HOW MUCH GERMANY HAS WON IN THE WAR
Let us now take up, in their order, the seven elements mentioned in
the last chapter.
I
_The first element of German advantage: the booty acquired from the
occupation of enemy territory_
Germany is getting direct war-profits from the enemy territories
occupied by her. These territories, listed in the ascending order
of their richness, are: Montenegro, 14,000 square kilometres;
Albania, 20,000; Serbia, 87,000; Roumania, 70,000 (Bulgaria and
Austria-Hungary share the pillage of these four territories);
dependent territories of Russia, 260,000; Belgium, 29,000; and
France, 20,000; making a grand total of 500,000 square kilometres.
In order to realize as clearly as possible the importance of the
booty wrung by Germany from this enormous area, we may establish by
means of examples or statistics that this plunder comes from nine
principal sources:—
_Seizure of Human Material._—Throughout these 500,000 square
kilometres of occupied territory, the Germans have scientifically
enslaved 42,000,000 human beings, who furnish a vast amount of
labor—this labor being all the cheaper because, as we shall see, the
slaves are robbed in various ways.
_Seizure of War-Material._—By reason of their lightning advances
in Belgium, France, Serbia, and Roumania the Germans have taken
possession of vast stores of war-material: cannon, rifles, munitions,
wagons, locomotives, cars, as well as thousands of kilometres of
railway, of which they make full use, representing a certain value of
billions of francs. (The Belgian railway system alone is worth three
billions.)
_Seizure of Food-stuffs._—The official report of April 12, 1917, on
the acts committed by the Germans in France contrary to international
law, states: ‘The inhabitants, subjected as they were to annoyances
of every sort, watched daily the theft of such food-stuffs as they
happened to possess.’ Everywhere the Germans steal horses, cattle,
domestic animals, grain, potatoes, food-products of all kinds,
sugar, alcohol, all of which constitute the reserve supply of the
occupied countries. Their harvests, too, are appropriated through the
cultivation of productive lands by means of labor obtained almost
without cost from the enslaved peoples.
_Theft of Raw Materials._—Throughout the length and breadth of the
occupied territories, the Germans, at the dictates of expediency,
have seized raw materials: coal and iron ore, copper, petroleum, and
so forth. Metals—bronze, zinc, lead, copper, tin—have been taken from
private citizens, as well as textile fabrics—wool, cotton cloth, and
the like. When one learns that from the cities of the North of France
alone the Germans stole 550 million francs’ worth of wool, it is easy
to see that this single source of plunder has been worth a number of
billions to them.
_Theft of Finished Products._—Everywhere in the occupied territories,
so far as means of transportation permit, motors, steam-hammers,
machinery, rolling-mills, lathes, presses, drills, electrical
engines, looms, and so forth, have been taken to pieces by mechanics
and transported into Germany. The total value of this stolen material
in Belgium and the North of France alone—the richest industrial
districts in the world—is almost incalculable.
_Theft of Personal Property._—The official French report previously
quoted states: ‘In the shops, officers and soldiers made free with
whatever pleased their fancy. Every day the people witnessed the
theft of property which was indispensable to them. At Ham, General
von Fleck carried off all the furniture of M. Bernot’s house, where
he had been quartered.’ The property thus stolen is sent to Germany,
as is proved by this advertisement in the _Kölnische Zeitung_:
‘Furniture moved from the theatre of military operations to all
destinations.’ From this source, war-booty to the value of several
billions has already been divided among an army of Germans.
_Seizure of Works of Art._—The Germans have stolen countless
works of art, ‘in order’—so runs a recent official note of their
government—‘that they may be preserved as a record of art and
civilization.’—‘It would be impossible,’ declares _Le Temps_, ‘to
find a more cynical admission of the thefts committed by the German
authorities in our museums and public buildings.’ If one remembers
that this methodical pillage has gone merrily on among private
individuals, drawing on the unlimited stores of works of art which
have been accumulated throughout the centuries in Poland, and
particularly in Belgium and France, it must certainly be apparent
that the value of these stolen art treasures is immense.
