NAPOLEON’S ARMY AND ITS GENERALS
The army with which Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812 was the largest
which he had yet commanded, and almost certainly the largest that had
ever been gathered for the purposes of a campaign under the leadership
of a single man. None the less it was too small for its task, and
when, on August 23rd, Napoleon left Smolensk on the last stage of
the advance on Moscow, his communications were already inadequately
guarded. A greater defect was its lack of homogeneity. Even in the
nominally French regiments which formed the core of the vast host there
were great numbers of troops drawn from the German, Dutch, Flemish and
Italian provinces of the Empire. Round this nucleus were ranged masses
of allies from almost every country in southern and western Europe.
The French Imperial Army in 1812 contained 107 regiments of infantry of
the line and 31 of light infantry--138 in all. According to numeration
there should have been 164, but 26 had disappeared from the roll for
various reasons. During 1812 several new regiments were formed, chiefly
from the _conscrits réfractaires_--men who had endeavoured to escape
the remorseless conscription, and were confined and trained in special
remote camps.
An infantry regiment comprised 1 depôt battalion and from 2 to 5 field
battalions, each of 6 companies of 140 officers and men. One company
consisted of Grenadiers and 1 of Voltigeurs; the former were chosen
for height and strength, the latter, whose duties were those of
skirmishers, for activity. All were, however, armed with the flintlock
musket, though that of the Voltigeurs was of a lighter and improved
pattern. Voltigeur sergeants carried a special _carabine_. Sappers were
armed with a _mousqueton_ or carbine. All these weapons were fitted
with a triangular bayonet. Fire training was frequently of a very
elementary character. The number of cartridges carried on the person
was from 50 to 60.
Non-commissioned officers, Grenadiers and Sappers, were provided with
a short sabre (_sabre-bricquet_) in addition to their fire-arms.
Musicians also were armed with swords.
The total weight carried on the march, including weapons, ammunition,
rations, kit, and share of camping essentials, was about 50 English
pounds.
The line cavalry comprised 16 regiments of Cuirassiers and
_Carabiniers_, 24 of Dragoons, 28 of _Chasseurs-à-cheval_, 11 of
Hussars, and 9 of _Chevau-légers_. The last were special regiments
designed to accompany the heavy Cuirassiers, who were ill adapted for
performing scouting and outpost duty. Each cavalry regiment had, as
a rule, 1 depôt squadron and 4 field squadrons, each of 2 companies
of 125 officers and men, or a total of 1000 sabres. _Chevau-léger_
regiments appear to have had only 3 field squadrons.
Cuirassiers were protected by steel helmets and cuirasses. The cuirass
covered both back and breast, and weighed about 15 pounds. The
breastplate was theoretically bullet-proof at a range of 40 metres,
and really seems to have afforded fairly adequate protection, judging
from the small proportion of killed and wounded among the cuirassier
officers disabled at Borodino. Cuirassiers were armed with a long,
straight sword and a pair of pistols. Dragoons carried in addition
a carbine. _Chasseurs-à-cheval_ and Hussars had carbine, pistol and
a curved sabre. In the _Chevau-léger_ regiments two-thirds of the
troopers were armed with lance, sabre and one pistol; the remainder
had, in place of the lance, a carbine in order to perform skirmishing
and outpost duties.
The cavalry was largely mounted upon horses of German breed; but even
so the supply was hardly adequate. Besides, many of the horses were too
young, and the hardships of the war destroyed them at a rate which was
steadily on the increase. The pace of the charges was never the wild
gallop familiar to us from many a spirited but inaccurate painting. A
trot was the best that Cuirassiers could usually do, and light cavalry
was often little faster.
It has become a kind of legend that Napoleon’s artillery was always
his strongest arm, but this was by no means the case. In his earlier
campaigns he was weak in artillery; in 1805 and 1806 he had but 5 guns
to 3000 men. It is true that his gunners were generally better trained
than their opponents; but at Eylau at any rate this hardly compensated
for numerical inferiority, the French having only some 250 guns to
oppose to 460 Russian pieces. At Aspern, again, Napoleon put only some
200 guns into the field against more than 300 admirably served Austrian
cannon. His infantry also was evidently deteriorating in quality, and
needed the moral as well as the physical support of powerful batteries.
