A similar order was issued, August 5, by the War Department to army

officers.[173] In accordance with his instructions, Captain Morris of

the "Adams," on July 29 or 30, stopped the ship "Monsoon," from

Alexandria. Her agent wrote a correspondent in Boston that, when the

bill failed in the Senate, he had had no doubt of her being allowed

to proceed, "but the Secretary and Mr. Madison have made a sort of

embargo, or directed the stoppage of vessels."[174] He added that

another brig was lying in the river ready loaded, but held by the same

order. Morris's indorsement on the ship's papers shows the

barefacedness of the transaction. "Whereas the within-mentioned ship

'Monsoon' is laden with flour, and _must_ pass within the control of

the enemy's squadron now within, and blockading Chesapeake Bay, if she

be allowed to proceed on her intended voyage, and as the enemy might

derive from her such intelligence and succor as would be serviceable

to themselves and injurious to the United States, I forbid her

proceeding while the enemy shall be so disposed as to prevent a

reasonable possibility of her getting to sea without falling into

their possession."[175] At this writing the British had left the

Potomac itself, and the most of them were above. A week later, at

Charleston, a ship called the "Caroline" was visited by a United

States naval officer, and found with a license from Cockburn to carry

a cargo, free from molestation by British cruisers.[176] "With flour

at Lisbon $13 per barrel, _no sale_, and at Halifax $20, _in demand_,"

queries a Baltimore paper of the day, "where would all the vessels

that would in a few days have been off from Alexandria have gone, if

the 'Monsoon' had not been stopped? They would have been _captured_

and sent to Halifax."[177]

Morris's action was in accordance with the Secretary's order, and went

no further than to stop a voyage which, in view of the existing

proclaimed blockade, and of the great British force at hand, bore

collusion on its face. The President's request for legislation, which

Congress had denied, went much further. It was a recurrence, and the

last, to the policy of commercial retaliation, fostered by himself and

Jefferson in preference to armed resistance. By such measures in peace,

and as far as commercial prosperity was concerned, they had opened the

nation's veins without vindicating its self-respect. The military value

of food supplies to the enemy in Canada and on the coast, however,

could not be contested; and during the recess of Congress it received

emphasis by a Canadian embargo upon the export of grain. Hence, at the

next session the President's recommendation of July was given

attention, and there was passed almost immediately--December 17,

1813,--a sweeping embargo law, applicable not only to external commerce

but to coasters. As this ended the long series of commercial

restrictions, so was it also of limited duration as compared with them,

being withdrawn the following April.

By the Act of December 17, as interpreted by the Treasury, foreign

merchant vessels might depart with cargoes already laden, except

provisions and military stores, which must be relanded; but nothing

could be shipped that was not already on board when the Act was

received. Coasters, even for accustomed voyages, could obtain

clearances only by permission from the President; and the rules for

such permission, given through the collectors, were extremely

stringent. In no case were the vessels permitted to leave interior

waters, proceeding from one sound or bay to another, and be "at sea"

for even a short distance; nor were they to be permitted to carry any

provisions, or supplies useful to an enemy, if there was the slightest

chance of their falling into his power. It would appear that the

orders of July 29 had been allowed to lapse after the great body of

the British left the Chesapeake; for Morris, still in the Potomac,

acknowledging the receipt of this Act on December 20, writes: "There

are several vessels below us in the river with flour. I have issued

orders to the gunboats to detain them, and as soon as the wind will

permit, shall proceed with this ship, to give all possible effect to

the Act." Six days afterwards, having gone down as he intended, he

found the British anchored off the mouth of the stream, at a point

where the bay is little more than five miles wide. "Two American brigs

passed down before us, and I have every reason to believe threw

themselves into the enemy's hands last Wednesday."[178]

On September 6 the principal part of the British fleet quitted

Chesapeake Bay for the season; leaving behind a ship of the line with

some smaller vessels, to enforce the blockade. Viewed as a military

campaign, to sustain the character as well as the interests of the

country, its operations cannot be regarded as successful. With

overwhelming numbers, and signally favored by the quiet inland waters

with extensive ramifications which characterized the scene of war, the

results, though on a more extensive scale, differed nothing in kind

from the harassment inflicted all along the coast from Maine to

Georgia, by the squadrons cruising outside. Ample demonstration was

indeed afforded, there as elsewhere, of the steady, remorseless,

far-reaching effect of a predominant sea power; and is confirmed

explicitly by an incidental remark of the Russian minister at

Washington writing to Warren, April 4, 1813, concerning an armistice,

in connection with the abortive Russian proffer of mediation.[179]

Even at this early period, "It would be almost impossible to establish

an armistice, without raising the blockade, since the latter does them

more harm than all the hostilities."[180] But in direct military

execution the expedition had undoubtedly fallen far short of its

opportunity, afforded by the wretchedly unprepared state of the region

against which it had been sent. Whether the fault lay with the

commander-in-chief, or with the Admiralty for insufficient means given

him, is needless here to inquire. The squadron remaining through the

winter perpetuated the isolation of Norfolk from the upper bay, and

barred the "Constellation" and "Adams" from the sea. Ammunition and

stores had to be brought by slow and unwieldly transportation from the

Potomac across country, and it was not till January 18, 1814, that the

"Adams" got away. Two attempts of the "Constellation" a month later

were frustrated.

The principal two British divisions, the action of which has so far

been considered, the one blockading the Chesapeake, the other watching

Decatur's squadron in New London, marked the extremities of what may

be considered the central section of the enemy's coastwise operations

upon the Atlantic. Although the commercial shipping of the United

States belonged largely to New England, much the greater part of the

exports came from the district thus closed to the world; and within it

also, after the sailing of the "President" and "Congress" from Boston,

and the capture of the "Chesapeake", lay in 1813 all the bigger

vessels of the navy, save the "Constitution".

In the conditions presented to the enemy, the sections of the

coast-line south of Virginia, and north of Cape Cod, differed in some

important respects from the central division, and from each other.

There was in them no extensive estuary wide open to the sea,

resembling Chesapeake and Delaware bays, and Long Island Sound,

accessible to vessels of all sizes; features which naturally

determined upon these points the chief effort of a maritime enemy,

enabling him readily to paralyze the whole system of intercourse

depending upon them, domestic as well as foreign. The southern waters

abounded indeed in internal coastwise communications; not consecutive

throughout, but continuous for long reaches along the shores of North

and South Carolina and Georgia. These, however, were narrow, and not

easily approached. Behind the sea islands, which inclose this

navigation, small craft can make their voyages sheltered from the

perils of the sea, and protected in great measure from attack other

than by boats or very light cruisers; to which, moreover, some local

knowledge was necessary, for crossing the bars, or threading the

channels connecting sound with sound. Into these inside basins empty

numerous navigable rivers, which promoted intercourse, and also

furnished lines of retreat from danger coming from the sea. Coupled

with these conditions was the fact that the United States had in these

quarters no naval establishment, and no naval vessels of force.

Defence was intrusted wholly to gunboats, with three or four armed

schooners of somewhat larger tonnage. American offensive operation,

confined here as elsewhere to commerce destroying, depended entirely

on privateers. Into these ports, where there were no public facilities

for repair, not even a national sloop of war entered until 1814 was

well advanced.

Prior to the war, one third of the domestic export of the United

States had issued from this southern section; and in the harassed year

1813 this ratio increased. The aggregate for the whole country was

reduced by one half from that of 1811, and amounted to little more

than one fourth of the prosperous times preceding Jefferson's embargo

of 1808, with its vexatious progeny of restrictive measures; but the

proportion of the South increased. The same was observable in the

Middle states, containing the great centres of New York, Philadelphia,

and Baltimore. There a ratio to the total, of a little under fifty per

cent, rose to something above that figure. The relative diminution,

corresponding to the increases just noted, fell upon New England, and

is interesting because of what it indicates. Before the war the export

of domestic produce from the eastern ports was twenty per cent of the

national total; in 1813 it fell to ten per cent. When the domestic

export is taken in conjunction with the re-exportation of foreign

products, the loss of New England is still more striking. From

twenty-five per cent of the whole national export, domestic and

foreign, she now fell to ten per cent of the diminished total. When it

is remembered that throughout 1813 the Eastern ports alone were open

to neutral ships, no commercial blockade of them having yet been

instituted, these results are the more noticeable.

