and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; in vain have they
provided that they shall have power to pass laws, which shall be necessary
and proper to carry those powers into execution; that those laws and that
constitution shall be the "supreme law of the land, and that the judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws
of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." In vain have the people of
the several States solemnly sanctioned these provisions, made them their
paramount law, and individually sworn to support them whenever they were
called on to execute any office. Vain provisions! ineffectual
restrictions! vile profanation of oaths! miserable mockery of legislation!
if the bare majority of the voters in any one State may, on a real or
supposed knowledge of the intent with which a law has been passed, declare
themselves free from its operation--say here it gives too little, there
too much, and operates unequally--here it suffers articles to be free that
ought to be taxed--there it taxes those that ought to be free--in this
case the proceeds are intended to be applied to purposes which we do not
approve--in that the amount raised is more than is wanted. Congress, it is
true, are invested by the constitution with the right of deciding these
questions according to their sound discretion; congress is composed of the
representatives of all the States, and of all the people of all the
States; but we, part of the people of one State, to whom the constitution
has given no power on the subject, from whom it has expressly taken it
away--we, who have solemnly agreed that this constitution shall be our
law--we, most of whom have sworn to support it--we now abrogate this law,
and swear and force others to swear that it shall not be obeyed; and we do
this, not because congress have no right to pass such laws--this we do not
allege--but because they have passed them with improper views. They are
unconstitutional from the motives of those who passed them, which we can
never with certainty know; from their unequal operation, although it is
impossible, from the nature of things, that they should be equal; and from
the disposition which we presume may be made of their proceeds, although
that disposition has not been declared. This is the plain meaning of the
ordinance, in relation to laws which it abrogates for alleged
unconstitutionality. But it does not stop there. It repeals, in express
terms, an important part of the constitution itself, and of laws passed to
give it effect, which have never been alleged to be unconstitutional. The
constitution declares that the judicial powers of the United States extend
to cases arising under the laws of the United States; and that such laws,
the constitution, and treaties, shall be paramount to the State
constitutions and laws. The judiciary act prescribes the mode by which the
case may be brought before a court of the United States by appeal, when a
State tribunal shall decide against this provision of the constitution.
The ordinance declares that there shall be no appeal, makes the State law
paramount to the constitution and laws of the United States, forces judges
and jurors to swear that they will disregard their provisions, and even
makes it penal in a suitor to attempt relief by appeal. It further
declares, that it shall not be lawful for the authorities of the United
States, or of that State, to enforce the payment of duties imposed by the
revenue laws within its limits.
Here is a law of the United States, not even pretended to be
unconstitutional, repealed by the authority of a small majority of the
voters of a single State. Here is a provision of the constitution, which
is solemnly abrogated by the same authority.
On such expositions and reasonings, the ordinance grounds not only an
assertion of the right to annul the laws, of which it complains, but to
enforce it by a threat of seceding from the Union, if any attempt is made
to execute them.
This right to secede is deduced from the nature of the constitution, which
they say is a compact between sovereign States, who have preserved their
whole sovereignty, and therefore are subject to no superior; that because
they made the compact, they can break it, when, in their opinion, it has
been departed from by the other States. Fallacious as this course of
reasoning is, it enlists State pride, and finds advocates in the honest
prejudices of those, who have not studied the nature of our government
sufficiently to see the radical error, on which it rests.
The people of the United States formed the constitution, acting through
the State legislatures in making the compact, to meet and discuss its
provisions, and acting in separate conventions, when they ratified those
provisions; but the terms used in its construction, show it to be a
government, in which the people of all the States collectively are
represented. We are _one people_ in the choice of president and vice
president. Here the States have no other agency, than to direct the mode
in which the votes shall be given. The candidates having a majority of all
the votes are chosen. The electors of a majority of States may have given
their votes for one candidate, and yet another may be chosen. The people,
then, and not the States, are represented in the executive branch.
In the house of representatives there is this difference, that the people
of one State do not, as in the case of president and vice president, all
vote for the same officers. The people of all the States do not vote for
all the members, each State electing only its own representatives. But
this creates no material distinction. When chosen, they are all
representatives of the United States, not representatives of the
particular State from whence they come. They are paid by the United
States, not by the State; nor are they accountable to it for any act done
in the performance of their legislative functions; and however they may in
practice, as it is their duty to do, consult and prefer the interests of
their particular constituents, when they come in conflict with any other
partial or local interest, yet it is their first and highest duty, as a
representative of the United States, to promote the general good.
