THE NECESSITY FOR A DECISION
In the preceding chapters I have pointed out that the advantages
which Germany has already gained through the war, or has assured for
herself in the future, if the present situation remains essentially
unchanged, consist of seven chief elements. Before we arrive at final
conclusions concerning these elements, let us establish the following
facts:—
1. In three years of war, Germany has spent on the war 1612 francs
per capita of her population. France, in the same period, has spent
2200 francs per capita—that is to say, 608 francs, or the immense
figure of 38 per cent, more than Germany.
If the formula ‘without indemnity’ be adopted, with respect to the
expenses of the war, far indeed from serving the cause of the Right,
it would result in this unspeakable iniquity: each Frenchman who
desired peace would have to bear a financial burden heavier by more
than a third than that of each German and loyal subject of the Kaiser
who loosed the dogs of war. Therefore this enormous difference—38
per cent—in the per capita war-expenses between France and
Germany would in itself suffice to make the economic—and hence the
political—downfall of France, swift, complete, inevitable, and beyond
recall.
2. Unquestionably Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, _as
separate states_, have been ruined by their war-expenses, but this
ruin is all to the advantage of Germany, as it throws her vassals
into a condition of absolute financial dependence. As a result, if
Pan-Germany is to continue to exist, the Berlin government must be
the unchallenged controller of all the financial combinations on
which the peace and well-being of Pan-Germany depend. Now these
combinations evidently can serve only to strengthen the German
hegemony.
No parallel situation is to be found among the Entente powers. The
ruin of Russia, for example, would simply make the ruin of France
more inevitable, unless a decisive victory of the Allies were to
rob Germany of her iniquitous spoils and at the same time guarantee
to France the legitimate reparation which alone can save her from
irretrievable financial disaster.
3. If Germany can still continue to float new internal loans with
comparative ease, it is because her wholesale territorial and
Pan-German seizures are considered by her people as new pledges of
the credit of the German state as the heart of Pan-Germany.
4. France, which has spent in three years of war 2500 francs per
capita of her population, has suffered only loss: 20,000 square
kilometres of her territory have been invaded, and given over to
undreamed-of spoliation at German hands. Germany, on the other hand,
which has spent only 1691 francs per capita for the war, has occupied
500,000 square kilometres of foreign soil, burglarized her own
allies, and piled up huge profits from the war.
The diversity of these profits is so great, and the mortgage that
they have placed on the future is so heavy, that no figures will
convey the sum-total of these advantages; but enough has been said to
show that the aggregate is enormous. If one deducts the 115 billions
of francs devoted by Germany to the war from the total represented
by all the elements of advantage already enumerated, one begins
to realize that Germany has really wrung from the war present and
future profits which can be computed only in _hundreds of billions of
francs_. This war, therefore, has brought Germany boundless material
gain, such as no war in history has ever brought to one people. It
is equally certain, on the other hand, that Germany can utilize her
advantages only on the express condition of maintaining certain
indispensable conditions of the situation on which they are based. We
shall now see to what minimum these conditions may be reduced.
Our table shows that out of the seven elements of advantage won by
Germany from the war, the last six—that is, those in the second
group—are altogether independent of the first, except for one
small detail relating to the national fortunes of the territories
occupied by Germany to the southeast—that is, in Albania, Montenegro,
Roumania, and Serbia.
If, therefore, the formula, ‘peace without annexations and
indemnities,’ were actually adopted, Germany, by withdrawing from
Belgium and France to the west, Russian Poland to the east, and
Montenegro, Albania, Roumania, and Serbia to the southeast, would
renounce her first element of advantage, represented by the value of
the invaded territories—that is, about 155 billion francs. From this,
however, must be deducted the tens of billions’ worth of plunder
carried out of the invaded territories during these three years,
consisting either of products already used up by the Germans, or of
material, metals, and securities which have already been removed to
Germany. Her renunciation of this first element of advantage would
therefore be rendered relatively incomplete were the formula adopted.
We should note also that there are excellent reasons why Germany’s
renunciation could never apply in reality to the territories invaded
by her to the southeast—_to Serbia, at all events_.
