CHAPTER IV

THE FIRST STAGE OF THE CAMPAIGN. OPERATIONS FROM KOVNO TO VITEBSK

The Russian frontier in 1812, from the Black Sea to where the River Bug

issues from Galicia, was practically as it is to-day. The ten Polish

Governments, however, then formed the greater part of the Grand Duchy

of Warsaw: the border therefore stopped short at the Bug and the lower

Niemen below Grodno. The Niemen, rising near the city of Minsk, flows

roughly westward for about 150 miles to Grodno, thence about 80 miles

northward to Kovno, and then some 110 miles westward into the Kurisches

Haff. From Grodno to Kovno the channel is deeply sunk and difficult to

cross. There were in 1812 bridges at Grodno and Tilsit; but at Kovno

the Königsberg-Vilna high-road was served only by a ferry. For the last

60 miles of its course the Niemen is in Prussian territory. It thus

became extremely important for Napoleon as soon as he had occupied its

right bank. He had already collected a large flotilla of gunboats and

barges, under Rear-Admiral Baste, in the ports of the Frisches and

Kurisches Haffs, and was able therefore to bring immense quantities of

supplies from his advanced depôts to Kovno and thence to Vilna.

For about 100 miles south-westward from Grodno there was no natural

frontier; thence to the Austrian border it was formed by the Bug,

which, issuing from Galicia below the town of Sokal, flows northward

for some 110 miles to Brest-Litovsk, and then north-westward for 70

miles more to what was in 1812 the Polish border. For nearly 100 miles

near Brest-Litovsk the Pinsk Marshes close in upon the river. The

Austro-Russian border need not be considered, for it was neutralised;

Schwarzenberg operated only as an auxiliary, in Poland. Trade continued

as usual, and when Admiral Chichagov’s army passed close along the

frontier on its way to attack Schwarzenberg it was not molested by

Russia’s nominal enemies.

The first provinces on the right bank of the Niemen entered by the

_Grand Armée_ were Courland to the north and the various districts

which had once formed the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the southward.

Lithuania was and is a region of woods and marshy plain land, broken

in places, and intersected in every direction by streams flowing in

deeply sunken channels. In the south there stretched inland from the

Bug the famous marshes of Pinsk, one of the largest tracts of fenland

in the world, extending as it does for some 300 miles east and west, by

over 100 north and south. The soil, even when not actually swampy, was

generally soft, and there were hardly any good roads. Towns were few;

the population was sparse and wretchedly poor.

At distances varying from about 120 to over 300 miles eastward of the

Bug and Niemen a second natural line is formed by the Düna and the

Dnieper. The Düna rises near the Volga, flows roughly south-west to

Vitebsk, there turns west-north-west and runs for nearly 300 miles to

the Baltic at Riga. Above Vitebsk it is fairly often fordable during

the summer heats. In 1812 it was bridged at Vitebsk and Dünaburg,

half-way to Riga, but, since the left bank is generally higher than the

right between these places, the river does not afford a good line of

defence.

From the Düna at Vitebsk southward to the Dnieper at Orsha is a gap

of about 45 miles. At Orsha the Dnieper, one of the great rivers of

Europe, turns to the southward, to flow for 800 miles into the Black

Sea. Seventy miles above Orsha is Smolensk, where in 1812 there was a

bridge. At Mohilev, 50 miles below Orsha, there was another. The river

is rarely fordable even during the summer. Its tributary the Berezina,

which was a most important strategic feature in the campaign, flows

towards it on the east at an acute angle for 200 miles, joining at a

point nearly due east of Warsaw and west of Orel. In 1812 there were

bridges at Borisov and Bobruisk, but in general the river is fordable

in summer. The right bank is usually higher than the left.

Napoleon’s advanced bases were the places on the Vistula, especially

Danzig and Warsaw--though Danzig was infinitely the most important. The

road from Danzig to the frontier divided at Wehlau; the left branch

going by Tilsit through Courland to Mitau and Riga, and thence to

St. Petersburg; the right by Insterburg and Gumbinnen to the Niemen

at Kovno, thence by Vilna, Ochmiana, Minsk, Borisov and Orsha, to

Smolensk. From Mitau and Riga two roads converged on Jakobstädt, and

then passed along the right bank of the Düna, by Dünaburg, Drissa,

Desna and Polotsk, to Vitebsk, whence two or three roads led to

Smolensk. From Polotsk and Smolensk ran roads north-westward to St.

Petersburg.

From Vilna a road led by Sventsiani and Glubokoie to Desna and Polotsk.

From near Sventsiani a branch went to Dünaburg, and from Glubokoie

another fork led by Lepel and Bechenkowiczi to Vitebsk. Cross-roads

connected Vitebsk with Orsha, and Lepel with the Smolensk-Minsk

road, half-way from Orsha to Bobr. From Orsha the main road to Kiev

ran down the right bank of the Dnieper through Mohilev and Staroi

Bykhov. From Bobr another road led to Bobruisk and thence into the

Orsha-Mohilev-Kiev highway. A third road went from Bobruisk to Minsk by

way of Igumen.

The road eastward from Warsaw forked some 30 miles out, separating into

two branches, which united again at Novi Svergen, 250 miles farther

on. The southern branch proceeded by Brest-Litovsk, Slonim and Nesvizh;

the northern one passed by Bielsk, Bielostok, Grodno and Novogrodek.

From Novi Svergen the road ran nearly north-eastward to Minsk, about

60 miles farther on. From Brest-Litovsk a road branched off to Lutsk,

through the Pinsk Marshes. At Kobrin, some 30 miles farther on, a road

pierced the marshes eastward, turning to the right about 30 miles short

of Pinsk, and eventually coming out in the direction of Lutsk and

Ostrog. A branch connected Pinsk with this road, and from Pinsk another

highway led through the fens northward to Nesvizh. From Slonim a road

led northward to Vilna, intersecting the Grodno road about a third of

the way out, and another cross-road connected the two Warsaw roads,

east of Grodno, by way of Volkovisk. Finally a road led from Nesvizh by

Slutsk to Bobruisk, and from the latter place another passed through

the eastern end of the Pinsk fens by Mozyr-on-Pripet to Kiev. There

were, of course, many minor roads or tracks, but these were practically

all that could be used for military purposes, and most of them were

inferior. From Smolensk eastward the road system became, so far as the

campaign was concerned, very simple, consisting merely of a single

trunk leading to Moscow.

Russian high-roads are commonly of considerable breadth, so that it was

possible for vehicles to move upon them several abreast. Both armies,

however, were so encumbered by immense trains that their columns

covered enormous lengths of road.

With the exception of Moscow, Warsaw and Riga, there were no large

towns, in the modern sense of the word, within the theatre of war,

and even Riga can scarcely be regarded as one. Moscow had somewhat

over 200,000 inhabitants, Warsaw about half as many. Vilna, Grodno,

Minsk, Vitebsk and Smolensk had each from 20,000 to 30,000 inhabitants;

Kovno, Dünaburg, Mitau, Brest-Litovsk, Bielostok, Mohilev and Bobruisk

perhaps from 15,000 to 20,000; Polotsk possibly 15,000. Borisov,

Orsha, Bobr, Smorgoni and many other places described as towns were

merely villages--not often large villages, according to modern ideas.

From Moscow to Smolensk, a distance of over 250 English miles, there

were only three small towns,--Viasma, Gzhatsk and Dorogobuzh--and the

largest of these had but about 5000 inhabitants.

While Napoleon was inspecting his depôts, completing the organisation

of his water transport, and setting in train the formation and pushing

to the front of his numerous reserve forces, the Grand Army, now

practically secure from Russian attack, was moving up to the Niemen.

By the 12th of June the advance-guard of the 10th Corps was at Tilsit,

and the Imperial Guard and five army corps, besides three corps of

the cavalry reserves, were steadily advancing behind towards the line

of the Niemen between Tilsit and Kovno. The 5th and 8th Corps were in

advance of Warsaw, and the 7th a little way in rear of it. The Emperor

still expected that Bagration would invade the Grand Duchy, for on

June 10th he wrote to Eugène on that hypothesis. He also appears to

have anticipated that Bagration’s advance would be supported by at

least a part of Barclay’s army. At all events he speaks of a possible

attack upon Eugène, which indicates that he looked for something like a

general encounter along his whole front.

He explained to Eugène that his echelon formation, with the left in

advance, would enable him to take in flank the attack of the Russians

directed against his right or centre. If Jerome were attacked, Eugène

with the 4th and 6th Corps would be able to fall on the flank of the

hostile columns, while if Eugène himself were assailed he could be

supported at need by the whole left wing. All this certainly appears to

point to the idea of a general Russian advance. Whether the somewhat

complicated manoeuvres anticipated by the Emperor took sufficiently

into account the inexperience of Eugène and Jerome, and the frightful

Polish tracks by which they would be obliged to move, may be doubted.

Moreover, it is clear that their successful execution depended upon the

Russian generals being so obliging as to play into Napoleon’s hands.

The armies, it must be remembered, were not yet in touch, and the

Russians had perfect freedom to manoeuvre at will.

By June 18th Napoleon had about 320,000 men (Imperial Guard, 1st, 2nd,

3rd, 4th, 6th and 10th _Corps d’Armée_, and 1st, 2nd and 3rd Reserve

Cavalry Corps) concentrated on a front of about 130 miles from Tilsit

south-westward to the Prusso-Polish frontier. Thence to Warsaw stood

the 5th, 7th and 8th Corps and the 4th Cavalry Corps--80,000 men on a

line of 80 miles. Finally, the Austrians, 34,000 strong, constituted

the detached right flank-guard, marching from Zamosc by Lublin on Warsaw.

Total 434,000 combatants, 1076 guns.

The Russians were cantoned as follows: The First Army was strategically

disposed in a main body, a reserve, and two semi-independent wings. The

1st Corps (Wittgenstein) constituted the right wing, about Rossieni,

some 100 miles north-west of Vilna, and nearly opposite to Napoleon’s

detached left flank-guard, under Macdonald, at Tilsit. About Lida,

60 miles south of Vilna, on the road to Slonim, stood the 6th Corps

(Dokhturov) and the 3rd Cavalry Corps (Pahlen II), forming the left

wing, under Dokhturov. The 2nd Corps (Baggohufwudt), the 3rd (Tuchkov

I) and the 4th (Shuvalov) were guarding the line of the Niemen above

and below Kovno, on a front of about 60 miles. The 1st Cavalry Corps

(Uvarov) was at Vilkomirz, 40 miles north-north-west of Vilna, and the

2nd (Korff) at Smorgoni, nearly 50 miles on the road to Minsk. The 5th

Corps (H.I.H. the Grand Duke Constantine) formed the general reserve

at Sventsiani, about 45 miles north-east of Vilna. The “Flying Corps”

of Cossacks under the Ataman Platov was pushed forward to the frontier

about Grodno, 60 miles west of Lida. The First Army, including Platov,

numbered some 126,000 men, including 19,000 regular cavalry and 584

guns.