In and after 1809, therefore, Napoleon greatly augmented his field
artillery. He also revived a practice of very doubtful utility in
attaching to each regiment of infantry 2 or 4 light guns, served by a
detachment of regimental gunners. The experiment had very qualified
success; corps commanders were inclined to regard the regimental
artillery as a mere nuisance. It would surely have been better to
attach batteries of regular artillery to the regiments.
There were 9 22-company regiments of foot artillery, 43 companies
of horse artillery in 6 regiments, and 27 6-company battalions of
artillery train. The company of foot artillery consisted of 120
officers and men, that of horse artillery of 100. A battery consisted
of a company of artillery and a company or half-company of train.
The field and horse artillery was armed with 12- and 6-pounder guns
and 32- and 24-pounder howitzers. There were also some 4-pounders. A
battery usually contained 4 or 6 guns and 2 howitzers. The regimental
guns were light 3-pounders.
The quality of the artillery was high. Many of its officers had made
a scientific study of their profession; and the force as a whole was
highly trained. The material was good, but British officers considered
it much inferior to that of their own army. Manoeuvring was for the
foot artillery a slow process, and for the rapid formation of his great
preparatory batteries Napoleon was generally obliged to rely upon the
horse artillery.
The technical troops were sufficient in number, admirable in quality,
and directed by scientific officers. All through the Napoleonic wars
the engineers did splendid service, and never was their skill and
devotion more evident than in Russia. The construction and maintenance
of the bridges of the Berezina, amid every kind of misery and
disadvantage, is perhaps the fairest leaf on the crown of the French
engineers.
Napoleon, realising that in thinly peopled Russia he could not wage
war as in Germany, had made great exertions to organise a transport
service, especially for the conveyance of food supplies. There were 26
battalions. Most of these had each 252 four-horsed waggons, each waggon
with a load of 1500 kilogrammes. Four of them had 600 light carts,
each with a load of 600 kilogrammes; and 4 were supplied each with 600
ox-waggons with a capacity of 1000 kilogrammes. The oxen were later to
be killed and eaten--a foolish idea, which it is needless to say could
not be carried out. Overworked draft cattle cannot be used for food.
In practice the transport broke down hopelessly. Despite ruthless
plundering in Prussia it was short of draft beasts from the outset. So,
too, was the artillery, and it may be imagined that when horses were
found the latter appropriated them as a matter of course. Forage was
scarce. Finally there were hardly any roads which would bear the weight
of the trains. They soon fell far to the rear, and from the first there
was a shortage of supplies at the front.
Distinct from the army as a whole was the Imperial Guard. The inception
of this force dated from 1800, when Napoleon formed a “Consular Guard”
of 2 infantry and 2 cavalry regiments, selected from men who had served
four campaigns. In 1806 and 1807 fresh regiments were raised on the
same principle, and then numerous battalions of picked recruits. When
Holland was incorporated in the Empire the Dutch Guards were also
included.
The Old Guard comprised 3 regiments of Grenadiers (1 Dutch) and 2 of
Chasseurs. The infantry of the New or Young Guard included 1 regiment
of “Fusilier-Grenadiers” and 1 of “Fusilier-Chasseurs,” formed in 1806,
6 regiments of Tirailleurs (Sharpshooters), 7 of Voltigeurs, and 1 of
“Flanqueurs-Chasseurs.” The last was a new regiment. The Voltigeurs and
Tirailleurs had for the most part served two campaigns in Spain, and
were seasoned troops. The 2nd and 3rd regiments of each arm remained
in Spain, and the 7th Voltigeurs in France. All the other regiments
went to Russia. They formed one division of the Old Guard and two of
the Young Guard. The “Legion of the Vistula”--3 regiments of veteran
Polish troops--was attached to the Guard on entering Russia. All Guard
infantry regiments consisted of 2 field battalions, generally weaker
than line units.
The cavalry included the two original regiments of the old Consular
Guard, the Chasseurs-à-cheval and the Grenadiers-à-cheval, and
a Dragoon regiment. These were French. There were also 2 Lancer
regiments, 1 Dutch, 1 Polish. Guard cavalry regiments had 5 field
squadrons. There were 2 squadrons of Gendarmerie d’Élite, and the
celebrated Mameluke company--a troop of Oriental cavaliers.
