PROBLEM OF REPRESENTATION: MONADS OF LEIBNITZ.
105. The pretension to find a real truth, the fountain of all others,
is dangerous in the extreme, however indifferent it may at first sight
appear. Pantheism, and the deification of the _me_, two systems which
coincide at bottom, are a consequence not easy to be avoided if it be
attempted to establish all human science upon one fact.
106. The real truth or fact, which would serve as the basis of all
science, should be immediately perceived, otherwise it would lack the
character of origin and basis of other truths; because the medium by
which it should be perceived would itself have the better right to
the title of first truth. If this intermediate fact were the cause of
the other, evidently this latter would not be primitive; and if the
priority were given to the order of knowledge instead of the order of
being, we should still have the same difficulty as now to explain the
transition from subject to object, or the legitimacy of the medium by
which we perceive the primitive fact.
Since then, the immediate presence, the intimate union of the
understanding with the thing known is necessary, it is clear that as
the _me_ has this immediate presence only for itself and its own acts,
the fact sought for must be the _me_ itself. That which is immediately
present to us is the facts of consciousness; by them we place ourselves
in communication with what is distinct from us. In case then that we
must find a primitive fact, the origin of all others, this fact must be
the _me_. If we deny this consequence, we must deny the possibility
of finding any fact which may be the source of transcendental science.
Here we see how the apparently most innocent philosophical pretensions
lead to fatal results.
107. There is here certainly very little chance for evasion, but there
is one so specious as to merit an examination.
The fact, which is the scientific origin of all others, is not
necessarily their true origin. By distinguishing between the principle
of being and the principle of knowledge, all difficulty seems to be
avoided. It is absurd and contrary to common sense, that the _me_ is
the origin of all that exists; but not that it is the representative
principle of all that is or can be known. Representation is not
synonymous with causality. Ideas represent but do not cause the
objects represented. Why, then, is it not possible to admit a fact
representative of all that the human understanding can know? It is
certain that the perception of this fact must be immediate, that is, it
must be supposed intimately present to the understanding perceiving it;
for which reason, it can be nothing else than the _me_: this, however,
is not to deify the _me_, but only to concede to it a representative
force, which may have been given to it by a superior being. It makes
the _me_ not an universal cause, but a mirror which reflects the
internal and external worlds.
This explanation reminds us of the famous system of _monads_ advanced
by Leibnitz; an ingenious system indeed, the lofty flight of one of
the mightiest geniuses that ever honored the human race. The whole
world formed of invisible beings, all representative of the same
universe, whereof they are a part, but by a representation adequate to
their respective categories, and in conformity to their corresponding
point of view, according to the place which they occupy, unrolling
themselves in an immense series, which, commencing with the lowest
order, goes on ascending to the very portal of infinity; and at the
uppermost point of existences is the monad, which, in itself contains
the reason of all things, which has produced them from nothing, given
to them their representative force, and distributed them into their
proper categories, establishing among them a sort of parallelism of
perception, will, action, and motion, in such a manner that, without
any one communicating any thing to another, they all move on in most
perfect conformity, in ineffable harmony. This is grand, beautiful, and
wonderful; a colossal hypothesis which the genius of Leibnitz alone
could ever have conceived.
108. Having paid this tribute of admiration to the eminent author of
the _Monadology_, we observe that its gigantic conception is only an
hypothesis which all the talent of its inventor could never base upon
a single fact capable of giving to it an appearance of probability.
Omitting the very serious difficulties, which this system, doubtless
against the will of its author, opposes to the explanation of free
will, we shall confine ourselves to the examination of the bearings of
this system upon the question now before us.
In the first place, the representation of the monads, being a mere
hypothesis, can serve to explain nothing, unless philosophy is to be
made the sport of ingenious combination. The _me_ is a monad, that is,
an indivisible unity; of this there can be no doubt. The _me_ is a
monad representative of the universe: this is an absolutely gratuitous
assertion, and until it is proved in some way or other, we have the
right to ignore it.
109. Now, suppose the representative force, as understood by Leibnitz,
to exist in the _me_; this hypothesis does not impugn what has been
said against the primitive origin of transcendental science. On close
inspection, the hypothesis of Leibnitz will be found to explain the
origin of ideas, but not their connection. Make the soul a mirror, in
which, by an effect of the creative will, every thing is represented;
still it does not explain the order of these representations, show how
one of them springs from another, or assign to them any other bond
than the unity of consciousness. This system then is quite out of the
question: we are not disputing on the manner in which representations
exist in the soul, nor on their origin; but we are examining the
opinion which pretends to found all science upon a single fact, and to
unfold all ideas as simple modifications of that fact. This Leibnitz
never said, nor can any thing be found in any of his works to indicate
such a thought. Moreover, the difference between this system of
_Monadology_ and that of the German Philosophers, which we impugn, is
too palpable to escape any one.
I. So far is Leibnitz from advocating universal identity, that he
establishes an infinite plurality and multiplicity: his monads are
beings really different and distinct among themselves.
II. The whole universe, composed of monads, proceeded, according to
Leibnitz, from one infinite monad; and this procession was not by
emanation, but by creation.
III. In the infinite monad, in God, Leibnitz places the sufficient
reason of every thing.
IV. Knowledge has been freely given by God himself to the monads.
V. This knowledge, and the consciousness of it, belong to the monads
individually, and Leibnitz never even remotely took into consideration
this foundation of all things, which by its transformation ascends from
nature to consciousness, or descends from the region of consciousness
and is converted into nature.
110. These differences so marked need no comments; they show most
evidently that the philosophers of modern Germany cannot shield
themselves under the name of Leibnitz; although, in truth, these
philosophers have no failing of that kind: far from seeking guides,
they all aspire to originality, and this is one principal cause of
their extravagance, Hegel, Schelling, and Fichte, all pretend to
be founders of a philosophy; and Kant was so governed by the same
ambition, that he made very important alterations in the second
edition of his _Critic of Pure Reason_, lest he should be taken for a
plagiarist from Berkeley's idealism.(10)