PROBLEM OF REPRESENTATION EXAMINED.
111. All our knowledge is by representation, without which it would be
inconceivable; and yet what is representation in itself considered? We
cannot say: it enlightens us as to other objects, but not as to itself.
It is obvious that we do not attempt to conceal the very grave
difficulties which the solution of this problem offers: on the
contrary, we point them out with all clearness, in order to avoid that
vain presumption which is as fatal to science as to every thing else.
But let it not be supposed that we intend to banish this question from
the arena of philosophy: for many and serious as are its difficulties,
we are yet of opinion that they allow of sufficiently probable
conjectures.
112. The representative force may emanate from any one of these three
sources: identity, causality, or ideality. We will explain ourselves.
A thing may represent itself; and this we call representation of
identity. A cause may represent its effect; and this is what we
understand by representation of causality. A being, whether substance
or accident, may represent another distinct from itself, which is not
its effect; and this we call representation of ideality.
We do not see how it is possible to assign any other source of
representation: holding, therefore, the division to be complete, we
will examine its three points; and we beg to call the attention of the
reader more especially to this matter, because it is one of the most
important in philosophy.
113. That which represents must have some relation to the thing
represented: whether essential or accidental, inherent or communicated,
this relation must exist. Two beings, having absolutely no relation,
one of which nevertheless represents the other, are a monstrosity.
There is nothing without a sufficient reason; and there being no
relation between the thing representing, and that represented, there is
no sufficient reason of the representation.
It is here to be borne in mind that, for the present, we abstract
the nature of this relation; we do not assert it to be either real
or ideal; we only say that, between the thing representing and that
represented, there must be some link, whatever that link may be. Its
mysteries, its incomprehensibility, do not destroy its existence.
Philosophy perhaps may be unable to explain the enigma; but it
can demonstrate the existence of the link. Thus, abstracting all
experience, it is possible to demonstrate _a priori_, that there is a
relation between the _me_ and other beings, by the mere fact of their
representation existing in the _me_.
The incessant communication of intelligences with each other, and with
the universe, proves that there is a point of union for them all.
Representation, alone, is a convincing proof of this: so many beings,
apparently dispersed and unconnected, are intimately united in some
centre, so that the simple phenomenon of intelligence leads us to
affirm the common link, the unity in which plurality is joined. This
unity, with pantheists, is universal identity; with us, it is God.
114. Here observe that this relation between the thing representing and
that represented, is not necessarily direct or immediate; it suffices
that it be with a third object: thus, they who explain representation
by identity, and they who account for it by intermediate ideas, must
equally admit it; for, on the present matter, there is no difference
between those who hold these ideas to be produced by the action of
objects upon our mind, and those who make them proceed immediately from
God.
115. Whatever represents any thing, contains in some sense the thing
represented; for an object cannot be represented unless it is in some
manner or other in the representation. It may be the object itself,
or its image; but this image cannot represent the object, unless it
is known to be its image. Every idea then involves the relation of
objectivity; otherwise it could not represent the object, but only
itself. The act of intelligence is immanent, but in such a manner, that
the intellect does not need to go out of itself to attain its object.
When we think of a star a million leagues distant, our mind certainly
does not go to the point where the star is; but by means of the idea,
it destroys in an instant this immense distance, and unites itself with
the star. What it perceives is not the idea, but its object: if this
idea did not involve a relation to the object, it would cease to be an
idea to the mind, and would represent nothing except itself.
116. There is then, in every perception, a connection of the being
that perceives with the thing perceived. When this perception is not
immediate, the medium must be such as to contain a necessary relation
to the object; it must conceal itself in order to offer to the eye of
the mind only the thing represented. From the instant that it presents
itself, and is seen, or even noticed, it ceases to be an idea and
becomes an object. The idea is a mirror, which is most perfect when it
creates the most perfect illusion. It must necessarily present only the
objects, and project them at the proper distance, without allowing the
eye to see the crystalline plane which reflects them.
117. This union of the thing representing, with that represented, of
the intellect with its objects, may, in some instances, be explained
by identity. In general, no contradiction is discovered in any thing
representing itself to the eye of the understanding, if we suppose
them to be united in some way or other. In case then that the thing
known is itself intelligent, we see no difficulty in its being its
own representation, and consequently none in confounding ideality
and reality in the same being. If an idea can represent an object,
why may it not represent itself? If an intelligent being can know an
object through the medium of an idea, why may it not know that object
immediately? The union of the thing known with the intellect is to
us a mystery, it is true; but is the union effected by the medium of
an idea less so? To the idea may be objected all that can be brought
against the thing itself; and it is even more inexplicable how one
thing represents another, than how it represents itself. The thing
representing and that represented, have between them a sort of relation
of containing and contained. It is easily conceived that the identical
contains itself, since identity expresses much more than to contain;
but it is not so easily conceived how the accident can contain the
substance, the transitory the permanent, the ideal the real. Identity
is then a true principle of representation.
118. We would here make the following remarks necessary to avoid
equivocations.
I. We do not assert a necessary relation between identity and
representation; for this would make every being representative, since
every being is identical with itself. We establish this proposition:
identity may be the origin of representation; but we deny the two
following: identity is the necessary origin of representation;
representation is a sign of identity.
II. We determine nothing as to the application of the relations between
representation and identity, so far as finite beings are concerned.
III. We abstract the duality which results from supposing only subject
and object, and enter into no question on the nature of this duality.
119. These ideas being fixed, we may observe that we have an
incontestable proof that there is no intrinsic repugnance between
identity and representation in two dogmas of the Catholic religion: the
beatific vision and the divine intelligence. The dogma of the beatific
vision teaches us that the human soul in the mansion of the blessed
is intimately united to God, and sees him face to face in his very
essence. No one ever said that this vision was made by the medium of an
idea, but theologians, and among them St. Thomas, expressly teach the
contrary. We have then identity united with representation, that is,
the divine essence representing, or rather presenting, itself to the
eyes of the human mind. The dogma of divine intelligence teaches that
God is infinitely intelligent. God does not need to go out of himself,
nor employ distinct ideas in order to understand; he sees himself in
his essence. Here, too, identity is united with representation, and the
intelligent being identified with the thing understood.(11)