THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.--THIRD PERIOD, FROM THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION TO
THE END OF THE WAR, B.C. 413-404.
The destruction of the Sicilian armament was a fatal blow to the power
of Athens. It is astonishing that she was able to protract the war so
long with diminished strength and resources. Her situation inspired
her enemies with new vigour; states hitherto neutral declared against
her; her subject-allies prepared to throw off the yoke; even the
Persian satraps and the court of Susa bestirred themselves against her.
The first blow to her empire was struck by the wealthy and populous
island of Chios. This again was the work of Alcibiades, the implacable
enemy of his native land, at whose advice a Lacedaemonian fleet was
sent to the assistance of the Chians. Their example was followed by
all the other Athenian allies in Asia, with the exception of Samos, in
which the democratical party gained the upper hand. In the midst of
this general defection the Athenians did not give way to despair.
Pericles had set apart a reserve of 1000 talents to meet the
contingency of an actual invasion. This still remained untouched, and
now by an unanimous vote the penalty of death, which forbad its
appropriation to any other purpose, was abolished, and the fund applied
in fitting out a fleet against Chios. Samos became the head-quarters
of the fleet, and the base of their operations during the remainder of
the war.
After a time the tide of success began to turn in favour of the
Athenians. They recovered Lesbos and Clazomenae, defeated the Chians,
and laid waste their territory. They also gained a victory over the
Peloponnesians at Miletus; while the Peloponnesian fleet had lost the
assistance of Tissaphernes, the Persian satrap, through the intrigues
of Alcibiades. In the course of a few months Alcibiades had completely
forfeited the confidence of the Lacedaemonians. The Spartan king Agis,
whose wife he had seduced, was his personal enemy; and after the defeat
of the Peloponnesians at Miletus, Agis denounced him as a traitor, and
persuaded the new Ephors to send out instructions to put him to death.
Of this, however, he was informed time enough to make his escape to
Tissaphernes at Magnesia. Here he ingratiated himself into the
confidence of the satrap, and persuaded him that it was not for the
interest of Persia that either of the Grecian parties should be
successful, but rather that they should wear each other out in their
mutual struggles, when Persia would in the end succeed in expelling
both. This advice was adopted by the satrap; and in order to carry it
into execution, steps were taken to secure the inactivity of the
Peloponnesian armament, which, if vigorously employed, was powerful
enough to put a speedy end to the war. In order to secure his return
to Athens, Alcibiades now endeavoured to persuade Tissaphernes that it
was more for the Persian interest to conclude a league with Athens than
with Sparta; but the only part of his advice which the satrap seems to
have sincerely adopted was that of playing off one party against the
other. About this, however, Alcibiades did not at all concern himself.
It was enough for his views, which had merely the selfish aim of his
own restoration to Athens, if he could make it appear that he possessed
sufficient influence with Tissaphernes to procure his assistance for
the Athenians. He therefore began to communicate with the Athenian
generals at Samos, and held out the hope of a Persian alliance as the
price of his restoration to his country. But as he both hated and
feared the Athenian democracy, he coupled his offer with the condition
that a revolution should be effected at Athens, and an oligarchy
established. The Athenian generals greedily caught at the proposal;
and though the great mass of the soldiery were violently opposed to it,
they were silenced, if not satisfied, when told that Athens could be
saved only by means of Persia. The oligarchical conspirators formed
themselves into a confederacy, and Pisander was sent to Athens to lay
the proposal before the Athenian assembly. It met, as it might be
supposed, with the most determined opposition. The single but
unanswerable reply of Pisander was, the necessities of the republic;
and at length a reluctant vote for a change of constitution was
extorted from the people. Pisander and ten others were despatched to
treat with Alcibiades and Tissaphernes.
Upon their arrival in Ionia they informed Alcibiades that measures had
been taken for establishing an oligarchical form of government at
Athens, and required him to fulfil his part of the engagement by
procuring the aid and alliance of Persia. But Alcibiades knew that he
had undertaken what he could not perform, and he now resolved to escape
from the dilemma by one of his habitual artifices. He received the
Athenian deputation in the presence of Tissaphernes himself, and made
such extravagant demands on behalf of the satrap that Pisander and his
colleagues indignantly broke off the conference.
