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SEA POWER IN ITS RELATIONS
TO THE WAR OF
1812
BY
CAPTAIN A.T. MAHAN, D.C.L., LL.D.
_United States Navy_
AUTHOR OF "THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783," "THE
INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
AND EMPIRE," "THE INTEREST OF AMERICA
IN SEA POWER," ETC.
IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL. II
LONDON
SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON & COMPANY
LIMITED
[Illustration: _From a Copley Print copyright 1899 by Curtis &
Cameron, Publishers, Boston._
_The Constitution_]
CONTENTS
CHAPTER IX
THE WINTER OF 1812-1813--BAINBRIDGE'S SQUADRON: ACTIONS BETWEEN
"CONSTITUTION" AND "JAVA," "HORNET" AND "PEACOCK"--INCREASING
PRESSURE ON ATLANTIC COAST
Page
Bainbridge's squadron sails 1
His plans for the cruise 2
The "Essex" fails to join 3
Proceedings of "Constitution" and "Hornet" 3
Action between "Constitution" and "Java" 4
The "Constitution" returns to the United States 7
Proceedings of the "Hornet" 7
Action between the "Hornet" and "Peacock" 8
The "Hornet" returns 9
The Chesapeake and Delaware blockaded 9
Subsequent extension of blockade to the whole coast south of
Newport 10
Three periods into which the War of 1812 divides 10
Difficulty of American frigates in getting to sea 11
Difficulty of manning the navy 12
Cruise of the "Chesapeake" 13
Gradual suppression of American commerce 14
Increasing stringency of the commercial blockade 15
British occupation of Delaware and Chesapeake Bays 16
Diminution of the coasting trade, and increase of land carriage 17
Effects upon prices 18
Abandoned condition of the western Atlantic 20
Diminution in number of prizes taken by Americans 20
Estimate of relative captures by the two belligerents 21
Relative captures no indication of relative immunity 23
American deprivation makes for the prosperity of Halifax and
Canada 23
The blockade the chief offensive maritime operation of Great
Britain, in 1813 24
No opposition longer possible to the American Navy 25
Strength of the British blockading divisions 25
Escape possible only by evasion 25
The brunt of the British naval operations falls upon the
Chesapeake and Delaware 26
CHAPTER X
CAMPAIGN OF 1813 ON THE LAKE FRONTIER, TO THE BATTLE OF LAKE ERIE
The British naval service on the lakes under Warren's
supervision 28
Sir James Yeo appointed to the local command 29
Appoints Captain Barclay to take charge of British vessels on
Lake Erie 29
The Americans now superior on Ontario 29
Montreal the true American objective 29
Dearborn ordered to concentrate effort upon Lake Ontario 30
Chauncey's first plan, to capture Kingston 30
Dearborn and Chauncey ordered to proceed first against Kingston,
then Toronto, then Niagara 31
Dearborn's objections 32
His reports obtain change of plan from the Government 33
Chauncey's new plan 33
The expedition leaves Sackett's Harbor 36
Capture of Toronto 36
Chauncey's anxiety for Sackett's Harbor 37
Capture of Fort George, and British retreat from Niagara 38
Effects of the American occupation of the Niagara peninsula 40
American naval vessels escape from Black Rock to Erie 41
British attack upon Sackett's Harbor 42
Premature firing of the naval yard and vessels 45
Consequent delay in Chauncey's preparations 45
Yeo takes the lake with his squadron 46
American reverse at Stony Creek 46
The army retreats upon Fort George 47
The British re-occupy the peninsula, except Fort George 47
Dearborn is relieved from command 48
Paralysis of the American forces at Niagara 48
Yeo in temporary control of Lake Ontario 49
Chauncey sails to contest control 51
Characteristics of the ensuing naval campaign 52
Predominant idea of Chauncey and Yeo 52
Relative powers of the two squadrons 53
Their encounter of August 10, 1813 56
Chauncey's extreme caution 59
The engagement of September 11 60
Expediency of a "general chase" under the conditions 61
CHAPTER XI
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1813 ON THE LAKES AND NORTHERN FRONTIER--THE BATTLE
OF LAKE ERIE
The American Navy on Lake Erie 62
Perry's eagerness for active operations 63
Coincidence of events on Lakes Erie and Ontario 64
Inferiority of Perry's crews in numbers and quality 64
Professional contrast between Chauncey and Perry 65
Personal difficulty. Perry applies to be detached 66
The Navy Department refuses 67
Position of the American army on the Maumee 67
Procter's attack upon Fort Meigs 68
Procter and Barclay plan attack on Erie 69
Re-enforcements of troops refused them 69
Barclay blockades Erie 70
Barclay visits Long Point 71
Perry's squadron crosses the bar at Erie 72
Procter attacks Fort Stephenson, and is repulsed 73
Barclay retires to Malden 74
Perry in control of the lake 74
Destitution of provisions in the British camp and fleet 75
Barclay goes out to fight 76
Composition and armament of the two squadrons 76
Controversy about the battle 78
Dispositions of the two commanders 80
Opening of the battle 81
Examination of the controversy between Perry and Elliott 82
Progress of the engagement 88
Second stage of the battle 89
The British surrender 94
Meritorious conduct of Captain Barclay 94
Question of credit on the American side 95
Comparison of the campaigns on Erie and on Ontario 99
Effect of the battle on the fate of the Northwest 99
Its bearing upon the peace negotiations of the following year 100
Influence of control of the water illustrated on the lakes 101
CHAPTER XII
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1813 ON THE LAKES AND NORTHERN FRONTIER, AFTER
THE BATTLE OF LAKE ERIE
Perry's victory promptly followed up 102
General Harrison lands his army at Malden 103
Recovery of Detroit. Battle of the Thames, October 5, 1813 103
The Indians fall away from the British 103
Harrison's army transferred to Niagara 104
Perry detached from the lake service 104
Changed American plan of campaign on Ontario 104
General James Wilkinson replaces Dearborn 104
The Government designates Kingston as the objective 105
The embarkation begins at Niagara under cover of the navy 106
Yeo's squadron appears in the neighborhood 106
Encounter between the two squadrons, September 28, 1813 107
Criticism of Chauncey's management 108
Wilkinson's troops reach Sackett's Harbor 110
The British re-enforce Kingston 110
New change of American plan. The army to be directed on
Montreal 111
Intended junction with the troops from Lake Champlain, under
General Hampton 111
Wilkinson's army assembled within the mouth of the St. Lawrence 114
It proceeds down the river 114
Pursuit by a British detachment 114
American reverse at Chrystler's Farm 115
Hampton fails to join Wilkinson, and returns to Plattsburg 116
The expedition abandoned. Wilkinson goes into winter quarters
at French Mills 116
Chauncey returns to Sackett's Harbor from the St. Lawrence 117
Transports Harrison's division from Niagara to Sackett's Harbor 117
Fleets lay up for the winter 117
Disastrous close of the campaign upon the Niagara 118
Americans evacuate Fort George and the peninsula 120
They burn Newark 120
Act disavowed by the American Government 120
Sir Gordon Drummond in command in Upper Canada 120
The British, under General Riall, cross the Niagara and
capture Fort Niagara 121
Lewiston, Youngstown, and Manchester burned in retaliation for
Newark 121
Buffalo burned, and three naval vessels at Black Rock 121
General failure of the campaign about Lake Ontario 122
Discussion of the causes 123
CHAPTER XIII
SEABOARD MARITIME OPERATIONS, 1813
United States on the defensive on the seaboard 126
British reasons for partially relaxing severity of blockade 127
Reasons do not apply to armed vessels or coasting trade 127
American Navy powerless to protect commerce 127
To destroy that of the enemy its principal mission 128
Cruises of the "President" and "Congress" 128
Efficacy of the British convoy system 130
Its chief failure is near ports of arrival 131
This dictates the orders to Captain Lawrence 131
Importance of the service 132
Imperfect preparation of the "Chesapeake" 132
Efficiency of the "Shannon." Broke's professional merit 133
His challenge to Lawrence. Not received 134
The "Chesapeake" sails, purposely to fight 135
Account of the action 136
The "Chesapeake" captured 140
Analysis of the engagement 141
Decatur fails to get to sea with a squadron 148
Driven to take refuge in New London 148
Frigates confined there for the war 149
Particular anxiety of the British Government about American
frigates 150
Expectations of the Admiralty and the country from Warren's
fleet 151
Effects of the blockade of New London on local coasting 152
Evidence of the closeness of the whole blockade south of
New London 153
Conditions at New York 154
British operations in the upper Chesapeake, 1813 156
Conditions in Delaware Bay 158
American precautions in Chesapeake and Delaware 159
Circumspect conduct of the British vessels in the Chesapeake 161
Warren brings a detachment of troops from Bermuda 162
Rencounters in and near Hampton Roads 163