The general explanation is that the industries of the United States at

that time divided into two principal classes,--agricultural and

maritime; the former of which supplied the material for commerce,

while the latter furnished transportation for whatever surplus of

production remained for export. Manufactures sufficed only for home

demands, being yet in a state of infancy; forced, in fact, upon an

unwilling New England by the policy of commercial restriction which

drove her ships off the sea. Domestic products for export therefore

meant almost wholly the yield of the fields, the forests, and the

fisheries. The latter belonged to New England, but they fell with the

war. Her soil did not supply grain enough to feed her people; and her

domestic exports, therefore, were reduced to shipments of wheat and

flour conveyed to her by inland transportation from the more fertile,

but blockaded, regions to the southward. Despite the great demand for

provisions in Halifax and the St. Lawrence region, and the facility

for egress by sea, through the absence of blockade, the slowness and

cost of land carriage brought forward an insufficient supply, and laid

a heavy charge upon the transaction; while the license system of the

British, modifying this condition of things to their own advantage, by

facilitating exports from the Chesapeake, certainly did operate, as

the President's message said, to regulate American commerce in

conformity with British interests.

The re-exportation of foreign produce had once played a very large

part in the foreign trade of New England. This item consisted chiefly

in West India commodities; and although, owing to several causes, it

fell off very much in the years between 1805 and 1811, it had remained

still considerable. It was, however, particularly obnoxious to British

interests, as then understood by British statesmen and people; and

since it depended entirely upon American ships,--for it was not to the

interest of a neutral to bring sugar and coffee to an American port

merely to carry it away again,--it disappeared entirely when the

outbreak of war rendered all American merchant vessels liable to

capture. In fact, as far as the United States was concerned, although

this re-exportation appeared among commercial returns, it was not an

interest of commerce, accurately so called, but of navigation, of

carrying trade. It had to do with ships, not with cargoes; its gain

was that of the wagoner. Still, the loss by the idleness of the ships,

due to the war, may be measured in terms of the cargoes. In 1805 New

England re-exported foreign products to the amount of $15,621,484; in

1811, $5,944,121; in 1813, no more than $302,781. It remains to add

that, as can be readily understood, all export, whether of foreign or

domestic produce, was chiefly by neutrals, which were not liable to

capture so long as there was no blockade proclaimed. From December 1

to 24, 1813, forty-four vessels cleared from Boston for abroad, of

which five only were Americans.[181]

Under the very reduced amount of their commercial movement, the

tonnage of the Middle and Southern states was more than adequate to

their local necessities; and they now had no need of the aid which in

conditions of normal prosperity they received from the Eastern

shipping. The latter, therefore, having lost its usual local

occupation, and also the office it had filled towards the other

sections of the Union, was either left idle or turned perforce to

privateering. September 7, 1813, there were in Boston harbor

ninety-one ships, two barks, one hundred and nine brigs, and

forty-three schooners; total, two hundred and forty-five, besides

coasters. The accumulation shows the lack of employment. December 15,

two hundred square-rigged vessels were laid up in Boston alone.[182]

Insurance on American vessels was stated to be fifty per cent.[183]

Whether tonnage to any large amount was transferred to a neutral flag,

as afterwards so much American shipping was during the Civil War, I

have not ascertained. It was roundly intimated that neutral flags were

used to cover the illicit intercourse with the enemy before mentioned;

but whether by regular transfer or by fraudulent papers does not

appear. An officer of the frigate "Congress," in her unprofitable

voyage just mentioned, says that after parting with the "President,"

she fell in with a few licensed Americans and a great number of

Spaniards and Portuguese.[184] The flags of these two nations, and of

Sweden, certainly abounded to an abnormal extent, and did much of the

traffic from America; but it seems unlikely that there was at that

particular epoch any national commerce, other than British, at once

large enough, and sufficiently deficient in shipping of its own, to

absorb any great number of Americans. In truth, the commerce of the

world had lost pretty much all its American component, because this,

through a variety of causes, had come to consist chiefly of domestic

agricultural products, which were thrown back upon the nation's hands,

and required no carriers; the enemy having closed the gates against

them, except so far as suited his own purposes. The disappearance of

American merchant ships from the high seas corresponded to the void

occasioned by the blockade of American staples of commerce. The only

serious abatement from this generalization arises from the British

system of licenses, permitting the egress of certain articles useful

to themselves.

The results from the conditions above analyzed are reflected in the

returns of commerce, in the movements of American coasters, and in the

consequent dispositions of the enemy. In the Treasury year ending

September 30, 1813, the value of the total exports from the Eastern

states was $3,049,022; from the Middle section, $17,513,930; from the

South, $7,293,043. Virginia is here reckoned with the Middle, because

her exports found their way out by the Chesapeake; and this

appreciation is commercial and military in character, not political or

social. While this was the state of foreign trade under war

conditions, the effect of local circumstances upon coasting is also to

be noticed. The Middle section, characterized by the great estuaries,

and by the description of its products,--grain primarily, and secondly

tobacco,--was relatively self-sufficing and compact. Its growth of

food, as has been seen, was far in excess of its wants, and the

distance by land between the extreme centres of distribution, from

tide-water to tide-water, was comparatively short. From New York to

Baltimore by road is but four fifths as far as from New York to

Boston; and at New York and Baltimore, as at Boston, water

communication was again reached for the great lines of distribution

from either centre. In fact, traffic from New York southward needed to

go no farther than Elk River, forty miles short of Baltimore, to be in

touch with the whole Chesapeake system. Philadelphia lies half-way

between New York and Baltimore, approximately a hundred miles from

each.

The extremes of the Middle section of the country were thus

comparatively independent of coastwise traffic for mutual intercourse,

and the character of their coasts co-operated to reduce the

disposition to employ coasters in war. From the Chesapeake to Sandy

Hook the shore-line sweeps out to sea, is safely approachable by

hostile navigators, and has for refuge no harbors of consequence,

except the Delaware. The local needs of the little communities along

the beaches might foster a creeping stream of very small craft, for

local supply; but as a highway, for intercourse on a large scale, the

sea here was too exposed for use, when taken in connection with the

facility for transport by land, which was not only short but with

comparatively good roads.

In war, as in other troublous times, prices are subject to complicated

causes of fluctuation, not always separable. Two great staples, flour

and sugar, however, may be taken to indicate with some certainty the

effects of impeded water transport. From a table of prices current, of

August, 1813, it appears that at Baltimore, in the centre of the wheat

export, flour was $6.00 per barrel; in Philadelphia, $7.50; in New

York, $8.50; in Boston, $11.87. At Richmond, equally well placed with

Baltimore as regarded supplies, but with inferior communications for

disposing of its surplus, the price was $4.00. Removing from the grain

centre in the other direction, flour at Charleston is reported at

$8.00--about the same as New York; at Wilmington, North Carolina,

$10.25. Not impossibly, river transportation had in these last some

cheapening effect, not readily ascertainable now. In sugar, the scale

is seen to ascend in an inverse direction. At Boston, unblockaded, it

is quoted at $18.75 the hundredweight, itself not a low rate; at New

York, blockaded, $21.50; at Philadelphia, with a longer journey,

$22.50; at Baltimore, $26.50; at Savannah, $20. In the last named

place, nearness to the Florida line, with the inland navigation,

favored smuggling and safe transportation. The price at New Orleans, a

sugar-producing district, $9.00, affords a standard by which to

measure the cost of carriage at that time. Flour in the same city, on

February 1, 1813, was $25 the barrel.

In both articles the jump between Boston and New York suggests

forcibly the harassment of the coasting trade. It manifests either

diminution of supply, or the effect of more expensive conveyance by

land; possibly both. The case of the southern seaboard cities was

similar to that of Boston; for it will not be overlooked that, as the

more important food products came from the middle of the country, they

would be equally available for each extreme. The South was the more

remote, but this was compensated in some degree by better internal

water communications; and its demand also was less, for the white

population was smaller and less wealthy than that of New England. The

local product, rice, also went far to supply deficiencies in other

grains. In the matter of manufactured goods, however, the disadvantage

of the South was greater. These had to find their way there from the

farther extreme of the land; for the development of manufactures had

been much the most marked in the east. It has before been quoted that

some wagons loaded with dry goods were forty-six days in accomplishing

the journey from Philadelphia to Georgetown, South Carolina, in May of

this year. Some relief in these articles reached the South by

smuggling across the Florida line, and the Spanish waters opposite St.

Mary's were at this time thronged with merchant shipping to an

unprecedented extent; for although smuggling was continual, in peace

as in war, across a river frontier of a hundred miles, the stringent

demand consequent upon the interruption of coastwise traffic provoked

an increased supply. "The trade to Amelia,"--the northernmost of the

Spanish sea-islands,--reported the United States naval officer at St.

Mary's towards the end of the war, "is immense. Upwards of fifty

square-rigged vessels are now in that port under Swedish, Russian,

and Spanish colors, two thirds of which are considered British

property."[185] It was the old story of the Continental and License

systems of the Napoleonic struggle, re-enacted in America; and, as

always, the inhabitants on both sides the line co-operated heartily in

beating the law.

