by the people of the United States in their sovereign capacity, to the
present federal government. We have endeavored to show that the people,
having granted certain powers to the general government, such powers are
necessarily withdrawn from the several States by the people thereof for
the purpose of establishing one grand central power, which, when exercised
within its delegated authority, should be recognized as the supreme law of
the land; hence the people of the several States having to the extent of
the powers granted, surrendered the separate State sovereignty, they
became one grand, inseparable, sovereign and independent nation. The very
fact that each and every citizen of our entire country has a voice in
controlling the policy of the general government, shows conclusively that
they owe obedience to its enactments, consequently, our national laws are
alike binding upon every individual from Florida to Maine, and from the
Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean.
But independent of our arguments, we have in the foregoing pages presented
copious extracts from letters written by Messrs. Madison, Jay and Hamilton
pending the adoption of the constitution, all of which must convince the
most skeptical, that all parties at that time understood that they were
granting certain powers to the general government that could not
thereafter be resumed and controlled by the various States. The able
manner in which the importance of such an arrangement is argued, the clear
and conclusive reasoning, the contrasts drawn between one great and
powerful nation and several petty, jealous, contending little
sovereignties, should cast into the shade the weak sophism that is palmed
off by the political demagogues of the present day for the purpose of
dividing the people, under the disguise of what is called State
sovereignty.
The arguments already advanced to show that we have a national government
whose authority is supreme throughout the length and breadth of this
country, (State laws to the contrary notwithstanding,) should be
sufficient to convince the most ultra States rights secessionist that his
dogma is only a garbled name for treason. Nevertheless, we will now
proceed to give in full the celebrated Proclamation issued to the
nullifiers of South Carolina twenty-eight years ago by the hero of the
battle of New Orleans, recommending its careful perusal by every American
citizen who has a spark of patriotism left within him. Its noble,
patriotic sentiments will be found decidedly refreshing when contrasted
with the crouching imbecility and indecision that has characterized not
only James Buchanan but many of our leading politicians in the present
dangerous, suffering and distracted condition of our beloved country.
General Jackson, a brave, daring, noble hero, knowing his duty, hastened
to perform it in defiance of every obstacle; he resolves to save his
country, at every hazard, from falling into the vortex of anarchy, ruin
and disgrace.
When the hydra-headed monster, treason, began to make its appearance, the
honored son of Tennessee, whose name is held in reverence by every friend
of liberty, whose memory will be honored as the savior of his country,
actuated by a high sense of his duty, with true Roman firmness, standing
upon the temple of liberty, proclaiming to the world that he will maintain
the integrity of his country or perish while marching under its glorious
banner warning the enemies of the Union, to pause and consider the awful
consequences of persisting in their treasonable designs, and decide
whether they are prepared to assume such a terrible responsibility.
I will now give his proclamation in full, hoping that the spirit of
patriotism, firmness and justice therein contained will cause a heartfelt
response by my fellow countrymen.
PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION.
_Proclamation of Andrew Jackson, President of the United States._
WHEREAS, a convention assembled in the State of South Carolina have passed
an ordinance, by which they declare "That the several acts and parts of
acts of the congress of the United States, purporting to be laws for the
imposing of duties and imposts on the importation of foreign commodities,
and now having actual operation and effect within the United States, and
more especially," two acts for the same purposes passed on the 29th of
May, 1828, and on the 14th of July, 1832, "are unauthorized by the
constitution of the United States, and violate the true meaning and intent
thereof, and are null and void, and no law," nor binding on the citizens
of that State or its officers: and by the said ordinance, it is further
declared to be unlawful for any of the constituted authorities of the
State or of the United States to enforce the payment of the duties imposed
by the said acts within the same State, and that it is the duty of the
Legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to give full effect to
the said ordinance:
AND WHEREAS, By the said ordinance, it is further ordained that, in no
case of law or equity decided in the courts of said State, wherein shall
be drawn in question the validity of the said ordinance, or of the acts of
the legislature that may be passed to give it effect, or of the said laws
of the United States, no appeal shall be allowed to the Supreme Court of
the United States, nor shall any copy of the record be permitted or
allowed for that purpose, and that any person attempting to take such
appeal shall be punished as for a contempt of court:
And, finally, the said ordinance declares that the people of South
Carolina will maintain the said ordinance at every hazard; and that they
will consider the passage of any act, by congress, abolishing or closing
the ports of the said State, or otherwise obstructing the free ingress or
egress of vessels to and from the said ports, or any other act of the
Federal Government to coerce the State, shut up her ports, destroy or
harrass her commerce, or to enforce the said acts otherwise than through
the civil tribunals of the country, as inconsistant with the longer
continuance of South Carolina in the Union, and that the people of the
said State will thenceforth hold themselves absolved from all further
obligation to maintain or preserve their political connection with the
people of the other States, and will forthwith proceed to organize a
separate government, and do all other acts and things which sovereign and
independent States may of right do.
