CHAPTER V

THE OPERATIONS ABOUT SMOLENSK

With the arrival of Napoleon’s main army on the Düna and Dnieper the

first stage of the campaign came to an end. To all appearance the

invaders had gained immense advantages. Nearly the whole of the ancient

Duchy of Lithuania, together with most of Kurland, had passed into

Napoleon’s hands almost without a blow having been struck in their

defence. A number of considerable towns had been occupied, and a great

quantity of Russian stores captured. The Russian armies, which six

weeks earlier had been ranged along the line of the Bug and the Niemen,

had now retreated behind that formed by the Düna and the Dnieper, and

the passage of both these rivers could be effected by the French at

their convenience. The Russian troops, apart from the discouragement

caused by constant retreating, had suffered considerable material loss.

When the withdrawal from the frontier began the armies of Barclay and

Bagration had numbered together some 174,000 men. On the Düna the

First Army had been joined by about 9000 reserves, and at Smolensk by

17 depôt battalions and 4 batteries of artillery--probably 6000 more.

Bagration had incorporated in his army the garrison of Mohilev and

six reserve battalions from Bobruisk--say 3000. These figures, added

together, give a total of 192,000.

On August 6th the Russian forces were as follows:--

The First and Second Armies presented a total of 121,000 men; besides

a detachment of 1 Dragoon and 3 Cossack regiments detached towards

Poriechie. Three regiments of Cossacks had been detached to Riga and

elsewhere. Two of Raievski’s infantry regiments, which had been the

worst sufferers at Saltanovka, had been sent into the interior to

recruit. The deduction under these headings may be fairly estimated

at 4500 men. Wittgenstein’s corps and the reserves from Drissa and

Dünaburg were on July 12th over 28,500 strong. The total effective

of the Russian First and Second Armies early in August was therefore

154,000, showing a deficiency since June of 38,000 men. The fighting

round Mohilev and Vitebsk had scarcely cost more than 6000 or 7000

men, and 5000 is a high estimate for losses in the rear-guard actions.

The diminution from other causes was therefore 27,000. It is to be

accounted for by sickness, by straggling and fatigue due to the long

and painful marches, but also in large measure to desertion among the

Lithuanian troops. These half-hearted men were probably no great loss,

nor can it be said that the diminution was, on the whole, excessive;

still it was serious. Over and above the abandoned magazines a portion

of the material had been lost. Only eight guns had been captured in

action, but some thirty more had been abandoned during the long marches

through sands, swamps and forests; it says volumes for the Russian

artillery that the number was not greater.

If, however, the Russian losses had been serious, those of the French

had been more so. The causes which diminished the strength of the

Russians operated also against the invaders, and apparently the latter,

for the most part used to a higher standard of living, were less able

to endure hardships. Fatigue and heat might have been endured without

any very serious results, but owing to the breakdown of the transport,

the supplies of bread and biscuit could never keep up with the troops;

even flour was rarely to be had. Meat was, as a rule, not lacking,

but it was often of bad quality, the cattle being overdriven and

frequently themselves ill-fed. A diet of poor meat, unseasoned, and

unaccompanied by bread or vegetables, is not suitable for men who have

to endure hard labour and fatigue under the rays of a Russian midsummer

sun. Such bread and biscuit as were procurable were bad, and the

ill-ground rye had serious effects upon the stomachs of men accustomed

to well-prepared wheaten flour. Every effort was made to bring up

adequate supplies, but the ill-fed and over-worked draft beasts were

utterly unable to cope with the transport, and died in great numbers.

The men, foraging for themselves, were rarely able to obtain more than

small quantities of grain, and as there were no portable mills in

the equipment of the troops it had to be consumed boiled. The water

available in Lithuania was scanty in quantity and often bad; and in

the general disorganisation of the commissariat brandy, which formed

part of the usual ration, and might, at any rate, have done something

towards rendering the water less unwholesome, was rarely served out.

The result was a frightful amount of sickness--diarrhoea, dysentery and

typhus--and in a wretchedly poor and sparsely populated region little

could be done to reduce it. The sick were left behind in temporary

hospital camps; where they died by thousands in the midst of filth,

starvation and general destitution. Of those who went into these dens

of misery it was calculated that not one in ten ever emerged alive.

The fighting line was seriously weakened by the immense number of sick.

It was also reduced by the necessity of making large detachments to

bring up the belated supply trains and to forage for bread, and yet

further depleted by straggling, partly for purposes of foraging, partly

owing to fatigue, and in some measure to indiscipline. This straggling

had always been one of the bad features of the Napoleonic army, and the

marches always appear, except when in face of the enemy, to have been

conducted with great irregularity. A German eyewitness was amazed to

see the regiments of Davout’s corps, the best disciplined of the army,

making a short march in the most disorderly array.

There is, of course, something to be said for this permission to

the men to take their ease when there was no necessity for precise

formation and watchfulness; and certainly nothing is ever gained

by harassing and overworking soldiers distinguished for cheerful

readiness--as Frenchmen have always been. But it is difficult to avoid

the conclusion that the irregularity went beneath the surface. With

the gaiety and readiness of the French nature is intermixed a decided

strain of impatience under restraint which easily degenerates into

lawlessness. The straggling which, in earlier days, had perhaps been

necessary for the ill-compacted Revolutionary armies, had now become

a habit, and soon developed into a monstrous abuse, which ultimately,

as much as anything, proved the ruin of the army. The writer is far

from wishing to defend a hard and inelastic discipline which crushes

personal initiative. But he is strongly of opinion that had the French

march discipline been better at the outset, the army would not have

broken up as it did during the retreat. Upon this subject more will be

said in its proper place.

Finally, it must be observed that the proper means of checking

the evils which afflicted the contending armies were very little

understood. Not only was there a deficiency of trained _personnel_,

but the medical art was, as compared with what it is to-day, in a

very undeveloped condition. It cannot be said that Napoleon did not

endeavour to provide his troops with medical and surgical assistance,

but it was never adequate, either in quantity or quality. The

officers were rarely qualified to make good the deficiencies of the

sanitary services. Among the corps commanders there were certainly

some who thoroughly understood the details of administration. Davout

was undoubtedly the best of them; but Ney was also a careful and

conscientious administrator. As early as August he is found issuing

orders for the preparation of winter clothing. Among the divisional

leaders, also, there were some who thoroughly understood how to look

after their men--De Fezensac instances Ledru des Essarts as one of

them. Still, the careful administrators were certainly in a minority,

and their excellent intentions were often hampered by lack of

scientific knowledge.

Turning from the general examination of these evils to consideration

of the intrinsic damage which they caused, it is to be noted that the

1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 8th Army Corps and the 4 corps of

Reserve Cavalry totalled on June 24th about 315,000 men. The returns

of August 3rd and 4th give an aggregate of less than 213,000. There

were, therefore, even on the showing of the official returns, 102,000

men in rear. Detachments account for about 20,000. There remain 82,000;

and, since allowance must be made for drafts and absentees rejoined, it

will probably be fair to estimate that the losses amounted to 100,000.

The loss in battle cannot be estimated higher than 15,000; it follows

that 85,000 men had disappeared from the muster-rolls by reason of

straggling and sickness--that is, nearly 30 per cent. Of course, they

were not all permanently lost to the army, but a very large proportion

were, owing to the terrible lack of provision for the temporarily

disabled soldiers.

The mortality among the horses had been very large, mainly owing to

lack of forage. The number dwindled day by day, and this circumstance

was, in a sense, more fatal than loss of men. Every disabled horse

meant further lessening of the means of transport. The cavalry

regiments were unable to mount even their diminished effectives except

by sweeping up horses from the countryside; and these were rarely of

much service. The guns of the reserve parks had to be left at Vilna,

and even part of the artillery of several army corps.

When Napoleon reached Vitebsk the number of men missing among the

450,000 who had crossed the frontier in June and July, may be

conservatively calculated at 120,000, and a very large proportion

of them were either already dead or disabled from further service.

Straggling and desertion were especially prevalent among the foreign

regiments. Their administration was generally less efficient; less

care was taken of them by the French officials. They had naturally

little affection for the cause in which they had been enlisted by

their sovereigns, and their officers must have been exasperated at

the disgraceful fashion in which Napoleon invariably endeavoured to

saddle their troops with the sole blame for disorders. It is more than

probable that disgust at this, no less than the way in which they had

been sacrificed, was one of the motives which impelled so many German

officers to turn against Napoleon in the following year.

For every reason a halt was imperatively necessary, and Napoleon called

it as soon as the escape of the First Russian Army was an accomplished

fact. On the 29th he wrote to Davout, ordering him to canton his

troops. The various corps took up quarters on a line extending from

Surazh to beyond Mohilev, with the cavalry pushed out in front and on

the flanks. Latour-Maubourg was about Rogachev-on-Dnieper, some 60

miles south of Mohilev, with a Polish infantry division in support.

There was a little skirmishing between the advanced French cavalry and

belated Russian detachments. On July 30th Murat’s horsemen picked up

about 100 prisoners and 40 abandoned vehicles, and captured a welcome

supply of flour and forage. On the 31st Villata’s Italian cavalry

brigade surprised a Russian convoy at Velizh, escorted by 4 depôt

battalions. The 2nd Chasseurs under Colonel Banco charged, and captured

60 waggons and 250 prisoners. The total Russian loss was estimated by

Eugène at 700, and 600 sacks of flour and a herd of bullocks fell into

the hands of the Italian troopers. But for these captures the French

cavalry could hardly have advanced another step. The regiments were,

with few exceptions, very weak, and the horses exhausted by fatigue

and privation. Sebastiani--perhaps with some exaggeration, for he was

ill and discouraged--declared that his division had only 2300 mounted

men remaining, out of over 4000. Hardly one of the corps was really

fit for service except perhaps the 1st. Ney had not yet received his

reserve of artillery, which was toiling up from the rear. Not even in

the 1st Corps were things altogether satisfactory. Davout was growling

at the disorder in the regiments, threatening Desaix, whom he accused

of abetting it, with arrest, and re-establishing discipline by stern

methods, including the shooting of marauders caught in the act.

During the last days of July Oudinot had fought several very bloody and

inconclusive actions with Wittgenstein. The 2nd Corps had been forced

back upon the Düna; and on August 4th Napoleon ordered St. Cyr, who

was near Bechenkoviczi, to march to its support, though the unhappy

Bavarians had scarcely begun to refit and were still smitten with

disease. St. Cyr complained bitterly, but he had to obey.

