THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.--SECOND PERIOD, FROM THE PEACE OF NICIAS TO THE
DEFEAT OF THE ATHENIANS IN SICILY, B.C. 421-413.
Several of the allies of Sparta were dissatisfied with the peace which
she had concluded; and soon afterwards some of them determined to
revive the ancient pretensions of Argos, and to make her the head of a
new confederacy, which should include all Greece, with the exception of
Sparta and Athens. The movement was begun by the Corinthians, and the
league was soon joined by the Eleans, the Mantineans, and the
Chalcidians.
Between Sparta and Athens themselves matters were far from being on a
satisfactory footing. Sparta confessed her inability to compel the
Boeotians and Corinthians to accede to the peace, or even to restore
the town of Amphipolis. Athens consequently refused to evacuate Pylus,
though she removed the Helots and Messenians from it. In the
negotiations which ensued respecting the surrender of Pylus, Alcibiades
took a prominent part. This extraordinary man had already obtained
immense influence at Athens. Young, rich, handsome, profligate, and
clever, Alcibiades was the very model of an Athenian man of fashion.
In lineage he was a striking contrast to the plebeian orators of the
day. He traced his paternal descent from Ajax, whilst on his mother's
side he claimed relationship with the Alcmaeonidae and consequently
with Pericles. On the death of his father Clinias Pericles had become
his guardian. From early youth the conduct of Alcibiades was marked by
violence, recklessness, and vanity. He delighted in astonishing the
more sober portion of the citizens by his capricious and extravagant
feats. He was utterly destitute of morality, whether public or
private. But his vices were partly redeemed by some brilliant
qualities. He possessed both boldness of design and vigour of action;
and, though scarcely more than thirty at the time of which we are now
speaking, he had already on several occasions distinguished himself by
his bravery. His more serious studies were made subservient to the
purposes of his ambition, for which some skill as an orator was
necessary. In order to attain it he frequented the schools of the
sophists, and exercised himself in the dialectics of Prodicus,
Protagoras, and above all of Socrates.
Such was the man who now opposed the application of the Lacedaemonian
ambassadors. Their reception had been so favourable, that Alcibiades
alarmed at the prospect of their success, resorted to a trick in order
to defeat it. He called upon the Lacedaemonian envoys, one of whom
happened to be his personal friend; and he advised them not to tell the
Assembly that they were furnished with full powers, as in that case the
people would bully them into extravagant concessions, but rather to say
that they were merely come to discuss and report. He promised, if they
did so, to speak in their favour, and induce the Assembly to grant the
restitution of Pylus, to which he himself had hitherto been the chief
obstacle. Accordingly on the next day, when the ambassadors were
introduced into the Assembly, Alcibiades, assuming his blandest tone
and most winning smile, asked them on what footing they came and what
were their powers. In reply to these questions, the ambassadors, who
only a day or two before had told Nicias and the Senate that they were
come as plenipotentiaries, now publicly declared, in the face of the
Assembly, that they were not authorized to conclude, but only to
negotiate and discuss. At this announcement, those who had heard their
previous declaration could scarcely believe their ears. A universal
burst of indignation broke forth at this exhibition of Spartan
duplicity; whilst, to wind up the scene, Alcibiades, affecting to be
more surprised than any, distinguished himself by being the loudest and
bitterest in his invectives against the perfidy of the Lacedaemonians.
Shortly afterwards Alcibiades procured the completion of a treaty of
alliance for 100 years with Argos, Elis, and Mantinea (B.C. 420). Thus
were the Grecian states involved in a complicity of separate and often
apparently opposite alliances. It was evident that allies so
heterogeneous could not long hold together; nevertheless, nominally at
least, peace was at first observed.
