CHAPTER VI

EMPLOYMENT IN THE FIELD WITH INFANTRY (_contd._)

THE RETREAT

The reply of the British drummer-boy when asked by the great

Napoleon to beat the “Retreat,” is historical, and, following the

traditions of the British infantry, the word will not be found in

the index of _Infantry Training_. Nevertheless, although British

infantry never retreat, they may be called upon to perform that

most difficult operation of war--“a retirement in the face of the

enemy.”

_Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, speaking of the retreat

says: “The cavalry and other mounted troops, aided by a strong

force of artillery, will meanwhile check the enemy’s advance,

and the remainder of the force, with the exception, if possible,

of _a rear guard in support of the mounted troops_, will move as

rapidly as possible to the shelter of the rallying position and

there reorganise. Steps should be taken immediately _to secure any

bridges, defiles, or other vital points on the line of retreat_

at which the enemy’s mounted troops might intercept the force.

Commanders of retreating troops must recognise that their greatest

danger will arise from attacks in flank delivered by the enemy’s

mounted troops and horse artillery; if possible, therefore, they

should take precautions _that all ground commanding their line of

retreat is occupied by flank guards_.”

There are three distinct ways of employing machine guns with

infantry to assist in covering the retreat, as will be seen from

the portions of the above quoted in italics, viz. (1) With the rear

guard. (2) To secure vital points on the line of retreat. (3) To

occupy commanding positions on the flanks. The use of machine guns

with the rear guard will be dealt with separately, so we will see

how they should be employed to fulfil the two latter duties.

Let us suppose that the moment has arrived when the commander of

the force decides to break off the engagement and to effect a

retreat. We have already seen how the cavalry and their machine

guns will co-operate, and we may assume that their intervention

will enable the infantry to break off the fight under cover of the

fire of the rear guard and their machine guns. In anticipation

of this, the commander of the machine-gun batteries--other than

those allotted to the rear guard--will assemble them in a central

position and receive from the commander of the force his plan of

action and instructions for the co-operation of the machine guns.

These instructions should definitely state the positions to be

occupied on the line of retreat, and for how long such positions

are to be held (_e.g._ until the infantry are past such-and-such a

place, or to the last possible moment, etc.); but they should leave

all details as to unit of guns, fire positions, opening fire,

etc., to the machine-gun commander, who should be given a free hand

in carrying out his instructions. The machine-gun commander will

then issue his orders to battery commanders, allotting the battery

for the flank and the battery which is to occupy positions on the

line of retreat. In like manner the battery commander will tell off

sections to occupy certain positions, if these have already been

selected, and if not he will direct his battery to a position of

readiness and will gallop off with his section commanders to select

the positions for each section and explain the course of action to

be taken. The position of readiness must be in the vicinity of the

position to be occupied, and section commanders must take steps to

ensure that their sections keep in signalling connection with them

and can be brought up by signal to the position selected.

The choice of the position will depend upon the nature of the

country and the features favourable to delaying the enemy, but it

may be laid down that the machine guns should not be placed in

one line, but should be broken up as much as possible, so that no

two guns are at the same range. In the same way, guns placed in

well-concealed positions on the lower slopes of hills should have

the other guns of their sections higher up, where they can command

a wide extent of country and at the same time cover the retirement

of the guns below. All guns must be so placed that they can be

_retired under cover of the ground immediately they move_. The

guns on the higher ground will open fire at long range, and the

opportunity may be afforded at this stage for using “deliberate”

fire at the most rapid rate possible, in imitation of rifle fire,

for the double purpose of concealing the guns and deceiving

the enemy by causing them to believe that the position is held

by infantry. The guns at the lower position should watch their

opportunity for opening fire on a large and vulnerable target; but

should none be presented, it is possible by reserving fire to catch

the enemy in close formation should they press on when the guns

have ceased fire, thinking the position has been vacated.

It may be possible to surprise the enemy from close range at

bridge-heads or on roads through defiles leading to the line of

retreat, if guns are carefully concealed in positions commanding

such approaches. Indeed, the opportunities for ambushing pursuing

cavalry or infantry will be frequent during the early stages of a

retreat, and no chance must be lost in making the enemy pay dearly

for his temerity during the pursuit. One successful ambush by

machine guns is worth more than the most stubborn stand, for it

imposes caution as nothing else can; and caution in the pursuit

means delay, and delay spells failure. When machine guns get a

really good target at close range, the result is little short of

annihilation, and the morale effect of such a heavy loss, totally

unexpected and inflicted in a few moments, takes the life out of

the pursuit more completely than even a long stand.

The machine guns allotted to the flanks will find positions in

the way already described. These positions must be chosen along

the line of retreat so as to hold all ground from which fire can

be brought to bear on the retreating columns, and from which the

enemy can be successfully repulsed when he attempts to break

through. If there has been time to form infantry flank guards, the

machine guns will assist in strengthening their resistance, and

in covering their withdrawal. When acting alone they should open

fire on suitable targets at the longest ranges, but when supporting

infantry they may be able to reserve fire and surprise the enemy

from close range. Guns working together on a flank must keep in

touch with each other by signal, and guns should work in sections

in mutual support. A battery acting as a flank guard to a force

retreating must be prepared to occupy a front of some two or three

miles, and sections will often be in positions a mile apart in

open ground. Directly the guns have taken up positions the battery

commander should go off with scouts from each gun and select fresh

positions along the line of retreat. He will give the signal for

retirement, and if in action at the time one gun of each section

should move off first under cover of the fire of the others; or

where the situation permits, a flank section may be ordered to move

first. It must sometimes occur that the cavalry on the flanks will

be compelled to retire by a superior force, and when this is the

case machine guns in position may be able to inflict considerable

loss, should the pursuing cavalry follow them too closely while

retiring.

As soon as it is known that the main body has reached the rallying

position and is ready to hold it, the machine guns can be

withdrawn. This will not usually be possible in daylight, and as a

rule it will take place after dark. The dispositions of the machine

guns in the rallying positions will be the same as in the case with

infantry in the defence.

REAR GUARDS

The prime necessity for the machine guns with a rear guard of a

retreating force is mobility, and without this they will be of

little service and become a hindrance rather than a help.

“A rear guard carries out its mission best by compelling the

enemy’s troops to halt and deploy for attack as frequently and at

as great a distance as possible. It can usually effect this by

taking up a succession of defensive positions which the enemy must

attack in turn. When the enemy’s dispositions are nearly complete,

the rear guard moves off by successive retirements, each party as

it falls back covering the retirement of the next by its fire.

This action is repeated on the next favourable ground.... A rear

guard may also effectually check an enemy by attacking his advanced

troops as they emerge from a defile or difficult country.”[32]

Machine guns, by reason of their concentrated fire and shallow

beaten zone, are peculiarly suited for compelling troops to deploy

at long range. They are also suited for quickly taking up a

defensive position, and, when mobile, can instantly cease fire and

move off in a few moments with considerable rapidity.

Their power for suddenly developing an intense fire will enable

them quickly to overwhelm an enemy caught “emerging from a defile

or difficult country.” It would appear therefore that the machine

guns are far more fitted than infantry to perform the duties of a

rear guard as quoted above.

“The first consideration in selecting a position for the artillery

is that it shall be able to open fire on an enemy at long range,

and thus compel his infantry to assume an extended formation at

the greatest possible distance. The second is that it should be

possible to withdraw without difficulty.”[33]

When the infantry arrive within effective rifle range of the

artillery, the latter will be compelled to retire, especially if

the former are supported by cavalry. This will also be the moment

when the infantry will require to retire to a fresh position in

rear. Machine guns that have been well concealed, or which have

taken up fresh positions in good cover in rear of the infantry

line, should be able to unmask and by their fire hold off the enemy

until both guns and infantry have effected their retreat. The

facility with which they can traverse and sweep widely extended

lines, and instantly concentrate fire on any portion of it, make

them of great service in covering a retirement at effective range,

as they can render the hottest fire ineffective and aimed fire

impossible for a short time.

Machine guns with a rear guard must be prepared to work from place

to place with great rapidity, and for this purpose they must

arrange to bring the gun horses close up to their fire position.

Alternative positions are essential, but must be reached under

cover and unobserved by the enemy. Sections will act independently,

using their guns in mutual support; but the retirement of

one section may often afford another the opportunity, from a

well-chosen position on a flank, to surprise the enemy from close

range as they press forward to occupy the abandoned position.

A ruse that may sometimes be successful where guns are really well

concealed is to bring up the gun horses and retire at a gallop

by a pre-arranged signal all along the position, but leaving one

gun of each section still in position but flat on the ground,

where it will be completely concealed even from glasses. This is

almost certain to draw a hot pursuit, especially if the artillery

and infantry have retired previously, and if fire is reserved

till close range a severe check may be administered to the enemy.

“Skilfully laid ambushes will cause the enemy to move with caution

in pursuit.”[34]

Machine guns should never retire for a few hundred yards, except

where absolutely necessary for covering the retirement of those in

front. Once in position, they should only be moved to alternative

positions when discovered, and these will usually be more or less

on the same general alignment. When they retire they should move

to such a distance in rear as to give them time to select, or

if necessary improvise, good cover in the new positions and to

replenish ammunition, etc. “The positions should be sufficiently

far apart to induce the enemy, after seizing one, to re-form column

of route before advancing against the next.”[35]

General Alderson, speaking at the Aldershot Military Society in

1904 and referring to the South African War, said: “I had two

Maxims with tripod mountings on pack-saddles, which belonged to the

1st Battalion Mounted Infantry. These guns had well-trained mounted

detachments, and a pushing officer, with a good eye for ground, in

command. _They were most useful, and more than once saved the flank

of their unit from being turned by galloping up and coming into

action on the flank of the out-flanking Boers_.... I am of opinion

that if the most is to be got out of the guns, the detachments,

_even with infantry_, should be mounted.... With the detachment

mounted ... there is no question about the guns not keeping up, and

they can be sent quickly to any desired position. They can hold on

to any such position as long as required to _cover the advance or

retirement of their infantry_, and then easily catch them up or get

into another position. In fact, if the detachment is mounted the

value of the guns is more than doubled.”

