EMPLOYMENT IN THE FIELD WITH INFANTRY
The employment of machine guns with infantry seems at first sight
to be obvious, for they fire the same ammunition and have the
same range and kinetic effect. Nevertheless the first machine
gun was used by the French in 1870 as artillery, and its name
“mitrailleuse” indicates “grape shot” rather than rifle bullets.
This initial error in its tactical employment, together with its
crude mechanism, artillery carriage, and short range (about 500
yards), enabled the artillery to silence it early in the battle, so
that it rarely proved of any use.
On the few occasions when it was concealed from the artillery
and used at short range against the infantry, its effect was as
astonishing as it was decisive. At Gravelotte several batteries of
mitrailleuses concealed near St. Hubert’s Farm reserved their fire
until the attacking infantry was on the glacis within close range.
The result was decisive, and the German attack was repulsed with
terrific loss. Again at Mars la Tour, the German official account
describes the repulse of the 38th Prussian Brigade by mitrailleuse
batteries placed on the crest of the hill, as causing them such
losses as to amount almost to annihilation. The brigade lost more
than half its numbers and two-thirds of its officers.
When it is remembered that this mitrailleuse was not automatic, but
had to be operated by hand, that it had 25 barrels and a maximum
effective range of only 500 yards, and that it cheerfully engaged
in the artillery duel at ranges between 2,000 and 4,000 yards,
the only wonder is that, having accomplished so much, the reasons
for its failure were not immediately apparent, and that it has
taken nearly forty years to convince the world that tactics are
as necessary for the effective employment of machine guns as for
infantry. The general principles for their tactical employment have
already been dealt with in Chapter II., but they are so excellently
condensed in Sect. 187 of the German Regulations, that at the risk
of repetition they may be quoted here.
“Machine guns enable commanders to develop at fixed points the
maximum volume of infantry fire on the smallest possible front.
Machine guns can be employed over any country that is practical
for infantry, and when they are unlimbered they must be able to
surmount considerable obstacles. In action they offer no greater
target than riflemen fighting under like conditions, and they can,
in proportion to their fire value, support far greater losses than
infantry. They can utilise all cover that infantry are able to use.
Cover which is barely sufficient for a section of infantry (60
men) can protect an entire machine-gun detachment (six guns).”
In order to see in more detail how machine guns should be employed
with infantry and the limitations of their tactics, it will be
necessary to follow the sequence of the infantry combat in attack
and defence, and to assume such situations as seem likely to arise.
ADVANCED GUARDS
The action of the infantry of an advanced guard will follow the
same lines whatever the dimensions of the force, and the battalion
is a convenient unit with which to deal. There are four battalions
in a brigade, and three brigades in a Division; consequently the
Divisional General will have six batteries of four guns each, or 24
machine guns, under his command. We will assume that the battalion
we are dealing with forms the advanced guard of its brigade, and
that the Brigadier has given it a battery of four machine guns, two
of which will probably belong to the battalion.
_Field Service Regulations_, 1909, page 79, says: “An advanced
guard is divided into a vanguard and a main guard.... The special
duty of the vanguard is reconnaissance. It will therefore generally
be composed of the advanced guard mounted troops, with or without a
body of infantry as a support. By day, when the country is open and
the advanced guard is strong in mounted troops, infantry will not
as a rule form part of the vanguard.... The main guard comprises
the troops of the advanced guard not allotted to the vanguard.”
We will first take the case of infantry with the vanguard as a
support to the mounted troops, and suppose that two companies are
allotted for this duty and have been given a section of machine
guns. The formation of the infantry of the vanguard will largely
depend on the nature of the country and the proximity of the enemy.
Where the country is open plain they will probably be extended in
a long line of skirmishers, in which case the machine guns should
march close in rear of the centre on the road. Should the country
be close or broken, the vanguard infantry may be confined to the
road--with small parties pushed out to the front and flanks--in
which case the machine guns should march in rear of the advanced
party, and not in rear of the vanguard. It must be remembered
that machine guns are able to come into action and open a heavy
and accurate fire in less time than it would take infantry of
equal fire power to deploy and to open fire from a position; it is
therefore the machine guns of the vanguard that should be the first
to open fire and give the infantry time to deploy and find fire
positions. When the enemy is encountered the object of the vanguard
infantry must be to support the cavalry as quickly as possible, and
enable them to mount and push forward round the flanks.