By August 4th the Grand Army had settled down in cantonments.

Head-quarters were at Vitebsk, where ovens were being built, and

hospitals and magazines established. The 4th Corps was at Surazh,

Velizh and Poriechie, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Corps about Rudnia,

the 3rd Corps around Liozna, north-west of Rudnia, with the 24th Light

Infantry supporting Sebastiani. The 1st Corps, not yet reunited, was

spread from Vitebsk to Orsha, with the 8th Corps at the latter place,

and the 5th between Sklov and Mohilev, whither Latour-Maubourg was also

moving.

The general results of the halt were very beneficial. The

establishments of the regiments began to rise. It is true that the

muster rolls for August 4th only show about 197,000 men present out

of a nominal 270,000, but stragglers were rallying each day; and men

and horses were at least reposing from fatigue. The supply department

was not entirely satisfactory. Davout’s troops were able to draw

breadstuffs from the country along the Dnieper, and had, as has been

seen, captured several Russian depôts. The corps north of the Dnieper,

however, depended for bread mainly on what could be brought up by the

over-worked transport from Vilna and Minsk. Here, however, there was an

improvement, since the halt allowed the trains to close up. If bread

were not regularly served out the men at any rate obtained something,

and the corps commanders were able to begin to accumulate a small

reserve.

Besides the increase caused by stragglers and convalescents rejoining,

reinforcements were arriving. The rear detachments of the Imperial

Guard were beginning to come up, also the Hesse-Darmstadt Guards, under

Prince Emil, of which one battalion joined at Vitebsk, while the other

was marching from Vilna. Three newly formed battalions for the Vistula

Legion were also on the way, and various _régiments de marche_ (i.e.

drafts, convalescents, etc.). A Portuguese cavalry regiment had joined

Davout, and the Grand Quarter-General, 4690 strong, reached Vitebsk on

the 7th. When hostilities recommenced the Grand Army was considerably

the better for its rest. Davout’s troops especially were in excellent

order, and carried on the person bread, biscuit and flour for fifteen

days. The Westphalians also were well supplied. North of the Dnieper

matters were less satisfactory. Friant on rejoining Davout stated that

he had always had to forage for breadstuffs, though he had plenty of

meat.

The administration of the hospitals was still very bad, even at

Vitebsk; and elsewhere no doubt it was much worse. Matters were not

improved by the fact that Surgeon-General Larrey and General Mathieu

Dumas, the chief of the military administration, were on bad terms with

each other.

Some changes were at this time made in the commands. Napoleon’s old,

but not very capable or energetic, friend, Junot, was appointed to the

command of the 8th Corps. Marchand was given the Württemberg division

of Ney’s corps. It had been commanded at the outset by the Crown

Prince Wilhelm, but, partly owing to disgust at the disorder, and the

fashion in which he and his men were slandered to save the faces of the

French, partly owing to illness, he had returned to Vilna, leaving the

command to Lieutenant-General Scheler. Marchand declined to take the

direct control out of the hands of the latter, and the two worked well

together. Otherwise, being an old comrade and subordinate, Marchand was

probably welcome to Ney.

The Marquis d’Alorna, one of the few Portuguese officers who had

preferred to serve Napoleon willingly, was appointed Military Governor

of Mohilev. General Charpentier was placed in charge of Vitebsk, and

Gomès Freyre, another Portuguese, of Glubokoïe. The two brigades of

Bavarian light cavalry belonging to the 6th Corps were combined into a

division, under General Graf von Preising, and transferred to the 4th

Corps, which now had 36 squadrons.

Napoleon, of course, did not intend the halt to be more than temporary.

At the outset of the campaign he had told Metternich that he did not

intend to go farther than Smolensk in 1812, but, having established

himself there, purposed to organise Lithuania and consolidate his rule

in the former Polish provinces before attempting to conquer Russia

Proper. This statement he repeated to others--notably to Jomini--and

it can hardly be considered as a mere blind. Up to the present he had

failed to strike a heavy blow at the opposing Russian army The extent

of country which he occupied was by no means an advantage, since it

was too poor to support his huge forces, and merely lengthened his

already long line of communications. But now, at last, a battle might

reasonably be expected. Barclay and Bagration had united their forces,

and it was scarcely within the bounds of probability that Smolensk,

a home of the ancient Rurikovich line, long contended for with hated

Poland, one of the sacred cities of Russia, would be abandoned without

fighting. The halt had for its primary object the putting of the army

into good condition preparatory to a fresh and energetic advance.

As early as August 6th Napoleon told Eugène that an early renewal of

hostilities was to be anticipated, and that he should probably advance

on Smolensk by the left bank of the Dnieper. On the same day he was

asking Davout for information as to which bank of the river was in

his opinion the better for the advance. Davout’s reply was that upon

the whole he thought the left bank the more suitable, and apparently

this decided the Emperor. The merits and demerits of the plan will

be discussed later. Here it is only necessary to observe that it was

preconceived, and not due to the influence of Russian operations.

The two Russian armies were concentrated at Smolensk by August 4th.

The city had practically no fortifications of value. Its massive brick

walls were capable of resisting the attack of field guns, but there

were several ill-closed breaches; and the only guns in the place were

antique pieces without carriages, kept mainly as relics. Smolensk

was garrisoned by a column of 17 depôt battalions, 8 squadrons and 4

batteries of artillery--about 6000 or 7000 men--which had been brought

from Kaluga by General Winzingerode. The infantry was drafted into the

two armies, ten battalions going to the 1st, seven to the 2nd, which

had dwindled during its forced marches, and needed more strengthening

in proportion. The artillery was also divided, but the squadrons

were sent back to Kaluga to serve as a nucleus for fresh formations.

Winzingerode was sent with the Kazan Dragoons from Uvarov’s division

and 3 regiments of Cossacks to observe the French left wing towards

Surazh and Poriechie. There then remained a held army of 121,000 men,

of whom over 18,000 were regular cavalry, with some 650 pieces of

artillery.

Unhappily there was no unity of command. Barclay, as minister of

war, was the hierarchical chief, but both Bagration and himself

were Generals of Infantry, and the former was the senior in rank.

Though a Georgian by birth he posed as an ultra Russian and received

accordingly the willing, not to say eager and unscrupulous, support of

the many officers who chose to regard Barclay as a half-hearted and

even treacherous foreigner. His fighting record was a good one, and he

might, with some justice, consider that he had the better title to the

command-in-chief. Barclay also, with all his fine qualities, appears

to have been deficient in tact. He does not appear to have fully

realised the difficulties with which Bagration had had to contend, nor

the very creditable attempts which he had made to effect a junction.

After crossing the Dnieper Bagration appears to have considered that

his best service would be performed in operating upon Napoleon’s

flank. Von Wollzogen, sent to urge him to hasten the union of the two

armies, found him, according to his own account, by no means willing

to do so, and informed Barclay. The latter thereupon wrote pressing

him to hasten, in phrases which, though hardly beyond what the urgency

of the case required, were perhaps unjust in their implications, and

were certainly fiercely resented by Bagration. He reached Smolensk in

a frame of mind which would find cause of offence in every trifle.

Barclay, however, displayed unusual tact, for which his aide-de-camp

Löwenstern gives himself the credit. When Bagration came to report

himself the War-Minister met him in his antechamber in full uniform,

and expressed his regret that he had been anticipated in calling upon

him. The two chiefs then had a conversation, as the result of which

Barclay apologised by letter for any injustice which he might have

done his colleague. For the moment good relations were established,

and Barclay wrote to the Tzar expressing his admiration of Bagration’s

character. But it is to be feared that Bagration’s friendly feelings

were of no very long continuance, and a sense of injury still rankled

in his mind. What was worse, many of the general officers were almost

openly intriguing for the definite appointment of Bagration to the

supreme command. Yermólov actually wrote to the Tzar urging him to

make it. The chief of the malcontents was the Grand Duke Constantine,

who, as the Tzar’s brother and heir apparent, was the most important

commander in the army. Constantine was a violent and irrational person,

bearing, both in disposition and in the exceeding ugliness of his

features, a strong resemblance to his ill-fated father. Barclay’s

position rapidly became almost an intolerable one.

For the moment all went well. A council was called for the 6th of

August, and to it came the two commanders-in-chief, the Grand Duke

Constantine, whom Barclay dared not omit, Yermólov, Toll and St.

Priest, Bagration’s French chief-of-staff. The decision as to an

offensive had been taken before the meeting, and only the details

were to be settled. There was naturally considerable divergence of

opinion. The extension of the French cantonments appeared to afford

an excellent opportunity. It was determined to throw strong forces

against Napoleon’s extreme left, under Eugène, which might perhaps be

completely destroyed. Bagration, however, wished to drive the attack

home with the full force of both armies, and to this Barclay would not

agree. He was very naturally uneasy as to what the mighty conqueror

opposed to him might do to turn the tables. Smolensk, weak as it was,

was the pivot of the Russian operations, and its loss would shatter

the entire strategic plan. Barclay therefore proposed that Bagration

should hold it while the First Army pushed forward against Vitebsk.

To this Bagration demurred, and eventually it was decided to leave

only a detachment to cover the city and to march upon Vitebsk with the

combined armies, the Second holding rather back on the left to guard

against a turning movement.

Barclay, however, was very uneasy. The Tzar had bidden him preserve

his army at all hazards, and, though he underestimated Napoleon’s

strength, it was no light thing to advance to the attack of so terrible

an adversary. Sir Robert Wilson, the British military commissioner,

who reached head-quarters a few days later, says that Barclay was

terrorised by his opponent’s renown, but, seeing the situation and

the tremendous consequences which would ensue on the destruction of

Russia’s single formidable army, it can hardly be wondered that he

was resolute to take no risks. He informed the Council of Alexander’s

words, and expressed his firm determination not to move more than three

marches from Smolensk.

It is, of course, possible to argue that the plan, thus confined, was

but a half-measure; but it is equally possible that Barclay’s caution

saved the Russian army from destruction. He was certainly so far

dominated by Napoleon that he expected to be turned, and prepared to

throw back his right wing at the first alarm. On the other hand, it was

certain that if Napoleon pursued his usual strategy he would endeavour

to turn one or the other of the Russian flanks, and probability pointed

to the right.

