CAMPAIGN OF 1813 ON THE LAKE FRONTIER, TO THE BATTLE OF
LAKE ERIE
In April, 1813, on the land frontier of the north and west, no
substantial change had taken place in the conditions which gave to the
United States the power of the offensive. Such modification as
Chauncey's energy had effected was to strengthen superiority, by
promising ultimate control of the upper and lower lakes. The British
had not been idle; but the greater natural difficulties under which
they labored, from less numerous population and less advanced
development of the country and its communications, together with a
greater severity of climate, had not been compensated by a naval
direction similar to that exercised by the American commodore and his
efficient second, Perry. Sir John Warren had been ordered to pay
attention to the lakes, the naval service of which was placed under
his charge. This added to his responsibilities, and to the drain upon
his resources of men and materials; but, with an oversight already
extending from Halifax to Jamaica and Barbados, he could do little for
the lakes, beyond meeting requisitions of the local authorities and
furnishing a draft of officers. Among those sent from his fleet was
Captain Barclay, who commanded the British squadron in Perry's action.
The Admiralty, meantime, had awaked to the necessity of placing
preparations and operations under competent naval guidance, if command
of the water was to be secured. For that purpose they selected Captain
Sir James Lucas Yeo, a young officer of much distinction, just turned
thirty, who was appointed to the general charge of the lake service,
under Warren. Leaving England in March, accompanied by a body of
officers and seamen, Yeo did not reach Kingston until May 15, 1813,
when the campaign was already well under way; having been begun by
Dearborn and Chauncey April 24. His impressions on arrival were
discouraging. He found the squadron in a weak state, and the enemy
superior in fact and in promise. They had just succeeded in burning at
York a British vessel intended for thirty guns, and they had, besides,
vessels building at Sackett's Harbor. He had set to work, however,
getting his force ready for action, and would go out as soon as
possible to contest the control of Ontario; for upon that depended the
tenure of Upper Canada.[40] Barclay, upon the arrival of his superior,
was sent on to Amherstburg, to fulfil upon Erie the same relation to
Yeo that Perry did to Chauncey.
It had been clearly recognized by the American authorities that any
further movement for the recapture of Detroit and invasion of Canada
would depend upon the command of Lake Erie; and that that in turn
would depend largely upon mastery of Ontario. In fact, the nearer the
sea control over the water communications could be established, the
more radical and far-reaching the effect produced. For this reason,
Montreal was the true objective of American effort, but the
Government's attention from the first had centred upon the
northwestern territory; upon the extremity of the enemy's power,
instead of upon its heart. Under this prepossession, despite adequate
warning, it had persisted in the course of which Hull's disaster was
the outcome; and now, though aroused by this stunning humiliation, its
understanding embraced nothing beyond the Great Lakes. Clear
indication of this narrow outlook is to be found in the conditions on
Lake Champlain, the natural highway to Canada. Only the scantiest
mention is to be found of naval preparation there, because actually
little was being done; and although the American force was momentarily
superior, it was so simply because the British, being in Canada wholly
on the defensive, and therefore obliged to conform to American
initiative, contemplated no use of this lake, the mastery of which,
nevertheless, was soon afterward thrown into their hands by a
singularly unfortunate occurrence.
Dearborn, who still remained in chief command of the armies on the New
York frontier, was therefore directed to concentrate his effort upon
Ontario, starting from Sackett's Harbor as a base. Chauncey, whose
charge extended no farther than the upper rapids of the St. Lawrence,
had of course no other interest. His first plan, transmitted to the
Navy Department January 21, 1813,[41] had been to proceed immediately
upon the opening of navigation, with the fleet and a land force of a
thousand picked troops, against Kingston, the capture of which, if
effected, would solve at a single stroke every difficulty in the upper
territory. No other harbor was tenable as a naval station; with its
fall, and the destruction of shipping and forts, would go the control
of the lake, even if the place itself were not permanently held.
Deprived thus of the water communications, the enemy could retain no
position to the westward, because neither re-enforcements nor supplies
could reach them. To quote Chauncey's own words, "I have no doubt we
should succeed in taking or destroying their ships and forts, and, of
course, preserve our ascendency on this lake."
This remark, though sound, was narrow in scope; for it failed to
recognize, what was perfectly knowable, that the British support of
the Lake Erie stations and the upper country depended on their power
to control, or at worst to contest, Ontario. Of this they themselves
were conscious, as the words of Yeo and Brock alike testify. The new
American Secretary of War, Armstrong, who was a man of correct
strategical judgment and considerable military information, entered
heartily into this view; and in a letter dated February 10
communicated to Dearborn the orders of the President for his
operations, based upon the Secretary's recommendation.[42] Four
thousand men were to be assembled at Sackett's, and three thousand at
Buffalo. The former, under convoy of the fleet, was to proceed first
against Kingston, then against York (Toronto). After this the two
corps should co-operate in an attack to be made upon the British
Niagara frontier, which rested upon Fort George on the Ontario shore,
and Fort Erie upon Lake Erie. This plan was adopted upon the
assumption, which was probably correct, that the enemy's entire
military force upon Ontario did not exceed twenty-one hundred regular
troops, of whom six hundred were at Kingston and twelve hundred at
Niagara. Armstrong, who recognized the paramount importance of
Montreal, had received the exaggerated impression that there might be
in that neighborhood eight to ten thousand regulars. There were not
yet nearly that number in all Canada;[43] but he was perhaps correct
in thinking that the provision for the offensive, which he had found
upon taking office a few weeks before, was insufficient for an advance
in that quarter.
Dearborn very soon discovered objections to proceeding against
Kingston, in his own estimates of the enemy's numbers, based upon
remarkable reports received from sources "entitled to full credit."
On March 3 he was satisfied that from six to eight thousand men had
been assembled there from Quebec, Montreal, and Upper Canada; while
the presence of Sir George Prevost, the Governor General, and
commander-in-chief in Canada, who had seized an opportunity to make a
hurried visit to Kingston to assure himself as to the progress of the
ships building, convinced the American general that an attack upon
Sackett's was contemplated.[44] From that time forward Dearborn
realized in his own person the process of making pictures to one's
self concerning a military situation, against which Napoleon uttered a
warning. Chauncey was more sceptical, although he could not very well
avoid attention to the reports brought in. He expresses himself as
believing that a considerable number of men had been assembled in
Kingston, but that their real object was to proceed against Harrison
in the Far West.[45]
There seems to have been no foundation for any of these alarms.