Of the two army corps which composed the Second Army the 8th (Borozdin

I) was at Volkovisk, 60 miles south-south-west of Lida, and the 7th

(Raievski) at Novi Dvor, 20 miles farther south. The 4th Cavalry Corps

(Sievers), and about 4000 Cossacks, under General Ilovaïski, connected

the two. The newly formed 27th Division (Neverovski) which was marching

from Moscow to join Bagration, had not yet passed Minsk. Including it

the Second Army comprised about 47,000 men, including 7000 regular

cavalry, and 168 guns.

The Third Army was widely dispersed and could not take the field for

some weeks. It numbered in all perhaps 45,000 men.

Thus, owing to various causes--divided counsels, imperfect

organisation, bad roads and especially the lack of any real

command-in-chief--the Russian forces were, almost up to the very

moment of hostile contact, in a state of dangerous dispersion. The

secret history of the months during which Alexander had been at Vilna

will probably never be accurately known. Dissension and intrigue were

rampant in the Tzar’s personal _entourage_. Much valuable time was

wasted in drafting and discussing plans of action, all impracticable,

because based upon hypotheses which proved untenable. They all

considerably underestimated Napoleon’s fighting strength, and appear

to have assumed a concentration of the Russian forces about Vilna.

There was great disorder in the higher commands. Barclay was nominally

commander-in-chief, but Alexander frequently issued orders, through his

adjutant, Prince Volkonski, over the head of the harassed War-Minister,

while to make confusion worse confounded Phull, as Clausewitz

expresses it, “sometimes put in _his_ oar.” Contrary to the usually

accepted belief, it appears that Barclay would have preferred to stand

to fight, granted a favourable opportunity. The deciding factor in the

situation seems to have been that almost at the last moment the Russian

staff obtained better information as to the strength which Napoleon had

with him in Prussia.

At all events the party of prudence finally obtained the upper hand

in the Tzar’s councils. The policy of retreating before the invader

had been so often discussed that there was nothing unexpected in the

resolution which was adopted. It was determined to draw back the whole

First Army at least as far as Sventsiani. All the corps commanders

were warned to be ready to retreat thither immediately upon receiving

orders, except Wittgenstein, who was given permission to anticipate

them if pressed by a rapid advance of Napoleon’s extreme left wing

over the Niemen. Platov, it was vaguely supposed, would be able to

threaten Napoleon’s communications, and would be supported by Bagration

from Volkovisk. Tormazov, with the Third Army, was to retreat on

Kiev if hard pressed; but, if not, was to leave General Sacken with

his incomplete division to observe the Austrian frontier, and with

the rest of his army to fall upon the right of the forces which were

opposed to Bagration. General Okunev, in his commentaries upon the war,

suggests that Bagration and Tormazov should have effected a junction

and advanced in force against Napoleon’s communications while he was

engaged in front with Barclay. As, however, Napoleon could detach

80,000 men, under Eugène, to support the 114,000 whom he already had

in the Grand Duchy, Bagration, Tormazov and Platov would eventually be

outnumbered by at least two to one; while Napoleon would still have

possessed a double superiority of numbers over Barclay. In fact the

Russians were so enormously outmatched at every point that retreat

was the only sensible strategy. Napoleon, it is true, assumed that

the Russians would stand to fight. This was partly, no doubt, due

to mistaken but not unreasonable calculations as to their state of

preparation, but also largely, it is to be feared, to the obstinate

optimism which during his latter years became something like an acute

mental disease with him. He had developed a fatal habit of believing

that his enemies would always play into his hands.

Accordingly, still proceeding on the assumption that Bagration would

invade the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, while Barclay stood fast to oppose

his own advance upon Vilna, the French Emperor decided to operate the

passage of the Niemen close to Kovno. Kovno lies at the confluence

of the Vilia, the river of Vilna, with the Niemen, and was therefore

admirably adapted for the collection of stores by water from Danzig

and Königsberg, and forwarding them to Vilna as soon as that place and

the surrounding country were in Napoleon’s power. In point of fact

the Vilia proved too sinuous and difficult to be of much utility,

but this could hardly be known at the time, and in any case did not

greatly affect the value of Kovno as a base. The forest of Pilwiski

or Wilkowiski, extending over a considerable area on the bank of the

river opposite Kovno, furnished an excellent screen for Napoleon’s

operations. Finally, by bridging the river and debouching rapidly in

the direction of Vilna, Barclay might be separated from his detached

right wing under Wittgenstein. All this obviously assumed that the

Russians would remain stationary.

On June 22nd Jerome was directed to be at Augustowo on the 25th. On

that day his three corps were extended along the Warsaw-Augustowo

road, and the head of the 5th Corps, which was leading, was nearly

50 miles away. The 8th was still farther behind, and the 7th as yet

in the neighbourhood of Warsaw, awaiting the Austrians, who were

slowly advancing from Lublin. Napoleon was probably misinformed as

to distances, and certainly had not taken into full consideration

the wretched Polish roads. He apparently calculated upon being able

to throw his main body suddenly across the Niemen at Kovno, deal a

smashing blow at Barclay and then wheel round to crush Bagration.

Fortunately for the Russians they had now decided to do the right

thing, and had no intention of awaiting their enemies’ pleasure. The

three corps on the Niemen were drawn back to Vilna, leaving only a

light cavalry screen along the right bank. Wittgenstein retired from

Rossieni to Keidani, 40 miles nearer Vilna. On June 23rd, therefore,

Barclay had four corps echeloned on a line of 70 miles, nearly two

marches from the Niemen at its nearest point; and, as all were ready

to retreat on Sventsiani at the shortest notice, Napoleon’s plans were

already half disconcerted. Irresolution, however, clung to the Russian

counsels, and Dokhturov was still left in a dangerously isolated

position at Lida.

On the 22nd Napoleon, being himself at Wilkowiski, about 40 miles from

Kovno, drafted a proclamation to the army which may be regarded as

the official declaration of war. It was of the usual Napoleonic type,

chiefly compounded of false statements and prophecies which were never

fulfilled. Mr. Hereford George is probably correct in pronouncing that

“a more unfortunate document was perhaps never penned.”

On the afternoon of the 23rd Napoleon had under his hand opposite Kovno

in the Pilwiski Forest some 214,000 men, comprising the Imperial Guard,

the reserve parks and engineers, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd _Corps d’Armée_,

and the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Corps of Reserve Cavalry. At Tilsit, in line

with the main body, was the 10th Corps, under Macdonald. Eugène, with

the 4th and 6th Corps, was still some 60 miles to the right rear, and

could hardly reach the Niemen near Kovno before the 28th. General

Bonnal appears to consider that his absence materially contributed to

the failure of the Emperor’s strategy, but it is a little difficult

entirely to agree with him. Even had the situation been as Napoleon

imagined it, with the Russians extended in a long, thin line upon

the frontier, Eugène’s absence could not have fatally influenced

results. The invaders, with their overwhelming numerical superiority,

could not fail of success. Without Eugène Napoleon had 247,000 men in

all opposed to Barclay’s 120,000. Bagration could hardly under any

circumstances have gained more than a temporary success over the head

of the long column of divisions marching from Lublin to Augustowo,

and as yet not disquieted by Tormazov on its rear. Given that Reynier

and Schwarzenberg were forced to turn back to face Tormazov--as did

ultimately happen--Jerome would still have over 60,000 regulars against

Bagration’s 36,000; and Eugène’s retardation would place him in a

favourable position for supporting him. It is even permissible to

argue that Eugène’s absence was rather a favourable circumstance than

otherwise, since the knowledge that Napoleon was short of over 70,000

men might have induced Barclay to stand to give battle, which was

precisely what Napoleon desired.

As a fact the situation was quite other than Napoleon envisaged it. Had

all his corps been in position to time, the manoeuvre of Vilna would

still have failed. Had Jerome, with his whole force, reached Augustowo

on the 25th June, as contemplated, he could not have reached Grodno

before the 27th. Volkovisk is nearly 50 miles farther on, and Bagration

evacuated it on the 28th to retreat on Minsk. It was absolutely

impossible for Jerome to reach him. Of Barclay’s corps, the 1st was

nearly two days’ march from the Niemen, and Wittgenstein had permission

to retreat as soon as he had information of the French passage of the

river. Baggohufwudt, Tuchkov and Shuvalov were still farther back, out

of touch with the French, who could not reach them in less than two

forced marches, even if they stood fast. Dokhturov alone was somewhat

isolated, and ran considerable risk of being cut off from the main

body. Still even had Dokhturov been cut from Barclay it is highly

probable that the course of events would have been little different.

A junction of the two Armies of the West would have eventually been

effected, and it is possible that Barclay, short of 20,000 men, would

not have made, as he did, at least one very perilous halt on his march

to Smolensk.

To conclude, when once the Russian commanders had determined to adopt

a policy of steady retreat, and to adhere to it with more or less

resolution, the campaign may almost be said to have decided itself.

Napoleon was ever striving to obtain contact with his elusive foes and

to fight the great battle which should crush the heart out of their

resistance. But only thrice all through the advance was he able to

establish this contact, and in each case the Russians drew away without

having sustained decisive defeat. The first operations on the Niemen

were typical of most of those which were to follow.

On June 23rd all the troops under Napoleon’s immediate command were

nearly opposite Kovno. Napoleon gave the strictest orders that only

light cavalry were to approach the river; infantry, artillery and heavy

cavalry were to be kept under cover in the forest, so as to conceal

from the enemy until the last moment the exact direction in which the

blow was to be dealt. Meanwhile the river was reconnoitred for a point

of passage, and a bend between Kovno and the village of Poniemon, a

little higher up, was selected by General Haxo, Davout’s chief of

engineers.

