THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND ITS GENERALS
The circumstance which most impresses the reader who for the first
time, and without knowledge of the conditions, peruses the story of
the Franco-Russian campaign of 1812 is that the forces of Russia were,
as compared with those of Napoleon, very weak. This weakness in war is
familiar enough to all students of Russian history, nor are the reasons
far to seek. Since, however, it must appear peculiar to all who regard
Russia as a power essentially huge and powerful--the “Colossus of the
North”--its causes must be briefly reviewed.
It is true that Russia is a country of vast extent; but her huge
territory, to-day very imperfectly developed, was in 1812 largely
in an almost primeval condition, while the population was even more
sparsely distributed. The country was and is covered in many places
by wide expanses of almost impenetrable forest, and by vast tracts of
morass. In the western provinces the marshes of Pinsk cover an area
of more than 20,000 square miles; and in 1812 they were pierced by
only three indifferent roads. The majority of the numerous rivers do
not in themselves present grave obstacles to intercommunication or
military operations, being in summer shallow and easily fordable, and
in winter usually frozen over, but they are often wide, and frequently
have soft or sandy beds. The larger of them must be negotiated by means
of bridges, and in 1812 bridges were few. Moreover, in Central Russia
the soil is generally yielding and sandy, and every small stream has
hollowed for itself in the course of ages a gully more or less deep.
These gullies, repeatedly recurring, presented considerable obstacles,
especially since they were rarely bridged.
The distances to be traversed were and are enormous. Readers of
Herodotus will remember how the prospect of the three months’ march
from Miletus to Susa frightened Kleomenes and the elders of Sparta. To
transfer troops from the Caucasus to St. Petersburg in 1812 involved a
journey of even greater magnitude--without the aid of the Royal Road of
Persia. Even to-day the Russian roads are comparatively few and bad. In
1812 it was infinitely worse. The few high-roads were frequently very
badly maintained; cross-roads of use for military purposes were almost
non-existent.
Finally, Russia was as undeveloped politically as economically. The
bulk of the peasantry were serfs chained to the soil. The accepted
method of enrolling them for the national defence was to call upon the
nobles, who owned the greater part of the land, for a levy of so many
per hundred or thousand souls. Their interests naturally induced them
to endeavour to retain the best and most industrious of their serfs,
and to furnish for the army the ill-conditioned or idle, as far as
possible. In a country in which corruption has always been rampant
the recruiting officials were doubtless amenable to the influence of
judicious bribery, and the actual result of a military levy was often
far less than it should have been. The slowness of communication, the
general poverty of the Government, the lack of factories of clothing,
arms and ammunition, added to the difficulty of rapidly and efficiently
increasing the armed strength. In 1812 Russia was suffering also from
an almost complete cessation of commerce, the result of the British
blockade of her coasts brought on by the alliance with Napoleon in
1807, and the financial difficulties were in consequence even greater
than usual.
The Russian army, since its organisation on European methods by Peter
the Great, has usually tended to be a rather crude and imperfect copy
of the most modern force of the time. In 1812 French ideas naturally
predominated, and their influence was apparent in many respects,
especially in the direction of the higher organisations.
Early in 1810, as already noted, General Barclay de Tolly became
Minister of War in Russia, and set himself earnestly, with the support
of the Emperor, to reorganise the army. Divided counsels near the Tzar,
and the adverse influence of the conditions above detailed, rendered
the execution of his plans slow and difficult. Nevertheless, a great
deal was effected, and whatever opinions may be held as to Barclay’s
military ability there can be no doubt of his talent for organising.
In 1812 the Russian infantry comprised 6 regiments of Imperial Guards,
14 of Grenadiers, 50 of light infantry (Chasseurs), and 96 of the line.
