CHAPTER XI

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1813 ON THE LAKES AND NORTHERN FRONTIER.

THE BATTLE OF LAKE ERIE

While the movements last related in the preceding chapter were in

progress, the contest for Lake Erie was brought to a final decision.

After the successful transfer of the vessels from Black Rock to Erie,

June 18, Perry remained upon the upper lake superintending all

administrative work; but in particular pressing the equipment of the

two brigs ordered by Chauncey the previous winter. To one of these, on

which Perry intended to embark his own fortunes, was given the name of

"Lawrence," the captain of the "Chesapeake," whose death, heroic in

defeat, occurred at this period. The other was called the "Niagara."

They were sister vessels, of five hundred tons, constructed for war,

and brig-rigged; that is, with two masts, and carrying square sails on

both. Their armaments also were alike; eighteen 32-pounder carronades,

and two long 12-pounder guns. They were thus about equivalent in

fighting force to the ocean sloops-of-war, "Wasp" and "Hornet," which,

however, were three-masted. The remainder of the force would now be

called a scratch lot. Three were schooner-rigged gunboats, built for

the navy at Erie; the remainder were the vessels brought from Black

Rock. Of these, one was the brig "Caledonia," formerly British,

captured by Elliott the previous autumn; the others were purchased

lake craft. When finally taking the lake, August 6, the squadron

consisted of the two brigs, of the Black Rock division,--"Caledonia,"

"Somers," "Tigress," "Ohio," and "Trippe,"--and of three other

schooners,--"Ariel," "Scorpion," and "Porcupine,"--apparently those

built at Erie; ten sail, all of which, except the "Ohio," were in the

final decisive battle.

On July 23 the vessels were rigged, armed, and ready for service, but

there were not men enough to man them. How little exacting Perry was

in this matter, and how eager to enter upon active operations, is

shown by a letter from his superior, Chauncey, to the Secretary of the

Navy, dated July 8: "I am at a loss," he says, "to account for the

change in Captain Perry's sentiments with respect to the number of men

required for the little fleet at Presqu' Isle; for when I parted with

him on the last of May, we coincided in opinion perfectly as to the

number required for each vessel, which was one hundred and eighty for

each of the new brigs, sixty for the 'Caledonia,' and forty for each

of the other vessels, making in all seven hundred and forty officers

and men. But if Captain Perry can beat the enemy with half that

number, no one will feel more happy than myself."[74] Chauncey having

supreme control over both lakes, all re-enforcements from the seaboard

were sent to him; and as he had his own particular enemy on Ontario to

confront, it was evident, and natural, that Perry would be least well

served. Hence, after successive disappointments, and being of more

venturous temper than his superior, it is not surprising that he soon

was willing to undertake his task with fewer men than his unbiased

judgment would call necessary.

The clash of interests between the two squadrons, having a common

superior but separate responsibilities, is seen by a comparison of

dates, which shows operations nearly simultaneous. On July 23 the Erie

squadron was reported "all ready to meet the enemy the moment they are

officered and manned;" on July 20 the "General Pike" was ready, and

on the 21st the Ontario squadron sailed from Sackett's Harbor. On

August 5 Perry had his vessels across the bar at Erie, and next day

stood out into the lake. On the 7th Chauncey and Yeo met for their

first encounter. On the 8th the two Ontario schooners, "Hamilton" and

"Scourge," were lost with nearly all on board; and on the 10th the

"Julia" and "Growler" were captured. After this, it may be imagined

that Chauncey with difficulty parted with men; and in the midst of his

second collision with Yeo the battle of Lake Erie occurred. In it, of

the one hundred and eighty men deemed necessary by Chauncey, Perry's

brig had one hundred and forty-two, of whom thirty were sick; while

the squadron, with nearly all its vessels present, instead of the

intended seven hundred and forty, had but four hundred and ninety. Of

this total, nearly one hundred were received from the army on August

31, only nine days before the action. For the most part these were

strangers to shipboard. Barring them, Perry's fighting force was

barely more than half that required by Chauncey's estimate.

Indirectly, and notwithstanding Perry's disposition to make the best

of his difficulty, this condition came near causing his withdrawal

from the lake service; a loss which, had it occurred, might have

reversed the issues, for in few general actions has the personality of

the commander counted for so much, after the battle joined. In a

letter of July 26 to Chauncey, he had written: "The men that came by

Mr. Champlin are a motley set, blacks, soldiers, and boys. I cannot

think you saw them after they were selected."[75] Chauncey replied,

somewhat testily, "I regret you are not pleased with the men sent you;

for, to my knowledge, a part of them are not surpassed by any seamen

we have in the fleet; and I have yet to learn that the color of the

skin, or the cut and trimmings of the coat, can affect a man's

qualifications or usefulness." To this he added a warning not much

short of a reproof: "As you have assured the secretary that you should

conceive yourself equal or superior to the enemy, with a force in men

so much less than I had deemed necessary, there will be a great deal

expected from you by your country, and I trust they will not be

disappointed in the high expectations formed of your gallantry and

judgment. I will barely make an observation, which was impressed upon

my mind by an old soldier; that is, 'Never despise your enemy.'"[76]

This advice was sound, rightly weighed. Yet it is not too much to say

that the confidence which carried Perry on to decisive victory has in

it inevitably something of that assurance of success which is akin to

contempt of the enemy, and that it was the precise quality in which

Chauncey, throughout his own career on the lakes, showed himself

deficient, and consequently failed. His plan at that moment, as he

himself said in a letter to Perry of July 14, was "to seek a meeting

with Sir James Yeo as soon as possible, in order to decide the fate of

this lake, and join you immediately after." This was an intelligent

project: to beat one enemy first, and then carry his force over to

beat the other; but never, when in presence of his antagonist, could

he despise him sufficiently to cut his gunboats adrift, and throw one

or two vessels into the midst of the fire, as Perry rushed his own

ship in, had her cut to pieces,--and won. It is even worse to respect

your enemy too greatly than to despise him. Said Farragut, speaking of

an officer he highly valued: "Drayton does not know fear, but he

believes in acting as if the enemy never can be caught unprepared;

whereas I believe in judging him by ourselves, and my motto in action

is, '_L'audace, et encore de l'audace, et toujours de l'audace!_'"

This described Perry in battle.

Although Chauncey closed with expressions of confidence which might be

considered conciliatory, Perry experienced an annoyance which was

natural, though excessive. He was only twenty-eight, quick of temper,

though amiable, and somewhat prone to see more offence than was

intended. When the letter reached him, the squadron had just crossed

the bar; the most critical movement of the campaign, had the enemy

been duly watchful. Having accomplished this, he had before him only

the common vicissitudes of naval warfare. Nevertheless, under his

first impulse of resentment, he applied to be removed from the

station,[77] giving as his reason, not the quality of men sent,

concerning which indeed he had said, "I am pleased to see anything in

the shape of a man," but that "I cannot serve under an officer who has

been so totally regardless of my feelings." He then summarized the

difficulties with which he had contended, and added, "The critical

state of General Harrison was such that I took upon myself the

responsibility of going out with the few young officers you had been

pleased to send me," (Elliott, the second in command, did not arrive

till the squadron was over the bar), "with the few seamen I had, and

as many volunteers as I could muster from the militia. I did not

shrink from this responsibility; but, Sir, at that very moment I

surely did not anticipate the receipt of a letter in every line of

which is an insult." He then renewed his request. "I am willing to

forego that reward which I have considered for two months past almost

within my grasp." Fortunately for the renown of the service, from

which one of its finest actions might have been lost, it was

impossible to grant his application until after the battle had made

the question of the command on Lake Erie one of very minor

importance. The secretary replied to him with words in which rebuke

and appreciation were aptly blended. "A change of commander, under

existing circumstances, is equally inadmissible as it respects the

interest of the service and your own reputation. It is right that you

should reap the harvest which you have sown."[78]

[Illustration: CAPTAIN OLIVER HAZARD PERRY.

_From the painting by Gilbert Stuart in the possession of O.H.