Prevost was a soldier of good reputation, but wanting in initiative,
audacity, and resolution, as the current war was to prove. His
presence at Kingston at this moment was simply one incident in a rapid
official visit to the upper military posts, extending as far as
Niagara, and accomplished in four weeks; for, leaving Quebec February
17, he was again writing from there on the 17th of March. As far as
can be deduced from his correspondence, four companies of regulars had
preceded him from Montreal to Kingston, and there may very well have
been a gathering of local forces for inspection or otherwise; but no
re-enforcements of regulars, other than that just mentioned, reached
Kingston from down the river before May. Dearborn never renounced his
belief in the meditated attack, though finally satisfied that it was
abandoned; and his positive reports as to the enemy's numbers wrung
from Armstrong acquiescence in a change of plan, by which York, and
not Kingston, should be the first object of the campaign.[46]
Chauncey, who had some sound military ideas, as his first plan showed,
was also brought round to this conclusion by a process of reasoning
which he developed in a second plan of operations, submitted March
18,[47] but evidently long since matured. It apparently antedates
Dearborn's apprehensions, and is not affected by them, though the two
worked together to a common mistaken decision. The commodore's letter
presents an interesting study, in its demonstration of how an
erroneous first conception works out to false conclusions, and in the
particular instance to ultimate military disaster. The capture of
Kingston, his first plan, and its retention, which Armstrong purposed,
would have settled the whole campaign and affected decisively the
issue of the war. Chauncey's new project is dominated throughout by
the view, which was that of the Government, that the great object of
the war was to control the northwestern territory by local operations,
instead of striking at the source of British power in its
communication with the sea. At this moment, the end of March, the
British naval force on Ontario was divided between York and Kingston;
in each were vessels afloat and vessels building. An attack upon
Kingston, Chauncey said, no doubt would be finally successful--an
initial admission which gave away his case; but as the opposing force
would be considerable, it would protract the general operations of the
campaign--the reduction of the northwest--longer than would be
advisable, particularly as large re-enforcements would probably
arrive at Quebec in the course of two months. On the other hand, to
proceed against York, which probably could be carried immediately,
would result in destroying at once a large fraction of the British
fleet, greatly weakening the whole body. Thence the combined Americans
would turn against Fort George and the Niagara line. If successful
here, the abandonment of Fort Erie by the British would release the
American vessels which by its guns were confined at Black Rock. They
would sail forth and join their consorts at Erie; which done,
Chauncey, leaving his Ontario fleet to blockade Yeo at Kingston, would
go to the upper lake and carry against the British the squadron thus
concentrated there, would co-operate with the army under General
Harrison, recover Detroit, and capture Malden. Lake Erie and its
surroundings would thus become an American holding. After this, it
would be but a step to reconquer Michilimackinac, thereby acquiring an
influence over the Indians which, in conjunction with military and
naval preponderance, would compel the enemy to forsake the upper
country altogether, and concentrate his forces about Kingston and
Montreal.
It is interesting to see an elaborate piece of serious reasoning
gradually culminate in a _reductio ad absurdum_; and Chauncey's
reasoning ends in a military absurdity. The importance of Kingston is
conceded by him, and the probability of capturing it at the first is
admitted. Thereupon follows a long project of operation, which ends in
compelling the enemy to concentrate all his strength at the very
points--Kingston and Montreal--which it is most important for the
Americans to gain; away from which, therefore, they should seek to
keep the enemy, and not to drive him in upon them. This comes from the
bias of the Government, and of the particular officer, regarding the
Northwestern territory as the means whereby success was to be
accomplished instead of merely the end to be attained. To make the
Western territory and control of the Indians the objects of the
campaign was a political and military motive perfectly allowable, and
probably, in view of recent history, extremely necessary; but to make
these things the objective of operations was to invert the order of
proceedings, as one who, desiring to fell a tree, should procure a
ladder and begin cutting off the outermost branches, instead of
striking at the trunk by the ground.
Eighteen months later Chauncey wrote some very wise words in this
spirit. "It has always been my opinion that the best means to conquer
Canada was to cut off supplies from Lower to Upper by taking and
maintaining some position on the St. Lawrence. That would be killing
the tree by girdling; the branches, dependent on ordinary supplies,
die of necessity. But it is now attempted to kill the tree by lopping
off branches" [he is speaking of the Niagara campaign of 1814]; "the
body becomes invigorated by reducing the demands on its
resources."[48] By this time Chauncey had been chastened by
experience. He had seen his anticipated glory reaped on Lake Erie by
his junior. He had seen the control of Ontario contested, and finally
wrung from him, by vessels built at Kingston, the place which he had
failed to take when he thought it possible. He had been blockaded
during critical months by a superior squadron; and at the moment of
writing, November 5, 1814, Sir James Yeo was moving, irresistible,
back and forth over the waters of Ontario, with his flag flying in a
ship of 102 guns, built at Kingston. In short, the Canadian tree was
rooted in the ocean, where it was nourished by the sea power of Great
Britain. To destroy it, failing the ocean navy which the United States
had not, the trunk must be severed; the nearer the root the better.
Demonstration of these truths was not long in coming, and will be
supplied by the narrative of events. When Chauncey penned the plan of
operations just analyzed, there were in York two vessels, the "Prince
Regent" of twenty guns, the "Duke of Gloucester," sixteen, and two--by
his information--on the stocks. On April 14 the ice in Sackett's
Harbor broke up, though large floes still remained in the lake. On the
19th these also had disappeared. Eighteen hundred troops were embarked
by the squadron, and on the 24th the expedition started, but was
driven back by heavy weather. The next day it got away finally, and on
the early morning of the 27th appeared off York. The troops were
landed westward of the town, and proceeded to attack, supported by the
shipping. The enemy, inferior in number, retired; the small regular
force making its escape, with the exception of fifty who surrendered
with the militia present. The American loss, army and navy, was a
little over three hundred; among whom was General Pike, an excellent
soldier, who commanded the landing and was mortally wounded by the
explosion of a magazine. The "Duke of Gloucester" schooner was taken,
but the "Prince Regent" had gone to Kingston three days before; the
weather which drove Chauncey back had enabled her to join her fleet as
soon as released by the ice. By her escape the blow lost most of its
effect; for York itself was indefensible, and was taken again without
difficulty in the following July. A 30-gun vessel approaching
completion was found on the stocks and burned, and a large quantity of
military and naval stores were either destroyed or brought away by the
victorious squadron. These losses were among the news that greeted
Yeo's arrival; but, though severe, they were not irreparable, as
Chauncey for the moment imagined. He wrote: "I believe that the enemy
has received a blow that he cannot recover, and if we succeed in our
next enterprise, which I see no reason to doubt, we may consider the
upper province as conquered."[49] The mistake here was soon to be
evident.
No time was wasted at York. The work of destruction, and of loading
what was to be carried away, was completed in three days, and on May 1
the troops were re-embarked, to sail for Fort George on the morrow.
