THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.--FIRST PERIOD, FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR
TO THE PEACE OF NICIAS, B.C. 431-421.
War was now fairly kindled. All Greece looked on in suspense as its
two leading cities were about to engage in a strife of which no man
could forsee the end; but the youth, with which both Athens and
Peloponnesus then abounded, having had no experience of the bitter
calamities of war, rushed into it with ardour. It was a war of
principles and races. Athens was a champion of democracy, Sparta of
aristocracy; Athens represented the Ionic tribes, Sparta the Dorian;
the former were fond of novelty, the latter were conservative and
stationary; Athens had the command of the sea, Sparta was stronger upon
land. On the side of Sparta was ranged the whole of Peloponnesus,
except Argos and Achaia, together with the Megarians, Boeotians,
Phocians, Opuntian Locrians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians.
The allies of Athens, with the exception of the Thessalians,
Acarnanians, Messenians at Naupactus, and Plataeans, were all insular,
and consisted of the Chians, Lesbians, Corcyraeans, and Zacynthians,
and shortly afterwards of the Cephallenians, To these must be added her
tributary towns on the coast of Thrace and Asia Minor, together with
all the islands north of Crete, except Melos and Thera.
The Peloponnesians commenced the war by an invasion of Attica, with a
large army, under the command of the Spartan King Archidamus (B.C.
431). Pericles had instructed the inhabitants of Attica to secure
themselves and their property within the walls of Athens. They obeyed
his injunctions with reluctance, for the Attic population had from the
earliest times been strongly attached to a rural life. But the
circumstances admitted of no alternative. Archidamus advanced as far
as Acharnae, a flourishing Attic borough situated only about seven
miles from Athens. Here he encamped on a rising ground within sight of
the metropolis, and began to lay waste the country around, expecting
probably by that means to provoke the Athenians to battle. But in this
he was disappointed. Notwithstanding the murmurs and clamours of the
citizens Pericles remained firm, and steadily refused to venture an
engagement in the open held. The Peloponnesians retired from Attica
after still further ravaging the country; and the Athenians retaliated
by making descents upon various parts of the coasts of Peloponnesus,
and ravaging the territory of Megara.
Such were the results of the first campaign. From the method in which
the war was conducted it had become pretty evident that it would prove
of long duration; and the Athenians now proceeded to provide for this
contingency. It was agreed that a reserve fund of 1000 talents should
be set apart, which was not to be touched in any other case than an
attack upon Athens by sea. Any citizen who proposed to make a
different use of the fund incurred thereby the punishment of death.
With the same view it was resolved to reserve every year 100 of their
best triremes, fully manned and equipped.
Towards the winter Pericles delivered, from a lofty platform erected in
the Ceramicus, the funeral oration of those who had fallen in the war.
This speech, or at all events the substance of it, has been preserved
by Thucydides, who may possibly have heard it pronounced. It is a
valuable monument of eloquence and patriotism, and particularly
interesting for the sketch which it contains of Athenian manners as
well as of the Athenian constitution.
In the following year (B.C. 430) the Peloponnesians, under Archidamus,
renewed their invasion of Attica. At the same time the Athenians were
attacked by a more insidious and a more formidable enemy. The plague
broke out in the crowded city. This terrible disorder, which was
supposed to have originated in AEthiopia, had already desolated Asia
and many of the countries around the Mediterranean. A great proportion
of those who were seized perished in from seven to nine days. It
frequently attacked the mental faculties, and left even those who
recovered from it so entirely deprived of memory that they could
recognise neither themselves nor others. The disorder being new, the
physicians could find no remedy in the resources of their art. Despair
now began to take possession of the Athenians. Some suspected that the
Peloponnesians had poisoned the wells; others attributed the pestilence
to the anger of Apollo. A dreadful state of moral dissolution
followed. The sick were seized with unconquerable despondency; whilst
a great part of the population who had hitherto escaped the disorder,
expecting soon to be attacked in turn, abandoned themselves to all
manner of excess, debauchery, and crime. The numbers carried off by
the pestilence can hardly be estimated at less than a fourth of the
whole population.