The section commander must go forward at once with scouts from
each gun, and quickly grasp the situation, consulting the officer
commanding the troops engaged as to the action to be taken; he must
then select the positions for his guns to come into action. The
scouts should take ranges and have everything ready for the guns to
open fire on arrival. The moment the guns open fire, the section
commander should send scouts off to find alternative positions to
the front and flank from which it may appear possible to enfilade
the enemy. Should the target be unsuitable, _e.g._ a line of
well-concealed skirmishers, etc., fire must be _reserved_, and the
guns should take up positions of observation while the section
commander and scouts seek for a position on the flanks from which
to bring an effective fire.
As soon as the vanguard infantry are deployed the section commander
must co-operate with them entirely, and must take his instructions
from the vanguard commander, who should leave him a free hand,
merely telling him his intentions and how the guns may best assist
him.
When the main guard comes up, in the case where the vanguard is
checked, the section commander should take the earliest opportunity
of placing himself under the battery commander, and at this stage
the guns should be used to seize and hold positions of importance,
especially artillery positions. If the advanced-guard action
discloses the fact that the main body of the enemy has been
encountered, and the G.O.C decides to engage, the advanced guard
will be required to seize all positions of tactical value and to
hold off the enemy until the main body has had time to arrive and
deploy. Their action will vary according to whether the G.O.C.
decides to act on the offensive or defensive. The latest German
Regulations say: “On becoming engaged, that side will have the
advantage which gains the start over its opponents in readiness
for action, and thus reaps the benefit of the initiative.” No arm
is better able to assist in this than the machine gun, and every
available battery should be brought up at this stage to take part
in the advanced-guard engagement.
The Germans say: “The advanced guard will fight on a wider front
than that ordinarily allotted to a force of its size, so as to
seriously engage the enemy. It will be disposed in groups more or
less detached, which will occupy those positions the possession of
which will most protect the deployment of the main body. _It will
be assisted by detachments of machine guns, which will be placed
for preference on those positions which it is most necessary to
prevent the enemy from capturing._”[16]
The commander of the machine guns of the advanced guard is
under the immediate orders of the O.C. advanced guard, and must
co-operate with him throughout the engagement. All officers with
machine guns must remember that isolated action is useless, and
that however effective their fire may be locally, unless it
directly furthers the object of the action, it is an unjustifiable
waste of fire power.
The seizure of ground likely to be of use to the main
body--particularly artillery positions--must be the first
consideration of machine guns with the advanced-guard infantry,
once the infantry are in action. That they can hold these
unsupported is certain. “There never has been and cannot be such
a thing as a successful attack on a line of machine guns in a
favourable position in action, until the machine guns have been
well battered by artillery fire,” says Lieutenant Parker in his
book _Tactical Organisation and Uses of Machine Guns in the Field_.
In the cases where the infantry of the advanced guard forms the
main guard, the battery of machine guns should march with the
foremost body of troops and should never march in rear, where they
are useless, and where, if on a road, they can only be moved up
with difficulty. The battery commander should remain with the O.C.
advanced guard until he is fully acquainted with the situation
and his intentions. Should the situation be such as to enable the
advanced guard to brush aside the opposition, the machine guns must
be used vigorously to support the infantry attack, and should be
pushed forward to seize positions before the infantry deploy, and
cover their deployment by fire. In the preliminary stages these
positions will probably be on the immediate front, and the four
guns should be able to occupy a front roughly coinciding with the
first deployment of the infantry. As soon as the infantry come
into action the machine guns may be withdrawn and used on the
flanks to bring a cross fire to bear, and to fire on any closed
bodies, led horses, etc., that may offer a target. At this stage
the guns should work in pairs in mutual support, and may be used on
one or both flanks as the situation requires.