Machine guns with the rear guard will certainly be exposed to

artillery fire, and they will seldom have the time or opportunity

for making sufficient cover to protect themselves. It will be

necessary therefore either to withdraw the gun on coming under

artillery fire or to find shelter from it. If good natural cover

has been obtained, it will only be necessary to lower the gun flat

on the ground behind it, and for the detachment to lie flat close

against it, when they will be practically safe. The artillery will

cease fire as soon as they find there is nothing to fire at, but

the detachment should not move for some time after this, as the

guns, having got the range, will be able to inflict considerable

damage if the detachment exposes itself.

It is always advisable to keep one or two sections in reserve with

a rear guard to be used to protect the flanks or any point where

the pursuit threatens to break through in the manner mentioned by

General Alderson. These sections should remain with the rear-guard

commander and be under his immediate command; they should be in

readiness for instant action.

OUTPOSTS

The duties of the outposts are:

(1) To provide protection against surprise.

(2) In case of attack, to gain time for the commander of the force

to put his plan of action into execution.[36]

The first duty of outposts, which is _reconnaissance_, cannot

be assisted by machine guns; but their second duty, which is

_resistance_, may be materially strengthened and aided by them,

as we have already seen in dealing with the defence. Little can

be said about tactics, and it will be necessary to use the guns

in positions on the line of resistance where their fire power is

most likely to be of value. In order clearly to understand where

and how machine guns should be used with outposts, it will be

necessary first to examine the composition and distribution of

outposts of a force of all arms. _Field Service Regulations_,

Part I., 1909, says: “When there is any possibility of a force

coming in conflict with an enemy, its commander, when halting for

the night, should first decide on his dispositions in case of

attack, and then arrange the quartering of his command and the

position of the outposts accordingly.... Command, co-operation, and

inter-communication will be facilitated by placing the advanced

troops along well-defined natural features, such as ridges,

streams, the outer edges of woods, etc., or in the vicinity of

roads, but this must not be allowed to outweigh the necessity

for making the best tactical dispositions possible. In enclosed

country, and at night, the movements of troops are generally

confined to the roads and tracks, which should be carefully

watched. If the outpost position is extensive, it may be divided

into sections, each section being numbered from the right. The

extent of a section depends upon the amount of ground which can be

supervised conveniently by one commander. The extent of frontage

to be allotted to each company will depend on the defensive

capabilities of the outpost position, and, where they exist, on

the number of approaches to be guarded. The outpost position will

invariably be strengthened and communications improved where

necessary. Piquets and supports will do this without waiting for

definite orders.... The outposts of a force of all arms consist of

outpost mounted troops, outpost companies, and, where necessary,

the reserve. Machine guns will generally be included and sometimes

artillery.... When stationary, the duty of local protection will

fall almost entirely on the infantry, most of the outposts mounted

troops being withdrawn, their place in this case being with the

reserve, if there be one. In certain cases, however, standing

mounted patrols may be left out at night with advantage....

“Machine guns with outposts may be employed to sweep approaches,

and to cover ground which an enemy in advancing may be compelled to

pass or occupy.”[37]

Machine guns must be used on the principles given above, which

naturally fall under two distinct headings, viz. use by day and

use by night. Machine guns with outposts by day will not occupy

their fire positions unless an attack is imminent, but should be

posted with the reserves in their own section of the defence. This

must not prevent emplacements or pits for the guns being made,

ranges carefully taken and written up, and everything being ready

in case of action. These positions and the subsequent action will

correspond so closely with those already suggested for infantry in

the defence in the last chapter, that they need not be repeated. By

night, however, the case is very different, and it is necessary to

select very carefully the position of each gun, so that it commands

a road, a bridge, or other ground which the enemy in advancing may

be compelled to pass or occupy. These places must be selected in

order of importance, and an endeavour made to leave no approach by

which a body of troops might move uncovered by fire. The machine

guns must occupy their positions before dark and be carefully laid

to sweep the area of ground necessary for protecting the position,

the angle of elevation of the gun being taken by clinometer

afterwards in order that it may be relaid if necessary in the dark.

Great care must be taken to conceal these guns from observation

when bringing them into position or withdrawing them, and it is

worth while going to some considerable trouble to do this. One

method of many is suggested to show what is meant. Field guns might

be placed in the positions by day and withdrawn before night, the

machine guns being brought up on the limbers and dropped in the

position behind a screen of brushwood, and withdrawn again in the

morning when the field gun is brought up.

The detachment of each machine gun must find two double sentries

and their reliefs, who will remain at their posts with the gun,

which should have the belt ready in the feed block, but not

actually loaded. These men may either take it in turn to stand to

the gun or both be directed to watch. When there are no infantry

sentries on piquet duty in front of the gun, it will be necessary

to detail two who will be posted in the usual way some little

distance in front of the gun to prevent it being rushed in the

dark. The method of preparing the sights and laying the gun for

night work is given in Chapter VII.

The value of machine guns with the outposts at night is shown

by an incident at the Battle of Mukden, March 6th, 1905. Two

Russian battalions made a night attack against the hill north of

Tung-chia-wen, which was occupied by the 2nd Japanese Regiment.

There was no moon and the night was very dark. Two Japanese machine

guns did great execution at ranges between 50 and 100 yards, and

the Russians were repulsed with a loss of 450 men, the Japanese

casualties being only 48.

CHAPTER VII

EMPLOYMENT IN FORTRESS WARFARE

The siege of Port Arthur by the Japanese and its defence by the

Russians have thrown an entirely new light on Fortress Warfare.

Although the main principles of the attack and defence remain

unchanged and the primary armament of both is still the heavy

artillery, the improvement of small-arms, their great range, and

rapid fire have materially altered the nature of the fighting in

the later stages and during the assault. The result of this has

been to prolong the defence after the fortress has been dismantled

by the bombardment, and to render the storming of a single breach

an operation no longer possible in war. The machine gun is largely

responsible for this; and when high-explosive shells have destroyed

the fortifications and disabled the artillery, the stormers will

be met by rifle fire and that of machine guns concealed among

the ruins of the works. The intensity and accuracy of this fire

will be such as to result frequently in the complete repulse of

the assault, and even when the glacis of a work has been occupied

it may be several weeks before the capture of the work itself is

effected.

Machine guns are particularly suited to the defence of

fortresses during this period, and Sir G. S. Clarke, in his book

_Fortification_, says: “The fire of the Maxim gun, delivering about

700 bullets a minute,[38] can be directed by one man, who need not

show more than his head (easily shielded) above the parapet, the

feed being tended by another man completely under cover. In the

special qualities of the machine gun there is a distinct advantage

to the defence, arising from the fact that _an intense fire over a

particular area can be suddenly developed by a few men occupying

a small space_. This, in the case of night attacks especially,

is a valuable quality. At Port Arthur the Russians in some cases

employed machine guns with good effect, concealing them so that

their fire came as a surprise to the assaulting parties. Their

portability renders them well suited for the defence of positions,

and they will doubtless form an important element in the armament

of fortresses.”

Speaking of the difficulty of “storming” the modern fortress, the

same author says: “The _vive force_ school proposed therefore--on

paper--to shell them heavily and then storm, trusting to incomplete

organisation and general unpreparedness. There is little or nothing

in military history to bear out the views of this school, and

modern experience is entirely against them. Only one such attempt

was made in 1870-1, against the indifferent provisional works of

Belfort, garrisoned mainly by _Gardes Mobiles_--and this failed

completely. The tremendous assaults on the defences of Port Arthur

may have been partially inspired by the German teaching; but the

results were discouraging, although the devoted and sustained

gallantry of the Japanese could not be surpassed and probably would

not be equalled by any European army.”

The machine guns of a fortress should be divided into two

classes--the stationary and the mobile guns. To the former will be

allotted the defence of distinct portions of the permanent works,

and they will be provided with cone and parapet mountings,[39] the

former being fixed and the latter capable of being moved within the

work to which it is allotted.

The mobile guns should be mounted on a light tripod and carried

in a low-wheeled handcart, or they may be mounted on a very light

two-wheeled carriage capable of being drawn by one man and having

wheels of small track, which can move over the narrowest roads

in the fortress. These mobile guns should not be allotted to any

particular work, but to the garrison other than those within the

forts, for use in repelling assaults and making counter-attacks.

We will deal first with the stationary machine guns. It will not be

necessary to provide a machine gun for each cone mounting, as the

guns can be easily carried from one cone to another as required.

Shields should be used with all stationary mountings, but must be

detachable, and should not be placed in position until required, as

they indicate the situation of the gun and are easily destroyed by

artillery.

The positions for machine-gun mountings in a fort must depend on

the size and construction of the work, the nature of the outer

defences, and particularly on the supporting works in the immediate

vicinity. Positions commanding the glacis and the entanglements,

on salients of works and enfilading ditches, and any dead ground

where the enemy may effect a lodgment, are suitable. Counterscarp

galleries at the angles of works flanking the ditch should

invariably have machine-gun positions, with a special loophole,

long and shallow, to enable them to sweep a wide area with fire.

The selection of the positions for machine guns in permanent works

belongs to the art of the engineer, and there is little that can be

said of their tactical employment. Fire should be reserved until

the attack has reached close range, and then only opened when the

target is large and vulnerable. Guns must be concealed by every

possible device and all the loopholes must be blinded. By night

all guns should be mounted and trained to sweep ground by which

the enemy must approach; when search-lights are not in use, the

elevation should be checked by the use of a clinometer and the

amount of traverse may be shown by chalk lines on the parapet, or

white stones placed in two rows. In this way accurate fire may be

brought to bear on the assault on the darkest night, and many night

attacks were repulsed with machine-gun fire by the Russians at Port

Arthur. Sir G. S. Clarke says: “The front faces of the forts were

retrenched in some cases by obstacles and a line of field parapet

across the terre-plein. _These, with the assistance of machine guns

brought up at the last moment_, enabled assaults of the breaches

formed by the mines to be repulsed.” Again, “The Russians used

machine guns with effect, frequently concealing them in light

blindages, so that their positions could not be detected until they

were brought to bear upon an attacking force.”

The war correspondent Mr. F. Villiers, in his book _Three Months

with the Besiegers_, speaking of the storming of West Panlung

Redoubt,[40] says: “The death-dealing machine guns of the Russians

_in the casemates of the fort_ are playing ghastly havoc--such

havoc that only a score or more of Ouchi’s battalions reached the

first ditch of the fence, where they threw themselves panting into

the grateful cover of the pits their own artillery have torn.”