In the July which followed the treaty with Argos, the Olympic games,
which recurred every fourth year, were to be celebrated. The Athenians
had been shut out by the war from the two previous celebrations; and
curiosity was excited throughout Greece to see what figure Athens would
make at this great Pan-Hellenic festival. War, it was surmised, must
have exhausted her resources, and would thus prevent her from appearing
with becoming splendour. But from this reproach she was rescued by the
wealth and vanity, if not by the patriotism, of Alcibiades. By his
care, the Athenian deputies exhibited the richest display of golden
ewers, censers, and other plate to be used in the public sacrifice and
procession; whilst for the games he entered in his own name no fewer
than the unheard-of number of seven four-horsed chariots, of which one
gained the first, and another the second prize. Alcibiades was
consequently twice crowned with the olive, and twice proclaimed victor
by the herald.
The growing ambition and success of Alcibiades prompted him to carry
his schemes against Sparta into the very heart of Peloponnesus,
without, however, openly violating the peace.
The Lacedaemonians now found it necessary to act with more vigour; and
accordingly in B.C. 418 they assembled a very large army, under the
command of the Spartan king, Agis. A decisive battle was fought near
Mantinea, in which Agis gained a brilliant victory over the Argives and
their allies. This battle and that of Delium were the two most
important engagements that had yet been fought in the Peloponnesian
war. Although the Athenians had fought on the side of the Argives at
Mantinea, the peace between Sparta and Athens continued to be nominally
observed.
In B.C. 416 the Athenians attacked and conquered Melos, which island
and Thera were the only islands in the AEgean not subject to the
Athenian supremacy. The Melians having rejected all the Athenian
overtures for a voluntary submission, their capital was blockaded by
sea and land, and after a siege of some months surrendered. On the
proposal, as it appears, of Alcibiades, all the adult males were put to
death, the women and children sold into slavery, and the island
colonized afresh by 500 Athenians. This horrible proceeding was the
more indefensible, as the Athenians, having attacked the Melians in
full peace, could not pretend that they were justified by the custom of
war in slaying the prisoners. It was the crowning act of insolence and
cruelty displayed during their empire, which from this period began
rapidly to decline.
The event destined to produce that catastrophe--the intervention of the
Athenians in the affairs of Sicily--was already in progress. A quarrel
had broken out between Egesta and Selinus, both which cities were
seated near the western extremity of Sicily; and Selinus, having
obtained the aid of Syracuse, was pressing very hard upon the
Egestaeans. The latter appealed to the interests of the Athenians
rather than to their sympathies. They represented how great a blow it
would be to Athens if the Dorians became predominant in Sicily, and
joined the Peloponnesian confederacy; and they undertook, if the
Athenians would send an armament to their assistance, to provide the
necessary funds for the prosecution of the war. Their most powerful
advocate was Alcibiades, whose ambitious views are said to have
extended even to the conquest of Carthage. The quieter and more
prudent Nicias and his party threw their weight into the opposite
scale. But the Athenian assembly, dazzled by the idea of so splendid
an enterprise, decided on despatching a large fleet under Nicias,
Alcibiades, and Lamachus, with the design of assisting Egesta, and of
establishing the influence of Athens throughout Sicily, by whatever
means might be found practicable.
For the next three months the preparations for the undertaking were
pressed on with the greatest ardour. Young and old, rich and poor, all
vied with one another to obtain a share in the expedition. Five years
of comparative peace had accumulated a fresh supply both of men and
money; and the merchants of Athens embarked in the enterprise as in a
trading expedition. It was only a few of the wisest heads that escaped
the general fever of excitement, The expedition was on the point of
sailing, when a sudden and mysterious event converted all these
exulting feelings into gloomy foreboding.
At every door in Athens, at the corners of streets, in the market
place, before temples, gymnasia, and other public places, stood Hermae,
or statues of the god Hermes, consisting of a bust of that deity
surmounting a quadrangular pillar of marble about the height of the
human figure. When the Athenians rose one morning towards the end of
May, 415 B.C., it was found that all these figures had been mutilated
during the night, and reduced by unknown hands to a shapeless mass.