The artillery of the Guard consisted of 10 foot and 4 horse artillery
companies with their train. In August, 1812, the foot batteries
were armed (apparently) with 32 4-pounder guns, 18 6-pounders, 24
12-pounders, and 14 32- and 24-pounder howitzers; the horse batteries
with 16 6-pounder guns and 8 24-pounder howitzers. The Guard also
possessed its own service of engineers, and eight companies of seaman
for work on coasts or inland waters.
The pay of the Guards was higher than that of the troops of the line,
and non-commissioned officers ranked with line subalterns. The Guards
were envied and disliked by the line troops, who regarded them as a
pampered corps. Napoleon certainly nursed them as far as possible, and
in 1812 they were only in action, as a body, on a single occasion.
The idea that they were the deciding factor in all Napoleon’s great
victories is without foundation.
Marshal Berthier, as Prince of Neufchâtel, was attended at
head-quarters by a battalion of Guards raised in his own principality;
and a troop of specially selected horsemen formed Napoleon’s personal
escort. During the campaign a battalion of Hesse-Darmstadt Guards,
under Prince Emil, and a regiment of Portuguese light cavalry were also
attached to head-quarters.
The higher organisation of the army was by brigades, divisions, and
army corps of infantry or cavalry as the case might be. The strength of
these units varied greatly. A brigade of infantry often consisted of
a single large regiment; and divisions varied in the number of their
battalions from 6 to 22. Compans’ division of Davout’s corps was equal
in strength to the two Westphalian divisions taken together. The army
corps also varied much in strength, owing to Napoleon’s reasonable
practice of entrusting specially talented generals with greater numbers
than less able officers. The 1st Corps of the Grand Army in 1812
consisted of five large divisions, and totalled some 72,000 men; while
the entire Westphalian Corps counted only 18,000.
The science of clothing soldiers simply and sensibly is so little
understood even to-day that it can hardly be sought in 1812. There was
less of polish and pipeclay in the French army than in that of Great
Britain; but the uniforms were frequently as comfortless and awkward
as they well could be. One wonders how the men could march and fight
in them. The headgear was often especially clumsy and absurd. To deal
with the many types of uniform would need a separate work. The infantry
were generally attired in the blue uniform coat which had replaced the
Bourbon white at the Revolution. Cuirassiers wore blue; Dragoons green;
Chasseurs and Hussars green, with facings of every colour. In general
it seems that there was a good deal of rather tawdry display about the
uniforms of Napoleon’s soldiers. Love of ostentation appears to be so
deeply emplanted in the French character that at this day the abolition
of the old glaring uniforms has been much delayed.
The soldier’s daily rations consisted of, roughly, 28 ounces of bread,
4 ounces of vegetables or 2 of rice, 10 ounces of meat, and beer or
wine according to the country. French soldiers, with their national
genius for cookery, were adepts at making themselves comfortable;
and when rations were regularly distributed they fared well enough.
But Napoleon’s system of subsisting his armies on the country would
not work in Russia. Even in Germany in 1806, and still more in 1813,
the troops were often in dire distress for food. In 1812 almost from
the first it was impossible to keep up any regular distribution of
rations. The soldiers were reduced to marauding for supplies, but in
a poor country they were often not procurable, and the unfortunate
men early began to feel the pinch of want. Napoleon did his best. He
ordered the construction of bakeries at every halting-place; but orders
can effect little without materials, and the latter were frequently
lacking. The rye of Russia, also, did not suit the stomachs of men
accustomed to flour ground from other grains; and the quality both of
flour and bread was generally bad. Herds of beef-cattle were driven
with the army, but their flesh rapidly deteriorated under the effects
of bad fodder and fatigue. Generally speaking, the periods when the
Grand Army was not living from hand to mouth were few, even on the
advance. During the retreat it was half-starved at best.