The wind, which for some days had been fair and moderate from the
eastward, then came on to blow a gale which would make landing
impossible off Niagara, and even navigation dangerous for the small
vessels. This lasted through the 7th, Chauncey writing on that day
that they were still riding with two anchors ahead and lower yards
down. So crowded were the ships that only half the soldiers could be
below at one time; hence they were exposed to the rain, and also to
the fresh-water waves, which made a clean breach over the schooners.
Under such circumstances both troops and seamen sickened fast. On the
8th, the weather moderating, the squadron stood over to Fort Niagara,
landed the troops for refreshment, and then returned to Sackett's; it
being thought that the opportunity for surprise had been lost, and
that no harm could come of a short further delay, during which also
re-enforcements might be expected.
Soon after his return Chauncey sent a flag of truce to Kingston. This
made observations as to the condition of the enemy which began to
dispel his fair illusions.[50] His purpose to go in person to Niagara
was postponed; and despatching thither the squadron with troops, he
remained at Sackett's to protect the yard and the ships building, in
co-operation with the garrison. His solicitude was not misplaced.
Niagara being a hundred and fifty miles from Sackett's, the fleet and
army had been committed to a relatively distant operation, depending
upon a main line of communication,--the lake,--on the flank and rear
of which, and close to their own inadequately protected base, was a
hostile arsenal, Kingston, harboring a naval force quite able to
compete with their own. The danger of such a situation is obvious to
any military man, and even to a layman needs only to be indicated.
Nevertheless the enterprise was launched, and there was nothing for it
now but to proceed on the lines laid down.
Chauncey accordingly sailed May 22, re-enforcements of troops for the
defence of Sackett's having meantime arrived. He did not reach Niagara
until the 25th. The next day was spent in reconnoissances, and other
preparations for a landing on the lake shore, a short mile west of
Fort George. On the 27th, at 9 A.M., the attack began, covered by the
squadron. General Vincent, in command of the British Niagara frontier,
moved out to meet his enemy with the entire force near Fort George,
leaving only a small garrison of one hundred and thirty men to hold
the post itself. There was sharp fighting at the coast-line; but
Vincent's numbers were much inferior, and he was compelled steadily to
give ground, until finally, seeing that the only alternatives were the
destruction of his force or the abandonment of the position, he sent
word to the garrison to spike the guns, destroy the ammunition, and to
join his column as it withdrew. He retreated along the Niagara River
toward Queenston, and thence west to Beaver Dam, about sixteen miles
from Fort George. At the same time word was sent to the officers
commanding at Fort Erie, and the intermediate post of Chippewa, to
retire upon the same place, which had already been prepared in
anticipation of such an emergency. The three divisions were thus in
simultaneous movement, converging upon a common point of
concentration, where they all assembled during the night; the whole,
as reported by Vincent to his superior, now not exceeding sixteen
hundred.[51] The casualties during the day's fighting had been
heavy, over four hundred killed and wounded; but in the retreat no
prisoners were lost except the garrison of the fort, which was
intercepted. Dearborn, as before at York, had not landed with his
troops; prevented, doubtless, by the infirmities of age increasing
upon him. Two days later he wrote to the Department, "I had presumed
that the enemy would confide in the strength of his position and
venture an action, by which an opportunity would be afforded to cut
off his retreat."[52] This guileless expectation, that the net may be
spread not in vain before the eyes of any bird, provoked beyond
control such measure of equanimity as Armstrong possessed. Probably
suspecting already that his correct design upon Kingston had been
thwarted by false information, he retorted: "I cannot disguise from
you the _surprise_ occasioned by the _two escapes of a beaten enemy_;
first on May 27, and again on June 1. Battles are not gained, when an
inferior and broken enemy is not destroyed. Nothing is done, while
anything that might have been done is omitted."[53] Vincent was unkind
enough to disappoint his opponent. The morning after the engagement he
retired toward a position at the head of the lake, known then as
Burlington Heights, where the town of Hamilton now stands. Upon his
tenure here the course of operations turned twice in the course of the
next six months.
[Illustration: MAP OF NIAGARA PENINSULA]
While Vincent was in retreat upon Burlington, Captain Barclay arrived
at his headquarters, on the way to take charge of the Lake Erie
squadron;[54] having had to coast the north shore of Ontario, on
account of the American control of the water. The inopportuneness of
the moment was prophetic of the numberless disappointments with which
the naval officer would have to contend during the brief three months
preceding his defeat by Perry. "The ordnance, ammunition, and other
stores for the service on Lake Erie," wrote Prevost on July 20, with
reference to Barclay's deficiencies, "had been deposited at York for
the purpose of being transported to Amherstburg, but unfortunately
were either destroyed or fell into the enemy's hands when York was
taken by them; and the subsequent interruption to the communication,
by their occupation of Fort George, has rendered it extremely
difficult to afford the supplies Captain Barclay requires, which,
however, are in readiness to forward whenever circumstances will
permit it to be done with safety."[55] The road from Queenston to Fort
Erie, around Niagara Falls, was the most used and the best line of
transportation, because the shortest. To be thrown off it to that from
Burlington to Long Point was a serious mishap for a force requiring
much of heavy and bulky supplies. To add to these more vital
embarrassments, the principal ship, the "Queen Charlotte," which had
been lying at Fort Erie, had been ordered by Vincent to leave there
when the place was evacuated, and to go to Amherstburg, thus giving
Barclay the prospect of a land journey of two hundred miles through
the wilderness to his destination. Fortunately for him, a vessel
turned up at Long Point, enabling him to reach Amherstburg about June
7.
The second step in Chauncey's programme had now been successfully
taken, and the vessels at Black Rock were free to move. With an energy
and foresight which in administration seldom forsook him, he had
prepared beforehand to seize even a fleeting opportunity to get them
out. Immediately upon the fall of York, "to put nothing to hazard, I
directed Mr. Eckford to take thirty carpenters to Black Rock, where he
has gone to put the vessels lying there in a perfect state of repair,
ready to leave the river for Presqu' Isle the moment we are in
possession of the opposite shore." Perry also was on hand, being
actively engaged in the landing at Fort George; and the same evening,
May 27, he left for Black Rock to hasten the departure. The process
involved great physical labor, the several vessels having to be
dragged by oxen against the current of the Niagara, here setting
heavily toward the falls. It was not until June 12 that they were all
above the rapids, and even this could not have been accomplished but
for soldiers furnished by Dearborn.[56] The circumstance shows how
hopeless the undertaking would have been if the enemy had remained in
Fort Erie. Nor was this the only peril in their path. Barclay, with
commendable promptitude, had taken the lake in superior force very
shortly after his arrival at Amherstburg, and about June 15 appeared
off Erie [Presqu' Isle]. Having reconnoitred the place, he cruised
between it and Black Rock, to intercept the expected division; but the
small vessels, coasting the beach, passed their adversary unseen in a
fog,[57] and on June 18 reached the port. As Chauncey had reported on
May 29 that the two brigs building there were launched, affairs on
that lake began to wear a promising aspect. The Lakes station as a
whole, however, was still very short of men; and the commodore added
that if none arrived before his approaching return to Sackett's, he
would have to lay up the Ontario fleet to man that upon Erie.