The two great food staples chosen sufficiently indicate general

conditions as regards communications from centre to centre. Upon this

supervened the more extensive and intricate problem of distribution

from the centres. This more especially imparted to the Eastern and

Southern coasts the particular characteristics of coasting trade and

coast warfare, in which they differ from the Middle states. These form

the burden of the letters from the naval captains commanding the

stations at Charleston, Savannah, and Portsmouth, New Hampshire; nor

is it without significance that Bainbridge at Boston, not a way port,

but a centre, displayed noticeably less anxiety than the others about

this question, which less touched his own command. Captain Hull, now

commanding the Portsmouth Yard, writes, June 14, 1813, that light

cruisers like the "Siren," lately arrived at Boston, and the

"Enterprise," then with him, can be very useful by driving away the

enemy's small vessels and privateers which have been molesting the

coasting trade. He purposes to order them eastward, along the Maine

coast, to collect coasters in convoy and protect their long-shore

voyages, after the British fashion on the high seas. "The coasting

trade here," he adds, "is immense. Not less than fifty sail last night

anchored in this harbor, bound to Boston and other points south. The

'Nautilus' [a captured United States brig] has been seen from this

harbor every week for some time past, and several other enemy's

vessels are on the coast every few days." An American privateer has

just come in, bringing with her as a prize one of her own class,

called the "Liverpool Packet," which "within six months has taken from

us property to an immense amount."[186]

Ten days later Hull's prospects have darkened. There has appeared off

Portsmouth a blockading division; a frigate, a sloop, and two brigs.

"When our two vessels were first ordered to this station, I believed

they would be very useful in protecting the coasting trade; but the

enemy's cruisers are now so much stronger that we can hardly promise

security to the trade, if we undertake to convoy it." On the contrary,

the brigs themselves would be greatly hazarded, and resistance to

attack, if supported by the neighborhood, may entail destruction upon

ports where they have taken refuge; a thought possibly suggested by

Cockburn's action at Havre de Grace and Frenchtown. He therefore now

proposes that they should run the blockade and cruise at sea. This

course was eventually adopted; but for the moment the Secretary wrote

that, while he perceived the propriety of Hull's remarks, "the call

for protection on that coast has been very loud, and having sent those

vessels for that special purpose, I do not now incline immediately to

remove them."[187] It was necessary to bend to a popular clamor, which

in this case did not, as it very frequently does, make unreasonable

demands and contravene all considerations of military wisdom. A month

later Hull reports the blockade so strict that it is impossible to get

out by day. The commander of the "Enterprise," Johnston Blakely,

expresses astonishment that the enemy should employ so large a force

to blockade so small a vessel.[188] It was, however, no matter for

surprise, but purely a question of business. The possibilities of

injury by the "Enterprise" must be blasted at any cost, and Blakely

himself a year later, in the "Wasp," was to illustrate forcibly what

one smart ship can effect in the destruction of hostile commerce and

hostile cruisers.

Blakely's letter was dated July 31. The "Enterprise" had not long to

wait for her opportunity, but it did not fall to his lot to utilize

it. Being promoted the following month, he was relieved in command by

Lieutenant William Burrows. This officer had been absent in China, in

mercantile employment, when the war broke out, and, returning, was

captured at sea. Exchanged in June, 1813, he was ordered to the

"Enterprise," in which he saw his only service in the war,--a brief

month. She left Portsmouth September 1, on a coasting cruise, and on

the morning of the 5th, being then off Monhegan Island, on the coast

of Maine, sighted a vessel of war, which proved to be the British brig

"Boxer," Commander Samuel Blyth.

The antagonists in the approaching combat were nearly of equal force,

the respective armaments being, "Enterprise," fourteen 18-pounder

carronades, and two long 9-pounders, the "Boxer," twelve 18-pounder

carronades and two long sixes. The action began side by side, at half

pistol-shot, the "Enterprise" to the right and to windward (position

1). After fifteen minutes the latter ranged ahead (2). As she did so,

one of her 9-pounders, which by the forethought of Captain Burrows had

been shifted from its place in the bow to the stern,[189] was used

with effect to rake her opponent. She then rounded-to on the starboard

tack, on the port-bow of the enemy,--ahead but well to the left

(3),--in position to rake with her carronades; and, setting the

foresail, sailed slowly across from left to right. In five minutes the

"Boxer's" maintopmast and foretopsailyard fell. This left the

"Enterprise" the mastery of the situation, which she continued to hold

until ten minutes later, when the enemy's fire ceased. Her colors

could not be hauled down, Blyth having nailed them to the mast. He

himself had been killed at the first broadside, and almost at the same

instant Burrows too fell, mortally wounded.

[Illustration: Diagram of the Enterprise vs. Boxer battle]

The "Boxer" belonged to a class of vessel, the gun brigs, which

Marryat through one of his characters styled "bathing machines," only

not built, as the legitimate article, to go up, but to go down.

Another,--the immortal Boatswain Chucks,--proclaimed that they would

"certainly d--n their inventor to all eternity;" adding

characteristically, that "their low common names, 'Pincher,'

'Thrasher,' 'Boxer,' 'Badger,' and all that sort, are quite good

enough for them." In the United States service the "Enterprise," which

had been altered from a schooner to a brig, was considered a

singularly dull sailer. As determined by American measurements, taken

four days after the action, the size of the two was the same within

twenty tons; the "Boxer" a little the larger. The superiority of the

"Enterprise" in broadside force, was eight guns to seven; or, stated

in weight of projectiles, one hundred and thirty-five pounds to one

hundred and fourteen. This disparity, though real, was in no sense

decisive, and the execution done by each bore no comparison to the

respective armaments. The hull of the "Boxer" was pierced on the

starboard side by twelve 18-pound shot, nearly two for each of the

"Enterprise's" carronades. The 9-pounder had done even better, scoring

five hits. On her port side had entered six of 18 pounds, and four of

9 pounds. By the official report of an inspection, made upon her

arrival in Portland, it appears that her upper works and sides forward

were torn to pieces.[190] In her mainmast alone were three 18-pound

shot.[191] As a set-off to this principal damage received, she had to

show only one 18-pound shot in the hull of the "Enterprise," one in

the foremast, and one in the mainmast.[192]

From these returns, the American loss in killed and wounded, twelve,

must have been largely by grapeshot or musketry. The British had

twenty-one men hurt. It has been said that this difference in loss is

nearly proportionate to the difference in force. This is obviously

inexact; for the "Enterprise" was superior in gun power by twelve per

cent, while the "Boxer's" loss was greater by seventy-five per cent.

Moreover, if the statement of crews be accurate, that the "Enterprise"

had one hundred and twenty and the "Boxer" only sixty-six,[193] it is

clear that the latter had double the human target, and scored little

more than half the hits. The contest, in brief, was first an artillery

duel, side to side, followed by a raking position obtained by the

American. It therefore reproduced in leading features, although on a

minute scale, the affair between the "Chesapeake" and "Shannon"; and

the exultation of the American populace at this rehabilitation of the

credit of their navy, though exaggerated in impression, was in

principle sound. The British Court Martial found that the defeat was

"to be attributed to a superiority of the enemy's force, principally

in the number of men, as well as to a greater degree of skill in the

direction of her fire, and the destructive effects of her first

broadside."[194] This admission as to the enemy's gunnery is

substantially identical with the claim made for that of the

"Shannon,"--notably as to the first broadside. As to the greater

numbers, one hundred and twenty is certainly almost twice sixty-six,

and the circumstance should be weighed; but in an engagement confined

to the guns, and between 18-pounder carronade batteries, it is of less

consequence than at first glance appears. A cruiser of those days

expected to be ready to fight with many men away in prizes. Had it

come to boarding, or had the "Boxer's" gunnery been good, disabling

her opponent's men, the numbers would have become of consideration. As

it was, they told for something, but not for very much.

If national credit were at issue in every single-ship action, the

balance of the "Chesapeake" and "Shannon," "Enterprise" and "Boxer,"

would incline rather to the American side; for the "Boxer" was not

just out of port with new commander, officers, and crew, but had been

in commission six months, had in that time crossed the ocean, and been

employed along the coast. The credit and discredit in both cases is

personal, not national. It was the sadder in Blyth's case because he

was an officer of distinguished courage and activity, who had begun

his fighting career at the age of eleven, when he was on board a

heavily battered ship in Lord Howe's battle of June 1, 1794. At

thirty, with little influence, and at a period when promotion had

become comparatively sluggish, he had fairly fought his way to the

modest preferment in which he died. Under the restricted opportunities

of the United States Navy, Burrows had seen service, and his qualities

received recognition, in the hostilities with Tripoli. The unusual

circumstance of both captains falling, and so young,--Burrows was but

twenty-eight,--imparted to this tiny combat an unusual pathos, which

was somewhat heightened by the fact that Blyth himself had acted as

pall-bearer when Lawrence, three months before, was buried with

military honors at Halifax. In Portland, Maine, the two young

commanders were borne to their graves together, in a common funeral,

with all the observance possible in a small coast town; business being

everywhere suspended, and the customary tokens of mourning displayed

upon buildings and shipping.