[Illustration: DETAILS OF THE UNIFORMS OF THE INFANTRY OF THE FRENCH
ARMY IN 1812
From “_Uniformes de l’Armée française_.” By Lienhart and Humbert
_By permission of the publisher, Moritz Ruhl, Leipzig_]
In the disorganisation of the transport the hospital service fared
badly. There was a fairly adequate staff of surgeons and medical
officers; but their efforts--often devoted and persevering in the
highest degree--could effect little when supplies of every kind were
lacking. On the outward route, no less than the return, men died in
thousands by the roadsides, uncared for and unnoticed. Nearly half
the Bavarian Corps died or was invalided without seeing an enemy. The
hospitals were inadequate and badly equipped from the outset; later on
their condition became too frightful for words. All whom ill-fortune or
duty brought into contact with them describe them in terms of horror.
They eventually became mere charnel-houses, in which men were left to
perish in thousands of every kind of misery.
The French army in 1812 was undoubtedly, from the military standpoint,
the best organised in Europe; but its officers, as a whole, left
much to be desired. The rapid increase of the numbers of the rank
and file since 1806 had involved the improvisation of thousands of
officers, often from doubtful material. The best of the regimental
officers were those who united education to practical experience,
but they were relatively few in number. The cadets of the military
school were admirable material, but naturally lacked experience and,
as De Fezensac adds, the physical strength which was so necessary.
But besides those classes of educated officers there was a third
composed of promoted sergeants, whose education was, as a rule,
elementary. One of them, the worthy Staff-Captain Coignet, tells us in
his delightful autobiography that he did not learn to write until he
was thirty-three years of age! He was, indeed, a man of much natural
sagacity, and keenly regretted his deficiencies; but it is obvious that
these illiterate men can scarcely have made good company officers.
The officers of the artillery and engineers were indeed generally
excellent; but many of those of the cavalry, though dashing leaders on
the field, possessed little solid knowledge of the duties of their arm,
and the work of keeping in touch with the enemy was often very badly
performed.
As regards their ideas of personal ease the French officers were no
better than their opponents. Their private vehicles and baggage swelled
the trains to gigantic dimensions--a fact which contributed much to the
disasters of the retreat.
The quality of the rank and file was by no means what it had been in
the great years of Austerlitz and Jena. The bloody campaign of 1807
had created gaps not easily to be filled at the time, and the Austrian
and Peninsular wars deprived the army of the leisure necessary for
it to repair its losses. The French divisions of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd
and 4th Army Corps contained many old regiments, but even in them
there was a large proportion of recruits; and there were a number
of regiments, belonging to newly annexed provinces, which were not
altogether trustworthy. Their material--the sturdy peasantry of the Low
Countries and North Germany--was excellent, and their conduct on the
field usually irreproachable; but their administration and discipline
left much to be desired. Their bad condition was continually exercising
the soul of the order-loving Davout. In one despatch he describes the
Dutch 33rd Léger as _canaille_, and declares in disgust that he can do
nothing with it. Ney likewise complained of the 129th, and pointed out
that it would have been better to draft the recruits of which it was
composed into older regiments. It is probable that Napoleon’s object in
forming new units was to train as many officers as possible.
The deterioration of the troops rendered it necessary to employ deep
tactical formations, with consequent risk of heavy losses. The usual
formations for attacking infantry were (1) the “column of companies,”
in which each battalion advanced with its companies in three-deep line,
one behind another, and (2) the “column of divisions,” with a front
of two companies instead of one. At best the front was narrow and the
volume of fire proportionately weak, even when, as was usual, each
battalion was preceded by a skirmishing line of Voltigeurs. Napoleon
was fully aware of the fire weakness of these attack formations, and
recommended as the ideal the _ordre mixte_ in which battalions in
column alternated with others in line. This order, like the others,
failed hopelessly against the British two-deep line which brought
every musket into action; and it is remarkable that able French
generals continued to employ it when its inefficiency had been so
clearly demonstrated. It is at least probable that the excitable and
imaginative French soldiery could not advance steadily in line. At any
rate, French tacticians trusted, to the end, in the thick skirmishing
line which preceded the advance being able to clear a way for the
masses behind. As the Russians, with less intelligent and (on the
whole) worse trained troops, adopted similar tactics, the problems
which troubled the French in Spain did not arise in Russia.