General Neverovski was left to guard Smolensk. His division was

improved in quality by making over two regiments to Paskievich, and

receiving in return those of Poltava and Ladoga. The Kharkov Dragoon

regiment and three regiments of Cossacks were also attached to him,

and he was directed to move out along the left bank of the Dnieper.

Having thus, as he hoped, provided for speedy intelligence, and for the

security of Smolensk, if it were threatened, Barclay, on August 7th,

set his forces in motion. Bagration moved along the right bank of the

Dnieper to Katan, some 16 miles from Smolensk. The 5th and 6th Corps

and the 3rd Cavalry Corps advanced on Rudnia, and the 2nd, 3rd and 4th

Corps and the rest of the cavalry in the direction of Poriechie. A

detachment of light infantry under Baron Rosen connected the First and

Second Armies. Each column was preceded by an advance guard of infantry

and cavalry, and in front of all were the Cossacks under the general

command of Platov. The advancing army totalled about 113,000 men.

At the end of the first day’s march, Barclay received intelligence from

Winzingerode that Eugène and Nansouty were at or near Poriechie. This

naturally suggested that Napoleon had obtained information, and was

moving to turn the Russian right. Barclay accordingly halted, and faced

to the north-east, requesting Bagration to advance to Prikaz Vidra, 16

miles north of Katan, to guard the left flank. Platov was still moving

north-westward, and on the 8th he encountered Sebastiani’s division

near Inkovo, east of Rudnia. Sebastiani was supported by the 24th

Léger and Beurmann’s light cavalry brigade from Ney’s corps. Beurmann,

however, hardly showed the vigour which the occasion required, and only

his Württemberg horse artillery battery took a decided share in the

action, the brunt of which fell upon Sebastiani. The French division,

which was less than 3000 strong, fought well, but was forced to fall

back before superior numbers. A company of the 24th was captured by

the Cossacks, and the loss probably totalled 600 men, of whom 300 were

prisoners. Murat was at head-quarters during the action, and by some

the reverse is attributed to his absence. Undoubtedly he would have

been better able to combine the operations of Sebastiani and Beurmann

than was his chief-of-staff, Belliard, and would also have brought

pressure to bear upon Ney. The latter, who was cantoned about Liozna,

concentrated his troops, but made no move to Sebastiani’s support, for

which he was next day severely reprimanded by Napoleon.

On the same day Nansouty’s outposts near Velizh were attacked by those

of Winzingerode. The intelligence all went to show that the Russians

were advancing against the French left wing. On the 8th Napoleon

received Davout’s report upon the roads along the Dnieper; and at

2 a.m. on the 9th he replied to say that he had decided to march

upon Smolensk by the left bank, and ordered the Marshal to trace the

itinerary. Murat hurried to the front to resume his command. Ney drew

towards him the three divisions of the 1st Corps to meet a Russian

advance. On the 8th the Guard had been paid, and had received brandy

for ten days. Friant, who was to fall at the head of the Old Guard

on the field of Waterloo, was nominated Colonel-General of the Foot

Grenadiers in place of General Dorsenne, recently deceased. He was

welcomed at a parade on the 9th by Napoleon himself--much to his

pleasure.

On the 10th General Eblé was sent to Rasasna, 22 miles above Orsha,

with orders to throw four bridges over the Dnieper. The weather was

very bad, with heavy rain, which broke up the roads and impeded

the march of the troops. Nansouty’s and Montbrun’s cavalry (except

Sebastiani’s division), Ney’s corps, and the divisions of Morand,

Friant and Gudin, were directed on Rasasna. Eugène would follow,

forming the rear-guard of the movement, which was covered on its left

by extensive forests. Davout’s army was also ordered on Rasasna, except

Dombrowski’s division, which was to remain near Mohilev to observe

Bobruisk. It is characteristic of Napoleon’s methods that Ney knew

nothing of the proposed movement until late on the 10th. On the 11th

the Guard left Vitebsk. The weather was still bad, and it was probably

owing to this that Ney was unable to evacuate all his sick, earning

thereby another reprimand from Napoleon.

General Charpentier was left to garrison Vitebsk with the new Guard

regiment of “Flanqueurs-Chasseurs,” Guyon’s cavalry brigade of the

4th Corps, the 3rd battalion of the 1st Vistula Regiment, and a

Hesse-Darmstadt battalion on the way from Vilna--3800 men in all, a

number which would be increased by the 16th to over 7000 by various

_bataillons de marche_. Sebastiani’s division, temporarily commanded by

General Pajol, was to remain in observation near Rudnia. Dombrowski’s

division was between Rogachev and Mohilev. A battalion of Westphalians

garrisoned Orsha. Deducting these detachments, Napoleon had available

for the advance on Smolensk over 200,000 men, exclusive of the

head-quarter troops. By the 13th the whole huge mass was either at or

within easy reach of Rasasna, and Nansouty, Montbrun and Ney crossed

the river and took the lead.

It is somewhat remarkable that there is no indication during this

period of any attempt to ascertain the whereabouts of the Russians.

Napoleon knew that they had not pushed their advance on Vitebsk, but he

was apparently so confident that his move would meet all emergencies

that he does not seem to have troubled himself about the 120,000

enemies who were somewhere to his left.

Barclay, as has been seen, was facing towards Poriechie. About this

time he received a direct order from Alexander to take the offensive.

Bagration moved to Prikaz Vidra on the 9th; and Barclay reported that

the two armies could concentrate in a day if necessary, that in their

position they covered Smolensk and the country between the Düna and

Dnieper, and could easily be supplied from the magazines which had

been prepared beforehand at Toropetz and other places.

Bagration, however, was not satisfied. He was in a mood which would

probably have induced him to quarrel with anything that Barclay did. He

told Arakcheiev that the War-Minister’s head-quarters were so choked

with Germans that a Russian could not live there, and that constant

marching and counter-marching would drive him mad. To Yermólov he wrote

that he had neither hay, straw, bread nor a position, and that Barclay

must either do something or else supersede him (Bagration). He expected

that Napoleon would amuse them by demonstrations about Rudnia, and move

on Smolensk by their left. It is not clear whether this anticipation of

the French Emperor’s intentions was the result of careful reflection,

or simply due to the natural tendency of every commander to imagine

himself the especial object of the enemy’s attentions.

The result was that Barclay, in despair, gave Bagration a free hand. He

empowered him to withdraw upon Smolensk if he judged it necessary, and

in general to take his own measures for the protection of the Russian

left flank. The unfortunate War-Minister was beset by open and secret

foes, and this, added to the responsibility which weighed upon him,

probably explains this extraordinary step, which practically amounted

to an abdication of the supreme command.

On the 12th, accordingly, Bagration withdrew towards Smolensk. On the

same day, however, Barclay received fresh information that the French

were in force near Poriechie. It was absolutely baseless, but he could

scarcely discredit it, more especially as he was obsessed by the idea

of an attack from that quarter. He wrote to Bagration that he expected

an attack on the 15th, and took up a position between the Kasplia lake

and the village of Volokovaia, about 22 miles north-west of Smolensk.

He called up Bagration to Katan and Nadva, about 8 miles farther

north-west, in order to guard his own left. On the 13th the Second Army

was retiring on Smolensk, and the 7th Corps had actually reached the

place when Barclay’s order of recall arrived.

This seems almost to have disturbed Bagration’s mental balance. He

complained bitterly of the constant counter-marching, which was

steadily exhausting and depleting the Second Army. For this there was

good excuse, but little for the violent letters which he wrote to

Yermólov, in which he describes Barclay as a traitor worthy of death.

The latter had certainly carried his cautious policy too far, since

another march in advance on the 9th or 10th would have shown that there

were no large forces in his front, and he was certainly in a state of

great irresolution. Still, seeing the character of his adversary, this

was, at any rate, excusable, and one may fairly ask why the masses of

Russian light cavalry had not better enlightened the situation.

It must be said in defence of Bagration that however much he allowed

his fiery temperament to master him, and though his letters to a

dangerous intriguer like Yermólov were subversive of all military

subordination, he did not himself set the example of disobedience. On

the 14th he counter-marched the 8th Corps on Katan, pushing Sievers’

and Vassilchikov’s cavalry, with a supporting brigade of the 7th Corps,

on towards Volokovaia. The bulk of the 7th Corps was at Smolensk,

and the men needed rest, so that Raievski did not commence his march

until 7 p.m. As he moved off, cannonading was heard in the direction

of Krasnoï. Towards 10 o’clock an aide-de-camp arrived from Neverovski

with the news that French troops were advancing by the south bank of

the Dnieper. Bagration had also, by some means, received intelligence,

for soon after came orders from him to halt. In the night, Raievski

received a fresh order to return to support Neverovski. At daybreak on

the 15th the 7th Corps re-entered Smolensk.

On the morning of the 14th the Grand Army began to advance from

Rasasna. Murat led the way with Nansouty’s, Montbrun’s and Grouchy’s

corps and the light cavalry of the 1st and 3rd Corps; and behind him

came Ney’s three infantry divisions. In rear of Ney came Davout’s

corps, and then the Guard. Eugène was crossing at Rasasna; the 8th

Corps was marching from Orsha on Davout’s right, and the 5th farther

out, covered towards the south by Latour-Maubourg. Between two and

three in the afternoon the advance-guard reached Krasnoï, occupied by

Neverovski’s division.

Various French writers have expressed astonishment at this small force

having been left exposed, and apparently by accident on the south side

of the Dnieper. All this is, of course, little better than nonsense,

or, at best, adulation of Napoleon’s genius, which was so great that it

robbed his opponents of common sense! The sending of the 27th Division

along the left bank of the river was a perfectly rational measure of

precaution. It was in observation, and not intended to abide the attack

of a greatly superior force, though it was quite capable of dealing

with a division or flying detachment. By whichever bank the Russian

leaders chose to operate they could not leave the other unobserved,

especially since the French held the crossings at Orsha and elsewhere.

The mistake--presumably Bagration’s--appears to have been in not

stationing the infantry closer to Smolensk and sending only the cavalry

to observe the Orsha road.

Krasnoï is a small town about 30 miles from Smolensk. Neverovski’s

cavalry outposts were about Liady, a few miles west. They were driven

out by Grouchy’s corps, which formed Murat’s left wing; and Neverovski

learned that overwhelming forces were marching upon him.