Machine guns should rarely be used in the firing line after the
infantry deploy, as they offer a rather marked target and can be
far more profitably employed in pressing the attack on the flanks.
There are several instances of the successful use of machine guns
with the advanced guard in South Africa in 1900 to support the
mounted vanguard, and on many occasions they were able to brush the
enemy aside without deploying the main guard or delaying the march
of the column.
THE ATTACK
Under cover of the advanced-guard action and the subsequent
artillery duel the infantry will deploy for the attack. The first
advance of the infantry will probably be covered and supported by
the artillery, and they will generally be able to push forward to
within long range of the enemy’s infantry, without the necessity
of covering their advance by rifle fire. From here, however, the
firing line will begin to suffer from rifle fire, and it will be
necessary to reply to this fire in order to cover the further
advance.
“To enable the attack to be prosecuted it is clear that from
this moment the hostile fire must be met by fire of greater
power, _its intensity and duration being dependent on the effect
produced_. Moreover, from this point forward movement will as a
rule be contingent on the mutual fire support afforded to one
another by neighbouring bodies, and on the effects produced by
the _covering fire brought to bear on the enemy’s line_ wherever
the ground admits of such action, by supports, reserves, and the
troops specially told off for this purpose. Covering fire should
be delivered so as to strike the enemy, disturb his aim, and
compel him to seek shelter when the assailant is exposed or in
difficulties. _In such circumstances intensity of fire is of the
first importance; but fire should be reserved when the assailants’
progress is satisfactory, or when he is under cover._”[17]
No one who has controlled the covering fire of infantry, even
on manœuvres, will dispute the immense difficulty of timing
the opening and ceasing of such a fire, with even a company,
to coincide with the advance of the troops covered; while the
necessity for observation of fire and its concentration on certain
parts of the enemy’s position make it still more difficult
effectively to cover the advance of troops with rifle fire at long
range.
That machine guns will be able to perform this duty far more
effectively and easily than infantry is manifest from the nature
of the fire required, the features being _intensity_, _control_,
and _concentration_, all of which are characteristic of machine
guns. When required to cover the advance of infantry, machine guns
should be used in batteries and must be so placed that they are
able to see the infantry they are covering, and to sweep those
portions of the enemy’s position from which fire can be brought
to bear on the advancing troops. If the enemy’s artillery is not
silenced or at least dominated by that of the attackers, it will
be necessary to conceal the machine guns from view and provide
cover from fire. That machine guns well concealed and provided with
cover (pits) are able to remain in action under artillery fire for
considerable periods, is proved by instances in the Russo-Japanese
War (see Chapter III. p. 28). Major Kuhn, who was with the Japanese
Army in Manchuria, in his report states: “Importance is laid on
concealing the guns, and it was claimed that none had been knocked
out by the Russian artillery.” Covering fire from the flanks is
more likely to be effective than frontal fire, because it will
enfilade entrenchments, reach men behind natural cover and have a
more disconcerting morale effect than frontal fire. It will not
always be possible to find suitable fire positions on the flanks
for machine guns at this stage of the attack, and it will then be
necessary to place them in rear of the attacking infantry and fire
over their heads. This can be done with perfect safety--indeed,
there is far less danger of accidentally hitting the attacking
infantry with machine guns than with artillery fire. Direct fire
should only be used when it is impossible to use indirect fire on
account of the nature of the ground in the vicinity.
Indirect fire from the reverse slope of a hill has the advantage
of concealing the guns and rendering them immune from artillery
fire. The position must be carefully selected with due regard to
the slope in its relation to fire from the enemy as laid down in
chap. ii. p. 67, of _Training Manuals Appendix_, 1905. The best
position is just below the crest of a steep slope, as observation
of fire is rendered easier and the effect of shrapnel minimised.