The French cavalry was excellent on the field, but otherwise often
unsatisfactory. In scouting and outpost work it was inefficient; more
than once during the campaign touch with the Russians was entirely
lost. No doubt much of this inefficiency was due to the exhaustion of
the horses. Forage was generally scarce, and to losses from fatigue and
lack of food were soon added those in action. The men were frequently
poor horse-masters. Murat took no care for the mounts, and over-worked
his force from the first. When the central army began its retreat only
15,000 horsemen remained mounted, and none but the Guard regiments were
really fit for service.
Concerning the internal condition of the French army something must
be said. With the old soldiers devotion to their leader was still
the watchword; but it would be a grave mistake to imagine that this
sentiment was universal, especially among the better educated elements
of the army. Yet the loyalty of the troops, as a whole, admits of no
doubt. Sir Robert Wilson and De Fezensac are at one in bearing witness
to this. The desire for plunder no doubt counted for something, but it
was hunger rather than greed that made the French soldier a marauder.
The spirit of brigandage was indeed rife in the army, and infected
everyone from the commanders downward. On the whole, it may fairly
be said that in the ranks the sense of loyalty was strong and the
general spirit good, but that discipline was often badly maintained
and naturally tended to become more and more relaxed as hardships
increased. Further, it may be observed that while there were numbers
of irreproachable men among the officers, there were also many greedy
adventurers, besides those who were demoralised, like their men, by
years of predatory warfare. Finally, there was, of course, in the army
the ruffianly element, which is never absent. To this element must be
attributed the commission of most of the atrocities which undoubtedly
took place, and for which the whole army had later to suffer. One
further point must be touched upon. The evidence as to the presence
of women and children with the army, especially during the retreat,
is abundant and overwhelming. This unhappy element consisted, in the
first place, of female camp-followers--_vivandières_, _cantinières_
and the like--mostly the wives of soldiers. Some of the officers, at
any rate, were ill-advised enough to take their wives with them. The
foreign population of Moscow mostly awaited the invaders, and fled
with them in fear of Russian vengeance. Finally, the morals of the
French army in sexual matters can only be described as low, at any rate
from the British standpoint. Napoleon himself was not so much immoral
as unmoral--not that there is any absolute proof that he gave way to
his passions during the Russian campaign--and many of his officers
followed his example. On the whole, it seems clear that for one reason
or another the invading army was burdened with thousands of women and
children, whose sufferings during the retreat constituted probably its
most harrowing feature.
The troops of the allied states who accompanied and outnumbered the
French were, generally speaking, the fair equals on the field of their
comrades-in-arms. The Bavarians, Westphalians and Württembergers all
behaved splendidly; and some of the finest fighting in the war was
accomplished by the Berg and Baden regiments at the passage of the
Berezina. The Italians fought admirably at the one general action at
which they had the fortune to be present. The great Polish contingent
performed splendid service for the man to whom Poland looked for its
restoration to the roll of independent nations. Nor can any fault be
found with the conduct in battle of the Spanish and Portuguese troops,
though they were no better than prisoners, serving by compulsion. The
Austrians and Prussians generally took no very prominent part in the
campaign; but what they did was by no means to their discredit.
It was in administration rather than fighting quality that the allied
troops fell below the French standard. They were also generally
so badly supplied that the best administration could have effected
little to improve their lot. The fine Bavarian and Württemberg troops
wasted away by half before they had seen an enemy, and the Poles, to
judge from Poniatowski’s despatches, were often little better off.
That the Spaniards and Portuguese supplied more than their proportion
of deserters and pillagers is merely what might have been expected,
and the same may be said of the Croats and Illyrians, whose interest
in the war in which they were sacrificed was absolutely _nil_. Yet,
on the whole, it cannot well be said that the foreign troops showed
conspicuously worse discipline than their French comrades, though
doubtless the general mixture of races and languages tended to lower
the general standard.
As to the absolute quality of the allied troops it is very difficult to
speak. The German and Swiss infantry were very solid and good, though
of course the quality of the different contingents varied, and perhaps
the Bavarians, Württembergers and Badeners rose above the general
level. The Saxon cavalry were admirable, and probably the best in the
entire _Grande Armée_. The German artillery also, especially that of
Württemberg, was good.