The number of machine guns allotted to the permanent works of Port

Arthur is given as 38 by the United States Official Report, while

Nojine, in _The Truth about Port Arthur_, gives them in detail as

28, the distribution of which is shown in red figures on the map at

the end of Chapter IX. The ten guns unaccounted for were probably

mobile, and used for the defence of the harbour and the various

landing-places in the neighbourhood of the fortress.

The mobile machine guns of the fortress will be used on the

advanced line of defence with the mobile troops, and should be

divided into two--those allotted to the outposts and those allotted

to the local reserve.[41] Those allotted to the outposts must be

placed in carefully selected positions commanding the approaches

to the section of the defence to which they have been posted.

These positions will usually be in minor works such as redoubts,

emplacements, and lunettes, and they will be selected for their

good field of fire, particular attention being paid to their

command of dead ground in front of other works. Great care and

trouble must be taken in concealing the guns and providing them

with good cover, not only from rifle fire, but also from artillery.

An endeavour should be made to command all wire entanglements along

the front with machine guns, and the angles of traverse of each gun

should be carefully laid off and marked in white paint or tape, so

that they may be used in the dark accurately to sweep their area

of ground. Too much stress cannot be laid on the importance of the

accurate laying and sighting of machine guns by day for use at

night, and it must be remembered that they are the only weapons

which are capable of bringing a rapid and concentrated rifle fire

on a particular spot in the dark, and are therefore invaluable to

the defence during a night attack.

The detachments of guns on outpost duty at night should be told

off into three watches of two men each, whose duty it will be to

remain with the gun in readiness for instant action. The gun should

be loaded and laid, and the men on duty should watch the front.

Where the gun is in an emplacement or other loop-holed work, one

man should watch through the loophole in turns of half an hour

at a time. The strain of peering into the dark and listening for

the sound of an approach at night is so great that no man should

be required to do this duty for more than half an hour at a time,

while the chance of a man dozing during a short spell is much

reduced and the acuteness of the senses has not time to get dulled.

Very strict orders must be given to insure that fire is not opened

prematurely; and where infantry sentries are on duty near the gun,

it may be advisable not to load the gun, but merely to insert the

belt in the feed-block in readiness.

It is always advisable to have the gun ready for any emergency

at night, and the following will be found an effective method of

preparing the sights for aiming in the dark. Cut a piece of white

paper, previously prepared with luminous paint, into the shape

of a triangle, and paste it on the slide of the tangent sight so

that the apex of the triangle touches the bottom of the V of the

sight. Cut also a circular piece of a size that will fit on the

foresight just below the tip, and paste this on the foresight. On

looking over the sights in the dark, when the luminous ball on the

foresight is seen resting on the apex of the luminous triangle on

the tangent sight, the gun will be truly laid for the range for

which the sight is set.

Machine guns with the local reserves must be light and mobile; they

will be used in a similar way to those with infantry, and to assist

in counter-attacks, particularly against the advanced infantry

positions and sap-heads of the besiegers. They may also have

opportunities of enfilading a trench or firing into a work that has

been captured by the enemy. When used for this purpose they must be

brought up by hand under cover and open fire at close range from

a position that commands the interior of the trench or work, and

if possible enfilades it. Great risks are justified in bringing up

machine guns for this purpose, as the results of a successful fire

action will usually be decisive and far-reaching.

The following is an example of their use in this manner during the

siege of Port Arthur:

“On the attack on 203-Metre Hill, machine guns on Akasakayama

flanked the position and enfiladed the attackers. Four hundred

Japanese were sheltered together in a parallel, where they

were completely screened from fire from any part of 203-Metre

Hill. Suddenly two machine guns, _which had been concealed on

Akasakayama, where they could fire directly into the parallel_,

opened fire. Within a few seconds it was turned into a veritable

pandemonium, a seething mass of humanity, where men were wildly

fighting to get away, trampling on the wounded, climbing over

piles of corpses which blocked the entrance, and trying to escape

down the coverless hillside. But the Maxims did their work as

only Maxims can, and within a few moments practically the whole

force was wiped out; a few men were shot dead as they ran down

the hillside, but nearly all the others were killed in the narrow

trench. It took the Japanese days to extricate and carry away the

fearfully intermingled corpses.”[42]

There are so many instances of the successful use of machine guns

in the defence of Port Arthur that it will be impossible to quote

more than a few of the most striking to illustrate the principle on

which they should be employed.

At the third general attack on November 26th, at 2 p.m., a large

force of Japanese assaulted Sung-shu fort, and having crossed the

moat through a bomb-proof passage, they gained the parapet of the

rampart and swarmed over it. “Into this seething mass of humanity

the machine guns of the forts and batteries on An-tzu Shan poured

such a tremendous fire that the attackers were mowed down, crushed,

dispersed, and sent head over heels to the moat again in less than

half a minute, before a single man had reached the interior of the

fort. _The same fate befell a fresh attempt undertaken at five

o’clock._”[43]

Here we see the importance of machine guns being able to command

the parapet of neighbouring works, and the necessity of reserving

fire until the best possible target is presented, even though the

enemy is permitted actually to scale the parapet. The same thing

occurred at the storming of Erh-lung Fort. At midnight on November

26th the Japanese “made a desperate attempt to storm the upper

battery, but the assailants were mown down by machine guns, _as

soon as they appeared on the parapet_.”[44]

This is a good illustration of the use of machine guns at night,

and no doubt these guns had been trained by day to sweep the

parapet in anticipation of an attack after dark. “On January 28th,

1905, near Linchinpan at about 7 p.m. the Japanese attacked the

forts of Vosnesenski and the trenches near by in which were posted

two machine guns. These latter opened fire at 200 or 300 yards on a

Japanese company in line. _In one or two minutes they fired about

1,000 rounds and the Japanese company was annihilated._”[45] During

the attack on North Chi-kuan Fort on December 19th, by the 38th

Regiment under General Samayeda, which took place at 5 p.m., the

men were sent over the parapet man by man from different points, to

make it more difficult for the Russian machine gunners. “As soon as

there was a little interval in the rattling of the machine guns, a

man would jump up and run for his life, and seek shelter behind the

débris piled up in the terre-plein after the explosion, or in the

holes which the big howitzer shells had made in the ground. Though

many of the men were shot down in the short race, little by little

a force of about 150 men were assembled in the front part of the

fort, and the commander, Captain Iwamoto, then led them against

the sandbag trenches at the rear.... The fighting was mostly

hand-to-hand, _but the Russian machine guns took an important part

in the defence_, their galling fire making fearful ravages amongst

the attacking party. The Japanese, therefore, got a couple of

mountain guns hauled up on the parapet, and with them succeeded in

silencing the Maxims.”[46]

Speaking of the use of machine guns in the defence of Port Arthur,

Norregaard says: “As an active means of defence the search-light

and _machine guns_ undoubtedly come in the first rank. The Japanese

acknowledge the immense value of machine guns to the defence. The

search-lights are stationary, they say, and the ground round Port

Arthur is broken, so that they can avoid them; but the machine guns

can be moved about anywhere and can easily be shifted from place to

place by a couple of men. It is nearly impossible to detect them

and put them out of action; their effect on the Japanese was most

disastrous and time after time enabled the Russians to beat off

their attacks, inflicting severe losses. Nothing can stand against

them, and it is no wonder that the Japanese fear them and even the

bravest have a chilly feeling creeping down their backs when the

enemy’s machine guns beat their devil’s tattoo. They shoot with

amazing precision even at very long range, and they were splendidly

served.”

The U.S.A. Official Report on the siege of Port Arthur states:

“Machine guns played an important part in the siege, being freely

used by both sides.... The guns were used with telling effect

against the Japanese in the numerous bloody assaults, _being

trained to cover all the approaches with murderous fire_.” These

last words condense into a single sentence their tactics in the

defence of a fortress.

The Russians used the Maxim of ·312 calibre manufactured by

Vickers, Sons & Maxim, of London, while the Japanese used the

Hotchkiss of ·253 calibre made at the Arsenal at Tokyo. The

Japanese had 72 of these weapons at Port Arthur, immediately under

the command of the Divisional General, viz. 24 guns with each

Division.

The use of machine guns in the siege of a fortress will cover a

far wider field than in the defence, and much that has already

been written of their employment both in the attack and defence,

of positions will apply to the attack on a fortress. It cannot be

claimed for machine guns that they are as vital to the success of

the besiegers as they are to the garrison, but that they often

afford material assistance during assaults, in holding sap-heads

and repelling sorties, cannot be denied.

The details of their tactical employment with the besiegers will

differ greatly in accordance with the nature of the operations, and

particularly with the situation of the fortress and the surrounding

country. In the case of Port Arthur the broken and mountainous

nature of the terrain, the deep ravines, and rocky watercourses all

lent themselves to the employment of machine guns, and consequently

the Japanese were able to make greater use of them than would have

been the case under less favourable conditions.

It will be impossible here to do more than briefly indicate how

machine guns may be used to assist in siege operations generally,

and then show how the Japanese used them before Port Arthur.

“When the enemy’s advanced troops have been driven in and the

preliminary reconnaissance has enabled the line of investment to be

fixed, this line will be divided into sections, to which commanders

will be appointed and troops allotted.... Outposts will be

established as closely as possible round the fortress in order to

cut it off from outside communication and to protect the operations

in rear.[47] Machine guns should be allotted to these sections

in proportion to their importance in the line of investment.

The commander of the section should use them according to the

circumstances of the situation, but as a rule a large proportion of

the guns should be distributed to the outposts.... The duties of

outposts in siege operations are even more important and exacting

than they are in the field operations; in the case both of an

investment and of a regular siege the brunt of the work throughout

will fall upon the outposts.... They must therefore have greater

power of resistance than outposts in field warfare in order to

prevent the troops in rear from being disturbed by every skirmish.

The outposts of a section which is maintaining a close investment

should be about one quarter of the total infantry allotted to the

section, together with a proportion of artillery, _machine guns,

and engineers_.”[48]

The positions for the machine guns should be along the _line of

resistance_, which will usually be the piquet line. It will be

necessary to provide bomb-proof emplacements for the machine guns,

and alternative emplacements should be made for each gun. The

temptation to engage in the fire fight must be resisted, and the

machine guns should be solely employed for resisting attacks and

their fire reserved till close range. Once they have been unmasked,

it will be advisable to move them to a fresh position, leaving a

dummy gun in the old position.