_War Imposts._—Our official report establishes that ‘Requisitions
have everywhere been continuous. Towns that have had to meet the
expenses of troops quartered within their jurisdiction have been
overwhelmed by huge levies.’
Belgium is staggering under an annual war assessment of 480,000,000
francs. Bucharest, after its capture by the Germans, was forced
to pay a levy amounting to about 1900 francs per capita of the
population. At Craiova the levy was 950 francs per capita. An edict
forbids the circulation of paper money unless it has been specially
stamped by the Germans, who retain 30 per cent of its nominal value.
In April, 1917, the _Frankfurter Zeitung_ announced that the leaders
of the Austro-German forces of occupation in Roumania would shortly
call for an obligatory internal loan of a hundred million francs.
In Poland, the German government has just issued a billion marks in
paper money for enforced circulation. These are only single examples.
_Theft of Specie, Jewels, and Securities._—In September, 1916, the
Germans seized three quarters of a billion francs from the National
Bank of Belgium in Brussels, which was subsequently transferred to
Germany. In January, 1917, on the steamer Prinz Hendrick, they stole
a million francs from a Belgian who was traveling from England,
and took ten million francs’ worth of diamonds from the mail-bags.
In the village of Vraignes, on March 18, 1917, the Germans, before
evicting the inhabitants, stole from them the 13,800 francs they
had in their possession. At Noyon—we learn from the official report
already quoted—the Germans broke open and pillaged the safes of banks
and private citizens before retiring from the town. The securities,
jewels, and silver plate of Noyon represented a value of about
eighteen million francs. And, as I have said, these are only random
incidents.
Taking into consideration, then, the present high prices of
food-products, coal, metal, petroleum, war-material, machinery,
and the rest, it can be seen at a glance that each one of the
nine sources of booty just enumerated, on which the Germans have
been steadily drawing, in some cases for as much as three years,
has unquestionably yielded the value of several billions of
francs,—certain of them, perhaps, tens of billions. Hence we may
reasonably conclude that, without fixing a definite figure for the
yield of these nine sources, the total plunder has mounted well up in
the tens of billions.
Another basis for calculating the worth of the invaded territories
to Germany lies in the fact that the national fortunes of these
countries, according to ante-bellum statistics, amounted to about 155
billions of francs.
* * * * *
We shall now examine the six other elements of Germany’s present
advantageous situation—those which result from the domination
which the war has enabled her to exert over her own allies,
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. This domination, which amounts
practically to actual seizure, has permitted her to fulfill the
scheme of Central Pan-Germany as a result of the crushing of Serbia.
II
_The second element of German advantage: the Pan-German loans_
A portion of the approximate sum of 115 billion francs devoted by
Germany, up to the end of July, 1917, to the carrying on of the war
has enabled her to burglarize her own allies by taking advantage of
the extremely bad financial situation which faced them at the end
of the Balkan wars. As a result of this situation, Austria-Hungary,
Bulgaria, and Turkey, in order to sustain the present long-drawn-out
struggle, have been forced to draw on the credit of Berlin. The sum
total of the loans made by Germany to her allies and secured by her
own war loans cannot yet be verified, but there can be no doubt that
it mounts up to a respectable number of billions.
These loans have worked out to the immense advantage of Germany, for
the following reasons. Established facts prove that, without the
assistance of Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish troops, and
without the numerous products supplied her by the Orient, Germany
would have been beaten long ago, even in spite of the Allies’
blundering. As these troops and resources are of priceless value to
Germany, it would seem that she must have paid dearly for them, and
in gold. However, as the reserve of the German Imperial Bank was
1,356,875,000 marks in July, 1914, and 2,527,315,000 in February,
1917, it is certain that Germany has not lent gold to her allies,—in
large quantities, at any rate,—but only paper, whose value depends
solely on the strength of German credit.