The six elements of German advantage forming the second group of
our table are infinitely more important to Berlin than the first
element—which is in any case partially assured by the ‘no indemnity’
formula, as we have seen. Although they are less directly apparent
to the Allies, the six elements of the second group are nevertheless
_real_, for they depend on incontrovertible military, economic, and
geographic facts. Now these six elements, big with possibilities
for the future, depend entirely on the covert but certain seizure
which the war has enabled Germany to make of her own allies. But
this seizure was possible only as a result of Serbia’s destruction.
Serbia, therefore, formed the geographic bulkhead which Germany had
to batter down before her influence could predominate over Bulgaria
and Turkey. The destruction of Serbia was the _sine qua non_ of the
establishment of Central Pan-Germany, which assures the Kaiser of the
six principal elements of advantage from the war. Moreover, it is
undeniable that the essential prop of Central Pan-Germany has been
furnished by the Berlin-Bagdad Railroad, of which the most important
branch, that of Belgrade-Nish-Pirot, runs across Serbia. Now, that
Germany is fighting for the Berlin-Bagdad line, Count Karoly, an ally
of Berlin, admitted, speaking on December 12, 1916, in the Hungarian
Chamber. (See _Le Journal de Genève_, December 30, 1916.)
To sum up, then, German victory and the fruition of her most
important war-advantages depend directly on the maintenance of
Central Pan-Germany, made up of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Serbia,
Bulgaria, and Turkey. Now this maintenance is based on two prime
conditions.
1. The continuance of Serbia’s state of subjection to Austro-Germany.
2. The preservation of the new economic and military lines of
communication between Berlin on the one side and Vienna, Budapest,
Sofia, and Constantinople on the other. These are, indeed, the
bonds which have enabled Berlin to reduce to practical slavery
the Poles, Czechs, Jugo-Slavs, and Roumanians,—the adversaries of
Pan-Germany,—and then, without changing any names or long-established
frontiers, to make Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria vassal-states of
Berlin, and, consequently, active elements of Central Pan-Germany.
Finally, if the present order of things in Central Europe is
preserved, Germany can maintain the Hamburg-Bagdad line. This would
be assured by the adoption of the formula, ‘peace without indemnities
and annexations.’ This is easily proved.
As we have already seen, even if Germany were to withdraw in the
East and West, the stipulation ‘no indemnities’ would permit her to
give back the territories stolen from Russia, France, Belgium, and
Roumania in a condition of complete economic, physical, and moral
collapse: in a word, sucked dry. By reason, too, of the principle of
‘no indemnities,’ the reconstruction of these devastated countries
would be another cause of financial exhaustion for France, Russia,
Belgium, and Roumania, already overburdened with the costs of the
war. But, even assuming that the Germans withdraw from these occupied
territories to the East and West,—although at present there is no
reason for seriously considering such an eventuality,—no one in his
senses could believe that they would give up Serbia unless forced
to do so by the most ruthless methods; for Serbia, by reason of her
geographic position, is absolutely essential to the existence of
Central Pan-Germany, on which, in turn, Germany’s vast advantages
depend.
Of course, it is easy to imagine that Germany would give her
signature to treaties of settlement, even involving Serbia. But
treaties signed by Germany have no value whatever. ‘We snap our
fingers at treaties,’ said the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin to
Mr. Gerard, American Ambassador at Berlin. Besides, even supposing
that Berlin were party to a treaty concerning Serbia, this treaty
might allow Serbia to exist in theory, but not in fact. We must
look the situation in the face: Serbia is one great graveyard. Her
population has been systematically butchered by the Bulgarians, with
German approval. Serbia is utterly ruined: the Bulgaro-Austro-Germans
have taken everything.
Now the principle ‘no indemnities’ would keep Serbia in this terrible
and irremediable state of misery. It is evident that under these
conditions the Serbian state would be hopelessly crippled. If,
therefore, Austria-Germany were to say to the Allies, ‘Very well; in
conformity with the formula “no annexations, no indemnities,” we are
willing to recognize Serbia’s dependence by treaty,’ who would be
deceived by this sinister and portentous joke? Who could believe in
the sincerity of a proposition which, on the face of it, is rendered
impossible of fulfillment by the ‘no indemnities’ clause. And what
guaranty would the Allies hold that Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria
would withdraw from Serbia at the same time, in view of the fact that
such a withdrawal, if _bona fide_, would imply Berlin’s renunciation
of the whole Central Pan-German scheme and its vast attendant profits?