Perry, Esq._]

After the Frenchtown disaster[79] of January 22, 1813, the Army of the

Northwest under General Harrison had remained strictly on the

defensive throughout the spring and summer. The tenure of its position

on the Maumee River depended upon Fort Meigs, built during the winter

just above the Rapids, some twenty miles from the lake. Thirty miles

east of Meigs was Fort Stephenson at the mouth of the Sandusky River,

protecting the approaches to Sandusky Bay, near which were Harrison's

headquarters at the time Perry's squadron was ready to move. Fort

Stephenson by its situation contributed also to secure the

communications of the Maumee line with Central Ohio, and was an

obstacle to an enemy's approach by land to Erie, a hundred and fifty

miles further east. It was not, however, a work permanent in

character, like Meigs; and neither post could be considered secure,

because inadequately garrisoned. Fortunately, the general tenor of the

instructions received by Procter from Prevost conspired with his own

natural character to indispose him to energetic measures. His force of

regulars was small; and he had not the faculty, which occasional white

men have shown, to arouse vigorous and sustained activity in the

Indians, of whom he had an abundance at call. The use of them in

desultory guerilla warfare, which was prescribed to him by Prevost,

became in his hands ineffective. Nevertheless, from the number known

to be under his command, and the control of the water enabling him to

land where he would, the threat of savage warfare hung over the

frontier like a pall, until finally dissipated by Perry's victory.

The danger to British control of the water, and thereby to the

maintenance of their position in the northwest, if the American fleet

now building should succeed in getting upon the lake, was perfectly

apparent, and made Erie a third and principal point of interest. At

the time of Perry's arrival, March 27, the place was entirely

defenceless, and without any organization for defence, although the

keels of the two brigs were laid, and the three gunboats well advanced

in construction. By a visit to Pittsburgh he obtained from an army

ordnance officer four small guns, with some muskets; and upon his

application the local commander of Pennsylvania militia stationed at

Erie five hundred men, who remained till the vessels crossed the bar.

Under this slender protection went on the arduous work of building and

equipping a squadron in what was substantially a wilderness, to which

most of the mechanics and material had to be brought half a thousand

miles from the seaboard, under the difficulties of transport in those

days. The rapid advance in the preparations aroused the disquietude of

the British, but Procter had not the enterprising temper to throw all

upon the hazard, for the sake of destroying an armament which, if

completed, might destroy him; while the British inferiority of force

on Lake Ontario and the Niagara peninsula, together with the movement

of Chauncey and Dearborn resulting in the capture of York, April 27,

effectually prevented intervention from that quarter in the affairs of

Lake Erie. At this time Procter made his first effort of the season,

directed against Fort Meigs, which he held besieged for over a

week,--from May 1 to May 9. Although unable to capture it, the

mismanagement of an American relief force enabled him to inflict a

very severe loss; a corps of eight hundred and sixty-six men being cut

to pieces or captured, only one hundred and seventy escaping. The

chief points of interest in this business are the demonstration of the

weakness of the American frontier,--the principal defence of which was

thus not merely braved but threatened,--and the effect of control of

the water. By it Procter brought over gunboats which ascended the

river, and guns of a weight not to be transported by land. The lake

also secured his communications.

After the failure before Meigs, Procter turned his attention more

seriously to the situation at Erie, and demanded re-enforcements to

enable him to attack the place.[80] Prevost, being commander-in-chief

for all Canada, recognized the expediency of the move, and wrote him,

June 20, that he had directed General De Rottenburg at Niagara, to

push on re-enforcements and supplies; but Prevost was in Kingston, and

De Rottenburg, immediately responsible for Niagara, wrote declining to

weaken his force. He was already inferior to the United States army

under Boyd, which was then confronting him, resting upon Fort George;

and there was the prospect also that Chauncey might regain control of

the lake. Instead of co-operation for offence, he transmitted

arrangements for retreat in case of a disaster to Yeo on Ontario.

Procter enclosed this letter to the commander-in-chief, remarking

pathetically that he was fully confident of receiving aid from him,

but intentions were of no avail. Had the force ordered been sent, he

felt sure of destroying the fleet at Erie, thus securing the command

of the lake, which would have benefited also the centre [Niagara]

division. He should now, he said, make an attempt upon Sandusky; Erie

was impossible without re-enforcements. At the same time, July 13,

Captain Barclay was about to sail for Long Point, on the Canada shore

directly opposite Erie, to embark one hundred troops, and then to

endeavor to retain the American fleet in port until the required

assistance could be sent. The new British ship "Detroit" was nearly

ready for launching at Amherstburg, and could be equipped and gunned

there; but seamen were absolutely needed.

In accordance with these plans Barclay went with his squadron to Long

Point. There the desired soldiers were refused him; and, as also no

seamen were forthcoming, he wrote on July 16 a letter directly to Sir

George Prevost, "lest Sir James Yeo should be on the lake,"

representing the critical state of affairs, owing to the inadequate

equipment of his vessels, the want of seamen, and the advanced

preparations of the Americans to put afloat a force superior to his.

July 20 he appeared off Erie, where Perry's fleet was still in the

harbor, waiting for men. How imminent the exposure of the American

flotilla at that moment, and how great the British opportunity,

appears from the recently published memoirs of a prominent

resident.[81] "An English fleet of five vessels of war was at that

time cruising off the harbor, in full view. That fleet might at any

time have sent in its boats during a dark night, and the destruction

of the whole American fleet was almost inevitable; for Perry's force

was totally inadequate to its defence, and the regiment of

Pennsylvania militia, stationed at Erie expressly for the defence of

the fleet, refused to keep guard at night on board. 'I told the boys

to go, Captain,' said the worthless colonel of the regiment, 'but the

boys won't go.'" Like American merchant ships, American militia obeyed

or disobeyed as they pleased. Two hundred soldiers, loaned by Dearborn

when the Black Rock flotilla came round, had been recalled July 10. On

the 23d and 30th re-enforcements were received from Chauncey, in all

one hundred and thirty men. With these, and some landsmen enlisted on

the spot for four months, the force of the squadron, estimated to

require seven hundred and forty men, was raised to three hundred; but

having lately received two pressing letters from the Navy Department,

urging General Harrison's critical need of co-operation, Perry

determined to go out. Most opportunely for his purpose, Barclay

disappeared on the 30th, Friday, which thus for him made good its

title to "unlucky." He was absent until August 4, and was by the

Americans believed to have gone to Long Point. Before his Court

Martial he merely stated that "I blockaded as closely as I could,

until I one morning saw the whole of the enemy's force over the bar,

and in a most formidable state of preparation." The Court did not

press inquiry on the point, which perhaps lay beyond its instructions;

but the double failure, to intercept the Black Rock division on its

way to Erie,[82] and to prevent the crossing of the bar, were serious

strategic misadventures when confronting superior numbers. Perry's

preparations for the passage had been for some time completed, but

information of contemplated movements travelled so easily from shore

to shore that he gave no indication of immediate action until Sunday.

On that day the officers were permitted to disperse in town as usual,

but afterwards were hastily summoned back, and the vessels moved down

to the bar, on which the depth ordinarily was from five to seven feet,

much less than needed for the "Lawrence" and "Niagara." This obstacle,

hitherto a protection against naval attack, now imposed an extremely

critical operation; for to get over, the brigs must be lightened of

their guns and their hulls lifted upon floats. So situated, they were

helplessly exposed to destruction, as far as their own powers went.

From point to point the mouth of the harbor, where the outer bar

occurs, was eight tenths of a mile wide. As shown by a sketch of the

period, the distance to be travelled on the floats, from deep water

within to deep water without, was a mile; rather less than more. On

Monday morning, August 2, the movement of the vessels began

simultaneously. Five of the smaller, which under usual conditions could

pass without lightening, were ordered to cross and take positions

outside, covering the channel; a sixth, with the "Niagara," were

similarly posted within. The protection thus afforded was re-enforced

by three 12-pounder long guns, mounted on the beach, abreast the bar;

distant not over five hundred yards from the point where the channel

issued on the lake. While these dispositions were being made, the

"Lawrence's" guns were hoisted out, and placed in boats to be towed

astern of her; the floats taken alongside, filled, sunk, and made fast,

so that when pumped out their rising would lift the brig. In the course

of these preparations it was found that the water had fallen to four

feet, so that even the schooners had to be lightened, while the transit

of the "Lawrence" was rendered more tedious and difficult. The weather,

however, was propitious, with a smooth lake; and although the brig

grounded in the shoalest spot, necessitating a second sinking of the

burden-bearing floats,--appropriately called "camels,"--perseverance

protracted through that night and the day of the 3d carried her

outside. At 8 A.M. of the 4th she was fairly afloat. Guns, singly light

in weight as hers were, were quickly hoisted on board and mounted; but

none too soon, for the enemy appeared almost immediately. The

"Niagara's" passage was more easily effected, and Barclay offered no

molestation. In a letter to the Department, dated August 4, 1813, 9

P.M., Perry reported, "I have great pleasure in informing you that I

have succeeded in getting over the bar the United States vessels, the

'Lawrence,' 'Niagara,' 'Caledonia,' 'Ariel,' 'Scorpion,' 'Somers,'

'Tigress,' and 'Porcupine.'" He added, "The enemy have been in sight

all day." The vessels named, with the schooner "Ohio" and the sloop

"Trippe," constituted the entire squadron.