In reality, therefore, Germany, simply by keeping a printing-press
busy turning out little stamped slips of paper, has obtained troops,
food-stuffs, and raw materials which were indispensable to her in
avoiding defeat; and at the same time she has so established herself
as a creditor as to give her the right to exact final payment by her
allies for advances which were primarily made to them in Germany’s
own vital interest.
Now these obligations weigh so heavily on countries like
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, already in sore stress, that
they incur loans which no one of these three countries can ever hope
to pay off unless a victory of the Allied democracies should shatter
the financial yoke of Berlin.
In order to appreciate the nature of these loans and their
consequences, the example of Turkey is particularly instructive.
‘Germany’s advances to Turkey in no way represent Turkish
war-expenditure. We must add to them the requisitions made in the
country itself, and the war-material purchased in Germany and
Austria-Hungary which is not yet paid for.’
At the beginning of 1917 Djavid Bey arranged in Berlin for a new
loan of three million pounds, simply to enable Turkey to pay her
debts to the Krupp firm, as well as the advances made her by the
different groups of financiers and the German Minister of Finance.
This means, therefore, that, when Germany sends arms to the Turks
in order that they may use them to consolidate the Pan-German
scheme, she also finds a means of making this consignment of arms
serve to entangle the Turks still more hopelessly in the financial
web. ‘In Pan-Germanist circles, there has been much discussion of
the compensations which Turkey must make to Germany in return for
services rendered in the course of the war. It is the unanimous
opinion that Germany, without gaining any territorial acquisitions in
Turkey, must have controlling rights in the Ottoman Empire, so that
the Pera-Galata bridge may be as near Berlin as Constantinople.’
What has taken place in the spheres of finance between Berlin and
Constantinople has, by the very nature of things, been duplicated
between Berlin and Sofia, though of course in a less pronounced form.
Germany, therefore, by means of paper loans based on her own credit,
has caused colossal obligations to be assumed by her allies—countries
representing vast areas of land: Austria-Hungary with 676,616 square
kilometres, Bulgaria with 114,104, and Turkey with 1,792,900, or
2,583,620 square kilometres in all. Now these three countries are
precisely the ones which are indispensable to the carrying out of the
Central Pan-German ‘Hamburg to the Persian Gulf’ scheme; the loans,
therefore, are Pan-Germanist loans.
It should be borne in mind, on the other hand, that although
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey are financially encumbered
_in their quality of states_, the exploitation of these countries
by the Germans is very profitable. Their combined national fortunes
were estimated, before the war, at about 269 billion francs. We
must realize also that, although these loans granted by Berlin to
her allies are merely paper loans, they bind Turkey, Bulgaria, and
Austria-Hungary to Germany as closely as debtors can be bound to
a creditor. None of these three countries can reasonably hope to
get funds after the war from their present adversaries, who, it is
certain, will have none too much money for their own needs; and so
the financial situation as a whole combines with the enterprise shown
by the Berlin General Staff to strengthen the grip which Germany has
obtained over her allies through loans.
As this financial dependence of the three vassal states, with its
tremendous consequences, is, as I have said, maintained simply by
means of a printing-press and little slips of paper, which cost
very little indeed; and since Germany receives in exchange for
these slips of paper bearing her signature, men, food-stuffs, and
supplies which, but for the action of the Allies, would enable her
to establish Pan-Germany as mistress of Europe, we may safely say
that the Pan-Germanist loans floated by Berlin at her allies’ expense
constitute a powerful element of military advantage, which, if one
but examines the conditions of its origin, must stand out as the most
profitable and extraordinary swindle ever perpetrated.
III
_The third element of German advantage: the value of a monopoly in
exploiting the latent resources of the Balkans and Asia Minor_
The figure of 269 billions of francs quoted above takes no account of
the enormous agricultural and mineral wealth, as yet unexploited and
unappraised, of the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire. Now, the business
of tapping these vast reservoirs is entirely in the hands of the
Germans, as a result of the Pan-Germanist loans.