[Illustration:

JOACHIM MURAT, KING OF NAPLES

Commander of the French Cavalry

From the painting by Gérard at Versailles]

He at once made his dispositions for retreat. A little east of Krasnoï

the Lossmina river flows to the Dnieper through a gully over which the

high-road passed by the usual wooden bridge. Neverovski ordered the

50th Chasseurs with 2 guns to march with all speed to Korythnia,

nearly half-way to Smolensk, to form a sustaining force in case of a

grave defeat, and began to withdraw. When Murat and Ney arrived they

found him with 9 battalions, his cavalry and 8 guns, behind the ravine,

with 1 battalion and 2 guns in Krasnoï.

The general order of the French advance is a little uncertain, but

Grouchy, with Chastel’s light horse and De la Houssaye’s dragoons,

appears to have been on the left, the light cavalry of the 1st and

3rd Corps with the 24th Léger, personally led by Ney, in the centre;

Montbrun’s two Cuirassier divisions on the right, with Nansouty in

support. The 24th Léger attacked and carried Krasnoï about 3 p.m.,

capturing the two guns and driving the remains of the garrison over

the ravine. The 9th Polish Cavalry followed them over the bridge, but,

throwing themselves rashly upon the supporting infantry, were repulsed.

The Kharkov dragoons pursued, but declined to charge in face of the

masses behind, and Neverovski, seeing the French numbers, sent his

cavalry off to the rear, and began to withdraw, with his ten battalions

ranged in two dense columns.

The hostile horsemen were now crowding over the Lossmina ravine. Murat,

having got some squadrons together, flung himself at the Russian

rear-guard, threw it into disorder and captured five or six guns more.

Neverovski rallied the broken troops, and then, apparently doubting the

steadiness of his young recruits, supported now by the fire of only two

guns, united his force into a single great square. As the battalions

were formed, in Continental fashion, six deep, and as the number of men

was about 5000, each face was probably 130 yards long.

As the French and allied cavalry crossed the ravine each regiment

hurried up to the front and singly and apparently haphazard charged

the retiring square. To all appearance Murat exercised no general

control, but acted like a mere regimental commander, riding furiously

about, leading isolated charges which were futile against steady

infantry. The artillery was mostly blocked at the Lossmina, and only

three Württemberg guns succeeded in coming into action; while Ney’s

infantry, which might have held the Russians until the guns could do

their work, could not force its way up through the impeding hosts of

cavalry. The country was much broken and cut up by small hollows and

gullies; while the road was generally bordered by trees. Over this

country, eastward of Krasnoï, on the way to Korythnia, was moving the

host of French, Polish and German horsemen, while in its midst the

great square of the 27th Division lumbered solemnly along, with the

attacks of the cavalry breaking upon it like waves upon a rock, firing

and stabbing doggedly at everything that troubled it, and making its

way steadily to Korythnia in spite of what its assailants could do. The

firing of the Russian recruits appears to have often been wild, but

their steadiness was exemplary. Even when the three Württemberg guns at

last worked their way up and opened fire there was no shattering them.

A Württemberg regiment did succeed, at one moment, in breaking into

the square, but was forced out again, and the 27th Division steadied

its ranks and went on its dogged way. The charges grew more and more

ineffective owing to the fatigue of men and horses; and about 8 p.m.

Neverovski arrived in safety at Korythnia. There he rallied his cavalry

and rear-guard, and next day retreated on Smolensk. He had lost about

1500 men in all, of whom half were prisoners, with 8 guns. The French

losses do not appear to have exceeded 800.

The action was extremely creditable to the young Russian troops, though

it is only fair to say that they owed much to Murat’s mismanagement.

Ney, in the midst of the action, went to the King and endeavoured to

induce him to allow the infantry to pass to the front, but without

avail. He was furious, and wrote a memorandum to Napoleon begging him

to have a regular advance-guard of infantry. Cavalry, as he pointed

out, were powerless to prevent the retreat of infantry.

Raievski reached Smolensk at dawn on the 15th. In the town was

General Bennigsen, who was accompanying the army apparently in the

hope of succeeding to the chief command. To him the anxious commander

of the 7th Corps went for advice, but Bennigsen was not the man to

assist juniors in difficulties, much less to allow himself to become

associated with what might be a great disaster. He put Raievski off

with a few meaningless words, merely counselling him to save his

artillery. Raievski, as he says, felt that when the fate of Russia hung

in the balance it was no time to think of a few guns. He took up a

position about 2 miles in advance of the town, and awaited Neverovski,

who arrived at 2 p.m. From him Raievski learned that probably the whole

French army was advancing upon Smolensk, and hurried off a despatch

to Barclay. At 5 p.m. he heard artillery fire at his outposts, and,

hurrying to the front, saw the masses of Murat’s cavalry coming up from

Korythnia.

Raievski did not falter. As he saw it his duty was plain. He and his

men must die, if necessary, in defence of the city, for if it fell

Napoleon could take Barclay and Bagration in rear, cutting their

line of communication with Moscow and the south. He was supported by

Paskievich, to whom, according to his biographer, the main credit of

the resolution was due. This assertion may be taken for what it is

worth, though there is no reason to doubt that Paskievich cordially

supported his chief’s resolution.

Smolensk, in 1812, lay chiefly upon the southern bank of the river. It

had formerly been a great frontier fortress, but since the advent of

artillery its importance had dwindled, owing to the fact that it was

more or less commanded by low heights. Its nucleus consisted of the

ancient fortified city, whose massive brick walls formed an irregular

pentagon of nearly four miles in circumference. These walls were

generally about 30 feet high and from 15 to 20 in thickness. At the

top were galleries open to the sky, too narrow to admit of guns being

placed in position. At intervals were 32 towers, in which staircases

gave access to the walls. It was only on the platforms of these towers

that artillery could be placed, and they were in general less solidly

constructed than the walls. Inside the walls were backed by ancient

earthen ramparts. At the south-west angle was a small regular fort

of earth, in so neglected a condition that its ramparts could easily

be scaled by infantry. This so-called “Royal Citadel,” dating from

the days of the Polish occupation, constituted in reality perhaps the

weakest point in the line of defence. Close to the southern or Malakova

Gate a breach, made during the siege by Sigismund III of Poland in

1611, was covered by an earthen redan. The walls were encircled by a

ditch and covered way, also in a neglected condition. Along the east

side a considerable gully gave further protection, and at the west side

was another but shallower depression. All round the city were extensive

suburbs, mostly consisting of wooden buildings. Among them were many

dismantled earthworks. These suburbs extended almost up to the walls

of the inner city, and, since they afforded cover to assailants, the

defenders were practically forced to take up position either in or in

advance of them. They were generally called after the town the road to

which passed through them.

On the south side four chief roads ran into Smolensk, that from Warsaw

entering the city from the south-west by Krasnoï. The road from Mohilev

by Mstislavl led nearly directly southward; that to Roslavl and Orel

branched off from it near the Malakova Gate; the Ielnia-Kaluga road led

south-eastward for some distance, finally turning eastward.

From the north gate, over a long wooden bridge, led three roads, that

to Vitebsk on the left, that to Velizh and St. Petersburg in the

middle, and that to Moscow on the right. The latter ran for some 5

miles along the bank of the Dnieper, and then crossed the chord of a

great bend of the river to Solovievo, about 27 miles east of Smolensk,

where it passed again to the south side. A cross-road passed by the

village of Gorbunovo in a shallow curve to the high-road at Lubino, 14

miles distant. From the south side of Smolensk another track crossed

the Dnieper by a ford at Prudichevo, about 6 miles out, and also joined

the high-road about 2 miles west of Lubino. These tracks must be noted,

since a few days later they became of immense importance.

Raievski had with him only 8 regiments and 6 batteries of his own

corps, and Neverovski’s weakened force. According to himself his

strength (probably infantry and artillery only) was scarcely 13,000

men. He had 72 guns. Realising that his duty was to contest the

city inch by inch, he ranged his force in advance of the suburbs.

Paskievich’s division occupied the Krasnoï suburb and the ditch before

the citadel, with the Vilna Regiment from the 27th Division and a

makeshift battalion of convalescents stationed in reserve behind

the wall. Kolubakin’s division defended the Mstislavl suburb, and

Stavidzki’s brigade of the 27th that of Roslavl. These 23 battalions

could only guard about half of the south front of the suburbs. Four

more were in reserve in the town, and only two could be spared to

watch the line of nearly 2 miles from the Roslavl suburb to the river.

To make the best possible show Raievski stationed his cavalry there.

Eighteen guns were placed on the Royal Citadel; the rest along the

earth ramparts behind the walls. Thus placed, the Russians awaited

attack. Raievski says that though he had had little rest the night

before he could not sleep.

In the night the Lancers of Lithuania and the New Russian Dragoons

reached Smolensk, thus giving Raievski 12 more squadrons, with which he

strengthened his screen on the left.

By 10 p.m. on the 15th the bulk of Murat’s cavalry was about 3 miles

from Smolensk, with its outposts in touch with Raievski. Ney’s corps

was immediately behind. Davout had reached Korythnia. The Guard was in

rear of Davout; the head of the 4th Corps at Liadi. The 8th Corps had

lost its way, but the 5th was nearly in line with Davout, and could

come up in the afternoon. Without reckoning Eugène and the Guard,

120,000 men could be in front of Smolensk before evening.

What, meanwhile, were Barclay and Bagration doing? Barclay was still

anxious about an attack from the direction of Poriechie and sent

pressing orders to his cavalry commanders to endeavour to clear up

the situation. He doubted whether the advance on Smolensk was being

made by more than a part of the French army. Bagration was directed

to cross the Dnieper at Katan, and join Raievski and Neverovski in

defending the Smolensk road. Dokhturov’s corps would take his place at

Nadva. Bagration moved to Katan and threw a bridge, but he soon became

aware that to cross would simply mean his annihilation. He sent word

to Barclay that an army which he estimated at 115,000 men, without

Eugène and the Guard, was marching on Smolensk, and that he himself

must now go thither by the right bank. The reports of Bagration and

Raievski removed Barclay’s doubts, and he issued orders for all his

corps to march upon Smolensk next day. To Raievski Bagration sent a

characteristic message:

“Dear Friend,

“I shall not march to rejoin you--I shall run. I only wish I had

wings. Courage! God will help you!”