After this engagement, as the season progressed, coastwise operations

in this quarter became increasingly hazardous for both parties. On

October 22, Hull wrote that neither the "Enterprise" nor the

"Rattlesnake" could cruise much longer. The enemy still maintained his

grip, in virtue of greater size and numbers. Ten days later comes the

report of a convoy, with one of the brigs, driven into port by a

frigate; that the enemy appear almost every day, and never without a

force superior to that of both his brigs, which he fears to trust out

overnight, lest they find themselves at morning under the guns of an

opponent of weightier battery. The long nights and stormy seas of

winter, however, soon afforded to coasters a more secure protection

than friendly guns, and Hull's letters intermit until April 6, 1814,

when he announces that the enemy has made his appearance in great

force; he presumes for the summer. Besides the danger and interruption

of the coasting trade, Hull was increasingly anxious as to the safety

of Portsmouth itself. By a recent act of Congress four seventy-fours

had been ordered to be built, and one of them was now in construction

there under his supervision. Despite the navigational difficulties of

entering the port, which none was more capable of appreciating than

he, he regarded the defences as so inadequate that it would be

perfectly possible to destroy her on the stocks. "There is nothing,"

he said, "to prevent a very small force from entering the harbor." At

the same moment Decatur was similarly concerned for the squadron at

New London, and we have seen the fears of Stewart for Norfolk. So

marked was Hull's apprehension in this respect, that he sent the

frigate "Congress" four miles up the river, where she remained to the

end of the war; her crew being transferred to Lake Ontario. New York,

the greater wealth of which increased both her danger and her capacity

for self-protection, was looking to her own fortifications, as well as

manning, provisioning, and paying the crews of the gunboats that

patrolled her waters, on the side of the sea and of the Sound.

The exposure of the coasting trade from Boston Bay eastward was

increased by the absence of interior coastwise channels, until the

chain of islands about and beyond the Penobscot was reached. On the

other hand, the character of the shore, bold, with off-lying rocks and

many small harbors, conferred a distinct advantage upon those having

local knowledge, as the coasting seamen had. On such a route the

points of danger are capes and headlands, particularly if their

projection is great, such as the promontory between Portsmouth and

Boston, of which Cape Ann is a conspicuous landmark. There the coaster

has to go farthest from his refuge, and the deep-sea cruiser can

approach with least risk. In a proper scheme of coast defence

batteries are mounted on such positions. This, it is needless to say,

in view of the condition of the port fortifications, had not been done

in the United States. Barring this, the whole situation of the coast,

of trade, and of blockade, was one with which British naval officers

had then been familiar for twenty years, through their employment upon

the French and Spanish coasts, as well Mediterranean as Atlantic, and

in many other parts of the world. To hover near the land, intercepting

and fighting by day, manning boats and cutting out by night,

harassing, driving on shore, destroying the sinews of war by breaking

down communications, was to them simply an old experience to be

applied under new and rather easier circumstances.

Of these operations frequent instances are given in contemporary

journals and letters; but less account has been taken of the effects,

as running through household and social economics, touching purse and

comfort. These are traceable in commercial statistics. At the time

they must have been severely felt, bringing the sense of the war

vividly home to the community. The stringency of the British action is

betrayed, however, by casual notices. The captain of a schooner burned

by the British frigate "Nymphe" is told by her commander that he had

orders to destroy every vessel large enough to carry two men. "A brisk

business is now carrying on all along our coast between British

cruisers and our coasting vessels, in ready money. Friday last, three

masters went into Gloucester to procure money to carry to a British

frigate to ransom their vessels. Thursday, a Marblehead schooner was

ransomed by the "Nymphe" for $400. Saturday, she took off Cape Ann

three coasters and six fishing boats, and the masters were sent on

shore for money to ransom them at $200 each." There was room for the

wail of a federalist paper: "Our coasts unnavigable to ourselves,

though free to the enemy and the money-making neutral; our harbors

blockaded; our shipping destroyed or rotting at the docks; silence and

stillness in our cities; the grass growing upon the public

wharves."[195] In the district of Maine, "the long stagnation of

foreign, and embarrassment of domestic trade, have extended the sad

effects from the seaboard through the interior, where the scarcity of

money is severely felt. There is not enough to pay the taxes."[196]

South of Chesapeake Bay the coast is not bold and rocky, like that

north of Cape Cod, but in its low elevation and gradual soundings

resembles rather those of New Jersey and Delaware. It has certain more

pronounced features in the extensive navigable sounds and channels,

which lie behind the islands and sandbars skirting the shores. The

North Carolina system of internal water communications, Pamlico Sound

and its extensions, stood by itself. To reach that to the southward,

it was necessary to make a considerable sea run, round the far

projecting Cape Fear, exposed to capture outside; but from Charleston

to the St. Mary's River, which then formed the Florida boundary for a

hundred miles of its length, the inside passages of South Carolina and

Georgia were continuous, though in many places difficult, and in

others open to attack from the sea. Between St. Mary's and Savannah,

for example, there were seven inlets, and Captain Campbell, the naval

officer in charge of that district, reported that three of these were

practicable for frigates;[197] but this statement, while literally

accurate, conveys an exaggerated impression, for no sailing frigate

would be likely to cross a difficult bar for a single offensive

operation, merely to find herself confronted with conditions

forbidding further movement.

The great menace to the inside traffic consisted in the facility with

which cruisers outside could pass from entrance to entrance,

contrasted with the intricacies within impeding similar action by the

defence. If a bevy of unprotected coasters were discerned by an

enemy's lookouts, the ship could run down abreast, send in her boats,

capture or destroy, before the gunboats, if equidistant at the

beginning, could overcome the obstacles due to rise and fall of tide,

or narrowness of passage, and arrive to the rescue.[198] A suggested

remedy was to replace the gunboats by rowing barges, similar to, but

more powerful than, those used by the enemy in his attacks. The

insuperable trouble here proved to be that men fit for such work, fit

to contend with the seamen of the enemy, were unwilling to abandon the

sea, with its hopes of prize money, or to submit to the exposure and

discomfort of the life. "The crews of the gunboats," wrote Captain

Campbell, "consist of all nations except Turks, Greeks, and Jews." On

one occasion the ship's company of an American privateer, which had

been destroyed after a desperate and celebrated resistance to attack

by British armed boats, arrived at St. Mary's. Of one hundred and

nineteen American seamen, only four could be prevailed upon to enter

the district naval force.[199] This was partly due to the

embarrassment of the national finances. "The want of funds to pay off

discharged men," wrote the naval captain at Charleston, "has given

such a character to the navy as to stop recruiting."[200] "Men could

be had," reported his colleague at St. Mary's, now transferred to

Savannah, "were it not for the Treasury notes, which cannot be passed

at less than five per cent discount. Men will not ship without cash.

There are upwards of a hundred seamen in port, but they refuse to

enter, even though we offer to ship for a month only."[201]

During the American Civil War, fifty years after the time of which we

are speaking, this internal communication was effectually intercepted

by stationing inside steamers of adequate force; but that recourse,

while not absolutely impracticable for small sailing cruisers,

involved a risk disproportionate to the gain. Through traffic could

have been broken up by keeping a frigate in any one of the three

sounds, entrance to which was practicable for vessels of that class.

In view of the amount of trade passing back and forth, which Campbell

stated to be in one period of four months as much as eight million

dollars, it is surprising that this obvious expedient was not adopted

by the enemy. That they appreciated the situation is shown by the

intention, announced in 1813, of seizing one of the islands; which was

effected in January, 1815, by the occupation of Cumberland and St.

Simons'. As it was, up to that late period the routine methods of

their European experience prevailed, with the result that their

coastwise operations in the south differed little from those in the

extreme north. Smaller vessels occasionally, armed boats frequently,

pushed inside the inlets, seizing coasters, and at times even

attacking the gunboats. While the positive loss thus inflicted was

considerable, it will readily be understood that it was much exceeded

by the negative effect, in deterring from movement, and reducing

navigation to the limits of barest necessity.