Notwithstanding the conduct of Alcibiades the oligarchical conspirators
proceeded with the revolution at Athens, in which they had gone too far
to recede. Pisander, with five of the envoys, returned to Athens to
complete the work they had begun.
Pisander proposed in the assembly, and carried a resolution, that a
committee of ten should be appointed to prepare a new constitution,
which was to be submitted to the approbation of the people. But when
the day appointed for that purpose arrived, the assembly was not
convened in the Pnyx, but in the temple of Poseidon at Colonus, a
village upwards of a mile from Athens. Here the conspirators could
plant their own partisans, and were less liable to be overawed by
superior numbers. Pisander obtained the assent of the meeting to the
following revolutionary changes:--1. The abolition of all the existing
magistracies; 2. The cessation of all payments for the discharge of
civil functions; 3. The appointment of a committee of five persons,
who were to name ninety-five more; each of the hundred thus constituted
to choose three persons; the body of Four Hundred thus formed to be an
irresponsible government, holding its sittings in the senate house.
The four hundred were to convene a select body of five thousand
citizens whenever they thought proper. Nobody knew who these five
thousand were, but they answered two purposes, namely, to give an air
of greater popularity to the government, as well as to overawe the
people by an exaggerated notion of its strength.
Thus perished the Athenian democracy, after an existence of nearly a
century since its establishment by Clisthenes The revolution was begun
from despair of the foreign relations of Athens, and from the hope of
assistance from Persia; but it was carried out through the machinations
of the conspirators after that delusion had ceased.
At Samos the Athenian army refused to recognise the new government. At
the instance of Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus a meeting was called in
which the soldiers pledged themselves to maintain the democracy, to
continue the war against Peloponnesus, and to put down the usurpers at
Athens. The soldiers, laying aside for a while their military
character, constituted themselves into an assembly of the people,
deposed several of their officers, and appointed others whom they could
better trust. Thrasybulus proposed the recall of Alcibiades,
notwithstanding his connection with the oligarchical conspiracy,
because it was believed that he was now able and willing to aid the
democratic cause with the gold and forces of Persia. After
considerable opposition the proposal was agreed to; Alcibiades was
brought to Samos and introduced to the assembly, where by his
magnificent promises, and extravagant boasts respecting his influence
with Tissaphernes, he once more succeeded in deceiving the Athenians.
The accomplished traitor was elected one of the generals, and, in
pursuance of his artful policy, began to pass backwards and forwards
between Samos and Magnesia, with the view of inspiring both the satrap
and the Athenians with a reciprocal idea of his influence with either,
and of instilling distrust of Tissaphernes into the minds of the
Peloponnesians.
At the first news of the re-establishment of democracy at Samos,
distrust and discord had broken out among the Four Hundred. Antiphon
and Phrynichus, at the head of the extreme section of the oligarchical
party, were for admitting a Lacedaemonian garrison. But others,
discontented with their share of power, began to affect more popular
sentiments, among whom were Theramenes and Aristocrates. Meantime
Euboea, supported by the Lacedaemonians and Boeotians, revolted from
Athens. The loss of this island seemed a death-blow. The
Lacedaemonians might now easily blockade the ports of Athens and starve
her into surrender; whilst the partisans of the Four Hundred would
doubtless co-operate with the enemy. But from this fate they were
saved by the characteristic slowness of the Lacedaemonians, who
confined themselves to securing the conquest of Euboea. Thus left
unmolested, the Athenians convened an assembly in the Pnyx. Votes were
passed for deposing the Four Hundred, and placing the government in the
hands of the 5000, of whom every citizen who could furnish a panoply
might be a member. In short, the old constitution was restored, except
that the franchise was restricted to 5000 citizens, and payment for the
discharge of civil functions abolished. In subsequent assemblies, the
Archons, the Senate, and other institutions were revived; and a vote
was passed to recall Alcibiades and some of his friends. The number of
the 5000 was never exactly observed, and was soon enlarged into
universal citizenship. Thus the Four Hundred were overthrown after a
reign of four months, B.C. 411.
While these things were going on at Athens, the war was prosecuted with
vigour on the coast of Asia Minor. Mindarus, who now commanded the
Peloponnesian fleet, disgusted at length by the often-broken promises
of Tissaphernes, and the scanty and irregular pay which he furnished,
set sail from Miletus and proceeded to the Hellespont, with the
intention of assisting the satrap Pharnabazus, and of effecting, if
possible, the revolt of the Athenian dependencies in that quarter.