The safety of the infantry in front will depend entirely on the
range, height of the guns above the infantry, and the position of
the target (enemy). On level ground the range must not be less
than 800 yards,[18] and the infantry will be perfectly safe at all
distances between 200 yards from the guns and 200 yards from the
enemy. (See table, Appendix A.) The methods of employing indirect
fire have been given at the end of Chapter II., and its success
will depend largely upon the careful observation of fire by the
section commanders, who must concentrate their attention on this
alone--the battery commander giving the signal for opening and
ceasing fire, and the target or direction of fire for each section.
Machine guns used as covering fire have ample time for preparation;
and as ranges can be accurately taken, and great deliberation used
in selecting positions, observing fire, and correcting errors, the
maximum of accuracy should be attained. If the enemy is entrenched
against frontal fire, good results may be expected from accurate
distant fire, owing to the angle of descent of the bullet causing
the low parapet or shallow trench to be no protection.
They were successfully used by the Japanese as covering fire for
infantry in the attack, as the following examples will show: “At
Mukden on March 1st all the machine guns of a whole Japanese
division (12 to 18 guns) were brought into action upon a Russian
_point d’appui_. The Russian fire was silenced, but burst out again
whenever the machine-gun fire slackened. The Japanese infantry used
these pauses in the enemy’s fire to press forward to close range
_under cover of their machine-gun fire_.”[19] On March 2nd the
three machine guns of the 10th Japanese Infantry Regiment acted in
the same way against a Russian fieldwork. This method of employing
machine guns requires the closest co-operation with the infantry
from the commencement of the attack.
Again, during the Japanese attack on Namako Yama the infantry
were greatly assisted by covering fire from their machine guns
directed on the Russian trenches. These guns were used from behind
_screens_, and their success was largely due to their being well
concealed.
It will rarely be advisable for machine guns to follow infantry
into the firing line, where they present a conspicuous target
which attracts fire and renders their withdrawal difficult.
We made this mistake in the South African War more than once. At
Rietfontein the machine-gun detachment of the Gloucester Regiment,
which had followed the battalion into the firing line, was almost
annihilated. At Modder River the Scots Guards Maxim gun accompanied
the firing line, and the detachment was annihilated by pom-pom
fire, and the gun was left on the field alone all day.[20] In the
attack on Cronje’s laager at Paardeberg, machine guns were used in
the firing line on the left bank of the river, and when the attack
failed the machine guns, having suffered severe losses, could not
be withdrawn and had to be abandoned till nightfall.
When the covering fire of machine guns is no longer considered
necessary, they should be withdrawn and concentrated in batteries
in rear of the reserve or in such other convenient position as the
G.O.C. may direct. They should take this opportunity of refilling
belts, replenishing ammunition, water, etc., and if the guns have
fired many thousand rounds, of exchanging barrels.[21] They are
now at the immediate disposal of the G.O.C. and will be used by
him as a mobile reserve. Circumstances vary so in war that it is
impossible to particularize in their use at this stage, but their
great mobility will render them extremely valuable in the following
cases:
1. To assist a turning movement.
2. To reinforce a distant flank.
3. To repel a counter-attack.
4. To hold a captured position.
When the infantry reach close range, the point for the assault will
have been selected and the reserves massed behind this point. When
the reserves have been thrown in, and the fire fight has reached
its height, the moment will have arrived when one side or the other
will obtain superiority of fire. “_The climax of the infantry
attack is the assault which is made possible by superiority of
fire._”[22] To assist in the attainment of this superiority of
fire is the true rôle of machine guns with infantry, and, as their
beaten zone at short ranges is so small, they can safely fire
over the heads of prone infantry, even when the latter are within
a hundred yards of the target. The guns should now be pushed up
to the closest ranges, and fire of the most rapid description
concentrated on the point of assault. When it is remembered that
the machine guns of a single Infantry Division, as at present
organised, can bring a fire of more than ten thousand shots a
minute from close range where its accuracy is assured, at this
crisis, there will be no need to say any more on the tactical
importance of the probable result.
