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PAN-GERMANY
THE DISEASE AND CURE
By ANDRÉ CHÉRADAME
New Hampshire League To Provide For National Defense and To Enforce
International Peace
Branch of the National Security League
GOV. HENRY W. KEYES, _Honorary President_
FRANK S. STREETER, _President_
DR. ERNEST M. HOPKINS, President of Dartmouth }
ROLLAND H. SPAULDING, Ex-Governor } _Vice-Presidents_
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Clarence E. Carr _Andover_
Frank Knox _Manchester_
Lester F. Thurber _Nashua_
James W. Remick _Concord_
Gordon Woodbury _Bedford_
Nathaniel E. Martin _Concord_
James F. Brennan _Peterborough_
Charles R. Tilton _Tilton_
Andrew L. Felker _Meredith_
John S. B. Davie _Concord_
John B. Jameson _Concord_
Arthur M. Heard _Manchester_
SECRETARY
Hobart Pillsbury _Manchester_
TREASURER
Edward N. Pearson _Concord_
FINANCE COMMITTEE
Gen. Elbert Wheeler _Nashua_
Walter M. Parker _Manchester_
Harry H. Dudley _Concord_
Frederick W. Sawyer _Milford_
Rodney E. Smythe _Plymouth_
E. H. Hallett _Lisbon_
W. H. McCarten _Lancaster_
Arthur H. Hough _Lebanon_
Leslie P. Snow _Rochester_
W. R. Porter _Keene_
Charles E. Tilton _Tilton_
John Scammon _Exeter_
Fred H. Perry _Charlestown_
A. L. Mansfield _Hillsborough_
E. Bertram Pike _Haverhill_
Perley R. Bugbee _Hanover_
STATE HOUSE, CONCORD, N. H., Feb. 1, 1918.
The purpose of this book is to bring to the people of New Hampshire
a knowledge of the German plan to dominate the world by force and a
clear view of what the Germans have done toward the success of their
plan. It sounds a note of warning to every loyal American, to give
his greatest help to win the war. Read this and think about it.
[Illustration: Henry W. Keyes.]
Honorary President.
[Illustration: Frank S. Streeter.]
President.
[Illustration: Clarence E. Carr.]
Chairman Executive Committee.
[Illustration: Hobart Pillsbury.]
Secretary.
Pan-Germany
The Disease and Cure
By André Chéradame
[Illustration: Decoration]
_Reprinted from several issues of The Atlantic Monthly_
The Atlantic Monthly Press
Three Park Street, Boston, Mass.
_Copyright, 1917_
THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY COMPANY
THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY PRESS, INC.
[No student outside of Germany itself has studied the Pan-German
scheme in all its details more thoroughly than the distinguished
French publicist, André Chéradame. For more than twenty years he has
devoted all his energies and resources, physical and intellectual
alike, to a vigorous and exhaustive investigation of the origin and
progress of the monstrous conspiracy which threatens to overwhelm the
liberties of the entire world. His books, long unheeded, now read
like prophecies. The papers reprinted in this pamphlet originally
appeared in The Atlantic Monthly, where they attracted very great
interest. They are now published in inexpensive form, so that every
American who desires a clear understanding of the meaning of this
war may have a chance to read them. To careful readers we recommend
M. Chéradame’s more elaborate books, “The Pan-German Plot Unmasked”
and “Pan-Germanism and the United States,” published by Charles
Scribner’s Sons.
A new series of articles by this author will appear in The Atlantic
Monthly for 1918.]
[Illustration: PAN GERMANY at the beginning of 1917
PAN-GERMANY AS IT IS]
Pan-Germany
The Disease and Cure
CHAPTER I
HOW CHEAPLY GERMANY HAS FOUGHT THE WAR
At the beginning of 1916, I said in my book _The Pan-German Plot
Unmasked_,—
‘Finally, when all negotiations for an armistice have fallen flat
and Germany’s situation has become still more critical, we shall see
Berlin play her trump card. Protests against territorial annexations
will become insistent beyond the Rhine, secretly sanctioned by
the German government, which will finally say to the Allies: “Let
this slaughtering of one another cease! We are willing to listen
to reason; we resign our claims to those territories of yours now
occupied by our armies. The game has been played to a draw; so let us
treat for peace on that basis.”