At daybreak on the 23rd Napoleon in person arrived in his travelling

carriage at the bivouacs of the 1st Cavalry Corps. He descended at that

of the 6th Polish Lancers, and, still anxious to conceal everything

from the Russians until the last moment, removed his famous Guard

uniform and cocked hat, and donned the coat of a Polish officer--an

example followed by the staff-officers with him. Count Soltyk, an

officer of the Lancers, has minutely described the episode. Napoleon’s

strong common sense appears in his refusal of the heavy Polish cavalry

shako, and acceptance of a cap instead. He then rode forward to a

village directly opposite Kovno, and carefully reconnoitred the place

from the windows of the house of the village doctor. Returning to the

Lancers’ bivouac, he made a hasty meal, chatting meanwhile with the

Polish officers, and especially asking if their uniform suited him. He

then resumed his own garments and rode off to reconnoitre the course

of the river elsewhere. He approved Haxo’s selection of Poniemon, and

issued elaborate orders for the passage. They obviously imply that

vigorous resistance was anticipated; nothing was yet known of the

Russian retirement on Vilna. They also contain much minute regulation

of detail, which might well have been left to Haxo or Davout.

During the afternoon and evening the 1st Corps was brought up to

Poniemon, whither the pontoon trains, under General Eblé, were also

despatched. Three bridges, about 300 yards apart, were to be thrown

across. As soon as it was completely dark--that is to say, about 10

p.m.--General Morand, the commander of the 1st Division, crossed

in person with three companies of Voltigeurs and one of Sappers,

who were ferried over in boats. As they were disembarking they were

detected by the nearest Russian picket--a detachment of the Hussars

of Yelisabetgrad. They rode up to the mustering Voltigeurs, and their

leader challenged in French: “Qui vive?”

“France!” came the reply.

“What do you do here?” asked the Russian officer.

“You’ll soon see!” was the answer; and the bold officer turned rein,

to report to his superiors that the long-expected invasion had begun

at last. His troopers emptied their carbines in the direction of the

French party as they rode away, but apparently without effect; and the

Voltigeurs did not reply, Napoleon having issued orders that there was

to be no firing except in case of extreme necessity. The bridges were

completed by about 1 a.m. on the 24th, and Davout’s corps began to

defile across. There was no resistance; the only approach to fighting

consisted in the interchange of a few shots between the advanced French

troops and the rear-guards of the retreating Russian cavalry regiments.

The day broke as the passage was in progress: it continued practically

without intermission all through the 24th and 25th. As a military

spectacle it has, perhaps, never been surpassed; but the ease with

which it had been effected was probably by no means entirely pleasing

to Napoleon. He must have been unpleasantly conscious that the Russians

had no intention of delivering themselves into his hands, though he

probably hoped that they would stand to fight in advance of Vilna.

In the morning of the 24th Davout’s 1st Light Cavalry Brigade, under

Pajol, occupied Kovno, expelling the Cossack squadron which was the

only garrison; and in the afternoon Napoleon himself transferred

his head-quarters thither. He ordered a permanent pile bridge to be

constructed at the ferry, and threw another bridge over the Vilia, just

above its confluence with the Niemen.

The news of the invasion reached Alexander the same evening while he

was at a garden party at General Bennigsen’s mansion near Vilna. Next

day he announced it to his army in a proclamation, and to the nation

at large in another, addressed to Marshal Saltikov, Military Governor

of St. Petersburg. The tone of both was worthy of the occasion, and

contrasted strongly with the arrogant and theatrical ring of that of

Napoleon.

Orders were issued to all the corps commanders to retreat on

Sventsiani. It was recognised that Platov alone could hardly achieve

any serious damage to Napoleon’s communications, and he also was

directed to retire on Sventsiani by way of Lida and Smorgoni. Bagration

was warned not to allow himself to be cut from Minsk. All the orders

reached their destination safely, except those to Major-General

Dorokhov who, with the advance-guard of the 4th Corps, was at Orani,

south-west of Vilna. The 3rd and 4th Corps retired leisurely to the

suburbs of Vilna, which Barclay did not intend to evacuate until it

became absolutely necessary.

By the evening of the 25th the whole French army was over the Niemen

and pushing forward to Vilna. Murat opened the march with the 1st and

2nd Cavalry Corps. Behind were the 1st and 3rd Corps, the 3rd Cavalry

Corps, and the Imperial Guard, while the 2nd Corps had crossed the

Vilia at Kovno and was marching along its right bank, thus forming

the flank-guard of the advance on Vilna, and threatening to cut off

Wittgenstein towards Keidani. Davout and Ney had each detailed a

foreign regiment to guard Kovno and the bridges. The 10th Corps was

ordered to advance from Tilsit upon Rossieni, sweeping the right bank

of the Niemen, and thus clearing the course of the river for Baste’s

supply flotillas, which were now collecting at Tilsit, whence they were

pushed forward to Kovno.

There was practically no fighting on the march to Vilna. The thin

chain of Russian cavalry posts steadily retired as the French pressed

forward: only a few shots were fired from time to time. Napoleon hoped

for a battle at Vilna and the troops made forced marches day after

day to attain the desired end, at great cost to themselves, for the

weather was sultry, the roads were bad, and the provision trains were

already falling to the rear. The men began to leave the ranks in order

to forage for supplies, and the horses, ill-fed and over-worked, broke

down and died in great numbers. Even the artillery was ill-horsed from

the first, and the officers were forced to scour the country for draft

animals, often with very little success. Barclay was in position before

Vilna with the 3rd Corps and most of the 4th, and Baggohufwudt was in

touch to the north; but Alexander and his suite had already left for

Sventsiani, and Barclay was merely waiting until the French began to

close. The stores which could not be carried off were destroyed, and

at 4 a.m. on the 28th the 3rd and 4th Corps began to defile through

the town. Barclay and his staff left about 1 p.m.; and the rear-guard

followed, burning the bridge over the Vilia. Bruyère’s cavalry

division, which was heading the French advance, came through the town

before Barclay’s cavalry rear-guard was quite clear of the suburbs; and

its leading regiment, the 8th Hussars, was charged and driven back,

with the loss of several prisoners, by the Cossacks of the Imperial

Guard. The Russian columns were well on their way to Sventsiani, and

after three days of forced marching in tropical weather the French

impulse had expended its force.

On the same day a more serious skirmish took place near Vilkomirz.

Wittgenstein, falling back from Keidani, heard that Oudinot was

marching up the right bank of the Vilia and, fearing that he might be

anticipated at Vilkomirz, stationed his rear-guard, under Major-General

Kulnev (4 battalions, 4 squadrons, 1 Cossack regiment and 6 guns), on

the 27th at Develtova, requesting General Uvarov to support him with a

regiment of Dragoons. Meanwhile the 1st Corps defiled through Vilkomirz

on the Sventsiani road. As Kulnev, in his turn, was retiring through

the place from Develtova, he was attacked by Castex with Oudinot’s

advanced guard. The French cavalry charged the Russian Hussars and

Cossacks and drove them into the town with considerable loss, but

Kulnev succeeded in withdrawing his force across the Vilia, and burnt

the bridge, and Castex could only cannonade the Russians until the

arrival of infantry. Uvarov’s cavalry regiment, marching rather

carelessly to join Kulnev along the river-bank, came under artillery

fire and lost several men and horses. When Oudinot’s infantry began to

arrive Kulnev followed his chief. He had lost about 300 men, including

240 prisoners. Oudinot reported a loss of 50 killed and wounded. The

2nd Corps occupied Vilkomirz, and bivouacked for the night some 2 miles

on the Sventsiani road.

Napoleon himself entered Vilna in the afternoon of the 28th. Alexander

had sent his aide-de-camp, General Balashov, with a final message to

his opponent, offering to reopen negotiations if the French troops

withdrew across the Niemen. Napoleon, with his usual dramatic instinct,

received Balashov in the quarters which Alexander had lately quitted.

Needless to say, nothing came of the interview. Napoleon regarded the

message as an insult, or at best as an attempt to gain time. He merely

wrote a long letter to Alexander repeating all his real or imagined

grounds for the war. Danilevski says that Balashov was directed to tell

Napoleon that if he declined to listen to Alexander’s last overtures

he must expect war to the death. It is also said that Napoleon asked

questions concerning the roads to Moscow. Balashov replied that there

were several, and His Majesty might do as other monarchs had done, and

choose. Charles XII, for example, had taken the road that led by way of

Poltava!

Napoleon had, in fact, little reason for satisfaction. He had, as he

hoped, debouched suddenly into the midst of his opponent’s line of

defence; he had collected enormous forces upon his chosen point of

attack, and had carefully concealed it until the last moment. His

troops had made tremendous exertions to carry out his strategy. And

yet hardly anything had in reality been achieved. He was in possession

of his enemy’s empty head-quarters, and that was all. His army had

suffered severely in the impetuous rush upon Vilna, while that of

Russia had quietly withdrawn out of his reach. The carefully planned

blow, which was to have been crushing, had been wasted upon the empty

air.

On the 29th there was a violent thunderstorm, followed by five days

of continuous rain. The results were most disastrous. Movements of

troops, though much impeded, were not absolutely checked; but the

vast trains on the Vilna-Kovno road were entirely disorganised. The

bad roads and tracks became little better than quagmires. The horses

broke down completely under the additional strain, especially since the

country could supply very little fodder to replace that left behind

in abandoned vehicles. The defects of the transport became evident.

The waggons were too heavy for the bad Polish roads, and in order to

forward any supplies at all they had to be replaced by country carts,

which were only capable of carrying much smaller loads. The natural

consequences were a shortage of food supplies, and much marauding in

quest of them. The Lithuanians, whom the French were supposed to be

freeing from the Russian yoke, were maltreated and plundered everywhere

by their so-called deliverers. Requisitions, however unsparing,

entirely failed to re-establish the wrecked transport. The army was so

huge, its encumbrances so enormous, that the poverty-stricken country

could not supply the number of draft animals needed. The artillery

alone left 120 guns or more and hundreds of waggons at Vilna owing to

lack of horses. The number of the latter lost may be conservatively

estimated at 10,000; and some 30,000 soldiers were straggling about the

country, marauding for food and committing every kind of outrage.

Napoleon himself remained in Vilna for over a fortnight. The 4th and

6th Corps had only just reached the Niemen, and it was absolutely

necessary to bring up to the front the magazines from Königsberg.