The act inspired political, as well as religious, alarm. It seemed to
indicate a widespread conspiracy, for so sudden and general a
mutilation must have been the work of many hands. The sacrilege might
only be a preliminary attempt of some powerful citizen to seize the
despotisn, and suspicion pointed its finger at Alcibiades. Active
measures were taken and large rewards offered for the discovery of the
perpetrators. A public board was appointed to examine witnesses, which
did not, indeed, succeed in eliciting any facts bearing on the actual
subject of inquiry, but which obtained evidence respecting similar acts
of impiety committed at previous times in drunken frolics. In these
Alcibiades himself was implicated; and though the fleet was on the very
eve of departure, a citizen rose in the assembly and accused Alcibiades
of having profaned the Eleusinian mysteries by giving a representation
of them in a private house, producing in evidence the testimony of a
slave. Alcibiades denied the accusation, and implored the people to
have it investigated at once. His enemies, however, had sufficient
influence to get the inquiry postponed till his return; thus keeping
the charge hanging over his head, and gaining time to poison the public
mind against him.
The Athenian fleet, consisting of 100 triremes, and having on board
1500 chosen Athenian hoplites, as well as auxiliaries, at length set
sail, and proceeded to Corcyra, where it was joined by the other allies
in the month of July, 415 B.C. Upon arriving at Rhegium the generals
received the discouraging news that Egesta was unable to contribute
more than thirty talents. A council of war was now held; and it was
finally resolved to gain as many allies as they could among the Greek
cities in Sicily, and, having thus ascertained what assistance they
could rely upon, to attack Syracuse and Selinus.
Naxos joined the Athenians, and shortly afterwards they obtained
possession by surprise of the important city of Catana, which was now
made the head-quarters of the armament. Here an unwelcome message
greeted Alcibiades. After his departure from Athens, Thessalus, the
son of Cimon, preferred an indictment against him in consequence of his
profanation of the Eleusinian mysteries. The Salaminian, or state,
trireme was despatched to Sicily, carrying the decree of the assembly
for Alcibiades to come home and take his trial. The commander of the
Salaminia was, however, instructed not to seize his person, but to
allow him to sail in his own trireme. Alcibiades availed himself of
this privilege to effect his escape. When the ships arrived at Thurii
in Italy, he absconded, and contrived to elude the search that was made
after him, Nevertheless, though absent, he was arraigned at Athens, and
condemned to death; his property was confiscated; and the Eumolpidae,
who presided ever the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries,
pronounced upon him the curses of the gods. On hearing of his sentence
Alcibiades is said to have exclaimed, "I will show them that I am still
alive."
Three months had now been frittered away in Sicily, during which the
Athenians had done little or nothing, if we except the acquisition of
Naxos and Catana. Nicias now resolved to make an attempt upon
Syracuse. By a false message that the Catanaeans were ready to assist
in expelling the Athenians, he induced the Syracusans to proceed
thither in great force, and he availed himself of their absence to sail
with his whole fleet into the Great Harbour of Syracuse, where he
landed near the mouth of the Anapus. The Syracusans, when they found
that they had been deceived at Catana, marched back and offered Nicias
battle in his new position. The latter accepted it, and gained the
victory; after which he retired to Catana, and subsequently to Naxos
into winter quarters.
The Syracusans employed the winter in preparations for defence. They
also despatched envoys to Corinth and Sparta to solicit assistance, in
the latter of which towns they found an unexpected advocate.
Alcibiades, having crossed from Thurii to Cyllene in Peloponnesus,
received a special invitation to proceed to Sparta. Here he revealed
all the plans of Athens, and exhorted the Lacedaemonians to frustrate
them. For this purpose he advised them to send an army into Sicily,
under the command of a Spartan general, and, by way of causing a
diversion, to establish a fortified post at Decelea in the Attic
territory. The Spartans fell in with these views, and resolved to send
a force to the assistance of Syracuse in the spring, under the command
of Gylippus.
