_States_ agree to become members of a larger _one_, which they intend
to form. It is a kind of assemblage of societies, that constitute a
new one, capable of increasing by means of new associations, till they
arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the
security of the united body.
"'A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, may
support itself without any internal corruption. The form of this
society prevents all manner of inconveniences.
"'If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme authority, he
could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the
confederate States. Were he to have too great influence over one, this
would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a part, that which would still
remain free might oppose him with forces, independent of those which
he had usurped, and overpower him before he could be settled in his
usurpation.
"'Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate
States, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one
part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The State may be
destroyed on one side and not on the other; the confederacy may be
dissolved and the confederates preserve their sovereignty.
"'As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys the
internal happiness of each, and with respect to its external
situation, it is possessed, by means of the association, of all the
advantages of large monarchies.'
"I have thought it proper to quote at length these interesting
passages, because they contain a luminous abridgment of the principal
arguments in favor of the Union, and must effectually remove the false
impressions which a misapplication of the other parts of the work were
calculated to produce. They have, at the same time, an intimate
connection with the more immediate design of this paper; which is to
illustrate the tendency of the Union to repress domestic faction and
insurrection.
"A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised between a
_confederacy_ and a _consolidation_ of the States. The essential
characteristic of the first, is said to be the restriction of its
authority to the members in their collective capacities, without
reaching to the individuals of whom they are composed. It is contended
that the national council ought to have no concern with any object of
internal administration. An exact equality of suffrage between the
members, has also been insisted upon as a leading feature of a
confederate government. These positions are, in the main, arbitrary;
they are supported neither by principle nor precedent. It has indeed
happened, that governments of this kind have generally operated in the
manner which the distinction taken notice of supposes to be inherent
in their nature; but there have been in most of them extensive
exceptions to the practice, which serve to prove, as far as example
will go, that there is no absolute rule on the subject. And it will be
clearly shown, in the course of this investigation, that, as far as
the principle contended for has prevailed, it has been the cause of
incurable disorder and imbecility in the government.
"The definition of a _confederate republic_ seems simply to be 'an
assemblage of societies,' or an association of two or more States into
one State. The extent, modifications, and objects of the federal
authority are mere matters of discretion. So long as the separate
organization of the members be not abolished, so long as it exists by
a constitutional necessity for local purposes, though it should be in
perfect subordination to the general authority of the Union, it would
still be, in fact and theory, an association of States, or a
confederacy The proposed constitution, so far from implying an
abolition of the State government, makes them constituent parts of the
national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the
senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive, and very
important, portions of the sovereign power. This fully corresponds, in
every rational import of the terms, with the idea of a federal
government.
"In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three CITIES, or
republics, the largest were entitled to _three_ votes in the COMMON
COUNCIL, those of the middle class to _two_, and the smallest to
_one_. The COMMON COUNCIL had the appointment of all the judges and
magistrates of the respective CITIES. This was certainly the most
delicate species of interference in their internal administration; for
if there be anything that seems exclusively appropriated to the local
jurisdictions, it is the appointment of their own officers. Yet
Montesquieu, speaking of this association, says, 'Were I to give a
model of an excellent confederate republic, it would be that of
Lycia.' Thus we perceive that the distinctions insisted upon were not
within the contemplation of this enlightened writer, and we shall be
led to conclude that they are the novel refinements of an erroneous
theory."
The important paper just quoted from the "Federalist," is from the gifted
pen of James Madison, so long a prominent and leading statesman in the
democratic party, and one of the framers of our present government. Had we
space we would quote another, equally important, from the same source and
upon the same subject.
This paper, its pointed facts and its powerful reasoning in favor of a
stable Union, such as was contemplated by the present constitution, and
against the defects of the old confederation, we commend to the particular
attention of the thinking masses of the present democratic party. Although
written before the adoption of the existing constitution, and for the
express purpose of inducing the people to ratify that constitution, it
contains much that is applicable to the present political juncture,
inasmuch as the present secession dogmas of South Carolina and of the
Calhoun school of politicians are exactly the loose, inefficient
principles of that old confederation, and opposed to those of the present
constitution.