British attack upon Craney Island. Fails 164
Attack upon Hampton. Ineffective 166
Further movements of the British in the Chesapeake 167
Movement of licensed vessels in Chesapeake Bay during these
operations 170
Consequent recommendation of President to prohibit all
exports during the blockade 173
Rejected by Senate. Enforced in Chesapeake by executive order 174
Glaring necessity for such action 175
Embargo law passed in December, 1813 176
Main British fleet quits the Chesapeake. Its failure in
direct military operation 177
Efficacy of the blockade 177
Characteristics of the different sections of the United
States, as affecting their suffering from blockade 178
Statistical evidences of its effects 181
Prices of great staples: flour and sugar 184
Dependence of Eastern and Southern States upon coasting,
greater than that of Middle States 186
Captain Hull's reports on Eastern coasting 187
Action between the "Boxer" and "Enterprise" 188
Intermission of Eastern blockade during winter 192
Its resumption in increased vigor in 1814 192
Undefended conditions of the American coast 193
Conditions of Southern coasting trade 195
British blockade severs the mutual intercourse of the different
sections of the United States 198
Remarks of Representative Pearson, of North Carolina 199
Message of the Governor of Pennsylvania 200
Rigors of the blockade shown by figures 201
Momentary importance of the North Carolina coast 203
Advocacy of an internal navigation system 204
Evidence of privation in the rebound of prices and shipping
movement after peace 205
Exposition of conditions, in a contemporary letter by a
naval officer 207
The experiences of the War of 1812 now largely forgotten 208
Lessons to be deduced 208
Pressure upon the British Government exerted, even by the
puny contemporary American Navy 209
Advantage of the American position 211
Opinions of Presidents Washington and Adams as to the
international advantage of a navy 212
Policy of President Jefferson 213
CHAPTER XIV
MARITIME OPERATIONS EXTERNAL TO THE WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES,
1813-1814
Commerce destruction the one offensive maritime resort left
open to the United States 215
Respective objects of privateers and of naval vessels 216
The approaches to the British islands the most fruitful
field for operations against commerce 216
Cruise of the "Argus" 217
Capture of the "Argus" by the "Pelican" 217
Significance of the cruise of the "Argus" 219
Great number of captures by American cruisers 220
Comparatively few American merchant ships captured at sea 221
Shows the large scale on which British commerce throve, and
the disappearance of American shipping 221
Control of British Navy shown by American practice of
destroying prizes 222
Successes of the privateers "Scourge" and "Rattlesnake"
in the North Sea 223
The "Leo" and "Lion" off coast of Portugal 224
British army in southern France incommoded by cruisers off
Cape Finisterre 224
American cruises based on French ports 225
The privateer "Yankee" on the gold-coast of Africa 226
Action between the American privateer "Globe" and two British
packets, off Madeira 227
Captures in the same neighborhood by privateers "Governor
Tompkins" and "America" 228
The West Indies as a field for warfare on commerce 229
Activity there of American cruisers 230
Stringency of the Convoy Act in the West Indies. Papers captured
there by the "Constitution" 230
Indirect effects of the warfare on commerce 231
Cruise in the West Indies of the naval brigs "Rattlesnake" and
"Enterprise" 232
Combat between the privateer "Decatur" and British war schooner
"Dominica" 233
The "Comet" and the British ship "Hibernia" 234
The "Saucy Jack" and the British ship "Pelham" 235
The "Saucy Jack" with the bomb-ship "Volcano" and transport
"Golden Fleece" 236
Remarkable seizure by the privateer "Kemp" 237
The cruises of the privateer "Chasseur" 237
Combat between the "Chasseur" and the British war schooner "St.
Lawrence" 238
Contrasted motives of the ship of war and the privateer 241
Relative success of American naval vessels and privateers in
the war upon commerce 242
Cruise of the frigate "Essex" 244
Arrival in Valparaiso of the "Essex," and of the British ships,
"Phoebe" and "Cherub" 247
Action between the "Essex" and the "Phoebe" and "Cherub" 249
Cruise of the "Wasp" 253
Action between the "Reindeer" and "Wasp" 254
Action between the "Avon" and "Wasp" 256
Disappearance of the "Wasp" 257
Cruise of the "Peacock" 258
Action between "Epervier" and "Peacock" 259
Further cruise of the "Peacock" 261
Activity of American cruisers in British waters 262
Agitation in Great Britain 263
The effect produced due to the American people severally 265
Prostration of the Government in the United States, 1814 265
Determination to accept peace without relinquishment of
impressment by Great Britain 266
Development of privateering 267
Adaptation of vessels to the pursuit 268
Practical considerations determining vessels to be employed 269
Secretary of the Navy recommends squadrons of schooners for
action against commerce 270
Debate in Congress 271
Recommendation adopted 272
CHAPTER XV
THE NIAGARA CAMPAIGN, AND EVENTS ON THE GREAT LAKES, IN 1814
British advantages of position on the Niagara line 274
Unusual mildness of winter 1813-1814 276
Effect on operations 276
British project against the vessels in Put-in Bay 277
Difficulty of maintaining British garrison at Mackinac 278
American army abandons cantonments at French Mills 278
Part goes to Lake Champlain, part to Sackett's Harbor 278
American project against Kingston 279
General Brown's mistake as to the Government's purpose 280
Carries his army to the Niagara frontier 281
Chauncey's fears for Sackett's Harbor 281
Wilkinson's expedition to La Colle. Failure 282
Wilkinson superseded by General Izard 283
Yeo obtains momentary superiority on Ontario 283
Importance of Oswego 284
British capture Oswego, and destroy depots 284
Yeo blockades Sackett's Harbor 285
Difficulty of American situation on Ontario 285
British naval disaster in attempting to intercept convoy
from Oswego to Sackett's Harbor 286
Yeo abandons blockade of Sackett's Harbor 290
American plan of operations on northern frontier 291
Brown crosses the Niagara. Surrender of Fort Erie 294
Advance towards Fort George 294
Battle of Chippewa 295
Brown advances to Queenston 298
Chauncey's failure to co-operate 298
Consequent anxiety of the Government 299
Decatur ordered to relieve Chauncey 300
Chauncey's defence of his conduct 300
Discussion of his argument 301
British advantage through his inaction 304
Leads to the battle of Lundy's Lane 306
Battle of Lundy's Lane 309
Value to Americans of the battles of Chippewa and Lundy's Lane 311
Improvement in the militia through association with Brown's army 312
Brown unable longer to keep the field. Retires to Fort Erie 314
British assault upon Fort Erie. Disastrous repulse 314
British now embarrassed by Chauncey's blockade 315
American successful sortie from Fort Erie 316
Drummond abandons the siege, and retires to the Chippewa 317
Brown unable to follow him 317
Izard ordered from Lake Champlain to Brown's aid 318
His march 320
His corps arrives at the Niagara frontier 321
Strength of the British position on the Chippewa 322
Izard's hopelessness 322
Blows up Fort Erie and retires across the Niagara 323
Naval and military expedition against Mackinac 324
Unsuccessful, except in destroying British transports 324
British capture the American naval schooners "Tigress" and
"Scorpion" 325
American schooners "Ohio" and "Somers" also captured, off
Fort Erie 327
Loss of the "Caledonia" and "Ariel" 327
The Erie fleet lays up for the winter, after the British
abandon the siege of Fort Erie 328
CHAPTER XVI
SEABOARD OPERATIONS IN 1814. WASHINGTON, BALTIMORE, AND MAINE
Defensive character of the British northern campaign in 1814 329
Increase of vigor in their seaboard operations 330
Warren relieved by Cochrane 330
Intentions of the British Government 331
Retaliation for American actions in Canada 333
Prevost's call upon Cochrane to retaliate 334
Cochrane's orders to his vessels 334
Attitude of British officers 335
Early operations in Chesapeake Bay, 1814 336
Relations of Barney's flotilla to the British project against
Washington 337
Assembling of the British combined forces in the Chesapeake 340
Condition of American preparations 342
British advance. Destruction of Barney's flotilla 344
Retreat of American forces 345
American position at Bladensburg 346
Battle of Bladensburg 347
Burning of Washington 349
Capture and ransom of Alexandria by British frigates 350
Failure of British attempt on Baltimore 351
British harrying of New England coast 352
Occupation of Castine, in Maine 353
Destruction of the American frigate "Adams" 354
CHAPTER XVII
LAKE CHAMPLAIN AND NEW ORLEANS
Arrival of large British re-enforcements in Canada 355
Objects of the British northern campaign of 1814 356
Previous neglect of lake Champlain by both belligerents 357