In the second phase of the siege the machine guns not required

for the outpost line should be allotted to the local reserves

and the general reserve, and will be used as circumstances

require in assisting attacks on outlying works and in repelling

counter-attacks. In the third phase machine guns must be pushed

up to secure sap-heads and to assist the infantry in the

assault; they will be found specially useful in covering the

advance of assaulting infantry by sweeping parapets with fire

and in securing captured works against counter-attacks. Sandbags

should always be carried with machine guns supporting infantry

in the assault, and the first consideration should be to secure

the guns from fire on reaching a position. It must be remembered

that machine guns in siege operations are always exposed to their

worst enemy--artillery--and that their only hope of success is

by concealment and cover. An example of their use in repulsing a

counter-attack at Port Arthur is given by Nojine in his book _The

Truth about Port Arthur_. Speaking of the attempt by the Russians

to retake Chien-shan, he says: “The 13th Regiment took two-thirds

of it, but could not advance further, as the Japanese threw in

heavy reinforcements _and brought up a number of machine guns_.

On the night of the 5th we had to withdraw and abandon further

attempts to retake the position, as one attack alone had cost us

500 men.”

The following account from the U.S.A. Official Report of the

storming of Fort Erh-lung, one of the principal forts of Port

Arthur, shows how machine guns can be used to assist in the final

assault. “On December 28th the parapet of Fort Erh-lung was blown

up at 10 a.m. by five mines being simultaneously sprung.... When

the smoke cleared sufficiently, the exterior slope at the salient

of the fort was seen to be filled with a dense crowd of Japanese

infantry, who closely hugged the ground.... It appears that the

Russians had occupied the heavy gun line which lies in the interior

of the fort _and with machine guns_ raked the front parapet and

thus made it impossible for the Japanese infantry to leave their

cover on the exterior slope. Meanwhile the Japanese brought up

_three machine guns, and with these replied to the Russian fire

from the heavy line_.... The bombardment kept up without diminution

until about 1 p.m., when it slackened perceptibly on both sides....

About 4 p.m. the Japanese infantry could be seen working along the

flanks of the work on the outside of the parapet. The Russians

retired to the gorge parapet which had been arranged to fire to

the front, and maintained themselves for several hours longer. By

7.30 p.m. the Japanese had fully mastered the position, and the

largest and strongest of the permanent works on the front of attack

fell into their possession.... A large number of field and machine

guns[49] were included in the spoils of Fort Erh-lung. The assault

entailed a loss of about 1,000 men to the Japanese.”

During the attack on Wangtai Fort the Japanese used machine guns

from the high ridge N.E. of the fort, and thus brought a heavy fire

against the Russian interior line.

The Japanese invariably brought up their machine guns with the

assault and lost no time in placing them in position to hold

captured works. This is indeed their true rôle in the assault, as

they will seldom be able to support the actual stormers with fire,

but once a foothold is gained in a work, they may be invaluable for

the purpose of holding it and thus set free the storming party for

another advance.

CHAPTER VIII

EMPLOYMENT IN THE FIELD IN MINOR OPERATIONS

SMALL WARS

Callwell, in his well-known work on this subject, defines the

small war in the following terms: “It comprises the expeditions

against savages and semi-civilised races by disciplined soldiers,

it comprises campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellions and

guerilla warfare in all parts of the world where organised armies

are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in the open

field, and it thus obviously covers operations very varying in

their scope and in their conditions.”[50]

The British Empire, “upon which the sun never sets,” is seldom

without its small war in some remote part of the globe, and it is

safe to affirm that there is never a small war in which the machine

gun does not play a prominent part.

Wars against savages or semi-civilised peoples differ fundamentally

in principles and tactics from war against a civilised enemy,

and the tactics adopted will be governed by the object of the

expedition and the tactics and arms of the enemy to be dealt with.

Callwell says: “The tactics of such opponents differ so greatly in

various cases that it is essential that these be taken fully into

consideration. The armament of the enemy is also a point of extreme

importance.”

In dealing with machine-gun tactics in small wars, it is obviously

impossible to treat with all the situations that may be met with or

to attempt to lay down definite rules for their use under all the

varying conditions of country, race, and arms before mentioned. It

will therefore be sufficient for our purpose to show how machine

guns may be used generally in warfare in uncivilised countries,

and then to take a single typical campaign to illustrate their

employment.

“Against an enemy who fights outside stockades, machine guns are

very efficacious; and in any case against all uncivilised people a

sudden burst of fire from these is often most paralysing.”[51]

After speaking of the jamming of non-automatic machine guns at

Ulundi, Abu Klea, Dogali, and Tofreck, Callwell says: “On the

other hand, Maxims, which can be easily handled and moved, have

done excellent service in East Africa, in Matabililand, and in

the campaigns on the North-West Frontier of India. There can be

no doubt that machine guns of an easily portable and thoroughly

trustworthy class may be most valuable in small wars, and they

will probably be freely used in such operations in the future,

especially when the enemy is inclined to attack in mass. In hill

warfare these weapons scarcely get a proper chance, as they are not

very well suited for picking off individuals and as it is dangerous

to thrust them too far to the front with the small parties which

are so much used in operations of this class. In bush warfare

also the want of a fair target is unfavourable to them, and when

the shooting is at short range the detachment is likely to be put

_hors de combat_, as it offers such a good target; this happened

at Owikokaro. An open field of fire and a well-defined object to

aim at are almost more necessary to machine guns than to artillery.

On the defensive, machine guns can hardly fail to be valuable. In

laager, zarebas, and detached posts of all kinds they are always

likely to be of service, and to a certain extent they may take the

place of guns for such work. During the operations in Rhodesia

in 1896 they were found very useful as a protection to the small

laagers left behind by the columns when they moved out for a fight.

Two of them did tremendous execution in Chakdara Fort during the

siege of that post in 1897. It is interesting to note that at the

fight on the Shangani River in Matabililand after the attempt to

capture the king had failed, the troops, although they were in a

bad position, could not move to a better one for a while, simply

because the machine guns would have been thrown out of action

during the change of position. Against rushes of Zulus, Ghazis,

or other fanatics the effect of such weapons is tremendous, as

long as the fire is well maintained. In the excitement of the

moment the best infantry may fire unsteadily; but machine guns can

be absolutely trusted to commit destructive havoc in the hostile

throng, provided that their mechanism does not go out of order.”[52]

The above is interesting as showing the wide field for their use in

small arms and yet how narrow the method of tactical employment.

It may be summed up in a few words: a good target, a good field of

fire, constant readiness for action, and sufficient protection to

enable the gun to be handled with confidence.

Machine guns should form an integral part of the arm to which they

are attached, and must be used with them to supplement their fire

power. In attack they must seek positions from which to bring to

bear a concentrated and overwhelming fire on the main body of the

enemy, and against savages this must be from the flanks or rear

to be successful, as the object is to prevent flight and insure

decisive results. Their real value in small wars lies in their

enormous defensive powers, which may be employed in clearing

the way for columns in enclosed country, in stopping a charge

of fanatics whether mounted or on foot, and in preventing small

columns on the march from being overwhelmed by superior numbers.

It will be found that, although it is the invariable rule for the

disciplined force in a small war to assume the initiative and

attack with vigour on every possible occasion, the uncivilised

enemy, by reason of his primitive arms and tactics, generally

avoids the encounter until he is able to make an attack at a time

and on ground of his own choosing. Thus we find the disciplined

force thrown on the defensive in the early stages of the expedition

and the very heavy losses inflicted then often directly lead to a

speedy termination of the campaign. Callwell says: “The tactics

adopted by the Zulus and Mahdists when flushed with confidence

were best met at a halt in close formation, even on ground where

arms of precision could not tell with full effect. In the jungles

of Dahomey the sudden hostile attacks on flanks and rear could be

confronted most satisfactorily by the troops on the spot acting

on the defence until the edge was taken off the hostile appetite

for combat.... Where a small force of regular troops is opposed to

great hostile masses, no matter how ill-armed or how deficient in

morale the masses may be, circumstances render it almost imperative

to act on the defensive.”

For this reason alone machine guns form the most valuable arm in

encounters of this nature, and their tremendous effect cannot be

better illustrated than at Omdurman, where they literally mowed

down the attacking masses in great swathes.

The first consideration when employing machine guns in a small war

is the method of carrying the gun and its ammunition, which must

be suited to the country in which the operations are to take place.

In the majority of cases it will be found that the usual transport

of the country is the most suitable, and a tripod-mounted gun can

be adapted to almost any form of carriage. In mountainous open

country such as the North-West Frontier of India mules or ponies

are suitable; in the desert the camel has been used; while in the

forests of East Africa machine guns have been carried by porters on

their heads, strapped on their backs, or slung beneath a pole by

two men. Whatever method is adopted, it is essential that the gun

can be brought into action easily and quickly, and that it is at

least as mobile as the troops it accompanies.

The operations in Somaliland in 1901-4 are an excellent example of

one of our typical small wars, and will serve to illustrate the use

of machine guns against a savage enemy in a bush country.

The camel is the transport animal of the country and riding camels

were used to carry the machine guns with the infantry of the force.

In the first expedition, under Lieut.-Colonel Swayne, there were

three Maxim guns--two of which were ·450 bore and one a ·303. On

June 2nd, 1901, Captain McNeil, who was left in zareba at Smala

to guard the live stock, was attacked by about 3,000 Somalis, who

increased to about 5,000 on the 3rd. His force consisted of three

British officers and 500 native troops, many of whom were native

levies and only 370 of whom were armed with rifles. There were

about 3,500 camels, 100 horses, and some cattle and goats in a

separate zareba from the men who were above and able to command it.

The Maxim, under Lieutenant Younghusband and served by Somalis,

was placed on a cairn of stones at the top of the men’s zareba and

commanded a good field of fire all round. The ground was fairly

open all round, and clear of bushes for about 150 yards from the

zareba. Before the camels could be driven in, the enemy’s horsemen

appeared and threatened to capture a large head of camels, to

prevent which a section under a Jemada was sent out to try to

keep off the enemy until these camels could be driven in. Captain

McNeil says: “I supported him by turning the Maxim on the nearest

horseman.... Some of the horsemen had got round by now a good way

out, but by keeping the Maxim on them, supported by long-range

volleys from the Punjabis, we did much to check them.”[53]

On June 3rd at about 9 a.m. a very large force of footmen attacked

in one long line several ranks deep and enveloped the south and

west sides of both zarebas. They came on at a steady pace and

opened fire at about 400 yards. Fire was reserved until the enemy

were at about 500 yards range, when heavy fire was opened by both

rifles and Maxim, with the result that no one got within 150 yards

of the zareba, though they advanced most pluckily. 180 dead were

found around the zareba, and the enemy’s loss was estimated at 500.