We will here make an extract from another paper of the "Federalist," to
show how Jay, Madison and Hamilton regarded the defects of that
confederation--to illustrate, with clearness, the _absolute necessity_ of
the adoption of our present constitution, considering, as they did, that
it would constitute an efficient remedy for those defects:
"CONCERNING THE DEFECTS OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION, IN RELATION TO
THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGISLATION FOR THE STATES IN THEIR COLLECTIVE
CAPACITIES.
"In the course of the preceding papers, I have endeavored, my fellow
citizens, to place before you, in a clear and convincing light, the
importance of union to your political safety and happiness. I have
unfolded to you a complication of dangers to which you would be
exposed, should you permit that sacred knot, which binds the people of
America together, to be severed or dissolved by ambition or by
avarice, by jealousy or by misrepresentation. In the sequel of the
inquiry, through which I propose to accompany you, the truths intended
to be inculcated will receive further confirmation from facts and
arguments hitherto unnoticed.
"In pursuance of the plan which I have laid down for the discussion of
the subject, the point next in order to be examined is the
'insufficiency of the present confederation to the preservation of the
Union.'
"It may perhaps be asked what need there is of reasoning or proof to
illustrate a position which is neither controverted nor doubted; to
which the understandings and feelings of all classes of men assent;
and which, in substance is admitted by the opponents as well as by the
friends of the new constitution? It must in truth be acknowledged,
that however these may differ in other respects, they in general
appear to harmonize in the opinion, that there are material
imperfections in our national system, and that something is necessary
to be done to rescue us from impending anarchy. The facts that support
this opinion are no longer objects of speculation. They have forced
themselves upon the sensibility of the people at large, and have at
length extorted from those whose mistaken policy has had the principal
share in precipitating the extremity at which we have arrived, a
reluctant confession of the reality of many of those defects in the
scheme of our federal government, which have been long pointed out and
regretted by the intelligent friends of the Union.
"We may indeed with propriety, be said to have reached almost the last
stage of national humiliation. There is scarcely anything that can
wound the pride, or degrade the character, of an independent people,
which we do not experience. Are there engagements, to the performance
of which we are held by every tie respectable among men? These are the
subjects of constant and unblushing violation. Do we owe debts to
foreigners, and to our own citizens, contracted in a time of imminent
peril, for the preservation of our political existence? These remain
without any proper or satisfactory provision for their discharge. Have
we valuable territories and important posts in the possession of a
foreign power, which, by express stipulations, ought long since to
have been surrendered? These are still retained, to the prejudice of
our interest not less than of our rights. Are we in a condition to
resent or to repel the aggression? We have neither troops, nor
treasury, nor government.[2] Are we even in a condition to remonstrate
with dignity? The just imputations on our own faith, in respect to the
same treaty, ought first to be removed. Are we entitled, by nature and
compact, to a free participation in the navigation of the Mississippi?
Spain excludes us from it. Is public credit an indispensable resource
in time of public danger? We seem to have abandoned its cause as
desperate and irretrievable. Is commerce of importance to national
wealth? Ours is at the lowest point of declension. Is respectability
in the eyes of foreign powers, a safeguard against foreign
encroachments? The imbecility of our government even forbids them to
treat with us: Our ambassadors abroad are the mere pageants of mimic
sovereignty. Is a violent and unnatural decrease in the value of land
a symptom of national distress? The price of improved land, in most
parts of the country, is much lower than can be accounted for by the
quantity of waste land at market, and can be only fully explained by
that want of private and public confidence, which are so alarmingly
prevalent among all ranks, and which have a direct tendency to
depreciate property of every kind. Is private credit the friend and
patron of industry? That most useful kind which relates to borrowing
and lending, is reduced within the narrowest limits, and this still
more from an opinion of insecurity than from a scarcity of money. To
shorten an enumeration of particulars which can afford neither
pleasure nor instruction, it may in general be demanded, what
indication is there of national disorder, poverty, and insignificance,
that could befal a community so peculiarly blessed with natural
advantages as we are, which does not form a part of the dark catalogue
of our public misfortunes?
"This is the melancholy situation to which we have been brought by
those very maxims and councils, which would now deter us from adopting
the proposed constitution; and which, not content with having
conducted us to the brink of a precipice, seem resolved to plunge us
into the abyss that awaits us below. Here, my countrymen, impelled by
every motive that ought to influence an enlightened people, let us
make firm stand for our safety, our tranquility, our dignity, our
reputation. Let us at last break the fatal charm which has too long
seduced us from the paths of felicity and prosperity.