Each regiment consisted of 3 4-company battalions with an establishment
of 764 officers and men per battalion in the Guards, and 738 in the
line. As a fact, only the Guard regiments were able to complete 3
field battalions. The strengths of the line regiments were so low
that Barclay could only complete 2 battalions of each regiment at the
expense of the third. One company of the third battalion was also
completed by drafts from the other three, and these companies combined
in threes or fours to form battalions of “combined grenadiers.” There
then remained to each regiment a weak battalion of three depleted
companies. These were collected at various strategic centres as
“Reserve Divisions,” and Barclay hoped to complete them with recruits.
He designed the formation of thirty-six depôts at suitable points, at
which new levies were to be trained into additional battalions and
squadrons for the infantry and cavalry regiments. In this respect,
however, there was not enough time for his judicious arrangements to
have much effect. In practice Russia was able to do little more than
maintain her field army at something like war strength. The third
battalions, reserves and new levies were chiefly absorbed in feeding
the fighting line.
A large proportion of the troops were by 1812 armed with a musket
of new model, about equal to that with which the French and British
infantry were furnished, but many still carried the older and clumsier
weapon which had been employed in 1807. The bullet was rather heavier
than that of the French infantry musket; but, judging from the fact
that the Russians usually appear to have had a higher proportion of
killed to wounded than their adversaries, it is probable that the
powder was often inferior.
The Russian cavalry included 6 Guard regiments--2 of Cuirassiers, 1 of
Dragoons, 1 of Hussars, 1 of Uhlans (Lancers) and 1 of Cossacks--each
of 4 field squadrons and 1 depôt squadron. The Cossack regiment
included a detachment of Orenburg Cossacks, and apparently had 5 or 6
field squadrons. The line cavalry comprised 8 regiments of Cuirassiers,
36 of Dragoons, each of 4 field squadrons and the depôt; 11 of
Hussars and 5 of Uhlans, each with 8 field and 2 depôt squadrons. The
establishment of a Guard squadron was 159 officers and men, that of a
line squadron 151. The cavalry was well and adequately mounted, much
better so than that of Napoleon. The men were less well trained than
their opponents, but, belonging to a country in which there is a horse
to every five or six human beings, were probably good horse masters.
Hay was the usual forage, and, to the surprise of Clausewitz, the
horses throve upon it. Accurate details of armament I have been unable
to procure, except that the line Cuirassiers were only protected on the
breast. Helmets and cuirasses were painted black, not polished--a very
sensible and labour-saving device.
The gradual inclusion in Russia of nomadic peoples and of the old
border moss-trooping or Cossack (really _Kazak_=freebooter) settlements
enabled the Government to supplement its forces by swarms of irregular
horsemen. Besides the Cossacks these were Crimean Tartars, Kalmuks and
Bashkirs--the latter still clothed in chain mail and armed with the
bow! In June there were perhaps 15,000 of them on the western frontier.
Their numbers later increased to 30,000 or more. Their reputation
rests largely upon the dread with which they inspired the demoralised
Napoleonic army during its retreat. In the field they could not contend
with regulars, and even during the retreat could never achieve anything
against such of the French infantry as kept its ranks. For guerilla
operations and for harassing the retreat they were invaluable.
In artillery Russian armies have usually been very strong. The
inefficiency of the mediæval Muscovite levies of horse and foot led
early to a remarkable and precocious development of the artillery arm.
Peter the Great in his reorganisation paid special attention to it, and
his crowning victory at Poltava was very largely due to his excellent
artillery. After Peter’s reign his policy was continued, and Russia
owed many victories to the masses of well-served guns which accompanied
her armies.
In 1812 the Russian artillery of the line comprised 44 heavy, 58 light
and 22 horse-artillery batteries organised in 27 foot and 10 reserve
brigades, besides single horse artillery batteries attached to the
cavalry. There were also 29 depôt companies. The numbers of gunners and
drivers varied from an average of 240 for the heavy batteries to 160
for light artillery companies. They were each armed with 12 guns and
howitzers. Cossacks had their own horse batteries.
The artillery of the Guard comprised 2 heavy and 2 light batteries,
each of 16 guns and howitzers, and 2 horse artillery batteries of 8,
with establishments in proportion.