The danger of rushing machine guns up to the front while still

mounted is shown in an incident that occurred on June 17th during

a successful attack on the Mullah’s villages near Feriddin. During

the reconnaissance the mounted corps became somewhat heavily

engaged, and Colonel Swayne sent forward the reserve company and

the Maxims to bring fire to bear from a commanding spur about two

miles to the front. On reaching the spur they came under a heavy

fire, and the Maxim camels and some ponies were shot down. The

Somalis, however, were able to disentangle the Maxims from the dead

camels and bring them into action on commanding ground.[54] Colonel

Swayne, in his official report, said: “Mekometers were badly wanted

for the Maxims.... The Maxims had a trick of jamming at critical

moments, but were quickly set right again. The fault may have been

due to the belts.”

When the Maxim gun jams without a breakage of the mechanism, the

fault is usually want of experience on the part of the gunner.

During the third expedition the machine guns were increased to

eleven and were carried by porters with the infantry.

The disaster to Colonel Plunkett’s force at Gumburu on April 17th

was due to ammunition running short. The force, consisting of about

200 men with two machine guns, was attacked by a large force of

horse and foot. They at once formed square, and took up a position

in an open spot surrounded by dense bush at from 300 to 600 yards’

distance. For some two hours they were able to hold off the enemy,

but on the ammunition being exhausted they were overwhelmed.

On April 22nd, 1903, Major Gough’s force of about 200 men with one

machine gun was attacked in thick bush by a large force under very

similar conditions to Colonel Plunkett. The attack began at 10.30

a.m. from all sides, and was continued with great determination

until 2 p.m. Square was formed, and fire opened at very close

range (20 to 50 yards), owing to the dense bush. “The Maxim, under

Sergeant Gibb, was moved from place to place as occasion arose, the

enemy always giving way when it opened fire.”[55]

In the fourth expedition, under General Egerton, the ammunition per

machine gun was 30,200 rounds in garrison, 10,400 rounds with the

brigade, and 2,200 rounds in second-line transport; 6,000 rounds

with each gun was carried ready in belts.

During the action at Jidbali on January 10th, 1904, the force

engaged, which consisted of about 2,500, including native levies,

the infantry, about 1,299 strong, formed the usual hollow square

round the transport. The enemy consisted of the pick of the

Mullah’s fighting Dervishes, and were about 6,000 to 8,000 strong.

The Dervishes advanced in regular skirmishing order, rushing from

cover to cover, and lying down. A few got within 400 yards of the

square, _but were unable to face the heavy rifle and Maxim fire

that met them_, and this attack failed. Then two determined rushes

were made on the front and right flank of the square, _but they

were met with such a terrific fire from rifles and Maxims that the

charging enemy could not face it_. At 10 a.m. the whole mass of

the enemy broke and fled, followed by fire till it was masked by

the pursuing mounted troops. Six hundred and sixty-eight dead were

counted round the position two days later.[56]

“_Much execution was done by the Maxim worked in the right corner

of the square by Sergeant Gibbs, 1st Bn. King’s African Rifles, on

the groups of Dervishes taking cover behind the scattered clumps

of bushes surrounding the square. One entire group of nine men was

wiped out in a moment by this Maxim._”[57]

It will be seen that machine guns are a very useful auxiliary in

bush warfare, especially in holding posts and defending squares

from the rush of fanatics. They must always march with the main

body of the arm to which they are attached, and be used as

circumstances require. A high state of efficiency in working the

gun, a thorough knowledge of its mechanism, and ability to bring

it into action with great rapidity are of more importance in bush

warfare than tactical handling, which is usually of the simplest

description.

MOUNTAIN WARFARE

“The principle of always having bodies of men in rear or on the

flanks, covering by their fire the advance or retirement of the

troops nearest the enemy, is specially important in hill fighting.

On nearly every ridge and spur positions will be found where this

can be done, and advantage can also often be taken of parallel

features, from which covering and cross fire may be used with

effect.”[58]

It will seldom be possible to make much use of machine guns with

the advanced guards, as mountaineers usually oppose the advance

by bands of skirmishers who fire from the cover of rocks and

scattered sangars, and while affording a bad target to the machine

gun, can quickly put it out of action by concentrating their fire

upon it. They are also unsuitable for piqueting the heights, on

account of the difficulty of getting them into position and of

rapidly withdrawing them again. They are, however, very useful to

strengthen small fortified posts on the lines of communications,

and for the defence of camps by night, being trained by day and the

sights prepared as suggested in Chapter VII., page 150. Callwell

says: “It is a good plan, if night attacks are at all probable,

to train guns and machine guns by daylight upon points where the

enemy may be expected to mass, or from which assault is to be

anticipated. _This was done at the defence of Chakdara in 1897 with

excellent results._”

Machine guns are invaluable to the rear guard of a force retiring,

which is an exceedingly difficult undertaking in mountain warfare,

because hillmen invariably await this opportunity to swoop down

and make a vigorous attack. The very nature of the operations

necessitates frequent retirements. Callwell says: “Columns have

to visit outlying valleys for punitive purposes, and must then

rejoin the main body; and even when penetrating into the heart of

a hostile mountain district, the rear of the army, as it passes

successively the homes of different tribes and clans, draws these

down upon it, and, as a result of the general direction of its

march, retires before them.”

_Field Service Regulations_, 1909, speaking of rear guards in

mountain warfare, says: “Mountain artillery should usually form

part of a rear guard, _and machine guns may be usefully employed_.

The withdrawal of the artillery is usually an encouragement to the

enemy to press on, and on such occasions machine guns will often

find scope for action....” “If the rear-guard commander considers

it impossible to reach camp before nightfall, it will generally be

advisable for him to halt and bivouac for the night in the most

favourable position for defence.” Here, again, machine guns will

be most useful in defending the bivouac after dark if trained by

daylight to sweep approaches, while the morale effect of its

accurate fire in the dark will be considerable. There are many

instances from our wars on the North-West Frontier where machine

guns might have been used profitably in covering the retreat; but

to be successfully employed in such cases, they must be far more

mobile and better trained for rapid-fire practice than they have

been in the past. Lieut.-Colonel Haughton’s retreat from the Iseri

Kandeo Pass is typical of such operations. “A brigade had been sent

on detached duty into the Warais Valley, and after completing its

work there was rejoining the rest of the army in Maidan. In doing

so the brigade had to cross the Iseri Kandeo Pass over the hills

which separate the two valleys. As the force quitted its bivouacs

the Ghurkas were left as rear guard, while the 15th Sikhs were told

off to hold the Kotal, which was about half-way. The main body and

baggage moved off early, and the latter reached the maidan almost

unnoticed. The Ghurkas, however, were pressed from the commencement

of the retirement right up to the top of the Kotal; then they

marched on, leaving the 15th Sikhs to cover the retirement. As the

Sikhs began to draw in their piquets from the heights above the

pass, the Afridis, as was their wont, grew bolder and bolder, and,

taking advantage of the cover of a wood hard by, they crept down

close to the rear guard. One company as it withdrew was suddenly

charged by a crowd of swordsmen.... But those who participated in

this rush paid dearly for their temerity, the Sikh company meeting

them with steady musketry and being most opportunely reinforced

by another company. The carrying off of the wounded was, however,

becoming a matter of serious difficulty, so reinforcements were

asked for. These arrived in the shape of two companies of Dorsets

and of several companies of the 36th Sikhs under Lieut.-Colonel

Haughton, who assumed command, and who withdrew his force down the

hill without much loss.”[59] It is easy to imagine how machine

guns might have been used here, and how their presence might even

have rendered the reinforcements unnecessary; but unless they are

capable of coming into action and opening fire in thirty seconds,

and of packing up and moving off again after ceasing fire in the

same time, the rear guard in mountain warfare is no place for them

and they had best march with the baggage.

During the expedition to Tibet some trouble arose with the machine

guns owing to the extreme cold, which not only froze the water in

the barrel-casing of the Maxims, but froze the lubricating oil in

the lock and recoiling parts and thus rendered the gun useless.

When very low temperatures are encountered in high latitudes,

alcohol or spirit should be added to the water to prevent it

freezing; and as potable spirit is liable to “evaporate,” a little

paraffin oil should be added. Glycerine may be substituted for

lubricating oil in temperatures where even Russian petroleum will

freeze.

CONVOYS

Callwell defines a convoy as “a column of non-combatants guarded by

a comparatively speaking small escort.” The object of this escort

is to hold off all hostile parties and to get the convoy to its

destination in safety. Escorts will generally have to be reduced

to the smallest possible size in order not to deprive the fighting

force of men. They will therefore always act on the defensive,

while endeavouring to keep moving with the convoy, which will only

be halted when compelled to do so for its own safety. When the

escort consists of the three arms, machine guns may be used to

reduce the number of infantry required very considerably, while

adding to the defensive power of those necessary.

In minor operations where every available rifle is required with

the fighting force, machine guns will be found invaluable to

replace infantry. Their exact position with the convoy must depend

upon its composition and length and the number of guns available.

The principle of having a machine gun, or where possible a section,

at the head and another at the rear end of the line of wagons or

pack animals is sound, as these are the vital points, and an attack

on the centre can be met by a cross fire from these positions. If

the convoy is unduly long, another gun or section may be placed in

the centre. Should it be necessary to form laager, the machine guns

in the front and rear enable this to be done under their converging

fire. Where wagons or carts are used and the enemy is unprovided

with arms of precision, machine guns may be mounted on the tops

of wagons, so that they can open fire instantly and fire while

moving forward with the convoy; this position not only provides

them with a good field of fire, but also affords protection to the

detachments from a sudden charge home of savages from an ambush.

“The success of an attack upon a convoy usually depends upon the

defeat of the protecting troops. This will involve a combat, which

will be governed by the principles already laid down in this

manual.... If fighting is inevitable, the enemy should be engaged

as far from the convoy as possible.”[60]

For this reason machine guns should open fire on any body of the

enemy presenting a good target, even at long range, if they are

moving to attack the convoy. The presence of machine guns with a

convoy will free the infantry to move out wide on the flanks in

open country, and to push ahead to piquet hills, clear bush, and

occupy heights on the line of march, without exposing the convoy to

danger during their absence.