At midnight on the 15th-16th Napoleon wrote to Eugène saying that

Smolensk was evacuated. A little later Ney was ordered to occupy

it. It does not appear that the Emperor had any definite information

upon which to base his over-confident opinion. He seems indeed to have

been impressed by Bagration’s bridge-building at Katan, which had been

observed on the 15th by a reconnaissance from head-quarters. A flank

attack upon his army as it lay stretched along the Rasasna-Smolensk

road might have serious consequences. He consequently halted the whole

of the 1st Corps about Korythnia, except Gudin’s division, which

continued its advance on Smolensk.

[Illustration: BATTLE OF SMOLENSK

August 17 1812]

Very early on the 16th the French and Russian outposts before Smolensk

were bickering with each other. Between 8 and 9 a.m. the bulk of Ney’s

and Murat’s force reached the front. The King and the Marshal brought

some batteries into action against Raievski’s artillery, and Ney

deployed his corps opposite the Krasnoï suburb and the Royal Citadel,

Ledru’s division on the right, Scheler’s Württembergers on the left

rear, Razout in reserve. Murat’s divisions extended to the right. The

advance posts were skirmishing hotly, and on both sides a number of

guns were engaged, but, to the astonishment of Raievski, no attack

was made. He spoke afterwards of his success having been due to the

feeble measures of the French. Ney and Murat were, of course, awaiting

orders. Ney also had less than 19,000 infantry, scarcely enough to

attempt to carry the city by main force, especially since he did not

know Raievski’s strength. Napoleon was keeping the bulk of his army

ready to face towards Katan and endeavouring to clear up the situation

by reconnaissances. Towards noon he heard that the bridge had been

removed, and started for Smolensk. He arrived about 1 p.m. and, going

at once to the front, closely reconnoitred the Russian position.

It was perhaps in consequence of inferences made from what he had

seen, that Napoleon directed Murat and Ney to press their advance. The

indications as to time are very vague, but in all probability nothing

like an attack was made until the afternoon. Apparently about 1.30

p.m. the Russian cavalry were forced to retire under the walls of the

town, and the Württembergers began to press home the attack on the

Krasnoï suburb. Raievski’s line was so thin that an advance in force

at any point would shatter it. In strengthening the defence in the

Krasnoï suburb troops had to be moved in that direction. All along the

opposing fronts extended a line of fire, and, though the attack was

nowhere being energetically pressed, the Russian troops were almost all

engaged. There remained in reserve only the two regiments in the town,

when Raievski was informed that the French had penetrated his skeleton

left and were approaching the bridge. He rushed off to repel them with

his feeble reserve, and at this moment a battalion of the French 46th,

seeing the Royal Citadel almost denuded of defenders, dashed forward,

easily mounted the crumbling earth rampart, and penetrated into the

interior. The garrison, however, resisted desperately. Raievski,

finding the report of the advance upon the bridge baseless, hurried

back to the threatened point, supports were brought up, and the gallant

assailants thrown back over the rampart just as a second battalion

was mounting to their assistance, carrying it away in their retreat.

As they went to the rear they were heavily fired upon, and suffered

great loss. Elsewhere the only successes gained had been the driving

in of stubbornly resisting outposts, and the French opportunity was

fleeting. At 3.20 p.m. General Sokolnicki, a Polish officer attached

to the General Staff, reported Russian troops on the road to Rudnia.

Gudin’s division did not reach the front until 4 p.m., Poniatowski

not until 5 p.m., and time was needed for the men to rest and to take

up position. The critical period for the Russians was, in fact, over.

Firing continued until dusk, but no attempt was made to press home an

attack. The Russian main army was pouring down towards the city, and

any success could hardly be more than a temporary one. Raievski’s fine

resolution had robbed Napoleon of his chance; and it is no discredit

to him that his own immediate peril had been less great than he had

imagined.

Bagration, despite his encouraging words, was not able to arrive to

Raievski’s assistance until the evening, and as the distance from Katan

to Smolensk is not more than 17 miles, it must be supposed that he felt

himself obliged to halt in order to become satisfied that Napoleon’s

reconnaissances did not prelude a serious attack. He himself hastened

on to Smolensk, and having ascertained that Raievski was not as yet

pressed and also, apparently, that no attack was intended at Katan,

hurried back to the latter place and directed Borozdin on Smolensk. The

Second Cuirassier Division had already been sent on. Raievski, feeling

that cavalry was useless in the town, kept them on the north side of

the Dnieper.[1]

Barclay, having convinced himself of his error as to the direction of

Napoleon’s attack, turned the heads of all his corps towards Smolensk,

and the march was pressed with desperate energy. All through the

hot summer’s day, over roads so bad as not to deserve the name, the

Russian soldiers pressed forward. Tuchkov I with the 3rd and 4th Corps

and Uvarov’s cavalry came from Kasplia by the Poriechie road; the

Grand Duke Constantine, with the 2nd and 3rd, and Korf’s and Pahlen’s

cavalry, from Volokovaia by Prikaz Vidra; Dokhturov from Nadva by the

Rudnia road; while Borozdin and Vassilchikov marched along the bank

of the Dnieper. Tuchkov’s and Dokhturov’s troops had to march over 24

miles in a direct line without allowing for sinuosities in the roads

and additions occasioned by moving into position, Constantine’s over

22. Nevertheless, by five in the afternoon the whole army was within

easy reach of the threatened town, and an hour later Borozdin’s leading

brigade reached the bridge to the support of Raievski.

Smolensk being saved, the problem before the Russian generals was

what next to do. Barclay anticipated that, having failed to capture

Smolensk, Napoleon’s next move would be on Solovievo. Its seizure

would force the Russian armies either to reopen their chief line of

communications at the sword’s point, with all the chances against

them, or to retreat northward. The abandonment of Smolensk would then

become practically inevitable. It would, of course, have been perfectly

feasible to leave a garrison in the place which might have held out for

a week or two, but it may reasonably be asked what end could be gained

by sacrificing it. At any rate, it was obvious that a possible French

move upon Solovievo must be guarded against, and it was arranged that

the Second Army should move eastward ready to anticipate the enemy at

the threatened point, while the First remained about Smolensk to defend

the line of the Dnieper.

To this end Dokhturov, with the 6th Corps, Konovnitzin’s division

of the 3rd and the Chasseurs of the Guard, was ordered to relieve

Raievski, and about midnight his troops arrived to take up the

positions in the suburbs vacated by those of the former. Raievski left

the 6th Chasseurs at the disposal of Dokhturov; and the Dragoons of

Siberia, Irkutsk and Orenburg replaced the cavalry of the Second Army.

Paskievich assisted Dokhturov’s divisional leaders in posting their

troops; while the 7th Corps and 27th Division crossed the Dnieper and

rejoined the 8th Corps. Next day Bagration started eastward, leaving a

rear-guard at Sheïn Ostrog, 3 miles east of Smolensk, to guard a ford

on the Dnieper.

In Smolensk Likhachev’s division held the Krasnoï suburb and the

Royal Citadel, and that of Kapsevich those of Mstislavl and Roslavl.

Konovnitzin’s division was held in reserve. For the present the left

was only watched by the 6th Chasseurs and the cavalry. The Guard

Chasseurs were at the bridge. Dokhturov had at his disposal about 120

guns, some of which were hoisted on to the platforms of the towers.

The rest of the First Army was stationed on the St. Petersburg road,

about a mile and a half from the city, on a low plateau overlooking

it. The corps of Baggohufwudt and Ostermann-Tolstoï were in front

line, the former on the right of the road, the latter on the left. On

Baggohufwudt’s right were the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Corps, while behind

him stood Strogonov’s division of the 3rd Corps. The 3rd Cavalry Corps

(less the regiments in Smolensk) was stationed to the left and in

advance of the 4th Corps. The general reserve was formed by the 5th

Corps, stationed 1 verst in rear of Strogonov. Finally, Platov’s and

Karpov’s Cossacks watched the course of the river as far as Katan.

While Dokhturov’s troops were taking up their positions they came

into collision with the French outposts, which were driven back

some short distance, Likhachev and Kapsevich making a general move

forward at daybreak on the 17th in order to clear their front.

This has been usually regarded as a general sortie on the part of

Dokhturov to regain the suburbs, but neither in the French documents

nor in Raievski’s account is there any indication that they had been

evacuated. Meanwhile, Davout’s corps and the bulk of the Guard had

arrived; and Napoleon had before Smolensk on the morning of the 17th

the 1st, 3rd and 5th Corps, the Guard, and Murat’s eight cavalry

divisions--in all over 120,000 men. Junot’s corps, owing to a series

of mischances and misdirections, for which Napoleon blamed Junot, and

the latter his senior divisional commander Tharreau, was still in rear.

Latour-Maubourg was observing the country some distance to the south,

while the 4th Corps was extended from Korythnia back to Rasasna.

Napoleon was still uneasy concerning the Russian troops at Katan, so

much so that on the 17th, by his orders, Ney sent thither Mourier’s

cavalry brigade, supported by 6 battalions of Würtembergers and 6 guns,

to guard against a possible flank attack. The force had a sharp action

with the Cossacks and supporting infantry, which cost them 11 officers

and probably 200 men killed and wounded.

During the morning there was continual skirmishing in the suburbs, but

it was not until past midday that Napoleon ordered the advance. His

reasons for assaulting the city at all are obscure, but it is possible

that he expected to be able to carry the suburbs without excessive

difficulty, and that the old walls of the city would easily yield

to a steady cannonade. He may have counted upon the disadvantage of

Dokhturov’s position on a down slope, and on the fact that he himself

could overlook both the city and the opposite bank of the river.

Bogdanovich says that he wished to cross the Dnieper and cut off

Bagration’s army, and only when no ford could be found did he make a

direct assault--but there is no trace of this in the French documents.

De Chambray thinks that Napoleon expected the Russians to deliver

battle before the city. But from his higher ground he could see every

movement of troops from Barclay’s position. He therefore had no grounds

for making such an assumption, and there is no reason for supposing

that he did so. It is, of course, possible that he hoped by developing

an assault, to induce Barclay to support Dokhturov with the bulk of his

forces and fight with his back to the river, but there appears to be

no evidence in favour of the supposition.