IV
_The fourth element of German advantage: the value resulting from
the creation of an economic Pan-Germany_
Economic Pan-Germany, as it was outlined by List, Roscher, Rodbertus,
and other German economists, may be defined as follows: A territory
uniting under one supreme central control Central Europe, the
Balkans, and Turkey—_a territory large enough to include military and
economic resources entirely sufficient to provide for the needs of
the population in times of war; and to assure its rulers in times of
peace the domination of the world_.
The seizure by Berlin of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey—all
essential elements of Central Pan-Germany—was accomplished in three
ways: _militarily_, by the supremacy acquired by the German General
Staff over the troops of the vassal states; _financially_, by means
of the paper loans granted by Germany; and _diplomatically_, by the
treaties signed in Berlin on January 11, 1917, establishing the
strongest sort of German protectorate over the Ottoman Empire. This
done, the consolidation of Pan-Germany was quickly undertaken by
Berlin in a great number of ways.
_Control of Customs._—As the establishment of the great Pan-German
_Zollverein_ (Customs Union) was not to be accomplished at one
stroke, the Kaiser’s government set about preparing the necessary
steps. Numerous conferences held at Berlin and attended by German,
Austrian, and Hungarian statesmen and business men, resulted in the
following essential provisions. (1) An economic customs agreement
of long duration, which would make a single economic unit of
Germany and Austria-Hungary; (2) to bring this about gradually, a
progressive increase of duty—free articles, and a unification of
the customs charges on certain goods; (3) a close economic union
between Austro-Germany and Bulgaria and Turkey, to be arranged and
established with the greatest possible expedition.
_Ethnographic Control._—Certain nations afford considerable
resistance to the Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme. The Serbians, who are
morally irreducible, are an obstacle to the permanent establishment
of the Pan-German nexus between Hungary and Bulgaria; and without
this the entire Pan-German programme falls flat. The systematic
destruction of the Serbian people has been entrusted to the Bulgars,
who, under pretext of quelling insurrections, slaughter not only
the Serbian men, but also women and children, down to babies at the
breast. In the Ottoman Empire the Armenians happen to occupy those
regions which were characterized in the Reichstag by Herr Delbrück
as ‘Germanic India.’ Berlin therefore puts to good use the Turks’
inherited taste for massacres of Christians. Already more than one
million Armenians have been got out of the way.
_Agricultural Control._—The food crisis in Germany has led Berlin to
proceed with the greatest haste toward utilizing the rich farming
districts which the fortunes of war have put within her grasp.
Hundreds of experts, with thousands of agricultural implements,
have been sent to Roumania, Serbia, and Asia Minor. In this latter
country, two cultural centres in particular have received attention.
In the province of Adana cotton-growing is being developed; on the
plains of Anatolia the intensive cultivation of grain is in progress.
These energetic efforts have had a twofold result: the Turks will
not revolt against Germanic domination—because of starvation, if for
no other reason; and, by reason of the increasing yield of Serbian,
Roumanian, and Turkish lands, more of which are continually being
brought into service, the food-supply of the Central Empires becomes
more and more completely assured.
_Banking Control._—The exploitation of Eastern Pan-Germany calls for
vast capital. The German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish
banks have formed powerful combinations. As the leaders of this
movement in Germany we find the Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner Bank, the
Kölnische Bankverein; in Austria-Hungary the Vienna Kredit-Anstalt
and the Hungarian Bank of Credit in Budapest.
_Economic Control._—As the rapid exploitation of the latent
resources of the Balkans and Turkey is the principal economic object
of the Germans, they have just established, in coöperation with
King Ferdinand, the ‘Institute for Furthering Economic Relations
between Germany and Bulgaria.’ In order to facilitate the Germanic
penetration of Turkey, ten thousand Turkish boys between the ages of
twelve and eighteen years are to come to Germany for their technical
education. These young Turks, living in German families, learning
German, and saturating themselves with German ideas, will soon be
able collaborators with the Teutons themselves in germanizing Turkey
and exploiting the numerous concessions which, if the war turns out
successfully for them, will be wrung from the Ottoman government by
the subjects of the Kaiser.