[Illustration: PLAN OF ERIE HARBOR 1814

Copied from Captain's Letters, 1814, vol. 3, page 23, with letter

from Capt. A. Sinclair. May 6, 1814. A.H.E. Verified, Chas. W.

Stewart.]

While Perry was thus profitably employed, Procter had embarked on

another enterprise against the magazines on the American front of

operations. His intention, as first reported to Prevost, was to attack

Sandusky; but the conduct of the Indians, upon the co-operation of

whom he had to rely, compelled him to diverge to Fort Meigs. Here the

savages began to desert, an attempt to draw the garrison into an

ambush having failed; and when Procter, after two days' stay,

determined to revert to Sandusky, he was accompanied by "as many

hundred of them as there should have been thousands." The white troops

went on by water, the Indians by the shore. They appeared before Fort

Stephenson on Sunday, August 1. The garrison was summoned, with the

customary intimation of the dire consequences to be apprehended from

the savages in case of an assault. The American commander, Major

Croghan, accepted these possibilities, and the following day, during

which the "Lawrence" was working her way over Erie bar, the artillery

and the guns of the gunboats were busy battering the northwest angle

of the fort. At 4 P.M. an assault was made. It was repelled with heavy

loss to the assailants, and little to the besieged. That night the

baffled enemy withdrew to Malden.

The American squadron having gained the lake and mounted its

batteries, Barclay found himself like Chauncey while awaiting the

"General Pike." His new and most powerful vessel, the ship "Detroit,"

was approaching completion. He was now too inferior in force to risk

action when he might expect her help so soon, and he therefore

retired to Malden. Perry was thus left in control of Lake Erie. He put

out on August 6; but, failing to find the enemy, he anchored again off

Erie, to take on board provisions, and also stores to be carried to

Sandusky for the army. While thus occupied, there came on the evening

of the 8th the welcome news that a re-enforcement of officers and

seamen was approaching. On the 10th, these joined him to the number of

one hundred and two. At their head was Commander Jesse D. Elliott, an

officer of reputation, who became second in command to Perry, and took

charge of the "Niagara."

On August 12 the squadron finally made sail for the westward, not to

return to Erie till the campaign was decided. Its intermediate

movements possess little interest, the battle of Lake Erie being so

conspicuously the decisive incident as to reduce all preceding it to

insignificance. Perry was off Malden on August 25, and again on

September 1. The wind on the latter day favoring movement both to go

and come, a somewhat rare circumstance, he remained all day

reconnoitring near the harbor's mouth. The British squadron appeared

complete in vessels and equipment; but Barclay had his own troubles

about crews, as had his antagonist, his continual representations to

Yeo meeting with even less attention than Perry conceived himself to

receive from Chauncey. He was determined to postpone action until

re-enforcements of seamen should arrive from the eastward, unless

failure of provisions, already staring him in the face, should force

him to battle in order to re-establish communications by the lake.

The headquarters of the United States squadron was at Put-in Bay, in

the Bass Islands, a group thirty miles southeast of Malden. The harbor

was good, and the position suitable for watching the enemy, in case he

should attempt to pass eastward down the lake, towards Long Point or

elsewhere. Hither Perry returned on September 6, after a brief visit

to Sandusky Bay, where information was received that the British

leaders had determined that the fleet must, at all hazards, restore

intercourse with Long Point. From official correspondence, afterwards

captured with Procter's baggage, it appears that the Amherstburg and

Malden district was now entirely dependent for flour upon Long Point,

access to which had been effectually destroyed by the presence of the

American squadron. Even cattle, though somewhat more plentiful, could

no longer be obtained in the neighborhood in sufficient numbers, owing

to the wasteful way in which the Indians had killed where they wanted.

They could not be restrained without alienating them, or, worse,

provoking them to outrage. Including warriors and their families,

fourteen thousand were now consuming provisions. In the condition of

the roads, only water transport could meet the requirements; and that

not by an occasional schooner running blockade, but by the free

transit of supplies conferred by naval control. To the decision to

fight may have been contributed also a letter from Prevost, who had

been drawn down from Kingston to St. David's, on the Niagara frontier,

by his anxiety about the general situation, particularly aroused by

Procter's repulse from Fort Stephenson. Alluding to the capture of

Chauncey's two schooners on August 10, he wrote Procter on the 22d,

"Yeo's experience should convince Barclay that he has only to dare and

he will be successful."[83] It was to be Sir George's unhappy lot, a

year later, to goad the British naval commander on Lake Champlain into

premature action; and there was ample time for the present indiscreet

innuendo to reach Barclay, and impel him to a step which Prevost

afterwards condemned as hasty, because not awaiting the arrival of a

body of fifty seamen announced to be at Kingston on their way to

Malden.

At sunrise of September 10, the lookout at the masthead of the

"Lawrence" sighted the British squadron in the northwest. Barclay was

on his way down the lake, intending to fight. The wind was southwest,

fair for the British, but adverse to the Americans quitting the harbor

by the channel leading towards the enemy. Fortunately it shifted to

southeast, and there steadied; which not only enabled them to go out,

but gave them the windward position throughout the engagement. The

windward position, or weather gage, as it was commonly called,

conferred the power of initiative; whereas the vessel or fleet to

leeward, while it might by skill at times force action, or itself

obtain the weather gage by manoeuvring, was commonly obliged to await

attack and accept the distance chosen by the opponent. Where the

principal force of a squadron, as in Perry's case, consists in two

vessels armed almost entirely with carronades, the importance of

getting within carronade range is apparent.

Looking forward to a meeting, Perry had prearranged the disposition of

his vessels to conform to that which he expected the enemy to assume.

Unlike ocean fleets, all the lake squadrons, as is already known of

Ontario, were composed of vessels very heterogeneous in character.

This was because the most had been bought, not designed for the navy.

It was antecedently probable, therefore, that a certain general

principle would dictate the constitution of the three parts of the

order of battle, the centre and two flanks, into which every military

line divides. The French have an expression for the centre,--_corps de

bataille_,--which was particularly appropriate to squadrons like those

of Barclay and Perry. Each had a natural "body of battle," in vessels

decisively stronger than all the others combined. This relatively

powerful division would take the centre, as a cohesive force, to

prevent the two ends--or flanks--being driven asunder by the enemy.

Barclay's vessels of this class were the new ship, "Detroit," and the

"Queen Charlotte;" Perry's were the "Lawrence" and "Niagara." Each had

an intermediate vessel; the British the "Lady Prevost," the Americans

the "Caledonia." In addition to these were the light craft, three

British and six Americans; concerning which it is to be said that the

latter were not only the more numerous, but individually much more

powerfully armed.

The same remark is true, vessel for vessel, of those opposed to one

another by Perry's plan; that is, measuring the weight of shot

discharged at a broadside, which is the usual standard of comparison,

the "Lawrence" threw more metal than the "Detroit," the "Niagara" much

more than the "Queen Charlotte," and the "Caledonia," than the "Lady

Prevost." This, however, must be qualified by the consideration, more

conspicuously noticeable on Ontario than on Erie, of the greater

length of range of the long gun. This applies particularly to the

principal British vessel, the "Detroit." Owing to the difficulties of

transportation, and the demands of the Ontario squadron, her proper

armament had not arrived. She was provided with guns from the ramparts

of Fort Malden, and a more curiously composite battery probably never

was mounted; but, of the total nineteen, seventeen were long guns. It

is impossible to say what her broadside may have weighed. All her

pieces together fired two hundred and thirty pounds, but it is

incredible that a seaman like Barclay should not so have disposed them

as to give more than half that amount to one broadside. That of the

"Lawrence," was three hundred pounds; but all her guns, save two

twelves, were carronades. Compared with the "Queen Charlotte," the

battery of the "Niagara" was as 3 to 2; both chiefly carronades.

