruiser, he placed at the husband's disposition all that part of the

vessel where their quarters were, posting a sentry to prevent intrusion

and to secure all their personal effects from molestation. Scott's

Autobiography, vol. i. p. 70.

[240] Afterwards Rear-Admiral Emmons.

[241] The new United States sloop of war "Frolic," named after the

vessel taken by the "Wasp," was captured by the frigate "Orpheus," April

20, 1814.

[242] Ante, p. 3.

[243] Porter to the Secretary of the Navy, July 3, 1814. Niles'

Register, vol. vi. p. 338.

[244] Porter's Report of this action is to be found in Niles' Register,

vol. vi. pp. 338-341. Hillyar's in Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxii. pp.

168-170.

[245] The Secretary of the Navy to Blakely, March 3, 1814. Navy

Department MSS.

[246] Blakely to the Navy Department, Niles' Register, vol. vii. p. 115.

[247] The particulars of this action are taken from the minutes of the

"Wasp," enclosed in Blakely's Report, Niles' Register, vol. vii. p. 115.

[248] Blakely's Report, Niles' Register, vol. vii. p. 192.

[249] Niles' Register, vol. vii. p. 173.

[250] James says that two of these guns were 18-pounders; but the first

lieutenant of the "Peacock," who brought the prize into port, and from

there wrote independently of Warrington, agrees with him in saying

eighteen thirty-twos. Niles' Register, vol. vi. pp. 180, 196.

[251] In a "Synopsis of Naval Actions," between British and American

vessels, contributed to the Naval Chronicle by a "British naval officer

on the American station," occurs the remark relative to the defeat of

the "Avon": "Miserable gunnery on our side, attributable ... above all

to not drilling the men at firing at the guns; a practice the Americans

never neglect." Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxiv. p. 469.

[252] For Captain Warrington's report of this cruise, see Niles'

Register, vol. vii. p. 155.

[253] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxii. p. 244. See also, Ibid., pp. 211,

218.

[254] London paper, quoted in Niles' Register, vol. vii. p. 175.

[255] Niles' Register, vol. vii. p. 190. Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxii. p.

244.

[256] Niles' Register, vol. vii. p. 190.

[257] Writings of James Monroe.

[258] Captains' Letters, Dec. 11, 1814. Bainbridge's italics.

[259] It will be remembered that after the repeal of the Orders in

Council, June 23, 1812, impressment remained the only _sine quâ non_ of

the United States.

[260] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 704.

Author's italics. This was the result of a Cabinet meeting held the same

day. "June 27, 1814. In consequence of letters from Bayard and Gallatin

of May 6-7, and other accounts from Europe of the ascendancy and views

of Great Britain, and the dispositions of the great Continental Powers,

the question was put to the Cabinet: 'Shall a treaty of peace, silent on

the subject of impressment, be authorized?' Agreed to by Monroe,

Campbell, Armstrong, and Jones. Rush absent. Our minister to be

instructed, besides trying other conditions, to make a previous trial to

insert or annex some declaration, or protest, against any inference,

from the silence of the Treaty on the subject of impressment, that the

British claim was admitted or that of the United States abandoned."

(Works of Madison, vol. iii. p. 408.)

[261] Niles' Register, vol. vii. p. 190.

[262] Navy Department MSS.

[263] For Porter's and Perry's correspondence on this subject see

Captains' Letters, Navy Department MSS., Oct. 14 and 25, Nov. 29, Dec.

2, 9, and 25, 1814; Jan. 9, 1815.

[264] Porter to Secretary, Feb. 8, 1815. Captains' Letters.

[265] Benton's Abridgment of Debates in Congress, vol. v. p. 359, note.