Nicias, having received reinforcements from Athens, recommenced
hostilities as soon as the season allowed of it, and resolved on
besieging Syracuse. That town consisted of two parts--the inner and
the outer city. The former of these--the original settlement was
comprised in the island of Ortygia; the latter afterwards known by the
name of Achradina, covered the high ground of the peninsula north of
Ortygia, and was completely separate from the inner city. The island
of Ortygia, to which the modern city is now confined, is of an oblong
shape, about two miles in circumference, lying between the Great
Harbour on the west, and the Little Harbour on the east, and separated
from the mainland by a narrow channel. The Great Harbour is a splendid
bay, about five miles in circumference, and the Little Harbour was
spacious enough to receive a large fleet of ships of war. The outer
city was surrounded on the north and east by the sea and by sea-walls
which rendered an assault on that side almost impracticable. On the
land side it was defended by a wall, and partly also by the nature of
the ground, which in some part was very steep. West and north-west of
the wall of the outer city stood two unfortified suburbs, which were at
a later time included within the walls of Syracuse under the names of
Tyche and Neapolis. Between these two suburbs the ground rose in a
gentle acclivity to the summit of the ranges of hills called Epipolae.
It was from the high ground of Epipolae that Syracuse was most exposed
to attack. Nicias landed at Leon, a place upon the bay of Thapsus, at
the distance of only six or seven stadia from Epipolae, took possession
of Epipolae, and erected on the summit a fort called Labdalum. Then
coming farther down the hill towards Syracuse, he built another fort of
a circular form and of considerable size at a place called Syke. From
the latter point he commenced his line of circumvallation, one wall
extending southwards from Syke to the Great Harbour, and the other wall
running northwards to the outer sea. The Athenians succeeded in
completing the circumvallation towards the south, but in one of their
many engagements with the Syracusans they lost the gallant Lamachus.
At the same time, the Athenian fleet entered the Great Harbour, where
it was henceforth permanently established. The northern wall was never
completed, and through the passage thus left open the besieged
continued to obtain provisions. Nicias, who, by the death of Lamachus,
had become sole commander, seemed now on the point of succeeding. The
Syracusans were so sensible of their inferiority in the field that they
no longer ventured to show themselves outside the walls. They began to
contemplate surrender, and even sent messages to Nicias to treat of the
terms. This caused the Athenian commander to indulge in a false
confidence of success, and consequent apathy; and the army having lost
the active and energetic Lamachus, operations were no longer carried on
with the requisite activity.
It was in this state of affairs that the Spartan commander, Gylippus,
passed over into Italy with a little squadron of four ships, with the
view merely of preserving the Greek cities in that country, supposing
that Syracuse, and, with her, the other Greek cities in Sicily, were
irretrievably lost. At Tarentum he learned to his great surprise and
satisfaction that the Athenian wall of circumvallation at Syracuse had
not yet been completed on the northern side. He now sailed through the
straits of Messana, which were left completely unguarded, and arrived
safely at Himera on the north coast of Sicily. Here he announced
himself as the forerunner of larger succours, and began to levy an army
which the magic of the Spartan name soon enabled him to effect; and in
a few days he was in a condition to march towards Syracuse with about
3000 men. The Syracusans now dismissed all thoughts of surrender, and
went out boldly to meet Gylippus, who marched into Syracuse over the
heights of Epipolae, which the supineness of Nicias had left unguarded.
Upon arriving in the city, Gylippus sent a message to the Athenians
allowing them a five days' truce to collect their effects and evacuate
the island. Nicias returned no answer to this insulting proposal; but
the operations of Gylippus soon showed that the tide of affairs was
really turned. His first exploit was to capture the Athenian fort at
Labdalum, which made him master of Epipolae. He next commenced
constructing a counter-wall to intersect the Athenian lines on the
northern side. This turn of affairs induced those Sicilian cities
which had hitherto hesitated to embrace the side of Syracuse. Gylippus
was also reinforced by the arrival of thirty triremes from Corinth,
Leucas, and Ambracia. Nicias now felt that the attempt to blockade
Syracuse with his present force was hopeless. He therefore resolved to
occupy the headland of Plemmyrium, the southernmost point of the
entrance to the Great Harbour, which would be a convenient station for
watching the enemy, as well as for facilitating the introduction of
supplies. Here he accordingly erected three forts and formed a naval
station. Some slight affairs occurred in which the balance of
advantage was in favour of the Syracusans. By their change of station
the Athenians were now a besieged rather than a besieging force. Their
triremes were becoming leaky, and their soldiers and sailors were
constantly deserting. Nicias himself had fallen into a bad state of
health; and in this discouraging posture of affairs he wrote to Athens
requesting to be recalled, and insisting strongly on the necessity of
sending reinforcements.