From what has been stated, it is evident that if Perry's plan were

carried out, opposing vessel to vessel, the Americans would have a

superiority of at least fifty per cent. Such an advantage, in some

quarter at least, is the aim of every capable commander; for the

object of war is not to kill men, but to carry a point: not glory by

fighting, but success in result. The only obvious dangers were that

the wind might fail or be very light, which would unduly protract

exposure to long guns before getting within carronade range; or that,

by some vessels coming tardily into action, one or more of the others

would suffer from concentration of the enemy's fire. It was this

contingency, realized in fact, which gave rise to the embittered

controversy about the battle; a controversy never settled, and

probably now not susceptible of settlement, because the President of

the United States, Mr. Monroe, pigeonholed the charges formulated by

Perry against Elliott in 1818. There is thus no American sworn

testimony to facts, searched and sifted by cross-examination; for the

affidavits submitted on the one side and the other were _ex parte_,

while the Court of Inquiry, asked by Elliott in 1815, neglected to

call all accessible witnesses--notably Perry himself. In fact, there

was not before it a single commanding officer of a vessel engaged.

Such a procedure was manifestly inadequate to the requirement of the

Navy Department's letter to the Court, that "a true statement of the

facts in relation to Captain Elliott's conduct be exhibited to the

world." Investigation seems to have been confined to an assertion in a

British periodical, based upon the proceedings of the Court Martial

upon Barclay, to the effect that Elliott's vessel "had not been

engaged, and was making away,"[84] at the time when Perry "was

obliged to leave his ship, which soon after surrendered, and hoist his

flag on board another of his squadron." The American Court examined

two officers of Perry's vessel, and five of Elliott's; no others. To

the direct question, "Did the 'Niagara' at any time during the action

attempt to make off from the British fleet?" all replied, "No." The

Court, therefore, on the testimony before it, decided that the charge

"made in the proceedings[85] of the British Court Martial ... was

malicious, and unfounded in fact;" expressing besides its conviction

"that the attempts to wrest from Captain Elliott the laurels he gained

in that splendid victory ... ought in no wise to lessen him in the

opinion of his fellow citizens as a brave and skilful officer." At the

same time it regretted that "imperious duty compelled it to promulgate

testimony which appears materially to differ in some of its most

important points."

In this state the evidence still remains, owing to the failure of the

President to take action, probably with a benevolent desire to allay

discord, and envelop facts under a kindly "All's well that ends well."

Perry died a year after making his charges, which labored under the

just imputation that he had commended Elliott in his report, and again

immediately afterwards, though in terms that his subordinate thought

failed to do him justice. American naval opinion divided, apparently

in very unequal numbers. Elliott's officers stood by him, as was

natural; for men feel themselves involved in that which concerns the

conduct of their ship, and see incidents in that light. Perry's

officers considered that the "Lawrence" had not been properly

supported; owing to which, after losses almost unparalleled, she had

to undergo the mortification of surrender. Her heroism, her losses,

and her surrender, were truths beyond question.

The historian to-day thus finds himself in the dilemma that the

American testimony is in two categories, distinctly contradictory and

mutually destructive; yet to be tested only by his own capacity to

cross-examine the record, and by reference to the British accounts.

The latter are impartial, as between the American parties; their only

bias is to constitute a fair case for Barclay, by establishing the

surrender of the American flagship and the hesitancy of the "Niagara"

to enter into action. This would indicate victory so far, changed to

defeat by the use Perry made of the vessel preserved to him intact by

the over-caution of his second. Waiving motives, these claims are

substantially correct, and constitute the analysis of the battle as

fought and won.

Barclay, finding the wind to head him and place him to leeward,

arranged his fleet to await attack in the following order, from van to

rear: The schooner "Chippewa," "Detroit," "Hunter," "Queen Charlotte,"

"Lady Prevost," "Little Belt."[86] This, he said in his official

letter, was "according to a given plan, so that each ship [that is,

the "Detroit" and "Queen Charlotte"] might be supported against the

superior force of the two brigs opposed to them." The British vessels

lay in column, in each other's wake, by the wind on the port tack,

hove-to (stopped) with a topsail to the mast, heading to the southwest

(position 1). Perry now modified some details of his disposition. It

had been expected that the "Queen Charlotte" would precede the

"Detroit," and the American commander had therefore placed the

"Niagara" leading, as designated to fight the "Charlotte," the

"Lawrence" following the "Niagara." This order was now reversed, and

the "Caledonia" interposed between the two; the succession being

"Lawrence," "Caledonia," "Niagara." Having more schooners than the

enemy, he placed in the van two of the best, the "Scorpion" and the

"Ariel"; the other four behind the "Niagara." His centre, therefore,

the "Lawrence," "Caledonia," and "Niagara," were opposed to the

"Detroit," "Hunter," and "Queen Charlotte." The long guns of the

"Ariel," "Scorpion," and "Caledonia" supplied in measure the

deficiency of gun power in the "Lawrence," while standing down outside

of carronade range; the "Caledonia," with the rear schooners, giving a

like support to the "Niagara." The "Ariel," and perhaps also the

"Scorpion," was ordered to keep a little to windward of the

"Lawrence." This was a not uncommon use of van vessels, making more

hazardous any attempt of the opponent to tack and pass to windward, in

order to gain the weather gage with its particular advantages

(position 1).

The rear four schooners, as is frequently the case in long columns,

were straggling somewhat at the time the signal to bear down was made;

and they had difficulty in getting into action, being compelled to

resort to the sweeps because the wind was light. It is not uncommon to

see small vessels with low sails thus retarded, while larger are being

urged forward by their lofty light canvas. The line otherwise having

been formed, Perry stood down without regard to them. At quarter

before noon the "Detroit" opened upon the "Lawrence" with her long

guns. Ten minutes later the Americans began to reply. Finding the

British fire at this range more destructive than he had anticipated,

Perry made more sail upon the Lawrence. Word had already been passed

by hail of trumpet to close up in the line, and for each vessel to

come into action against her opponent, before designated. The

"Lawrence" continued thus to approach obliquely, using her own long

twelves, and backed by the long guns of the vessels ahead and astern,

till she was within "canister range," apparently about two hundred and

fifty yards, when she turned her side to the wind on the weather

quarter of the "Detroit," bringing her carronade battery to bear

(position 2). This distance was greater than desirable for carronades;

but with a very light breeze, little more than two miles an hour,

there was a limit to the time during which it was prudent to allow an

opponent's raking fire to play, unaffected in aim by any reply.

Moreover, much of her rigging was already shot away, and she was

becoming unmanageable. The battle was thus joined by the

commander-in-chief; but, while supported to his satisfaction by the

"Scorpion" and "Ariel" ahead, and "Caledonia" astern, with their long

guns, the "Niagara" did not come up, and her carronades failed to do

their share. The captain of her opponent, the "Queen Charlotte,"

finding that his own carronades would not reach her, made sail ahead,

passed the "Hunter," and brought his battery to the support of the

"Detroit" in her contest with the "Lawrence" (Q_{2}). Perry's vessel

thus found herself under the combined fire of the "Detroit," "Queen

Charlotte," and in some measure of the "Hunter"; the armament of the

last, however, was too trivial to count for much.

Elliott's first placing of the "Niagara" may, or may not, have been

judicious as regards his particular opponent. The "Queen Charlotte's"

twenty-fours would not reach him; and it may be quite proper to take a

range where your own guns can tell and your enemy's cannot.

Circumstance must determine. The precaution applicable in a naval duel

may cease to be so when friends are in need of assistance; and when

the British captain, seeing how the case stood, properly and

promptly carried his ship forward to support his commander,

concentrating two vessels upon Perry's one, the situation was entirely

changed. The plea set up by Cooper, who fought Elliott's battle

conscientiously, but with characteristic bitterness as well as

shrewdness, that the "Niagara's" position, assigned in the line behind

the "Caledonia," could not properly be left without signal,

practically surrenders the case. It is applying the dry-rot system of

fleet tactics in the middle of the eighteenth century to the days

after Rodney and Nelson, and is further effectually disposed of by the

consentient statement of several of the American captains, that their

commander's dispositions were made with reference to the enemy's

order; that is, that he assigned a special enemy's ship to a special

American, and particularly the "Detroit" to the "Lawrence," and the

"Queen Charlotte" to the "Niagara." The vessels of both fleets being

so heterogeneous, it was not wise to act as with units nearly

homogeneous, by laying down an order, the governing principle of which

was mutual support by a line based upon its own intrinsic qualities.

The considerations dictating Perry's dispositions were external to his

fleet, not internal; in the enemy's order, not in his own. This was

emphasized by his changing the previously arranged stations of the

"Lawrence" and the "Niagara," when he saw Barclay's line. Lastly, he

re-enforced all this by quoting to his subordinates Nelson's words,

that no captain could go very far wrong who placed his vessel close

alongside those of the enemy.