The constitution of the United States, then, forms a _government_, not a
league; and whether it be formed by compact between the States, or in any
other manner, its character is the same. It is a government, in which all
the people are represented, which operates directly on the people
individually, not upon the States; they retained all the power they did
not grant. But each State having expressly parted with so many powers, as
to constitute jointly with the other States a single nation, cannot from
that period possess any right to secede, because such secession does not
break a league, but destroys the unity of a nation; and any injury to that
unity is not only a breach, which would result from the contravention of a
compact, but it is an offence against the whole Union. To say that any
State may at pleasure secede from the Union, is to say that the United
States are not a nation; because it would be a solecism to contend, that
any part of a nation might dissolve its connection with the other parts,
to their injury or ruin, without committing any offence. Secession, like
any other revolutionary act, may be morally justified by the extremity of
oppression; but to call it a constitutional right, is confounding the
meaning of terms; and can only be done through gross error, or to deceive
those, who are willing to assert a right, but would pause before they made
a revolution, or incur the penalties consequent on a failure.
Because the Union was formed by compact, it is said the parties to that
compact may, when they feel themselves aggrieved, depart from it; but it
is precisely because it is a compact, that they cannot. A compact is an
agreement, or binding obligation. It may, by its terms, have a sanction or
penalty for its breach, or it may not. If it contains no sanction, it may
be broken with no other consequence than moral guilt; if it have a
sanction, then the breach incurs the designated or implied penalty. A
league between independent nations generally has no sanction, other than a
moral one; or, if it should contain a penalty, as there is no common
superior, it cannot be enforced. A government, on the contrary, always
has a saction, express or implied; and in our case, it is both necessarily
implied, and expressly given. An attempt by force of arms to destroy a
government, is an offence, by whatever means the constitutional compact
may have been formed; and such government has the right, by the law of
self-defence, to pass acts for punishing the offender, unless that right
is modified, restrained, or resumed by the constitutional act. In our
system, although it is modified in the case of treason, yet authority is
expressly given to pass all laws necessary to carry its powers into
effect, and under this grant provision has been made for punishing acts,
which obstruct the due administration of the laws.
It would seem superfluous to add anything to show the nature of that
Union, which connects us; but as erroneous opinions on this subject are
the foundation of doctrines the most destructive to our peace, I must give
some further development to my views on this subject. No one,
fellow-citizens, has a higher reverence for the reserved rights of the
States, than the magistrate, who now addresses you. No one would make
greater personal sacrifices, or official exertions to defend them from
violation; but equal care must be taken to prevent, on their part, an
improper interference with, or resumption of the rights they have vested
in the nation. The line has not been so distinctly drawn, as to avoid
doubts in some cases of the exercise of power. Men of the best intentions,
and soundest views, may differ in their construction of some parts of the
constitution; but there are others, on which dispassionate reflection can
leave no doubt. Of this nature appears to be the assumed right of
secession. It rests, as we have seen, on the alleged undivided sovereignty
of the States, and on their having formed, in this sovereign capacity, a
compact, which is called the constitution, from which, because they made
it, they have the right to secede. Both of these positions are erroneous,
and some of the arguments to prove them so have been anticipated.
The States severally have not retained their entire sovereignty. It has
been shown, that, in becoming parts of a nation, not members of a league,
they surrendered many of their essential parts of sovereignty. The right
to make treaties, declare war, levy taxes, exercise exclusive judicial
and legislative powers, were all of them functions of sovereign power. The
States, then, for all these purposes, were no longer sovereign. The
allegiance of their citizens was transferred, in the first instance, to
the government of the United States; they became American citizens, and
owed obedience to the constitution of the United States, and to laws made
in conformity with the powers it vested in congress. This last position
has not been, and cannot be denied. How, then, can that State be said to
be sovereign and independent whose citizens owe obedience to laws not made
by it, and whose magistrates are sworn to disregard those laws when they
come in conflict with those passed by another? What shows conclusively
that the States cannot be said to have reserved an undivided sovereignty,
is, that they expressly ceded the right to punish treason, not treason
against their separate power, but treason against the United States.
