hastily. It is to be borne in mind that the fire can only have a
decisive effect when it is directed against troops situated within
effective range. The arm to which they belong has little to do
with the question; the decisive point in choice of target is first
and foremost the momentary tactical importance of that target.
Afterwards fire must be turned on to those targets which, owing to
their height, depth, breadth, and density, render a high percentage
of hits probable.
_Para. 215._--Good results from indirect fire can only be achieved
if the range and position of the target are known, or if the fall
or the effect of the shots can be observed from a point close to
the detachment.
_Para. 216._--Firing over one’s own troops is only permissible when
the nature of the ground renders possible the deployment of several
firing lines one above the other.
_Para. 217._--Firing by night can only promise success if the
guns can be trained by daylight on to points where the enemy is
expected, or if well-lit objects are taken as targets, such as
bivouacs or camps.
_Para. 218._--From the very beginning of an action it must be
remembered that the number of cartridges carried is limited, and
that the consumption of ammunition implies an expenditure of power
which should only be made when it will meet with success. Should
the decision be taken, however, to fire on a given target, the
ammunition necessary to attain the object of the action must be
expended. Fire with an insufficient effect weakens the morale of
the troops, whilst it encourages the enemy.
_Para. 219._--The losses inflicted on the enemy will affect him
more if he incurs them in a short space of time, than if they are
distributed over a long period; it is advisable therefore in most
cases, even in the face of a weaker enemy, to open fire with the
whole detachment rather than with one or two sections only.
The expenditure of ammunition necessary for the silencing of the
enemy will in both cases be about the same, but in the former case
one’s own loss will be appreciably smaller.
_Para. 220._--A change of objective should not be made until the
result aimed at against the first target has been fully realised. A
frequent change of objective weakens the fire, and should therefore
be avoided.
_Para. 221._--A distribution of fire over several objectives cannot
be avoided under all circumstances, but it must not resolve itself
into an aimless scattering of fire.
_Para. 222._--In every case coolness, marksmanship, and strict fire
discipline are necessary to get full value in fire effect. In an
engagement, should the majority of those in command be put out of
action, fire discipline must still be preserved. With well-trained
and well-disciplined troops, the presence of mind of the individual
soldier, and the example of stout-hearted and cool-headed men will
ensure a successful conclusion to an engagement fought against an
enemy in a similar plight.
_Para. 223._--The officer commanding the troops announces the
object of the action, and also the objective in a general way.
_Para. 224._--The machine-gun detachment commander selects the
positions, determines the range, names the targets in detail
together with the nature of attack on them, and orders the opening
of fire.
_Para. 225._--The section commander passes on the orders. He
decides the place for each gun, also the portion of the objective
to be fired at, and the range for each individual weapon. He
observes the service of the guns, and is especially responsible
that the correct target is fired at and for the fire action of his
section.
_Para. 226._--The No. 1 of the gun selects the spot to place his
gun, and the most suitable height for it to stand above ground,
follows in detail all orders, and ensures (using in case of
necessity independent measures) that the centre of the cone of
dispersion falls on the target. He is responsible for the service
of the gun in detail, and attentively watches the weapon so as to
remedy any defects which might interfere with its fire effect.
_Para. 227._--By a correct utilisation of the degree of
independence allotted to each individual commander, by a rapid
and accurate ascertaining of ranges, by a correct judgment of the
influence of the weather on the cone of dispersion, it is possible
to avoid an interruption of the fire of the whole detachment for an
alteration of the sights. Any such interruption must be especially
avoided when it is obvious from the nature of the objective that
it will only be in view a short time. Again, when firing at such
objectives, no time must be lost by giving a long and detailed
description of the target.
A well-trained detachment should be able to get quickly on to the
target, and to distribute its fire advantageously on receiving
brief words of command. If one part of the enemy is silenced or has
vanished, the fire must at once be independently directed on the
still visible and active part of the objective.
_Para. 228._--The position of the commander is of importance for
issuing commands and controlling the fire. In peace exercises
all commanders must issue their orders from the same positions
and in the same attitude they would adopt in actual warfare. The
commander may allow himself to depart from this rule, and order the
subordinate commanders to do the same, in so far as such a step is
necessary for instructional purposes. Moreover, it must be strongly
insisted upon that no man should expose himself more than is
absolutely necessary for the observation of the general situation,
the service of the guns, the conveyance of ammunition, and the
taking of ranges.