Oppressed at once by war and pestilence, their lands desolated, their
homes filled with mourning, it is not surprising that the Athenians
were seized with rage and despair, or that they vented their anger on
Pericles, whom they deemed the author of their misfortunes. But that
statesman still adhered to his plans with unshaken firmness. Though
the Lacedaemonians were in Attica, though the plague had already seized
on Athens, he was vigorously pushing his schemes of offensive
operations. A foreign expedition might not only divert the popular
mind but would prove beneficial by relieving the crowded city of part
of its population; and accordingly a fleet was fitted out, of which
Pericles himself took the command, and which committed devastations
upon various parts of the Peloponnesian coast. But, upon returning
from this expedition, Pericles found the public feeling more
exasperated than before. Envoys had even been despatched to Sparta to
sue for peace, but had been dismissed without a hearing; a
disappointment which had rendered the populace still more furious.
Pericles now found it necessary to call a public assembly in order to
vindicate his conduct, and to encourage the desponding citizens to
persevere. But though he succeeded in persuading them to prosecute the
war with vigour; they still continued to nourish their feelings of
hatred against the great statesman. His political enemies, of whom
Cleon was the chief, took advantage of this state of the public mind to
bring against him a charge of peculation. The main object of this
accusation was to incapacitate him for the office of Strategus, or
general. [The Strategi, or Generals, were ten in number, elected
annually, and were intrusted not only with the command on military
expeditions, but with the superintendence of all warlike preparations,
and with the regulation of all matters in any way connected with the
war department of the state.] He was brought before the dicastery on
this charge, and sentenced to pay a considerable fine; but eventually a
strong reaction occurred in his favour. He was re-elected general, and
apparently regained all the influence he had ever possessed.
But he was not destined long to enjoy this return of popularity. His
life was now closing in, and its end was clouded by a long train of
domestic misfortunes. The epidemic deprived him not only of many
personal and political friends, but also of several near relations,
amongst whom were his sister and his two legitimate sons Xanthippus and
Paralus. The death of the latter was a severe blow to him. During the
funeral ceremonies, as he placed a garland on the body of this his
favourite son, he was completely overpowered by his feelings and wept
aloud. His ancient house was now left without an heir. By Aspasia,
however, he had an illegitimate son who bore his own name, and whom the
Athenians now legitimised and thus alleviated, as far as lay in their
power, the misfortunes of their great leader.
After this period it was with difficulty that Pericles was persuaded by
his friends to take any active part in public affairs; nor did he
survive more than a twelvemonth. An attack of the prevailing epidemic
was succeeded by a low and lingering fever, which undermined both his
strength of body and vigour of intellect. As Pericles lay apparently
unconscious on his death-bed, the friends who stood around it were
engaged in recalling his exploits. The dying man interrupted them by
remarking: "What you praise in me is partly the result of good fortune,
and at all events common to me with many other commanders. What I
chiefly pride myself upon you have not noticed--no Athenian ever wore
mourning through me."
The enormous influence which Pericles exercised for so long a period
over an ingenious but fickle people like the Athenians, is an
unquestionable proof of his intellectual superiority. This hold on the
public affection is to be attributed to a great extent to his
extraordinary eloquence. Cicero regards him as the first example of an
almost perfect orator, at once delighting the Athenians with his
copiousness and grace, and overawing them by the force and cogency of
his diction and arguments. He seems, indeed, to have singularly
combined the power of persuasion with that more rapid and abrupt style
of oratory which takes an audience by storm and defies all resistance.
As the accomplished man of genius and the liberal patron of literature
and art, Pericles is worthy of the highest admiration. By these
qualities he has justly given name to the most brilliant intellectual
epoch that the world has ever seen. But on this point we have already
touched, and shall have occasion to refer hereafter in the sketch of
Grecian literature.