BLOCKHOUSES

Blockhouses have been much used in warfare in uncivilised

countries ever since the introduction of firearms, to enable small

detachments on a frontier or on the lines of communication to

maintain themselves in the midst of the enemy when unsupported by

other troops, and also to form a chain of posts across an enemy’s

country for the capture or suppression of guerilla bands.

Looking back to the South African War, it appears inexplicable

that little or no use was made of machine guns to hold the long

blockhouse lines which stretched for so many hundreds of miles in

every direction during the latter stages of the war. Time after

time the Boers succeeded in breaking through this line, even in

places where the blockhouses were within effective range of each

other and the intervening space guarded by elaborate barbed-wire

entanglements. The reason for this is not difficult to discover.

Screened by the darkness, the fire of the small garrisons of these

blockhouses was neither sufficiently powerful nor accurate to

stop the majority of the enemy from breaking through, even though

stopped by the entanglements and compelled to use a single gap. The

annihilating and concentrated fire of machine guns which had been

laid by day to sweep the entanglements should render the forcing of

a similar blockhouse line impossible in the future. Machine guns in

detached blockhouses should be sited as low as is compatible with a

good field of fire, and should have long narrow loopholes prepared

for them for at least two positions on every face. Constant change

of position within the blockhouse after firing will prevent the

enemy from being able to “snipe” the gunners through the loopholes.

The great variety of conditions and circumstances under which minor

operations take place renders it impossible to do more than show

how they may be used in certain selected instances. The machine

gunner must be prepared to modify and adapt his tactics to suit the

special circumstances of the expedition with which he is employed,

and he cannot do better than study Callwell’s _Small Wars, their

Principles and Practice_, which has been so freely quoted in this

chapter.

ENCLOSED COUNTRY

This chapter would not be complete without some reference to the

use of machine guns in enclosed country such as is found in the

United Kingdom. Clery, in his _Minor Tactics_, p. 118, says that

cultivated country is the most favourable to the attack, while in

defence the country to the front cannot be too open. “In the first,

infantry gains a succession of covered positions by means of which

it comes on more equal terms with the defence. In the second, the

infantry of the defence has a clear field to destroy the assailants

as they approach.”

Apart from civil war, the only possible occasion for the use of

machine guns in the British Isles is against an invader, and it

is well known to students of modern war that the prospects of a

successful invasion do not depend upon the strength or weakness of

our fleet, but on that of our army for home defence. The duty of a

fleet in time of war is to go to sea and destroy the enemy’s ships,

and while it is absent on this mission an opportunity for invasion

may occur, the success of which will wholly depend upon the force

the invader will meet on landing.

The Japanese recently landed in Manchuria in spite of Russia’s

superior naval strength; but because it was the case of an island

invading a continent, we do not apply the lesson to ourselves, and

are content to believe that a continent cannot invade an island.

It is obvious to the military student that no invasion will be

attempted unless its success is reasonably certain, and the

presence of four divisions of regular troops at home renders such

an enterprise extremely difficult, if not impossible, without

permanent command of the sea. But these four divisions are not

the Home Defence Force, and form that part of our Expeditionary

Army for service outside the United Kingdom. We may, therefore,

rest assured that as long as we retain command of the sea, no

invasion can take place until we are involved in an over-seas war

which requires a more or less large portion of our Expeditionary

Force--an event which has happened almost every decade.

It will be safe, therefore, to assume that in the event of an

invasion we shall have to rely on our Territorial Army to meet the

enemy, and it will be doing this force no injustice to assume that

they will be compelled to act on the defensive in the face of a

highly trained and disciplined Continental Army. Indeed, it is

difficult for a soldier to realise how a Volunteer force, trained

for fourteen days in the year and unacquainted with military

discipline, can hope to meet on equal terms, even if superior by

three to one in numbers, the pick of Continental manhood trained

under an iron discipline for the minimum of two years.

Be that as it may, it is necessary to realise the difficulties to

be faced, not the least of which is the question of _training_,

for, as already pointed out, it is absolutely essential to the

successful use of machine guns that the personnel should be very

highly trained, and this applies to their use in enclosed country

even more than elsewhere.

Although as a general principle enclosed country benefits the

attacker and is disadvantageous to the defender, this is not

always the case with machine guns, and provided the golden rule

of “concealment, cover, and surprise” is intelligently applied,

enclosed country is particularly suited for the use of machine guns

in the defence.

For this purpose machine guns should be trained to work in pairs in

mutual support. They must be so mounted that they can be carried by

hand for considerable distances into position, and must be capable

of firing from a low siting when they must be inconspicuous. If

mounted, as at present, on a wheeled carriage, a light tripod may

be carried on the carriage, which will render the gun far more

inconspicuous and useful.

While all the principles for the tactical handling of machine guns

with infantry hold good, there are several points of importance

to be noted in using them in the defence in enclosed country. The

advance of any formed bodies of the enemy will be confined to the

roads; consequently machine guns must endeavour to command all

roads leading from the enemy, especially where they become defiles.

The hedgerows, standing crops, woods, and lanes must be used to

afford concealment in advancing or retiring from position to

position, and scouts must be specially trained in finding the

easiest _concealed_ way from field to field by gates, gaps, or

through stiles. The way from the road or lane to the selected

position must be always marked by sticks or broken branches which

are placed to indicate the direction of gates or gaps, or where

a turning has to be made. The usual procedure will be for the

scouts to work across country on one or both sides of the road. The

section commander, who should be mounted, will select the position

for the guns, and scouts from each gun will be sent out to guide

them to the positions. The carriages and ammunition cart must

move up the road to the nearest point to the position, and scouts

should select and mark the easiest way to the carriages. Careful

co-operation between the guns and carriages will often enable the

latter to greatly facilitate movement, by pushing up by-lanes or

across fields to a position near the guns. Ammunition will usually

have to be carried to the guns by hand, so that great pains must

be taken to get the cart as near the position as possible. The

selection of the position will be governed by the facilities it

presents for surprising the enemy in close formation at effective

range. The range must be accurately found, and fire must only be

opened by order of the section commander. In selecting a position

care must be taken that it offers perfect concealment from view,

and that the guns can retire under cover to their carriages. The

neighbourhood of conspicuous objects, such as single trees, a gap

in a fence, etc., must be carefully avoided, and care must be taken

to secure a good field of fire for as great a distance as possible

to the front, while the flanks and any cover within effective range

which the enemy might occupy must be watched by scouts. It is in

this matter of careful reconnaissance, of selecting ground and

occupying or watching all neighbouring cover, that the successful

use of machine guns in enclosed country mainly depends. The enemy

is obliged by the nature of the country to move in close formation

to pass defiles, roads, gaps, or to avoid crops, woods, and

villages, and it is the intelligent anticipation of where this will

occur that gives the machine gun its chance for decisive action.

The hedges, orchards, lanes and woods, and other features will

afford endless opportunities for bringing _flanking_ fire to bear

on the enemy. Nothing is so effective, and the morale effect on an

enemy who is enfiladed at close range renders it usually decisive.

Cover will generally be provided by the spade, and ditches require

little work to turn them into excellent pits, the only thing

necessary as a rule being to excavate a hole in rear for the back

leg of the tripod. Where there is a ditch with a hedge in front of

it, the ditch should be improved so as to provide a pit for the gun

to fire through the hedge about six inches above ground level. If

the hedge is too thick to fire through, it should not be cut down,

but a hole should be cut in the growth for the muzzle of the gun

sufficiently large to aim through. If it is necessary to cut a gap

in the hedge, the growth should be cut through close to the ground,

but _without removing it_ until the moment for opening fire.

Alternative positions in the same hedgerow should be avoided, as it

is certain to be discovered immediately, and the range is probably

already known.

The edge of the wood, if it commands suitable ground, is an

excellent position for machine guns; but if the carriages remain in

the wood they must be provided with cover. When time and material

are available, a good field of fire may be obtained by erecting

a platform ten to twelve feet above the ground in the trees, and

placing a machine gun on this; not only is the field of fire much

increased, but the gun will be almost impossible to discover. This

was done on one occasion in the Spanish-American War, when it met

with considerable success.

When machine guns are used for the defence of villages or farms,

they should be placed outside the village or farm buildings well

clear of the walls. The salient angle will usually be the most

suitable place, a good field of fire being the chief object. The

guns should be placed so as to flank one side of the village, and

must be most carefully concealed, a pit being usually the best

form of cover. Walls should as a rule be avoided, as they are very

easily destroyed by artillery fire and always afford a conspicuous

target.

When time permits the pits should be deepened and hollowed out

in front to afford the firers protection from artillery fire.

Similar protection may be provided for the rest of the detachment

by making a narrow and deep trench connected with each side of the

gun pit. Should it be necessary to defend the village to the last,

a second position should be provided in the centre of the village,

commanding the main avenues, and the church tower, or roof, may

afford a suitable site, provided artillery is not present.

Although machine guns have never been used in England, they

were employed by the French in 1871 during General Chanzy’s

retreat from the Loire to Le Mans with great success, and this

campaign is particularly interesting to us because the country

greatly resembles England. Dr. Miller Maguire, in his lecture

given at the Royal Artillery Institute on this campaign, quotes

the German official account as follows: “The entire country is

covered with the densest cultivation of long-standing growth,

with vineyards, orchards, and vegetable gardens.... Owing to the

extensive subdivision of land customary in this country, every

property is surrounded by hedges, ditches, and walls. There are,

consequently, numerous positions and isolated points at which

even moderate troops could defend themselves behind good cover.

Although the superior effect of the chassepot here ceased to

avail, _the mitrailleuses were in their true element_, and became

a dangerous weapon in the narrow passes.” Dr. Maguire remarks: “I

do not know how far you will be inclined to apply those remarks to

the circumstances of your own country in the event of invasion.

It might be a good lesson to try; for the several arms could

be handled between Dover and London step by step.” Later on he

quotes from a British officer, who says: “In fact, Kent and Surrey

combined, with vineyards instead of hop gardens, would be an exact

picture of the country through which the Germans were pushing on.”

There are numerous instances in this campaign where the

mitrailleuse caused great loss to the Germans, and enabled the

French to delay their advance and hold on to villages and positions

with greatly inferior forces.