He also wished to organise Lithuania, or rather to exploit it. A

provisional government of French partisans was set up at Vilna;

garrisons were distributed; and officials placed over the various towns

and districts. The first act of the Government was to order levies

of horse and foot for Napoleon’s service; one cavalry regiment was

to consist entirely of Lithuanian squires, and to be attached to the

Imperial Guard. Otherwise the Government could exercise practically no

civil functions; its duties were simply such as arose from the military

occupation of the country. The peasants were reduced to abject misery

by endless requisitions, and by the lawless violence of the stragglers

who swarmed everywhere. The French _sous-préfet_ of Novi Troki, a

place less than 20 miles from Vilna, was plundered and stripped by

marauding soldiers on his way thither, and if such an event could take

place within a day’s march of Napoleon’s head-quarters, the state of

affairs farther afield may be imagined. Napoleon’s stringent orders

against pillage and disorder were little better than useless. The

pillage arose simply from lack of food, and the latter was the natural

outcome of the fact that the expedition was too large to work in the

existing conditions. Napoleon had taken immense pains to organise it,

and up to a point he had foreseen and provided for everything. But he

had not taken into full account physical difficulties: he had, amongst

other blunders, organised a wheeled transport for which roads hardly

existed, and he had failed to perceive that the vast magnitude of his

enterprise automatically created fresh obstacles to success, or at any

rate enormously increased those which already existed.

Though on reaching Vilna Napoleon must have realised that his strategy

had already in part miscarried, he at once entered upon the execution

of the second part of the plan--the crushing of Bagration’s army

which, as he hoped, was already closely pressed by Jerome. As a fact

Bagration left Volkovisk that very day for Minsk, while Jerome did

not reach Grodno until the 30th. So far as Jerome was concerned,

therefore, Bagration was in no danger, and it was only the vacillation

at the Russian Imperial head-quarters which later brought him within

measurable distance of destruction. There were other forces within

Bagration’s sphere of operations which the French Emperor might hope

to sweep also into his net. Platov, from Grodno, could hardly hope

to reach the First Army with the French in force at Vilna; while the

advance-guard of the 4th Corps, after waiting at Orani for orders until

the 27th, was also isolated. A more important quarry than either of

these, however, was Barclay’s detached left wing under Dokhturov, which

had only just started from the neighbourhood of Lida, having of course

received its orders last.

Napoleon therefore ordered the following movements: Oudinot, supported

by Doumerc’s Cuirassier Division from Grouchy’s Corps, was to follow

Wittgenstein from Vilkomirz towards Sventsiani. Murat, with Montbrun’s

Cavalry Corps and Friant’s and Gudin’s Infantry Divisions, was directed

to pursue Barclay’s central columns. Nansouty, with two of his three

divisions and Morand’s Infantry Division, was directed upon Svir,

nearly due east of Vilna, with the object of falling on the flank of

Dokhturov’s column. Davout with his 4th and 5th Divisions, Pajol’s

Cavalry Brigade, the Lancers of the Guard, Grouchy’s two remaining

cavalry divisions, Valence’s Cuirassier Division from Nansouty’s Corps,

and the Legion of the Vistula, about 45,000 men in all, was to advance

upon Minsk and intercept the retreat of Bagration. Davout’s other

light cavalry brigade (Bordesoulle) was sent south-westward from Vilna

to scout in that direction, and on the 30th encountered Dorokhov’s

detachment, which he took for the rear-guard of Baggohufwudt’s Corps.

Dorokhov, seeing that French troops were now at Vilna, retreated

southward in the hope of joining Platov and, ultimately, Bagration.

Meanwhile Davout and Dokhturov, advancing on converging lines, were

rapidly approaching. Dokhturov was marching from Lida in two columns,

and on the 30th his left flank-guard, consisting of a brigade of

Pahlen’s cavalry, under General Kreutz, reached Ochmiana on the

Vilna-Minsk road just as Pajol’s brigade was approaching from Vilna.

The danger must, to the Russian generals, have appeared very great,

and had they not shown extraordinary energy it would have been so,

for although Davout’s infantry was considerably in rear of Pajol it

could easily arrive next day and assail the left flank of Dokhturov’s

column as it crossed the road. Dokhturov however, as on another and

greater emergency, rose to the occasion. He called upon his men for a

great effort; and on the 1st of July the 6th Corps and Pahlen’s cavalry

crossed the Vilna-Minsk road just ahead of Davout’s advancing columns,

and pressed on towards Sventsiani. There was some brisk skirmishing at

Ochmiana between Kreutz and Pajol; but at night the bulk of Dokhturov’s

force had reached Svir, after a splendid forced march of 28 miles on

an execrable road, with a loss of only some scores of men and a few

retarded baggage-waggons. During the march of the 2nd the trains were

harassed by Nansouty’s advanced guard and a portion of them captured,

but that evening Dokhturov was in line with the rest of the First

Army about Sventsiani. His prompt decision, admirably seconded by the

steadiness and fine marching of his troops, had extricated him safely

from a very dangerous position.

Meanwhile Barclay and Wittgenstein had operated their retreat from

Vilna and Vilkomirz with little difficulty, and with hardly any

fighting. On the 2nd of July the First Army about Sventsiani numbered

about 114,000 men; but the Tzar’s advisers had now definitely decided

not to fight before reaching the Düna. The magazines which could not be

carried away were burned; and on the 3rd the retreat was continued, the

2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Corps retiring directly on Drissa, covered by a

rear-guard under Korff, while Wittgenstein and Dokhturov fell back on

the wings.

The retreat was conducted steadily and with no great haste. Alexander

and Phull were impatient for the arrival of the army at Drissa, and the

latter sent Clausewitz, afterwards the historian of the war, to hasten

the march. Barclay, who knew better than Phull the demoralising effects

of a hasty retreat, was very angry, and declined to hurry. On the 5th

there was a slight action at Davigelishki between Sebastiani’s leading

brigade under Subervie and Korff’s cavalry rear-guard. The French were

repulsed, and Prince von Hohenlohe, the Colonel of the 3rd Württemberg

Chasseurs, was captured. On the 6th and 8th, however, the Russians

made night marches and distanced their pursuers; and on the 11th the

whole of the Russian centre and left were at Drissa, while Wittgenstein

was at Druia, a little lower down the Düna. There were at Drissa and

Dünaburg 19 reserve battalions, all very weak, and 20 fairly strong

depôt squadrons. Most of them were assigned to Wittgenstein, who formed

them into provisional regiments.

Eugène and St. Cyr reached the Niemen on the 29th of June, and crossed

at Prenn on the 30th, one of the pontoon bridges from Kovno being

used for the purpose. Thence they marched for Vilna, the 4th Corps

leading. The roads were frightfully bad; the rain poured in torrents

without intermission, and, to add to their other miseries, the men

were half-starved, the trains being even less able to keep up with the

march than they had been a few days before. Eugène reached Novi Troki

on the 4th, and there rested for two days. St. Cyr had halted about

half-way from the Niemen. On the 30th Poniatowski and Latour-Maubourg

reached Grodno. King Jerome, with the 8th Corps, was near Augustowo.

Reynier, with the 7th, was at Bielsk on the Warsaw-Bielostok road; and

Schwarzenberg, advancing with characteristic slowness and caution, some

way east of Warsaw. Reynier’s special duty was to cover Warsaw, and

Jerome could not therefore count upon him until he had been relieved

by the Austrians. On the 30th Jerome received orders to march on

Ochmiana--this was under the impression that Dokhturov’s corps, which

had just reached that place, was the army of Bagration. Next day,

however, he received fresh directions. Napoleon had ascertained the

real identity of the troops at Ochmiana and now ordered his brother to

direct the 5th and 8th Corps upon Minsk, and the 7th upon Nesvizh. It

is obvious that these contradictory directions must have harassed and

confused the inexperienced general whom his brother’s will had placed

in command of three army corps; and his chief-of-staff Marchand, a

good enough divisional leader, was hardly the man to make good his

chief’s deficiencies. Jerome’s troops were so exhausted by the march

from Warsaw, over bad roads and in pouring rain, that he felt himself

obliged to give them a brief rest at Grodno. Reynier was delayed at the

passage of the Narew, Platov having carefully destroyed all the boats.

Minsk, Jerome’s indicated objective, is nearly 180 miles from Grodno by

Novogrodek and Mir, and Nesvizh 140 from Bielostok.

Bagration left Volkovisk for Minsk late on June 28th. He expected

to reach it on July 7th, but on the same day Davout was approaching

Ochmiana, and could easily arrive before him. On the 30th, however,

Colonel Benkendorff, one of Alexander’s aides-de-camp, arrived with

fresh orders, by which Bagration was to march upon Drissa to join

Barclay. Bagration, unaware that Davout was already advancing on Minsk

from Vilna, and probably believing that the order would not have been

sent had not Napoleon been following Barclay with the bulk of his

forces, decided to join his colleague by the shortest possible route.

He reached Slonim on July 1st, and on the 3rd arrived at Novogrodek,

40 miles on the Ochmiana road, where the 27th Division, marching

from Minsk, joined him. Early on the 4th the head of the column was

at Nikolaev-on-Niemen, and, although there were by no means too many

pontoons, two bridges were thrown over the flooded river. The passage

was begun as early as possible, and the 8th Corps was already across

when reports arrived from Platov. He announced that he was at Vologin,

some 20 miles from Nikolaev, that he was skirmishing with French

cavalry, and that they belonged to Davout’s Corps, which was marching

on Minsk. Platov had reached Vologin on his way to join Barclay; and

there he was met by Dorokhov returning to effect a junction with

Bagration at Minsk.

On the 3rd Jerome’s advance-guard had started eastward from Grodno, and

on the 4th his main body was at last under way. Contradictory orders

and lack of information had led Bagration into a situation of grave

danger.

The Second Army, with Platov and Dorokhov, counted now about 45,000

regulars, 9000 irregulars and 192 guns. Davout had about 42,000 men,

but only 30,000 actually in hand. Jerome was advancing from Grodno with

nearly 55,000 more; his advance-guard was some 60 miles from Novogrodek

in Bagration’s rear.