In the third year of the war (B.C. 429) Archidamus directed his whole
force against the ill-fated town of Plataea. The siege that ensued is
one of the most memorable in the annals of Grecian warfare. Plataea
was but a small city, and its garrison consisted of only 400 citizens
and 80 Athenians, together with 110 women to manage their household
affairs. Yet this small force set at defiance the whole army of the
Peloponnesians. The latter, being repulsed in all their attempts to
take the place by storm, resolved to turn the siege into a blockade,
and reduce the city by famine. The Plataeans endured a blockade of two
years, during which the Athenians attempted nothing for their relief.
In the second year, however, about half the garrison effected their
escape; but the rest were obliged to surrender shortly afterwards (B.C.
427). The whole garrison, consisting of 200 Plataeans and 25
Athenians, were now arraigned before five judges sent from Sparta.
Their indictment was framed in a way which precluded the possibility of
escape. They were simply asked "Whether, during the present war, they
had rendered any assistance to the Lacedaemonians and their allies?"
Each man was called up separately before the judgment-seat, and the
same question having been put to him and of course answered in the
negative, he was immediately led away to execution. The town of
Plataea was transferred to the Thebans, who a few months afterwards
levelled all the private buildings to the ground. Thus was Plataea
blotted out from the map of Greece (B.C. 427). In recording the fall of
Plataea we have anticipated the order of chronology.
The most important event in the fourth year of the war (B.C. 428) was
the revolt of Mytilene; the capital of Lesbos, and of the greater part
of that island. The Athenians sent out a fleet which blockaded
Mytilene both by sea and land, The Peloponnesians promised their
assistance; but from various causes their fleet was unable to reach the
place. Meanwhile the provisions of the town were exhausted, and it was
therefore resolved, as a last desperate expedient, to make a sally, and
endeavour to raise the blockade. With this view even the men of the
lower classes were armed with the full armour of the hoplites. But
this step produced a very different result from what had been expected
or intended. The great mass of the Mytileneans regarded their own
oligarchical government with suspicion and now threatened that, unless
their demands were complied with, they would surrender the city to the
Athenians. In this desperate emergency the Mytilenean government
perceived that their only chance of safety lay in anticipating the
people in this step. They accordingly opened a negotiation with
Paches, the Athenian commander, and a capitulation was agreed upon by
which the city was to be surrendered and the fate of its inhabitants to
be decided by the Athenian Assembly.
At Athens the disposal of the prisoners caused great debate. It was on
this occasion that the leather-seller Cleon first comes prominently
forward in Athenian affairs. If we may trust the picture drawn by the
comic poet Aristophanes, Cleon was a perfect model of a low-born
demagogue; a noisy brawler, insolent in his gestures, corrupt and venal
in his principles. Much allowance must no doubt be made for comic
licence and exaggeration in this portrait, but even a caricature must
have some grounds of truth for its basis. It was this man who took the
lead in the debate respecting the disposal of the Mytileneans, and made
the savage and horrible proposal to put to death the whole male
population of Mytilene of military age, and to sell the women and
children into slavery. This motion he succeeded in carrying and a
trireme was immediately despatched to Mytilene, conveying orders to
Paches to carry the bloody decree into execution. This barbarous
decree made no discrimination between the innocent and the guilty; and
on the morrow so general a feeling prevailed of the horrible injustice
that had been committed, that the magistrates acceded to the prayer of
the Mytilenean envoys and called a fresh assembly. Notwithstanding the
violent opposition of Creon, the majority of the assembly reversed
their former decree and resolved that the Mytileneans already in
custody should be put upon their trial, but that the remainder of the
population should be spared. A second trireme was immediately
despatched to Mytilene, with orders to Paches to arrest the execution.