Operations on the lake in 1813 358
British attempt in spring of 1814 361
Macdonough in control of lake, in summer of 1814 362
British "Confiance" building to contest control 362
Instructions of British Government to Prevost 362
Prevost in August reports approaching readiness to move 363
Treasonable actions of American citizens about Lake Champlain 364
Izard, with four thousand troops, leaves Plattsburg for
Sackett's Harbor 365
Consequent destitution of the Champlain frontier 365
British advance to Plattsburg 366
Relative positions of American squadron and land forces 367
Question of distance between squadron and land batteries 368
Opinions of Izard and Yeo as to the relations of the batteries
to the squadron 370
Proper combination for Prevost 371
Backward state of "Confiance" upon Downie's taking command 372
Urgent letters of Prevost to Downie 373
Downie's expectations in attacking 375
Macdonough's dispositions 376
Downie's consequent plan of engagement 377
Naval battle of Lake Champlain 377
Decisive character of the American victory 381
Preoccupation of the British Government with European conditions 382
Episodical character of the New Orleans expedition 382
Negotiations of Admiral Cochrane for the co-operation of the
Creek Indians 383
His measures for training them, and preparations for the
expedition 384
Objects of the British ministry 385
Attack upon Fort Bowyer, Mobile Bay, by a British squadron 386
Previous occupation of West Florida to the Perdido, by the
United States 387
Pensacola, remaining in Spanish hands, utilized by British 387
Seized by Jackson, and works destroyed 388
Arrival of British expedition in Mississippi Sound 388
Gunboat battle of Lake Borgne 390
British advance corps reaches the bank of the Mississippi 391
Night attack by American Navy and Jackson 391
Sir Edward Pakenham arrives from England 392
His preliminary movements 392
Particular danger of Jackson's position 393
Details of the final day of assault, January 8, 1815 394
The British withdraw after repulse 396
Capture of Fort Bowyer, Mobile Bay 397
Final naval episodes 397
Sailing of the "President." She grounds on the New York bar 398
Overtaken, and is captured, by the British blockading division 398
The "Constitution" captures the "Cyane" and "Levant" 404
Capture of the British sloop "Penguin" by the "Hornet" 407
CHAPTER XVIII
THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
Early overtures towards peace by the United States 409
Castlereagh refuses to entertain the project of abandoning
impressment 410
Russia, in 1812, suggests negotiations for peace under mediation
of the Czar 411
United States accepts, but Great Britain refuses 412
Great Britain, through the Czar, offers a direct negotiation,
1813 412
The United States accepts, and names five commissioners 413
The original instructions to the American Commission, 1813 413
Reduced, 1814, through pressure of the war 414
Confident attitude of Great Britain at the opening of the
negotiations 415
Hostile spirit in Great Britain towards the United States 415
The instructions to the British Commission 416
The demand on behalf of the Indians 417
Faulty presentation of it by the British Commission 418
British claim concerning the Great Lakes and boundaries 419
Discussion of these propositions 419
Reasons for British advocacy of the Indians 421
Final reduction of British demand for the Indians and acceptance
by American Commission 423
Concern of British ministry for the opinion of Europe 424
News received of the capture of Washington 424
Sanguine anticipations based upon reports from Cochrane and Ross 424
The British Government suggests the _uti possidetis_ as the
basis of agreement 425
The American Commission refuse, and offer instead the _status
ante bellum_ 426
News arrives of the British defeat on Lake Champlain 426
The political instructions to the commanders of the New Orleans
expedition, to be communicated for the satisfaction of the
continental powers 427
Urgency of the European situation 428
Dangerous internal state of France 428
Consequent wish of the British ministry to withdraw Wellington
from Paris 429
He is pressed to accept the American command 429
Wellington thus brought into the discussion of terms 430
He pronounces against the basis of _uti possidetis_ 431
The British ministry accept his judgment 431
The _status ante bellum_ accepted by Great Britain 431
Subsequent rapid conclusion of agreement 432
Terms of the Treaty 432
Signed by the commissioners, December 24, 1814 434
Despatched to America by a British ship of war 435
Ratified by the United States, February 17, 1815 435
Gallatin's opinion of the effect of the war upon the people
of the United States 436
INDEX 439
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
VOLUME TWO.
THE CHASE OF THE _Constitution_ _Frontispiece_
From the painting by S. Salisbury Tuckerman.
THE QUARTERDECK OF THE _Java_ BEFORE THE SURRENDER Page 6
From a drawing by Henry Reuterdahl.
THE NEW CARRYING TRADE Page 18
From a drawing by Stanley M. Arthurs.
THE RETREAT OF THE BRITISH FROM SACKETT'S HARBOR Page 44
From a drawing by Henry Reuterdahl.
THE FLEETS OF CHAUNCEY AND YEO MANOEUVRING ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN Page 52
From a drawing by Carlton T. Chapman.
CAPTAIN ISAAC CHAUNCEY Page 60
From the engraving by D. Edwin, after the painting by
J. Woods.
CAPTAIN SIR JAMES LUCAS YEO Page 60
From the engraving by H.R. Cook, after the painting by
A. Buck.
CAPTAIN OLIVER HAZARD PERRY Page 66
From the painting by Gilbert Stuart, in the possession
of O.H. Perry, Esq.
PERRY RECEIVING THE SURRENDER OF THE BRITISH AT THE BATTLE
OF LAKE ERIE Page 94
From a drawing by Henry Reuterdahl.
CAPTAIN PHILIP BOWES VERE BROKE Page 134
From the mezzotint by Charles Turner, after the
painting by Samuel Lane, in the possession of Lady
Saumarez.
THE CAPTURE OF THE _Chesapeake_ BY THE _Shannon_--THE
STRUGGLE ON THE QUARTERDECK Page 138
From a drawing by Henry Reuterdahl.
CAPTAIN JAMES LAWRENCE Page 140
From the painting by Gilbert Stuart, in the possession
of the New Jersey Historical Society, Newark, N.J.
THE BURNING OF A PRIVATEER PRIZE Page 222
From a drawing by Henry Reuterdahl.
CAPTAIN DAVID PORTER Page 244
From the painting by Charles Wilson Peale, in
Independence Hall, Philadelphia.
CAPTAIN THOMAS MACDONOUGH Page 360
From the painting by Gilbert Stuart, in the Century
Club, New York, by permission of the owner, Rodney
Macdonough, Esq.
THE BATTLE OF LAKE CHAMPLAIN Page 380
From a drawing by Henry Reuterdahl.
MAPS AND BATTLE PLANS.
VOLUME TWO.
Plan of Engagement between _Constitution_ and _Java_ Page 4
Plan of Engagement between _Hornet_ and _Peacock_ Page 8
Map of Niagara Peninsula Page 38
Surroundings of Sackett's Harbor Page 43
Plan of Chauncey's Engagement, August 10, 1813 Page 58
Plan of Erie Harbor, 1814 Page 72
Diagram of the Battle of Lake Erie, September 10, 1813 Page 82
Chauncey and Yeo, September 28, 1813 Page 108
_Chesapeake_ and _Shannon_ Page 136
Outline Map of Chesapeake Bay and Rivers Page 156
_Enterprise_ and _Boxer_ Page 188
_Argus_ and _Pelican_ Page 218
_Montague_, _Pelham_, and _Globe_ Page 228
_Chasseur_ and _St. Lawrence_ Page 238
_Wasp_ and _Reindeer_ Page 254
Sketch of the March of the British Army, under General Ross,
from the 19th to the 29th August, 1814 Page 344
Tracing from pencil sketch of Battle of Lake Champlain made
by Commodore Macdonough Page 368
Battle of Lake Champlain Page 377
The Landing of the British Army, its Encampments and
Fortifications on the Mississippi; Works they erected on
their Retreat; with the Encampments and Fortifications
of the American Army Page 392
Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812
THE WAR (_Continued_)
CHAPTER IX
THE WINTER OF 1812-1813--BAINBRIDGE'S SQUADRON: ACTIONS
BETWEEN "CONSTITUTION" AND "JAVA," "HORNET" AND
"PEACOCK"--INCREASING PRESSURE ON ATLANTIC COAST
The squadron under Commodore William Bainbridge, the third which
sailed from the United States in October, 1812, started nearly three
weeks after the joint departure of Rodgers and Decatur. It consisted
of the "Constitution" and sloop of war "Hornet," then in Boston, and
of the "Essex," the only 32-gun frigate in the navy, fitting for sea
in the Delaware. The original armament of the latter, from which she
derived her rate, had been changed to forty 32-pounder carronades and
six long twelves; total, forty-six guns. It is noticeable that this
battery, which ultimately contributed not merely to her capture, but
to her almost helplessness under the fire of an enemy able to maintain
his distance out of carronade range, was strongly objected to by
Captain Porter. On October 14 he applied to be transferred to the
"Adams," giving as reasons "my insuperable dislike to carronades, and
the bad sailing of the "Essex," which render her, in my opinion, the
worst frigate in the service."[1] The request was not granted, and
Porter sailed in command of the ship on October 28, the two other
vessels having left Boston on the 26th.