_Railway Control._—The railway systems of European Pan-Germany have
been brought to the highest degree of perfection. In Turkey, German
officers are absolutely in control of the railroads. Out of the
2435 kilometres which separate Constantinople from Bagdad, only 583
kilometres of line remain to be constructed—and this distance is
traversed by automobile roads. As for the Turkish railroads belonging
to French and English companies, the German government has suggested
that the Turks ‘purchase’ them. One should cherish no illusions as
to the real meaning of this word ‘purchase.’ It means, according to
Turco-German methods, that the expenses involved in this purchase
should be set down against the war damages which the Central Powers
consider to be due them from the Allies.
_Canal Control._—The canal project, outlined as far back as April
26, 1895, by the Pan-Germanist Dr. G. Zoepfl, was taken up and
begun by the Economic Congress of Central Europe, which met at
Berlin on March 19, 1917. This project is made up of the following
elements: (1) Union of the Rhine with the Danube by the opening up to
navigation of the Main and of the canal from the Main to the Danube.
(2) Completion of the central canal joining the Vistula and the
Rhine. (3) The Oder-Danube canal, joining the Baltic and Black Sea.
(4) Opening to navigation of the Rhine as far as Bâle. (5) Union of
the Elbe with the Danube by means of the river Moldau. (6) Union of
the Weser with the Main by means of the Fulda-Werra. (7) Connection
of the Danube and the Vistula by means of canals. (8) Union of the
Danube with the Dniester by means of the Vistula. (9) Opening to
navigation of the Save. (10) Opening to navigation of the Morava
and the Vardar as far as Saloniki. The Danube is the base of this
gigantic programme of construction. ‘The Danube means everything to
us,’ declared General von Groener, in December, 1916.
* * * * *
This rapid sketch of the preparations now going on in the economic
sphere of Pan-Germany will permit any clear-thinking man to
understand the crushing power which will lie in this formidable
system when all its latent resources have been developed by
the Germans to the profit of their hegemony. The organization
of Pan-Germany is only in its first stages; nevertheless, the
concentrated military, economic, and strategic strength which it has
already put at the disposal of Berlin is so great that it permits
Germany to baffle her far more numerous, but widely scattered,
adversaries. What, then, would be the strength of a completely
organized Pan-Germany? It is undeniable, in fact, that a methodical,
big-scale development of all the mineral, vegetable, animal, and
industrial products of economic Pan-Germany, together with the
low-cost transportation afforded by a complete system of canals,
would make it possible for the Germans to pay high wages to their own
workmen, and yet at the same time bring about such a reduction of net
prices in every line of industry as to force Pan-German products on
the whole world by their sheer cheapness.
It is easy to see, then, that in the face of economic Pan-Germany’s
overwhelming methods any economic revival on the part of the European
nations now allied would be impossible. The economic ruin of the
Allies, after so exhausting and costly a war as this, would by the
nature of things bring about their political subjection to Berlin.
Besides, there is not a country in the world which could escape the
clutches of economic Pan-Germany on the one hand, or the consequences
of the irremediable ruin of the Allies on the other. The fact that
Pan-Germany is organizing itself is an ominous event which should
receive the concentrated attention of all the world’s free peoples;
for it places in German hands the elements of such an overwhelming
economic power as has no precedent in the world’s history.
V
_The fifth element of German advantage: the value of military
Pan-Germany_
Berlin relies, above all else, on her military resources to render
secure for all time that economic Pan-Germany which is destined to
provide her, in peace-time, with a permanent means of acquiring
wealth and world-dominion. Military Pan-Germany is, therefore, the
complement and the pledge of economic Pan-Germany. The Kaiser’s
successful seizure, through the fortunes of war, of new sources of
man-power—Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Ottoman soldiery; of new
strategic points or regions of exceptional importance, located in
invaded countries _or in those of his own allies_, has furnished him
with the basis of military Pan-Germany. In 1914, Prussian militarism
held sway over only the 68 million inhabitants of the German Empire.