The best of the Polish troops were very good indeed; but the regiments
were largely composed of raw recruits, hastily raised for the great
effort which, as the Poles of Warsaw fondly hoped, was to re-establish
their national existence. The cavalry was good; the infantry less so.
Discipline does not appear to have been very satisfactory; the officers
included too many _Pans_, owing their commissions to their noble birth.
The Prussians were probably the best disciplined and best officered of
all the allied troops. The general quality of the Austrians, also, was
good.
Upon the whole, it cannot be doubted that the _Grande Armée_ of 1812
was too heterogeneous, and that its quality was not of the best. Much
of it had been hastily raised; and its enormous numbers merely added
to the difficulty of provisioning it and, in consequence, to its misery
and losses. General Bonnal thinks that Napoleon, when he collected the
gigantic force, was more or less suffering from megalomania; and that
he would have achieved more had he depended upon a Franco-Polish first
line of about 250,000 troops, perfectly organised, disciplined and
supplied. The point is certainly worthy of consideration.
Something must be said of the commanders who, under the direction
of Napoleon, conducted the greatest of his armies during the most
ambitious and disastrous of his campaigns.
For Napoleon himself a very few words must suffice. More has probably
been written about him than of any other single figure in history.
No good purpose can here be served by anything more than some brief
animadversions upon the share which he himself had in the catastrophe
of 1812.
Napoleon’s position as the greatest military leader of modern times
is as yet unchallenged; and it is needless therefore to discuss it.
In 1812 he was, as far as years go, a comparatively young man. He was
barely forty-three; his bodily energy and capacity of endurance were
yet enormous. Nevertheless, he was not the Napoleon of 1800 and 1805.
He had grown stout and somewhat unwieldy; and his gross habit of body
must at times have affected his mind. Nor is it possible to ignore
the first-hand evidence as to his indifferent health on more than one
important occasion.
Napoleon’s fierce and impetuous nature always made light of obstacles,
and lack of patience was certainly a very pronounced feature in his
character. Wellington is said to have remarked that it incapacitated
the Emperor from defensive action in 1814, when circumstances
imperatively demanded it.
Finally, Napoleon in 1812 was ruler as well as general; and political
considerations probably had something to do with his adoption of
courses of action indefensible from the military standpoint.
Napoleon’s natural impatience, and his rage at being unable to strike
a crushing blow, will probably explain the fatal rush in August past
Smolensk on to Moscow. Bodily suffering appears to the author to
account satisfactorily for his undoubted lack of energy at Borodino.
The fatal delay at Moscow may fairly be attributed to a combination of
political circumstances and not entirely unfounded optimism as regards
the future.
For some of Napoleon’s amazing blunders on the retreat reasons such as
these will hardly account. The fatal dispersion of the marching columns
along 60 miles of road, even after passing Smolensk, when the army was
already worn down to a mere remnant; the unnecessarily slow pace of the
march, the burning of the pontoon train previous to the passage of the
Berezina, are cases in point; and can hardly be attributed to anything
save declining intellectual powers.
On the whole, it seems difficult to deny that Napoleon, in 1812,
had definitely entered upon his decline; that his perception was
less clear than of old; that his bodily energy had decayed; that his
genius, though still capable of burning brightly, now only blazed forth
fitfully. Certainly there were times during the Moscow campaign when it
appeared to be almost extinct.
Marshal Berthier, Prince of Neufchâtel, served in 1812, as in every
campaign of Napoleon since 1796, as chief-of-staff. His methodical
habits and untiring industry, coupled with his complete familiarity
with Napoleon’s character, rendered him indispensable to the latter.
His military talents were not remarkable, and his general position
was rather that of a confidential secretary than that of a modern
chief-of-staff--for whom, indeed, there was no place near a man of
Napoleon’s essentially despotic temperament.