In order to facilitate a junction, Bainbridge had sent Porter full
details of his intended movements.[2] A summary of these will show his
views as to a well-planned commerce-destroying cruise. Starting about
October 25, he would steer first a course not differing greatly from
the general direction taken by Rodgers and Decatur, to the Cape Verde
Islands, where he would fill with water, and by November 27 sail for
the island Fernando de Noronha, two hundred and fifty miles south of
the Equator, and two hundred miles from the mainland of Brazil, then a
Portuguese colony, of which the island was a dependency. The trade
winds being fair for this passage, he hoped to leave there by December
15, and to cruise south along the Brazilian coast as far as Rio de
Janeiro, until January 15. In the outcome the meeting of the
"Constitution" with the "Java" cut short her proceedings at this
point; but Bainbridge had purposed to stay yet another month along the
Brazilian coast, between Rio and St. Catherine's, three hundred miles
south. Thence he would cross the South Atlantic to the neighborhood of
St. Helena, remaining just beyond sight of it, to intercept returning
British Indiamen, which frequently stopped there. Porter failed to
overtake the other vessels, on account of the bad sailing of the
"Essex." He arrived at Fernando de Noronha December 14, one day before
that fixed by Bainbridge as his last there; but the "Constitution" and
"Hornet" had already gone on to Bahia, on the Brazilian mainland,
seven hundred miles to the southwest, leaving a letter for him to
proceed off Cape Frio, sixty miles from the entrance of Rio. He
reached this rendezvous on the 25th, but saw nothing of Bainbridge,
who had been detained off Bahia by conditions there. The result was
that the "Essex" never found her consorts, and finally struck out a
career for herself, which belongs rather to a subsequent period of the
war. We therefore leave her spending her Christmas off Cape Frio.
The two other vessels had arrived off Bahia on December 13. Here was
lying a British sloop of war, the "Bonne Citoyenne," understood to
have on board a very large amount of specie for England. The American
vessels blockaded her for some days, and then Captain Lawrence
challenged her to single combat; Bainbridge acquiescing, and pledging
his honor that the "Constitution" should remain out of the way, or at
least not interfere. The British captain, properly enough, declined.
That his ship and her reported value were detaining two American
vessels from wider depredations was a reason more important than any
fighting-cock glory to be had from an arranged encounter on equal
terms, and should have sufficed him without expressing the doubt he
did as to Bainbridge's good faith.[3] On the 26th the Commodore,
leaving Lawrence alone to watch the British sloop, stood out to sea
with the "Constitution," cruising well off shore; and thus on the
29th, at 9 A.M., being then five miles south of the port and some
miles from land, discovered two strange sail, which were the British
frigate "Java," Captain Henry Lambert, going to Bahia for water, with
an American ship, prize to her.
Upon seeing the "Constitution" in the south-southwest, the British
captain shaped his course for her, directing the prize to enter the
harbor. Bainbridge, watching these movements, now tacked his ship,
and at 11.30 A.M. steered away southeast under all plain sail, to draw
the enemy well away from neutral waters; the Portuguese authorities
having shown some sensitiveness on that score. The "Java" followed,
running full ten miles an hour, a great speed in those days, and
gaining rapidly. At 1.30, being now as far off shore as desired,
Bainbridge went about and stood toward the enemy, who kept away with a
view to rake, which the "Constitution" avoided by the usual means of
wearing, resuming her course southeast, but under canvas much reduced.
At 2.10 the "Java," having closed to a half mile, the "Constitution"
fired one gun ahead of her; whereupon the British ship hoisted her
colors, and the American then fired two broadsides. The "Java" now
took up a position to windward of the "Constitution," on her port
side, a little forward (2.10); "within pistol-shot," according to the
minutes submitted by the officer who succeeded to the command; "much
further than I wished," by Bainbridge's journal. It is not possible
entirely to reconcile the pretty full details of further movements
given by each;[4] but it may be said, generally, that this battle was
not mainly an artillery duel, like those of the "Constitution" and
"Guerrière," the "Wasp" and "Frolic," nor yet one in which a principal
manoeuvre, by its decisive effect upon the use of artillery, played
the determining part, as was the case with the "United States" and
"Macedonian." Here it was a combination of the two factors, a
succession of evolutions resembling the changes of position, the
retreats and advances, of a fencing or boxing match, in which the
opponents work round the ring; accompanied by a continual play of
the guns, answering to the thrusts and blows of individual
encounter. In this game of manoeuvres the "Constitution" was somewhat
handicapped by her wheel being shot away at 2.30. The rudder remained
unharmed; but working a ship by relieving tackles, the substitute for
the wheel, is for several reasons neither as quick nor as accurate.
[Illustration: PLAN OF THE ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN CONSTITUTION AND
JAVA]
Certain salient incidents stand out in both accounts, marking the
progress of the engagement. Shortly before three o'clock the head of
the "Java's" bowsprit was shot away, and with it went the jib-boom. At
this time, the fore and main masts of the British frigate being badly
wounded, with all the rigging cut to pieces, Captain Lambert looked
upon the day as lost unless he could board. The sailing master having
been sent below wounded, the first lieutenant, whose account is here
followed, was directed to run the ship alongside the enemy; but the
helm was hardly put up when the foremast went overboard, at five
minutes past three, a time in which both accounts agree. The British
narrative states that the stump of their bowsprit caught in the mizzen
rigging of the "Constitution" (3.35). This Bainbridge does not
mention; but, if correct, the contact did not last long, for the
"Constitution" immediately wore across the "Java's" bow, and the
latter's maintopmast followed the foremast. The British frigate was
now beaten beyond recovery; nevertheless the flag was kept flying, and
it was after this that Captain Lambert fell, mortally wounded.
Resistance was continued until 4.05, by the American accounts; by the
British, till 4.35. Then, the enemy's mizzenmast having fallen, and
nothing left standing but the main lower mast, the "Constitution" shot
ahead to repair damages. There was no more firing, but the "Java's"
colors remained up till 5.25,--5.50 by the British times,--when they
were hauled down as the "Constitution" returned. The American loss
was nine killed and twenty-five wounded; that of the British, by their
official accounts, twenty-two killed, one hundred and two wounded.
The superiority in broadside weight of fire of the "Constitution" over
the "Java" was about the same as over the "Guerrière." The "Java's"
crew was stronger in number than that of the "Guerrière," mustering
about four hundred, owing to having on board a hundred supernumeraries
for the East India station, to which the ship was ultimately destined.
On the other hand, the material of the ship's company is credibly
stated to have been extremely inferior, a condition frequently
complained of by British officers at this late period of the
Napoleonic wars. It has also been said, in apparent extenuation of her
defeat, that although six weeks out from England, having sailed
November 12, and greater part of that time necessarily in the trade
winds, with their usual good weather, the men had not been exercised
in firing the guns until December 28, the day before meeting the
"Constitution," when six broadsides of blank cartridges were
discharged. Whatever excuse may exist in the individual instance for
such neglect, it is scarcely receivable in bar of judgment when
disaster follows. No particular reason is given, except "the many
services of a newly fitted ship, lumbered with stores;" for in such
latitudes the other allegation, "a succession of gales of wind since
the day of departure,"[5] is incredible. On broad general grounds the
"Java" needed no apology for being beaten by a ship so much heavier;
and the "Constitution's" loss in killed and wounded was over double
that suffered from the "Guerrière" four months before, when the
American ship had substantially the same crew.[6] Further,
Bainbridge reported to his Government that "the damage received in the
action, but more especially the decayed state of the "Constitution,"
made it necessary to return to the United States for repairs."