The Athenians refused to recall Nicias, but they determined on sending
a large reinforcement to Sicily, under the joint command of Demosthenes
and Eurymedon. The news of these fresh and extensive preparations
incited the Lacedaemonians to more vigorous action. The peace, if such
it can be called, was now openly broken; and in the spring of 413 B.C.
the Lacedaemonians, under King Agis, invaded Attica itself, and,
following the advice of Alcibiades, established themselves permanently
at Decelia, a place situated on the ridge of Mount Parnes about 14
miles north of Athens, and commanding the Athenian plain. The city was
thus placed in a state of siege. Scarcity began to be felt within the
walls; the revenues were falling off, whilst on the other hand expenses
were increasing.
Meanwhile in Sicily the Syracusans had gained such confidence that they
even ventured on a naval engagement with the Athenians. In the first
battle the Athenians were victorious, but the second battle, which
lasted two days, ended in their defeat. They were now obliged to haul
up their ships in the innermost part of the Great Harbour, under the
lines of their fortified camp. A still more serious disaster than the
loss of the battle was the loss of their naval reputation. It was
evident that the Athenians had ceased to be invincible on the sea; and
the Syracusans no longer despaired of overcoming them on their own
element.
Such was the state of affairs when, to the astonishment of the
Syracusans, a fresh Athenian fleet of 75 triremes, under Demosthenes
and Eurymedon, entered the Great Harbour with all the pomp and
circumstance of war. It had on board a force of 5000 hoplites, of whom
about a quarter were Athenians, and a great number of light-armed
troops. The active and enterprising character of Demosthenes led him
to adopt more vigorous measures than those which had been hitherto
pursued. He saw at once that whilst Epipolae remained in the
possession of the Syracusans there was no hope of taking their city,
and he therefore directed all his efforts to the recapture of that
position. But his attempts were unavailing. He was defeated not only
in an open assault upon the Syracusan wall, but in a nocturnal attempt
to carry it by surprise. These reverses were aggravated by the
breaking out of sickness among the troops. Demosthenes now proposed to
return home and assist in expelling the Lacedaemonians from Attica,
instead of pursuing an enterprise which seemed to be hopeless. But
Nicias, who feared to return to Athens with the stigma of failure,
refused to give his consent to this step. Demosthenes then urged
Nicias at least to sail immediately out of the Great Harbour, and take
up their position either at Thapsus or Catana, where they could obtain
abundant supplies of provisions, and would have an open sea for the
manoeuvres of their fleet. But even to this proposal Nicias would not
consent; and the army and navy remained in their former position. Soon
afterwards, however, Gylippus received such large reinforcements, that
Nicias found it necessary to adopt the advice of his colleague.
Preparations were secretly made for their departure, the enemy appear
to have had no suspicion of their intention and they were on the point
of quitting their ill-fated quarters on the following morning, when on
the very night before (27 Aug. 413 B.C.) an eclipse of the moon took
place. The soothsayers who were consulted said that the army must wait
thrice nine days, a full circle of the moon, before it could quit its
present position; and the devout and superstitious Nicias forthwith
resolved to abide by this decision.
Meanwhile the intention of the Athenians became known to the
Syracusans, who determined to strike a blow before their enemy escaped.
They accordingly attacked the Athenian station both by sea and land.
On land the attack of Gylippus was repulsed; but at sea the Athenian
fleet was completely defeated, and Eurymedon, who commanded the right
division, was slain The spirits of the Symcusans rose with their
victories; and though they would formerly have been content with the
mere retreat of the Athenians, they now resolved on effecting their
utter destruction. With this view they blocked up the entrance of the
Great Harbour with a line of vessels moored across it. All hope seemed
now to be cut off from the Athenians, unless they could succeed in
forcing this line and thus effecting their escape. The Athenian fleet
still numbered 110 triremes, which Nicias furnished with
grappling-irons, in order to bring the enemy to close quarters, and
then caused a large proportion of his land-force to embark.