Hither he was pursued by the Athenian fleet under Thrasyllus. In a few
days an engagement ensued (in August, 411 B.C.), in the famous straits
between Sestos and Abydos, in which the Athenians, though with a
smaller force, gained the victory and erected a trophy on the
promontory of Cynossema, near the tomb and chapel of the Trojan queen
Hecuba. The Athenians followed up their victory by the reduction of
Cyzicus, which had revolted from them. A month or two afterwards
another obstinate engagement took place between the Peloponnesian and
Athenian fleets ness Abydos, which lasted a whole day, and was at
length decided in favour of the Athenians by the arrival of Alcibiades
with his squadron of eighteen ships from Samos.
Shortly after the battle Tissaphernes arrived at the Hellespont with
the view of conciliating the offended Peloponnesians. He was not only
jealous of the assistance which the latter were now rendering to
Pharnabarzus, but it is also evident that his temporizing policy had
displeased the Persian court. This appears from his conduct on the
present occasion, as well as from the subsequent appointment of Cyrus
to the supreme command on the Asiatic coast as we shall presently have
to relate. When Alcibiades, who imagined that Tissaphernes was still
favourable to the Athenian cause waited on him with the customary
presents, he was arrested by order of the satrap, and sent in custody
to Sardis. At the end of a month, however, he contrived to escape to
Clazomenae, and again joined the Athenian fleet early in the spring of
410 B.C. Mindaras, with the assistance of Pharnabazas on the land side,
was now engaged in the siege of Cyzicus, which the Athenian admirals
determined to relieve. Here a battle ensued, in which Mindarus was
slain, the Lacedaemonians and Persians routed, and almost the whole
Peloponnesian fleet captured. The severity of this blow was pictured
in the laconic epistle in which Hippocrates, the second in command,
[Called Epistoteus or "Secretary" in the Lacedaemonian fleet. The
commander of the fleet had the title of NAVARCHUS.] announced it to
the Ephors: "Our good luck is gone; Mindarus is slain; the men are
starving; we know not what to do."
The results of this victory were most important. Perinthus and
Selymbria, as well as Cyzicus, were recovered; and the Athenians, once
more masters of the Propontis, fortified the town of Chrysopolis, over
against Byzantium, at the entrance of the Bosporus; re-established
their toll of ten per cent, on all vessels passing from the Euxine; and
left a squadron to guard the strait and collect the dues. So great was
the discouragement of the Lacedaemonians at the loss of their fleet
that the Ephor Endius proceeded to Athens to treat for peace on the
basis of both parties standing just as they were. The Athenian
assembly was at this time led by the demagogue Cleophon, a lamp-maker,
known to us by the later comedies of Aristophanes. Cleophon appears to
have been a man of considerable ability; but the late victories had
inspired him with too sanguine hopes and he advised the Athenians to
reject the terms proposed by Endius. Athens thus throw away the golden
opportunity of recruiting her shattered forces of which she stood so
much in need; and to this unfortunate advice must be ascribed the
calamities which subsequently overtook her.
The possession of the Bosporus reopened to the Athenians the trade of
the Euxine. From his lofty fortress at Decelea the Spartan king Agris
could descry the corn-ships from the Euxine sailing into the Harbour of
the Piraeus, and felt how fruitless it was to occupy the fields of
Attica whilst such abundant supplies of provisions were continually
finding their way to the city.
In B.C. 408 the important towns of Chalcedon, Selymbria, and Byzantium
fell into the hands of the Athenians, thus leaving them undisputed
masters of the Propontis.
These great achievements of Alcibiades naturally paved the way for his
return to Athens. In the spring of 407 B.C. he proceeded with the
fleet to Samos, and from thence sailed to Piraeus. His reception was
far more favourable than he had ventured to anticipate. The whole
population of Athens flocked down to Piraeus to welcome him, and
escorted him to the city. He seemed to be in the present juncture the
only man capable of restoring the grandeur and the empire of Athens:
he was accordingly named general with unlimited powers, and a force of
100 triremes, 1500 hoplites, and 150 cavalry placed at his disposal.