At about 12.30 the French advanced to the attack. Ney moved against

the Royal Citadel and the Krasnoï suburb, with Ledru’s division on the

right, the remainder of the Württembergers on the left, and Razout

in reserve. Davout assailed the Mstislavl suburb, Morand’s division

in the centre, Friant’s on the right, and Gudin’s, accompanied by

the Marshal in person, on the left. Compans and Desaix were in

reserve. Still farther to the right advanced Poniatowski’s corps, with

Zayonczek’s division marching on the left against the Malakova Gate,

and Kniaziewicz’s on the right against the Nikolska suburb. The whole

east front of the city was merely observed by Murat’s cavalry.

On the whole the attack was, up to a certain point, successful--as

might have been expected, when some 55,000 infantry were advancing

downhill against about 19,000, whose position among a straggling maze

of timber buildings was swept by the fire of over 300 guns. Progress

was, however, very slow. Ledru and the Württembergers eventually

carried the riverine suburbs, but could get no farther; the Royal

Citadel, now formidably armed and garrisoned, defied attack. Davout’s

three splendid divisions went forward with admirable determination,

drove Kapsevich’s troops into the suburbs, and gained ground steadily,

though at the price of very severe losses. On the right the Poles,

after fierce fighting, captured the suburbs opposite to them, but,

coming under the fire from the ramparts, were brought to a stand. The

result was that by five o’clock the French and Poles had carried all

the suburbs. Kapsevich’s division was being pressed back towards the

walls by Davout’s advance. Konovnitzin’s troops had all been used up in

supporting the fighting line.

On the French right the Russian dragoons were charged and driven back

into the city by the Polish cavalry. A battery of heavy artillery

opened from the north bank of the Dnieper and checked the pursuers, but

as it was isolated the Poles, with great gallantry, forded the river

and rode forward to charge. They were attacked and repulsed by the

escort of Barclay, who had just come thither to reconnoitre. A Lancer

regiment was then detailed to escort the battery. Murat and Poniatowski

now established a mass of artillery on the bank which fired over the

city upon the permanent bridge and the temporary ones which had been

thrown near it. Barclay thereupon placed several batteries in position

on the north bank opposite the French and Polish guns, and after a hot

cannonade succeeded in silencing them or forcing them to withdraw. Sir

Robert Wilson says that he chose the position for the Russian artillery.

As he saw himself driven from the suburbs Dokhturov sent to Barclay for

reinforcements. The latter sent an encouraging message; and ordered

forward the division of the young Prince Eugen of Württemberg, who had

never yet commanded in action, and was burning to distinguish himself.

Eugen reached the front at the most critical moment of the action.

Dokhturov’s reserves were all engaged; Ney was furiously assailing

the Royal Citadel; Davout and Poniatowski had driven Kapsevich and

Konovnitzin upon and into the city, and were massing for an assault

on the Malakova Gate. Kapsevich’s division was broken and crowding

back in complete disorder; Generals Skalon and Balla had fallen; and

Dokhturov, having no fresh troops to put in, was greatly depressed. The

appearance of Eugen’s division relieved him. Pushnitzki’s brigade was

sent off to the right to help Likhachev against Ney, Rossi’s to the

left to strengthen the defence against Poniatowski; and the Chasseur

brigade, led by Eugen himself, marched straight forward to the Malakova

Gate and, charging furiously out through the midst of the fugitives,

reoccupied the covered way and checked the farther advance of Davout.

The driving of the Russians out of the suburbs marked the end of the

French success. Rossi’s brigade reached the Royal Citadel just in time

to help Likhachev to resist Ney’s final attack, which was repelled

with heavy loss, though Ledru and Scheler were now supported by the

4th Regiment from Razout’s division. Dokhturov rallied Kapsevich’s

division, and posted his force along the walls, Prince Eugen taking

command on the left. The French halted within musket-shot, sheltering

as best they could behind the houses and the old earthworks among them,

but losing heavily by the fire from the battlements, and especially

from the light guns on the towers. It was clearly hopeless to attempt

an assault until a breach had been effected, and Napoleon sent forward

24 12-pounder guns of the Imperial Guard, which joined Davout’s

reserve and opened a furious fire. The Russians retorted vigorously,

and as the infantry attacks slackened, the battle became a tremendous

cannonade. The Russian artillery strove its hardest to silence the

12-pounder batteries, but in vain; they pounded steadily at the ancient

walls, the gunners encouraged by the example set by Davout and Comte

Sorbier, who personally directed their fire; but they could make little

impression. Accounts are conflicting as to the fate of the covered

way, the Russians insisting that they occupied it; while the French

equally declared that they carried it. Captain François of the 30e de

Ligne says that the enfilading fire of the French artillery finally

obliged the Russians to abandon it; and that Davout’s sappers began to

undermine the wall. Probably fortune varied at different points. It is

only certain that the French and Poles were definitely checked at the

wall, and the battle died out when darkness came on.

By this time the city and suburbs were everywhere on fire. The French

later declared that the city had been deliberately destroyed; but

this is entirely improbable. Being very largely constructed of wood,

it was certain to take fire, and both time and means were lacking to

extinguish a conflagration which spread with the fall of every shell.

The losses on both sides had been heavy. The Russians had engaged

only 55 battalions, and Dokhturov’s entire force, including cavalry,

Cossacks and artillery, probably hardly exceeded 30,000 men. Barclay

probably understates his loss at 4000, but no Russian authority admits

more than 6000. Prince Eugen gives his own loss at 1300. Though his

division came into action late it must be remembered that one brigade

had to execute a desperate sortie in the face of enormous odds and

a concentrated fire of cannon and musketry. Konovnitzin’s division

can hardly have suffered more; that of Likhachev and the detachments

on the left probably lost less in proportion. On the other hand,

Kapsevich’s troops must have lost heavily. Probably the Russian figure

of 6000 casualties is near the mark. In other words, Dokhturov had lost

one-fifth of his effective strength. Raievski estimated his losses on

the 16th at about 1000, giving a Russian total for the two days of 7000.

The French losses were naturally much greater, since they had brought

far larger numbers into action, but were apparently not heavier in

proportion. Davout gave the losses of the 1st Corps at from 5000 to

6000 men. Gudin returned a loss in his single division of 294 killed

and 1436 wounded, and his list was by no means complete. The 7th Léger,

for example, figures in it for 655 casualties, while, according to

its Colonel, it had 707. Ney, according to Martinien’s lists, had 129

officers killed and wounded in his infantry and cavalry, and his total

loss must have been in the neighbourhood of 3500. Poniatowski reported

a loss of 518 killed and 812 wounded; we must suppose that only the

seriously hurt were registered. Reckoning the Polish losses at 2000,

Ney’s at 3500, Davout’s at 5500, and adding a possible 1000 for losses

among the artillery, reserve cavalry and Guard, we have a total of

12,000. Prisoners there were few on either side.

At 11 p.m. Barclay issued orders to evacuate Smolensk. He stated in

his memoir to the Tzar that he had only intended to hold it to give

Bagration time to get well forward on the Moscow road. This end was now

attained, but the result of the order was what practically amounted to

an open mutiny. A number of general officers, headed by the Grand Duke

Constantine and by Bennigsen, who had no command and was not entitled

to be present, went to Barclay’s quarters and furiously protested

against the abandonment of the city. Sir Robert Wilson received urgent

letters from many generals on the same subject. Bagration, though

he was not personally concerned in the mutinous demonstration, was

bitterly indignant at Barclay’s determination. He persisted that the

First Army could easily hold its ground on the high ground behind

Smolensk, while the Second Army could pass the Dnieper and attack

Napoleon in flank. Barclay was of opinion that for the Second Army to

adventure itself over the Dnieper would mean its destruction, and that,

as regarded holding the line of the Dnieper, Napoleon had merely to

extend his right to cut the Russian communications. Furthermore, he

points out bitterly, operations of this kind, to be successful, require

harmony between commanders. Towards the mutinous deputation he acted

with firmness and dignity. He declined to withdraw his orders, and

bade them leave his presence. Foiled in the attempt to bring pressure

to bear upon him, the malcontents enlisted Wilson on their side, and

induced him, as a personal friend of Alexander, to carry a letter

to St. Petersburg demanding a new general. They also entrusted him

with a declaration on their part that if orders came from the capital

to suspend hostilities the army would regard them as not truly

expressive of the Tzar’s real determination, and would continue the

struggle. All this was not altogether discreditable to the hearts of

the generals, if it did no special honour to their heads. Wilson, who

had rather hastily concluded that Barclay was not a fit person for the

post of commander-in-chief and was also, it is to be feared, unduly

influenced by his personal feelings towards Bennigsen and Bagration,

accepted the mission. The result of wasting time in this mutinous

delegation was that the retirement from Smolensk was not properly

carried out.

[Illustration: THE OLD FORTIFICATIONS OF SMOLENSK

The north-east front abutting on the river. The illustration gives a

good impression of the deeply-sunken course of a Russian river]

Dokhturov withdrew his four divisions from the city without great

difficulty, carrying off all his guns and all but the most severely

injured of his wounded, took up the temporary bridges, broke

the permanent structure, and was safe. But in the confusion at

head-quarters no measures had been taken for properly occupying the

_tête du pont_ on the right bank. At 2 a.m. Ney ascertained that

the wall in his front was deserted and entered the city, while a

little later Davout also marched in by the Malakova Gate. The bridge

was broken, but the river was only four feet deep, and at 9 a.m. a

detachment of 600 Württembergers and Portuguese dashed through it and

surprised the _tête du pont_. The Chasseurs holding it were driven out

pell-mell. Hügel’s Württemberg brigade at once followed; Ney brought up

his artillery to the river’s edge and the work was maintained. Barclay

could only mask it with his rear-guard, under Baron Korff, consisting

of 7 regiments of Chasseurs and 3 of Lancers and Hussars, which

occupied the northern suburb. Davout promptly set to work to restore

the bridge.

Barclay did not at once commence his retreat. For this Clausewitz

blames him severely, but it must be remembered that on the 16th his

whole army had made a forced march, and that on the 17th part of it

had been heavily engaged. Then also he was probably still harassed and

distracted by the mutinous state of his subordinates. For the moment

his firmness appears to have crushed insubordination. The Grand Duke

was sent off to St. Petersburg under the pretext that his presence was

needed there. Otherwise Barclay’s delay was perhaps due to a desire

to mislead Napoleon as to his line of retreat. In this he certainly

succeeded; but it was scarcely necessary to retain the whole of his

army in position; a well-handled rear-guard could have masked the

direction of the march.