The armament consisted of 18-pounder (1/2-_púd_) howitzers and
12-pounder guns for the heavy batteries, 9-pounder howitzers and
6-pounder guns for the light artillery, and 6-pounders for the horse
batteries. The heavy ammunition waggons customary in other European
armies were not employed in Russia, their place being taken by a larger
number of light vehicles. The quality of the material appears generally
to have been excellent, though Sir R. Wilson and General Kutaïsov
recommended various improvements; and the draft horses were very
numerous and good. The Russian artillery continually performed feats of
transport that speak volumes for its high quality, and the number of
pieces abandoned or captured was extraordinarily small.
The technical troops were few in number and lacking both in scientific
officers and training. The medical department, though far better than
in 1807, when it was practically non-existent, was still terribly
inadequate and ill equipped, and trained physicians and surgeons were
very few.
There were 32 garrison regiments, 1 Guard garrison battalion, garrison
artillery, and pensioners.
A detailed statement of the Russian forces is given in Appendix C, but
of course all of these were not available. Immediately disposable to
meet the invasion there were:--
First Line
About
First Army of the West 126,000
Second ” ” 40,000
Third ” ” 45,000
------- 211,000
Second Line
About
27th Infantry Division 7,500
Reserve Troops and Riga Garrison 37,500
------ 45,000
--------
Total 256,000
To reinforce the fighting line there were brought up during the
campaign--
About
From Finland 14,000
” the Turkish frontier 44,000
” the Crimea 5,000
Militia, Recruits, Cossacks, etc. 90,000
------ 153,000
--------
Total actually employed 409,000
--------
The last item can only be a very rough estimate. It is, however,
certain that the large figures given in some authorities bear no
proportion to the numbers of reinforcements which actually reached the
front. It is of course obvious that the entire armed strength of Russia
cannot be reckoned as opposed to Napoleon. The Asiatic, Caucasian and
Crimea troops could at best only furnish small detachments.
The First and Second Armies had received at the hands of Barclay a
fairly complete army-corps organisation, each corps containing two
infantry divisions, a brigade or division of cavalry, and two brigades
of artillery, with a battery of horse artillery attached to the
cavalry. The Third Army and the Army of the Danube were still organised
in the main on the old system of mixed divisions.
The characteristics of the Russian soldier have never varied. He
was and is endowed with remarkable endurance and courage, but is
comparatively unintelligent. In 1812 illiteracy was practically
universal.
The conditions of service were bad. The period was twenty-five years,
and brutal methods were often necessary to compel the recruits to leave
the homes which they would probably never see again. Life in the ranks
was hard, and only the fact that it was probably no harder than the
existence of the average peasant could have rendered it endurable.
The men were well clothed, for obvious reasons; but they were in
general ill-fed, ill-lodged, ill-cared-for, and practically unpaid.
The methods of maintaining discipline were brutal, and if in theory
military service meant emancipation from serfdom, in practice the men
were treated as slaves. It is all to their honour that they made and
make such good soldiers.
The great characteristic of Russian troops is their extraordinary
solidity and imperturbability under the most terrible punishment. A
Russian army hardly ever dissolves under the influence of defeat;
it must literally be battered to pieces. A good example of this was
afforded at Zorndorf in 1758, when Frederick the Great gained a Cadmean
success over a largely raw, badly trained and equipped, and ill-led
Russian army not greatly superior in number to his own. He nearly
destroyed both wings of the Russian host, but the centre stood firm,
rallied the survivors, fought doggedly until nightfall, and lumbered
defiantly away with some show of equality. The campaign of 1812 was to
afford further proof of these characteristics.
There is a tendency to regard the Russian soldiers as generally large
men, but there is abundant evidence that this was not the case. An
English observer, writing about 1854, describes them as usually
undersized, but they were doubtless hardy enough. The Guards were
picked men. The cavalry, artillery, light infantry and grenadiers
absorbed the best of the remaining recruits; the ordinary line
regiments, with very inadequate means, had to assimilate and train the
poorest of the available material.