Remembering that the mitrailleuse of 1870 was a clumsy and

primitive weapon, worked by hand and mounted on a field carriage,

there is every reason to suppose that the modern automatic machine

gun, on its light and mobile tripod, will be still more valuable in

fighting in enclosed country.

CHAPTER IX

MACHINE GUNS IN THE ARMIES OF THE WORLD

AMERICA (UNITED STATES)

GUN.--At present there are three machine guns in use in the United

States, viz.:

(_a_) The Gatling.

(_b_) The Maxim Automatic.

(_c_) The Colt Automatic.

(_a_) _The Gatling._--Calibre ·3 in., and takes the service rifle

bullet. It has 10 barrels, and is fed by a rotating cylinder. The

gun is mounted on a shielded carriage with limber. The rate of fire

is about 600 rounds per minute.

(_b_) _The Maxim Automatic._--This is similar to the one in use in

our own service, and takes the ·3 in. U.S. service ammunition.

_Mounting._--For infantry and cavalry, a tripod mounting. For use

in fortified works, a two-wheeled shielded carriage.

The transport is by means of pack-animals. A complete outfit

consists of five packs, _e.g._ the gun and tripod form one pack,

and the remaining four packs carry 1,500 rounds of ammunition

and accessories for the gun, including water for filling the

water-jacket.

For firing blank it is fitted with an attachment called the “drill

and blank-fire attachment.”

(_c_) _The Colt Automatic._--Calibre ·3 in., and takes the service

rifle bullet. The gun is fed by means of a cartridge belt, and

fires 400 rounds a minute.

The weight is 40 lb., and the gun is mounted either on a tripod

mounting or a wheeled carriage.

A “silencer” for the Maxim was tested in March, 1909, and the

results compared with those obtained from the gun without the

silencer. As regards accuracy of fire there was nothing to choose

between the two. The silencer, however, reduced the noise to that

of a ·22 in. long cartridge, and when used at night the flash was

entirely obliterated.

ORGANISATION.--_Infantry._--One battalion in each regiment has a

machine-gun platoon consisting of 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, and 18

privates, and 2 guns.

_Cavalry._--In a regiment of 3 squadrons, 1 squadron has a

machine-gun platoon of 3 corporals and 18 privates.

AUSTRIA

GUN.--In 1907 after prolonged trial the Austrians definitely

adopted the Schwarzlose. It is a very simple weapon and very

reliable, firing 375 rounds per minute from a tripod mounting.

ORGANISATION.--A section of machine guns is attached to each

regiment of cavalry and infantry; there are also mountain companies

of machine guns.

With infantry the section consists of 2 guns; 10,000 rounds are

carried per machine gun. The detachment consists of 14 men per gun,

7 for actually working the gun and 7 to lead the horses. There are

7 horses to each gun, of which 1 carries the gun and 500 rounds, 5

carry from 1,500 to 2,000 rounds each, and 1 carries the shields.

There is also a spare horse. For hand transport one man carries 2

belts of 250 cartridges, another the gun and 1 belt, a third the

mounting and 1 belt, a fourth 2 belts, a fifth the water-jacket,

etc. The shields are left on the horse. It will be seen that when

the machine gun is taken forward in this way it has ready for

immediate use 1,500 rounds.

With cavalry the section consists of 4 guns without shields. On

account of the great independence of cavalry, the machine guns have

with them 15,000 rounds each, of which 5,000 are on pack-animals

and 10,000 in wagons. These wagons usually march in rear of the

column. The detachment, which is all mounted, consists of 9 men per

gun with 4 pack-horses (1 for the gun and 3 for ammunition). Hand

transport is provided for as with the infantry machine guns.

The mountain machine-gun company consists of 3 officers and 64

other ranks. There are 4 guns carried on pack-horses, with 2

pack-horses per gun for ammunition (4,000 rounds per gun).

TACTICAL (taken from a précis of the Austrian Regulations, 1908;

published in _Streffleurs militärische Zeitschrift_, April,

1908).--(_a_) _With Infantry._--During the advance it is well to

give some machine guns to the principal units of the covering

force, for they add to their resisting power, and in the many

phases of the preparatory fight they are sure to have opportunities

of effecting surprise. The place for the section leader is then

near the O.C. detachment. When the machine guns leave the column it

is always advisable to detail a few cavalry to cover them.

To take up a position it is necessary to observe the following:

(1) To manœuvre out of sight of the enemy. This will often

necessitate unloading and carrying forward the _matériel_ by hand.

(2) Not to keep the guns too close together, which may cause

additional losses. The “position of observation” will play an

important part in the machine-gun fight.

The narrow effective zone of the machine guns allows them to fire

over the heads of other troops. Such fire will be advantageously

employed when machine guns occupy high positions. But it is only

allowed at ranges greater than 1,000 yards, and when the troops

over whom they are firing are at least 400 yards from the guns.

Under these circumstances the use of searching fire is forbidden.

Both in attack and defence it is necessary to remember that

machine guns are not suitable for a continuous fight of long

duration. If during the preparatory fight the machine guns have

found opportunities of opening fire, they ought, when the general

engagement has begun, to be withdrawn from the firing line and held

ready to act again under certain circumstances of importance.

These circumstances are:

In attack: to act on the enemy’s flank to facilitate the infantry

advance; to open fire on the decisive point, whether flank or

front, from a dominating position, either over the heads of the

infantry or by carrying the machine guns up into the firing line.

In defence: to reinforce threatened points; to stop enveloping

movements; to repulse an assault; to take part in a counter-attack.

In most cases these tasks will necessitate the machine guns being

at once carried into the firing line to fight side by side with the

infantry.

(_b_) _With Cavalry._--The rôle of machine guns with cavalry is

thus determined:

(1) To take part in dismounted action: if pushed forward, they

allow the number of men dismounted to be limited; if kept in

reserve or pushed against a flank, they facilitate the success of

the frontal attack.

(2) To add considerably to the offensive and defensive power of

patrols by replacing the battalions of chasseurs which used to be

attached to the cavalry.

(3) Finally, to take part in the cavalry fight; for this they

should be judiciously divided among the troops of the advanced

guard, and should make use of their mobility. This will allow

them to open fire from well-chosen positions before the moment of

contact, and help to obtain the desired result.

The place for the machine-gun commander is near the General. If the

machine guns have been well placed in the column, they will--thanks

to their mobility, which is equal to that of any cavalry

detachment--be able to make use of the considerable time required

by a large force of cavalry to get into battle formation.

Whereas with infantry the surprise of the enemy is always effected

by making use of the features of the ground, the best method for

cavalry guns is to utilise their rapidity of motion and their

resemblance to other cavalry units, for which at a distance they

are easily mistaken.

The widest power of initiative is left to the commander for the

grouping of his units in the fight. Very often he will only bring

up near the firing line the horse carrying the gun and one carrying

ammunition, in order to be able to escape rapidly. At other times

all the horses will be brought up close under cover. At others the

whole section will dash up to their position at full speed; the

guns will be unloaded at once, and the horses will disappear to the

rear. The one important thing is to open fire as a surprise.

To sum up: the Austrian Regulations only confirm the rules already

laid down by very competent writers who have published works

on the subject. They enunciate in a clear and concise form the

principles which should govern the employment of machine guns in

various circumstances, laying particular stress on the necessity

for constant readiness for action in a position of observation.

In _Les Mitrailleuses à l’Etranger_ Lieutenant M. quotes certain

Austrian officers who, writing before the publication of the

Regulations of 1908, considered that the value of machine guns

lay chiefly in their use as a reserve of fire. Lieut.-Colonel

Berndt says: “In offence, as in defence, machine guns must be held

back as a reserve of fire to be used at the moment when the rapid

development of heavy fire is required.” Lieutenant Binder is of the

same opinion, and also recommends their being used in the closest

co-operation with the infantry. Lieutenant Hayeck-Liprandi, a

cavalry officer, fully realises the importance of machine-guns, as

relieving cavalry to a large degree of the necessity for dismounted

action. He also advocates the attachment of machine-gun sections to

regiments at the disposal of the regimental commanding officer.[61]

CHINA

GUN.--The Chinese have bought numbers of Maxims for attachment to

their infantry. With cavalry they have adopted the Madsen.

Their organisation is at present in process of evolution, and no

official views on their tactical employment have been published

hitherto.

DENMARK

GUN.--In 1904 Major-General Madsen, the Danish War Minister,

invented the Rekyl (recoil) machine gun. The gun weighs only 13½

lb., is not much longer than the service rifle, and in case of need

can be served by one man. It has a rate of fire of 750 rounds per

minute with a muzzle velocity of 2,350 ft. per second.

ORGANISATION.--Every Hussar Squadron in the Danish Army is to have

a section of three guns attached. The gun is carried on a horse

together with 300 rounds of ammunition, and with each gun there is

a led horse with reserve ammunition.

TACTICS.--The gun detachment can easily and rapidly follow all

the movements of the body of horse to which they are attached,

even through woods. It is therefore argued that the possession of

this weapon will do away with the necessity for dismounted cavalry

action.

FRANCE

GUN.--France has adopted both the Puteaux and Hotchkiss patterns

of machine gun without shields. With cavalry the question of

mounting has not yet been definitely settled, but experiments have

been carried out with wheeled carriages drawn by four horses. The

infantry sections have been provided with a tripod mounting (70

lb.), which can be adjusted to two heights, either 1 ft. 6 in. or 2

ft. 6 in. above the ground.

ORGANISATION.--At present (1909) every brigade, both of cavalry

and of infantry, has a two-gun section attached. It is intended to

provide every regiment with a section as soon as possible.

With cavalry the detachment for each gun consists of 24 men, who

are all mounted. The carriage carries 16,500 rounds of ammunition

in addition to the gun.

The infantry section is commanded by a lieutenant, who has under

him one N.C.O. and 23 men, armed with rifles. There are two gun

horses, which each carry a gun, tripod, and one box of ammunition;

and eight ammunition horses, which each carry seven boxes, three on

each side and one on top. A box contains 150 rounds, so that each

section has 8,700 rounds. The “Souchier” telemeter is carried.

TACTICAL.--The French Regulations are at present under

consideration, and the tendency seems to be to follow the

principles laid down by the Germans.