In bringing machine guns into action for this purpose, they will
generally be used in batteries, but may come into action in
sections or even single guns once the objective has been pointed
out. The object being to obtain superiority of fire regardless of
cost, rapidity and concentration of fire must be the principal
points. The guns must therefore press forward to the closest
range, and where it is possible to bring a cross or enfilading
fire to bear, the opportunity must not be neglected. It may be
necessary to fire over the heads of the infantry or even to push
guns into the firing line itself, though this is seldom desirable
if good positions can be found in rear. When any portion of the
line advances to the assault, fire must be concentrated over their
heads on the position assaulted; and when they are so close to
the position as to render such fire impossible, fire must not
cease, but be directed over the position so as to strike the enemy
as they retreat. Fire from machine guns may be kept up from 500
yards’ range over the heads of prone infantry within 100 yards of
the target with perfect safety, and from 800 yards over infantry
advancing to within the same distance. General Nogi, speaking of
the use of machine guns in the attack, says: “Our troops trained
machine guns on the most advanced lines of infantry _to overwhelm
with fire the points at which resistance was greatest_. Sacks of
earth were used to mask them. _They have often enabled the infantry
to advance with success._” M. Ullrich, war correspondent of the
_Gazette de Cologne_, was present in many engagements in which
machine guns were pushed up to support the firing line in the final
stage. He says: “In the offensive the Japanese frequently made
successful use of machine guns. _When the infantry were carrying
out a decisive attack, they were supported by their machine guns,
which concentrated their fire on points arranged beforehand_....
When machine guns have been skilfully employed, their action has
been infinitely more effective than that of field artillery, more
especially when they fire at infantry ranges.” The following is
an example of their actual use in this way. “The Japanese,” says
a Russian eye-witness of the fighting round Mukden, “brought up
during the night dozens of machine guns with hundreds of thousands
of cartridges to their front line of skirmishers, from 400 to 500
yards from our positions, and entrenched them there. _When the
assault commenced, at dawn, the machine guns opened fire with fatal
accuracy on the parapets of our trenches and on our reserves_,
preventing them from coming up. We could do nothing with the enemy,
because when the machine guns showed the least vulnerability, they
were at once protected by shields of bullet-proof steel.”[23]
The machine guns of the enemy will all be in action during the
final stages, but they should not be engaged by the machine guns
of the attack except when exposed. They are very difficult to put
out of action by small-arm fire at any time, and when employed by
the defence are sure to be well concealed and provided with cover.
It is the duty of the artillery to silence machine guns, and this
was so far recognised in the war between Russia and Japan that
the latter brought up mountain guns on more than one occasion to
silence the Russian machine guns.
At Kinsan on June 26th, 1905, when the Japanese were attacking the
position, the Russians brought up two machine guns against the
43rd Regiment and a mountain battery at 3 p.m. The battery at once
silenced the machine guns, and by 5.30 p.m. the hill was in the
hands of the Japanese.[24] Captain Niessel, of the Russian Army,
gives another instance. “It was on August 31st at 7 p.m. that the
Japanese decided to drive the machine guns out of the village of
Goutsiati by _artillery fire_. Knowing that their infantry had been
checked, they posted at the village of Datchaotsiati a battery
which showered on us shrapnel and high explosive shell. Although
the men had taken cover behind a wall of earth, we had many wounded
and could not breathe freely until nightfall, when the enemy
ceased their fire, to which _we could not reply on account of the
distance_. At 9 p.m. I was ordered to evacuate the position.”[25]
The moment the infantry assault is successful, the machine guns
must be pushed forward into the captured position to secure the
ground gained and to repel counter-attacks. As the confusion at
this moment will be considerable, it will seldom be possible for
the machine-gun commander to receive orders from the G.O.C., but
this must not prevent him from immediately directing guns to occupy
and quickly entrench themselves in positions which it may appear
vital to secure, and to order the remainder of the guns not so
required to follow and fire on the enemy wherever he may show signs
of rallying. In order that these two distinct duties may be carried
out instantly and without confusion, it will be advisable to tell
off beforehand those batteries that are to pursue the enemy.
Theoretically every available gun should be launched in the
pursuit, but the recent war between Russia and Japan has shown
how often a position that has been stormed and captured has been
retaken by a rapid counter-attack before the attackers have had
time to rally and prepare to hold what they have taken. Machine
guns can render a position safe from counter-attack so quickly and
effectually that this duty should be the _first_ consideration of a
machine-gun commander with infantry in the assault.
