IMMEDIATE INTELLIGIBILITY.
120. Neither active nor passive representation can be predicated of
all things; we mean to say, that there are some beings which are not
endowed with intellectual activity, and cannot be even passively the
object of the acts of the intellect.
As regards the power of active representation, which is at bottom
only the faculty of intelligence, it is evident that many beings are
destitute of it. There may be greater difficulty with regard to passive
representation, or the fitness to be the immediate object of the
intellect.
121. An object cannot be known immediately, that is, without the
mediation of an idea, if it do not itself perform the functions of this
idea, and unite itself to the intellect which is to know it. This alone
takes from all material objects the character of being _immediately
intelligible_: so that if a mind be imagined having no idea of the
corporeal universe, it could know nothing of it, although for all
eternity in the midst of it.
Hence it follows that matter neither is, nor can be, intelligent or
intelligible: the ideas which we have of it come from another source;
without them we might be united to matter, and never know or even
suspect its existence.
122. An opportunity is here presented of explaining an exceedingly
curious doctrine of St. Thomas. This eminent metaphysician was
of opinion that it required greater perfection to be immediately
intelligible than to be intelligent; so that the human mind, although
endowed with intelligence, does not possess intelligibility.
In his _Summa Theologica_,[6] the holy Doctor asks if the soul knows
itself by its essence, and answers that it does not, and thus defends
his position:
[6] P. 1^a, Q. 87^a, A. 1^o.
"Things are intelligible accordingly as they act, and not as they have
the power to act, as is said in the ninth book of Metaphysics (tex. 20
tr. 3). For any thing that comes under knowledge is being, is the true,
in so far as it is in act, and this is manifestly apparent in sensible
things. Thus the sight does not perceive that which may be colored,
but that only which actually is colored. And in the same manner as is
manifest, the intellect, in so far as it knows material things, knows
that only which is in act.... Hence, also, in immaterial substances,
each one is intelligible by its essence, accordingly as it is in act
by its essence. Therefore, the essence of God, which is a pure and
perfect act, is absolutely and perfectly intelligible by itself; thus
God knows, by his essence, not only himself but also all other things.
But the essence of the angel belongs to the class of intelligible
beings as an act, but not as a pure and complete act, wherefore his
understanding is not completed by his essence. For, although the
angel knows himself by his essence, he cannot know all things by his
essence, but knows those distinct from himself only by their images.
But the human intellect in the class of intelligible beings is only
a possible being.... Therefore, considered in its essence, it is an
intelligent power; hence of itself it has the faculty of understanding,
but not of being understood, except inasmuch as it acts. On this
account the Platonists placed the order of intelligible beings above
the order of intellect; because the intellect understands only by
participation of the intelligible; but according to them, that which
participates is beneath that of which it participates. If, then, the
human intellect places itself in act by the participation of separate
intelligible forms, as the Platonists held, it would know itself by
this participation of incorporeal things. But as it is natural to our
intellect in the present life to look to material and sensible things,
it follows that our intellect knows itself only as it is placed in act
by the species (ideas) abstracted from sensible things by the light
of the intellect acting, which is the act of the intelligible things
themselves.... Therefore our intellect does not know itself by its
essence but by its acts."
Such is the doctrine of St. Thomas. Cardinal Cajetan, one of the most
penetrating and subtile minds that ever existed, has a commentary on
this passage, worthy of the text. These are his words: "Two things
expressly follow, from what is said in the text. The first is, that our
intellect has of itself the faculty of understanding. The second is,
that our intellect has not of itself the faculty of being understood.
Hence the order of intellect is below the order of intelligible beings.
For if the perfection, which our intellect has of itself, is sufficient
to understand, but not to be understood, it necessarily follows that
greater perfection is required in a thing to be understood than to
understand. And because St. Thomas saw this consequence, which at
first sight does not seem true, and might even be objected to him, he
excludes this apprehension, by showing that this must be admitted to be
true not only by the Peripatetics, from whose doctrine it results, but
also by the Platonists."
But afterwards, in answer to an objection brought by Scotus, called
the Subtle Doctor, he adds: "But because in order to understand an
intellect and an intelligible object are required, and the relation of
the intellect to the intelligible, is the relation of the perfectible
to its perfection, since the intellect in act consists in its being
itself the intelligible thing, as is evident from what has been said
above; it follows that immaterial beings are divided into two orders,
intellects, and things intelligible. And as the intelligible consists
in perfective immateriality, it follows that any thing is intelligible
inasmuch as it is immaterially perfective. That intelligibility
requires immateriality is shown by this, that no material thing is
intelligible, unless, inasmuch as it is abstracted from matter.... It
has already been shown that any thing is intelligible by this, that not
only itself, but others, also, are in the intelligible order, either in
act or in potentiality; it is thus nothing more than to be perfected or
perfectible by the intelligible."