[Illustration: DIAGRAM OF THE BATTLE OF LAKE ERIE SEPTEMBER 10,

1813]

Cooper, the ablest of Elliott's champions, has insisted so strongly

upon the obligation of keeping the station _in the line_, as laid

down, that it is necessary to examine the facts in the particular

case. He rests the certainty of his contention on general principles,

then long exploded, and further upon a sentence in Perry's charges,

preferred in 1818, that "the commanding officer [Perry] issued, 1st,

an order directing in what manner the line of battle should be formed

... and enjoined upon the commanders to preserve their stations in the

line" thus laid down.[87] This is correct; but Cooper omits to give

the words immediately following in the specification: "and in all

cases to keep as near the commanding officer's vessel [the "Lawrence"]

as possible."[88] Cooper also omits that which next succeeds: "2d, An

order of attack, in which the 'Lawrence' was designated to attack the

enemy's new ship (afterwards ascertained to have been named the

'Detroit'), and the 'Niagara' designated to attack the 'Queen

Charlotte,' which orders were then communicated to all the commanders,

including the said Captain Elliott, who for that purpose ... were by

signal called together by the said commanding officer ... and

expressly instructed that 'if, in the expected engagement, they laid

their vessels close alongside of those of the enemy, they could not be

out of the way.'"[89] An officer, if at once gallant and intelligent,

finding himself behind a dull sailing vessel, as Cooper tells us the

"Caledonia" was, could hardly desire clearer authority than the above

to imitate his commanding officer when he made sail to close the

enemy:--"Keep close to him," and follow up the ship which "the

'Niagara' was designated to attack."

Charges preferred are not technical legal proof, but, if duly

scrutinized, they are statements equivalent in value to many that

history rightly accepts; and, at all events, that which Cooper quotes

is not duly scrutinized if that which he does not quote is omitted. He

does indeed express a gloss upon them, in the words: "Though the

'Niagara' was ordered to direct her fire at the 'Queen Charlotte,' it

could only be done from her station astern of the 'Caledonia,' ...

without violating the primary order to preserve the line."[90] This

does not correctly construe the natural meaning of Perry's full

instructions. It is clear that, while he laid down a primary

formation, "a line of battle," he also most properly qualified it by a

contingent instruction, an "order of attack," designed to meet the

emergency likely to occur in every fleet engagement, and which

occurred here, when a slavish adherence to the line of battle would

prevent intelligent support to the main effort. If he knew naval

history, as his quotation from Nelson indicates, he also knew how many

a battle had been discreditably lost by "keeping the line."

With regard to the line, however, it is apt to remark that in fleet

battle, unless otherwise specially directed, the line of the assailant

was supposed to be parallel to that of the defence, for the obvious

reason that the attacking vessels should all be substantially at the

same effective range. This distance, equal for all in fleets as

usually constituted, would naturally be set, and in practice was set,

by the commander-in-chief; his ship forming the point through which

should be drawn the line parallel to the enemy. This rule, well

established under Rodney, who died in 1792, was rigidly applicable

between vessels of the same force, such as the "Lawrence" and

"Niagara;" and whatever deductions might be made for the case of a

light-framed vessel, armed with long guns, like the "Caledonia,"

keeping out of carronade distance of an opponent with heavy scantling,

would not in the least apply to the "Niagara." For her, the standard

of position was not, as Cooper insists, a half-cable's length from her

next ahead, the "Caledonia;" but abreast her designated opponent, at

the same distance as the "Lawrence" from the enemy's line. Repeated

mishaps had established the rule that position was to be taken from

the centre,--that is, from the commander-in-chief. Ships in line of

battle, bearing down upon an enemy in like order, did not steer in

each other's wake, unless specially ordered; and there is something

difficult to understand in the "Niagara" with her topsail sharp aback

to keep from running on board the "Caledonia," although the fact is in

evidence. The expression in Perry's report of the action, "at 10 A.M.

... formed the line and bore up," would by a person familiar with

naval battles be understood to mean that the line was first formed

parallel to the enemy, the vessels following one another, after which

they steered down for him, changing course together; they would then

no longer be in each other's wake, but in echelon, or as the naval

phrase then went, in bow and quarter line. Barclay confirms this, "At

10 the enemy bore up under easy sail, in a line abreast."[91] Thus,

when the distance desired by the commander-in-chief was reached,--a

fact more often indicated by his example than by signal,--the helm

would bring them again in line of battle, their broadsides bearing

upon the enemy.

The technical point at issue is whether Perry, finding the long-gun

fire of the "Detroit" more destructive than he had anticipated, and

determining in consequence to shorten the period of its duration by

changing his original plan, increasing sail beyond the speed of such

slower vessels as the "Caledonia," had a right to expect that his

subordinates would follow his example. In the opinion of the writer,

he had, in the then condition of the theory and practice of fleet

battles; his transfer of his own position transferred the line of

battle in its entirety to the distance relative to the enemy which he

himself was seeking to assume. Were other authority lacking, his

action was warrant to his captains; but the expression in his report,

"I made sail, and directed the other vessels to follow, for the

purpose of closing with the enemy," causes increased regret that the

exact facts were not ascertained by cross-examination before a

Court-Martial.

Elliott's place therefore was alongside the "Queen Charlotte," so to

engage her that she could attend to nothing else. This he did not do,

and for failure the only possible excuse was inability, through lack

of wind. The wind was light throughout, yet not so light but that the

"Lawrence" closed with the "Detroit," and the "Queen Charlotte" with

her flagship when she wished. None of Elliott's witnesses before the

Court of Inquiry state that he made sail before the middle of the

action, but they attribute the failure to get down to the lightness of

the wind. They do state that, after the "Lawrence" was disabled, a

breeze springing up, sail was made; which indicates that previously it

had not been. Again, it is alleged by the testimony in favor of

Elliott that much of the time the maintopsail was sharp aback, to keep

from running into the "Caledonia;" a circumstance upon which Cooper

dwells triumphantly, as showing that the "Niagara" was not by the wind

and was in her place, close astern of the "Caledonia." Accepting the

statements, they would show there was wind enough to fan the "Niagara"

to--what was really her place--her commodore's aid; for in those days

the distance between under fire and out of fire for efficient action

was a matter of half a mile.[92] Perry's formulated charge, addressed

to the Navy Department, and notified to Elliott, but never brought to

trial, was that when coming into action an order was passed by trumpet

for the vessels astern to close up in the line; that a few moments

previously to the enemy's opening fire the "Niagara" had been within

hail of the "Lawrence," and nevertheless she was allowed to drop

astern, and for two hours to remain at such distance from the enemy as

to render useless all her battery except the two long guns. Perry

himself made sail at the time the hail by trumpet was passed. The

"Niagara" did not.

There is little reason for doubt that the tenor of Perry's

instructions required Elliott to follow the "Queen Charlotte," and no

doubt whatever that military propriety imperiously demanded it of him.

The question of wind must be matter of inference from the incidents

above stated: the movement of the "Lawrence" and "Queen Charlotte,"

and the bracing aback of the "Niagara's" topsail. A sentence in

Perry's report apparently, but only apparently, attenuates the force

of these. He said, "At half-past two, the wind springing up, Captain

Elliott was enabled to bring his vessel, the 'Niagara,' gallantly into

close action." Alluding to, without insisting on, Perry's subsequent

statement that he endeavored to give as favorable a color as possible

to Elliott's course, it is clear enough that these words simply state

that Captain Elliott at 2.30 reached the range at which the "Lawrence"

had fought since a little after noon.

Quitting now the discussion of proprieties, the order of events seems

to have been as follows: Perry having taken the initiative of bearing

down, under increased sail, Elliott remained behind, governed by, or

availing himself of--two very different motives, not lightly to be

determined, or assumed, by the historian--the technical point, long

before abandoned in practice, that he could not leave his place in the

line without a signal. Thus his action was controlled by the position

of his next ahead in the line, the dull-sailing "Caledonia," a vessel

differing radically from his own in armament, having two long and for

that day heavy guns, quite equal in range and efficiency to the best

of the "Detroit's,"[93] and therefore capable of good service, though

possibly not of their best, from the distance at which Perry changed

his speed. Elliott's battery was the same as Perry's. He thus

continued until it became evident that, the "Queen Charlotte" having

gone to the support of the "Detroit," the "Lawrence" was heavily

overpowered. Then, not earlier than an hour after Perry bore down, he

realized that his commander-in-chief would be destroyed under his

eyes, unless he went to his support, and he himself would rest under

the imputation of an inefficient spectator. He ordered the "Caledonia"

to bear up, in order that he might pass (position 3; C_{1}, C_{2}).