The officers, as a class, were not capable of adequately training the
fine material at their disposal. There were honourable exceptions, but
at his best the Russian regimental officer was hardly the equal of
his opponent of corresponding rank, though often, perhaps, a better
linguist and a finer social figure. The Guards, as a whole, obtained
the best officers, and after them the pick went to the cavalry and
artillery, while the line infantry regiments were often very badly
off. The ordinary battalion and company leaders frequently lacked all
but the most elementary military instruction. Appointment and promotion
were too often due to Court favour, female influence or corruption.
The officers were, as a class, indolent. Too often they were not at
the head of their men; their private carriages or sledges swelled the
trains to enormous proportions, while the fighting line was weakened by
the numbers of men detailed for their service. Gambling and drunkenness
were very prevalent, and personal cowardice by no means uncommon, as
Duke Eugen of Württemberg and Löwenstern testify. It is fair to add
that defects such as these existed more or less in all armies of the
period, but the Russian army has always been badly or inadequately
officered.
In the higher ranks the conditions were not more satisfactory. There
was a superabundance of general officers, but their quality often left
much to be desired, and appointments were frequently due to other
causes than military efficiency. This was, it is true, not especially
the case in 1812. Alexander, presumably with the assistance of Barclay
de Tolly, seems to have made a very fair choice of corps commanders,
and several of the divisional leaders later acquired a well-deserved
renown.
The foreign officers were a most important element. Germany furnished
the largest contingent, but there were many French _émigrés_, as
the Duc de Richelieu, Langeron, and St. Priest, and at least one
Italian, the Marquis Paulucci. It may fairly be said of them that
their general intellectual and scientific level was higher than that
of the native officers. The latter were naturally bitterly jealous;
and the foreigners rarely receive justice at the hands of popular
Russian writers. It is humiliating to find even Tolstoï stooping to
perpetuate these jealousies and employing the term “German” in an
obviously contemptuous sense. Many of these foreigners did excellent
work for Russia in 1812--though it is true that Phull, perhaps the
most prominent of them, was an unpractical dreamer.
Mikhail Bogdanovich, Baron Barclay de Tolly, Minister of War and
Commander-in-Chief of the First Army of the West at the outbreak of
hostilities, was himself in some sense a foreigner, and seems to have
been regarded as one, much to his misfortune, by the ultra-Russian
officers. He was a Livonian by birth, and ultimately of Scottish
extraction, being descended from a member of the family of Barclay of
Towie, who had settled in Livonia in the seventeenth century. In 1812
General Barclay de Tolly was fifty-one years of age. His rise in the
army had at first been very slow, owing to his unassuming character and
to lack of influence; but his skill and courage as a divisional leader
in 1807 and 1809, especially displayed in his march across the frozen
Baltic in the latter year, had brought him to the front rank in the
Russian councils. His reorganisation of the Russian army in 1810-12
will probably constitute his best title to fame. The published Russian
documents bear emphatic witness to his industry, energy, and scientific
spirit. His deficiencies in high command are to be attributed partly
to inexperience in handling large masses of troops--an inexperience
which he shared with all but a very few contemporary leaders. He was
overburdened with work, being War Minister as well as general, and was
constantly harassed by the insubordination, sometimes verging upon
mutiny, of his assistants. His personal character stands very high.
Patriotism and devotion to duty were to him a religion; and he was one
of the few men in Russia who rose above narrowly patriotic views. His
scorn of personal profit and ease do him the highest honour, since they
were shared by few indeed of the men about him. Alexander’s trust in
him never seems really to have faltered. The dreamy, romantic, crowned
knight-errant and the simple, devoted soldier of his country had indeed
much in common. Russia has had few sons to compare with Barclay de
Tolly; and it is not to her credit that his worth has been so little
appreciated.