M. le Commandant Niessel, in his preface to _Les Mitrailleuses à

l’Etranger_, by Lieutenant M., says: “There is one principle which

should dominate the whole subject and never be lost to view. It

is that machine guns are condensed infantry, and that therefore

it is as infantry that they should be used in battle. Together

with accuracy and power of fire, the characteristic which should

especially distinguish infantry in battle is their utilisation

of every feature of the ground. Machine guns, then, to exert to

the full their powers of effecting surprise and developing great

intensity of fire, should reach effective and, if possible, close

range without being observed.

“Machine guns ought, then, in battle to be carried forward by

hand by the detachment, in order to take up positions as much

under cover as possible; this does not in any degree lessen their

opportunities of offensive action, for there can be no hope of

decisive success for the infantry whom they are supporting except

in a vigorous offensive.”

GERMANY

GUN.--Germany has adopted the Maxim gun. The guns are mounted on

sleighs which are themselves mounted on limbered gun-carriages,

being clamped into grooves. They can either be fired from the

carriage or be dismounted and fired from the sleigh. The gun on

the sleigh can be adjusted to fire from a height of 1 ft. 6 in., 2

ft. 6 in. or 3 ft. 6 in. above the ground by a simple lattice-work

arrangement. The gun can easily be dragged to almost any position

where men can go, and can be fired by men lying down under cover.

ORGANISATION.--Machine guns have been organised into 16 batteries

(called Sections), which are independent, and 216 companies, which

are attached to infantry regiments.

The battery consists of six machine guns, drawn by four horses and

divided into three sections (called Divisions). There are three

ammunition wagons and one battery wagon (1st line). There are three

2nd-line wagons. The detachment consists of:

1 captain (in command); 3 lieutenants; 1 sergeant-major; 12

N.C.O.’s; 36 gunners; 28 drivers; 1 armourer; 1 trumpeter; 1

apothecary (dresser); 70 horses (20 saddle and 50 draught).

The men wear a special greyish-green uniform, and are armed with

carbine and bayonet; the carbines are carried in the limbers.

87,300 rounds are carried with each battery.

Each company consists of six guns drawn by two horses, three

wagons, and one cart. The detachment consists of:

1 lieutenant (in command); 3 second lieutenants; 9 N.C.O.’s; 74

men; 28 horses (7 saddle, 18 draught, and 3 spare).

All the officers and 3 warrant officers are mounted. The men are

armed with automatic pistols. 72,000 rounds are carried with each

company, as follows:

With the guns 18,000

With the wagons 42,000

With the reserve cart 12,000

------

Total 72,000

======

On going into action each gun is made up to 5,000 rounds. The

infantry pattern range-finder is used.

TACTICAL.--_Regulations for Machine-Gun Detachments in the German

Army._

_Para. 187._--Machine guns enable commanders to develop at fixed

points the maximum volume of infantry fire on the smallest

possible front. Machine guns can be employed in any country which

is practicable for infantry, and when once they are unlimbered

they must be able to surmount considerable obstacles. In action

they offer no greater target than riflemen, fighting under like

conditions, and they can in proportion to their fire value support

far greater losses than infantry.

When movements over the battlefield are contemplated, and the

machine guns (unlimbered as soon as hostile fire is expected)

are pulled or carried forward, they can utilise all cover which

infantry is able to use. Cover that is barely sufficient for a

section of infantry can protect an entire machine-gun detachment.

The construction of the carriage on which guns, ammunition, and men

can be conveyed, and the capabilities of the team, enable machine

guns to keep up with mounted troops on the march.

_Para. 188._--The range and striking effect of the machine gun is

identical with that of the infantry rifle. The rapid succession

of shots and the narrow concentration of the cone of dispersion,

together with the possibilities of uniting several guns on a

limited front, render it feasible for machine guns to obtain

rapidly a decisive success in certain positions, and even at long

ranges to inflict heavy losses in a short time on large and deep

targets. Machine guns, however, are of small use to a commander

fighting a protracted rifle-fire engagement.

_Para. 189._--An engagement with a thin line of skirmishers under

good cover should be avoided. It demands a heavy expenditure of

ammunition which is not commensurate with the result obtained.

During a lengthy rifle-fire action the detachments with their guns

should be withdrawn temporarily from their position, so as to save

their effect for a decisive moment.

_Para. 190._--The engagement of hostile machine guns that offer

a difficult target is by no means the chief duty of machine-gun

detachments; in most cases it will be more profitable to leave this

to other arms. When engaging hostile machine guns the most accurate

information should be sought regarding the enemy’s position.

_Para. 191._--Machine-gun detachments can at all times and under

all conditions confidently await the attacks of hostile cavalry.

To meet these any formation can be adopted which allows of a

well-directed and calmly delivered fire being poured into the

advancing cavalry. Both when firing from the carriage and from the

gun dismounted the fire must be distributed all along the advancing

line of cavalry; special attention must be paid to the supporting

lines, to one’s own flanks, and to the defence of the carriages

when the guns are separated from them. Machine-gun detachments

are able to advance in the open fields without any fear of the

enemy’s cavalry, provided the latter is not supported by artillery

or infantry, or is not in such force as to be able to attack

simultaneously from different sides in several lines.

_Para. 192._--In action against artillery it should be remembered

that at long ranges the superiority of fire will always remain with

this branch. If machine guns are to engage artillery, the sleighs

must be brought as near as possible to it. The rapidity of movement

of machine guns due to their being horsed will enable them to start

the action from a flank, and thus produce a sensible increase of

effect. Scattering the fire from all the machine guns along the

entire line of a battery is as useless as it is purposeless.

_Para. 193._--Machine-gun detachments should generally be employed

undivided; on special occasions separate sections may be made to

act independently. The detachment commander will decide as to the

distribution of the ammunition train to the individual sections.

The employment of single machine-gun detachments will be seldom

advisable. In such cases the senior detachment leader will command

the entire force of machine guns.

_Para. 194._--In view of the uses to which machine-gun

detachments may be applied, and with the object of increasing

their independence of action, it is desirable that a few mounted

men should be attached to them for reconnaissance. Otherwise

the readiness of machine guns is such that it is only in very

obstructed and overgrown country that they require special

protection. Here it may be necessary, in order to secure the

threatened flanks and rear, and to protect the carriages left

behind, to detail small parties of cavalry or infantry. An

application for such from a machine-gun commander should be

complied with by any infantry or cavalry commander in the vicinity.

_Para. 196._--Machine guns can never replace artillery.

_Para. 197._--Machine guns will always find their chief work to

be at the place where their powerful fire effect, together with

their mobility (on the march) and the advantage of being able to

get across country when separated from their carriage, can best be

utilised.

_Para. 198._--For the correct manœuvring of machine guns it is

necessary to possess a clear knowledge of the general situation,

of the aims of the commander, and of the state of the action. The

disposal of the machine-gun detachments rests with the superior

command. By attaching machine-gun detachments to stated bodies of

troops, the full value of the former in action can only be realised

in exceptional cases.

_Para. 199._--All commanders must quickly make their dispositions

to suit the situation, and must always realise that neglect and

delay are a more serious hindrance to success than an error in the

choice of means.

_Para. 200._--At the commencement of an action the commander will

proceed to the O.C. troops, or to the commander of the force to

which his detachment is detailed, and receive the necessary orders

for the impending action. It is his duty, in case of emergency, to

act on his own initiative. During the progress of the action he

will remain in constant communication with that commanding officer,

in order to keep him constantly informed of what he is doing, and

in turn to be posted in the progress of the fight.

_Para. 201._--In choosing a position the first condition to fulfil

is to obtain the best possible fire effect for the task in hand;

then secondly one may think of cover.

_Para. 202._--The choice of every position must be preceded by

special reconnoitring, the opportune and skilful performance of

which is essential to success. This includes ascertaining what

the targets are, where there are suitable fire positions, and the

facilities for approach, the nature of the ground to be crossed,

and lastly what security is offered against surprises.

_Para. 203._--In the advance and in defensive positions the

commander reconnoitres himself. During retirements the commander

remains with the detachment so long as it is within effective range

of the enemy, but sends back for reconnoitring purposes a senior

officer. Before occupying a position the commander, if possible,

must have examined it himself.

_Para. 205._--The attention of the enemy must not be previously

directed to the position selected. A personal inspection is often

to be carried out only on foot, leaving all escort behind.

_Para. 206._--The following points guide the choice of position:

an open field of fire; a front lying as far as possible at right

angles to the line of fire; plenty of space; possibility of

sweeping all the ground right up to the closest range; concealment,

and facilities for communication along and behind the line of fire.

_Para. 207._--Positions close to or on a level with a point to

which the enemy has ranged are to be avoided as much as possible.

Similarly it is not advisable to take up a position in close

proximity to prominent objects, still less straight in front of

them, as they facilitate the enemy’s ranging. On the other hand, a

position in front of a dark background or in a place covered with

vegetation hinders the enemy from picking up the target.

Every kind of concealment, even of an artificial nature, offers

advantages, because the observation of the enemy is thereby impeded.

_Para. 208._--During the advance and in moving into position

security should not be overlooked. On threatened flanks special

scouts must be sent out by the officer who is bringing up the

troops, especially in close country. These should not ride far

ahead, but should bear in mind to keep in touch with the troops.

During the advance roads should be used as long as possible.

_Para. 210._--The pace of the advance and the moment of unlimbering

depend on the object of the commander, the state of the action,

the nature of the country and the state of the ground.

_Para. 211._--The dispositions for taking up a position must be

made in time to avoid any delay in opening fire. Every effort

must be made to take up a position unobserved, and to open fire

by surprise. Both of these are, however, only possible if special

attention is paid to the utilisation of cover during the advance to

the position, thus keeping the enemy in ignorance of the locality

which it is intended to occupy. In the absence of cover, or when

immediate entry into action is required, the surprise of the enemy

must be effected by rapidity in occupying a position.

_Para. 213._--The most favourable position must be sought for each

individual weapon with regard to fire effect and cover. As a rule

there is an interval of 20 paces between guns, but the direction

and regularity of the intervals in the detachment are not to be

insisted upon. It must be considered, however, that the losses

caused by the enemy’s fire will be heavier in proportion as the

machine guns are posted closer together. Care must be taken that

the individual guns do not interfere with one another’s fire.

Placing single guns in echelon may offer advantages where the

flanks are threatened.

When the nature of the ground or of the target renders a more

careful choice necessary for each gun, it is recommended that this

be carried out by the No. 1 of the gun.