In these operations the ships of war were seconded by privateers from

the West Indies, which hovered round this coast, as the Halifax vessels

did round that of New England, seeking such scraps of prize money as

might be left over from the ruin of American commerce and the

immunities of the licensed traders. The United States officers at

Charleston and Savannah were at their wits' ends to provide security

with their scanty means,--more scanty even in men than in vessels; and

when there came upon them the additional duty of enforcing the embargo

of December, 1813, in the many quarters, and against the various

subterfuges, by which evasion would be attempted, the task was

manifestly impossible. "This is the most convenient part of the world

for illicit trade that I have ever seen," wrote Campbell. From a return

made this summer by the Secretary of the Navy to Congress,[202] it is

shown that one brig of eighteen guns, which was not a cruiser, but a

station ship at Savannah, eleven gunboats, three other schooners, and

four barges, were apportioned to the stretch of coast from Georgetown

to St. Mary's,--over two hundred miles. With the fettered movement of

the gunboats before mentioned, contrasted with the outside cruisers, it

was impossible to meet conditions by distributing this force, "for the

protection of the several inlets," as had at first been directed by the

Navy Department. The only defensive recourse approximately satisfactory

was that of the deep-sea merchant service of Great Britain, proposed

also by Hull at the northward, to assemble vessels in convoys, and to

accompany them throughout a voyage. "I have deemed it expedient," wrote

Campbell from St. Mary's, "to order the gun vessels to sail in company,

not less than four in number, and have ordered convoy to the inland

trade at stated periods, by which means vessels may be protected, and

am sorry to say this is all that can be effected in our present

situation."[203] In this way a fair degree of immunity was attained.

Rubs were met with occasionally, and heavy losses were reported from

time to time. There was a certain amount of fighting and scuffling, in

which advantage was now on one side, now on the other; but upon the

whole it would appear that the novelty of the conditions and ignorance

of the ground rather imposed upon the imagination of the enemy, and

that their operations against this inside trade were at once less

active and less successful than under the more familiar features

presented by the coasts of Maine and Massachusetts.

Whatever more or less of success or injury attended the coastwise

trade in the several localities, the point to be observed is that the

enemy's operations effectually separated the different sections of the

country from one another, so far as this means of intercourse was

concerned; thereby striking a deadly blow at the mutual support which

might be given by communities differing so markedly in resources,

aptitudes, and industries. The remark before made upon the effect of

headlands, on the minor scale of a particular shore-line, applied with

special force to one so extensive as that of the United States

Atlantic coast in 1813. Cape Cod to the north and Cape Fear to the

south were conspicuous examples of such projection. Combined with the

relatively shelterless and harborless central stretch, intervening

between them, from the Chesapeake to Sandy Hook, they constituted

insuperable obstacles to sustained intercommunication by water. The

presence of the enemy in great numbers before, around, and within the

central section, emphasized the military weakness of position which

nature herself had there imposed. To get by sea from one end of the

country to the other it was necessary to break the blockade in

starting, to take a wide sweep out to sea, and again to break it at

the desired point of entrance. This, however, is not coasting.

The effect which this coast pressure produced upon the welfare of the

several sections is indicated here and there by official utterances.

The war party naturally inclined to minimize unfavorable results, and

their opponents in some measure to exaggerate them; but of the general

tendency there can be no serious doubt. Mr. Pearson, an opposition

member of the House from North Carolina, speaking February 16, 1814,

when the record of 1813 was made up, and the short-lived embargo of

December was yet in force, said: "Blocked up as we are by the enemy's

squadron upon our coast, corked up by our still more unmerciful

embargo and non-importation laws, calculated as it were to fill up the

little chasm in the ills which the enemy alone could not inflict; the

entire coasting trade destroyed, and even the little pittance of

intercourse from one port to the other in the same state destroyed [by

the embargo], the planters of the Southern and Middle states, finding

no market at home for their products, are driven to the alternative of

wagoning them hundreds of miles, in search of a precarious market in

the Northern and Eastern states, or permitting them to rot on their

hands. Many articles which are, or by habit have become, necessary for

comfort, are obtained at extravagant prices from other parts of the

Union. The balance of trade, if trade it may be called, from these and

other causes being so entirely against the Southern and Middle states,

the whole of our specie is rapidly travelling to the North and East.

Our bank paper is thrown back upon the institutions from which it

issued; and as the war expenditures in the Southern and Middle states,

where the loans have been principally obtained, are proportionately

inconsiderable, the bills of these banks are daily returning, and

their vaults drained of specie, to be locked up in Eastern and Western

states, never to return but with the return of peace and

prosperity."[204]

The isolation of North Carolina was extreme, with Cape Fear to the

south and the occupied Chesapeake north of her. The Governor of the

central state of Pennsylvania, evidently in entire political sympathy

with the national Administration, in his message to the legislature at

the same period,[205] is able to congratulate the people on the

gratifying state of the commonwealth; a full treasury, abundant yield

of agriculture, and the progress of manufacturing development, which,

"however we may deprecate and deplore the calamities of protracted

war, console us with the prospect of permanent and extensive

establishments equal to our wants, and such as will insure the real

and practical independence of our country." But he adds: "At no period

of our history has the immense importance of internal navigation been

so strikingly exemplified as since the commencement of hostilities.

The transportation of produce, and the intercourse between citizens of

the different states, which knit more strongly the bonds of social and

political union, are greatly retarded, and, through many of their

accustomed channels, entirely interrupted by the water craft of the

enemy, sinking, burning, and otherwise destroying, the property which

it cannot appropriate to its own use." He looks forward to a renewal

of similar misfortune in the following year, an anticipation more than

fulfilled. The officials of other states, according to their political

complexion, either lamented the sufferings of the war and its supposed

injustice, or comforted themselves and their hearers by reflecting

upon the internal fruitfulness of the country, and its increasing

self-sufficingness. The people were being equipped for independence of

the foreigner by the progress of manufactures, and by habits of

economy and self-denial, enforced by deprivation arising from the

suppression of the coasting trade and the rigors of the commercial

blockade.

The effect of the latter, which by the spring of 1814 had been in

force nearly a twelvemonth over the entire coast south of Narragansett

Bay, can be more directly estimated and concisely stated, in terms of

money, than can the interruption of the coasting trade; for the

statistics of export and import, contrasted with those of years of

peace, convey it directly. It has already been stated that the exports

for the year ending September 30, 1814, during which the operation of

the blockade was most universal and continuous, fell to $7,000,000, as

compared with $25,000,000 in 1813, and $45,000,000 in 1811, a year of

peace though of restricted intercourse. Such figures speak distinctly

as well as forcibly; it being necessary, however, to full appreciation

of the difference between 1813 and 1814, to remember that during the

first half of the former official period--from October 1, 1812, to

April 1, 1813,--there had been no commercial blockade beyond the

Chesapeake and Delaware; and that, even after it had been instituted,

the British license system operated to the end of September to qualify

its effects.

Here and there interesting particulars may be gleaned, which serve to

illustrate these effects, and to give to the picture that precision of

outline which heightens impression. "I believe," wrote a painstaking

Baltimore editor in December, 1814, "that there has not been an

arrival in Baltimore from a foreign port for a twelvemonth";[206] yet

the city in 1811 had had a registered tonnage of 88,398, and now

boasted that of the scanty national commerce still maintained, through

less secluded ports, at least one half was carried on by its

celebrated schooners,[207] the speed and handiness of which, combined

with a size that intrusted not too many eggs to one basket, imparted

special facilities for escaping pursuit and minimizing loss. A

representative from Maryland at about this time presented in the House

a memorial from Baltimore merchants, stating that "in consequence of

the strict blockade of our bays and rivers the private-armed service

is much discouraged," and submitting the expediency "of offering a

bounty for the destruction of enemy's vessels;" a suggestion the very

extravagance of which indicates more than words the extent of the

depression felt. The price of salt in Baltimore, in November, 1814,

was five dollars the bushel. In Charleston it was the same, while just

across the Spanish border, at Amelia Island, thronged with foreign

merchant ships, it was selling at seventy cents.[208]

Such a contrast, which must necessarily be reproduced in other

articles not indigenous, accounts at once for the smuggling deplored

by Captain Campbell, and at the same time testifies both to the

efficacy of the blockade and to the pressure exercised upon the

inland navigation by the outside British national cruisers and

privateers. This one instance, affecting one of the prime necessaries

of life, certifies to the stringent exclusion from the sea of the

coast on which Charleston was the chief seaport. Captain Dent,

commanding this naval district, alludes to the constant presence of

blockaders, and occasionally to vessels taken outside by them, chased

ashore, or intercepted in various inlets; narrating particularly the

singular incident that, despite his remonstrances, a flag of truce was

sent on board the enemy by local authorities to negotiate a purchase

of goods thus captured.[209] This unmilitary proceeding, which evinces

the necessities of the neighborhood, was of course immediately stopped

by the Government.