Fresh ammunition must be brought up, and every endeavour made to
conceal the guns and construct good cover from any material found
in the position.
“During the battle of Mukden, on the evening of March 1st, a
position at Sha-shan was captured by the Japanese. The Russians
had taken up another position some 500 yards in rear, from which
they opened an effective fire upon the Japanese infantry in the
captured position. Another Russian force about 1,000 yards
further to the west threatened their flank. The Japanese, however,
succeeded in bringing up _the machine guns which had taken part in
the attack, and brought them into action under cover of a number of
sandbags abandoned by the Russians_. The effect was decisive: all
counter-attacks failed before the annihilating fire of the machine
guns.”[26]
IN THE DEFENCE
When infantry are acting on the defensive, it is advisable that the
majority of the machine guns should be held in reserve, and used to
check turning movements, to reinforce distant portions of the line
of defence, and to deliver counter-attacks, but their principal
rôle will be the repelling of the assault. Guns allotted for this
purpose must be placed in very carefully selected positions in the
line of defence, from which they can command narrow approaches,
and sweep ground in front of trenches or important works by cross
fire, especially any dead ground likely to afford temporary cover
to the attackers. Concealment is of the first importance, and cover
from fire absolutely necessary, but the combination of the two
requires great skill both in choosing positions and in constructing
an inconspicuous shelter. In certain positions where the country
is flat or undulating and has no abrupt features, pits will be
found the best form of cover; but where the ground presents
marked features, emplacements providing overhead cover will not
only conceal the guns, but render them immune from shrapnel. The
Japanese used these emplacements with great success, the guns often
remaining concealed even when the enemy were within 300 yards.
The positions for machine guns should not be in one and the same
line, and they should be placed at wide intervals. At least two
positions should be provided for each gun, and a second series
of positions in rear, commanding those in front, should also be
provided. The machine guns should be allotted to their positions by
sections, each gun being so placed that its fire crosses that of
the other when possible. Section commanders should be responsible
for having all ranges from their respective positions taken and
written up in each emplacement. They must arrange with the O.C. of
that portion of the position to which they are allotted the time
and signal (if any) for opening fire; the exact moment should be
left to the discretion of the section commander as a rule, the O.C.
merely indicating the stage of the attack up to which fire is to be
reserved, and great care should be taken not to open fire before
this stage has been reached. Every endeavour should be made to
ensure co-operation between the machine-gun units in reserving fire
till the shortest range has been reached by the attack and a really
good target presented. Nothing can justify a machine gun opening
fire from a concealed position until its fire will give the best
results that can be expected from that place, and to ensure this
it is necessary that the target is big and vulnerable, the range
close, and the fire unexpected by the enemy. Captain von Beckmann,
speaking of the Russo-Japanese War, says: “Premature fire upon
unsuitable targets at long range is to be deprecated. The greater
the surprise, and the shorter the time within which heavy loss is
inflicted, the greater the morale effect produced. At the battle
of Hai-kou-tai on January 27th, 1905, a Japanese company attacked
Sha-shan. Four Russian machine guns _opened fire at about 1,100
yards upon the extended firing line, without causing any serious
loss or affecting its advance_. On the other hand, the Japanese
on March 1st had _approached to within 200 or 300 yards_ of the
Russian position at Wang-chia-wo-pang and were beginning the final
assault. Two Russian machine guns _suddenly came into action_, and
the Japanese assault _was repulsed with heavy loss_ owing to the
annihilating fire.”
These two instances well illustrate the right and wrong way of
using machine guns in the defence. Where a battery is allotted to
one section of the defence the guns should be distributed two or
four along the front and one or more on each flank. Single guns
may be used in the defence where a section cannot be spared, as
the assistance of a supporting gun is not essential to its safety
when behind entrenchments. In the first instance guns may be kept
in rear of the position until the direction of the attack has
been ascertained, provided they are able to occupy their positions
unseen.