The utmost diligence was needful. The former trireme had a start of
four-and-twenty hours, and nothing but exertions almost superhuman
would enable the second to reach Mytilene early enough to avert the
tragical catastrophe, The oarsmen were allowed by turns only short
intervals of rest, and took their food, consisting of barley-meal
steeped in wine and oil, as they sat at the oar. Happily the weather
proved favourable; and the crew, who had been promised large rewards in
case they arrived in time, exerted themselves to deliver the reprieve,
whilst the crew of the preceding vessel had conveyed the order for
execution with slowness and reluctance. Yet even so the countermand
came only just in time. The mandate was already in the hands of
Paches, who was taking measures for its execution. The fortifications
of Mytilene were razed, and her fleet delivered up to the Athenians.
The fate of the Plataeans and Mytileneans affords a fearful
illustration of the manners of the age; but these horrors soon found a
parallel in Corcyra. A fearful struggle took place in this island
between the aristocratical and democratical parties. The people at
length obtained the mastery, and the vengeance which they took on their
opponents was fearful. The most sacred sanctuaries afforded no
protection; the nearest ties of blood and kindred were sacrificed to
civil hatred. In one case a father slew even his own son. These
scenes of horror lasted for seven days, during which death in every
conceivable form was busily at work.
The seventh year of the war (B.C. 425) was marked by an important
event. An Athenian fleet was detained by bad weather at Pylus in
Messenia, on the modern bay of Navarino. Demosthenes, an active
Athenian officer, who was on board the fleet, thought it an eligible
spot on which to establish some of the Messenians from Naupactus, since
it was a strong position, from which they might annoy the
Lacedaemonians, and excite revolt among their Helot kinsmen. As the
bad weather continued for some time, the soldiers on board amused
themselves, under the directions of Demosthenes, in constructing a sort
of rude fortification. The nature of the ground was favourable for the
work, and in five or six days a wall was throws up sufficient for the
purposes of defence. Demosthenes undertook to garrison the place; and
five ships and 200 hoplites were left behind with him.
This insult to the Lacedaemonian territory caused great alarm and
indignation at Sparta. The Peloponnesian fleet was ordered to Pylus;
and the Lacedaemonian commander, on arriving with the fleet,
immediately occupied the small uninhabited and densely wooded island of
Sphacteria, which, with the exception of two narrow channels on the
north and south, almost blocked up the entrance of the bay. Between
the island and the mainland was a spacious basin, in which the fleet
took up its station. The Lacedaemonians lost no time in attacking the
fortress; but notwithstanding their repeated attempts they were unable
to effect a landing.
Whilst they were preparing for another assault, they were surprised by
the appearance of the Athenian fleet. They had strangely neglected to
secure the entrances into the bay: and, when the Athenian ships came
sailing through both the undefended channels, many of their triremes
were still moored, and part of their crews ashore. The battle which
ensued was desperate. Both sides fought with extraordinary valour; but
victory at length declared for the Athenians. Five Peloponnesian ships
were captured; the rest were saved only by running them ashore, where
they were protected by the Lacedaemonian army.
The Athenians, thus masters of the sea, were enabled to blockade the
island of Sphacteria, in which the flower of the Lacedaemonian army was
shut up, many of them native Spartans of the highest families. In so
grave an emergency messengers were sent to Sparta for advice. The
Ephors themselves immediately repaired to the spot; and so desponding
was their view of the matter, that they saw no issue from it but a
peace. They therefore proposed and obtained an armistice for the
purpose of opening negotiations at Athens. But the Athenians, at the
instigation of Cleon, insisted upon the most extravagant demands, and
hostilities were accordingly resumed. They were not however attended
with any decisive result. The blockade of Sphacteria began to grow
tedious and harassing. The force upon it continually received supplies
of provisions either from swimmers, who towed skins filled with linseed
and poppy-seed mixed with honey, or from Helots, who, induced by the
promise of large rewards, eluded the blockading squadron during dark
and stormy nights, and landed cargoes on the back of the island. The
summer, moreover, was fast wearing away, and the storms of winter might
probably necessitate the raising of the blockade altogether. Under
these circumstances, Demosthenes began to contemplate a descent upon
the island; with which view he sent a message to Athens to explain the
unfavourable state of the blockade, and to request further assistance.