To do this would have been to abandon to the enemy the very important
link in the communications, upon which chiefly depended the
re-enforcement and supplies for both armies on the Niagara peninsula.
The inherent viciousness of the plan upon which the American
operations were proceeding was now quickly evident. At the very moment
of the attack upon Fort George, a threatening but irresolute movement
against Sackett's was undertaken by Prevost, with the co-operation of
Yeo, by whom the attempt is described as a diversion, in consequence
of the enemy's attack upon Fort George. Had the place fallen, Chauncey
would have lost the ship then building, on which he was counting to
control the water; he would have had nowhere to rest his foot except
his own quarter-deck, and no means to repair his fleet or build the
new vessels continually needed to maintain superiority. The case of
Yeo dispossessed of Kingston would have been similar, but worse; for
land transport in the United States was much better than in Canada.
The issue of the war, as regarded the lakes and the Northwestern
territory, lay in those two places. Upon them depended offensive and
defensive action.
At the time of the attack upon Sackett's only two vessels of the
squadron were there, the senior officer of which, Lieutenant Chauncey,
was in momentary command of the navy yard as well. The garrison
consisted of four hundred regular troops, the coming of whom a week
before had enabled Chauncey to leave for Niagara. Dearborn had already
written to Major-General Jacob Brown, of the New York militia, asking
him to take command of the station; for which his local knowledge
particularly fitted him, as he was a resident of some years' standing.
He had moreover manifested marked military capacity on the St.
Lawrence line, which was under his charge. Brown, whose instincts were
soldierly, was reluctant to supersede Colonel Backus, the officer of
regulars in command; but a letter from the latter received on the
27th, asking him to take charge, determined his compliance. When he
arrived five hundred militia had assembled.
The British expedition left Kingston with a fine fair wind on the
early morning of May 27--the same day that the Americans were landing
at Fort George. The whole fleet accompanied the movement, having
embarked troops numbering over seven hundred; chiefly regulars. At
noon they were off Sackett's Harbor. Prevost and Yeo stood in to
reconnoitre; but in the course of an hour the troops, who were already
in the boats, ready to pull to the beach, were ordered to re-embark,
and the squadron stood out into the lake. The only result so far was
the capture of twelve out of nineteen American barges, on their way
from Oswego to the Harbor. The other seven gained the port.
During the next thirty-six hours militia kept coming in, and Brown
took command. Sackett's Harbor is an indentation on the south side of
a broad bay, called Black River Bay, into which the Black River
empties. The harbor opens eastward; that is, its back is toward the
lake, from which it is distant a little over a mile; and its north
side is formed by a long narrow point, called Navy Point, on which was
the naval establishment. Where Black River Bay meets the lake, its
south shore is prolonged to the west by a projection called Horse
Island, connected with the land by a fordable neck. Brown expected the
landing to be made upon this, and he decided to meet the attack at the
water's edge of the mainland, as the enemy crossed the neck. There he
disposed his five hundred militia, placing the regulars under Backus
in a second line; a steadying point in case the first line of
untrained men failed to stand firm. It was arranged that, if the enemy
could not be resisted, Lieutenant Chauncey was to set fire to the
naval stores and shipping, and cross with his crews to the south side
of the harbor, east of a work called Fort Volunteer, where Brown
proposed to make his final stand. From there, although an enemy at the
yard could be molested, he could not certainly be prevented from
carrying off stores or ships; hence the necessity for destruction.
[Illustration: SURROUNDINGS OF SACKETT'S HARBOR]
The British landed upon Horse Island soon after daylight of May 29,
and from there advanced. The militia met them with a volley, but then
broke and fled, as had been foreseen by Brown, himself yet a militia
officer. Their colonel behaved gallantly, and was killed in trying to
rally his men; while Brown in person, collecting a hundred of the
fugitives, worked round with them to the left flank of the approaching
British. These, moving through the woods, now encountered Backus and
his regulars, who made upon them an impression of overwhelming
numbers, to which the British official report bears a vivid testimony.
The failure to carry the place is laid by this paper upon the light
and adverse winds, which prevented the co-operation of the squadron's
heavy guns, to reduce the batteries and blockhouse. Without this
assistance, it was impracticable to carry by assault the works in
which the Americans had taken refuge. The gunboats alone could get
within range, and their small carronades were totally inadequate to
make any impression on the forts and blockhouses. "The troops were
reluctantly ordered to leave a beaten enemy." Brown makes no mention
of this retreat into the works, though it appears clear that the
Americans fell gradually back to their support; but he justifies
Prevost's withdrawal, bitterly criticised by writers of his own
nation, in the words, "Had not General Prevost retreated most rapidly
under the guns of his vessels, he would never have returned to
Kingston."[58]
In the midst of the action word was brought to Lieutenant Chauncey
that the battle was lost, and that the yard must be fired. Brown, in
his official report, expressly acquitted him of blame, with words of
personal commendation. The two schooners in commission had retreated
up Black River; but the prize "Duke of Gloucester," and the ship
approaching completion, were fired. Fortunately, the flames were
extinguished before serious damage was done; but when Commodore
Chauncey returned on June 1, he found that among a large quantity of
materials consumed were the stores and sails of the new ship. The loss
of these he thought would delay the movements of the squadron three
weeks; for without her Yeo's force was now superior.[59]
[Illustration: THE RETREAT OF THE BRITISH FROM SACKETT'S HARBOR.