"It is true, as has been before observed, that facts too stubborn to
be resisted, have produced a species of general assent to the abstract
proposition, that there exist material defects in our national system;
but the usefulness of the concession, on the part of the old
adversaries of federal measures, is destroyed by a strenuous
opposition to a remedy, upon the only principles that can give it a
chance of success. While they admit that the government of the United
States is destitute of energy, they contend against conferring upon it
those powers which are requisite to supply that energy. They seem
still to aim at things repugnant and irreconcilable; at an
augmentation of federal authority, without a diminution of State
authority; at sovereignty in the Union, and complete independence in
the members. They still, in fine, seem to cherish with blind devotion
the political monster of an _imperium in imperio_. This renders a full
display of the principal defects of the confederation necessary, in
order to show, that the evils we experience do not proceed from minute
or partial imperfections, but from fundamental errors in the structure
of the building, which cannot be amended, otherwise than by an
alteration in the very elements and main pillars of the fabric.
"The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing
confederation, is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or
GOVERNMENTS in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as
contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of whom they consist. Though
this principle does not run through all the powers delegated to the
Union, yet it pervades and governs those on which the efficacy of the
rest depends."
A violation of any of the articles of the old confederation was the act
only of the States, as sovereign and independent parties to a contract,
and did not implicate individuals in the crime of _treason_, if acting
_under the sanction_ of such a State. Not so, however, with individuals
under the present constitution, even though acting under the sanction of
particular States; because the present constitution is that of the
_people_ and not of the States as States in their sovereign capacity, for
the _people_ of the States have delegated to a general government, in the
constitution, certain powers, which are taken away from the States, and
cannot, therefore, be exercised by those States without subjecting the
_people_ of the States so exorcising them to punishment for _high
treason_.
To show that eminent statesmen, even before the adoption of our present
constitution, so regarded the principles of the government proposed to be
established under it, we will quote another extract from the "Federalist,"
commencing on page 102 of vol. I:
"If it be possible to construct a federal government capable of
regulating the common concerns, and preserving the general
tranquility, it must be founded, as to the objects committed to its
care, upon the REVERSE of the principle contended for by the opponents
of the proposed constitution. It must carry its agency to the PERSONS
OF THE CITIZENS. It must stand in need of no intermediate legislation;
but must itself be empowered to employ the arm of the ordinary
magistrate to execute its own resolutions. The majesty of the national
authority must be manifested through the medium of the courts of
justice. The government of the Union, like that of each State, must be
able to address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of
INDIVIDUALS, and to attract to its support those passions which have
the strongest influence upon the human heart. It must, in short,
possess all the means, and have a right to all the methods, of
executing the powers with which it is entrusted, that are possessed
and exercised by the governments of the particular States."
An argument against the adoption of our present constitution was urged by
its enemies to prevent its adoption, that it would create a central
government _too strong_--a government _so strong_ as to endanger the
reserved rights of the States. This objection is thus stated and answered
upon pages 106 and 107, vol. I, of the "Federalist:"
"It may be said, that it would tend to render the government of the
Union too powerful, and to enable it to absorb those residuary
authorities which it might be judged proper to leave with the States
for local purposes. Allowing the utmost latitude to the love of power,
which any reasonable man can require, I confess I am at a loss to
discover what temptation the persons entrusted with the administration
of the general government, could ever feel to divest the States of the
authorities of that description. The regulation of the mere domestic
police of a State appears to me to hold out slender allurements to
ambition. Commerce, finance, negotiation, and war seem to comprehend
all the objects which have charms for minds governed by that passion;
and all the powers necessary to those objects ought, in the first
instance, to be lodged in the national depository. The administration
of private justice between the citizens of the same State; the
supervision of agriculture, and of other concerns of a similar nature;
all those things, in short, which are proper to be provided for by
local legislation, can never be desirable cares of a general
jurisdiction. It is, therefore, improbable that there should exist a
disposition in the federal councils to usurp the powers with which
they are connected; because the attempt to exercise them would be as
troublesome as it would be nugatory; and the possession of them, for
that reason, would contribute nothing to the dignity, to the
importance, or to the splendor of the national government."