Bagration, of course, estimated Davout’s force as about 70,000 men--the

original strength of the 1st Corps; and probably reckoned Jerome’s army

at about equal numbers. After considering his position, he decided to

make a dash for Minsk by way of the left bank of the Niemen and the

Slonim-Minsk high-road, hoping that Platov and Dorokhov would be able

to impose on Davout and hinder his march until the 8th, by which date

Bagration hoped to reach Minsk. The 8th Corps was hastily crossed back

over the Niemen; the pontoons were taken up; and the Second Army pushed

for the Minsk road beyond Mir, which it reached on the 6th, having

covered nearly 40 miles in two days.

As might have been expected, Platov’s mass of irregulars and Dorokhov’s

small detachment could not for a moment withstand the march of Davout’s

column. When the French infantry pushed steadily forward the Cossacks

could only withdraw, and Dorokhov was not strong enough to defend

an open town against 30,000 sabres and bayonets. Platov therefore

retreated southward to join Bagration, and on the 7th Davout’s

advanced guard entered Minsk unopposed, Compans, Desaix and Valence

arriving next day. He captured in the town over 300,000 pounds of

flour, and a vast quantity of forage, as well as much barrack and

hospital equipment. On the same day Colbert’s Lancer Brigade, which

was covering Davout’s left flank and rear, entered Vileika, where he

found 180,000 pounds of flour, 200,000 of biscuit, 4500 bottles of

spirits, and over 200 tons of forage, besides clothing and hospital

stores. These captures were the first of any importance that had yet

been made. The loss to the Russians was of far less importance than the

gain to the French, upon whom inadequate supplies, hard marches, and

trying climatic conditions had already had the worst effect. Even in

the regiments of Davout’s Corps, notoriously the best disciplined and

administered of the army, disorder was rife. The Dutch 33rd Léger was

a prime offender. During the march to Minsk it left nearly half its

numbers behind as marauders; and eventually Napoleon was obliged to

issue a special order against them. Davout’s anger at its misconduct

vented itself for days in his despatches and conversation; and, as was

but too often the case with him, he allowed it to exceed the bounds of

consideration and decency. The result was a permanent breach between

himself and Desaix.

Bagration at Mir learned that Davout, greatly his superior in numbers

as he believed, was across his path at Minsk, while Jerome’s

advance-guard was approaching Novogrodek, and Reynier was on the march

from Bielostok to Slonim. He decided, rightly under the circumstances

as they presented themselves to him, to march for the Berezina at

Bobruisk, which, as we have seen, was fortified, and thence make for

the Düna by way of Mohilev and Orsha on the Dnieper. A more perilous

march can hardly be imagined, for it would take him right across the

front of the French columns moving eastward from Vilna and Minsk.

Bagration, however, expected that Davout’s objective was Bobruisk, as

appears by his action a few days later, and evidently hoped to get

round his left flank. On July 7th the 8th Corps marched to Nesvizh on

the Brest-Litovsk-Bobruisk high-road, and the 7th to Novi-Svergen on

that to Minsk, in order to rally Dorokhov, while Platov, with some

Cossacks and one of Raievski’s infantry regiments, took post at Mir

to guard the road from Novogrodek against Jerome. On the 8th Raievski

joined Borozdin, and both corps remained at Nesvizh until the 10th.

A halt was imperative to rest the weary troops, who had marched over

150 miles in nine days, on wretched roads and in generally terrible

weather; and it was also necessary to enable the jaded trains to get

well forward on the road to Bobruisk. Bagration was fuming at the

necessity for continual retreat, and on the 8th wrote an excited letter

on the subject to Count Arakcheiev.

On the same day Jerome’s advance-guard, Rosniecki’s Polish Cavalry

Division, reached Novogrodek. On the 9th the bulk of the 5th and 8th

Corps arrived, Reynier reached Slonim from Bielostok, and Rosniecki

started for Mir. On that day his leading brigade under General Turno

came in contact with Platov, and a brisk action ensued, as the result

of which the Poles were driven back with a loss of over 100 prisoners,

besides killed and wounded.

[Illustration: GENERAL PRINCE BAGRATION, COMMANDER OF THE SECOND

RUSSIAN ARMY IN 1812]

Next day Bagration started Borozdin with the divisions of Neverovski

and Prince Karl of Mecklenburg on the road to Bobruisk. He kept the 7th

Corps still at Nesvizh to give the men another day’s rest, and held

back Voronzov’s division to support Platov if necessary, reinforcing

the latter with one regiment of infantry and three of cavalry, under

Major-General Vassilchikov.

Platov had already evacuated Mir and drawn back towards Nesvizh. On

the 10th he was attacked by Rosniecki, and a cavalry action on a large

scale ensued. Rosniecki had with him six regiments--some 3300 lances

and sabres, while Tyskiewicz’s brigade, about 1200 more, was at Mir.

Platov and Vassilchikov had at their immediate disposal at least 2000

regular cavalry and 3000 Cossacks. Rosniecki’s first two brigades,

including that of Turno, and Vassilchikov’s regulars crashed together

in a furious hand-to-hand combat, with fairly equal fortune; but

the third brigade coming up in support was enveloped by a cloud of

Cossacks and broken. Thereupon the whole division was forced to give

ground, hotly pressed by the Russian Hussars, Dragoons and Cossacks. A

complete rout was only averted by the gallant advance of Tyskiewicz’s

brigade, which covered the retreat and enabled the broken regiments

to rally near Mir. The Russians thereupon drew off. They had suffered

considerably, and two Cossack colonels had been killed. But the Poles

had lost over 700 men, and it may be imagined that the morale of the

Polish army was considerably shaken.

On the 11th Raievski and Voronzov evacuated Nesvizh and marched some

20 miles to Romanovo, while Platov fell back on Nesvizh. On the 12th

Bagration made another long march to Slutsk, while Platov followed to

Romanovo.

At Slutsk Bagration learned that French troops had been located at

Svislocz on the Berezina, about 27 miles north of Bobruisk. The

inference was that Davout was marching to anticipate him at the latter

place. He sent forward Raievski at once to the threatened fortress

with the 7th Corps and some cavalry and Cossacks, while the 8th waited

at Slutsk for the arrival of Platov.

Romanovo lay on the small river Morvez, which was there spanned

by a bridge. The advance-guard of Jerome’s army was formed on the

14th, as before, by Rosniecki’s division and Tyskiewicz’s brigade;

Latour-Maubourg, with the German and Polish Cuirassiers forming

the rest of his cavalry corps, was following some distance to the

rear. Platov had part of his force in advance of the bridge, and as

Tyskiewicz’s brigade came on it was suddenly charged, cut up and driven

back. The Russians then retired across the bridge, and Rosniecki,

following, plunged into a heavy cross-fire from Platov’s infantry

regiment and horse artillery, and only extricated himself with severe

loss. The whole division was thrust back in disorder until it reached

Latour-Maubourg and his cuirassier division. The Polish losses had been

very heavy; the 1st Chasseurs had been practically destroyed. Platov

took 300 prisoners. He knew better than to expose his irregulars and

light horsemen to the charge of the Saxon and Westphalian Cuirassiers

and retired in the night to Slutsk. This released Borozdin, who

followed in the track of Raievski; and in this way the Second Army,

Raievski leading and Platov bringing up the rear, arrived at Bobruisk,

where it was completely concentrated on the 18th. It had suffered much

from fatigue and sickness during its long and painful marches, and

Bagration felt it necessary to use six of the weak reserve battalions

in the fortress to recruit his depleted regiments. But the Second Army

was at least safe. A glance at the map will show that all the way from

Nesvizh it had the Pinsk morasses on its right; and had Jerome and

Davout been able to combine their attacks, the result to it might well

have been fatal.

In following Bagration on his march to Bobruisk the course of events

elsewhere has been somewhat anticipated. On July 14th King Jerome

had thrown up his command. A little previously he had quarrelled with

Vandamme, who commanded the 8th Corps under him. Vandamme was a man

whose general character is entitled to no kind of respect. His conduct

in Germany had been abominable. He was, however, a thorough soldier,

and could not endure Jerome’s easy-going ideas of military discipline.

The consequence was an open quarrel and the supersession of Vandamme.

Napoleon, who knew his insubordinate disposition, did not traverse

Jerome’s action. But the delay at Grodno and the failure to close with

Bagration kindled his wrath, all the more so since his own immediate

operations had miscarried. He vented his rage and disappointment in two

violently abusive letters, and Jerome left the army.

As regards the degree of blame which attaches to Jerome, it is obvious

that, but for the ill-advised order to march upon Drissa, Bagration

would have been in no danger. He left Volkovisk on June 28th; Jerome

did not even reach Grodno until the 30th. The vile Polish roads,

rendered worse by the rain, made marching extremely difficult. A rest

may well have been necessary for the over-worked and ill-fed troops;

and Jerome was obliged to wait until Reynier had been relieved by the

slowly advancing Austrians. Owing to the orders which he had received

from head-quarters, Bagration all but marched into the midst of the

forces manoeuvring to intercept him. It is clear that, had Jerome moved

eastward from Grodno at once, he would have pressed his antagonist

hard. On the other hand, he had to take into account the harassed state

of his troops, their lack of adequate supplies, the miserable roads,

the absence of Reynier, the slowness of Schwarzenberg, and last, not

least, the hidden Russian army of Tormazov, which might prove very

formidable. Napoleon in his place would probably have taken the risk

of an advance of Tormazov on Warsaw. Jerome did not, and, indeed,

seeing his position as a subordinate, could not, do so. It is possible

that he did not act with all the vigour which circumstances demanded;

but in that case the blame must be laid at the door of Napoleon

for appointing to a vitally important command a man who lacked the

necessary qualifications for it. Napoleon also was directing manoeuvres

on the basis of hypotheses which might, and in fact did, prove

unfounded. He appears rather to have ignored geographical and climatic

conditions; he was certainly ill-informed as to distances. Finally he

was committing the same error which had already cost him dear in Spain,

in endeavouring to direct complicated strategic manoeuvres from a

distance; and the optimism which was becoming a mental disease with him

badly affected his calculations.