_Drawn by Henry Reuterdahl._]
The defence of Sackett's Harbor obtained immediately for Brown, who
was just thirty-eight, the commission of brigadier general in the
army; for the new Secretary, Armstrong, was looking round anxiously
for men to put in command, and was quick to seize upon one when he
found him. To Chauncey, on the other hand, the affair in its
consequences and demonstration of actualities was a rude awakening, to
which his correspondence during the succeeding six weeks bears witness
by an evident waning of confidence, not before to be noted. On June 4
he tells the Secretary of the Navy that he has on Ontario, exclusive
of the new ship not yet ready, fourteen vessels of every description,
mounting sixty-two guns; whereas Yeo has seven, which, with six
gunboats, carry one hundred and six. "If he leave Kingston, I shall
meet him. The result may be doubtful, but worth the trial." This
resolution is not maintained. June 11 he hears, with truth, that Yeo
was seen at the head of the lake on the 7th, and that the Americans at
Fort George had taken his squadron to be Chauncey's. By the same
channel he learns of a disastrous engagement of the army there, which
was likewise true. His impulse is to go out to meet the British
squadron; but he reflects that the enemy may then again find an
opportunity to descend upon Sackett's, and perhaps succeed in burning
the new ship. Her size and armament will, he thinks, give him the
decisive superiority. He therefore resolves to put nothing to hazard
till she is finished.[60]
The impression produced by the late attack is obvious, and this
decision was probably correct; but Yeo too is building, and meantime
he has possession of the lake. On June 3 he left Kingston with a
squadron, two ships and four schooners, carrying some three hundred
troops for Vincent. On the evening of the 7th, about six o'clock, he
was sighted by the American army, which was then at Forty Mile Creek
on the Ontario shore; a position to which it had retired after a
severe reverse inflicted by the enemy thirty-six hours before.
Vincent's retreat had been followed as far as Stony Creek, ten miles
west of Forty Mile Creek, and somewhat less distant from Burlington
Heights, where the British lay. The situation of the latter was
extremely perilous; for, though strongly placed, they were greatly
outnumbered. In case of being driven from their lines, they must
retreat on York by a long and difficult road; and upon the same poor
communications they were dependent for supplies, unless their squadron
kept control of the lake. Recognizing that desperate conditions call
for desperate remedies, Vincent resolved to risk an attack with seven
hundred men under Colonel Harvey, in whose suggestion the movement
originated. These fell upon the American advance corps at two o'clock
in the morning of June 6. An hour of fighting ensued, with severe loss
on both sides; then Harvey, considering sufficient effect produced,
drew off his men before daylight revealed the smallness of their
numbers.
There was in this affair nothing intrinsically decisive, scarcely more
than a business of outposts; but by a singular coincidence both
American generals present were captured in the confusion. The officer
who succeeded to the command, a colonel of cavalry, modestly
distrustful of his own powers, could think of nothing more proper than
to return to Forty Mile Creek, sending word to Fort George. Dearborn,
still too weak to go to the front, despatched thither General Morgan
Lewis. On his way Lewis was overtaken by two brief messages from the
commander-in-chief announcing the appearance of Yeo's fleet, and
indicating apprehension that by means of it Vincent might come upon
Fort George before the main army could fall back there. It was most
improbable that the British general, with the command of the lake in
doubt would thus place himself again in the position from which he had
with difficulty escaped ten days before; but Dearborn's fears for the
safety of the forts prevailed, and he ordered a retreat. The movement
began by noon of June 8, and in a few days the army was back at
Niagara River, having lost or abandoned a quantity of stores. The
British followed to within ten miles of the fort, where they took up a
position. They also reoccupied Beaver Dam; and a force of six hundred
Americans sent to dislodge them, under Colonel Boerstler, was
compelled to surrender on June 24.[61] Dearborn, who had already
reported to the Department that he personally was "so reduced in
strength as to be incapable of any command," attributed his
embarrassments "to the temporary loss of command of the lake. The
enemy has availed himself of the advantage and forwarded
re-enforcements and supplies." The effect of controlling the water
cannot be contested; but the conditions at Stony Creek were such that
it should have been possible to drive Vincent away from any hold on
the south shore of Ontario. Creditable as had been the enterprise of
Colonel Harvey, it had accomplished no change in material conditions.
Dearborn was soon afterward relieved. His officers, including Scott,
joined in a letter of regret and esteem, prompted doubtless by
sympathy for the sufferings and miscarriage of an aged officer who had
served gallantly in his youth during the War of Independence.
To Colonel Harvey's attack, on the morning of June 6, a British
military critic has with justice assigned the turning of the tide in
the affairs of Upper Canada.[62] It is perfectly true that that
well-judged movement, admirable in conception and execution, checked
the progress of the American arms at a moment most favorable to them,
and put an end to conditions of advantage which never there recurred.
That this effect was produced, however, is attributable to the
inefficiency of the American officers in command. If Harvey had
divined this, from the previous operations, and made it a part of his
calculations, it is so much more to his credit; the competency of the
opponent is a chief factor to be considered in a military enterprise.
It detracts nothing from Harvey's merit to say that there was no
occasion for the American retreat, nor for the subsequent paralysis of
effort, which ended in expulsion from the Niagara peninsula at the end
of the year. "For some two months after this," wrote a very competent
eye-witness, afterward General Scott, "the army of Niagara, never less
than four thousand strong, stood fixed in a state of ignominy, under
Boyd, within five miles of an unintrenched enemy, with never more than
three thousand five hundred men."[63] Scott seems not to have known
that this inactivity was enjoined by the War Department till Chauncey
could resume control of the lake.[64] From this time, in fact, the
Niagara army and its plans disappear from the active operations.
Yeo remained in undisputed mastery of the water. That the British at
this time felt themselves the stronger in effective force, may be
reasonably inferred from their continuing to keep the lake after
Chauncey's new ship was out. She was launched June 12, and named the
"General Pike," in honor of the officer killed at the taking of York.
Her armament was to be twenty-six long 24-pounders, which under some
circumstances would make her superior, not only to any single vessel,
but to any combination of vessels then under the British flag. If it
was still possible, by use of favoring conditions, to contend with the
American fleet after the addition to it of this ship, by so much more
was Yeo able to deal successfully with it before her coming. A
comparison of the armaments of the opposing forces also demonstrates
that, whatever Chauncey's duty might have been without such prospect,
he was justified, having this decisive advantage within reach, in
keeping his fleet housed waiting for its realization. The British new
vessel, the "Wolfe," with the "Royal George"[65] and the "Melville,"
together threw a broadside weight of nine hundred and twenty
pounds,[66] to which the "Madison" and "Oneida" could oppose only six
hundred; and the batteries of all five being mainly carronades, there
are no qualifications to be made on the score of differing ranges. The
American schooners, though much more numerous than the British, in no
way compensated for this disparity, for reasons which will be given
when the narrative of operations begins. Unknown to Chauncey, the
vindication of his delay was to be found in Yeo's writing to the
Admiralty, that he was trying to induce the enemy to come out before
his new ship was ready.