To suppose such a thing possible implies a complete ignorance of the
Germanic spirit as it has manifested itself since the beginning of
history. Besides, declarations made by the Germans themselves show
that they will never recede from their position as regards Serbia.
As early as December, 1916, the _Frankfurter Zeitung_ prepared
its readers in advance for the ‘pacifist’ tactics about to be
employed—tactics which are now being tried out with the help of the
Russian anarchists, the Kienthal Socialists, and the Pope.
‘Certainly,’ said the Frankfort paper, ‘if we are to make a lasting
profit from the military situation, both in its favorable and in its
less advantageous aspects, it is essential that special questions
should be severally considered in their relation to the whole.
To-day our point of view should be as follows: in the East, the
formulation of definite demands, and in the West, negotiations on a
flexible basis. This is not a programme but a general line of action.
“Negotiation” is by no means a synonym for “renunciation.”’
This last sentence should be read and pondered over by all the
Allies. Here we find an absolutely clear statement as regards the
fate of Serbia, whose restoration, by means indicated later, is the
one thing which can save the world from the consequences of the
Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme.
On August 8, 1917, at a banquet given at London for M. Pachitch,
the Serbian Premier, Mr. Lloyd George acknowledged in decisive
terms Great Britain’s obligations to Serbia—obligations which are
practically those of the whole Entente.
‘What I have already said in the name of the British Government
regarding Belgium, I here repeat in the name of the same Government
regarding Serbia. The first condition of peace must be its complete
and unrestricted restoration. I have not come here to make a speech.
I have simply come to say that, no matter how long the war should
last, Britain has pledged her honor that Serbia shall emerge from
the conflict independent and completely restored. Moreover, it is
not only a matter of honor. The security of civilization is directly
involved here. In the West, Belgium has blocked Germany’s way, and
Serbia in the East has been the check of the Central Powers. She must
continue to mount guard over the gateway to the East.’
To this the Berlin _Kreuzzeitung_ made reply,—
‘Mr. Lloyd George has said that the integral restoration of Serbia
was an essential condition of peace and that British honor was
pledged to this restoration. The war-aims of England and those of
Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria are in absolute opposition on this
point.’
The _Hamburger Fremdenblatt_, speaking for Germany as well, added,—
‘Germany and Austria-Hungary have crushed Serbia. They alone will
decide what disposition is to be made of King Peter’s former realm.’
There can be no illusion here. The formula ‘peace without annexations
and indemnities’ cannot apply to Serbia, which is the keystone of
Pan-Germany.
We now see that, even if the withdrawal of Germany from the
territories of Belgium, France, and Russia now held by her were to
take place, Central Pan-Germany would remain essentially intact;
and her commercial competition alone would suffice to bring about
the economic ruin of France, England, and Russia. The last-named
countries would be staggering under their colossal war-debts,
with no offsetting compensation, whereas Germany, thanks to six
great elements of advantage, would find her war-losses more than
counterbalanced by her profits. What chance would the Allied powers,
exhausted by a deadly peace, have against the thirty million soldiers
of Pan-Germany, when Berlin, refreshed by a short respite, should
choose to renew her hold over those western territories which she had
temporarily relinquished?
Is it not plain what depths of deception lie beneath that formula,
‘peace without annexations and indemnities,’ which the Russian
Socialists, ignorant of the vast advantages accruing to Germany from
the war, have adopted at the suggestion of Berlin’s Leninist agents?
Let us look at the facts, not at the words. If the formula ‘peace
without annexations and indemnities’ is acceptable to the Germans, it
is simply because this formula, in the opinion of Berlin, will assure
the maintenance of Central Pan-Germany, which, in turn, pledges to
Germany the domination of Europe and the fulfillment of all other
elements of the Pan-German scheme.
Now, if Central Pan-Germany were to survive, thus assuring to Germany
all its vast attendant advantages, and leaving the Allies to face
their incalculable war-losses, could such a peace properly be called
a ‘white peace’? Could a peace which gave Germany the domination of
Europe be called a ‘drawn game,’ a ‘peace without annexations or
indemnities’? What sort of ‘limping peace’ (_paix boiteuse_) would
permit Prussian militarism to hold sway over the 150 million people
of Pan-Germany instead of the 68 millions of 1914, and put 30 million
soldiers at Berlin’s disposal? What one of the exhausted states of
Europe could lift a hand under such conditions? This would be no
_paix boiteuse_; it would be the peace of slavery.