AND WHEREAS, the said ordinance prescribes to the people of South Carolina
a course of conduct in direct violation of their duty as citizens of the
United States, contrary to the laws of their country, subversive of its
constitution, and having for its object the destruction of the Union--that
Union, which, coeval with our political existence, led our fathers,
without any other ties to unite them than those of patriotism and a common
cause, through a sanguinary struggle to a glorious independence--that
sacred Union, hitherto inviolate, which, perfected by our happy
constitution, has brought us, by the favor of Heaven, to a state of
prosperity at home, and high consideration abroad, rarely, if ever,
equalled in the history of nations. To preserve this bond of our political
existence from destruction, to maintain inviolate this state of national
honor and prosperity, and to justify the confidence my fellow citizens
have reposed in me, I, ANDREW JACKSON, _President of the United States_,
have thought proper to issue this my PROCLAMATION, stating my views of the
constitution and laws applicable to the measures adopted by the convention
of South Carolina, and to the reasons they have put forth to sustain them,
declaring the course which duty will require me to pursue, and, appealing
to the understanding and patriotism of the people, warn them of the
consequences that must inevitably result from an observance of the
dictates of the convention.
Strict duty would require of me nothing more than the exercise of those
powers with which I am now, or may hereafter be invested, for preserving
the peace of the Union, and for the execution of the laws. But the
imposing aspect which opposition has assumed in this case, by clothing
itself with State authority, and the deep interest which the people of the
United States must all feel in preventing a resort to stronger measures,
while there is a hope that anything will be yielded to reasoning and
remonstrance, perhaps demand, and will certainly justify, a full
exposition to South Carolina and the nation of the views I entertain of
this important question, as well as a distinct enunciation of the course
which my sense of duty will require me to pursue.
The ordinance is founded, not on the indefeasible right of resisting acts
which are plainly unconstitutional, and too oppressive to be endured; but
on the strange position that any one State may not only declare an act of
congress void, but prohibit its execution--that they may do this
consistently with the constitution--that the true construction of that
instrument permits a State to retain its place in the Union, and yet be
bound by no other of its laws than those it may choose to consider as
constitutional. It is true, they add, that to justify this abrogation of a
law, it must be palpably contrary to the constitution; but it is evident,
that, to give the right of resisting laws of that description, coupled
with the uncontrolled right to decide what laws deserve that character, is
to give the power of resisting all laws. For, as by the theory, there is
no appeal, the reasons alleged by the State, good or bad must prevail. If
it should be said that public opinion is a sufficient check against the
abuse of this power, it may be asked why it is not deemed a sufficient
guard against the passage of an unconstitutional act by congress? There
is, however, a restraint in this last case, which makes the assumed power
of a State more indefensible, and which does not exist in the other. There
are two appeals from an unconstitutional act passed by congress--one to
the judiciary, the other to the people and the States. There is no appeal
from the State decision in theory, and the practical illustration shows
that the courts are closed against an application to review it, both
judges and jurors being sworn to decide in its favor. But reasoning on
this subject is superfluous, when our social compact, in express terms,
declares that the laws of the United States, its constitution, and
treaties made under it, are the supreme law of the land; and, for greater
caution, adds "that the judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding." And it may be asserted without fear of refutation, that
no federal government could exist without a similar provision. Look for a
moment to the consequence. If South Carolina considers the revenue laws
unconstitutional, and has a right to prevent their execution in the port
of Charleston, there would be a clear constitutional objection to their
collection in every other port, and no revenue could be collected
anywhere; for all imposts must be equal. It is no answer to repeat, that
an unconstitutional law is no law, so long as the question of its legality
is to be decided by the State itself; for every law operating injuriously
upon any local interest will be perhaps thought, and certainly
represented, as unconstitutional, and, as has been shown, there is no
appeal.
If this doctrine had been established at an earlier day, the Union would
have been dissolved in its infancy. The excise law in Pennsylvania, the
embargo and non-intercourse law in the eastern States, the carriage tax in
Virginia, were all deemed unconstitutional, and were more equal in their
operation than any of the laws now complained of; but fortunately none of
those States discovered that they had the right now claimed by South
Carolina. The war into which we were forced to support the dignity of the
nation and the rights of our citizens, might have ended in defeat and
disgrace instead of victory and honor, if the States who supposed it a
ruinous and unconstitutional measure, had thought they possessed the right
of nullifying the act by which it was declared, and denying supplies for
its prosecution. Hardly and unequally as those measures bore upon several
members of the Union, to the legislatures of none did this efficient and
peaceable remedy, as it is called, suggest itself. The discovery of this
important feature in our constitution was reserved to the present day. To
the statesmen of South Carolina belongs the invention, and upon the
citizens of that State will unfortunately fall the evils of reducing it to
practice.