Although Lieutenant Chads, who succeeded Lambert, was mistaken in
supposing the American ship bound to the East Indies, he was evidently
justified in claiming that the stout resistance of the "Java" had
broken up the enemy's cruise, thus contributing to the protection of
the British commerce.
[Illustration: THE QUARTERDECK OF THE _JAVA_ BEFORE THE
SURRENDER.
_Drawn by Henry Reuterdahl._]
The "Java" was considered by Bainbridge too much injured to be worth
taking to the United States. She was therefore set on fire December
31, and the "Constitution" went back to Bahia, where the prisoners
were landed under parole. Thence she sailed for home January 6, 1813,
reaching Boston February 27. Before his departure the Commodore
directed Lawrence to blockade Bahia as long as seemed advisable, but
to beware of a British seventy-four, said to be on the coast. When it
became expedient, he was to quit the position and move northward;
first off Pernambuco, and thence to the coast of Cayenne, Surinam, and
Demerara, a favorite cruising ground for American commerce-destroyers.
The "Hornet" was to be in Boston in the first fortnight of April.
In pursuance of these discretionary orders Lawrence remained off Bahia
for eighteen days, till January 24, when the expected seventy-four,
the "Montagu," appeared, forcing him into the harbor; but the same
night he came out, gave her the slip, and proceeded on his cruise. On
February 24, off the Demarara River, he encountered the British brig
of war "Peacock," a vessel of the same class as the "Frolic," which
was captured a few months before by the "Wasp," sister ship to the
"Hornet." There was no substantial difference in size between these
two approaching antagonists; but, unfortunately for the equality of
the contest, the "Peacock" carried 24-pounder carronades, instead of
the 32's which were her proper armament. Her battery power was
therefore but two thirds that of the "Hornet." The vessels crossed on
opposite tacks, exchanging broadsides within half pistol-shot, the
"Hornet" to windward(1). The "Peacock" then wore; observing which,
Lawrence kept off at once for her and ran on board her starboard
quarter (2). In this position the engagement was hot for about fifteen
minutes, when the "Peacock" surrendered, hoisting a flag union down,
in signal of distress. She had already six feet of water in the hold.
Being on soundings, in less than six fathoms, both anchored, and every
effort was made to save the British vessel; but she sank, carrying
down nine of her own crew and three of the "Hornet's." Her loss in
action was her commander and four men killed, and twenty-nine wounded,
of whom three died; that of the American vessel, one killed and two
wounded. The inequality in armament detracts inevitably from glory in
achievement; but the credit of readiness and efficiency is established
for Lawrence and his crew by prompt action and decisive results. So,
also, defeat is not inglorious under such odds; but it remains to the
discredit of the British commander that his ship did no more
execution, when well within the most effective range of her guns. In
commenting upon this engagement, after noticing the dandy neatness of
the "Peacock," James says, "Neglect to exercise the ship's company at
the guns prevailed then over two thirds of the British navy; to which
the Admiralty, by their sparing allowance of powder and shot for
practice, were in some degree instrumental."
With the survivors of the "Peacock," and prisoners from other prizes,
Captain Lawrence found himself now with two hundred and seventy-seven
souls on board and only thirty-four hundred gallons of water. There
was at hand no friendly port where to deposit his captives, and
provisions were running short. He therefore steered for the United
States, and arrived at Holmes' Hole on March 19.[7]
[Illustration: PLAN OF ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN HORNET AND PEACOCK]
The capture of the "Peacock" was the last of five naval duels, three
between frigates and two between sloops, all favorable in issue to the
United States, which took place in what may justly be considered the
first of the three periods into which the War of 1812 obviously
divides. Great Britain, long reluctant to accept the fact of war as
irreversible, did not begin to put forth her strength, or to exercise
the measures of repression open to her, until the winter of 1812-13
was drawing to a close. On October 13, convinced that the mere news of
the revocation of the Orders in Council would not induce any change in
the American determination, the hitherto deferred authority for
general reprisals was given; but accompanying them was an express
provision that they were not to be understood as recalling the
declaration which Warren had been commissioned to make, in order to
effect a suspension of hostilities.[8] On November 27, however, hopes
from this source having apparently disappeared, directions were sent
the admiral to institute a rigorous commercial blockade of Delaware
and Chesapeake bays,[9] the usual public notification of the fact to
neutral Powers, for the information of their shipping affected by it,
being issued December 26, three days before the action between the
"Constitution" and "Java." On February 21, three days before the
"Hornet" sank the "Peacock," Warren wrote that in compliance with the
orders of November 27 this blockade had been put in force. The ship
"Emily," from Baltimore for Lisbon, under a British license, with a
cargo of flour, was turned back when attempting to go to sea from the
Chesapeake, about February 5; Warren indorsing on her papers that the
bay had been placed under rigorous blockade the day before.[10]
Captain Stewart, the senior United States officer at Norfolk, notified
his Government of these facts on February 10.[11] Soon after, by an
Order in Council dated March 30, the measure was extended to New York,
Charleston, Port Royal, Savannah, and the Mississippi River.[12] Later
in the year Warren, by a sweeping proclamation, dated November 16,[13]
widened its scope to cover Long Island Sound, inside of Montauk and
Black Point; the latter being on the Connecticut shore, eight miles
west of New London. From thence it applied not only to the ports
named, but to all inlets whatsoever, southward, as far as the Florida
boundary. Narragansett Bay and the rest of New England remained still
exempt.
These restrictions, together with the increase of Warren's force and
the operations of 1813 in the Chesapeake, may be considered as
initiating the second stage of the war, when Great Britain no longer
cherished hopes of any other solution than by the sword, but still was
restrained in the exercise of her power by the conflict with Napoleon.
With the downfall of the latter, in April, 1814, began the third and
final act, when she was more at liberty to let loose her strength, to
terminate a conflict at once weakening and exasperating. It is not
without significance that the treaty of peace with the restored
Bourbon government of France was signed May 30, 1814,[14] and that on
May 31 was issued a proclamation placing under strict and rigorous
blockade, not merely specified places, but "all the ports, harbors,
bays, creeks, rivers, inlets, outlets, islands, and sea-coasts of the
United States," from the border of New Brunswick to that of
Florida.[15] In form, this was only the public notification of a
measure already instituted by Warren's successor, Cochrane, embracing
Newport, Boston, and the East under restrictions heretofore limited to
New York--including Long Island Sound--and the coast southward; but it
was not merely the assertion of a stringent resolution. It was a clear
defiance, in the assurance of conscious power, of a principal
contention of the United States, that the measure of blockades against
neutrals was not legitimately applicable to whole coasts, but only to
specified ports closely watched by a naval force competent to its
avowed purpose.
Despite the gathering of the storm, the full force of which was to be
expected in the spring, the United States ships of war that reached
port in the early and middle winter of 1812-13 remained. There is,
perhaps, an unrecognized element of "hindsight" in the surprise felt
at this fact by a seaman of to-day, knowing the views and wishes of
the prominent officers of the navy at that period. Decatur, with the
"United States," reached New York in December, accompanied by the
"Macedonian." Neither of these vessels got to sea again during the
war. By the time they were ready, both outlets to the port were
effectually blocked. Rodgers, with the "President" and "Congress,"
entered Boston December 31, but did not sail again until April 23. The
"Constellation," Captain Stewart, was reported, perhaps erroneously,
as nearly ready for sea at Washington, November 26, waiting only for a
few additional hands. Later in the winter she went to Annapolis, to
examine her powder, leaving there for Hampton Roads February 1, on
account of the ice. On the 4th, approaching her destination, she
discovered two ships of the line, three frigates, and two smaller
British vessels, working up from the Capes for the Roads. In the face
of such a force there was nothing to do but to escape to Norfolk,
where she remained effectually shut up for the rest of the war.
Bainbridge, as already known, brought the "Constitution" back for
repairs in February. Even from Boston she was unable to escape till
the following December.
That there were satisfactory reasons for this seeming dilatoriness is
assured by the character of the officers. Probably the difficulty of
keeping up the ship's companies, in competition with the superior
attractions of privateering and the very high wages offered by the
merchants for their hazardous but remunerative commercial voyages
accounted for much. Hull wrote from New York, October 29, 1812, that
the merchants fitting out their vessels gave such high wages that it
was difficult to get either seamen or workmen.[16] Where no system of
forced enrolment--conscription or impressment--is permitted,
privateering has always tended to injure the regular naval service.