Before his departure he took an opportunity to atone for the impiety of
which he had been suspected. Although his armament was in perfect
readiness, he delayed its sailing till after the celebration of the
Eleusinian mysteries at the beginning of September. For seven years
the customary procession across the Thriasian plain had been suspended,
owing to the occupation of Decelea by the enemy, which compelled the
sacred troop to proceed by sea. Alcibiades now escorted them on their
progress and return with his forces, and thus succeeded in reconciling
himself with the offended goddesses and with their holy priests, the
Eumolpidae.
Meanwhile a great change had been going on in the state of affairs in
the East. We have already seen that the Great King was displeased with
the vacillating policy of Tissaphernes, and had determined to adopt
more energetic measures against the Athenians. During the absence of
Alcibiades, Cyrus, the younger son of Darius, a prince of a bold and
enterprising spirit, and animated with a lively hatred of Athens, had
arrived at the coast for the purpose of carrying out the altered policy
of the Persian court; and with that view he had been invested with the
satrapies of Lydia, the Greater Phrygia, and Cappadocia. The arrival
of Cyrus opens the last phase of the Peloponnesian war. Another event,
in the highest degree unfavourable to the Athenian cause, was the
accession of Lysander, as NAVARCHUS, to the command of the
Peloponnesian fleet. Lysander was the third of the remarkable men whom
Sparta produced during the war. In ability, energy, and success he may
be compared with Brasidas and Gylippus, though immeasurably inferior to
the former in every moral quality. He was born of poor parents, and
was by descent one of those Lacedaemonians who could never enjoy the
full rights of Spartan citizenship. His ambition was boundless, and he
was wholly unscrupulous about the means which he employed to gratify
it. In pursuit of his objects he hesitated at neither deceit, nor
perjury, nor cruelty, and he is reported to have laid it down as one of
his maxims in life to avail himself of the fox's skin where the lion's
failed.
Lysander had taken up his station at Ephesus, with the Lacedaemonian
fleet of 70 triremes; and when Cyrus arrived at Sardis, in the spring
of 407 B.C., he hastened to pay his court to the young prince, and was
received with every mark of favour. A vigorous line of action was
resolved on. Cyrus at once offered 500 talents, and affirmed that, if
more were needed, he was prepared even to coin into money the very
throne of gold and silver on which he sat. In a banquet which ensued
Cyrus drank to the health of Lysander, and desired him to name any wish
which he could gratify. Lysander immediately requested an addition of
an obolus to the daily pay of the seamen. Cyrus was surprised at so
disinterested a demand, and from that day conceived a high degree of
respect and confidence for the Spartan commander. Lysander on his
return to Ephesus employed himself in refitting his fleet, and in
organising clubs in the Spartan interest in the cities of Asia.
Alcibiades set sail from Athens in September. Being ill provided with
funds for carrying on the war, he was driven to make predatory
excursions for the purpose of raising money. During his absence he
intrusted the bulk of the fleet at Samos to his pilot, Antiochus, with
strict injunctions not to venture on an action. Notwithstanding these
orders, however, Antiochus sailed out and brought the Peloponnesian
fleet to an engagement off Notium, in which the Athenians were defeated
with the loss of 15 ships, and Antiochus himself was slain. Among the
Athenian armament itself great dissatisfaction was growing up against
Alcibiades. Though at the head of a splendid force, he had in three
months time accomplished literally nothing. His debaucheries and
dissolute conduct on shore were charged against him, as well as his
selecting for confidential posts not the men best fitted for them, but
those who, like Antiochus were the boon companions and the chosen
associates of his revels. These accusations forwarded to Athens, and
fomented by his secret enemies, soon produced an entire revulsion in
the public feeling towards Alcibiades. The Athenians voted that he
should be dismissed from his command, and they appointed in his place
ten new generals, with Conon at their head.
The year of Lysander's command expired about the same time as the
appointment of Conon to the Athenian fleet. Through the intrigues of
Lysander, his successor Callicratidas was received with dissatisfaction
both by the Lacedaemonian seamen and by Cyrus. Loud complaints were
raised of the impolicy of an annual change of commanders. Lysander
threw all sorts of difficulties into the way of his successor, to whom
he handed over an empty chest, having first repaid to Cyrus all the
money in his possession under the pretence that it was a private loan.