At the beginning of 1917, it had been extended by consent or by force
to the 176 million people of Pan-Germany.
This result—evidently the consequence of an immense extension of
exclusive influence throughout Central and Eastern Europe—has
permitted the German General Staff to take over at will certain
strategic points or regions of the greatest importance, over which
it exerted no direct influence before the war. Zeebrugge, on the
North Sea, for instance; Trieste, Pola, and Cattaro on the Adriatic;
the Bulgarian coasts of the Ægean; the Ottoman Straits; the Turkish,
Bulgarian, and Roumanian shores of the Black Sea, have always been
strategic points or districts of exceptional value.
This value, however, has become vastly greater now that these
points or districts form part of a single military system under
the directing and organizing power of the Berlin General Staff. At
present, these essential strategic points and districts are the
strongholds of the Pan-German frontiers. They are, in fact, connected
by continuous fortifications, defended in the most effective way
the world has ever known by an intensive system of barbed-wire
entanglements, deep-dug subterranean shelters, machine-guns, and
heavy artillery. The internal military organization of Pan-Germany
is being carried forward with uninterrupted speed. Factories of
war-material have been judiciously distributed throughout the whole
territory, with the double object of utilizing raw materials near
their source of origin, thus avoiding useless transportation, and of
making possible the swift dispatch of munitions to any threatened
sector of front. For this reason the Krupp firm, at the outbreak of
war, established important branch factories, not only in Bavaria, but
also in Bulgaria and Turkey.
The railway system and strategic automobile roads in Pan-Germany have
been developed very swiftly—notably in the Balkans and in Turkey,
where the need was relatively great. Back of every military front
railroads running parallel with that front have been constructed, so
that reinforcements may be sent to any given point with the maximum
of speed. All this, taken as a whole, has converted Pan-Germany into
one gigantic, extremely powerful fortress.
A new phase is now in preparation. The Kaiser’s General Staff, not
content with holding the high command of all forces in Pan-Germany,
is determined to standardize as far as possible their arms, their
munitions, and their methods of instruction. The Deputy Friedrich
Naumann—one of the sponsors of the _Mitteleuropa_ idea—is plainly
smoothing the way toward this end, which, because of geographic
reasons, most intimately concerns Austria-Hungary. In the _Vossische
Zeitung_ he has just outlined a scheme of ‘full and complete
harmony of the Central Empires in so far as military matters are
concerned.’ He boldly adds an avowal which is well worth remembering.
‘_Mitteleuropa_ is in existence to-day. Nothing is lacking save
its organs of movement and action. These organs can be provided by
its two emperors, since they have at their disposal the necessary
elements for the creation of a common army.’
This prophecy merits our close attention; for it can readily be seen
that, if the unification of the Armies of the two Central Empires
were to take place, neither Bulgaria nor Turkey, on whose military
resources the German General Staff is getting an increasingly firm
grip, could prevent the absorption of their armed forces into the
Pan-German system.
As for the military strength of Pan-Germany, it is an easy matter
to estimate it. Even if the Kaiser’s armies were to withdraw from
Russia, Poland, Belgium, and France, Pan-Germany would still include
150,000,000 people. Now, as Germany has mobilized about 20 per
cent of her own population and that of her allies,—who have become
vassals,—we see that Central Pan Germany can count upon approximately
30,000,000 soldiers. Prussian militarism, whose destruction by the
Allies has become the true, legitimate, essential aim of the war, has
therefore become far more widespread, through the carrying out of the
Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme, than it was in 1914. It is proved by
well-established facts that Berlin, while vigorously pushing a peace
campaign destined to disunite the Allies, is doing everything in
her power to turn Pan-Germany into a fortress the strength of which
is unexampled in the world’s history. In any case it is undeniable
that, as military Pan-Germany is a pledge of the success of economic
Pan-Germany, its establishment constitutes an important element of
advantage for the German cause. This will be further proved when we
come to examine the two final elements of advantage.