‘On the day when this proposition is put forward, the Allies will
find themselves face to face with the most subtle move yet made by
Berlin—the most insidious German snare. Then, above all things, must
the steadfastness, the perspicacity, and the unity of the Allies be
most brilliantly made manifest. The trick of the “drawn game,” if
successful, would involve an overwhelming triumph for Germany and an
irreparable tragedy for the Allies and for the liberty of the world.’
Only a few months after these lines were printed, the prophecy began
to be fulfilled more and more completely. Every possible step has
been taken by Germany to bring about peace on the basis of a draw.
The slogan, ‘Peace without annexations or indemnities,’ was coined to
that end. At first the Allies believed that this formula originated
in Russia; as a matter of fact, however, it was worked out in Berlin
and then suggested to the Russian Socialists through secret agents
whom Germany has successfully established in the Petrograd _Soviet_.
These Socialists, doubtless well-meaning, but over-fond of theories
and always ready to embrace the wildest utopian schemes,—ignorant,
too, of all realities, as has been shown by the steady aggravation
of the general situation in Russia since they came into power with
the Revolution,—have declared enthusiastically for the ‘peace without
annexations and indemnities.’ As there exist also in the other Allied
countries groups of Socialists with a stronger grip on theories
than on facts, and also because Allied sympathies naturally rallied
strongly to the support of the Russian Revolution, the formula,
‘peace without annexations or indemnities,’ thanks to its apparent
origin, has unquestionably made serious inroads on a certain section
of Allied public opinion.
The Stockholm manœuvres, engineered by all the powerful and varied
means at the disposal of German propagandists, were designed to
establish this formula as the fixed basis of all peace negotiations.
When the astuteness of the Allied governments prevented the
fulfillment of this attempt within the period desired by Berlin,
the Vatican was persuaded through Viennese agencies to throw its
influence on the side of peace as determined by Germany.
As a matter of fact, the Pope’s peace proposals, while not embodying
the exact terms of the Kaiser’s formula, involved, in the last
analysis, practically the same essential results. Berlin, therefore,
in order to assure unceasing discussion of her formula,—a discussion
tending at least to bring about an armistice, which would split
up and morally disarm the Allies, thus making it possible for her
to deal with them separately,—outdid herself in mobilizing toward
one end the most widely divergent forces, from the Maximalist
anarchists of Petrograd to the most hidebound reactionaries of the
Sacred College. The extent, the vigor, and the persistence of the
amazing ‘pacifist’ offensive launched by Germany were such that
the expressions ‘peace without indemnities or annexations,’ ‘drawn
game,’ ‘white peace,’ ‘_paix boiteuse_,’ have become as current in
the Allied countries as if they had some established connection
with reality. This is entirely contrary to the fact: with the best
intentions in the world, _peace without annexations or indemnities,
as things stand now, is impossible. There can be no ‘white peace,’ no
‘drawn game,’ no ‘paix boiteuse.’_
To tell the truth, a section of Allied opinion has become befuddled
by these formulæ of Berlin, whose function is to accomplish in
the moral order the same asphyxiating action as that of the gases
employed on the battlefield by the German General Staff. The result
of this moral intoxication is that important groups of the Allies
begin to juggle with words and lose sight of facts. As the natural
outcome of giving serious thought to impossibilities, grave errors
are made in weighing the present situation, with an attendant
weakening of the joint action of the Allied democracies. It is
imperative, therefore, that the pursuit of Utopias, leading only to
disaster, be abandoned, and that we return to those realities which
alone can lead to victory and the establishment of a durable peace.
If the formula ‘peace without annexations and indemnities’ has been
allowed to insinuate itself into the general discussion, it is only
because great numbers of the Allied peoples fail to understand the
overwhelming advantages which Germany, by means of the war, has been
able to assure to herself for the present and the future. The object
of this paper is to show just what these advantages are, and at the
same time to brand the utter hypocrisy of the slogan, ‘peace without
annexations and indemnities,’ which, regarded even in the most
favorable light, would allow Germany to make off with immense booty,
leaving the Allies to face the incalculable losses incurred by them
in a war launched by their adversary.