Though not demonstrably certain, it seems probable that the wind,

light throughout, was now so fallen as to impede the retrieval of his

position; the opportunity to close, used by Perry, had passed away. At

all events it was not till between 2 and 2.30 that the "Niagara"

arrived on the scene, within effective range of the carronades which

constituted nine tenths of her battery.

With this began the second stage of the battle (3). Perry's bearing

down, receiving only the support of the long guns of the "Caledonia"

and of the schooners ahead of him, had brought the "Lawrence" into hot

engagement with the "Detroit," supported a half hour later by the

"Queen Charlotte." By a little after two o'clock both flagships were

well-nigh disabled, hull and battery; the "Lawrence" most so, having

but one gun left out of ten on the broadside. "At 2.30," wrote

Barclay, "the Detroit was a perfect wreck, principally from the raking

fire of the gunboats." Which gunboats? Evidently the "Ariel" and

"Scorpion," for all agree that the rear four were at this hour still

far astern, though not absolutely out of range. To these last was

probably due the crippling of the "Lady Prevost," which by now had

gone to leeward with her rudder injured. Up to this time, when the

first scene closed, what had been the general course of the action?

and what now the situation? Assuming, as is very probable, that

Barclay did not open with his long 24's until Perry was a mile, two

thousand yards, from him,--that distance requiring six degrees

elevation for those guns,--an estimate of speeds and courses, as

indicated by the evidence, would put the "Lawrence" in action, at two

hundred and fifty yards, at 12.10. This calculation, made

independently, received subsequent confirmation in consulting

Barclay's report, which says 12.15.[94] The same time, for the duller

"Caledonia" and the "Niagara," would place them one thousand yards

from the British line. This range, for the 32-pounder carronades of

the "Niagara," and the 24's of the "Queen Charlotte," required an

elevation of from four to six degrees. Coupling this with the British

statement, that the carronades of the "Charlotte" could not reach the

"Niagara," we obtain probable positions, two hundred and fifty yards

and one thousand yards, for the principal two American vessels at

quarter-past noon.

From the general lightness and occasional failure of the wind up to 2

P.M., it is more than likely that no great change took place before

that hour. What air there was might touch all alike, but would affect

least the "Lawrence," "Detroit," and "Queen Charlotte," because their

sails were being rent; and also they were in the centre of the

cannonade, which is believed usually to kill the breeze. The tendency

of the "Caledonia," "Niagara," and American vessels in rear of them,

between 12.30 and 2 P.M., during which period, to use Barclay's

report, "the action continued with great fury," would therefore be to

approach slowly the scene where the "Lawrence," supported by the long

guns of the "Ariel," "Scorpion," and "Caledonia," maintained the day

against the "Detroit" and "Queen Charlotte," backed by the schooner

"Chippewa" and the 6 and 4 pounder pop-guns of the "Hunter." How near

they drew is a mere matter of estimate. Taking all together, it may be

inferred that the "Niagara" had then been carried as close as five

hundred to six hundred yards to the British line, but it would appear

also towards its rear; rather, probably, that the British had advanced

relatively to her, owing to her course being oblique to theirs.

The situation then was as follows: The "Lawrence," disabled, was

dropping astern of the "Detroit," "Queen Charlotte," and "Hunter."

More than half her ship's company lay dead or wounded on her decks.

Her loss, 83 killed and wounded out of a total of 142,--sick

included,[95]--was mostly incurred before this. With only one gun

left, she was a beaten ship, although her colors were up. The

"Detroit" lay in the British line almost equally mauled. On her lee

quarter,--that is, behind, but on the lee side,--and close to her, was

the "Queen Charlotte." Her captain, second to Barclay, had been

killed,--the first man hit on board,--and her first lieutenant

knocked senseless; being succeeded in command by an officer whom

Barclay described as of little experience. The first lieutenant of the

"Detroit" was also wounded mortally; and Barclay himself, who already

had been once hit in the thigh, was now a second time so severely

injured,--being his eighth wound in battle, though now only

thirty-two,--that he was forced at this critical instant to go below,

leaving the deck with the second lieutenant. The "Hunter" was astern

of her two consorts. The "Lady Prevost," fifth in the British order,

had fallen to leeward with her rudder crippled. The position of the

leading and rear British schooners is not mentioned, and is not

important; the reliance of each being one long 9-pounder gun.

Before this, taking advantage of the breeze freshening, the "Niagara"

had gone clear of the "Caledonia," on her windward side, and had stood

to the southwest, towards the "Detroit." She had not at first either

foresail or topgallantsails set; and since she passed the "Lawrence"

to windward, she was then almost certainly over two hundred and fifty

yards from the British line, for there is no conclusive proof that the

"Lawrence" was nearer than that. Combining the narrative of the

British commodore with that of his second lieutenant, who now took

charge, it appears that Barclay, before going below, saw a boat

passing from the "Lawrence" to the "Niagara," and that the second

lieutenant, Inglis, after relieving him, found the "Niagara" on the

weather beam of the "Detroit." Perry, seeing the "Lawrence" incapable

of further offensive action, had decided to leave her and go on board

the "Niagara," and in this brief interval was making his passage from

one vessel to the other. After leaving the "Lawrence" astern, the

"Niagara" had made sail; the foresail having been set, and the

topgallantsails "in the act of being set, before Captain Perry came

on board."[96] This necessarily prolonged the time of his passage,

and may have given rise to the opprobrious British report that she was

making off. Her making sail as she did indicated that she had suffered

little aloft; she had been out of carronade range, while her consort,

still in fighting condition, was bearing the brunt; it was natural to

conclude that she would not alone renew the action, now that the

"Lawrence" was hopelessly disabled. The wish, too, may possibly have

helped the thought. The "Lawrence," in fact, having kept her colors

flying till Perry reached the "Niagara," struck immediately

afterwards. Had she surrendered while he was on board, he could not

honorably have quitted her; and the record was clearer by his reaching

a fresh ship while the flag of the one he left was still up.

What next happened is under no doubt so far as the movements of the

"Niagara" are concerned, though there is irreconcilable difference as

to who initiated the action. Immediately after Perry came on board,

Elliott left her, to urge forward the rear gunboats. Her helm was put

up, and she bore down ahead of the "Detroit" to rake her; supported in

so doing by the small vessels, presumably the "Ariel," "Scorpion," and

"Caledonia." The British ship tried to wear, both to avoid being raked

and to get her starboard battery into action; many of the guns on the

broadside heretofore engaged being disabled. The "Charlotte" being on

her lee quarter, and ranging ahead, the two fell foul, and so remained

for some time. This condition gave free play to the American guns,

which were soon after re-enforced by those of the rear gunboats;

enabled, like the "Niagara," to close with the freshening breeze.

After the two British vessels got clear, another attempt was made to

bring their batteries to bear; but the end was inevitable, and is

best told in the words of the officer upon whom devolved the duty of

surrendering the "Detroit." "The ship lying completely unmanageable,

every brace cut away, the mizzen-topmast and gaff down, all the other

masts badly wounded, not a stay left forward, hull shattered very

much, a number of guns disabled, and the enemy's squadron raking both

ships ahead and astern, none of our own in a position to support us, I

was under the painful necessity of answering the enemy to say we had

struck, the 'Queen Charlotte' having previously done so."[97] A

Canadian officer taken prisoner at the battle of the Thames saw the

"Detroit," a month later, at Put-in Bay. "It would be impossible," he

wrote, "to place a hand upon that broadside which had been exposed to

the enemy's fire without covering some portion of a wound, either from

grape, round, canister, or chain shot."[98] Her loss in men was never

specifically given. Barclay reported that of the squadron as a whole

to be forty-one killed, ninety-four wounded. He had lost an arm at

Trafalgar; and on this occasion, besides other injuries, the one

remaining to him was so shattered as to be still in bandages a year

later, when he appeared before the Court Martial which emphatically

acquitted him of blame. The loss of the American squadron was

twenty-seven killed, ninety-six wounded; of whom twenty-two killed and

sixty-one wounded were on board the "Lawrence."

[Illustration: PERRY RECEIVING THE SURRENDER OF THE BRITISH AT

THE BATTLE OF LAKE ERIE.