* * * * *
_Para. 242._--In an action of two forces meeting, the advanced
guard must secure time and space for the main body to deploy. As
the accomplishment of this duty depends essentially on the rapid
occupation of favourable points on the ground, the allotment of
machine guns to the advanced guard will be highly advantageous. On
the arrival of the infantry the machine guns must be withdrawn from
the firing line, and kept in readiness for further employment.
_Para. 243._--In an attack on a fully developed and defended front,
the machine guns will as a rule be kept back. They constitute a
highly mobile reserve at the disposal of the G.O.C., which may
be used for the speedy reinforcement of threatened points, for
acting against the flanks of an enemy, and for the preparation of
an attempt to break his line. The attack in view has a chance of
success only when superiority of fire is established. For this
purpose machine guns possess ample mobility to enable them to
follow infantry advancing to the attack. That they should join in
the rushes of the firing line is no more required of them than that
they should join in the charge.
Under skilful and judicious leadership they will nevertheless be
able to come so close to the enemy as to take part in the decisive
fire engagement; the temporary increase of distance from the
carriages need not be considered.
It is of exceptional advantage to direct the fire against the point
of the enemy’s line selected for the attack from a commanding
position, or from a flank, since under these circumstances it
is not necessary to cease fire when the infantry continue their
advance, and prepare for the final rush. Should such a position be
reached at a range which admits of the maximum fire effect (800
yards or under) any further forward movement of the machine guns is
wrong; it interrupts the fire effect and entails fresh laying and
ranging.
_Para. 244._--In the event of a successful issue of the action, the
machine guns must co-operate with the first pursuit by a lavish use
of their fire power. As soon as the victory is assured they will be
hurried forward into the captured position to support the infantry
in their occupation of the same, and to crush the last powers of
resistance of the enemy.
_Para. 245._--Should the attack fail, the machine guns must support
the retiring troops.
_Para. 246._--In using machine guns in defence, one must consider
that the guns are not suitable for conducting a protracted action
for any space of time, and that the advantage of the machine
guns’ mobility cannot be utilised if a fixed part of the position
is handed over to them for defence at the outset. It is to be
recommended generally, and particularly in the defence, to keep the
guns at first with the reserve, and to utilise them as the need
arises--to strengthen the defending line at threatened points,
to hinder outflanking, and to repel an attempt at storming the
position, or for offensive movements. This does not always exclude
machine guns from entering into action at the commencement of an
engagement, _e.g._ if it is necessary to command certain important
approaches. Also, if a covered retreat for the machine guns is
assured, it will be possible to place them to the front or to the
side of the main line of defence, so that they can sweep with their
fire the country which the enemy will presumably occupy with his
artillery.
At times a flanking machine-gun fire can be used to sweep dead
ground in front of the line of battle.
_Para. 247._--In all cases where machine guns are placed in
positions selected beforehand, cover must be constructed. If the
time is not sufficient for this, an attempt must at least be made
to arrange some artificial concealment, to improve the field of
fire, and to determine ranges.
_Para. 248._--After a successful action machine-gun detachments
must be utilised in the boldest fashion, to turn the victory
to account during the pursuit. They are highly suitable for
this purpose, as they unite great power of fire with rapidity
of movement. The pursuit must be continued as long as strength
permits. The machine guns will approach to within effective range
of the enemy, and hinder every attempt of the adversary to re-form
and take up a position. Flanking fire is especially effective. A
liberal supply of ammunition must be pushed forward, this being
necessary for the energetic maintenance of fire in pursuit.
_Para. 249._--When breaking off an action in the event of
an unsuccessful issue, the machine-gun detachment can render
considerable service by opposing the enemy, regardless of the
possible loss of the guns, and by pouring a vigorous fire into
him. For keeping the enemy in check, positions behind defiles with
covered lines of retreat are especially suitable.
Special importance must be attached to the provision of sufficient
ammunition, to the thorough reconnaissance of the lines of retreat,
and to the correct estimation of the moment for beginning to
retire, especially when the movement is to be carried out in
echelon. To avoid obstruction the ammunition wagons must be moved
away at the right moment. Increased attention must be paid to the
flanks, since it is from these that danger most threatens during
a retreat. If suitable positions can be occupied on the flanks,
increased facilities for conducting the retreat will be obtained by
utilising them.