_The significance of the low rate of German exchange_
The continual fall of German exchange is regarded by many of the
Allies as proof of the progressive and irremediable impoverishment
of Germany. When, for instance, the mark drops 47 per cent in
Switzerland, while the franc has depreciated only 13 per cent,
Frenchmen are for the most part inclined to believe that the war has
affected the two countries in relatively the same proportion; they
then conclude that Germany’s financial situation is infinitely worse
than that of France. In reality, such a comprehensive conclusion
cannot be reached simply through the rise and fall of exchange, which
reflects only certain special aspects of the financial situation of a
country.
Among the various causes affecting exchange, there are two principal
ones. The first is moral. It cannot be denied that the fluctuation
of exchange responds to foreign confidence. If German exchange is
low, it implies, to a certain extent at least, the existence of a
universal conviction that in the long run Germany cannot hold out
against her formidable ring of adversaries. As a result, there is no
great demand for the currency of a state whose credit, it is thought,
must finally collapse. It should be noted, however, that the reason
for this fall of exchange is only a moral evaluation anticipating a
probable outcome; it is not due to a mathematically certain estimate
of what Germany now stands to win or lose as a result of the war.
The second great factor affecting exchange, on the other hand, is
based on present realities which are susceptible of being accurately
determined. Germany, since she has been blockaded by sea, exports
infinitely less than formerly; consequently, her ability to settle
her accounts in foreign countries is limited. When she was able to
sell the United States a million marks’ worth of merchandise, she
then had at her disposal a million marks with which to pay cash
for such imports as she needed. Now that her exports have been so
reduced, she has little money to spare for spending abroad. If she
wishes to increase these foreign purchases, she must export her gold
and consequently reduce the security behind her banknotes. This
results in a lowering of the basis of German credit, with a resulting
drop in exchange.
We shall now see that this falling exchange, whatever its importance,
does not take into account all the elements of the general financial
situation.
If the blockade of Germany seriously complicates her food problems,
on the other hand it is in a way advantageous from a financial point
of view. In a word, when Germany found herself blockaded she was
obliged to evolve means of existing on her own resources or those
of her allies. Our enemies had great difficulties of organization
to overcome, but they turned them to good account: for if Germany’s
exports are small, her imports have been correspondingly reduced.
Hence she needs to send very little money abroad—a fact which is
financially in her favor.
Now, the case of France is radically different. The French
government, feeling assured of the liberty of the seas and believing
that the war would be a short one, found it more expedient to
place enormous orders abroad than to rely on domestic resources to
supply the nation’s need. As a result, French imports, according
to published statistics, exceed exports by one billion of francs
a month. This means that, as things stand now, France must pay
to foreign countries the staggering sum of twelve billion francs
a year, with no corresponding compensation, since her purchases
consist of products which are destroyed in use. For this reason
France is undergoing serious impoverishment while Germany gets off
comparatively easily. It is therefore plain that the fluctuations of
exchange bear little relation to those conditions which must be taken
into consideration in making an appraisal of the general situation;
they reflect, in fact, only a special and limited aspect of the
financial situation as a whole. Popular conclusions drawn from the
fall in the value of the mark are false when attempts are made to
give them an absolute or general significance.
_Why people are still ignorant of the vast advantages gained by
Germany from the war_
Many of the Allies are hoodwinked by the ‘great illusion’ which even
now prevents them, to their endless detriment, from seeing things as
they actually are. In the Allied nations, in fact, people continue to
speak of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, as if these
states remained just as they were before the war. But these terms
have no longer any relation to reality. The Quadruple Alliance of
Central Europe is simply a great illusion, studiously fostered by
William II, for by its means his plans are vastly facilitated. As a
matter of fact, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary are not the
allies, but the vassals, of Berlin, and their influence with her is
less than that of Saxony or Bavaria. The rulers at Constantinople,
Sofia, Vienna, and Budapest are simply marionettes moved by threads
which are pulled by Berlin according to her strategic needs.
Very often we hear it said, ‘Germany has created _Mitteleuropa_.’
This is another mistake. Geographically speaking, _Mitteleuropa_
includes only Central Europe; and Germany’s dominion is infinitely
further flung, extending as it does from the west front in France
to the British front before Bagdad. If we wish to see things in the
light of reality, we must say, for the present at least, ‘_There
is no longer any Germany; instead, there is Pan-Germany_.’ This
is an essential assumption if we are to reason justly. The map of
Pan-Germany at the beginning of 1917, which is printed above, shows
clearly the essential, but all-too-little-known elements of the
present situation, which is characterized by the fact that 73 million
Germans, aided by 21 million vassals,—Magyars, Slavs, and Turks,—have
reduced to slavery 82 millions of Latins, Slavs, and Semites,
belonging to thirteen different nationalities. Pan-Germany, which has
now almost completely reached the limits set by the Pan-German plan
of 1911, consists, therefore, of one vast territory containing about
176 million inhabitants and natural resources of the greatest variety.