VI
_The sixth element of German advantage: the importance of the vast
economic profits which accrue to Berlin at the expense of Russia
through the establishment of Pan-Germany_
We need only glance at the map to realize that a really free Russian
republic could never range itself on the side of Pan-Germany. It is
self-evident that, if Pan-Germany were to succeed in splitting Europe
in two, her economic and military pressure toward the East would be
irresistible. The countless agents whom Berlin already maintains in
the immense territory of Russia would find their work becoming easier
and easier. Following up the hypothesis, then, Russia, succumbing
to insoluble financial problems and unending internal difficulties,
would break up, from the Baltic to the Pacific, into a series of
anarchistic republics—all of which is according to the plans of
Lenine, who is a creature of Berlin. After that there would be
nothing to prevent German influence from becoming the controlling
force in the economic exploitation of the immense natural riches of
European and Asiatic Russia.
We are well within the bounds of reason in predicting such a
possibility. The fact that German agents have already succeeded in
stirring up most serious trouble throughout the length and breadth
of Russia—that they have provoked separatist movements in Finland,
Ukrainia, and the Caucasus, and that all China is seething with
disturbances which react on Asiatic Russia—proves to the satisfaction
of the most skeptical that the break-up of Russia into little states
inevitably subject to the political and economic influence of Berlin
would be an inevitable consequence of a successful Pan-Germany.
It is plain, therefore, that the huge profits which the Germans would
stand to gain by such a state of affairs—a direct result of military
Pan-Germany—form an element of advantage worthy of being considered
by itself.
VII
_The seventh element of German advantage: the transfer to Germany
of at least twenty-one billion francs of French credit_
The creation of military and economic Pan-Germany makes possible
a method of securing war-booty planned in advance by the
Pan-Germanists, which may be stated as follows: _The transfer to
Germany of funds owed to one of her enemies by another enemy, or by
one of her own allies_.
In order to understand this method of extortion one need only read
a passage from Tannenberg’s book, _Greater Germany_, published in
French translation in 1916 by the firm of Payot. This work possesses
exceptional interest for two reasons: first, it appeared in Germany
in 1911; its publication, therefore, was evidently inspired, as in
many other cases, by the ruling class at Berlin, in order to prepare
the German people for war by promises of colossal booty; second, the
facts of the case show that the German General Staff, ever since the
outbreak of hostilities, has been modeling the political conduct of
the war on the exact lines laid down by Tannenberg, who may be said
to have officially declared the Pan-German scheme of 1911.
Now, independent of the 35 billion marks—nearly 44 billion
francs—which were to be imposed on France in the coming war by way of
regular war indemnity, Tannenberg, in Article 5 of the hypothetical
treaty, outlined the following additional extortion:—
‘France cedes to Germany her claim to the 12 billion marks (15
billion francs) lent by her to Russia.’ This means nothing more or
less than a cession of credit.
On page 308 of Payot’s edition, Tannenberg indicates as follows the
use to be made by Germany of these Russian debts to France:—
‘We shall not be able to give thanks to Holy Russia for this splendid
sum, for she has made such vile use of these billions that to-day
almost nothing remains. There is no question of reimbursement. Russia
is not a mortgaged property subject to payment of interest, which can
be sold when this interest is not promptly forthcoming on the day it
is due. However, we shall be able to collect our money in another
way, simply by taking in exchange for these credits the territories
of the Poles in Posnania, East Prussia, and Upper Silesia; of the
Lithuanians on the banks of the Niemen; of the Letts on the Duna; of
the Esthonians on the Embach and the regions bordering on the rivers
of the northern coastal country; of the Czechs in Bohemia, Austrian
Silesia, and Moravia; of the Slavs in Southern Ukrainia, Carinthia,
Styria, Croatia, Dalmatia, Goerz, and Gradiska, in so far as they
come within the southern and eastern limits of Greater Germany.