_Para. 250._--Machine guns attached to independent cavalry might
be used to increase the power of cavalry, mounted and dismounted,
and on the offensive and defensive. The duties that will fall
on machine guns in this service demand great mobility and the
strictest fire discipline.
_Para. 251._--The commander of the independent cavalry will
make all decisions regarding the employment of machine guns. He
communicates all his plans of action to the machine gun commander,
and provides him further with special orders concerning the first
entry into action of the machine guns. If the machine guns are
not to be used, it is advisable to leave them behind in a suitable
covering position.
_Para. 252._--On reconnaissance duty with the cavalry, machine guns
will be most frequently employed in breaking down the resistance of
the enemy at small posts or defiles which they have occupied, or
vice versa--to stiffen the opposition made by the cavalry at such
points. On such an occasion even the assistance of a single section
with its ammunition will be of use to the cavalry detachment.
_Para. 253._--In the advance of cavalry against cavalry the
machine-gun detachments must take up their positions as soon as
possible, so as to support first the deployment, and then the
attack of the cavalry. The most advantageous position will be well
to the front and to a flank of the advancing cavalry, since from
there a continuation of the fire is rendered possible up to the
moment almost of the charge, and at the same time an outflanking
movement of the enemy is prevented on that side. A position secure
against direct attack is to be desired, yet a consideration of
the effect gained by the position described above precedes all
thought of cover. A change of position is almost always out of the
question, owing to the rapid development of a mounted action.
_Para. 254._--A wide separation of the sections is not advisable,
since several lines of fire hamper the movements of cavalry.
_Para. 255._--In a forward movement of the machine guns when
limbered up, decreasing the intervals to less than 10 paces must be
avoided, since smaller spaces render difficult the passage of the
limbers to the rear.
_Para. 256._--During the fight the detachment commander will have
to act on his own responsibility, according to the state of the
action. He must not wait for orders, and must always watch the
cavalry engagement; he must use every opportunity to join in the
issue at stake and make preparation for decisive action in case of
either a successful or an unsuccessful termination of the struggle.
Under certain conditions it may be advantageous to await events
with his guns ready to march.
_Para. 257._--In the event of a favourable issue of the action, it
will be his duty to follow the beaten enemy with his fire and to
prevent him from offering further resistance.
_Para. 258._--The nature of a cavalry engagement will often render
it necessary to keep the carriages close to the guns or to shoot
from the wheeled carriages. Since the massing of several carriages
in rear of the detachment offers the enemy a favourable opportunity
for attack and impedes firing towards the rear, the question will
arise whether the ammunition wagons should be kept back in a secure
place.
_Para. 260._--The machine-gun detachments attached to the cavalry
divisions remain with them in action. They will find occasion
to prove of service in the varied duties of cavalry during and
especially after action.
_Para. 261._--Also for protecting batteries in position, machine
guns can be profitably employed, if infantry are not forthcoming
for this duty.
_Extract from “Field Service Regulations, 1908”_
“The fire effect of machine guns is influenced primarily by correct
sighting, possibility of observation, size and density of target,
and methods of fire.”
“It is further affected by the suddenness with which fire is
opened, by the number of machine guns firing at the same target,
and by the enemy’s fire. The high rate of fire concentration of the
bullet-sheaf, and the possibility of bringing several machine guns
into action on a narrow front, enable great effect to be produced
in a short time even at long ranges. When the front of the target
is broken and irregular, the effect is reduced. A wrong sighting
elevation or an imperfect observation of fire may render the fire
completely ineffective.”
“Dense lines of skirmishers standing suffer heavy losses at ranges
of 1,650 yards and under. At lines of skirmishers lying, good
effect is to be expected at 1,100 yards and under, provided that
the observation of fire is good. Against artillery in action the
fire is similar to that of infantry. Owing to the mobility of
machine-gun batteries they are especially adapted for securing the
increased fire effect due to _oblique_ fire.”
“At short ranges under hostile fire machine guns can only be
brought up and withdrawn under cover.”