Machine guns at salients and on the flanks are of great value in
defending a position.
If sufficient machine guns are available, one or two batteries
should be reserved for the counter-attack. They should in this
instance be pushed right into the firing line when necessary and
used with the greatest boldness. It will be their duty to cover the
retirement of the Infantry in the event of a repulse, and for this
purpose positions in rear should have been selected beforehand.
Although the principle of reserving machine guns in the defence
must be strictly adhered to, there may be occasions when the use
of a battery or two well in front of the defensive position will
compel the enemy to deploy prematurely, cause him loss, and delay
his advance. Machine guns so used may also find opportunities for
surprising artillery while unlimbering, and thus render great
service to the defence. They should be withdrawn when their mission
is accomplished, and be reserved for further use as already
indicated. The following are examples from the Russo-Japanese War
of the use of machine guns in the defence of a position.
General Nogi has written: “Our most formidable foes were wire
entanglements placed 100 yards in front of the Russian trenches,
well lit up by search-lights and covered by the murderous fire of
machine guns. The defenders made use of them to flank dead ground
in their front and also had them at other points, kept carefully
in reserve and under good cover, to make use of continuous fire
against the attackers at the moment of the assault.”
“On January 28th, 1905, near Lin-chin-pu at about 7 p.m. the
Japanese attacked the forts of Vosnesenski and the trenches near
by, in which were posted two machine guns. _These latter opened
fire at 200 or 300 yards on a Japanese company in line. In one or
two minutes they fired about 1,000 rounds, and the Japanese company
was annihilated._”[27]
“At Mukden on March 1st, the left of a Japanese Division _being
within 300 yards of the enemy’s position_ and about to assault,
the Russians suddenly opened a very heavy machine-gun fire from
cleverly concealed positions, _causing such loss that the Japanese
attack was temporarily suspended_. On August 20th, 1904, the
Japanese captured a lunette near the village of Shin-shi after
severe fighting. _The Russians made a counter-attack with three
machine guns, and drove the Japanese out again with a loss of over
300._ The three machine guns retired from the lunette before the
attackers got home, and, taking up a position behind the open gorge
of the work, showered such a hail of bullets on the victorious
Japanese that they were compelled to retire.”[28]
“On February 27th, 1905, the Russians tried to surprise the
railway bridge over the Sha-ho on a very clear night, when one
could see as far as 500 yards. Four Japanese machine guns opened
fire on a company of the 10th Light Infantry, which was almost
wiped out.”[29]
At the battle of Hei-kow-tai, the Russians at Shen-tan-pu made
no less than five determined attacks against the Japanese
entrenchments, in which was a machine gun, but were repulsed each
time. The machine gun is said to have done great execution, and
_one thousand dead Russians were reported to have been found before
it_.[30]
The 8th Division of the Japanese Army are reported to have made
several fine attacks upon Hei-kow-tai, _but were each time repulsed
mainly by the fire of the Russian machine guns_.[31] The same
report says, “Throughout the campaign in Manchuria the Japanese
have suffered severely in attacking those points of the Russian
front which have been armed with machine guns,” and proceeds to
quote an episode in the operations of the 5th Division at the
battle of Mukden, to show to what lengths the Japanese went in
order to silence these weapons. It appears that the Japanese were
so galled by the fire of four machine guns that the attack was
materially affected. They decided to bring up two mountain guns to
within 500 yards of these machine guns, to try to destroy them.
The mountain guns were brought up behind a wall and fired through
two holes bored for the muzzles. Two machine guns were at once
destroyed, but so well had the others been concealed that they were
able to be withdrawn in safety.
Sufficient has been quoted to show that both the Japanese and
Russians made the greatest use of machine guns in the defence,
and that when employed on sound tactical principles they not only
afforded material assistance, but were often the predominant
factor. On the other hand, when these principles were neglected
or ignored, the machine guns merely wasted ammunition and were
impotent to affect the situation. The lesson to be learned is this:
_that machine guns are only useful when their tactical handling is
thoroughly understood, and then their effect is more decisive than
that of any other arm_.