The straightforward conduct of Callicratidas, however, who summoned the
Lacedaemonian commanders, and after a dignified remonstrance, plainly
put the question whether he should return home or remain, silenced all
opposition. But he was sorely embarrassed for funds. Cyrus treated
him with haughtiness; and when he waited on that prince at Sardis, he
was dismissed not only without money, but even without an audience.
Callicratidas, however, had too much energy to be daunted by such
obstacles. Sailing with his fleet from Ephesus to Miletus, he laid
before the assembly of that city, in a spirited address, all the ill
they had suffered at the hands of the Persians, and exhorted them to
bestir themselves and dispense with the Persian alliance. He succeeded
in persuading the Milesians to make him a large grant of money, whilst
the leading men even came forward with private subscriptions. By means
of this assistance he was enabled to add 50 triremes to the 90
delivered to him by Lysander; and the Chians further provided him with
ten days' pay for the seamen.
The fleet of Callicratidas was now double that of Conon. The latter
was compelled to run before the superior force of Callicratidas. Both
fleets entered the harbour of Mytilene at the same time, where a battle
ensued in which Conon lost 30 ships, but he saved the remaining 40 by
hauling them ashore under the walls of the town. Callicratidas then
blockaded Mytilene both by sea and land; but Conon contrived to
despatch a trireme to Athens with the news of his desperate position.
As soon as the Athenians received intelligence of the blockade of
Mytilene; vast efforts were made for its relief; and we learn with
surprise that in thirty days a fleet of 110 triremes was equipped and
despatched from Piraeus. The armament assembled at Samos, where it was
reinforced by scattered Athenian ships, and by contingents from the
allies, to the extent of 40 vessels. The whole fleet of 150 sail then
proceeded to the small islands of Arginusae, near the coast of Asia,
and facing Malea, the south-eastern cape of Lesbos. Callicratidas, who
went out to meet them, took up his station at the latter point, leaving
a squadron of 50 ships to maintain the blockade of Mytilene. He had
thus only 120 ships to oppose to the 150 of the Athenians, and his
pilot advised him to retire before the superior force of the enemy.
But Callicratidas replied that he would not disgrace himself by flight,
and that if he should perish Sparta would not feel his loss. The
battle was long and obstinate. All order was speedily lost, and the
ships fought singly with one another, In one of these contests,
Callicratidas, who stood on the prow of his vessel ready to board the
enemy, was thrown overboard by the shock of the vessels as they met,
and perished. At length victory began to declare for the Athenians.
The Lacedaemonians, after losing 77 vessels, retreated with the
remainder to Chios and Phocaea. The loss of the Athenians was 25
vessels.
The battle of Arginusae led to a deplorable event, which has for ever
sullied the pages of Athenian history. At least a dozen Athenian
vessels were left floating about in a disabled condition after the
battle; but, owing to a violent storm that ensued, no attempt was made
to rescue the survivors, or to collect the bodies of the dead for
burial. Eight of the ten generals were summoned home to answer for
this conduct; Conon, by his situation at Mytilene, was of course
exculpated, and Archestratus had died. Six of the generals obeyed the
summons, and were denounced in the Assembly by Theramenes, formerly one
of the Four Hundred, for neglect of duty. The generals replied that
they had commissioned Theramenes himself and Thrasybulus, each of whom
commanded a trireme in the engagement, to undertake the duty, and had
assigned 48 ships to them for that purpose. This, however, was denied
by Theramenes. There are discrepancies in the evidence, and we have no
materials for deciding positively which statement was true; but
probability inclines to the side of the generals. Public feeling,
however, ran very strongly against them, and was increased by an
incident which occurred during their trial. After a day's debate the
question was adjourned; and in the interval the festival of the
APATURIA was celebrated, in which, according to annual custom, the
citizens met together according to their families and phratries. Those
who had perished at Arginusae were naturally missed on such an
occasion; and the usually cheerful character of the festival was
deformed and rendered melancholy by the relatives of the deceased
appearing in black clothes and with shaven heads. The passions of the
people were violently roused. At the next meeting of the Assembly,
Callixenus, a senator, proposed that the people should at once proceed
to pass its verdict on the generals, though they had been only
partially heard in their defence; and, moreover, that they should all
be included in one sentence, though it was contrary to a rule of Attic
law, known as the psephisma of Canonus, to indict citizens otherwise
than individually. The Prytanes, or senators of the presiding tribe,
at first refused to put the question to the Assembly in this illegal
way; but their opposition was at length overawed by clamour and
violence. There was, however, one honourable exception. The
philosopher Socrates, who was one of the Prytanes, refused to withdraw
his protest. But his opposition was disregarded, and the proposal of
Callixenus was carried, The generals were condemned, delivered over to
the Eleven for execution, and compelled to drink the fatal hemlock.