I beg my readers to refer to this map of Pan-Germany every time
it is made desirable by the text. This repeated study of the map
is indispensable to a clear and complete comprehension of the
demonstration which follows. As regards the profits which Germany has
wrung from the war, it is particularly important, in order to grasp
the idea of Pan-Germany; for it is the direct result of its creation
that Germany, in spite of the losses and expenses inevitably incurred
by a warring nation, has been able to assure herself of certain
advantages which, considered as a whole, far outbalance her losses
and expenses, as we shall see.
In order to understand the nature of these advantages, one point must
first be made clear.
_The war has cost the Germans comparatively little_
For six fundamental reasons, the conduct of the war has really cost
the Germans far less than it has cost their adversaries.
1. _No Experimentation._ Germany, in order to produce a vast output
of various types of guns and projectiles economically evolved in
times of peace, needed only to extend, by means of machinery of
domestic manufacture, her arsenals and munition-factories, which
before the war were already considerable. On the other hand, the
production of war-material in France at the outbreak of hostilities
was very slack, while in England and Russia it was almost negligible.
In these three countries, therefore, it was necessary to improvise,
as best might be, thousands of new plants, to equip them with
machinery purchased in America at vast expense, and hastily to evolve
new types of cannon, projectiles, and the rest. Now, improvisation,
especially in war-time, means false starts and inevitable bad work,
which must be paid dearly for. Germany was not obliged to incur these
very considerable expenses.
2. _Regulated Wages._ The fact that the problem of German wages was
worked out at leisure in exact correlation to productions whose types
were exhaustively studied in the calm of peace-time certainly allowed
the Germans to obtain war-materials at a lower net cost than was
possible for the Allies.
3. _The Prevention of Waste._ The absence of experimentation and the
simple extension to war-work of highly efficient industrial methods
tested in peace-time, naturally allowed the Germans to avoid in all
spheres those immense losses of material of every nature whose bad
effects and heavy cost were incurred by the Allies. This state of
affairs in France caused losses which were as expensive as they were
inevitable. One may imagine the conditions existing in Russia, where
control is far more difficult of exercise than in France.
4. _Cheap Labor._ The Germans have forcibly enlisted the labor of
about two million prisoners of war. Moreover, the official French
report of April 12, 1917, concerning acts committed by the Germans
in violation of international law, asserts that in the occupied
territories deportation of workers has been a _general measure_. It
has ‘applied to the entire able-bodied population of both sexes,
from the ages of sixteen to sixty, excepting women with young
children.’
Now, the Germans requisition labor from among 7,500,000 Belgians,
3,000,000 French, 4,500,000 Serbians, 5,000,000 Roumanians,
22,000,000 Poles, Ruthenians, and Lithuanians—a total of 42,000,000
slaves.
Let us see what sort of remuneration is made. Take the case of a
young girl of Lille, twenty years old, who was forced to work for six
months, harvesting and threshing wheat and digging potatoes from six
in the morning to twilight, receiving all the while the vilest food.
For her six months of work she was given 9 francs, 45 centimes. The
Germans, therefore, have at their disposal a vast reservoir of labor
for which they pay next to nothing; moreover, the small amounts they
do pay remain in Pan-Germany.
The Allies, on the contrary, pay high wages to their workers, and,
when they run short, must needs pour out good gold in bringing
reinforcements from Asia, Africa, and America. This means that a
considerable part of the wages paid these foreign workmen will leave
France or England for all time.
5. _Free Coal and Iron Ore._ In addition to their own mines, the
Germans have seized important coal and iron mines in France, Belgium,
and Poland. A vast proportion of their ore and coal therefore costs
them nothing. Naturally, then, a German shell made with French
iron and Belgian coal costs far less than a French shell made with
American steel and English coal. As a result, the net price of a
greater part of German munitions is much lower than that paid by the
Allies.