Though unquestionably capable of being put by owners on a business
basis, as a commercial undertaking, with the individual seaman the
appeal of privateering has always been to the stimulants of chance and
gain, which prove so attractive in the lottery. Stewart, an officer of
great intelligence and experience in his profession, found a further
cause in the heavy ships of the enemy. In the hostilities with France
in 1798-1800, he said, "We had nearly four thousand able seamen in the
navy. We could frequently man a frigate in a week. One reason was
because the enemy we were then contending with had not afloat (with
very few exceptions) vessels superior in rate to frigates. The enemy
we are fighting now have ships of the line, and our sailors know the
great difference between them and frigates, and cannot but feel a
degree of reluctance at entering the service from the disparity of
force."[17] The reason seems to prove too much; pressed to an extreme,
no navy would be able to use light vessels, because the enemy had
heavier which might--or might not--be encountered. Certain it is,
however, that when the government in the following winter, in order to
stop the license trade with the enemy, embargoed all vessels in home
ports, much less difficulty was experienced in getting seamen for the
navy.
Whatever the reasons, the only frigates at sea during the first four
months of 1813 were the "Essex" and the "Chesapeake." The former,
after failing to meet Bainbridge, struck off boldly for the Pacific
Ocean on Porter's own motion; and on March 15, 1813, anchored at
Valparaiso, preparatory to entering on a very successful career of a
year's duration in those seas. The "Chesapeake" had sailed from Boston
December 17, making for the Cape Verde Islands. In their neighborhood
she captured two of a British convoy, which, thinking itself beyond
danger, had dispersed for South American destinations. The frigate
then proceeded to her cruising ground near the equator, between
longitudes 24° and 30° west, where she remained for about a month,
taking only one other merchantman. Leaving this position, she was off
the coast of Surinam from March 2 to 6, when she returned to the
United States; passing sixty miles east of the Caribbean Islands and
thence north of Porto Rico and Santo Domingo, as far west as longitude
75°, whence she ran parallel to the American coast, reaching Boston
April 9. Having seen nothing between February 5 and March 19, she then
began to meet sails, speaking eight between the latter date and her
arrival. Most of these were Americans, homeward bound from the Spanish
peninsula; the others neutrals.[18] The conclusion is evident, that
the British were keeping their trade well shepherded in convoys. If a
ship like the "Chesapeake" struck one of them, she would probably have
to fight the escorting vessel, as the "Wasp" did the "Frolic," while
the merchantmen escaped; but the chances were against her seeing
anything. Another evident conclusion, corresponding to the export
returns already quoted, is that the enemy had not yet shut down upon
the access of American merchant ships to their own coast.
This process was gradual, but steady. It is necessary to keep in mind
the distinction between a blockade, in the loose use of the term,
which closes a port only to the ships of the hostile nation, and the
commercial blockade which forbids neutrals as well. The former may be
intermittent, for the mere fact of war authorizes the capture of the
belligerent's shipping, wherever found; hence to intercept them at the
mouths of their own harbors is merely a more effectual method of
carrying out the measure. A blockade against neutrals requires the
permanent presence, before the blockaded port, of a force adequate to
make the attempt to enter or leave dangerous. For this many more ships
are needed. The British ministry, desirous chiefly to compel the
United States to peace, and embarrassed by the gigantic continental
strife in which it was engaged, sought at the outset to inflict such
harassment on the American coast as would cost the least diversion of
strength from the European contest. An ordinary blockade might be
tightened or relaxed as convenience demanded; and, moreover, there
were as yet, in comparison with American vessels, few neutrals to be
restrained. Normally, American shipping was adequate to American
commerce. The first move, therefore, was to gather upon the coast of
the United States all cruisers that could be spared from the Halifax
and West India stations, and to dispose along the approaches to the
principal ports those that were not needed to repress the privateers
in the Bay of Fundy and the waters of Nova Scotia. The action of these
privateers, strictly offensive in character, and the course of
Commodore Rodgers in sailing with a large squadron, before explained,
illustrate exactly how offensive operations promote defensive
security. With numbers scanty for their work, and obliged to
concentrate instead of scattering, the British, prior to Warren's
arrival, had not disposable the cruisers with which greatly to harass
even the hostile shipping, still less to institute a commercial
blockade. The wish to stock the Spanish peninsula and the West Indies
with provisions contributed further to mitigate the pressure.
These restraining considerations gradually disappeared.
Re-enforcements arrived. Rodgers' squadron returned and could be
watched, its position being known. The license trade filled up Lisbon,
Cadiz, and the West Indies. Hopes of a change of mind in the American
Government lessened. Napoleon's disaster in Russia reversed the
outlook in European politics. Step by step the altered conditions were
reflected in the measures of the British ministry and navy. For
months, only the maritime centres of the Middle States were molested.
The senior naval officer at Charleston, South Carolina, wrote on
October 14, four months after war was declared, "Till to-day this
coast has been clear of enemy's cruisers; now Charleston is blockaded
by three brigs, two very large, and they have captured nine sail
within three miles of the bar."[19] The number was increased shortly;
and two months later he expressed surprise that the inland navigation
behind the sea islands had not been destroyed,[20] in consequence of
its defenceless state. In January, 1813, the mouth of the Chesapeake
was watched by a ship of the line, two frigates, and a sloop; the
commercial blockade not having been yet established. The hostile
divisions still remained outside, and American vessels continued to go
out and in with comparative facility, both there and at Charleston. A
lively trade had sprung up with France by letters-of-marque; that is,
by vessels whose primary object is commerce, and which therefore carry
cargoes, but have also guns, and a commission from the Government to
make prizes. Without such authorization capture is piracy. By February
12 conditions grow worse. The blockaders have entered the Chesapeake,
the commercial blockade has been proclaimed, vessels under neutral
flags, Spanish and Swedish, are being turned away, and two fine
letter-of-marque schooners have been captured inside, one of them
after a gallant struggle in which her captain was killed. Nautical
misadventures of that kind became frequent. On April 3 three
letters-of-marque and a privateer, which had entered the Rappahannock,
were attacked at anchor by boats from Warren's fleet. The
letters-of-marque, with smaller crews, offered little resistance to
boarding; but the privateer, having near a hundred men, made a sharp
resistance. The Americans lost six killed and ten wounded; the enemy,
two killed and eleven wounded.[21]
In like manner the lower Delaware was occupied by one or more ships of
the line. Supported thus by a heavy squadron, hostile operations were
pushed to the upper waters of both bays, and in various directions;
the extensive water communications of the region offering great
facilities for depredation. Dismay and incessant disquietude spread
through all quarters of the waterside. Light cruisers make their way
above Reedy Island, fifty miles from the Capes of the Delaware;
coasting vessels are chased into the Severn River, over a hundred
miles above Hampton Roads; and a detachment appears even at the mouth
of the Patapsco, twelve miles from Baltimore. The destruction of bay
craft, and interruption of water traffic, show their effects in the
rise of marketing and fuel to double their usual prices. By May 1, all
intercourse by water was stopped, and Philadelphia was also cut off
from the lower Delaware. Both Philadelphia and Baltimore were now
severed from the sea, and their commerce destroyed, not to revive till
after the peace; while alarms, which the near future was to justify,
were felt for the land road which connected the two cities. As this
crossed the head waters of the Chesapeake, it was open to attack from
ships, which was further invited by deposits of goods in transit at
Elkton and Frenchtown. Fears for the safety of Norfolk were felt by
Captain Stewart, senior naval officer there. "When the means and force
of the enemy are considered, and the state of this place for defence,
it presents but a gloomy prospect for security."[22] Commodore Murray
from Philadelphia reports serious apprehensions, consternation among
the citizens, a situation daily more critical, and inadequate
provision for resistance.[23] There, as everywhere, the impotence of
the General Government has to be supplemented by local subscription
and local energy.