Treason is an offence against _sovereignty_, and sovereignty must reside
with the power to punish it. But the reserved rights of the States are not
less sacred because they have, for their common interest, made the general
government the depository of these powers.
The unity of our political character (as has been shown for another
purpose) commenced with its very existence. Under the royal government we
had no separate character: our opposition to its oppressions began as
_united colonies_. We were the _United States_ under the confederation,
and the name was perpetuated, and the Union rendered more perfect by the
federal constitution. In none of these stages did we consider ourselves in
any other light than as forming one nation. Treaties and alliances were
made in the name of all. Troops were raised for the joint defence. How,
then, with all these proofs, that under all changes of our position we
had, for designated purposes and with defined powers, created national
governments; how is it, that the most perfect of those several modes of
union should now be considered as a mere league, that may be dissolved at
pleasure? It is from an abuse of terms. "Compact" is used as synonymous
with "league," although the true term is not employed, because it would
at once show the fallacy of the reasoning. It would not do to say, that
our constitution was only a league; but it is labored to prove it a
compact, (which in one sense it is,) and then to argue, that, as a league
is a compact, every compact between nations must of course be a league,
and that from such an engagement every sovereign power has a right to
recede. But it has been shown, that in this sense the States are not
sovereign, and that even if they were, and the national constitution had
been formed by compact, there would be no right in any one State to
exonerate itself from its obligations.
So obvious are the reasons, which forbid this secession, that it is
necessary only to allude to them. The Union was formed for the benefit of
all. It was produced by mutual sacrifices of interests and opinions. Can
those sacrifices be recalled? Can the States, who magnanimously
surrendered their title to the territories of the west, recall the grant?
Will the inhabitants of the inland States agree to pay the duties, that
may be imposed without their assent, by those on the Atlantic or the Gulf,
for their own benefit? Shall there be a free port in one State, and
onerous duties in another? No one believes, that any right exists, in a
single State, to involve the others in these and countless other evils,
contrary to the engagements solemnly made. Every one must see, that the
other States, in self-defence, must oppose it at all hazards.
These are the alternatives, that are presented by the convention: A repeal
of all the acts for raising revenue, leaving the government without the
means of support; or an acquiescence in the dissolution of our Union by
the secession of one of its members. When the first was proposed, it was
known, that it could not be listened to for a moment. It was known, if
force was applied to oppose the execution of the laws, that it must be
repelled by force; that congress could not, without involving itself in
disgrace, and the country in ruin, accede to the proposition; and yet, if
this is not done on a given day, or if any attempt is made to execute the
laws, the State is, by the ordinance, declared to be out of the Union. The
majority of a convention assembled for the purpose have dictated these
terms, or rather this rejection of all terms, in the name of the people
of South Carolina. It is true, that the governor of the State speaks of
the submission of their grievances to a convention of all the States,
which, he says, they "sincerely and anxiously seek and desire." Yet this
obvious and constitutional mode of obtaining the sense of the other
States, on the construction of the federal compact, and amending it if
necessary, has never been attempted by those, who have urged the State on
to this destructive measure. The State might have proposed the call for a
general convention to the other States; and congress, if a sufficient
number of them concurred, must have called it. But the first magistrate of
South Carolina, when he expressed a hope, that, "on a review by congress
and the functionaries of the general government of the merits of the
controversy," such a convention will be accorded to them, must have known,
that neither congress, nor any functionary of the general government, has
authority to call such a convention, unless it be demanded by two-thirds
of the States. This suggestion, then, is another instance of the reckless
inattention to the provisions of the constitution, with which this crisis
has been madly hurried on; or of the attempt to persuade the people, that
a constitutional remedy had been sought and refused. If the legislature of
South Carolina "anxiously desire" a general convention to consider their
complaints, why have they not made application for it, in the way the
constitution points out? The assertion, that they "earnestly seek" it, is
completely negatived by the omission.