Never perhaps was a battle fought under circumstances of such intense
interest, or witnessed by so many spectators vitally concerned in the
result. The basin of the Great Harbour, about 5 miles in
circumference, in which nearly 200 ships, each with crews of more than
200 men, were about to engage, was lined with spectators. The
Syracusan fleet was the first to leave the shore. A considerable
portion was detached to guard the barrier at the mouth of the harbour.
Hither the first and most impetuous attack of the Athenians was
directed, who sought to break through the narrow opening which had been
left for the passage of merchant vessels. Their onset was repulsed,
and the battle then became general. The shouts of the combatants, and
the crash of the iron heads of the vessels as they were driven
together, resounded over the water, and were answered on shore by the
cheers or wailings of the spectators as their friends were victorious
or vanquished. For a long time the battle was maintained with heroic
courage and dubious result. At length, as the Athenian vessels began
to yield and make back towards the shore, a universal shriek of horror
and despair arose from the Athenian army, whilst shouts of joy and
victory were raised from the pursuing vessels, and were echoed back
from the Syracusans on land. As the Athenian vessels neared the shore
their crews leaped out, and made for the camp, whilst the boldest of
the land army rushed forward to protect the ships from being seized by
the enemy. The Athenians succeeded in saving only 60 ships, or about
half their fleet. The Syracusan fleet, however, had been reduced to 50
ships; and on the same afternoon, Nicias and Demosthenes, as a last
hope of escape, exhorted their men to make another attempt to break the
enemy's line, and force their way out of the harbour. But the courage
of the crews was so completely damped that they positively refused to
re-embark.
The Athenian army still numbered 40,000 men; and as all chance of
escape by sea was now hopeless, it was resolved to retreat by land to
some friendly city, and there defend themselves against the attacks of
the Syracusans. As the soldiers turned to quit that fatal encampment,
the sense of their own woes was for a moment suspended by the sight of
their unburied comrades, who seemed to reproach them with the neglect
of a sacred duty; but still more by the wailings and entreaties of the
wounded, who clung around their knees, and implored not to be abandoned
to certain destruction. Amid this scene of universal woe and
dejection, a fresh and unwonted spirit of energy and heroism seemed to
be infused into Nicias. Though suffering under an incurable complaint,
he was everywhere seen marshalling his troops and encouraging them by
his exhortations. The march was directed towards the territory of the
Sicels in the interior of the island. The army was formed into a
hollow square with the baggage in the middle; Nicias leading the van,
and Demosthenes bringing up the rear. The road ascended by a sort of
ravine over a steep hill called the Acraean cliff on which the
Syracusans had fortified themselves. After spending two days in vain
attempts to force this position, Nicias and Demosthenes resolved during
the night to strike off to the left towards the sea. But they were
overtaken, surrounded by superior forces, and compelled to surrender at
discretion. Out of the 40,000 who started from the camp only 10,000 at
the utmost were left at the end of the sixth day's march, the rest had
either deserted or been slain. The prisoners were sent to work in the
stone-quarries of Achradina and Epipolae. Here they were crowded
together without any shelter, and with scarcely provisions enough to
sustain life. The numerous bodies of those who died were left to
putrify where they had fallen, till at length the place became such an
intolerable centre of stench and infection that, at the end of seventy
days, the Syracusans, for their own comfort and safety, were obliged to
remove the survivors, who were sold as slaves. Nicias and Demosthenes
were condemned to death in spite of all the efforts of Gylippus and
Hermocrates to save them.
Such was the end of two of the largest and best appointed armaments
that had ever gone forth from Athens. Nicias, as we have seen, was
from the first opposed to the expedition in which they were employed,
as pregnant with the most dangerous consequences to Athens; and, though
it must be admitted that in this respect his views were sound, it
cannot at the same time be concealed that his own want of energy, and
his incompetence as a general, were the chief causes of the failure of
the undertaking. His mistakes involved the fall of Demosthenes, an
officer of far greater resolution and ability than himself, and who,
had his counsels been followed, would in all probability have conducted
the enterprise to a safe termination, though there was no longer room
to hope for success.