Among them was Pericles, the son of the celebrated statesman.
In the following year (B.C. 405), through the influence of Cyrus and
the other allies of Sparta, Lysander again obtained the command of the
Peloponnesian fleet, though nominally under Aracus as admiral; since it
was contrary to Spartan usage that the same man should be twice
NAVARCHUS. His return to power was marked by more vigorous measures.
He sailed to the Hellespont, and laid siege to Lampsacus. The Athenian
fleet arrived too late to save the town, but they proceeded up the
strait and took post at AEgospotami, or the "Goat's River;" a place
which had nothing to recommend it, except its vicinity to Lampsacus,
from which it was separated by a channel somewhat less than two miles
broad. It was a mere desolate beach, without houses or inhabitants, so
that all the supplies had to be fetched from Sestos, or from the
surrounding country, and the seamen were compelled to leave their ships
in order to obtain their meals. Under these circumstances the
Athenians were very desirous of bringing Lysander to an engagement.
But the Spartan commander, who was in a strong position, and abundantly
furnished with provisions, was in no hurry to run any risks. In vain
did the Athenians sail over several days in succession to offer him
battle; they always found his ships ready manned, and drawn up in too
strong a position to warrant an attack; nor could they by all their
manoeuvres succeed in enticing him out to combat. This cowardice, as
they deemed it, on the part of the Lacedaemonians, begat a
corresponding negligence on theirs; discipline was neglected and the
men allowed to straggle almost at will. It was in vain that
Alcibiades, who since his dismissal resided in a fortress in that
neighbourhood, remonstrated with the Athenian generals on the exposed
nature of the station they had chosen, and advised them to proceed to
Sestos. His counsels were received with taunts and insults. At
length, on the fifth day, Lysander, having watched an opportunity when
the Athenian seamen had gone on shore and were dispersed over the
country, rowed swiftly across the strait with all his ships. He found
the Athenian fleet, with the exception of 10 or 12 vessels, totally
unprepared, and he captured nearly the whole of it, without having
occasion to strike a single blow. Of the 180 ships which composed the
fleet, only the trireme of Conon himself, the Paralus, and 8 or 10
other vessels succeeded in escaping. Conon was afraid to return to
Athens after so signal a disaster, and took refuge with Evagoras,
prince of Salamis in Cyprus.
By this momentous victory (September, B.C. 405) the Peloponnesian war
was virtually brought to an end. Lysander, secure of an easy triumph,
was in no haste to gather it by force. The command of the Euxine
enabled him to control the supplies of Athens; and sooner or later, a
few weeks of famine must decide her fall. He now sailed forth to take
possession of the Athenian towns, which fell one after another into his
power as soon as he appeared before them. About November he arrived at
AEgina, with an overwhelming fleet of 150 triremes, and proceeded to
devastate Salamis and blockade Piraeus. At the same time the whole
Peloponnesian army was marched into Attica and encamped in the
precincts of the Academus, at the very gates of Athens. Famine soon
began to be felt within the walls, and at the end of three months it
became so dreadful, that the Athenians saw themselves compelled to
submit to the terms of the conqueror. These terms were: That the long
walls and the fortifications of Piraeus should be demolished; that the
Athenians should give up all their foreign possessions, and confine
themselves to their own territory; that they should surrender all their
ships of war; that they should readmit all their exiles; and that they
should become allies of Sparta.
It was about the middle or end of March, B.C. 404, that Lysander sailed
into Piraeus, and took formal possession of Athens; the war, in
singular conformity with the prophecies current at the beginning of it,
having lasted for a period of thrice nine, or 27 years. The insolence
of the victors added another blow to the feelings of the conquered.
The work of destruction, at which Lysander presided, was converted into
a sort of festival. Female flute-players and wreathed dancers
inaugurated the demolition of the strong and proud bulwarks of Athens;
and as the massive walls fell piece by piece exclamations arose from
the ranks of the Peloponnesians that freedom had at length begun to
dawn upon Greece.