If the doctrine of a State veto upon the laws of the Union carries with it
internal evidence of its impracticable absurdity, our constitutional
history will also afford abundant proof that it would have been repudiated
with indignation, had it been proposed to form a feature in our
Government.
In our colonial state, although dependent on another power, we very early
considered ourselves as connected by common interest with each other.
Leagues were formed for common defence, and, before the declaration of
independence, we were known in our aggregate character _as the United
Colonies of America_. That decisive and important step was taken jointly.
We declared ourselves a nation by a joint, not by several acts, and when
the terms of our confederation were reduced to form, it was in that of a
solemn league of several States, by which they agreed that they would
collectively form one nation for the purpose of conducting some certain
domestic concerns and all foreign relations. In the instrument forming
that Union is found an article which declares that "every State shall
abide by the determinations of congress on all questions which, by that
confederation, should be submitted to them."
Under the confederation, then, no State could legally annul a decision of
the congress, or refuse to submit to its execution; but no provision was
made to enforce these decisions. Congress made requisitions, but they were
not complied with. The government could not operate on individuals. They
had no judiciary, no means of collecting revenue.
But the defects of the confederation need not be detailed. Under its
operation we could scarcely be called a nation. We had neither prosperity
at home nor consideration abroad. This state of things could not be
endured, and our present happy constitution was formed, but formed in
vain, if this fatal doctrine prevails. It was formed for important objects
that are announced in the preamble made in the name and by the authority
of the people of the United States, whose delegates framed, and whose
conventions approved it. The most important among these objects, that
which is placed first in the rank, on which all others rest, is, "_to form
a more perfect Union_." Now, is it possible that even if there were no
express provision giving supremacy to the constitution and laws of the
United States over those of the States--can it be conceived, that an
instrument made for the purpose of "_forming a more perfect Union_" than
that of the confederation, could be so constructed by the assembled wisdom
of our country as to substitute for that confederation a form of
government dependent for its existence on the local interest, the party
spirit of a State, or of a prevailing faction in a State? Every man of
plain, unsophisticated understanding, who hears the question, will give
such an answer as will preserve the Union. Metaphysical subtlety, in
pursuit of an impracticable theory, could alone have devised one that is
calculated to destroy it.
I consider, then, the power to annul a law of the United States, assumed
by one State, _incompatible with the existence of the Union, contradicted
expressly by the letter of the constitution, unauthorized by its spirit,
inconsistent with every principle on which it was founded, and destructive
of the great object for which it was formed_.
After this general view of the leading principle, we must examine the
particular application of it which is made in the ordinance.
The preamble rests its justification on those grounds: It assumes, as a
fact, that the obnoxious laws, although they purport to be laws for
raising revenue, were in reality intended for the protection of
manufactures, which purpose it asserts to be unconstitutional; that the
operation of these laws is unequal; that the amount raised by them is
greater than is required by the wants of the government; and, finally,
that the proceeds are to be applied to objects unauthorized by the
constitution. These are the only causes alleged to justify an open
opposition to the laws of the country, and a threat of seceding from the
Union, if any attempt should be made to enforce them. The first virtually
acknowledges that the law in question was passed under a power expressly
given by the constitution to lay and collect imposts; but its
constitutionality is drawn in question from the _motives_ of those who
passed it. However apparent this purpose may be in the present case,
nothing can be more dangerous than to admit the position that an
unconstitutional purpose, entertained by the members who assent to a law
enacted under a constitutional power, shall make the law void: for how is
that purpose to be ascertained? Who is to make the scrutiny? How often may
bad purposes be falsely imputed--in how many cases are they concealed by
false professions--in how many is no declaration of motive made? Admit
this doctrine, and you give to the States an uncontrolled right to decide,
and every law may be annulled under this pretext. If, therefore, the
absurd and dangerous doctrine should be admitted, that a State may annul
an unconstitutional law, or one that it deems such, it will not apply to
the present case.