Disappointed in this endeavor, the British commodore meantime employed
his vessels in maintaining the communications of the British and
harassing those of the Americans, thus observing the true relation of
the lake to the hostilities. Mention has been made of the effect upon
Dearborn; morally, in the apprehension created, actually, in the
strength contributed to Vincent's army. "The enemy's fleet is
constantly hovering on the coast and interrupting our supplies," wrote
General Lewis, during Dearborn's incapacity. Besides incidental
mentions by American officers, Yeo himself reports the capture of two
schooners and boats loaded with stores June 13; and between that date
and the 19th he landed parties at the Genesee River and Great Sodus,
capturing or destroying a quantity of provisions. Transit between
Oswego and Sackett's was also in constant danger of an unexpected
interference by the British squadron. On June 20 it appeared off
Oswego, with apparent disposition to attack; but Yeo, who in his
exercise of chief command displayed a degree of caution remarkable in
view of his deservedly high reputation for dash acquired in less
responsible positions, did not pass beyond threat. All the same, the
mere uncertainty exercised a powerful influence on the maintenance of
intercourse. "If the schooners 'Lark' and 'Fly' are not now in
Sackett's," wrote Lieutenant Woolsey from Oswego, "they must have been
taken yesterday by the British boats. They were loaded with powder,
shot, and hospital stores for the army." He has also cordage, powder,
guns, cables, to send, and boats in which to ship them; but "under
existing circumstances I dare not take upon myself to send them
farther than to Sandy Creek, under strong guard. I think it would be
unsafe to venture round Stony Point [a projecting headland twelve
miles from Sackett's] without convoy or a good guard."[67]
On July 2, having ranged the lake at will since June 1, Yeo returned
to Kingston, and Chauncey again began to hear rumors. "The fleet has
taken on board two thousand men, and two thousand more are to embark
in boats; an attack upon this place is the object. The plan is to make
a desperate push at our fleet before the 'General Pike' can be got
ready.... His real object may be to land re-enforcements near Fort
George, to act with General Vincent against Dearborn. If this be his
object, he will succeed in obliging our army to recross the Niagara
River;"[68] a damaging commentary on the American plan of campaign.
This fear, however, was excessive, for the reason that an effective
American army on the Niagara had a land line of communication, bad but
possible, alternative to the lake. The British had not. Moreover, the
Niagara peninsula had for them a value, as a land link between Ontario
and Erie, to which nothing corresponded on the United States side. Had
Vincent been driven from Burlington Heights, not only would he have
lost touch with the lake, and been forced back on York, but Ontario
would for the British have been entirely cut off from Erie.
The "General Pike" was ready for service on July 20, and the following
evening Chauncey sailed. With this begins a period, extending over ten
or twelve weeks, which has no parallel in the naval lake history of
the war. It was unproductive of decisive results, and especially of
the one particular result which is the object of all naval action--the
destruction of the enemy's organized force, and the establishment of
one's own control of the water; nevertheless, the ensuing movements of
Yeo and Chauncey constituted a naval campaign of considerable
interest. Nothing resembling it occurred on either Lake Champlain or
Erie, and no similar condition recurred on Ontario. The fleets were
frequently in presence of each other, and three times came to blows.
On Erie and on Champlain the opposing forces met but once, and then
without any prolonged previous attempts at manoeuvring. They fought
immediately; the result in each case being an American victory, not
only complete but decisive, which has kept their remembrance alive to
this day in the national memory. On Ontario, after the close of the
season of 1813, the struggle resolved itself into a race of
ship-building; both parties endeavoring to maintain superiority by the
creation of ever-increasing numbers, instead of by crushing the enemy.
Such a contest sufficiently befits a period of peace; it is, for
instance, at this moment the condition of the great naval nations of
the world, each of which is endeavoring to maintain its place in the
naval scale by the constant production and development of material. In
war, however, the object is to put an end to a period of national
tension and expense by destroying the enemy; and the failure of the
commanders to effect this object calls for examination.
The indecisive result on Ontario was due to the particular composition
of the two squadrons; to the absence of strong compelling conditions,
such as made fighting imperative on Barclay upon Erie, and perhaps
also on Downie upon Champlain; and finally, to the extreme wariness of
the commanders, each of whom was deeply impressed with the importance
of preserving his own fleet, in order not to sacrifice control of the
lake. Chauncey has depicted for us his frame of mind in instructions
issued at this very moment--July 14--to his subordinate, Perry. "The
first object will be to destroy or cripple the enemy's fleet; but in
all attempts upon the fleet you ought to use great caution, for the
loss of a single vessel may decide the fate of the campaign."[69] A
practical commentary of singular irony was passed upon this utterance
within two months; for by sacrificing a single ship Perry decided his
own campaign in his own favor. Given the spirit of Chauncey's warning,
and also two opponents with fleets so different in constitution that
one is strong where the other is weak, and _vice versa_, and there is
found the elements of wary and protracted fighting, with a strong
chance that neither will be badly hurt; but also that neither will
accomplish much. This is what happened on Ontario.
[Illustration: THE FLEETS OF CHAUNCEY AND YEO MANOEUVRING ON LAKE
CHAMPLAIN.
_Drawn by Carlton T. Chapman._]
The relative powers of the two fleets need to be briefly explained;
for they constituted, so to say, the hands in the game which each
commander had to play. The British had six vessels, of varying sizes
and rigs, but all built for war, and sailing fairly well together.
They formed therefore a good manoeuvring squadron. The Americans had
three vessels built for war, and at the beginning ten schooners also,
not so designed, and not sailing well with the armaments they bore.
Whatever the merits of this or that vessel, the squadron as a whole
manoeuvred badly, and its movements were impeded by the poorer
sailors. The contrast in armaments likewise had a very decisive
effect. There were in those days two principal classes of naval
cannon,--long guns, often called simply "guns," and carronades. The
guns had long range with light weight of shot fired; the carronades
had short range and heavy shot. Now in long guns the Americans were
four times as strong as the British, while in carronades the British
were twice as strong as the Americans. It follows that the American
commodore should prefer long range to begin with; whereas the British
would be careful not to approach within long range, unless with such a
breeze as would carry him rapidly down to where his carronades would
come into play.
There was another controlling reason why short range favored the
British against the Americans. The schooners of the latter, not being
built for war, carried their guns on a deck unprotected by bulwarks.
The men, being exposed from the feet up, could be swept away by
canister, which is a quantity of small iron balls packed in a case and
fired from a cannon. When discharged, these separate and spread like
buckshot, striking many in a group. They can maim or kill a man, but
their range is short and penetrative power small. A bulwarked vessel
was, so to say, armored against canister; for it makes no difference
whether the protection is six inches of wood or ten of iron, provided
it keeps out the projectile. The American schooners were in this
respect wholly vulnerable.