[Illustration: FIELD-MARSHAL PRINCE BARCLAY DE TOLLY
General, War Minister, and Commander of the First Army of the West in
1812]
General Prince Peter Ivanovich Bagration, commander of the Second
Army of the West, was a man of different stamp. He was descended
from the Armenian royal line of the Bagratidae; and to his exalted
rank his rapid rise in the service was largely due. Though only
born in 1765, he was a major-general in 1795. At the same time
Bagration’s abilities were considerable enough to have ensured his
rise under any circumstances. Suvórov had a high opinion of him; and
the great leader’s judgment cannot be lightly set aside. Bagration
was essentially a fighter: his tactics were usually influenced by
his combative instincts; and his excitable temperament rendered
him reckless of his person. His impatient temper rendered him an
intractable colleague for the calm and methodical Barclay; and the
latter’s courtesy and deference to the senior who had come under his
orders did not always relieve their strained relations. On the whole,
it would seem that Bagration possessed better strategic insight than
his comrade; but his tactical ideas were not always happy. Having
regard to his impetuosity, it was, perhaps, fortunate for Russia
that he was not, as his admirers wished, placed in supreme command.
But in pressing the French retreat his fiery energy would have been
invaluable; and from this point of view his death was a national
disaster. It is but due to his memory to say that he really appears
to have been a man of too high and noble a character to condescend
to wilful insubordination or intrigue; his intractability was the
outcome of temporary ill-temper, as were his occasional unjust remarks
concerning Barclay. Towards the end of their association relations
between the two chiefs improved; and, on one occasion at least
Bagration openly testified to his regard for Barclay.
General Count Alexander Petrovich Tormazov, the commander of the Third
Army of the West, does not appear to have been a man of any exceptional
ability. His early successes were due to numerical superiority; but he
then unduly dispersed his forces, and was in his turn overwhelmed. At
Gorodeczna he would probably have been destroyed but for the methodical
slowness of his opponents.
General Prince Mikhail Hilarionovich Golénischev-Kutuzov, who in August
became Commander-in-Chief of all the Russian armies in the field, was
a veteran of sixty-seven years, of which fifty-two had been spent in
arms. He was certainly a man of ability, both political and military;
and his practical experience of war was great, though largely acquired
in service against Polish _guerrillas_ and Turkish irregulars. Though
he had been nominal Commander-in-Chief at Austerlitz, his reputation
had scarcely suffered; for it was well known that he had exercised
practically no authority, which had been usurped by the young Tzar and
his confidants. That he could take advantage of his opponents’ blunders
had been demonstrated at Dürrenstein in 1805, and on the Danube in
1811. But in 1812 Kutuzov was too old for the emergency; and wounds
and infirmity had diminished his bodily activity. Even in the Turkish
war this had been noticeable. As an ultra-Russian he was able to
command more loyal support than Barclay. His conduct of the battle of
Borodino was at least energetic, and his subsequent strategy sound; but
during the French retreat his lack of enterprise was evident. His last
campaign made him Field-Marshal and Prince of Smolensk, but can hardly
be said to have enhanced his reputation.
[Illustration:
FIELD-MARSHAL PRINCE GOLÉNISCHEV-KUTUZOV
Commander-in-chief of the Russian Armies in 1812]
General Baron Levin Bennigsen, the stout antagonist of Napoleon in
1806-1807, was for a time Kutuzov’s principal assistant; but the two
did not work well together, and eventually Bennigsen was retired.
Bennigsen, a Hanoverian soldier of fortune, was as old as Kutuzov,
but much more energetic. He appears to have been a selfish and jealous,
but able, man, and in the following year once more did Russia good
service. Barclay, according to Löwenstern, said of him, that despite
his ability, he was a “veritable pest” to the army, owing to his
egoism and envy; and this view is certainly borne out by a perusal of
Bennigsen’s unreliable and self-laudatory memoirs.