[Illustration:
MARSHAL DAVOUT
Commander of the 1st French Army Corps
From the painting by Gautherdt at Versailles]
Marshal Louis Nicolas Davout, Prince of Eckmuhl and Duke of Auërstadt,
commander of the huge 1st _Corps d’Armée_, was probably the best of
all Napoleon’s generals, though he never had such opportunities of
distinguishing himself in independent command as were granted to
Masséna and Soult. He was a fine example of the modern scientific
soldier, a stern disciplinarian and an admirable administrator, with a
passion for order and method; and very careful of his men. The charges
of cruelty brought against him do not appear to the author to have been
satisfactorily made out--certainly not according to the standards of
humanity generally accepted in Continental warfare. At the same time,
there was undoubtedly a harsh and rough side to his character, and
he seems to have lacked self-control and tact. Davout had excellent
strategic insight, and his tactical ability and tenacity in action had
been frequently and brilliantly demonstrated. He took a distinguished
part in the first half of the campaign of 1812, but rather failed in
the unaccustomed post of rear-guard commander. Men of his methodical
habit of mind are probably ill-fitted to shine in such a turmoil of
misery and disorder as the retreat from Moscow.
Marshal Oudinot, Duke of Reggio, was a hard-fighting veteran of
the Revolution, who had received his bâton for services rendered
in supporting Davout at Wagram. He was an excellent subordinate,
but failed in separate command like so many of Napoleon’s generals,
though his action previous to the passage of the Berezina was highly
meritorious.
Michel Ney, Duke of Elchingen, Marshal of France, reaped most of the
credit gained by Napoleon’s generals in 1812. Ney is commonly regarded
as a mere hard fighter, but he was fairly well educated, and to all
appearance a careful administrator. Among the papers of the French War
Office relating to 1812 is an order in which he carefully instructs his
suffering troops how to cook the unground grain which was their only
food. As a strategist Ney did not excel, and he failed in independent
command, but he was a fine tactician, and as a corps commander probably
unsurpassed. His famous title “Le Brave des Braves” fairly sums up his
character. His courage was indeed of that nobler type which rises to
its height at the moment when that of meaner men declines.
Prince Eugène, Viceroy of Italy, son of the ex-Empress Josephine, was
by virtue of his Imperial rank the commander of the army of Italy.
He was brave, disinterested and devoted to his stepfather, but his
military talents were not great, and he lacked experience. In 1809
he had been opposed to a commander even less capable than himself,
and his officers and soldiers had helped him successfully out of his
difficulties.
Prince Joseph Anthony Poniatowski, nephew of the last King of Poland,
could hardly have been passed over in appointing a commander for the
5th (Polish) Army Corps; especially as he was Minister of War of the
Grand Duchy of Warsaw. He was brave and popular with his men, but
possessed of no great capacity, and was indolent and pleasure loving.
General Gouvion St. Cyr, who was promoted Marshal for his victory
over Wittgenstein at Polotsk in August, was a very capable though
disaffected officer, who had, as far as good service counted for
anything, won his bâton long before.
General Reynier, the commander of the Saxon 7th Corps, was a
hard-fighting, experienced soldier of no special ability, and extremely
unfortunate in war. Junot, who took over the Westphalian Corps from
King Jerome, owed his position chiefly to Napoleon’s friendship for him.
[Illustration:
PRINCE JOSEPH ANTHONY PONIATOWSKI, NEPHEW OF STANISLAUS AUGUSTUS, THE
LAST KING OF POLAND
Commander of the 5th (Polish) Corps of the Grand Army
From the painting by T.A. Vauchelet at Versailles]
King Jerome Napoleon of Westphalia would probably have done well
enough at the head of the troops of his own kingdom; his courage, as
he showed at Waterloo, was beyond question. But to place him in
command of three army corps, operating in a difficult country, and
charged with a vitally important mission, was a gigantic blunder on
the part of Napoleon. It is no especial discredit to Jerome that he
failed so completely. General Bonnal observes that he cannot be blamed
for transgressing military principles with which he had never been
acquainted.
Marshal Victor, the commander of the 9th Corps, was an experienced
officer, but had been very unfortunate in the Peninsula against the
British.
Marshal Macdonald, commanding the 10th Corps, took a very small part in
the campaign; and, unless he had special orders, cannot be said to have
displayed much activity. He was a man of high personal character and a
good hard-fighting corps commander, but of no eminence as a general.