Over-insistence upon details of advantage or disadvantage is often
wearisome, and may be pushed to pettifogging; but these quoted are
general and fundamental. To mention them is not to chaffer over
details, but to state principles. There is one other which should be
noted, although its value may be differently estimated. Of the great
long-gun superiority of the Americans more than one half was in the
unprotected schooners; distributed, that is, among several vessels not
built for war, and not capable of acting well together, so as to
concentrate their fire. There is no equality between ten guns in five
such vessels and the same ten concentrated on one deck, under one
captain. That this is not special pleading, to contravene the
assertion advanced by James of great American superiority on Ontario,
I may quote words of my own, written years ago with reference to a
British officer: "An attempt was made to disparage Howe's conduct (in
1778), and to prove that his force was even superior to that of the
French, by adding together the guns in all his ships, disregarding
their classes, or by combining groups of his small vessels against
D'Estaing's larger units. For this kind of professional arithmetic
Howe felt and expressed just and utter contempt."[70] So Nelson wrote
to the commander of a British cruising squadron, "Your intentions of
attacking the 'Aigle'"--a seventy-four--"with your three frigates are
certainly very laudable, but I do not consider your force by any means
equal to it." The new American ship, the "General Pike," possessed
this advantage of the seventy-four. One discharge of her broadside was
substantially equal to that of the ten schooners, and all her guns
were long; entirely out-ranging the batteries of her antagonists.
Under some circumstances--a good breeze and the windward position--she
was doubtless able to encounter and beat the whole British squadron on
Ontario. But the American schooners were mere gunboats, called to act
in conditions unfavorable to that class of vessel, the record of which
for efficiency is under no circumstances satisfactory.
After leaving Sackett's, Chauncey showed himself off Kingston and then
went up the lake, arriving off Niagara on the evening of July 27. An
abortive attempt, in conjunction with the army, was made upon a
position of the enemy at Burlington Heights, then far in rear of his
main line; but it being found too strong, the fleet, with the troops
still on board, bore over to York and there retaliated the injury done
by Yeo at Genesee and Sodus. There was no opposition; many stores were
destroyed or brought away, some military buildings burned, and the
vessels then returned to Niagara. They were lying there at daybreak of
August 7 when the British appeared: two ships, two brigs, and two
large schooners. Chauncey had substantially his whole force: two
ships, the "Pike" and "Madison," the brig "Oneida," and ten
schooners. He got under way shortly and put out into the lake. Various
manoeuvres followed, his principal object being to get to windward of
the enemy; or, when the wind failed, to sweep[71] the schooners close
enough for their long guns to reach; the only useful function they
possessed. These efforts were unsuccessful, and night shut in with the
two opponents sailing in parallel lines, heading north, with the wind
at west; the Americans to leeward and in rear of the British. At two
in the morning, in a heavy squall, two schooners upset, with the loss
of all on board save sixteen souls. Chauncey reckoned these to be
among his best, and, as they together mounted nineteen guns, he
considered that "this accident gave the enemy decidedly the
superiority"; another instance of faulty professional arithmetic,
omitting from the account the concentration of power in the "General
Pike."
Yeo did not estimate conditions in the same way, and persisted warily
in keeping the weather gage, watching for a chance to cut off
schooners, or for other favoring opportunity; while Chauncey as
diligently sought to gain the advantage of the wind, to force action
with his heavy ships. Manoeuvring continued all day of the 8th, 9th,
and 10th. The winds, being light and shifting, favored now one, now
the other; but in no case for long enough to insure a meeting which
the American with good reason desired, and his antagonist with equal
propriety would accept only under conditions that suited him. At nine
in the evening of August 10 the American squadron was standing
northwest, with the wind at southwest, when the British, which was
then following to windward, wore and stood south. Chauncey made no
change in direction, but kept his vessels in two lines; this being the
order of battle by which, not being able to attack himself, he hoped
to induce Yeo to engage incautiously. The six smallest schooners, of
the eight now left to him, were put in the weather line; therefore
toward the enemy, if he persisted in keeping to windward. The lee
line, abreast of the other, and six hundred yards from it, was
composed of the "Pike," "Madison," and "Oneida," astern of which were
the two heaviest schooners. The smaller vessels were displayed as a
tempting bait, disposed, as it were, in such manner that the opponent
might hope to lay hands on one or more, without coming too much under
the "Pike's" heavy guns; for her two larger consorts, carrying
carronades chiefly, might be neglected at the distance named. If such
an attempt were made, the schooners' orders were to edge imperceptibly
to leeward, enticing the enemy to follow in his eagerness; and when he
was near enough they were to slip cleverly through the intervals in
the lee line, leaving it to finish the business. The lure was perhaps
a little too obvious, the enemy's innocent forgetfulness of the
dangers to leeward too easily presumed; for a ship does not get out of
the hold of a clear-headed captain as a mob of troops in hot pursuit
may at times escape the control of their officers. In view, however,
of Yeo's evident determination to keep his "fleet in being," by
avoiding action except on his own terms, nothing better was open to
Chauncey, unless fortune should favor him.
At half-past ten the British again wore, now standing northwest after
the American squadron, the rear vessels of which opened fire at eleven
(A). At quarter-past eleven the cannonade became general between the
enemy and the weather line (B). Fifteen minutes later, the four rear
schooners of the latter, which were overmatched when once within
carronade range, bore up and ran to leeward; two taking position on
the other side of the main division, and two astern of it (c, c). So
far all went according to plan; but unhappily the leading two American
schooners, instead of keeping away in obedience to orders,
tacked--went about towards the enemy--keeping to windward (d).
Chauncey, seeing the risk involved for them, but prepossessed with the
idea of luring Yeo down by the appearance of flight set by the
schooners, made what can scarcely be considered other than the mistake
of keeping away himself, with the heavy ships; "filled the
maintopsail, and edged away two points, to lead the enemy down, not
only to engage him to more advantage, but to lead him away from the
'Growler' and 'Julia'" (C). Yeo, equally dominated by a preconceived
purpose not to bring his ships under the guns of the "Pike," acted
much as a squirrel would do with two nuts in sight; he went for the
one safely distant from suspected danger. "He kept his wind," reported
Chauncey, "until he had completely separated those two vessels from
the rest of the squadron, exchanged a few shot with the 'Pike,' as he
passed, without injury to us, and made sail after the two schooners"
(e). Some time after midnight these surrendered to odds plainly
irresistible.[72]
The tacking of the two schooners was an act as ill-judged as it was
insubordinate, for which Chauncey was in no wise responsible. His
bearing up was certainly an error, which unfortunately lent itself to
the statement, contemporaneously made by an American paper, that he
retreated, leaving the two vessels to their fate. It was possible,
therefore, for Sir James to word the transaction as he airily did: "At
eleven we came within gunshot of their line of schooners, which opened
a heavy fire, their ships keeping off the wind to prevent our closing.