123. This theory may be more or less solid, but it is in either case
something more than ingenious; it raises a new problem in philosophy of
the highest importance: to assign the conditions of intelligibility. It
has moreover the advantage of being in accordance with a fact attested
by experience; this fact is the difficulty experienced by the mind in
knowing itself. If it is immediately intelligible, why does it not
know itself? What condition is wanting? Its intimate presence? It has
not only presence but identity. Perhaps the effort to know itself? But
the greater part of philosophy has no other end than this knowledge.
By denying immediate intelligibility to the soul, we can explain why
so great a difficulty is involved in ideological and psychological
investigations, by showing the reason of the obscurity experienced in
passing from direct to reflex acts.
124. The opinion of St. Thomas is not a mere conjecture: we may, in
order to establish it in some manner upon fact, assign a reason which
seems to us greatly to strengthen it, and which may be regarded as
merely an extension of the one already given.
A thing to be intelligible must have two qualities: immateriality,
and the activity necessary to operate upon the intelligent being.
This activity is indispensable, for in the act of intelligence, the
intellect is in some sense passive. When the idea is present, the
intellect cannot but know it: when it is wanting, it is impossible for
the intellect to know it. The idea, therefore, enables the intellect to
act; without it the intellect can do nothing. Consequently, if we admit
that any being can serve as idea to the intellect, we must concede that
being an activity to excite intellectual action; and so far we make it
superior to the intellect excited.
Thus we explain why our intellect, in this life at least, does not
know itself by itself. Experience shows that its activity needs to
be excited. Left to itself it is like one asleep; and this want of
activity in our mind, in the absence of exciting influences, is one of
the most constant of psychological facts.
This is not, however, to say that we have no spontaneity, and that no
action is possible without an external determining cause; but only
that this same spontaneous development would not exist, if we had not
previously been subjected to the influence of causes which brought out
our activity. We may learn things not taught us; but we could learn
nothing, if teaching had not presided over the first development of
our mind. There are, it is true, many ideas in our mind, which are not
sensations, and which cannot have emanated from them; but it is equally
true that a man, deprived of all his senses, could not think, because
his mind would want the exciting cause.
125. We have dwelt thus long upon the explanation of the problem of
intelligibility, because we consider it of scarcely less importance
than that of intelligence, although we do not find it treated in
philosophical works as it merits. We will now reduce this doctrine
to clear and simple propositions, so that the reader may form a
more complete conception of it; and also, in order to deduce some
consequences which have been only slightly indicated in our exposition:
I. A thing must be immaterial in order to be immediately intelligible.
II. Matter cannot be intelligible by itself.
III. The relations of spirits to bodies, or the representation of the
latter in the former, cannot be purely objective.
IV. Some other class of relations must necessarily be admitted to
explain the representative union of the world of intelligences with the
corporeal world.
V. Immediate objective representation supposes activity in the object.
VI. The power of an object to represent itself to the eyes of an
intelligence, supposes in it a faculty of acting on that intelligence.
VII. This faculty necessarily produces an effect, and consequently
involves a kind of superiority of the object over the intelligence.
VIII. An intelligent being is not necessarily immediately intelligible.
IX. Immediate intelligibility seems to require greater perfection than
intelligence.
X. Although not every intelligent being is intelligible, yet every
intelligible being is intelligent.
XI. God, who is in every sense infinite activity, is infinitely
intelligent and infinitely intelligible by himself.
XII. God is intelligible by all created intellects, provided it be his
will to present himself immediately to them, and strengthen and elevate
them as may be necessary.
XIII. There is no repugnance in immediate intelligibility being
communicated to some beings, which are consequently intelligible by
themselves.
XIV. Our soul, while united to our body, is not immediately
intelligible, and we know it only by its acts.
XV. In this want of immediate intelligibility is found the reason
of the difficulty of ideological and psychological studies, and
the obscurity which we experience in passing from direct to reflex
knowledge.
XVI. Therefore, the philosophy of the _me_, or that which seeks to
explain the internal and external world by starting from the _me_, is
impossible; it commences by denying one of the fundamental facts of
psychology.
XVII. Therefore, the doctrine of universal identity is also absurd,
since it gives both intelligence and immediate intelligibility to
matter, which can have neither.
XVIII. Spiritualism, therefore, is a truth which springs as well from
subjective as from objective philosophy, from intelligence as from
intelligibility.
XIX. We must, therefore, go beyond ourselves, and even rise above
the universe to find the origin of either subjective or objective
representation.
XX. Therefore, we must ascend to a primitive, infinite activity, which
places intelligences in communication among themselves and with the
corporeal world.
XXI. Therefore, purely ideological and psychological philosophy leads
us to God.
XXII. Therefore, philosophy cannot commence by a single fact, the
origin of all other facts, but must, and does end with this supreme
fact, the infinite existence, which is God.(12)