6. _Economical Transportation._ By reason of the grouping of the
Central Powers,—a result of the conquest of the Danube front by
the Teutons,—Germany profits by a geographical situation which is
infinitely more advantageous than that of the Allies, as regards not
only the speed, but also the cheapness, of war-transportation. It is
evident that it costs far less to send a shell from the Krupp factory
to any one of the Pan-German fronts than to send an American shell
to France, a Japanese shell to the Polish front, a French shell to
Roumania _via_ Archangel, or an English shell to the army operating
in Mesopotamia. By the same token, the cost of transporting a soldier
of Pan-Germany to any of the battle-fronts is infinitely lighter than
that of transporting Allied soldiers from Australia or America.
We should note that each one of these six factors which we have
just enumerated reacts profoundly on the sum-total of general
war-expenses, and that, taken together, they involve a formidable
sum. It can therefore truthfully be said that Germany carries on
the war much more economically than the Allies. Figures are so far
lacking which will give the true proportions, but we shall certainly
remain well within the realities of the case if we conclude that, as
a result of the six factors mentioned above, France must spend one
hundred and fifty million francs for war material to every hundred
million spent by Germany. When, therefore, France spends thirty
billions, Germany evidently spends not more than twenty billions. And
what is true of France applies even more accurately to some of the
other Allied nations.
This is a fact of the greatest general importance in coming to a true
understanding of the financial situation created by the war—a fact
which takes on its full significance when we realize that Germany is
not only carrying on the war cheaply, but that she has been enabled,
by means of this war, to win _very important advantages_.
They consist of seven principal elements. The last six of these,
it should be noted without fail, depend solely on the existence of
central Pan-Germany—that is, on the hegemony exercised by Germany
over Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey; they are therefore
wholly independent of the first element, which relates to Germany’s
occupation of enemy territories, particularly to the east and west.
They may be summarized as follows:—
SEVEN ELEMENTS IN TWO GROUPS
_The first group includes_:—
The advantages derived directly from Germany’s aggression, comprised
in a single element, namely, the plunder accruing from the occupation
of enemy territory. This may be analyzed thus:—
(_a_) The value of the 500,000 square kilometres of Montenegrin,
Serbian, Roumanian, Russian, Belgian, and French land held by the
Germans.
This value, estimated according to the national fortunes of the
respective countries before the war,—the area and population of
the occupied portions being taken into consideration,—is in the
neighborhood of 155 billion francs.
This figure, though naturally only approximate, is probably far below
the real sum. We know that the entire national fortune of France,
with its 536,000 square kilometres, was put before the war at 325
billion francs. The valuation of the 500,000 square kilometres of
occupied territory at 155 billions seems therefore an underestimate,
especially when one remembers that these 500,000 square kilometres
include Belgium and the North of France—the richest districts in the
world.
(_b_) The plunder of human beings, supplies, and property (laborers,
war-material, provisions, minerals, raw products, manufactured
products, personal property, art objects, war levies, specie, jewels,
and securities) which has been going on, in some cases for as long
as three years, throughout the occupied territories. This booty
unquestionably represents a value of tens of billions of francs.
These tens of billions should be deducted from the total of the
national fortunes of the invaded districts. The plunder in question
is composed of property or supplies already used up by the Germans or
taken away by them into Germany; the value it represents, therefore,
no longer exists in the invaded districts.
* * * * *
_The second group includes_:—
The advantages which Germany has assured herself for the present or
for the future through the creation of Pan-Germany, which in turn
result from
(_a_) Germany’s burglarization of her own allies—Austria-Hungary,
Bulgaria, and Turkey.
(_b_) The seizure by Germany and her allies of Serbia; in all six
elements:—
I. The Pan-German loans, which throw Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and
Turkey into a state of absolute financial dependence on Berlin.
II. The value of Germany’s monopoly in exploiting the latent
resources of the Balkans and Asia Minor, resulting from the
Pan-German loans.
III. The inherent value of the creation of Economic Pan-Germany. This
cannot fail to be a powerful instrument for the acquisition of wealth.
IV. The value of Military Pan-Germany, which is a guaranty of the
security of Economic Pan-Germany.
V. The value of the enormous economic profits assured to Berlin
through the existence of Pan-Germany _at the cost of Russia_. These
are a direct consequence of the establishment of Military Pan-Germany.
VI. The taking over by Germany of at least 21 billions of French
credit. This is a consequence of the establishment of Economic
Pan-Germany.