A somewhat singular incidental circumstance, supporting the other

inferences, is found in the spasmodic elevation of the North Carolina

coast into momentary commercial consequence as a place of entry and

deposit; not indeed to a very great extent, but ameliorating to a

slight degree the deprivation of the regions lying north and

south,--the neighborhood of Charleston on the one hand, of Richmond

and Baltimore on the other. "The waters of North Carolina, from

Wilmington to Ocracoke, though not favorable to commerce in time of

peace, by reason of their shallowness and the danger of the coast,

became important and useful in time of war, and a very considerable

trade was prosecuted from and into those waters during the late war,

and a coasting trade as far as Charleston, attended with less risk

than many would imagine. A vessel may prosecute a voyage from

Elizabeth City [near the Virginia line] to Charleston without being at

sea more than a few hours at any one time."[210] Some tables of

arrivals show a comparative immunity for vessels entering here from

abroad; due doubtless to the unquestioned dangers of the coast, which

conspired with the necessarily limited extent of the traffic to keep

the enemy at a distance. It was not by them wholly overlooked. In

July, 1813, Admiral Cockburn anchored with a division off Ocracoke

bar, sent in his boats, and captured a privateer and letter-of-marque

which had there sought a refuge denied to them by the blockade

elsewhere. The towns of Beaufort and Portsmouth were occupied for some

hours. The United States naval officer at Charleston found it

necessary also to extend the alongshore cruises of his schooners as

far as Cape Fear, for the protection of this trade on its way to his

district.

The attention aroused to the development of internal navigation also

bears witness to the pressure of the blockade. "It is my opinion,"

said the Governor of Pennsylvania, "that less than one half the

treasure expended by the United States for the protection of foreign

commerce, if combined with state and individual wealth, would have

perfected an inland water communication from Maine to Georgia." It was

argued by others that the extra money spent for land transportation of

goods, while the coasting trade was suspended, would have effected a

complete tide-water inland navigation such as here suggested; and

there was cited a declaration of Robert Fulton, who died during the

war, that within twenty-one months as great a sum had been laid out in

wagon hire as would have effected this object. Whatever the accuracy

of these estimates, their silent witness to the influence of the

blockade upon commerce, external and coastwise, quite overbears

President Madison's perfunctory denials of its effectiveness, based

upon the successful evasions which more or less attend all such

operations.

Perhaps, however, the most signal proof of the pressure exerted is to

be seen in the rebound, the instant it was removed; in the effect upon

prices, and upon the movements of shipping. Taken in connection with the

other evidence, direct and circumstantial, so far cited, what can

testify more forcibly to the strangulation of the coasting trade than

the fact that in the month of March, 1815,--news of the peace having

been received February 11,--there sailed from Boston one hundred and

forty-four vessels, more than half of them square-rigged; and that of

the whole all but twenty-six were for United States ports. Within three

weeks of April there arrived at Charleston, exclusive of coasters, one

hundred and fifty-eight vessels; at Savannah, in the quarter ending June

30, two hundred and three. Something of this outburst of activity, in

which neutrals of many nations shared, was due, as Mr. Clay said, to the

suddenness with which commerce revived after momentary suspension. "The

bow had been unstrung that it might acquire fresh vigor and new

elasticity"; and the stored-up products of the country, so long barred

within, imparted a peculiar nervous haste to the renewal of intercourse.

The absolute numbers quoted do not give as vivid impression of

conditions at differing times as do some comparisons, easily made. In

the year 1813, as shown by the returns of the United States Treasury,

out of 674,853 tons of registered--sea-going--shipping, only

233,439--one third--paid the duties exacted upon each several voyage,

and of these many doubtless sailed under British license.[211] In 1814

the total tonnage, 674,632, shows that ship-building had practically

ceased; and of this amount one twelfth only, 58,756 tons, paid dues for

going out.[212] In 1816, when peace conditions were fully established,

though less than two years had passed, the total tonnage had increased

to 800,760; duties, being paid each voyage, were collected on

865,219.[213] Thus the foreign voyages that year exceeded the total

shipping of the country, and by an amount greater than all the American

tonnage that put to sea in 1814.

The movement of coasting vessels, technically called "enrolled," is

not so clearly indicated by the returns, because all the trips of each

were covered by one license annually renewed. A licensed coaster might

make several voyages, or she might make none. In 1813 the figures show

that, of 471,109 enrolled tonnage, 252,440 obtained licenses. In 1814

there is, as in the registered shipping, a diminution of the total to

466,159, of which a still smaller proportion, 189,662, took out the

annual license. In 1816 the enrolment was 522,165, the licensing

414,594. In the fishing craft, a class by themselves, the employment

rose from 16,453 in 1814 to 48,147 in 1816;[214] the difference

doubtless being attributable chiefly to the reopening of the cod

fishing on the banks of Newfoundland, necessarily closed to the

American flag by the maritime hostilities.

The influence of the peace upon prices is likewise a matter too

interesting to a correct appreciation of effects to be wholly passed

over. In considering it, the quotations before the receipt of the news

doubtless represent conditions more correctly than do the immediate

changes. The official tidings of peace reached New York, February 11,

1815. The Evening Post, in its number of February 14, says, "We give

to-day one of the effects of the prospect of peace, even before

ratification. Our markets of every kind experienced a sudden, and to

many a shocking, change. Sugar, for instance, fell from $26 per

hundredweight to $12.50. Tea, which sold on Saturday at $2.25, on

Monday was purchased at a $1.00. Specie, which had got up to the

enormous rate of 22 per cent premium, dropped down to 2. The article

of tin, in particular, fell from the height of $80 the box to $25. Six

per cents rose from 76 to 88; ten per cents and Treasury notes from 92

to 98. Bank stock generally rose from five to ten per cent." In

Philadelphia, flour which sold at $7.50 the barrel on Saturday had

risen to $10 on Monday; a testimony that not only foreign export but

home supply to the eastward was to be renewed. The fall in foreign

products, due to freedom of import, was naturally accompanied by a

rise in domestic produce, to which an open outlet with proportionate

increase of demand was now afforded. In Philadelphia the exchange on

Boston reflected these conditions; falling from twenty-five per cent

to thirteen.

It may then be concluded that there is little exaggeration in the

words used by "a distinguished naval officer" of the day, in a letter

contributed to Niles' Register, in its issue of June 17, 1815. "No

sooner had the enemy blockaded our harbors, and extended his line of

cruisers from Maine to Georgia, than both foreign and domestic

commerce came at once to be reduced to a deplorable state of

stagnation; producing in its consequences the utter ruin of many

respectable merchants, as well as of a great multitude besides,

connected with them in their mercantile pursuits. But these were not

the only consequences. The regular supply of foreign commodities being

thereby cut off, many articles, now become necessaries of life, were

raised to an exorbitant price, and bore much upon the finances of the

citizen, whose family could not comfortably exist without them. Add to

this, as most of the money loaned to the Government for the purposes

of the war came from the pockets of merchants, they were rendered

incapable of continuing these disbursements in consequence of this

interruption to their trade; whence the cause of that impending

bankruptcy with which the Government was at one time threatened.... At

a critical period of the war [April, 1814] Congress found it

necessary to remove all restrictions upon commerce, both foreign and

domestic. It is a lamentable fact, however, that the adventurous

merchant found no alleviation from these indulgences, his vessels

being uniformly prevented by a strong blockading force, not only from

going out, but from coming into port, at the most imminent risk of

capture. The risk did not stop here; for the islands and ports most

frequented by American vessels being known to the enemy, he was

enabled from his abundance of means to intercept them there also. The

coasting trade, that most valuable appendage to an extensive

mercantile establishment in the United States, was entirely

annihilated. The southern and northern sections of the Union were

unable to exchange their commodities, except upon a contracted scale

through the medium of land carriage, and then only at a great loss; so

that, upon the whole, nothing in a national point of view appeared to

be more loudly called for by men of all parties than a naval force

adequate to the protection of our commerce, and the raising of the

blockade of our coast."

Such was the experience which sums up the forgotten bitter truth,

concerning a war which has left in the United States a prevalent

impression of distinguished success, because of a few brilliant naval

actions and the closing battle of New Orleans. The lesson to be

deduced is not that the country at that time should have sought to

maintain a navy approaching equality to the British. In the state of

national population and revenue, it was no more possible to attempt

this than that it would be expedient to do it now, under the present

immense development of resources and available wealth. What had been

possible during the decade preceding the war,--had the nation so

willed,--was to place the navy on such a footing, in numbers and

constitution, as would have made persistence in the course Great

Britain was following impolitic to the verge of madness, because it

would add to her war embarrassments the activity of an imposing

maritime enemy, at the threshold of her most valuable markets,--the

West Indies,--three thousand miles away from her own shores and from

the seat of her principal and necessary warfare. The United States

could not have encountered Great Britain single-handed--true; but

there was not then the slightest prospect of her having to do so. The

injuries of which she complained were incidental to a state of

European war; inconceivable and impossible apart from it. She was

therefore assured of the support of most powerful allies, occupying

the attention of the British navy and draining the resources of the

British empire. This condition of things was notorious, as was the

fact that, despite the disappointment of Trafalgar, Napoleon was

sedulously restoring the numbers of a navy, to the restraining of

which his enemy was barely competent.