Early on the 18th Napoleon was at the river-bank opposite Korff’s

position, but then he appears to have retired to rest, after sending a

brief letter to Maret at Vilna to announce the capture of Smolensk. He

certainly may have needed sleep, and it may also be imagined that the

bulk of the army, which had fought all day and been astir all night,

was reposing. At any rate the day was one of inaction for both sides,

except at the bridge, where desultory fighting went on until nightfall.

Ney slowly reinforced the _tête du pont_ by means of boats and rafts,

but the bridge could not be completed until Korff withdrew. It does not

seem to have been ready until late at night. During the day Junot’s

corps and the head of the 4th reached Smolensk.

There is some reason to believe that on this day Bagration’s ugly

temper led him into the commission of what was practically an act of

treason. He took off his entire army to Solovievo, leaving only four

regiments of Cossacks at the important road junction at Lubino. As the

high-road by the river was commanded by French artillery on the south

bank, Barclay would be forced to use for his retreat the cross-road

by Gorbunovo, which reached the highway at Lubino, and certainly a

handful of light horsemen was a most inadequate guard for this vital

last point. Barclay says that he only learnt at the last moment that it

was practically uncovered. Bagration’s retreat was natural, now that

Smolensk was abandoned, but in leaving no infantry at Lubino, and not

apparently informing his colleague, he committed, to say the least of

it, a very dubious action. Otherwise the incident throws light on the

bad staff-work of the Russians, and one may fairly ask why Yermólov and

St. Priest were not in close and frequent communication with each other.

Between 7 and 8 p.m. Dokhturov, with the 5th and 6th Corps, and Korff’s

and Pahlen’s cavalry (less detachments to rear-guard), was ordered to

march by cross-roads to Solovievo. An hour or so later the 2nd, 3rd

and 4th Corps, with Uvarov’s cavalry corps, started by the Gorbunovo

track for Lubino. At this moment apparently, Barclay heard that there

were no troops at that vital point except Karpov’s Cossacks. He at once

directed Major-General Tuchkov III with the Yelisabetgrad Hussars,

the Revel Regiment, the 20th and 21st Chasseurs and a horse artillery

battery to hasten thither. At 2 a.m. Korff withdrew from before

Smolensk.

From the first everything went wrong. The retreating columns

encountered all kinds of difficulties. The roads were, of course,

unspeakable. Gullies were frequent, and often had to be bridged for

the artillery to pass, nothing having been done in advance by the

inefficient staff. The darkness and the troubles incidental to filing

some 40,000 men along a single bad track caused endless delays. To

crown all, the column missed its way and wandered into a side track,

with the result that at daybreak its rear was only 2 or 3 miles

north-east of the St. Petersburg suburb! On the withdrawal of Korff,

Davout had completed his bridge-restoring, and at 4 a.m. Ney’s main

body began to pass.

Barclay, whose great military virtue was perfect self-possession in the

face of danger, ordered Prince Eugen, with as much of his division as

remained with him, to take up a position at the hamlet of Gedeonovo,

bidding him recollect that the fate of the army might depend upon his

firmness. Ney’s advance-guard was soon in contact with Eugen, who held

his ground obstinately, in order to give Korff time to file past.

After a good deal of fighting Eugen was forced back, but by that time

Korff had got his 14 battalions on to the Gorbunovo-Lubino track. Eugen

then fell back to another position towards Gorbunovo, and Ney was

preparing to follow, when orders arrived directing him to incline to

his right to the Moscow road. This appears to have been about 11 a.m.

Early on the 19th Napoleon sent Eblé to Prudichevo to bridge the

Dnieper, and ordered Junot’s corps to cross the river there, a

movement which would bring him to Lubino. Grouchy was sent along the

St. Petersburg road, Montbrun along that to Moscow, while Bruyère’s

division of Nansouty’s corps was ordered to support Ney. Evidently

Napoleon had no certainty as to the precise direction of Barclay’s

retreat, and so far the Russian general’s delay on the 18th had

justified itself. About 11 a.m. Davout’s corps began to cross the

bridge. The Guard, now rejoined by Claparède, was in Smolensk.

Eugène and Poniatowski were in the ruins of the suburbs. The Emperor

apparently spent the morning in his cabinet, but in the afternoon

mounted and proceeded to the high ground east of the city, opposite

Sheïn Ostrog.

General Tuchkov III in his march had to contend with the same

difficulties and obstacles which impeded the main column, so that he

did not reach the Moscow road, some 4 miles west of Lubino, until

8 a.m. Toll accompanied him, and they went forward to confer with

Karpov. It soon became evident that a force of cavalry, presumably

the advance-guard of Napoleon’s main body, was moving eastward from

Smolensk, and also that a strong column was passing the Dnieper at

Prudichevo. Tuchkov pushed Karpov out to observe Junot, and with his

own column took up a position across the road, where it passed over a

low swell, with his flanks covered by some small woods and his twelve

guns on the crest of the rise, and awaited events.

Soon after 10 o’clock skirmishing began on the high-road, probably

with the advanced guard of Bruyère’s division, supported perhaps by

some battalions of light infantry; but it cannot have been until about

1 p.m. that the head of Ney’s main column appeared, and the battle

of Lubino definitely began.[2] By this time the 3rd Corps, which was

at the head of Barclay’s column, had reached Lubino. As it tramped

through, Tuchkov I detached Tornov’s brigade of Grenadiers to support

his brother.

At 1 p.m. the head of Ney’s infantry column began to attack. The

Russians offered a steady resistance, and it was not until three that,

seeing the heavy masses coming into line, and knowing that Junot was

threatening his left, Tuchkov decided to withdraw behind the Stragan

rivulet, some 2 miles to his rear, and about the same distance from

Lubino. Ney inferred from the obstinate resistance that Tuchkov covered

some important movement, and asked Napoleon for support. It was

probably while he was awaiting a reply that Tuchkov drew off, covered

by his cavalry, towards Lubino. Napoleon ordered Gudin’s division to

reinforce Ney, sent Morand’s towards the left with a view to a turning

movement, but gave Junot no directions; clearly he had no conception of

the real importance of the action.

Meanwhile the Russians had safely retired behind the Stragan, where

they were joined by Barclay, bringing with him 8 heavy guns, 7

battalions, and a mass of cavalry. The 3rd and 4th Corps had now

reached Lubino, but Baggohufwudt and Korff were far to the rear, and

the cross-road was packed with baggage and hundreds of guns, which

would be the prey of the French could they break through. But Barclay

on the field, calm, brave and resourceful, was a very different

man from the anxious and harassed Barclay of the cabinet. Without

hesitation he ranged his scanty force in order of battle, and ordered

Yermólov to bring up the 3rd and 4th Corps with all speed.

The high-road, after crossing the Stragan, passed over the southern

end of a low wooded plateau which extended northward for some 2 miles.

South of the road a stretch of marsh, in most places passable owing to

the dry weather, extended to the Dnieper. Out of it arose several low

swells of firm ground, studded with hamlets and patches of wood. One of

these lay near the road, and needed to be occupied.

On the northern plateau Barclay posted 5 infantry regiments, and to the

south of the road 2 more, with 3 battalions in reserve. Twenty guns

were posted to sweep the road. On the swell in the marsh he stationed

26 squadrons of Hussars under General Orlov-Denisov. Of infantry and

guns there were no more available, and, to make a show of support

for Orlov-Denisov, Barclay ordered Uvarov’s cavalry to dismount, and

occupy a village behind the marsh on his left. At 5 o’clock, just as

the action was renewed, Konovnitzin and, a little later, Choglokov

arrived, bringing with them 7 regiments of their divisions and a

horse-battery. Choglokov’s troops were ordered to support the cavalry,

and Konovnitzin’s 4 regiments brought up to the centre.

At 5 p.m. Gudin’s division reached the front, and Ney at once sent it

forward, Razout’s advancing level with it on the left. Some Württemberg

artillery was carried forward with the advance to silence Barclay’s

battery. Ledru and Scheler remained in reserve.

[Illustration:

BATTLE OF LUBINO, AUGUST 19th, 1812

Fought to cover the passage of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Russian Army Corps

from the north of Smolensk to the Moscow road at Lubino]

Comte Gudin, one of the finest officers in the French service,

conducted the attack with splendid vigour. The 7th Léger, supported

by 2 battalions of the 21st and 127th Regiments, crossed the Stragan,

and, maddened by the fall of the General, who was struck down as he led

the charge, broke the Russian infantry to the south of the road and

drove them back, threatening to pierce Barclay’s thin defensive line.

Barclay at once sent forward Konovnitzin’s division which, charging

resolutely, checked the advance and enabled the broken troops to rally.

General Gérard, who succeeded to Gudin’s command, sent forward the 12th

Regiment, and restored the battle on the right. Meanwhile, a fierce

struggle was raging north of the road where Razout was making desperate

but fruitless attempts to carry the plateau. Attack after attack was

steadily met and repulsed.

Beyond Gudin’s right, Murat was coming up from Smolensk with Nansouty’s

and Montbrun’s cavalry, but only his single light division (Bruyère)

could be of much service. Still farther to the right Junot was

advancing from Prudichevo, but showed great irresolution. He at first

declined to move at all, and what actually took place is very obscure.

He seems, about five o’clock, to have reconnoitred the Russian left

with his cavalry brigade and two battalions of light infantry; and

some desultory fighting ensued. His cavalry do not appear to have

gained any success, and a company of light infantry which established

itself across the marsh was destroyed by the Russian Hussars. Then,

when Choglokov’s infantry was seen coming into action, Junot formed

his corps in squares opposite the Russian left. At last General Ochs

obtained permission to advance with 2 battalions of light infantry,

presently supported by Junot with 4 companies of Voltigeurs. He was

successful in driving back the Russian outposts, and with this Junot’s

attack came to an end. Murat had obliged Karpov’s Cossacks to retire

behind the main Russian line, and his light horsemen executed one or

two more or less successful charges on Orlov-Denisov’s troopers, but

without Junot’s co-operation he could do no more.