We will close our extracts from the luminous papers of the "Federalist,"
with the following, premising, however, that, in these fearful times of
raging secession madness, it would be well if the whole two volumes could
be put in the hands of every intelligent individual in the nation. This
extract refers again to the defects and the lamentable inefficiency of the
old confederation, as contrasted with the proposed efficiency and
stability of the government under the new constitution, a subject which
cannot be too deeply engraven upon the mind of every patriot to whatever
party he may belong. It can be found commencing upon page 131, of vol. 1,
of the "Federalist," and ending on page 133:
"Having in the three last numbers taken a summary review of the
principal circumstances and events which depict the genius and fate of
other confederate governments, I shall now proceed in the enumeration
of the most important of those defects which have hitherto
disappointed our hopes from the system established among ourselves. To
form a safe and satisfactory judgment of the proper remedy, it is
absolutely necessary that we should be well acquainted with the extent
and malignity of the disease.
"The next most palpable defect of the existing confederation, is the
total want of a SANCTION to its laws. The United States, as now
composed, have no power to exact obedience, or punish disobedience to
their resolutions, either by pecuniary mulcts, by a suspension or
divestiture of privileges, or by any other constitutional means. There
is no express delegation of authority to them to use force against
delinquent members; and if such a right should be ascribed to the
federal head, as resulting from the nature of the social compact
between the States, it must be by inference and construction, in the
face of that part of the second article, by which it is declared,
'that each State shall retain every power, jurisdiction, and right,
not _expressly_ delegated to the United States in Congress assembled.'
The want of such a right involves, no doubt, a striking absurdity, but
we are reduced to the dilemma, either of supposing that deficiency,
preposterous as it may seem, or of contravening or explaining away a
provision, which has been of late a repeated theme of the eulogies of
those who oppose the new constitution; and the omission of which, in
that plan, has been the subject of much plausible animadversion and
severe criticism. If we are unwilling to impair the force of this
applauded provision, we shall be obliged to conclude that the United
States affords the extraordinary spectacle of a government destitute
even of the shadow of constitutional power to enforce the execution of
its own laws. It will appear, from the specimens which have been
cited, that the American confederacy, in this particular, stands
discriminated from every other institution of a similar kind, and
exhibits a new and unexampled phenomenon in the political world.
"The want of a mutual guarantee of the State governments, is another
capital imperfection in the federal plan. There is nothing of this
kind declared in the articles that compose it; and to imply a tacit
guarantee from considerations of utility, would be a still more
flagrant departure from the clause which has been mentioned, than to
imply a tacit power of coercion, from the like consideration. The want
of a guarantee, though it might in its consequences endanger the
Union, does not so immediately attack its existence, as the want of a
constitutional sanction to its laws.
"Without a guarantee, the assistance to be derived from the Union in
repelling those domestic dangers, which may sometimes threaten the
existence of the State constitutions, must be renounced. Usurpation
may rear its crest in each State, and trample upon the liberties of
the people, while the national government could legally do nothing
more than behold its encroachments with indignation and regret. A
successful faction may erect a tyranny on the ruins of order and law,
while no succor could constitutionally be afforded by the Union to the
friends and supporters of the government. The tempestuous situation,
from which Massachusetts has scarcely emerged, evinces, that dangers
of this kind are not merely speculative. Who can determine what might
have been the issue of her late convulsions, if the mal-contents had
been headed by a Caesar or by a Cromwell? Who can predict what a
despotism, established in Massachusetts, would have upon the liberties
of New Hampshire or Rhode Island, of Connecticut or New York?
"The inordinate pride of State importance has suggested to some minds
an objection to the principle of a guarantee to the federal
government, as involving an officious interference in the domestic
concerns of the members. A scruple of this kind would deprive us of
one of the principal advantages to be expected from Union, and can
only flow from a misapprehension of the nature of the provision
itself. It could be no impediment to reforms of the State
constitutions by a majority of the people in a legal and peaceable
mode. This right would remain undiminished. The guarantee could only
operate against changes to be effected by violence. Towards the
prevention of calamities of this kind, too many checks cannot be
provided. The peace of society and the stability of government depend
absolutely on the efficacy of the precautions on this head. Where the
whole power of the government is in the hands of the people, there is
the less pretence for the use of violent remedies, in partial or
occasional distempers of the State. The natural cure for an
ill-administration, in a popular representative constitution, is a
change of men. A guarantee by the national authority would be as much
directed against the usurpations of rulers, as against the ferments
and outrages of faction and sedition in the community."