These tidings were very distasteful to the Athenians, who had looked
upon Sphacteria as their certain prey. They began to regret having let
slip the favourable opportunity for making a peace, and to vent their
displeasure upon Cleon, the director of their conduct on that occasion.
But Cleon put on a face of brass. He abused the Strategi. His
political opponent, Nicias, was then one of those officers, a man of
quiet disposition and moderate abilities, but thoroughly honest and
incorruptible. Him Cleon now singled out for his vituperation, and,
pointing at him with his finger, exclaimed--"It would be easy enough to
take the island if our generals were MEN. If I were General, I would
do it at once!" This burst of the tanner made the assembly laugh. He
was saluted with cries of "Why don't you go, then?" and Nicias,
thinking probably to catch his opponent in his own trap, seconded the
voice of the assembly by offering to place at his disposal whatever
force he might deem necessary for the enterprise. Cleon at first
endeavoured to avoid the dangerous honour thus thrust upon him. But
the more he drew back the louder were the assembly in calling upon him
to accept the office; and as Nicias seriously repeated his proposition,
he adopted with a good grace what there was no longer any possibility
of evading, and asserted that he would take Sphacteria within twenty
days, and either kill all the Lacedaemonians upon it, or bring them
prisoners to Athens.
Never did general set out upon an enterprise under circumstances more
singular; but, what was still more extraordinary, fortune enabled him
to make his promise good. In fact, as we have seen, Demosthenes had
already resolved on attacking the island; and when Cleon arrived at
Pylus he found everything prepared for the assault. Accident favoured
the enterprise. A fire kindled by some Athenian sailors, who had
landed for the purpose of cooking their dinner, caught and destroyed
the woods with which the island was overgrown, and thus deprived the
Lacedaemonians of one of their principal defences. Nevertheless such
was the awe inspired by the reputation of the Spartan army that
Demosthenes considered it necessary to land about 10,000 soldiers of
different descriptions, although the Lacedaemonian force consisted of
only about 420 men. But this small force for a long while kept their
assailants at bay; till some Messenians, stealing round by the
sea-shore, over crags and cliffs which the Lacedaemonians had deemed
impracticable, suddenly appeared on the high ground which overhung
their rear. They now began to give way, and would soon have been all
slain; but Cleon and Demosthenes, being anxious to carry them prisoners
to Athens, sent a herald to summon them to surrender. The latter, in
token of compliance, dropped their shields, and waved their hands above
their heads. They requested, however, permission to communicate with
their countrymen on the mainland; who, after two or three
communications, sent them a final message--"to take counsel for
themselves, but to do nothing disgraceful." The survivors then
surrendered. They were 292 in number, 120 of whom were native Spartans
belonging to the first families. By this surrender the prestige of the
Spartan arms was in a great degree destroyed. The Spartans were not,
indeed, deemed invincible; but their previous feats, especially at
Thermopylae, had inspired the notion that they would rather die than
yield; an opinion which could now no longer be entertained.
Cleon had thus performed his promise. On the day after the victory he
and Demosthenes started with the prisoners for Athens, where they
arrived within 20 days from the time of Cleon's departure. Altogether,
this affair was one of the most favourable for the Athenians that had
occurred during the war. The prisoners would serve not only for a
guarantee against future invasions, which might be averted by
threatening to put them to death, but also as a means for extorting
advantageous conditions whenever a peace should be concluded. Nay, the
victory itself was of considerable importance, since it enabled the
Athenians to place Pylus in a better posture of defence, and, by
garrisoning it with Messenians from Naupactus, to create a stronghold
whence Laconia might be overrun and ravaged at pleasure. The
Lacedaemonians themselves were so sensible of these things, that they
sent repeated messages to Athens to propose a peace, but which the
Athenians altogether disregarded.