At 6 p.m. Tuchkov I had brought forward all his corps, and was himself

at Lubino with his 3 rear-guard regiments, and 3 horse batteries

which he had drawn out of the stream of retreating artillery. The

position was still critical. Baggohufwudt had not yet arrived. Korff

was still farther back; the trains were still pouring along the

road from Gedeonovo. But everyone on the Russian side was at last

thoroughly awake to the emergency. Every attempt was made to hasten

the march; and the incompetent gilded youth of the General Staff, at

whom Eugen of Württemberg sneers bitterly, were doing useful work in

saving the trains and the precious artillery. At Lubino the bridge was

utterly inadequate for the vast throng of vehicles. Prince Alexander

of Württemberg suggested that another should be made. Löwenstern

dismounted a squadron of Hussars and set them to tear down the houses,

while Alexander and Baron Salza went with a company of pioneers to

the stream; and so, by desperate exertions, a bridge was constructed,

to which a part of the mass was diverted. The tracks were all but

impassable in many places, and had to be corduroyed and made up with

fascines and boughs before the trains could be got forward. The gunners

and drivers, admirably directed and encouraged by Count Kutaïsov, made

superhuman exertions to drag the artillery along, and, to their glory,

not a gun or caisson was abandoned.

On the Stragan the battle raged with unabated fury. Barclay de Tolly

was doing his uttermost, and though the line was often shaken it was

always reformed and steadied. Some of Ledru’s and Scheler’s troops

endeavoured to get round the Russian right, but their attempts had

no result; the Revel Regiment and the Bodyguard Grenadiers, fighting

doggedly with the bayonet, held them off; while Konovnitzin and Tuchkov

III still successfully defended the road. About seven Ney made a

general advance, calling up his reserves and sending forward every

available man. Gérard joined in on the right, throwing in his last

three battalions. The Russian position was critical, for Barclay had

sent forward all his reserves; but at this moment Baggohufwudt’s corps

at last made its appearance. Olsuviev’s division, which was marching

at its head, was at once put in; and again the opposing forces closed

in deadly strife. At first it seemed as if the French would carry all

before them in their impetuous onslaught, and matters looked so dark

that Tuchkov III went himself to ask Barclay for aid--as did Windham in

1855 in the Great Redan of Sevastopol. Barclay was furious. “Go back to

your post,” he stormed, “and get yourself killed! If you come back I’ll

shoot you!”

Colonel Voïkov came up the road with his heavy battery just in time

to check Gérard’s onslaught. Still the French held their own and,

believing themselves victorious, were slowly gaining ground; when

Eugen’s division at length marched upon the field, and Tuchkov, burning

to redeem himself, led on a counter-attack. He himself was wounded and

taken at the head of the Ekaterinoslav Regiment, but Eugen at once

supported, and after a bitter struggle, in which the bayonet was freely

employed, the French were finally repulsed. It was 9 o’clock when the

roar of conflict died away in the darkness. Korff had reached the

field; the artillery and trains were on the way to Solovievo; and the

Russians had gained a great strategic victory.

Morand’s division had been unable to come into action, having been

entangled in a piece of virgin forest, and was eventually recalled by

Napoleon. It has been suggested that had he been allowed to continue

his advance it would have ensured the destruction of the Russian army.

Lacking definite information as to time and topography, it is difficult

to express an opinion, but, judging from such descriptions as are

available, it seems very doubtful whether Morand could have debouched

with a force strong enough to be effective.

Barclay, having attained the object for which he had stood to fight,

had no intention of waiting to be overwhelmed by Napoleon’s main army

about Smolensk. At 4 a.m. on the 20th his much-tried troops evacuated

the field, and marched 20 miles to Solovievo, where Dokhturov arrived

the same day. Bagration, having thrown three bridges over the Dnieper,

was already across. On the 21st the First Army followed, took up the

bridges, and marched for Dorogobuzh.

French writers for the most part consider Lubino, or Valutina-Gora as

they call it, a victory, but to regard it thus is merely to make a mock

of the word. A battle is not necessarily fought for the possession

of a few yards of ground. Barclay had fought at Lubino in order to

secure the safe passage of his right column into the Moscow road. This

had been successfully achieved, and very heavy loss inflicted on the

pursuers, who had failed to capture a single gun or any appreciable

amount of baggage. Napoleon regarded the battle as a mere advance-guard

engagement. Had he realised its real importance he would not have

failed to send forward everything available. Barclay must have been

disastrously defeated, and probably driven northward with the remains

of his army.

The French had on the field at Lubino about 50,000 men, of whom

perhaps 37,000 were seriously engaged. The number of Russian troops

successively brought into action was probably about 30,000. The

losses were naturally heavy. Gérard alone reported 2297 killed and

wounded, and Ney can hardly have lost less than 4000. Junot probably

overestimated his losses at 700, but, including casualties among

Murat’s cavalry, the French total must have been over 7000. The losses

of the Russians were probably rather less, as they were standing on

the defensive, and for the most part succeeded in repelling attack,

nevertheless, they were very heavy--probably in the neighbourhood of

5000. Few prisoners were taken--not more than some hundreds on both

sides.

It is impossible to conclude this chapter without some remarks upon the

strategy which led up to the battles about Smolensk. It is tolerably

certain, judging from the evidence of documents, that Napoleon’s

plan of marching upon Smolensk by the left bank of the Dnieper was a

preconceived one. Considered by itself, there is little to say of the

manoeuvre. It was in no way hazardous, since the left flank of the

columns moving from Vitebsk was covered by forests, and once across the

Dnieper the march was protected by the river against a Russian flank

attack. Moreover, having two lines of supply, Napoleon risked nothing

by moving his army across from one to the other.

The manoeuvre was certainly unexpected by the Russian leaders--except

perhaps by Bagration--and it is clear that it was only the firmness of

Raievski and the prompt return of the main army that saved Smolensk

from falling into Napoleon’s hands.

Nevertheless, when we turn from the manoeuvre to its purpose it seems

doubtful whether it was by any means the best under the circumstances.

Napoleon’s object was the bringing to bay of the Russian main army and

the crushing of it in a decisive battle. As the Russians had chosen

to take the offensive, the opportunity was apparently in his hands.

Barclay might march fast enough to force an engagement before Davout

could arrive from Orsha, but even so Napoleon could meet him with equal

or superior numbers. If Barclay returned to the defensive, Napoleon’s

best manoeuvre was to advance to Poriechie, threatening the Russian

communications with Moscow. To reopen them Barclay and Bagration must

either give battle or retreat eastward in all haste, in which case

Smolensk would fall of itself. The utmost that could be expected of the

march south of the Dnieper was that the Russians might be forestalled

at Smolensk.

The modern French opinion appears to be that this forestalling was

the essence of the plan, and that Napoleon, having occupied the city,

intended to debouch from it and attack Barclay and Bagration in the

rear.

To the writer it appears that all criticism must necessarily base

itself upon the fact that Napoleon’s strategy was preconceived. Before

he knew anything of the Russian plans he had practically made up his

mind to advance on Smolensk by the left bank of the Dnieper. The

offensive movement of the Russians produced no change in his resolution.

It is highly probable that his determination was taken on grounds not

purely military. He must by now have recognised that warfare in Russia

was subject to conditions which did not obtain in Germany or Austria.

His opponents were elusive; but there were certain places regarded by

soldiers and people as holy, which the popular voice would probably

force the generals to make a show of defending. He therefore resolved

to threaten Smolensk directly, believing that thereby the Russian army

would be constrained to give battle.

Even so it appears somewhat doubtful whether this end could not have

been as well attained by manoeuvring on the right bank. The advance

by the left appears to have assumed that Smolensk would be uncovered

and undefended, and that the Russian field army would be too far away

to return to its rescue. Napoleon, on this hypothesis, would have

been able to occupy it and give battle to his outmanoeuvred opponents

with all the prestige of the capture of the sacred city behind his

onset. As a fact Barclay had provided for speedy information by his

flank-guard under Neverovski, and his resolution not to move far from

Smolensk afforded the means of frustrating Napoleon’s strategy. That he

only arrived in the nick of time hardly affects the discussion, since

his obsession about an attack from the direction of Poriechie delayed

him for a day. On the other hand, Napoleon’s hesitation, owing to the

appearance of Bagration’s army at Katan, also caused him to lose a

day, during which Barclay was able to arrive.

According to Barclay’s memoir to the Tzar he had no intention of

wasting his army in the defence of Smolensk, a place of no military

value, and merely held it in order to allow Bagration time to occupy

Solovievo. Bagration and the majority of the Russian generals appear

to have expected that he would have made it the centre of the Russian

operations. It is, of course, possible that Barclay, harassed and

perplexed, did make some conditional promise as to defending Smolensk

should a favourable opportunity offer. General Okunev--who may perhaps

voice the views of Paskievich--apparently thinks that it could have

been held. But it must be said that as the Russians’ line of retreat

was in extension of their left flank such a policy would have been

hazardous at best. There seems every reason to believe that Barclay’s

ideas were sound; what he lacked was commanding strength of character

to enforce them on his unruly officers.

Napoleon’s assault upon Smolensk is very difficult to account for: and

led to little but waste of human life.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: This is my own explanation of what happened. Bagration

says that he reached Smolensk at 10 a.m.; but Raievski declares that

the leading brigade of the 8th Corps did not arrive until past 6 p.m.,

and speaks of Bagration coming later. Either the march of the 8th

Corps was much delayed, or it moved with amazing slowness under the

circumstances. Seeing what Bagration had written to Raievski, it is

difficult to suppose that he would not make all speed to his rescue. It

is only possible to reconcile the conflicting statements as to the hour

of Bagration’s arrival at Smolensk by such an assumption as is made in

the text. For the rest it must be admitted that Bagration’s despatches

are often unreliable, and he naturally endeavoured to present himself

in the best light. When there is a conflict of testimony between him

and Raievski, I prefer to believe the latter.]

[Footnote 2: Only thus is it possible to reconcile the statements of

the Russian historians that the action began at 10 a.m. with that of

Eugen of Württemberg, that he did not withdraw from Gedeonovo until

about that hour. Ney seems to have followed him to his second defensive

position before he was recalled, which brings us to 11 a.m. at least;

and then time must be allowed for the march of nearly 6 miles to

Tuchkov’s front.]