At the same time, both northward and southward of these two great
estuaries, the approach of spring brought ever increasing enemies, big
and little, vexing the coasting trade; upon which, then as now, depended
largely the exchange of products between different sections of the
country. What it meant at that day to be reduced to communication by
land may be realized from a contemporary quotation: "Four wagons loaded
with dry goods passed to-day through Georgetown, South Carolina, for
Charleston, _forty-six days_ from Philadelphia."[24] Under the heading
"New Carrying Trade" a Boston paper announces on April 28 the arrival of
"a large number of teams from New Bedford with West India produce, and
four Pennsylvania wagons, seventeen days from Philadelphia."[25] "The
enemy has commenced his depredations on the coasting trade of the
Eastern States on a very extensive scale, by several ships and
sloops-of-war, and five or six active privateers. The United States brig
"Argus" cruises at the entrance of Long Island Sound for the protection
of trade, latterly jeopardized;"[26] a position from which she was soon
driven by an overwhelming force. Hull, now commanding at Portsmouth,
reports April 9, "several privateers on the Eastern coast, which have
been successful in cutting coasters out of several harbors east." May 7:
"A small force is indeed needed here; the enemy appear off the harbor
nearly every day. A few days since, a little east of this, they burnt
twelve coasters and chased several into this port."[27] The town is
defenceless. The Governor of Rhode Island laments to the Legislature
"the critical and exposed situation of our fellow-citizens in Newport,
who are frequently menaced by the ships and vessels about Point Judith";
mentioning beside, "the burning of vessels in Narragansett Bay, and the
destruction of our coasting trade, which deprives us of the usual and
very necessary supplies of bread stuffs from other States."[28] The ship
"Maddox," blockaded for two or three months in the Chesapeake, escaped
in May, and reached Newport with five thousand barrels of flour. This is
said to have reduced the price by $2.50 in Boston, where it was ranging
at $17 to $18; while at Cadiz and Lisbon, thanks to British licenses
and heavy stocking in anticipation of war, it stood at $12 to $13. The
arrival at Machias of a captured British vessel, laden with wheat, was
hailed "as a seasonable supply for the starving inhabitants of the
eastward."[29]
[Illustration: THE NEW CARRYING TRADE.
_Drawn by Stanley M. Arthurs._]
Ships returning from abroad necessarily had to pass through the
cruisers which interrupted the coasting trade. "Many valuable vessels
arrive, making at times hairbreadth escapes." The trade of Baltimore
and Philadelphia is thrown back upon New York and Boston; but both of
these, and the eastern entrance of Long Island Sound, have hostile
squadrons before them. The letter-of-marque schooner "Ned" has
transmitted an experience doubtless undergone by many. Bound to
Baltimore, she arrived off the Chesapeake April 18, and was chased
away; tried to get into the Delaware on the 19th, but was headed off;
made for Sandy Hook, and was again chased. Finally, she tried the east
end of the Sound, and there made her way through four or five ships of
war, reaching New York April 24.[30] Of course, under such
circumstances trade rapidly dwindled. Only very fast and weatherly
vessels could hope to cope with the difficulties. Of these the
conspicuous type was the Baltimore schooner, which also had not too
many eggs in one basket. In the general deprivation of commerce a
lucky voyage was proportionately remunerative; but the high prices of
the successful venture were but the complement and reflection of
suffering in the community. The harbors, even of New York, became
crowded with unemployed shipping.
This condition of things coastwise, supplemented by the activity of
American privateers, induced abnormal conditions of navigation in the
western Atlantic. The scanty success of Rodgers, Bainbridge, and the
"Chesapeake" have been noted; and it may be observed that there was a
great similarity in the directions taken by these and others. The Cape
Verdes, the equator between 24° and 30° west, the Guiana coast, the
eastern West Indies, Bermuda to Halifax, indicate a general line of
cruising; with which coincides substantially a project submitted by
Stewart, March 2, 1813, for a cruise by the "Constellation." These
plans were conceived with intelligent reference to known British
trade-routes; but, being met by the enemy with a rigid convoy system,
it was often hard to find a sail. The scattered American traders were
rapidly diminishing in numbers, retained in port as they arrived; and
it is noted that a British division of four vessels, returning to
Halifax after a four months' cruise between the Banks of Newfoundland
and Bermuda, have captured only one American.[31] An American
privateer, arriving at Providence after an absence of nearly four
months, "vexing the whole Atlantic," reports not seeing a single
enemy's merchant ship. Niles' return of prizes[32] to American
cruisers, national as well as privateers, gives three hundred and five
as the total for the first six months of the war; of which
seventy-nine only seem to have been taken distant from the home
shores. For the second six months, to June 30, 1813, the aggregate has
fallen to one hundred and fifty-nine, of which, as far as can be
probably inferred, ninety-one were captured in remote waters.
Comparing with the preceding and subsequent periods, we find here
evidently a time of transition, when American enterprise had not yet
aroused to the fact that British precaution in the Western Hemisphere
had made it necessary to seek prizes farther afield.
In view of the incompleteness of the data it is difficult to state
more than broad conclusions. It seems fairly safe, however, to say
that after the winter of 1812-13 American commerce dwindled very
rapidly, till in 1814 it was practically annihilated; but that, prior
to Napoleon's downfall, the necessities of the British Government, and
the importunity of the British mercantile community, promoted a
certain collusive intercourse by licenses, or by neutrals, real or
feigned, between the enemy and the Eastern States of the Union, for
the exportation of American produce. This trade, from the reasons
which prompted it, was of course exempt from British capture.
Subsidiary to it, as a partial relief to the loss of the direct
American market, was fostered an indirect smuggling import from Great
Britain, by way of Halifax and Montreal, which conduced greatly to the
prosperity of both these places during the war, as it had during the
preceding periods of commercial restriction. It was to maintain this
contraband traffic, as well as to foster disaffection in an important
section of the Union, that the first extension of the commercial
blockade, issued by Warren from Bermuda, May 26, 1813, stopped short
of Newport; while the distinction thus drawn was emphasized, by
turning back vessels even with British licenses seeking to sail from
the Chesapeake. By this insidious action the commercial prosperity of
the country, so far as any existed, was centred about the Eastern
States. It was, however, almost purely local. Little relief reached
the Middle and South, which besides, as before mentioned, were thus
drained of specie, while their products lay idle in their stores.
As regards relative captures made by the two belligerents, exact
numbers cannot be affirmed; but from the lists transmitted a fairly
correct estimate can be formed as to the comparative injury done in
this way. It must be remembered that such losses, however grievous in
themselves, and productive of individual suffering, have by no means
the decisive effect produced by the stoppage of commerce, even though
such cessation involves no more than the retention in harbor of the
belligerent's ships, as the Americans were after 1812, or as had been
the case during Jefferson's embargo of 1808. As that measure and its
congeners failed in their object of bringing the British Government to
terms, by deprivation of commerce, the pecuniary harm done the United
States by them was much greater than that suffered in the previous
years from the arbitrary action of Great Britain. She had seized, it
was alleged, as many as nine hundred and seventeen American
vessels,[33] many of which were condemned contrary to law, while the
remainder suffered loss from detention and attendant expenses; but
despite all this the commercial prosperity was such that the
commercial classes were averse to resenting the insults and injury. It
was the agricultural sections of the country, not the commercial,
which forced on the war.
Niles' Register has transmitted a careful contemporary compilation of
American captures, in closing which the editor affirmed that in the
course of the war he had examined not less than ten, perhaps twelve,
thousand columns of ship news, rejecting all prizes not accounted for
by arrival or destruction. It is unlikely that data complete as he
used are now attainable, even if an increase of accuracy in this point
were worth the trouble of the search. Up to May 1, 1813, he records
four hundred and eleven captures, in which are included the British
ships of war as well as merchantmen; not a very material addition. The
British Naval Chronicle gives the prize lists of the various British
admirals. From these may be inferred in the same period at least three
hundred seizures of American merchant vessels. Among these are a good
many Chesapeake Bay craft, very small. This excludes privateers, but
not letters-of-marque, which are properly cargo ships. Both figures
are almost certainly underestimates; but not improbably the proportion
of four to three is nearly correct. Granting, however, that the
Americans had seized four British ships for every three lost by
themselves, what does the fact establish as regards the effect upon
the commerce of the two peoples? Take the simple report of a British
periodical in the same month of May, 1813: "We are happy to announce
the arrival of a valuable fleet from the West Indies, consisting of
two hundred and twenty-six sail, under convoy of the "Cumberland,"
seventy-four, and three other ships of war."[34] This one fleet among
many, safely entering port, numbers more than half of their total
losses in the twelvemonth. Contrast this relative security with the
experience of the "Ned," cited a few pages back, hunted from headland
to headland on her home coast, and slipping in--a single ship by
dexterous management--past foes from whom no countryman can pretend to
shield her.