The Emperor, apparently believing that Bagration was stronger than

was actually the case, and that he might break northward, directed

Eugène with the 4th Corps on July 7th in the track of Davout; but

soon becoming aware that his intelligence was false, recalled him to

Smorgoni, where he arrived on the 12th. On the 14th Eugène left to

support the advance on Drissa, marching by way of Vileika, where the

magazines captured by Colbert afforded supplies. Nevertheless food

was invariably scanty. The wretched roads wore out the men, who fell

sick or straggled in numbers. The horses fared still worse, and many

died. St. Cyr, meanwhile, had marched by Novi Troki to Vilna, whence

he was directed by Glubokoïe also on Drissa. The march of the unhappy

Bavarians will later be alluded to. On July 11th Napoleon ordered

Mortier with part of the Guard also upon Glubokoïe, and next day the

first detachment of the Head-quarters Staff was directed thither. De

Fezensac, who was with this detachment, notes that the Young Guard were

already suffering from the effects of the tropical heat, scanty rations

and fatigue--especially the newly formed “Flanqueurs-Chasseurs.” Yet

Napoleon in a letter of the 11th suggests that Mortier can live on the

country!

The 10th Corps, after clearing the right bank of the Niemen, had been

directed north-eastward towards Mitau and Riga, which latter place

it was destined to besiege. The operations of the 10th Corps were

so isolated and otherwise of so languid a nature that they may for

the moment be ignored. Here it is only necessary to observe that the

10th Corps was moving north-eastward on a broad front, the Prussians

advancing on Mitau, the 10th Division, Poles and Germans under

Grandjean, on Dünaburg. At the latter place there was a bridge-head

garrisoned by some reserve battalions.

Davout, having occupied Minsk, remained there for some days. The

halt was necessary in order to rally the stragglers and re-establish

discipline. It was also utilised in commencing the organisation of

Minsk as one of the main depôts of the army, for which its situation

at the intersection of the Warsaw-Moscow and Vilna-Kiev high-roads

admirably fitted it.

Davout had rightly inferred that his occupation of Minsk would oblige

Bagration to retire upon Bobruisk. He might then endeavour to march up

the left bank of the Berezina to the Minsk-Smolensk road at Borisov or

Bobr, and thence press on to join Barclay. The Marshal accordingly sent

forward his advance-guard, under Bordesoulle, to reconnoitre Borisov

and occupy it if possible. He estimated Bagration’s strength, from the

reports of spies and peasants, at 16 to 18 regiments of infantry and

120 guns, besides cavalry. The evaluation was much below the truth, and

gives the impression that his informants had only seen and counted the

regiments of one of Bagration’s two corps and the 27th Division.

Borisov was undefended. Working parties were busy almost until the

last on the entrenchments of the bridge-head; but the only troops

available to defend it were two skeleton battalions, which retired

on the approach of the French to Mohilev. The place was occupied by

Bordesoulle on the 11th, and there and in the vicinity were taken

a large amount of flour and forage, about 80,000 pounds of salt,

16 spiked guns, 4000 cannon-balls and shells, some thousands of

entrenching tools, and a quantity of hospital equipment and supplies.

Davout’s other cavalry brigade, under Pajol, was directed on Igumen,

35 miles south-east of Minsk, and thence also upon the Berezina. On

the 13th it captured a Russian convoy of 180 waggons, which, however,

being left slenderly guarded, was retaken next day by Cossacks. Pajol,

meanwhile, occupied the crossings of the Berezina at Berezino and

elsewhere, and awaited the arrival of Davout. He reconnoitred towards

Bobruisk, and it was the presence of one of his detachments at Svislocz

which alarmed Bagration and induced him to precipitate his march.

Davout decided that to advance on Bobruisk would probably be waste of

time, since Bagration could almost certainly reach the place before

him. He therefore rightly determined to march for Mohilev, 110 miles

east of Minsk, and only some 60 from Berezino. Bagration was on the

14th still two days’ march west of Bobruisk with his advance-guard,

while Borozdin and Platov were yet farther off, and could not reach the

fortress until the 18th. Thence to Mohilev was four long days’ march

on bad roads, while Davout had a much shorter distance to traverse.

Even if he reached Bobruisk before the Russians, they could cross the

Berezina under cover of the fortifications.

While Davout remained about Minsk, Grouchy, with his two cavalry

divisions and Colbert’s Lancers, supported by Claparède’s Polish

Legion, was making a sweep northward and westward to the great bend of

the Dnieper near Orsha. On the 14th he entered Lepel, 48 miles north of

Borisov, capturing large magazines of food-stuffs and forage, besides

about 160 Russian prisoners. He then turned south-eastward to Orsha,

which was occupied on the 18th without resistance. The magazines of

provisions were even more important than those at Lepel, and a number

of boats and pontoons were also taken.

The withdrawal of King Jerome left Davout in command of the whole

Napoleonic right wing. Napoleon had intended that the Marshal should

assume chief command only when the junction of the two forces should be

complete, and later he reprimanded him for doing so before it had been

effected. It is difficult to perceive what other course lay open to

Davout. He made various efforts to induce the offended King to retain

his command, but in vain: Jerome was thoroughly disgusted.

Davout’s advanced guard left Minsk on July 12th, and by the 15th his

main body was concentrated near Igumen. Bagration’s whole force could

not reach Bobruisk until the 18th, the French thus had a long start in

the race to Mohilev. The untrustworthy 33rd Léger was left to garrison

Minsk. The 5th Corps and Latour-Maubourg were directed by Igumen on

Mohilev, and the 8th, temporarily commanded by General Tharreau, by

Minsk and Borisov on Orsha.

The 7th Corps was ordered back to Slonim by Napoleon. The Emperor,

deceived by Tormazov’s long inactivity, had made up his mind that he

need fear nothing from him. As a fact it was lack of preparation and

the necessity for completing it which was keeping Tormazov inactive;

his army was very far from a sham. Napoleon, however, deciding that the

34,000 Austrians were unnecessary in that region, determined to call

them up to the centre. Schwarzenberg had crossed the Bug at Mogilnitza

on July 3rd, and a week later reached Pruzhani, 60 miles on the

Brest-Litovsk-Minsk road. Detachments occupied Pinsk and other places,

and captured large supplies and immense quantities of salt. Otherwise

the Austrians had been inactive. The spirit both of officers and men

was decidedly hostile to the enterprise in which they were engaged,

and though Schwarzenberg himself was a Francophile he was naturally

very cautious, and probably under orders to do as little as possible.

Such considerations would naturally incline Napoleon to wish to have

the Austrians under his own eye. Reynier, with the 7th Corps, was to

take Schwarzenberg’s place and cover the frontier of the Grand Duchy of

Warsaw. These plans, however, could not be executed, for on July 23rd

the Russian Third Army appeared on the scene with momentous results,

and both Schwarzenberg and Reynier had to be diverted to check it.

Davout crossed the Berezina at Berezino on July 15th and advanced on

Mohilev, leaving Pajol with three regiments of cavalry and one of

infantry to guard communications. On the 19th he was near Mohilev

with Compans, Desaix and Valence. The place was defended only by four

skeleton battalions, and was easily carried by Desaix on the 20th.

Eighteen officers and 200 men were taken; with 120,000 rations of

biscuit and flour, some thousands of muskets, and several thousand

pounds of gunpowder.

Pajol on the 19th reported that Bobruisk was full of Russian troops.

Davout therefore inferred that he would soon be attacked, and made

preparations accordingly. He called up Claparède from the northward,

where he was supporting Grouchy, and sent for his reserve artillery,

which was still in rear. He had already sent to Poniatowski and

Tharreau to hasten their march. He was by no means at his ease, since

he had, as he says, only 16,000 men (an underestimate) and expected to

be attacked by 50,000. He looked about for a position in which he could

receive battle against superior numbers, and found one at Saltanovka,

about 8 miles on the Bobruisk road.

Bagration had received orders to advance on the Düna by way of Orsha,

and on the 19th he started Raievski with the 7th Corps, Platov,

Dorokhov and the bulk of Sievers’ cavalry, for Mohilev. Borozdin, with

the divisions of Karl of Mecklenburg and Neverovski, followed on the

20th, while Voronzov brought up the rear with his division of combined

grenadier companies, the 5th Chasseurs from Paskievich’s division and

the Kharkov Dragoons. The garrison of Bobruisk, under General Ignatiev,

consisted now of about 6000 men. The artillery armament was fairly

powerful, but the fortifications were by no means very formidable.

General Zapolski, commanding the reserve troops at Mozyr, was ordered

to hold firm there so as to cover Tormazov’s line of communications

with Kiev.

Bagration himself was furious at the necessity for retreating, and his

letters are couched in terms of angry disgust at the inaction of the

main army. “You have 100,000 men,” he says in one place. “Well, fight!”

And elsewhere, “Why don’t we fight? We are worse than the Prussians and

Austrians.” His troops were weakened by nineteen days of marching in

rain, heat and over vile tracks. Had there only been a little fighting

Bagration would have been less exasperated. He says in one letter that

he had galloped forty versts on the chance of seeing an engagement--an

admission which throws a somewhat amusing light upon his impetuous

character.

On the 21st Bagration’s leading troops reached Staroi Bykhov, some 25

miles south of Mohilev, and on the same day the advanced Cossacks,

under Sissoiev, met the remains of the Mohilev garrison pursued by the

3rd Chasseurs-à-cheval, the only light cavalry regiment which Davout

had retained. Unexpectedly assailed, the Chasseurs were broken and

pursued to within a few miles of Mohilev, losing over 200 prisoners

alone, and only rallying under cover of the 85th Regiment, which moved

out to their relief.

Davout, having ascertained that behind the Cossacks were at least two

Russian infantry divisions, collected on the 22nd his whole disposable

force in his chosen position at Saltanovka. His left rested on the

marshy bank of the Dnieper and was unassailable. His front was covered

by a stream flowing in a difficult ravine, spanned at Saltanovka, some

1200 yards from the Dnieper, by a wooden bridge. About a mile farther

up stood the hamlet and water-mill of Fatova, where a second rivulet,

flowing parallel to the Dnieper, joins the first. On this, a mile from

Fatova, lay the village of Selets. About Saltanovka there were thick

woods, especially on the north bank of the stream; farther west the

ground was more open, but broken and difficult. Generally speaking,

the position was extremely strong; only on the right was it at all

assailable. Desaix’s division guarded it, the 85th Regiment, under

General Friederichs, on the left, the 108th on the right. The bridge

was barricaded; the villages were prepared for defence. One of Compans’

regiments supported Desaix near Selets; the other two were held back

to meet a turning movement, and only brought up later. Valence’s

Cuirassiers and the remains of the 3rd Chasseurs were in reserve near

Selets. The whole force counted some 20,000 men with 56 guns. Claparède

and the artillery reserve could not arrive before the 23rd.