The anxiety caused to the British Admiralty by the operations of the

small American squadrons in the autumn of 1812 has already been

depicted in quotations from its despatches to Warren.[215] Three or

four divisions, each containing one to two ships of the line, were

kept on the go, following a general round in successive relief, but

together amounting to five or six battle ships--to use the modern

term--with proportionate cruisers. It was not possible to diminish

this total by concentrating them, for the essence of the scheme, and

the necessity which dictated it, was to cover a wide sweep of ocean,

and to protect several maritime strategic points through which the

streams of commerce, controlled by well-known conditions, passed,

intersected, or converged. So also the Admiralty signified its wish

that one ship of the line should form the backbone of the blockade

before each of the American harbors. For this purpose Warren's fleet

was raised to a number stated by the Admiralty's letter to him of

January 9, 1813, to be "upwards of ten of the line, exclusive of the

six sail of the line appropriated to the protection of the West India

convoys." These numbers were additional to detachments which, outside

of his command, were patrolling the eastern Atlantic, about the

equator, and from the Cape Verde Islands to the Azores, as mentioned

in another letter of February 10. "In all, therefore, about twenty

sail of the line were employed on account of American hostilities; and

this, it will be noticed, was after Napoleon's Russian disaster was

fully known in England. It has not been without interfering for the

moment with other very important services that my Lords have been able

to send you this re-enforcement, and they most anxiously hope that the

vigorous and successful use you will make of it will enable you

shortly to return some of the line of battle ships to England, which,

if the heavy American frigates should be taken or destroyed, you will

immediately do, retaining four line of battle ships." Attention should

fasten upon the importance here attached by the British Admiralty to

the bigger ships; for it is well to learn of the enemy, and to

appreciate that it was not solely light cruisers and privateers, but

chiefly the heavy vessels, that counted in the estimate of experienced

British naval officers. The facts are little understood in the United

States, and consequently are almost always misrepresented.

The reasons for this abundance of force are evident. As regards

commerce Great Britain was on the defensive; and the defensive cannot

tell upon which of many exposed points a blow may fall. Dissemination

of effort, however modified by strategic ingenuity, is thus to a

certain extent imposed. If an American division might strike British

trade on the equator between 20° and 30° west longitude, and also in

the neighborhood of the Cape Verdes and of the Azores, preparation in

some form to protect all those points was necessary, and they are too

wide apart for this to be effected by mere concentration. So the

blockade of the United States harbors. There might be in New York no

American frigates, but if a division escaped from Boston it was

possible it might come upon the New York blockade in superior force,

if adequate numbers were not constantly kept there. The British

commercial blockade, though offensive in essence, had also its

defensive side, which compelled a certain dispersion of force, in

order to be in local sufficiency in several quarters.

These several dispersed assemblages of British ships of war

constituted the totality of naval effort imposed upon Great Britain by

"the fourteen sail of vessels of all descriptions"[216] which composed

the United States navy. It would not in the least have been necessary

had these been sloops of war--were they fourteen or forty. The weight

of the burden was the heavy frigates, two of which together were more

than a match for three of the same nominal class--the 38-gun

frigate--which was the most numerous and efficient element in the

British cruising force. The American forty-four was unknown to British

experience, and could be met only by ships of the line. Add to this

consideration the remoteness of the American shore, and its dangerous

proximity to very vital British interests, and there are found the

elements of the difficult problem presented to the Admiralty by the

combination of American force--such as it was--with American advantage

of position for dealing a severe blow to British welfare at the

period, 1805-1812, when the empire was in the height of its

unsupported and almost desperate struggle with Napoleon; when Prussia

was chained, Austria paralyzed, and Russia in strict bonds of

alliance--personal and political--with France.

If conditions were thus menacing, as we know them to to have been in

1812, when war was declared, and the invasion of Russia just

beginning, when the United States navy was "fourteen pendants," what

would they not have been in 1807, had the nation possessed even one

half of the twenty ships of the line which Gouverneur Morris, a shrewd

financier, estimated fifteen years before were within her competency?

While entirely convinced of the illegality of the British measures,

and feeling keenly--as what American even now cannot but feel?--the

humiliation and outrage to which his country was at that period

subjected, the writer has always recognized the stringent compulsion

under which Great Britain lay, and the military wisdom, in his

opinion, of the belligerent measures adopted by her to sustain her

strength through that unparalleled struggle; while in the matter of

impressment, it is impossible to deny--as was urged by Representative

Gaston of North Carolina and Gouverneur Morris--that her claim to the

service of her native seamen was consonant to the ideas of the time,

as well as of utmost importance to her in that hour of dire need.

Nevertheless, submission by America should have been impossible; and

would have been avoidable if for the fourteen pendants there had been

a dozen sail of the line, and frigates to match. To an adequate

weighing of conditions there will be indeed resentment for impressment

and the other mortifications; but it is drowned in wrath over the

humiliating impotence of an administration which, owing to

preconceived notions as to peace, made such endurance necessary. It is

not always ignominious to suffer ignominy; but it always is so to

deserve it.

President Washington, in his last annual message, December 7, 1796,

defined the situation then confronting the United States, and

indicated its appropriate remedy, in the calm and forcible terms which

characterized all his perceptions. "It is in our own experience, that

the most sincere neutrality is not a sufficient guard against the

depredations of nations at war. To secure respect for a neutral flag

requires a naval force, organized and ready, to vindicate it from

insult or aggression. This may even prevent the necessity of going to

war, by discouraging belligerent powers from committing such

violations of the rights of the neutral party as may, first or last,

leave no other option" [than war]. The last sentence is that of the

statesman and soldier, who accurately appreciates the true office and

sphere of arms in international relations. His successor, John Adams,

yearly renewed his recommendation for the development of the navy;

although, not being a military man, he seems to have looked rather

exclusively on the defensive aspect, and not to have realized that

possible enemies are more deterred by the fear of offensive action

against themselves than by recognition of a defensive force which

awaits attack at an enemy's pleasure. Moreover, in his administration,

it was not Great Britain, but France, that was most actively engaged

in violating the neutral rights of American shipping, and French

commercial interests then presented nothing upon which retaliation

could take effect. The American problem then was purely defensive,--to

destroy the armed ships engaged in molesting the national commerce.

President Jefferson, whose influence was paramount with the dominant

party which remained in power from his inauguration in 1801 to the

war, based his policy upon the conviction, expressed in his inaugural,

that this "was the only government where every man would meet

invasions of the public order as his own personal concern;" and that

"a well-disciplined militia is our best reliance for the first moments

of war, till regulars may relieve them." In pursuance of these

fundamental principles, it was doubtless logical to recommend in his

first annual message that, "beyond the small force which will probably

be wanted for actual service in the Mediterranean [against the

Barbary pirates], whatever annual sum you may think proper to

appropriate to naval preparations would perhaps be better employed in

providing those articles which may be kept without waste or

consumption, and be in readiness when any exigence calls them into

use. Progress has been made in providing materials for seventy-four

gun ships;" but this commended readiness issued in not laying their

keels till after the war began.

Upon this first recommendation followed the discontinuance of building

ships for ocean service, and the initiation of the gunboat policy;

culminating, when war began, in the decision of the administration to

lay up the ships built for war, to keep them out of British hands. The

urgent remonstrances of two or three naval captains obtained the

reversal of this resolve, and thereby procured for the country those

few successes which, by a common trick of memory, have remained the

characteristic feature of the War of 1812.

NOTE.--After writing the engagement between the "Boxer" and the

"Enterprise," the author found among his memoranda, overlooked,

the following statement from the report of her surviving

lieutenant, David McCreery: "I feel it my duty to mention that

the bulwarks of the 'Enterprise' were proof against our grape,

when her musket balls penetrated through our bulwarks."

(Canadian Archives, M. 389, 3. p. 87.) It will be noted that

this does not apply to the cannon balls, and does not qualify

the contrast in gunnery.

FOOTNOTES:

[128] Broke's Letter to Lawrence, June, 1813. Naval Chronicle, vol. xxx.

p. 413.

[129] Rodgers' Report of this cruise is in Captains' Letters, Sept. 27,

1813.

[130] Captains' Letters, Dec. 14, 1813.

[131] Captains' Letters, June 3, 1812.

[132] The Department's orders to Evans and the letter transferring them

to Lawrence, captured in the ship, can be found published in the Report

on Canadian Archives, 1896, p. 74. A copy is attached to the Record of

the subsequent Court of Inquiry, Navy Department MSS.