If the Allies are to understand the crucial situation which lies
before them, they must realize that, as Lloyd George said, ‘The
security of civilization is directly involved in the independence
of Serbia.’ But the independence of Serbia can never be assured so
long as Germany practically exercises hegemony over the 50 million
people of Austria-Hungary, for the Austro-German unit of 118 million
inhabitants, all subject to Berlin, is geographically the mistress
of the Balkans. _The pledge of Serbia’s independence, therefore,
does not lie in Serbia, but north of the Danube._ This pledge
involves the liberation of the peoples under Hapsburg domination,—the
Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Jugo-Slavs, and Roumanians,—which alone can
permit the creation of a barrier sufficiently strong to block the
Hamburg-Persian Gulf line, and, at the same time, annul the vast
advantages that the definite establishment of the formidable economic
and military Pan-German scheme would assure to the Kaiser and his
people.
Now it is much easier to devise the destruction of Pan-Germany than
is generally supposed. This fact will become plain as soon as the
Allies as a whole realize that the freedom of the nationalities
subject to the Hapsburgs should not only be an object of the Entente
victory, but also a means to that victory. This, however, is a matter
which needs greater elaboration than I can give it at this point. It
is discussed at length in the concluding chapters of this volume.
In a word, the solution of the Central European problem means
everything for the Allies. So long as it shall remain unsolved,
victory will be out of their reach. On the other hand, when this one
point has been settled, all the other special war-aims of each of the
Allies can be fulfilled with ease.
Assuming now that the problem of Central Europe has been solved,
could it be said that the resulting peace would be ‘without
annexations and indemnities’? Plainly not: for this peace, if it is
to break up forever the autocracies of the Central Empires, must,
for reasons of nationality, change the existing frontiers, which
have made Austro-German imperialism possible. It might involve also
certain legitimate reparations. Can it be said that peace on the
terms of the Allies would be a ‘white peace’—a ‘drawn game’? Again
we must say no; for such a peace would bring incalculable benefits
to the world: the end of Prussian militarism, together with the
possibility of organizing the society of nations under other and
better conditions. Neither could it be called a ‘_paix boiteuse_,’
for the destruction of Prussian militarism would insure to the world
a long term of rest after the present awful struggle.
The formulæ ‘peace without indemnities or annexations,’ ‘white
peace,’ ‘drawn game’ and ‘_paix boiteuse_’ have therefore no more
connection with reality in the event of an Allied victory than in
that of a German victory. The truth in a nutshell is that, by virtue
of the prime importance of the Central European problem, either the
Allies will win victory through the destruction of Pan-Germany, or
else the Germans, thanks to Central Pan-Germany and its economic and
military advantages, will reduce all Europe to slavery. These are the
two phases of the dilemma.
In any case, the fact that expressions without any practical
application, and hence absurd, are constantly made use of in many
Allied organs of public opinion in the discussion of peace, proves
beyond doubt that certain Allied circles, poisoned by the influence
of Lenine or Kienthal, have lost their sense of realities. With
such insidious enemies as the Germans, this involves a real danger
for that moral resistance of the Allies which is so invaluable.
The Americans, through their practical common sense, can be of the
greatest service in helping the European Allies to set it at naught.
President Wilson, by his message to Russia and his Flag Day address,
has already done much for the common cause by clearly setting forth
the concrete difficulties to be overcome by the Allies if they are
to live at liberty. Mr. Gompers has done the same by his firm stand
regarding the Stockholm conference. By energetically opposing the
pernicious Socialist theoreticians, he has supported those real
Socialists in France, England, and Russia who understand the vital
importance of killing Prussian militarism.
May all true Americans continue to speak as these two men have done!
The common sense of their opinions, spread broadcast among the
European Allies, will help us to neutralize the deadly action of
those among us who have become intoxicated by theories. The cause of
the Allies is an ideal, but the triumph of this ideal can never be
insured by words; it can be compassed only by the accurate knowledge
of military and economic realities.