_Drawn by Henry Reuterdahl._]

Thus was the battle of Lake Erie fought and won. Captain Barclay not

only had borne himself gallantly and tenaciously against a superior

force,--favored in so doing by the enemy attacking in detail,--but the

testimony on his trial showed that he had labored diligently during

the brief period of his command, amid surroundings of extreme

difficulty, to equip his squadron, and to train to discipline and

efficiency the heterogeneous material of which his crews were

composed. The only point not satisfactorily covered is his absence

when Perry was crossing the bar. In his defence his allusion to this

incident is very casual,--resembles somewhat gliding rapidly over thin

ice; but the Court raised no question, satisfied, probably, with the

certainty that the honor of the flag had not suffered in the action.

On the American side, since the history of a country is not merely the

narrative of principal transactions, but the record also of honor

reflected upon the nation by the distinguished men it produces, it is

proper to consider the question of credit, which has been raised in

this instance. There can be no doubt that opportunity must be seized

as it is offered; for accident or chance may prevent its recurrence.

Constituted as Perry's squadron was, the opportunity presented to him

could be seized only by standing down as he did, trusting that the

other vessels would follow the example of their commander. The

shifting of the wind in the morning, and its failure during the

engagement, alike testify to the urgency of taking the tide as it

serves. There was no lagging, like Chauncey's, to fetch up heavy

schooners; and the campaign was decided in a month, instead of

remaining at the end of three months a drawn contest, to lapse

thenceforth into a race of ship-building. Had the "Niagara" followed

closely, there could have been no doubling on the "Lawrence"; and

Perry's confidence would have been justified as well as his conduct.

The latter needs no apology. Without the help of the "Niagara," the

"Detroit" was reduced to a "defenceless state," and a "perfect

wreck,"[99] by the carronades of the "Lawrence," supported by the

raking fire of the "Ariel" and "Scorpion." Both the expressions quoted

are applied by the heroic Barclay to her condition at 2.30, when, as

he also says, the "Niagara" was perfectly fresh. Not only was the

"Detroit" thus put out of action, but the "Charlotte" was so damaged

that she surrendered before her. To this the "Caledonia's" two long

twenty-fours had contributed effectively. The first lieutenant of the

"Queen Charlotte" testified that up to the time he was disabled, an

hour or an hour and a quarter after the action began, the vessel was

still manageable; that "the 'Niagara' engaged us on our quarter, out

of carronade range, with what long guns she had; but our principal

injury was from the 'Caledonia,' who laid on our beam, with two long

24-pounders on pivots, also out of carronade-shot distance."[100]

Is it to Perry, or to Elliott, that is due the credit of the

"Niagara's" action in bearing up across the bows of the "Detroit"?

This is the second stage of the battle; the bringing up the reserves.

An absolute reply is impossible in the face of the evidence, sworn but

not cross-examined. A probable inference, which in the present writer

amounts to conviction, is attainable. Before the Court of Inquiry, in

1815, Captain Elliott put the question to several of his witnesses,

"Was not the 'Niagara's' helm up and she standing direct for the

'Detroit' when Captain Perry came on board?" They replied, "Yes." All

these were midshipmen. By a singular fatality most of the "Niagara's"

responsible officers were already dead, and the one surviving

lieutenant had been below, stunned, when Perry reached the deck. It

may very possibly be that this answer applied only to the first change

of course, when Elliott decided to leave his position behind the

"Caledonia"; but if it is claimed as covering also the subsequent

bearing up eight points (at right angles), to cross the bows of the

"Detroit," it is to be observed that no mention of this very important

movement is made in a letter addressed to the Secretary of the Navy,

October 13, 1813, one month after the battle, drawn up for the

express purpose of vindicating Elliott, and signed by all the

lieutenants of the "Niagara," and by the purser, who formerly had been

a lieutenant in the navy. Their account was that Perry, on reaching

the ship, said he feared the day was lost; that Elliott replied it was

not, that he would repair on board the rear schooners, and bring them

up; that he did so, and "_the consequence was_ that in ten minutes the

'Detroit' and 'Queen Charlotte' with the 'Lady Prevost,' struck to us,

and soon after the whole of the enemy's squadron followed their

example."[101] This attributes the victory to the half-dozen long guns

of the four schooners, mostly inferior in caliber to the nine

carronades on board a single vessel, the "Niagara," raking within

pistol-shot of antagonists already in the condition described by

Barclay. Such a conclusion traverses all experience of the tactical

advantage of guns massed under one captain over a like number

distributed in several commands, and also contravenes the particular

superiority of carronades at close quarters. An officer of the

"Detroit," who was on deck throughout, testified that the "Lawrence"

had engaged at musket-shot, the "Niagara," when she bore down under

Perry, at pistol-shot. Barclay, and his surviving lieutenant, Inglis,

both lay most weight upon this action of the "Niagara," from which

arose also the fouling of the two largest British ships.

Perry's charges of 1818 against Elliott formulated deliberate

statements, under the responsible expectation of cross-examination

under oath. This is his account: "When the commanding officer [Perry]

went on board the 'Niagara,' Captain Elliott was keeping her on a

course by the wind, which would in a few minutes have carried said

vessel entirely out of action, to prevent which, and in order to bring

the said vessel into close action with the enemy, the said commanding

officer was under the necessity of heaving-to, stopping and

immediately wearing said vessel, and altering her course at least

eight points"; that is, perpendicular to the direction before steered.

Against this solemn and serious charge is unquestionably to be placed

the commendatory mention and letter given by Perry to Elliott

immediately after the battle. Upon these also he had to expect the

sharpest interrogation, to the mortification attendant upon which he

could only oppose evidence extenuative of, but in no case justifying,

undeniable self-contradiction. If the formal charge was true, no

excuse can be admitted for the previous explicit commendation. As a

matter of historical inquiry, however, such contradictions have to be

met, and must be weighed in the light of all the testimony. The

author's conclusion upon the whole is that, as Perry's action in first

standing down insured decisive action, so by him was imparted to the

"Niagara" the final direction which determined victory. The influence

of the rear gunboats brought up by Elliott was contributive, but not

decisive.

In short, the campaign of Lake Erie was brought to an immediate

successful issue by the ready initiative taken by Perry when he found

the British distant fire more destructive than he expected, and by his

instant acceptance of necessary risk, in standing down exposed to a

raking cannonade to which he for a long while could not reply. If, as

the author holds, he was entitled to expect prompt imitation by the

"Niagara," the risk was actual, but not undue. As it was, though the

"Lawrence" surrendered, it was not until she had, with the help of

gunboats stationed by Perry for that object, so damaged both her

opponents that they were incapable of further resistance. In the

tactical management of the "Lawrence" and her supports was no mere

headlong dash, but preparation adequate to conditions. Had the

"Niagara" followed, the "Lawrence" need never have struck. The

contemporary incidents on Erie and Ontario afford an instructive

commentary upon Napoleon's incisive irony, that "War cannot be waged

without running risks." There has been sufficient quotation from

Chauncey to indicate why the campaign on Ontario dragged through two

seasons, and then left the enemy in control. Small as the scale and

the theatre of these naval operations, they illustrate the unvarying

lesson that only in offensive action can defensive security be found.

The destruction of the British naval force decided the campaign in the

Northwest by transferring the control of the water. Its general

military results were in this respect final. Nothing occurred to

modify them during the rest of the war. Detroit and Michigan territory

fell back into the hands of the United States; and the allegiance of

the Indians to the British cause, procured by Brock's sagacious daring

a twelvemonth before, but rudely shaken by the events narrated, was

destroyed by the death of their great leader, Tecumseh, a month later

in the battle of the Thames, itself the direct consequence of Perry's

success. The frontier was henceforth free from the Indian terror,

which had hitherto disquieted it from the Maumee to Cleveland.

A more far-reaching political issue was also here definitely settled.

A sense of having betrayed the Indian interests in the previous

treaties of 1783 and 1794 was prevalent in British official circles,

and in their counsels a scheme had been circulated for constituting an

independent Indian territory, under joint guarantee of the two

nations, between their several dominions. This would be locally within

the boundaries of the United States; the sole jurisdiction of which

was thus to be limited and trammelled, because open to continual

British representation and reclamation, based upon treaty

stipulations.[102] This infringement upon the perfect sovereignty of

the nation inside its own borders, in favor of savage communities and

under foreign guarantee, was one of the propositions formally brought

forward as a _sine quâ non_ by the British negotiators at Ghent.