At half-past twelve this ship came within gunshot of the 'Pike' and
'Madison,' when they immediately bore up, fired their stern
chase-guns, and made sail for Niagara, leaving two of their schooners
astern, which we captured."[73] This gives a more victorious and
dashing air to the success than it quite deserves. As it stood, it was
real enough, though trivial. To take two vessels from a superior
fleet, within range of its commander-in-chief, is a handsome business,
which should not need to be embellished by the implication that a
greatly desired fight could not be had. To quote Marryat, "It is very
hard to come at the real truth of this sort of thing, as I found out
during the time that I was in his Majesty's service." Chauncey's
version is perfectly probable. Seeing that the enemy would not follow,
"tacked and stood after him. At twelve (midnight), finding that I must
either separate from the rest of the squadron, or relinquish the hope
of saving the two which had separated, I reluctantly gave up the
pursuit." His reading of Yeo's conduct is plausible. "From what I have
been able to discover of the movements of the enemy, he has no
intention of engaging us, except he can get decidedly the advantage of
wind and weather; and as his vessels in squadron sail better than our
squadron, he can always avoid an action.... He thinks to cut off our
small dull sailing schooners in detail." Here and always Chauncey's
conduct reflects the caution prescribed in his instructions to Perry,
rather than the resolute determination the latter showed to bring
matters to an issue. On the other hand, it is to be remembered that,
owing to the nearly equal facilities for ship-building--for replacing
ships lost--possessed by Kingston and Sackett's, a decisive naval
victory would not have the finality of result to be expected on Lake
Erie. Contrary to the usual conditions of naval war, the two ports,
not the fleets dependent on them, were the decisive elements of the
Ontario campaign; and the ignoring of that truth was the fundamental,
irremediable, American error.
[Illustration: PLAN OF CHAUNCEY'S ENGAGEMENT AUGUST 10, 1813]
Chauncey returned to Sackett's on August 13, provisioned the squadron
for five weeks, and sailed the same evening. On the 16th he was back
off Niagara, and there again sighted the enemy; but a heavy westerly
gale drove both squadrons to the lower end of the lake, where each
entered its own harbor on the 19th. August 29 the American put out
again, having an additional newly built schooner, named the "Sylph,"
large and fast, carrying three or four long 32-pounders. Chauncey
reported that he had now nine vessels with ninety-one guns, but that
the enemy was still superior. In number of guns, possibly; but it is
difficult to accept the statement otherwise, except in the one very
important particular of squadron manoeuvring power. This enabled Yeo
to avoid action, except when it suited him to fight; or unless
Chauncey was willing to engage first with part only of his squadron,
following it with the rest. Such advantage in manoeuvring greatly
increases the ability of the inferior to serve his own cause, but it
does not constitute superiority. The delusion of measuring force by
guns, irrespective of the ships that carry them, has been explained.
Yeo's intermediate movements do not appear, but on September 7 the
antagonists again met off the Niagara River. From that day till the
12th the American fleet endeavored to force a general action, which
the other steadily, and properly, refused. The persistent efforts of
the one to close, and of the other to avoid, led to a movement round
the lake, ending by the British entering Amherst Bay, five miles west
of Kingston. On one occasion, off the Genesee on September 11, a
westerly breeze carried the United States squadron within
three-quarters of a mile of the enemy, before the latter felt it. A
cannonade and pursuit of some hours followed, but without decisive
result. There seems traceable throughout Chauncey's account a distinct
indisposition to what is called technically "a general chase;" to
press on with part of the squadron, trusting to the slower vessels
coming up soon enough to complete the work of the faster. He was
unwilling thus to let his fleet loose. "This ship" (the "General
Pike"), "the 'Madison,' and the 'Sylph,' have each a schooner
constantly in tow, yet the others cannot sail as fast as the enemy's
squadron, which gives him decidedly the advantage, and puts it in his
power to engage me when and how he chooses." In such a situation
success can be had only by throwing the more rapid upon the enemy as
an advance guard, engaging as they get within range, relying upon
their effecting such detention that the others can arrive in time to
their support. To this recourse, though in halting fashion, Chauncey
finally came on what proved to be his last collision with Yeo,
September 28.
[Illustration: CAPTAIN ISAAC CHAUNCEY.
_From the engraving by D. Edwin after the painting by J. Woods._]
[Illustration: CAPTAIN SIR JAMES LUCAS YEO
_From the engraving by H.R. Cook after the Painting by A. Buck._]
FOOTNOTES:
[40] Yeo to Croker, May 26, 1813. Admiralty In-Letters, Records Office.
[41] Captains' Letters, Navy Department.
[42] American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. i. p. 439.
[43] Between July, 1812, and March 25, 1813, Prevost received
re-enforcements amounting in all to 2,175 regulars. His total force
then, for all Canada, excluding militia, was 9,177; of which 2,000 were
provincial corps. British Records Office.
[44] American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. i. p. 441.
[45] Chauncey to Navy Department, March 8, 12, and 16, 1813. Captains'
Letters.
[46] American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. i. p. 442.
[47] Captains' Letters.
[48] Captains' Letters, Nov. 5, 1814.
[49] Captains' Letters, May 7, 1813.
[50] Ibid., May 15.
[51] Canadian Archives. C. 678, p. 332.
[52] American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. i. p. 445.
[53] Ibid., p. 449. Armstrong's italics.
[54] Barclay's Narrative before the British Court Martial on the Battle
of Lake Erie. British Records Office.
[55] Prevost to Bathurst, Canadian Archives.
[56] Mackenzie's Life of Perry, vol. i. p. 148.
[57] Barclay's Narrative.
[58] Brown's and Prevost's Reports of this affair may be found in Niles'
Register, vol. iv. pp. 260, 261. That of Yeo is in the Canadian
Archives; M. 389, 6, p. 22.
[59] Captains' Letters, June 11, 1813.
[60] Captains' Letters.
[61] The account of these transactions is summarized from American State
Papers, Military Affairs, vol. i. pp. 445-449. For Vincent's report of
the Stony Creek affair see Cruikshank's Documentary History of the
Campaign on the Niagara Frontier, 1813, Part II, p. 8.
[62] Smyth's Précis of Wars in Canada, p. 137.
[63] Scott's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 94.
[64] American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. i. pp. 450, 451.
[65] Formerly the "Prince Regent."
[66] Yeo's Report of the Vessels on the Lakes, July 15, 1813. British
Records Office.
[67] Woolsey to Chauncey, June 20 and 21, 1813. Captains' Letters.
[68] Chauncey to the Department, July 5, 1813. Captains' Letters.
[69] Captains' Letters. Navy Department MSS.
[70] "History of the Royal Navy," edited by Sir W.L. Clowes, vol. iii.
p. 411.
[71] That is,--row
[72] Chauncey's Report of this cruise is in Captains' Letters, Aug. 13,
1813. Also, in Niles' Register, vol. iv. p. 421.
[73] James, Naval Occurrences. Appendix, p. lxxiv.