Napoleon, during the latter part of his career, was repeatedly accused
of placing his relations in positions for which they were not fitted.
The case of King Jerome is one in point; so also perhaps, to a certain
extent, is that of Napoleon’s celebrated brother-in-law, Joachim
Murat, King of Naples, commander of the Cavalry Reserves. Audacity and
tactical ability on the field Murat certainly possessed, but he was
hardly a great cavalry leader. His outpost and reconnaissance work was
often very badly performed, and his impetuosity caused him to overwork
and harass his men and horses. He lacked stability of character and
steadiness in adversity, as he was soon to show. Yet as King of Naples
he possesses more than one title to esteem, and in his character,
amidst vanity and absurdity, there was much that was elevated and noble.
The commanders of the four corps under Murat’s orders were all men of
experience as cavalry leaders. The best of them, perhaps, was Nansouty,
at any rate in his own estimation, but the name of Grouchy is better
known in Great Britain. Montbrun and Latour-Maubourg had seen much
service in Spain.
Marshal Lefebvre, Duke of Dantzic, commander of the Old Guard, was much
attached to Napoleon, but otherwise merely a rough, honest old soldier
of little strategic or tactical ability. His title was much better
deserved by the brilliant engineer, General Chasseloup, who accompanied
the army in 1812 as chief of his branch of the service.
Marshal Mortier, Duke of Treviso, commander of the Young Guard, was an
excellent corps commander, as had been demonstrated in Spain.
Marshal Bessières, Duke of Istria, had been associated with the cavalry
of the Guard since its formation. He was a fine cavalry leader, and a
man of integrity and devotion to his chief, otherwise deserving of no
special mention.
Generally speaking, Napoleon’s commanding officers had one great
defect. With few exceptions they had become so habituated to submission
to the dominating personality of the Emperor that they had lost all
power of initiative.
In an army so huge and of such experience there were naturally many
officers who in a less warlike age would have been acclaimed as great
generals. The majority of the divisional and brigade leaders were
excellent, though some were already wearing out. Several of them--men
such as Verdier--had had considerable experience in independent
command, and some had acquired therein a by no means savoury
reputation. Gudin, the leader of Davout’s 3rd Division, was perhaps the
most distinguished as a soldier, but his colleagues Friant, Morand,
Desaix and Compans were all fine officers. Legrand, Merle, Verdier,
Ledru, Marchand, Broussier, Pino, Bruyère, Sebastiani, St. Germain,
Claparède, Tharreau, and others were men of considerable merit and
experience.
Of the General Staff it may be said that it had scarcely any affinity
with the board of specially trained officers which accompanies and
assists a modern commander-in-chief. Napoleon’s absorption, in his
single person, of all military and administrative functions had reduced
it to a position of complete insignificance. For all practical purposes
it was nothing but a mass of orderlies, and though it contained many
talented and meritorious officers they had small opportunity of
distinguishing themselves so long as they remained members of it.
Napoleon in one moment of exasperation declared that “the General Staff
is organised in such a manner that nothing is foreseen.” The remark was
more or less true; but that such a state of affairs could exist is a
very severe comment upon his methods. The invading host was, in short,
the army of a despot who endeavoured to supervise everything himself
and discouraged initiative in others, with the natural result that much
that might have been done to minimise the catastrophe was not attempted.
The numbers of the invading army and its composition, according to the
states and peoples who contributed contingents, are given in detail in
Appendices A and B. Roughly it may be said that during the campaign
Napoleon disposed of the following numbers:--
First Line
Head-quarters; Imperial Guard; }
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 10th, }
Corps; } 449,000
Austrian Corps; Cavalry Reserve }
Second Line
9th Corps; Polish and Lithuanian levies; }
2 French Divisions; } 165,000
German Troops, Drafts, Parks, etc. }
Third Line
Drafts and organised troops in touch with }
Russians at close of campaign, including } 60,000
garrisons of Danzig and on Vistula }
--------
674,000
The composition by nations of the first two lines may be stated as
follows:--
French and New French 302,000
Germans and Swiss 190,000
Poles and Lithuanians 90,000
Italians, Illyrians, Spaniards, Portuguese 32,000
--------
614,000
--------