* * * * *
The German _Cavalry Drill Book_ of 1909 has some interesting
paragraphs on the employment of machine guns, which are here given:
_Para. 497._--Horse artillery and machine guns, by reason of their
fire, enhance the offensive and defensive powers of cavalry. In
defence and against unexpected opening of fire they form the most
effective portion of the force.
_Para. 498._--Horse-artillery fire will often be the first thing to
make the enemy disclose his dispositions, and thus is useful for
reconnaissance. In conjunction with machine guns it can break down
the enemy’s resistance in defiles, and thus save the cavalry the
necessity of dismounted action.
_Para. 498._--Artillery and machine guns enable the cavalry, ...
especially by fire effect upon their flanks, to distract hostile
columns from their line of march.
_Para. 500._--Detached forces of the Division may be allotted
artillery and machine guns to increase their powers of offensive
action.... The employment of single machine guns is forbidden.
_Para. 501._--The commanders of artillery and machine guns must
be kept informed of the situation and of the cavalry commander’s
intentions. They remain with him until the employment of their
commands has been arranged for; and, if necessary, it is their
duty to bring this question of employment to his notice. At later
stages they must keep in constant communication with him. Guns and
machine guns come into action for the first time by order of the
leader.
_Para. 502._--As a general principle, fire is to be opened on those
portions of the enemy the defeat of which is likely to influence
the decision of the fight. Under anything like equal conditions, a
duel with the hostile artillery cannot lead to rapid results. But
should the hostile artillery expose itself, the opportunity must be
seized with rapidity and energy. It may be also necessary to engage
hostile artillery in order to draw their fire from the cavalry.
_Para. 503._--Fire control is facilitated by keeping the batteries
together, nor is any great dispersion of the machine-gun sections,
as a rule, to be recommended. Many lines of fire cramp the
movements of cavalry during the mounted combat. The conditions
of the fight, however, or the configuration of the ground, may
necessitate dispersions and separate positions.... Machine guns
only require an escort when the field of view is very restricted.
_Para. 507._--In the _mounted cavalry combat_ guns and machine
guns must be brought into action so as to support, firstly, the
deployment; secondly, the attack. Positions for the machine guns,
to a flank and in front of the advancing cavalry, all on rising
ground, will allow fire to be maintained until immediately before
the collision, and will make it difficult for the enemy to
envelop a flank. On the other hand, the disadvantage is that any
large flank movement takes time, and sometimes so much time that
the decisive moment may pass while it is being carried out, and
the guns may arrive too late.... It is desirable that artillery
positions should be secured from direct attack by the nature of
the ground. But if circumstances demand it, artillery and machine
guns must come into action on the spot, without regard for cover or
other advantages.
_Para. 509._--Unless fresh bodies of cavalry offer a tempting
target, fire will be turned on to the hostile batteries and machine
guns immediately after the collision of the cavalry masses.
_Para. 510._--During the fight the leaders of artillery and machine
guns will for the most part have to act on their own initiative.
They must seek every opportunity for intervention, and, according
to the course of the fight, must make preparations for action under
favourable or unfavourable conditions. On occasions it may be
necessary to remain limbered up and ready to move.
_Para. 511._--After a successful attack artillery and machine
guns advance rapidly to follow up the beaten enemy with fire, and
to prevent his rallying for renewed opposition. If the result be
unfavourable, artillery and machine-gun leaders must come to a
timely decision whether the circumstances call for a retirement to
a covering position, or whether they should not hold on to their
fire position even at the risk of losing the guns.
_Para. 512._--Owing to the character of the cavalry encounter, it
is often advisable to keep the limbers with the guns. And it may
sometimes be well to leave a portion of the second-line wagons
and the carts of the machine-gun detachments behind in a place of
security, and to order the light-ammunition column to march at
the head of the second-line transport. Yet another question may
arise for the machine-gun detachments; whether to take the wheeled
carriage or only the sleigh mountings into the firing line.
_Para. 513._--If the assault succeeds, guns and machine guns hurry
to the captured position to take part in the pursuit.
Should their own attack fail, or should that of the enemy succeed,
artillery and machine guns must endeavour to cover the retirement,
and, disregarding the hostile artillery, must turn their fire into
pursuing riflemen.