Although by that time the United States stood alone face to face with

Great Britain, at whose full disposal were now the veterans of the

Peninsular War, and the gigantic navy, which the abdication of

Napoleon had released from all other opponents, the American

commissioners refused with dignity to receive the proposition even for

reference. "It is not necessary," they replied, "to refer such demands

to the American Government for its instructions. They will only be a

fit subject for deliberation when it becomes necessary to decide upon

the expediency of an absolute surrender of national independence."[103]

The envoys of the United States were able to be firm, because secure

of indignant support by their people; but it is beyond question that

two naval victories had arrayed upon their side, at the moment, the

preponderance of military argument, which weighs so heavily in

treaties of peace. New Orleans was yet in the future, with adverse

chances apparent; but, owing to the victory of Perry, the United

States was in firm military tenure of the territory, the virtual

cession of which was thus demanded. A year after Perry, McDonough's

equally complete success on Lake Champlain, by insuring control of the

water route for invasion, rolled back the army of Peninsular veterans

under Prevost, at a season of the year which forbade all hope of

renewing the enterprise until another spring. Great Britain was too

eager to end twenty years of continued war to brook further delay. The

lake campaigns of 1813 and 1814 thus emphasized the teaching of

history as to the influence of control of the water upon the course of

events; and they illustrate also the too often forgotten truth, that

it is not by brilliant individual feats of gallantry or skill, by

ships or men, but by the massing of superior forces, that military

issues are decided. For, although on a small scale, the lakes were

oceans, and the forces which met on them were fleets; and as, on a

wider field and in more tremendous issues, the fleets of Great Britain

saved their country and determined the fortunes of Europe, so Perry

and McDonough averted from the United States, without further

fighting, a rectification of frontier--as it is euphemistically

styled,--the effecting of which is one of the most fruitful causes and

frequent results of war in every continent and at every period.

NOTE.--For the battle of Lake Erie, the most important original

data are the Court Martial upon Barclay (British Records

Office), and the Court of Inquiry held at Elliott's request, in

April, 1815. The proceedings and testimony of the latter are

published in the appendix to a "Biographical Notice of Commodore

Jesse D. Elliott," by Russell Jarvis, Philadelphia, 1835.

Perry's Report of the battle, Sept. 13, 1813, is in American

State Papers, Naval Affairs, vol. i. p. 295. Barclay's report is

in Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxi. pp. 250-253, as well as in the

record of the Court. Jarvis, and Mackenzie's Life of Perry (5th

edition), give a large number of affidavits by officers present

in the engagement, and Mackenzie gives also a copy of the

charges preferred by Perry in 1818 against Elliott. In the

controversy which arose over the battle, Mackenzie, in the

appendix to the fifth edition of Perry's Life, Duer, and Tristam

Burges, Battle of Lake Erie (Boston, 1839), are the principal

champions on Perry's side; Jarvis (as above) and J. Fenimore

Cooper, Battle of Lake Erie, on the side of Elliott; but the

latter himself published several vindications of his conduct.

The usual naval histories, American and British, may be

consulted, and there are also incidental mentions and reports in

Niles' Register and the British Naval Chronicle, which will be

found useful.

FOOTNOTES:

[74] Captains' Letters, Navy Department MSS.

[75] Mackenzie's Life of Perry, vol. i. p. 166.

[76] Mackenzie's Life of Perry, vol. i. p. 186.

[77] Perry to the Secretary of the Navy, Aug. 10, 1813. Mackenzie's Life

of Perry, vol. i. p. 191.

[78] Secretary's Letters, Aug. 18, 1813. Navy Department MSS.

[79] Otherwise known by the name of the River Raisin. Ante, vol. i. p.

370.

[80] The data of this paragraph are taken from the Report on Canadian

Archives, 1896, Lower Canada, pp. 132, 138-140. Barclay in his Defence

before the Court Martial mentions the designs on Erie.

[81] Harm Jan Huidekoper, by Nina Moore Tiffany and Francis Tiffany.

1904. p. 187. Mr. Huidekoper speaks admiringly of the unfaltering

composure and cheerfulness which under these circumstances accompanied

Perry's energy.

[82] See ante, p. 41.

[83] Report on Canadian Archives, 1896. Lower Canada, p. 133.

[84] This statement appeared in the course of a _summary_ of the

evidence before the British Court, given by the Naval Chronicle, vol.

xxxii. pp. 241-242. The only support to it in the evidence, as recorded,

is Barclay's official letter, which he appears to have confirmed under

oath, that the "Niagara" kept out of carronade range, and "was perfectly

fresh at 2.30," when Perry went on board her. The first lieutenant of

the "Queen Charlotte," who remained in command, the captain being

killed, corroborated Barclay as to her distance.

[85] In the finding--or verdict--of the British Court, as in the

evidence, there is no expression of a charge that the "Niagara" was

making away. The finding restricted itself to the matter before the

Court, namely, Barclay's official conduct.

[86] There was a question whether the "Hunter" was ahead or astern of

the "Queen Charlotte." In the author's opinion the balance of evidence

is as stated in the text. Perry rearranged his line with reference to

the British, upon seeing their array. Had the "Charlotte" been next the

"Detroit," as James puts her, it seems probable he would have placed the

"Niagara" next the "Lawrence."

[87] Cooper, Battle of Lake Erie, p. 63.

[88] See Mackenzie's Life of Perry, 5th edition, vol. ii. pp. 251-252.

Perry's charges against Elliott, dated Aug. 8, 1818, are there given in

full.

[89] See Mackenzie's Life of Perry, 5th edition, vol. ii. pp. 251-252.

[90] Cooper's Battle of Lake Erie, p. 63.

[91] Barclay's Report, Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxi. p. 251.

[92] The range of a 32 pdr. carronade, with which the "Niagara" was

armed, throwing one solid shot, with ¼ degree elevation,--substantially

point-blank,--was 260 yards; at 5 degrees, 1260 yards. The difference,

1000 yards, is just half a sea mile. A British professional writer of

that day, criticising their commander's choice of position at Lake

Champlain, says: "At 1000 or 1100 yards the elevation necessary to be

given a carronade would have been so great that none but chance shots

[from the Americans] could have taken effect; whereas, in closing, he

gave up this advantage." Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxiii. p. 132.

[93] The "Caledonia" had two long 24-pounders, and one other lighter

gun, variously stated. The "Detroit's" heaviest were also two long 24's;

she had besides one long 18, six long 12's, etc.

[94] With reference to times, always very difficult to establish, and

often very important as bases of calculation, the following extract from

the Diary of Dr. Usher Parsons, surgeon of the "Lawrence," possesses

value; the more so as it is believed to have been copied from the log of

the vessel, which afterwards disappeared. The phraseology is that of a

log and a seaman, not of a physician. "At 10 called all hands to

quarters. A quarter before meridian the enemy began action at one mile

distance. In a half hour came within musket-shot of the enemy's new

ship.... At 1.30, so entirely disabled we could work the brig no longer.

At 2 P.M., most of the guns were dismounted, breechings gone, or

carriages knocked to pieces. At half-past two, when not another gun

could be worked or fired, Captain Perry hauled down the fighting flag

[not the national flag], which bore this motto 'Don't give up the ship,'

and repaired on board the 'Niagara,' where he raised it again. In ten

minutes after we struck." Publications of the Rhode Island Historical

Society, vol. vii. p. 244. This was called to the author's attention

after the account in the text was written.

[95] Mackenzie's Life of Perry, vol. ii. p. 283.

[96] Evidence of Midshipman Montgomery of the "Niagara," before the

Court of Inquiry.

[97] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxi. p. 252.

[98] Richardson, War of 1812, p. 243.

[99] Barclay's Report.

[100] British Court Martial Record.

[101] Navy Department, MSS. Miscellaneous Letters. My italics.

[102] This scheme appears outlined in a letter of Oct. 5, 1812, to Lord

Bathurst from Sir George Prevost, who in support of it adduces Brock's

opinion (Canadian Archives MSS). Bathurst replied, Dec. 9, 1812, "I so

entirely concur in the expediency of the suggestions contained in your

despatch, as to the necessity of securing the territories of the Indians

from encroachment, that I have submitted it to His Majesty's Secretary

for Foreign Affairs, in order that whenever negotiations for peace may

be entered into, the security of their possessions may not be either

compromised or forgotten." (British Colonial Office Records). Prevost

transmitted a copy of the letter to Admiral Warren, in his early

diplomatic capacity as a peace envoy. Gordon Drummond, the successor of

Brock, and later of Prevost, expressed the same interest (Canadian

Archives MSS., April 2, 1814).

[103] American State Papers, Foreign Affairs, vol. iii. pp. 710-713.