General Matvei Ivanovich Platov, Ataman of the Cossacks of the Don, is
probably better known to British readers than any of his colleagues. He
was a burly, genial officer, uniting to considerable military talents
the daring and good-humour which were even more important in the eyes
of his wild followers. He was an ideal leader of irregulars; his
ceaseless activity and energy will presently be more apparent.
Admiral Pavel Vasilievich Chichagov, Commander-in-Chief of the Army
of the Danube, is a somewhat remarkable figure in Russian history. He
perhaps owed some of his characteristics to his frequent association
with Englishmen. He seems to have been somewhat impetuous and
excitable; and certainly possessed a very independent temper, not
hesitating to speak his mind to his despotic master. A seaman and
diplomatist, placed in command of a land army at a great crisis, it
would not have been strange had he failed badly, but this was far from
being the case. Once clear of the Turkish embroglio he brought his army
to the front with all speed; and though, as a general, too slow, he
carried out his operations with a steady pertinacity, refusing to be
diverted by contradictory orders. For Napoleon’s escape at the Berezina
he was only very partially responsible; but the entire blame was laid
upon him by the hasty injustice of his countrymen, and his career
ended in voluntary exile many years later. It is not pleasant to find
his name still rancorously assailed. The Tzar Alexander II was of a
different opinion; one of the first ships of the Russian ironclad navy
was named _Chichagov_.
Of the advisers who surrounded and influenced--not always for his
good--the Tzar, the most prominent was the Prussian Phull. He had
occupied an important position on the Prussian staff in the fatal
year 1806, a fact which should surely have warned Alexander against
his counsels. Certainly none but the Tzar had any confidence in him,
and his utter lack of real military capacity was shown in the famous
project of the camp at Drissa.
Of the staff-officers the most notable were Major-General Alexei
Petrovich Yermólov and Colonel Baron Charles Toll. The former was an
extraordinary personality, who seems to have retained more barbarian
characteristics than any European military leader of modern times.
He was a man of great courage, considerable ability, and remarkable
will-power; but of a savage and unstable disposition. He could be
guilty of gross cruelty to prisoners of war, and later, as Viceroy of
the Caucasus, relied, as he admitted with cynical frankness, upon a
policy of indiscriminate massacre. Yet he was a kind and considerate
commander, beloved by his troops, and not ungenerous in his treatment
of subordinates. This treacherous side of his character would induce
him to intrigue against a rival, with whom he would then suddenly
become reconciled on some impulse of generosity. He intrigued against
Barclay, but wept bitterly when that ill-used chief left the army. It
may have been hypocrisy, as Löwenstern says; but it really has more
resemblance to one of those impulses which civilised men can hardly
understand, but which are characteristic of barbaric natures, such as
Yermólov’s. Yermólov’s policy of massacre failed to pacify Caucasia,
and his successor Paskievich declared it to have been a gross blunder.
Nevertheless, Yermólov has continued to this day to be the subject
of somewhat indiscriminate eulogy. It is perhaps better to take the
opinion of men who knew him. Barclay’s was terse and to the point: “An
able man, but false and intriguing.” Alexander’s was pithy: “His heart
is as black as his boot.” Clausewitz, who was little associated with
him, admitted his ability.
Toll was a scientific soldier of considerable attainments, and played a
distinguished part during the years 1812-1815.
Of the officers who, during the campaign, commanded detachments or army
corps several were men of real distinction.
General Mikhail Andreïevich Miloradovich--“the Russian Murat”--was
in charge of the advance-guard which pressed the French retreat. The
Russian documents show that he was hardly so much the mere swordsman
as Tolstoï would make him. Both in 1812 and 1813 Miloradovich
distinguished himself greatly, showing himself to be as admirable in
rear-guard command as he was in the leading of the pursuit.
Lieutenant-General Count Peter Wittgenstein, the German commander of
the 1st Army Corps, gained considerable renown by his independent
operations against Napoleon’s left wing. In high command he always
failed; but as a corps commander he was equal to most of the French
marshals, and, though frequently rash and inconsiderate, was never
lacking in stubbornness and energy.