‘This procedure enables us to kill three birds with one stone. Russia
rids herself of the burden of debts and interest-paying which is
crushing her; the Slavs of the West and South become citizens of a
Slavic country; and we Germans obtain, free of debt and incumbrance,
the much-needed territories for colonization.’
These words were written in 1911. On May 24, 1917, the Berlin
_Tägliche Rundschau_ thus exposed Germany’s future attitude toward
Russia:—
‘If we reach an agreement with the new Russian government, or
with the government which succeeds it, so much the better; but in
making our terms we shall deliberately turn to account the internal
situation of the ancient empire now in revolution. It is more
essential to-day than ever before that we should push our claims
against Russia for indemnity and for the annexation of that territory
which we so sorely need for colonization.’
The similarity between this programme of annexation and indemnity,
written so recently, and Tannenberg’s outline, published six years
ago, is indeed striking.
Let us now see how, in the present state of affairs, Tannenberg’s
plan for a transfer of credit could be worked out. Suppose we suggest
a hypothesis.
In the first place, it is evident that, if Russia should continue to
submit to anarchy fostered by German agents, her financial situation,
already perilous, would no longer permit her to pay the interest
on her bonds held abroad. Again, if Pan-Germany, now momentarily
established, continues to exist, Berlin will be able to take over
Russian obligations to France without the necessity of a formal
treaty. In fact, the tremendous pressure against Russia, exerted by
the mere geographical contact of Pan-Germany as she lies athwart
Europe, would practically render unnecessary the formal cession of
French credit. Berlin, taking fullest advantage of the situation,
would then say to Petrograd, ‘We consider that France owes us a
considerable sum by way of war-indemnity. We are unable to collect
this, but you Russians also owe an indemnity. We therefore assume
the position of France as your creditor, and, as the strength of
Pan-Germany has put you practically at our mercy, we demand the
payment of your debts in such and such a form.’
What resistance could disorganized Russia make to this claim,
presented with true German cynicism?
Russian extremists need not hope, as certain of them do, to avoid
paying the debts contracted by the old régime. If they do not care to
fulfill their obligations to France, which is working hard to sustain
the Russian Revolution, they will have to pay those same debts to
Berlin, where full use would be made of them to exploit the Russian
people.
Moreover, the ‘purchase’ of French- and English-owned railroads in
Turkey, suggested several months ago by Berlin, of which we have
already spoken, proves convincingly that the Germans intend also
to follow out the system of transferring credits in cases where
money is owed by Germany’s allies to Germany’s enemies. For a long
period great numbers of Frenchmen purchased the state obligations
of Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria, Roumania, and Turkey. It is
impossible to give the exact amount of French money thus invested
in Pan-Germanized Central and Eastern Europe, for the securities
of the above-mentioned countries were generally floated in several
foreign financial centres at once; but persons who have the most
thorough knowledge of French investments make a minimum estimate of
six billion francs. As for the French money invested in Roumania and
Serbia it will vanish into thin air as soon as the Austro-German
conquests are consolidated. As for investments in Austria-Hungary,
Bulgaria, and Turkey, the assumption by Germany of French
credits—supposing peace to be concluded on the basis of the present
war-map—would be easily accomplished if she reasoned as follows with
her allies:—
‘France now owes you war indemnities which you cannot collect. By
putting them down against the obligations owed by you to France,
you cancel this debt. However, we Germans have lent you during the
war great sums, and furnished you with supplies without which you
could never have continued the struggle. Since you cannot meet these
obligations we shall secure ourselves, in part at least, by assuming
France’s position as your creditor.’
On the whole, if the present state of things were to continue,
Berlin, by the process of transferring credit, would be able to cause
France the very considerable loss of about 15 billion francs owed
her by Russia, and 6 billions owed by Germany’s vassal states—a total
of at least 21 billions. Now that the Pan-German scheme has for the
moment been accomplished, we can truthfully say that 21 billions
of French money, at the lowest estimate, represented by Russia,
Austrian, Hungarian, Serbian, Bulgarian, and Turkish securities, have
been virtually Pan-Germanized.