Even more mortifying to Americans, because under their very eyes, in
sharp contrast to their sufferings, was the prosperity of Halifax and
Canada. Vexed though British commerce was by the daring activity of
American cruisers, the main streams continued to flow; diminished in
volume, but not interrupted. The closure of American harbors threw
upon the two ports named the business of supplying American products
to the British forces, the British West Indies, and in measure to
Great Britain itself. The same reason fixed in them the deposit of
British goods, to be illicitly conveyed into the United States by the
smuggling that went on actively along the northern seacoast and land
frontier; a revival of the practices under the embargo of 1808. This
underground traffic was of course inadequate to compensate for that
lost by the war and the blockade; but it was quite sufficient to add
immensely to the prosperity of these places, the communications of
which with the sea were held open and free by the British navy, and in
which centred what was left from one of the most important branches of
British trade in the days of peace. Halifax, from its position on the
sea, was the chief gainer. The effects of the war on it were very
marked. Trade was active. Prices rose. Provisions were in great
demand, to the profit of agriculture and fisheries. Rents doubled and
trebled. The frequent arrival of prizes, and of ships of war going and
coming, added to the transactions, and made money plentiful.[35]
Recalling the generalization already made, that the seacoast of the
United States was strictly a defensive frontier, it will be recognized
that the successive institution of the commercial blockades, first of
the Chesapeake and Delaware in March, and afterward of the whole coast
south of Newport, in May, were the offensive operations with which the
British initiated the campaign of 1813. These blockades were
supported, and their effects sustained and intensified, by an
accumulation of naval force entirely beyond the competition of the
American navy. In view of such overwhelming disparity, it was no
longer possible, as in 1812, by assembling a squadron, to impose some
measure of concentration upon the enemy, and thus to facilitate
egress and ingress. The movements of the British had passed wholly
beyond control. Their admiral was free to dispose his fleet as he
would, having care only not to hazard a detachment weaker than that in
the port watched. This was a condition perfectly easy of fulfilment
with the numbers under his command. As a matter of fact, his vessels
were distributed over the entire seacoast; and at every point, with
the possible exception of Boston, the division stationed was so strong
that escape was possible only by evasion, under cover of severe
weather conditions.
Under such circumstances, the larger the ship the more difficult for
her to get out. As early as the middle of April, Captain Jones,
formerly of the "Wasp," and now commanding the "Macedonian" in New
York, reports that "both outlets are at present strongly blocked, but
I believe at dark of the moon we shall be able to pass without much
risk."[36] May 22, when a moon had come and gone, Decatur, still on
board the "United States," in company with which the "Macedonian" was
to sail, thinks it will be better to try the Sound route. "The last
gale, which promised the fairest opportunity for us to get out, ended
in light southerly winds, which continued till the blockading ships
had regained their stations."[37] A few days later, the attempt by the
Sound resulted in the two being driven into New London, where they
remained to the close of the war. The only offensive operation by sea
open to the United States, the destruction of the enemy's commerce,
fell therefore to the smaller cruisers and privateers, the size and
numbers of which combined to make it impossible to restrain them all.
For defensive measures the seaboard depended upon such fortifications
as existed, everywhere inadequate, but which either the laxness or the
policy of the British commander did not attempt to overcome in the
case of the seaports, narrowly so called. The wide-mouthed estuaries
of the Chesapeake and Delaware, entrance to which could not thus be
barred, bore, therefore, the full brunt of hostile occupation and
widespread harassment. In this there may have been deliberate
intention, as well as easy adoption of the readiest means of
annoyance. The war, though fairly supported in the middle section of
the Union, was essentially a Southern and Western measure. Its most
strenuous fomenters came from those parts, and the administration was
Virginian. The President himself had been identified with the entire
course of Jefferson's commercial retaliation, and general policy
toward Great Britain during twelve years past. It is impossible for
land forces alone to defend against naval aggression a region like the
Chesapeake, with its several great, and numerous small, streams
penetrating the country in every direction; and matters are not helped
when the defendants are loosely organized militia. The water in such a
case offers a great central district, with interior lines, in the
hands of a power to which belongs the initiative, with an overpowering
mobile force, able at any moment to appear where it will in superior
strength.
No wonder then that the local journals of the day speak of continual
watchfulness, which from the present organization of the militia is
exceedingly toilsome, and of no little derangement to the private
affairs of the people.[38] The enemy spreads in every direction; and,
although the alarm caused much exceeds the injury done, disquietude is
extreme and universal. "Applications from various quarters are
constantly pouring in upon us," wrote a Governor of Maryland to the
President; "and as far as our very limited means will enable us we are
endeavoring to afford protection. But we have not arms and ammunition
to supply the demands of every section of the State; the unavoidable
expense of calling out the militia for its protection would greatly
exceed the ability of the State government. The capital of the State
[which was three miles from the bay, on a navigable river] has not
sufficient force for its protection. By the Constitution of the United
States, the common defence is committed to the National Government,
which is to protect each State against invasion, and to defray all
necessary expenses of a national war; and to us it is a most painful
reflection that after every effort we have made, or can make, for the
security of our fellow-citizens and of their property, they have
little to rely on but the possible forbearance of the enemy."[39] The
process of reaping what has been sowed is at times extremely
unpleasant.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Captains' Letters. Navy Department.
[2] Ibid., Bainbridge, Oct. 13, 1812.
[3] Niles' Register, vol. iv. p. 25.
[4] Bainbridge's report is in the Captains' Letters. Navy Department,
Jan. 3, 1813. It will be found also in Niles' Register, vol. iii. p.
410. Both give extracts from Bainbridge's journal, which is very full on
the subject of manoeuvres and times. The British account will be found
in the Naval Chronicle, vol. xxix. pp. 403-408, from which the plan of
the battle is copied.
[5] James' Naval History, edition 1824, vol. v. p. 313.
[6] Bainbridge in a private letter speaks of the men looking forward to
prize money for the "Guerrière" on their return. Niles' Register, vol.
iii. p. 411.
[7] Lawrence's Report of these transactions is in Captains' Letters,
March 19, 1813. It will be found also in Niles' Register, vol. iv. p.
84.
[8] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxviii. p. 305.
[9] Admiralty to Warren, British Records Office.
[10] Niles' Register, vol. iii. p. 383.
[11] Captains' Letters.
[12] Niles' Register, vol. iv. p. 159. The Admiralty's letter to Warren
to institute this blockade is dated March 25. British Records Office.
[13] Niles' Register, vol. v. p. 264.
[14] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxi. p. 464.
[15] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxi. p. 475.
[16] Captains' Letters.
[17] American State Papers, Naval Affairs, vol. i. p. 280.
[18] Captain Evans' Report, April 10, 1813. Captains' Letters.
[19] Captains' Letters.
[20] Ibid, Dec. 17, 1812.
[21] Niles' Register, vol. iv. p. 119. Naval Chronicle, vol. xxix. p.
501.
[22] March 17, 1813. Captains' Letters.
[23] March 17, 18, and 21. Ibid.
[24] Niles' Register, vol. iv. p. 222.
[25] Columbian Centinel.
[26] Niles' Register, vol. iv. p. 117.
[27] Captains' Letters.
[28] Message of the Governor of Rhode Island, May 5, 1813.
[29] Niles' Register, vol. iv. pp. 200, 209. There were reported in
Cadiz at this time 160,000 barrels of flour, unsold. The Columbian
Centinel (Feb. 17) speaks of the Lisbon market as deplorable.
[30] Niles' Register, vol. iv. p. 150.
[31] Niles' Register, vol. iv. p. 101.
[32] Ibid., p. 117.
[33] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 584. France
in the same period had seized five hundred and fifty-eight.
[34] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxix. p. 497. The following extract from an
American journal may have interest as indicating the extent of the
British convoy movement. "American brig 'Hazard,' arrived at New York
from Madeira, June 5, reports: 'April 11, arrived at Funchal the outward
bound East India and Brazil fleets, forty sail, under convoy. Sailed
April 12. April 21, arrived outward bound Cork fleet, one hundred and
eighty sail convoyed by a seventy-four, a frigate, and a sloop.' April
30, sailed from Jamaica, three hundred merchantmen, under convoy of a
seventy-four, two frigates and a sloop." (Columbian Centinel, of Boston,
June 9, 1813.)
[35] Murdoch's History of Nova Scotia, vol. iii. p. 351.
[36] Captains' Letters, April 13, 1813.
[37] Ibid., May 22.
[38] Niles' Register, vol. iv. p. 134.
[39] Letter of Governor Winder, April 26, 1813. Niles' Register, vol.
iv. p. 204.