General Dmitri Sergeievich Dokhturov, commanding the 6th Corps, had
served with distinction as a divisional leader in 1805, 1806 and
1807; and reaped fresh laurels in 1812. His conduct before and during
the battle of Maloyaroslavetz reflected the highest credit upon him,
and may be said in effect to have sealed the fate of the retreating
Napoleonic host.
Lieutenant-General Nikolai Nikolaievich Raievski, the commander of
the 7th Corps, gained a reputation little inferior to that earned by
Dokhturov. During the critical days of August 14-16, when Napoleon
was executing his famous flank march on Smolensk, Raievski’s ready
acceptance of responsibility and fine resolution ensured the defence
of the city, and gave Barclay and Bagration time to concentrate. His
action undoubtedly saved the Russians from severe defeat, if not,
indeed, from crushing and irretrievable disaster.
Lieutenant-General von der Osten-Sacken, commanding the reserves of
the Third Army, was detailed by Admiral Chichagov to guard his rear
against Schwarzenberg in November, while he himself marched to hold the
crossings of the Berezina. He executed his task with unfailing courage
and energy, though opposed to greatly superior numbers. Though an
elderly man, his fighting energy was great. In the two following years
he added to his reputation as a dauntless and hard-fighting commander.
None of the other Russian corps commanders was accorded the opportunity
of rendering such eminent service as these three; but none, whatever
his other defects, showed himself deficient at need in that
stubbornness which was probably the most necessary of all qualities
when opposed to Napoleon.
Nor can any serious fault be found with the majority of the divisional
commanders. Conspicuous among them were Konovnitzin, Neverovski, and
the young Prince Eugen of Württemberg, who next year gained a great
reputation as chief of the 2nd Corps. Among those who later rose
to the highest rank may be mentioned Voronzov, a brave, capable,
and altogether estimable man, the hero of the terrific struggle on
the plateau of Craonne in 1814, and thirty years later Viceroy of
the Caucasus. Also, in command of one of Raievski’s divisions was a
difficult-tempered, vain, and jealous young major-general, who in
after years was to achieve a European renown--Paskievich, presently to
be Field-Marshal Paskievich of Erivan and Prince of Warsaw. Another
prominent figure was that of the youthful Major-General Count Kutaïsov,
who commanded the artillery of Barclay’s army. Though only twenty-eight
years of age, he does not appear to have been unfitted for his post;
all who came in contact with him bear witness to his tireless energy.
Certainly the Russian losses in artillery were very slight, and to
Kutaïsov must part at least of the credit be given. He ended his
brief and brilliant career on the field of Borodino while leading a
successful counter-attack.
Of the Russian army as a whole it is to be said that there were
too many generals entitled by their rank to high command, and whom
it was deemed necessary to placate by giving them commands. At
Borodino, besides the general officers on the staffs of Barclay and
Bagration, Bennigsen was present as Chief-of-Staff of all the Russian
armies; Konovnitzin was “general of service,” and there were others.
Miloradovich commanded two army corps under Barclay, and General
Gorchakov was also on the field in a somewhat undefined capacity--all
these in addition to the Commander-in-Chief and the leaders of the two
armies. Most of them were useless on the field, for Barclay, Bagration,
and Kutuzov naturally sent orders direct to the corps and divisional
commanders. In 1813 matters were even worse. In order to employ as many
as possible of the ambitious general officers a practice was adopted
of combining corps in pairs. In this fashion a force of about 35,000
men was burdened with more than thirty generals and three distinct
staffs! In 1812 the confusion at head-quarters, owing to the presence
of unattached generals or relatives of the Tzar, was often great, and
that disaster did not ensue was more than once due to something like
sheer good fortune. Alexander also committed what might have been a
fatal error in not giving one general precedence over another when
acting together. Barclay and Bagration often found it hard to agree;
and though Chichagov and Tormazov, and, apparently, Wittgenstein and
Steingell, succeeded in working together, it was fortunate that trouble
did not arise.