On the 22nd the head of Bagration’s army was at Dashkova, 5 miles

south of Saltanovka. Bagration ordered Raievski with the 7th Corps and

Sievers’ cavalry to attack next day. His reason seems to be expressed

in his letter to Raievski on the 22nd. He tells him that he has only

6000 men in his front, according to his own intelligence; he is

therefore to attack with God’s help and enter Mohilev on the heels of

the enemy. Bagration’s reasoning clearly is that, Mohilev being only

held by a detachment, Raievski may easily clear the way, and the army

get through towards Orsha before the arrival of the French main body.

There is no indication that he intended to turn Davout’s right with

Borozdin and Neverovski while Raievski was attacking in front: they

could not reach Dashkova until late on the 23rd.

[Illustration:

1 verst = 2/3 mile. Russian Troops shown black, French shaded.

THE BATTLE OF SALTANOVKA (July 23rd, 1812)

Fought by Marshal Davout to check Bagration’s advance on Mohilev.]

Raievski advanced from Dashkova at 6 a.m. on the 23rd. He had with him

about 17,000 men with 84 or 96 guns. His cavalry he left in reserve at

Novo Sielki, 3 miles from Dashkova. He ordered Paskievich’s division

to endeavour to turn the French right, promising that as soon as the

attack made headway he would hurl Kolubakin’s division at Saltanovka.

Paskievich, driving in the French skirmishers, fought his way across

the rivulet, and, bringing up a battery to cover his advance, pushed on

against the 108th Regiment beyond it. Raievski, marking the advancing

roll of Paskievich’s fire, believed that the time had come, and sent

forward Kolubakin’s division. The Russians flung themselves at the

bridge, drove off a battalion of the 85th which endeavoured to take

them in flank, and pressed doggedly on under a murderous fire which

swept them away by platoons. Unable to advance, with the stolid courage

of their race they refused to fall back, and stood facing the French

volleys until Raievski withdrew them.

Paskievich’s leading troops, attacking Fatova, were charged and

repulsed across the stream by two battalions of the 108th under

Colonel Achard. Achard, in his turn, hotly pursuing, was driven back

to his own side; and Paskievich, again advancing, carried Fatova, and

penetrated almost to the outskirts of Selets; but his offensive power

had exhausted itself, and before the heavy fire of his well-posted

and well-protected opponents he could advance no farther. Meanwhile

Raievski, determined not to abandon his lieutenant, called up

Kolubakin’s reserves, and made another desperate attempt upon the

bridge, himself and General Vassilchikov leading on foot, with reckless

bravery. All was in vain; the splendid infantry went forward only to

die, and as the last attack reeled back from Friederichs’ front, an

aide-de-camp arrived to report Paskievich’s failure. It was now past

four o’clock, and Davout, feeling safe on his right, ordered forward

Compans with the 61st and 111th Regiments and began a general advance.

Prisoners told Raievski that Davout had about Mohilev 3 infantry and 2

cavalry divisions, and, believing that he was opposed by overwhelming

forces, he gave orders to retreat. Compans followed as far as Novo

Sielki, but as the road was practically a defile between woods he

could do nothing to seriously harass the Russian retreat, and Davout’s

handful of light cavalry was of course useless. Claparède and the heavy

artillery reached Mohilev during the closing stages of the battle.

Raievski at Dashkova was met by Bagration, and the latter, judging that

the way was barred by the bulk of Davout’s corps, decided to pass the

Dnieper and retreat on Smolensk.

Raievski gave his loss as 2504 killed, wounded and missing. That of the

French was naturally, under the conditions of the fighting, much less.

Davout stated it at less than 900. General Desaix was slightly wounded.

Davout was on worse terms with him than ever, and pointedly ignored him

in his reports.

Bagration wrote to Barclay that he had failed to break through at

Mohilev, and so would make for Smolensk. On the 24th Platov and

Dorokhov--except one fatigued infantry regiment--forded the Dnieper

at Verkalobovo, and pushed on to join Barclay. Raievski, supported

by Voronzov, held firm at Dashkova. Borozdin went back to Staroi

Bykhov, while the pontooneers were sent on to bridge the Dnieper at

Novi Bykhov, 14 miles farther south. On the 25th Borozdin marched

for the selected place of passage, and Raievski followed to Staroi

Bykhov, unpursued by Davout, who could not meddle with Sievers’ and

Vassilchikov’s squadrons. The Second Army crossed the Dnieper on

the 26th and 27th, and marched rapidly upon Mstislavl. On the same

day Platov was in touch with Barclay, having passed the Dnieper at

Dubrovna on the 27th. Davout had remained practically inactive. He has

been blamed for his inertness; but it must be remembered that he was

inferior in numbers to Bagration. He had in hand only some 25,000 men,

and his nearest reinforcement was the 5th Corps, which, harassed by

fatigue, disease and lack of supplies, only reached the Berezina on the

24th. On the 25th Bordesoulle reported that Bagration was bridging the

Dnieper, and on the same day Latour-Maubourg sent a detailed and fairly

accurate statement of Bagration’s strength, which probably made Davout

more than ever inclined to caution. On the 27th Poniatowski’s leading

brigade was at last within reach, but on the same day Bordesoulle

reported that Bagration was across the Dnieper. Whatever Davout might

have wished to attempt it was now too late. On the 29th Napoleon sent

orders for him to canton his three corps along the Dnieper.

As has been seen, the First Russian Army had concentrated at the

camp of Drissa, but it had scarcely arrived when proposals for its

abandonment were made.

The Russian army can scarcely be said to have had a commander at

this moment. Clausewitz gives a graphic account of the disorder that

prevailed. The Emperor was of course nominally the supreme head,

and he was more or less at the mercy of his personal entourage. He

himself believed in Phull, but everyone else distrusted the Prussian

theorist--certainly not without good reason. The Tzar’s relations

often exercised undue influence over him, and were distrusted and

disliked by the courtiers and soldiers; the courtiers were at odds

with the military men; finally, the native Russian officers were

jealous of the foreigners. Barclay himself was included among the

objects of their dislike, and Colonel von Wollzogen, one of his German

aides, was regarded with poisonous hatred, merely because his manners

were unpleasing! Projects of strategy were almost as numerous as

advisers. Count Lieven, late ambassador at Berlin, had there seen

much of Scharnhörst, who considered that no attempt should be made to

fight before reaching Smolensk. Barclay protested repeatedly against

remaining at Drissa, and he was supported by the Tzar’s relative,

Alexander of Württemberg. Paulucci, the chief-of-staff, declared

furiously that the man who had selected such a position could only be

either a fool or a traitor, and resigned.

The camp of Drissa lay in a bend of the Düna between Drissa and

Bridzievo. Its land front was about 6500 yards in length, that on

the river about 8000. The land front had ten redoubts, connected by

batteries. In front of redoubts 6, 7, 8 and 9 was an abattis 2000

yards long and 120 broad; but before the left wing a marshy wood gave

excellent cover to an attacking enemy. Two more redoubts strengthened

the first line of defence. The second was formed of five closed works,

and another formed a kind of citadel behind it. Communication was

maintained with the right bank by four bridges, which had only just

been constructed and were incompletely protected with outworks. The

subsidiary means of defence--pitfalls, palisades, entanglements and

abattis--were also very incomplete. The stores were largely accumulated

in wooden sheds in the village of Drissa, opposite the left wing and

exposed to hostile fire.

These tactical defects were, however, slight as compared with the

strategic disadvantages. Lying far away from the Moscow road it could

afford no defence against an enemy who chose to advance by that line,

and it did not even cover that to St. Petersburg. The roads which led

to it were mere country tracks, which ruined the convoys which had to

use them. Moreover, by retiring on Drissa the First Army had actually

retreated away from, instead of towards, Bagration, and if the two

separated forces wished to effect a junction they could do so only by

retiring far to the rear, or by perilous marches across the front of

Napoleon’s advancing columns.

Alexander, perhaps at Phull’s instigation, reprimanded Bagration for

retreating, as if he could have done anything else. Finally, however,

Phull was induced to give way, and it was decided, just in time, to

evacuate Drissa. The 1st Corps was ordered to cover the St. Petersburg

road, and on July 14th the rest of the army began its march for Vitebsk.

The French advanced troops were already almost on the Düna. On the

13th Oudinot with Legrand’s division made a somewhat unnecessary

demonstration against the bridge-head of Dünaburg. On the night of the

14-15th Wittgenstein bridged the Düna and sent across a detachment

under Kulnev, which surprised St. Genies’ cavalry brigade, and captured

the brigadier and over 100 men. Meanwhile the First Army pursued its

march, covered by the river, and reached Polotsk on the 18th.

On July 16th Napoleon left Vilna and on the 18th arrived at Glubokoïe.

Next day, learning that Drissa was abandoned, he turned Eugène towards

Vitebsk, placed the cavalry of the 6th Corps under his orders, and

called Grouchy also to join him. The 6th Corps was marching for

Glubokoïe, already in a sad condition owing to heat, bad roads and

deficiency of bread. It should have received 70,000 bread rations at

Vilna, but so completely had the commissariat broken down that only

27,000 could be furnished. Diarrhoea and dysentery had broken out; and

the unhappy Bavarians fell out in thousands, mostly to die untended by

the wayside.

Murat’s three infantry divisions, under the general command of Comte

Lobau, were extended from Perebrod, 20 miles west of Drissa, towards

the south-east. Oudinot was approaching on the left. Ney and Nansouty

were near Desna, some 20 miles below Drissa.

The conditions among the leading troops were less pitiable than with

the 6th Corps, but still very bad. Supplies were scanty. Bread was

scarce; the troops were lucky if they received even flour. Owing to

the breakdown of the transport clothing and equipment--especially

footgear--were becoming deficient. The roads were bad, the heat was

great and there was much sickness. Lack of supplies led to a general

slackening of the bonds of discipline. The country was ravaged by

marauding stragglers, who committed every kind of outrage. All efforts

to check the evil failed completely.

On the 18th Barclay was at Polotsk. He rightly inferred that Napoleon

would direct his attacks against the Russian left, and informed

Alexander that he must continue his retreat on Vitebsk. Fresh orders

were given to Wittgenstein; and the reserve troops at Dünaburg and

elsewhere were placed under his command.