[133] James' Naval History, vol. vi., edition of 1837. The account of

the action between the "Chesapeake" and "Shannon" will be found on pp.

196-206.

[134] Secretary to the Admiralty, In-Letters, May, 1814, vol. 505, p.

777.

[135] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxx, p. 413.

[136] Broke, in his letter of challenge, "was disappointed that, after

various verbal messages sent into Boston, Commodore Rodgers, with the

'President' and 'Congress,' had _eluded_ the 'Shannon' and 'Tenedos,' by

sailing the first chance, after the prevailing easterly winds had

obliged us to keep an offing from the coast."

[137] For the reason here assigned, and others mentioned in the

narrative, the author has preferred to follow in the main James'

account, analyzed, and compared with Broke's report (Naval Chronicle,

vol. xxx. p. 83), and with the testimony in the Court of Inquiry held in

Boston on the surrender of the "Chesapeake," and in the resultant courts

martial upon Lieutenant Cox and other persons connected with the ship,

which are in the Navy Department MSS. The official report of Lieutenant

Budd, the senior surviving officer of the "Chesapeake", is published in

Niles' Register (vol. iv, p. 290), which gives also several unofficial

statements of onlookers, and others.

[138] Not "across"; the distinction is important, being decisive of

general raking direction.

[139] Actually, a contemporary account, borrowed by the British "Naval

Chronicle" (vol. xxx. p. 161) from a Halifax paper, but avouched as

trustworthy, says the "Chesapeake" was terribly battered on the larboard

bow as well as quarter. The details in the text indicate merely the

local preponderance of injury, and the time and manner of its

occurrence.

[140] A slight qualification is here needed, in that of the injured of

the "Shannon" some were hurt in the boarding, not by the cannonade; but

the general statement is substantially accurate.

[141] Decatur to Navy Department. Captains' Letters, June, 1813.

[142] Decatur to Navy Department. Captains' Letters, June, 1813.

[143] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxix. p. 497.

[144] Croker to Warren, Jan. 9, 1813. Admiralty Out-Letters, British

Records Office. My italics.

[145] Message of the Governor of Connecticut, October, 1813. Niles'

Register, vol. v. p. 121.

[146] Message of the Governor of Connecticut, October, 1813. Niles'

Register, vol. v. p. 121.

[147] Niles' Register, vol. v. p. 302.

[148] Captains' Letters.

[149] Niles' Register, vol. vi. p. 136.

[150] Captains' Letters, Nov. 3 and Dec. 31, 1809; March 26, 1810; and

Oct. 12, 1813.

[151] American State Papers, Naval Affairs, vol. i. p. 307.

[152] Ante, page 16.

[153] The official reports of Warren and Cockburn concerning these

operations are published in the Naval Chronicle, vol. xxx. pp. 162-168.

[154] Captains' Letters, June 21, 1813.

[155] The American official account of this affair is given in Niles'

Register, vol. iv. pp. 375, 422. James' Naval History, vol. vi. pp.

236-238, gives the British story.

[156] Captains' Letters, April, 1813.

[157] Captains' Letters, May 21, 1813.

[158] Ibid.

[159] James, Naval History (edition 1837), vol. vi. p. 231.

[160] Warren's Gazette Letters, here referred to, can be found in Naval

Chronicle, vol. xxx. pp. 243, 245.

[161] Croker to Warren, March 20, 1813. Admiralty Out-Letters, Records

Office.

[162] Niles' Register, vol. iv. p. 404.

[163] The rise of the tide is about two and a half feet.

[164] This is the number stated by James, the British naval historian,

and is somewhat difficult to reconcile with Warren's expression, "the

troops and a re-enforcement of seamen and marines from the ships." To be

effective, the attack should have been in greater numbers.

[165] The British story of this failure, outside the official

despatches, is given in James' Naval History, vol. vi. pp. 232-234.

[166] Report of the commander of the "Scorpion" to Captain Morris, July

21, 1813. Captains' Letters.

[167] This letter, from the commanding officer of the "Narcissus", is in

Niles' Register, vol. iv. p. 279.

[168] Morris to Navy Department, August 13, 23, and 27. Captains'

Letters.

[169] Captain Hayes, of the "Majestic," in charge of the blockade of

Boston, wrote to Warren, October 25, 1813: "Almost every vessel I meet

has a license, or is under a neutral flag. Spanish, Portuguese, and

Swedes are passing in and out by hundreds, and licensed vessels out of

number from the West Indies. I find the licenses are sent blank to be

filled up in Boston. This is of course very convenient, and the

Portuguese consul is said to be making quite a trade of that flag,

covering the property and furnishing the necessary papers for any person

at a thousand dollars a ship." Canadian Archives, M. 389. 3. p. 189.

[170] Annals of Congress, 1813-1814, vol. i. p. 500.

[171] This parenthesis shows that the censures were not directed against

New England only, for the blockade so far declared did not extend

thither.

[172] Niles' Register, vol. iv. pp. 370, 386.

[173] Ibid., p. 387.

[174] Niles' Register, vol. iv. p. 387.

[175] Ibid., p. 402.

[176] Ibid.

[177] Ibid. Author's italics.

[178] Morris to Navy Department, Dec. 20 and 26, 1813. Captains'

Letters.

[179] Post, chapter xviii.

[180] British Records Office, Secret Papers MSS.

[181] Niles' Register, vol. v. p. 311.

[182] The Columbian Centinel, Boston, Sept. 7 and Dec. 15, 1813.

[183] Ibid., Dec. 18.

[184] Ibid.

[185] Campbell to the Navy Department, Nov. 11, 1814. Captains' Letters.

[186] Captains' Letters.

[187] Ibid., June 24, 1813.

[188] Hull to Navy Department, July 31, 1813. Ibid.

[189] Cooper tells the story that when this gun was transported, and

preparations being made to use it as a stern instead of a bow chaser,

the crew--to whom Burrows was as yet a stranger, known chiefly by his

reputation for great eccentricity--came to the mast to express a hope

that the brig was not going to retreat.

[190] Report of Lieutenant Tillinghast to Captain Hull. Captains'

Letters, Sept. 9, 1813.

[191] Hull to Bainbridge, Sept. 10. Niles' Register, vol. v. p. 58.

[192] Report of the carpenter of the "Enterprise." Captains' Letters.

[193] There is a discrepancy in the statements concerning the "Boxer's"

crew. Hull reported officially, "We have sixty-seven, exclusive of those

killed and thrown overboard." (Sept. 25. Captains' Letters.) Lieutenant

McCall, who succeeded to the command after Burrows fell, reported that

"from information received from officers of the 'Boxer' it appears that

there were between twenty and thirty-five killed, and fourteen wounded."

(U.S. State Papers, Naval Affairs, vol. i. p. 297.) The number killed is

evidently an exaggerated impression received, resembling some statements

made concerning the "Chesapeake;" but it is quite likely that the

"Boxer's" loss should be increased by several bodies thrown overboard.

[194] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxii. p. 473.

[195] Columbian Centinel, July 28, Sept. 1, and Nov. 13, 1813.

[196] Ibid., Sept. 25.

[197] Campbell to Navy Department, Jan. 4, 1814. Captains' Letters.

[198] For full particulars see Captains' Letters (Campbell), June 12,

1813; Jan. 2 and 4, Aug. 20, Sept. 3, Oct. 8, Oct. 15, Dec. 4, 1814.

[199] Campbell, Dec. 2, 1814. Captains' Letters.

[200] Dent to Navy Department, Jan. 28, 1815. Ibid.

[201] Campbell, Feb. 3, 1815. Ibid.

[202] June 7, 1813. Navy Department MSS.

[203] Captains' Letters, Sept. 3, 1814.

[204] Benton's Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, vol. v. p. 202.

[205] Dec. 10, 1813. Niles' Register, vol. v. pp. 257-260.

[206] Niles' Register, vol. vii. p. 194.

[207] Ibid., vol. viii. p. 234.

[208] Ibid., vol. vii. p. 168. Quoted from a Charleston, S.C., paper.

[209] Captains' Letters, May 3, 23, 24; June 27, 29; August 7, 17; Nov.

9, 13, 23, 1813.

[210] Niles' Register, vol. viii. p. 311. Quoted from a Norfolk paper.

[211] American State Papers, Commerce and Navigation, vol. i. p. 1017.

[212] Ibid., vol. ii. p. 12.

[213] American State Papers, Commerce and Navigation, vol. ii. p. 87.

[214] Ibid., vol. i. p. 1017; vol. ii. pp. 12, 87.

[215] Ante, vol. i. pp. 402-404.

[216] Admiralty's Letter to Warren. Feb. 10, 1813.