This, then, is the position in which we stand. A small majority of the
citizens of one State in the Union have elected delegates to a State
Convention; that Convention has ordained that all the revenue laws of the
United States must be repealed, or that they are no longer a member of
this Union. The Governor of that State has recommended to the Legislature
the raising of an army to carry the secession into effect, and that he may
be empowered to give clearances to vessels in the name of the State. No
act of violent opposition to the laws has yet been committed, but such a
state of things is hourly apprehended; and it is the intent of this
instrument to proclaim, not only that the duty imposed on me by the
Constitution "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed," shall be
performed to the extent of the powers already vested in me by law, or of
such others as the wisdom of Congress shall devise and entrust to me for
that purpose, but to warn the citizens of South Carolina who have been
deluded into an opposition to the laws, of the danger they will incur by
obedience to the illegal and disorganizing ordinance of the Convention; to
exhort those who have refused to support it to persevere in their
determination to uphold the Constitution and laws of their country; and to
point out to all the perilous situation into which the good people of that
State have been led, and that the course they are urged to pursue is one
of ruin and disgrace to the very State whose rights they affect to
support.
Fellow citizens of my native State, let me not only admonish you, as the
First Magistrate of our common country, not to incur the penalty of its
laws, but use the influence that a father would over his children whom he
saw rushing to certain ruin. In that paternal language, with that paternal
feeling, let me tell you, my countrymen, that you are deluded by men who
are either deceived themselves, or wish to deceive you. Mark under what
pretences you have been led on to the brink of insurrection and treason,
on which you stand! First, a diminution of the value of your staple
commodity, lowered by over production in other quarters, and the
consequent diminution in the value of your lands, were the sole effect of
the tariff laws.
The effect of those laws was confessedly injurious, but the evil was
greatly exaggerated by the unfounded theory you were taught to believe,
that its burthens were in proportion to your exports, not to your
consumption of imported articles. Your pride was roused by the assertion
that a submission to those laws was a state of vassalage, and that
resistance to them was equal, in patriotic merit, to the opposition our
fathers offered to the oppressive laws of Great Britain. You were told
that this opposition might be peaceably--might be constitutionally made;
that you might enjoy all the advantages of the Union, and bear none of its
burthens. Eloquent appeals to your passions, to your State pride, to your
native courage, to your sense of real injury, were used to prepare you for
the period when the mask, which concealed the hideous features of
disunion, should be taken off. It fell, and you were made to look with
complacency on objects which, not long since, you would have regarded with
horror. Look back to the arts which have brought you to this state--look
forward to the consequences to which it must inevitably lead! Look back to
what was first told you as an inducement to enter into this dangerous
course. The great political truth was repeated to you, that you had the
revolutionary right of resisting all laws that were palpably
unconstitutional and intolerably oppressive; it was added that the right
to nullify a law rested on the same principle, but that it was a peaceable
remedy! This character which was given to it, made you receive, with too
much confidence, the assertions that were made of the unconstitutionality
of the law and its oppressive effects. Mark, my fellow citizens, that, by
the admission of your leaders, the unconstitutionality must be _palpable_,
or it will not justify either resistance or nullification! What is the
meaning of the word _palpable_, in the sense in which it is here used?
that which is apparent to every one; that which no man of ordinary
intellect will fail to perceive. Is the unconstitutionality of these laws
of that description? Let those among your leaders who once approved and
advocated the principle of protective duties, answer the question; and let
them choose whether they will be considered as incapable, then, of
perceiving that which must have been apparent to every man of common
understanding, or as imposing upon your confidence, and endeavoring to
mislead you now. In either case, they are unsafe guides in the perilous
path they urge you to tread. Ponder well on this circumstance, and you
will know how to appreciate the exaggerated language they address to you.
They are not champions of liberty emulating the fame of our revolutionary
fathers; nor are you an oppressed people, contending, as they repeat to
you, against worse than colonial vassalage.
You are free members of a flourishing and happy Union. There is no settled
design to oppress you. You have indeed felt the unequal operation of laws
which may have been unwisely, not unconstitutionally passed; but that
inequality must necessily be removed. At the very moment when you were
madly urged on to the unfortunate course you have begun, a change in
public opinion had commenced. The nearly approaching payment of the public
debt, and the consequent necessity of a diminution of duties, had already
produced a considerable reduction, and that, too, on some articles of
general consumption in your State. The importance of this change was
underrated, and you were authoritatively told that no further alleviation
of your burthens were to be expected at the very time when the condition
of the country imperiously demanded such a modification of the duties as
should reduce them to a just and equitable scale. But, as if apprehensive
of the effect of this change in allaying your discontents, you were
precipitated into the fearful state in which you now find yourselves.