The next objection is, that the laws in question operate unequally. This
objection may be made with truth to every law that has been or can be
passed. The wisdom of man never yet contrived a system of taxation that
would operate with perfect equality. If the unequal operation of a law
makes it unconstitutional, and if all laws of that description may be
abrogated by any State for that cause, then indeed is the Federal
Constitution unworthy of the slightest effort for its preservation. We
have hitherto relied on it as the perpetual bond of our Union. We have
received it as the work of the assembled wisdom of the nation. We have
trusted to it as to the sheet anchor of our safety in the stormy times of
conflict with a foreign or domestic foe. We have looked to it with sacred
awe as the palladium of our liberties, and with all the solemnities of
religion have pledged to each other our lives and fortunes here, and our
hopes of happiness hereafter, in its defence and support. Were we
mistaken, my countrymen, in attaching this importance to the Constitution
of our country? Was our devotion paid to the wretched, inefficient,
clumsy, contrivance which this new doctrine would make it? Did we pledge
ourselves to the support of an airy nothing--a bubble that must be blown
away by the first breath of disaffection? Was this self-destroying,
visionary theory, the work of the profound statesmen, the exalted
patriots, to whom the task of constitutional reform was entrusted? Did the
name of Washington sanction, did the States deliberately ratify such an
anomaly in the history of fundamental legislation? No. We were not
mistaken. The letter of this great instrument is free from this radical
fault; its language directly contradicts the imputation; its spirit--its
evident intent, contradicts it. No, we did not err! Our Constitution does
not contain the absurdity of giving power to make laws, and another power
to resist them. The sages whose memory will always be reverenced, have
given us a practical, and, as they hoped, a permanent constitutional
compact. The Father of his Country did not affix his revered name to so
palpable an absurdity. Nor did the States, when they severally ratified
it, do so under the impression that a veto on the laws of the United
States was reserved to them, or that they could exercise it by
implication. Search the debates in all their Conventions, examine the
speeches of the most zealous opposers of federal authority, look at the
amendments that were proposed--they are all silent--not a syllable
uttered, not a vote given, not a motion made, to correct the explicit
supremacy given to the laws of the Union over those of the States, or to
show that implication, as is now contended, could defeat it. No, we have
not erred! The Constitution is still the object of our reverence, the bond
of our Union, our defence in danger, the source of our prosperity in
peace; it shall descend as we have received it, uncorrupted by sophistical
construction, to our posterity, and the sacrifices of local interest, of
State prejudices, of personal animosities, that were made to bring it into
existence, will again be patriotically offered for its support.
The two remaining objections made by the ordinance to these laws, are that
the sums intended to be raised by them are greater than are required, and
that the proceeds will be unconstitutionally employed.
The Constitution has given, expressly, to Congress the right of raising
revenue, and of determining the sum the public exigencies will require.
The States have no control over the exercise of this right other than that
which results from the power of changing the representatives who abuse it,
and thus procure redress. Congress may, undoubtedly, abuse this
discretionary power; but the same may be said of others with which they
are vested. Yet the discretion must exist somewhere. The Constitution has
given it to the representatives of all the people, checked by the
representatives of the States, and by the Executive power. The South
Carolina construction gives it to the Legislature or the Convention of a
single State, where neither the people of the different States, nor the
States in their separate capacity, nor the Chief Magistrate elected by the
people, have any representation. Which is the most discreet disposition of
the power? I do not ask you, fellow citizens, which is the constitutional
disposition--that instrument speaks a language not to be misunderstood.
But if you were assembled in general Convention, which would you think the
safest depository of this discretionary power in the last resort? Would
you add a clause giving it to each of the States, or would you sanction
the wise provisions already made by your Constitution? If this should be
the result of your deliberations when providing for the future, are you,
can you be ready, to risk all that we hold dear, to establish, for a
temporary and a local purpose, that which you must acknowledge to be
destructive, and even absurd, as a general provision? Carry out the
consequences of this right vested in the different States, and you must
perceive that the crisis your conduct presents at this day would recur
whenever any law of the United States displeased any of the States, and
that we should soon cease to be a nation.
The ordinance, with the same knowledge of the future that characterizes a
former objection, tells you that the proceeds of the tax will be
unconstitutionally applied. If this could be ascertained with certainty,
the objection would, with more propriety, be reserved for the law so
applying the proceeds, but surely cannot be urged against the laws levying
the duty.
These are the allegations contained in the ordinance. Examine them
seriously, my fellow-citizens; judge for yourselves. I appeal to you to
determine whether they are so clear, so convincing, as to leave no doubt
of their correctness; and even if you should come to this conclusion, how
far they justify the reckless, destructive course which you are directed
to pursue. Review these objections, and the conclusions drawn from them,
once more. What are they? Every law, then, for raising revenue, according
to the South Carolina ordinance, may be rightfully annulled, unless it be
so framed as no law ever will or can be framed. Congress have a right to
pass laws for raising a revenue, and each State has a right to oppose
their execution--two rights directly opposed to each other; and yet is
this absurdity supposed to be contained in an instrument drawn for the
express purpose of avoiding collisions between the States and the general
government, by an assembly of the most enlightened statesmen and purest
patriots ever embodied for a similar purpose.