The eighth year of the war (B.C. 424) opened with brilliant prospects
for the Athenians. Elate with their continued good fortune, they aimed
at nothing less than the recovery of all the possessions which they had
held before the Thirty Years' Truce. For this purpose they planned an
expedition against Boeotia. But their good fortune had now reached its
culminatiug point. They were defeated by the Boeotians with great loss
at the battle of Delium, which was the greatest and most decisive
engagement fought during the first period of the war an interesting
feature of the battle is that both Socrates and his pupil Alcibiades
were engaged in it, the former among the hoplites, the latter in the
cavalry. Socrates distinguished himself by his bravery, and was one of
those who, instead of throwing down their arms, kept together in a
compact body, and repulsed the attacks of the pursuing horse. His
retreat was also protected by Alcibiades.
This disastrous battle was speedily followed by the overthrow of the
Athenian empire in Thrace. At the request of Perdiccas, King of
Macedonia, and of the Chalcidian towns, who had sued for help against
the Athenians, Brasidas was sent by the Lacedaemonian government into
Macedonia, at the head of a small body of troops. On his arrival in
Macedonia he proclaimed that he was come to deliver the Grecian cities
from the tyrannous yoke of Athens. His bravery, his kind and
conciliating demeanour, his probity, moderation, and good faith, soon
gained him the respect and love of the allies of Athens in that
quarter. Acanthus and Stagirus hastened to open their gates to him;
and early in the ensuing winter, by means of forced marches, he
suddenly and unexpectedly appeared before the important Athenian colony
of Amphipolis on the Strymon. In that town the Athenian party sent a
message for assistance to Thucydides, the historian, who was then
general in those parts. Thucydides hastened with seven ships from
Thasos, and succeeded in securing Eion at the mouth of the Strymon; but
Amphipolis, which lay a little higher up the river, allured by the
favourable terms offered, had already surrendered to Brasidas. For his
want of vigilance on this occasion, Thucydides was, on the motion of
Cleon, sentenced to banishment, and spent the following twenty years of
his life in exile. Torone, Scione, and other towns also revolted from
Athens.
In the following year (B.C. 422) Cleon was sent to Macedonia to recover
the Athenian dependencies, and especially Amphipolis. He encamped on a
rising ground on the eastern side of the town. Having deserted the
peaceful art of dressing hides for the more hazardous trade of war, in
which he was almost totally inexperienced, and having now no
Demosthenes to direct his movements, Cleon was thrown completely off
his guard by a very ordinary stratagem on the part of Brasidas, who
contrived to give the town quite a deserted and peaceful appearance.
Cleon suffered his troops to fall into disorder, till he was suddenly
surprised by the astounding news that Brasidas was preparing for a
sally. Cleon at once resolved to retreat. But his skill was equal to
his valour. He conducted his retreat in the most disorderly manner.
His left wing had already filed off and his centre with straggling
ranks was in the act of following, when Brasidas ordered the gates of
the town to be flung open, and, rushing out at the head of only 150
chosen soldiers, charged the retreating columns in flank. They were
immediately routed; but Brasidas received a mortal wound and was
carried off the field. Though his men were forming on the hill, Cleon
fled as fast as he could on the approach of the enemy, but was pursued
and slain by a Thracian peltast. In spite, however, of the disgraceful
flight of their general, the right wing maintained their ground for a
considerable time, till some cavalry and peltasts issuing from
Amphipolis attacked them in flank and rear, and compelled them to fly.
On assembling again at Eion it was found that half the Athenian
hoplites had been slain. Brasidas was carried into Amphipolis, and
lived long enough to receive the tidings of his victory. He was
interred within the walls with great military pomp in the centre of
what thenceforth became the chief agora; he was proclaimed oecist, or
founder of the town; and was worshipped as a hero with annual games and
sacrifices.
By the death of Brasidas and Cleon the two chief obstacles to a peace
were removed; for the former loved war for the sake of its glory, the
latter for the handle which it afforded for agitation and for attacking
his political opponents. The Athenian Nicias, and the Spartan king
Pleistoanax, zealously forwarded the negotiations, and in the spring of
the year B.C. 421 a peace for 50 years, commonly called the PEACE OF
NICIAS, was concluded on the basis of a mutual restitution of prisoners
and places captured during the war.