At Polotsk the Tzar left the army. It was a wise step, for he

was useless at the front, while at the seat of government his

presence would be invaluable. Paulucci accompanied him, and was

replaced by Major-General Yermólov, while Colonel Toll became

Quartermaster-General. On bidding farewell Alexander bade Barclay not

to endanger his army, for it was the only one that Russia possessed.

This injunction undoubtedly made a strong impression upon Barclay, and

is the best explanation of his irresolution some weeks later.

On July 20th Napoleon’s plan was definitely formed. He would turn

Barclay’s left by throwing forward the Guard and the 4th and 6th Corps

to Bechenkoviczi on the road to Vitebsk, while Murat and Ney contained

the Russians in front, and Oudinot occupied Drissa and threatened their

right.

Barclay, however, was already moving. On the 19th Uvarov’s cavalry

corps started from Polotsk, and by the 23rd the entire army was

collected round Vitebsk. There Barclay heard that Bagration had

reached Mohilev, and wrote begging him to hasten his march on Orsha.

He sent Major-General Tuchkov IV with his infantry brigade, 3 cavalry

regiments and 1 of Cossacks, towards Babinovichi on the Orsha road, and

Lieutenant-General Count Ostermann-Tolstoï, who had succeeded Shuvalov

(retired through illness) with the 4th Corps, a brigade of Dragoons,

and the Hussars of the Guard and of Sumi, towards Ostrovno on the way

to Bechenkoviczi. The rest of the Russian army remained at Vitebsk to

rest and reorganise.

The advance-guard of the French 4th Corps was already at Bechenkoviczi.

Oudinot had two divisions at Polotsk and the third at Drissa. Lobau

was to Eugène’s left rear, with Ney some 20 miles farther back: Murat,

with Nansouty’s corps, was near Bechenkoviczi; Montbrun was moving up

the right bank of the Düna towards Vitebsk; Napoleon with the Guard was

at Kamen, about 21 miles from Bechenkoviczi. The unhappy 6th Corps was

toiling along the Glubokoïe-Polotsk road.

At 6 a.m. on the 25th Murat’s and Ostermann’s outposts collided near

Ostrovno. Here the road, coming from Vitebsk between woods, made a

sharp turn to the right, and another equally abrupt to the left some

way farther on. The leading Russian regiment, the Guard Hussars,

charged headlong and, sabring the French pickets, blundered up against

Piré’s brigade in the rear. It was driven back with heavy loss upon

a horse battery which was following, and in the confusion the French

captured six guns. Ostermann, who was some way behind, sent forward the

Sumi Hussars to check the French advance. He then formed for battle,

with Choglokov’s division deployed across the road and Bakhmetiev’s

in columns behind, and in this order the 4th Corps marched forward to

Ostrovno, and took position between the woods.

Ostermann had in all 18 battalions and 20 squadrons--some 13,000 men

and perhaps 60 guns. The French troops which could take part in the

action included Bruyère’s and St. Germain’s cavalry divisions and

Delzons’ infantry division--10,000 bayonets, 6000 lances and sabres,

with about 40 guns.

Ostermann proved a very poor tactician. Against infantry and artillery

in position the French cavalry could do nothing, and until the head

of Delzons’ division, the two battalions of the 8th Léger, arrived

the action was confined to some spectacular but useless cavalry

skirmishing. When the 8th Léger came up it was attacked by three

Russian battalions, which moved forward against it, but they were

charged in flank by two cavalry regiments and driven back. They should

not have been exposed alone in front of the position. Ostermann

then attacked both flanks of the French at once, but with only four

battalions, which were charged by the cavalry and broken. Delzons’

division was now coming into action, and Ostermann withdrew to a

position two miles farther back. The action was certainly not to his

credit.

Barclay on this day had sent Lieutenant-General Konovnitzin with

his division of the 3rd Corps (less Tuchkov IV’s brigade) and the

1st Cavalry Corps to support his advanced guard. Early on the 26th

Ostermann retired behind Konovnitzin, who took up a defensive position

behind a ravine, with a wood on his left. At 10 a.m. Murat arrived in

his front with Delzons and Nansouty. Huard’s brigade (two regiments)

was directed against the Russian right, Roussel’s upon the left; the

106th Regiment and Nansouty’s cavalry, except one brigade which covered

the left, remained in reserve.

Roussel’s troops found much difficulty in penetrating the wood on

the Russian left and, assailed by Konovnitzin’s reserve, were driven

out and over the ravine. The Russians, however, pursuing heedlessly,

were repulsed by a charge of one of Nansouty’s brigades; and Roussel,

rallying his troops, penetrated into the wood. Huard, meanwhile, was

steadily pushing forward on the Russian right, and, being presently

supported by the 106th, gained ground rapidly. Konovnitzin drew off in

good order and retreated on Vitebsk, little harassed by the way, the

broken and wooded nature of the country greatly impeding the pursuit.

Napoleon, wishing to deliver a general action at Vitebsk, directed

Eugène not to press too closely, lest Barclay should take alarm and

retreat without fighting.

On the 27th Napoleon had near Ostrovno the Guard (less Claparède

and Colbert), Lobau’s three divisions, the 3rd and 4th Corps, and

Nansouty’s and Montbrun’s cavalry, about 120,000 men in all. The 2nd

Corps was at Drissa and Polotsk, in contact with Wittgenstein, and

the 6th at Uchach, 60 miles in rear of Ostrovno. During the night

Konovnitzin had been joined by the corps commander, Tuchkov I, with

Strogonov’s division; and the united force now retired on Vitebsk.

Barclay had made up his mind to fight at Vitebsk. His reasons, as

detailed to the Tzar, were that Napoleon had in hand only the Guard,

the 3rd and 4th Corps, and Murat’s cavalry, while the steadiness of

the Russian troops in the recent fighting gave good hopes of victory;

and that he felt it his duty to draw Napoleon’s attention upon him and

give Bagration time wherein to come up. As regards the first reason he

did not know that Napoleon had with him three divisions of Davout’s

corps, and was therefore 30,000 stronger than his estimate. Respecting

the second, if Bagration really were making the terribly dangerous

march from Mohilev by Orsha and Babinovichi, Barclay was indeed bound

to fight for the sake of his comrade. That the plan of attempting

a junction by way of Orsha was hazardous is clear, but it scarcely

affects Barclay’s reasoning. On the assumption that Bagration was

coming by the Orsha road, and that Napoleon was only 90,000 strong, his

determination was not unwise.

The Russian army was drawn up on the 27th behind the Luchizza, a stream

flowing into the Düna just below Vitebsk. Clausewitz criticises the

position severely; but he seems rather prone to ignore the fact that

good tactical positions are not plentiful in Russia--as he himself

elsewhere admits. Strategically it had the grave defect of lying almost

parallel to the Orsha road by which communications with Bagration

were expected to be established. But it is at any rate certain that

it would, like the faulty position of Eylau, have been defended

with desperate courage. An advance-guard of 8 battalions, 2 Cossack

regiments and all the regular light cavalry was stationed on the left

bank of the Luchizza, under General Pahlen, the commander of the 3rd

Cavalry Corps.

Though the Russian army had suffered less than its opponents during the

long marches from the Niemen to Vitebsk it had not escaped considerable

losses by disease and fatigue. The reinforcements along the Düna had

mostly been assigned to Wittgenstein. Platov and Dorokhov were also

absent. Barclay’s strength at Vitebsk appears to have been about

82,000 men, of whom 14,000 were cavalry--mostly regulars--and over 400

excellently horsed guns.

On the 27th the French advance-guard moved upon Vitebsk, and there was

some brisk fighting between Pahlen’s detachment and Broussier’s and

Bruyère’s divisions. The Cossacks of the Russian Guard overthrew the

16th Chasseurs-à-cheval, who endeavoured to stop them with carbine

fire, and made a mad dash right among Broussier’s infantry squares,

while some Voltigeurs of the 9th French Regiment, pushed across

the Luchizza, defended themselves brilliantly against a cloud of

Russian horsemen. Pahlen steadily retired as the French advanced, and

Napoleon did not wish to press, since his concentration would not be

complete until the evening. Ney was still on the march from Ostrovno,

and Montbrun on the other bank of the Düna opposite Vitebsk. In the

afternoon Barclay received Bagration’s despatch announcing that he was

marching for Smolensk. Barclay at once issued orders for a retreat. In

the night the whole army, leaving its camp-fires burning, evacuated its

position and moved silently away in three columns, General Dokhturov,

with the 5th and 6th Corps, marching directly on Smolensk by way of

Rudnia, the rest of the army taking the more circuitous routes by

Surazh and Poriechie. Dokhturov’s march was covered by a rear-guard,

under Major-General Shevich, that of the other two columns by Pahlen

with 14 battalions and 32 squadrons. The withdrawal from the position

was a triumph of good management and discipline. Scarce a single

straggler was left behind, and the retiring columns were well on their

way before the fact of their departure was ascertained. The diverging

lines of retreat confused the French cavalry, and not until the 30th

was Murat definitely able to report that Barclay had retreated on

Smolensk. Except for some not very serious skirmishing between the

advanced guards of the French and the rear-guards of the Russians there

was no fighting. The Russians moved at a pace which set pursuit at

defiance. On July 31st Dokhturov was outside Smolensk, having marched

80 miles in four days. On August 1st Barclay arrived from Poriechie.

Bagration, hurrying from Novi Bykhov by Propoïsk and Mstistavl, came up

two days later. His troops had covered 150 miles through sands, bogs

and forests in eight days. The pedestrian feats of the Russians are

remarkable. Since June 28 the Second Army had marched over 540 miles,

giving an average of 15 miles a day. As there were some days of rest or

battle the actual pace was much more rapid.

The Russian losses in the fighting round Vitebsk may be estimated at

about 4000, with 6 (or 8) guns. Those of the French may have been a

little less.

Napoleon entered Vitebsk on the 28th. He must have been bitterly

disappointed at the negative result of his operations. Once more

the Russians had quietly withdrawn out of reach at the very moment

of contact. The French losses through fatigue and disease had been

relatively enormous, and the manoeuvre of Vitebsk had failed as

completely as the manoeuvre at Vilna. In a sense the failure was

even worse, for the Russians had emerged from the situation with a

great strategic success to their credit. In spite of blunders and

miscalculation, despite contradictory orders and lack of any unity of

command, Barclay and Bagration had achieved what had been the primary

object of their weary marches and manoeuvres to the rear, and had

effected their union.