* * * * *
In a recent article in the _Jahrbücher für die Deutschen Armeen und
Marine_ Captain von Beckmann gives the following summary of the
tactical use of machine guns:--
1. Machine guns must take up the smallest possible space, and be
capable of quickly coming into action (at rifle ranges). They must
be capable of accompanying infantry and cavalry wherever these arms
can go.
2. They can never take the place of artillery, though capable,
especially at short ranges, of affording effective support to the
latter.
3. The fire of one machine gun is approximately equivalent to that
of 80 infantrymen. The dispersion of fire is considerably less;
therefore while the effect is greater with an accurate sight, it is
less if the range is not accurately known.
4. The most suitable targets are those of some size and
depth--_e.g._ infantry columns, cavalry in all formations, and
artillery when limbered up. At medium ranges, extended firing lines
may be fired upon, but little effect can be produced upon men lying
down, even at the shortest ranges--though the morale effect may be
considerable.
5. Short bursts of heavy fire are especially effective. On the
other hand, long-continued fire is unsuitable, owing to the
expenditure of ammunition and the heating of the barrel.
6. Artillery in position provided with shields can only be
effectively damaged by enfilade or oblique fire.
7. Machine guns may either be employed directly under the orders
of the G.O.C. or be attached to certain units. In the first case
they will usually act in complete machine-gun units. In the second
case they will generally do so only at suitable targets at long
and medium ranges. In the later stages they will mostly be used in
sections. The use of single machine guns is to be avoided.
8. The intervals between machine guns in action must depend on
circumstances. They should not be too small if the guns are to
hold their ground for any length of time. When a section (2 guns)
is acting alone, the guns must be able to afford effective mutual
support in all directions.
9. Ammunition must be carefully husbanded, especially at the longer
ranges, while a good supply of ammunition is essential. Even
at long ranges, this ammunition will have to be carried by men
specially equipped for the purpose.
10. When the enemy is unexpectedly met with while on the march,
machine guns will be of special value to the advance guard in
rapidly seizing points in order to hold the enemy at a distance.
The occupation of such points at wide intervals will often
effectively deceive the enemy as to the strength of the force.
Machine guns thus employed will be withdrawn as soon as the
infantry come up and deploy, so as to be available for other work.
11. The wide extensions of modern armies will often make it
impossible for any but mounted troops to be concentrated
at decisive points--either to make the most of favourable
opportunities, or to ward off an unexpected danger. Mounted
machine-gun detachments will be very valuable for such purposes.
12. In the attack of a defensive position deliberately occupied,
part of the machine guns will at first be held in reserve, but,
according to the latest opinions formed from the lessons of the
Russo-Japanese War, the majority of the machine guns will support
the advance of the infantry. They are especially effective in
keeping down the defenders’ fire during the last stage of the
attack when the artillery is no longer able to fire over the heads
of the infantry.
13. On the defensive it is advisable that a considerable number of
machine guns should be held in reserve, especially with a view to
preventing any unexpected turning movements, repelling assaults,
delivering counter-attacks, and in case of such reinforcing any
threatened points in the line of defence. In fortified positions
machine guns may be usefully employed in front of the position to
force the enemy to deploy prematurely. His artillery as it comes
into action will frequently offer very suitable targets. The
majority of machine guns, however, will be placed in the line of
defence (or at least immediately in rear of the sections to which
they are allotted) as soon as the direction of the enemy’s attack
has been ascertained. This presence in the front line will make it
possible to reduce the number of men actually in that line and will
thus economise troops.
14. In the pursuit machine guns will be especially effective
against the flanks and rear of the retiring enemy. Again, in
covering a retirement and checking the enemy’s pursuit, machine
guns with cavalry and artillery will delay the enemy’s advance and
enable their own infantry to break away. In this case the first
duty will be to protect their own artillery.
15. With the Independent Cavalry machine guns form a very valuable
addition to the effective strength both for defence and offence.
Even in reconnaissance work they will be able to break down the
enemy’s resistance at certain points (villages) and to increase
the tenacity of their own forces in the defence of similar points.
Light machine guns carried on the saddle would be of the greatest
assistance to smaller bodies of cavalry in such circumstances.
Machine guns are also valuable in purely cavalry engagements,
especially when it is possible for them to take the enemy in flank.
If this be impossible, they can effectively follow up a success, or
cover the retirement of their own cavalry. If some of the machine
guns act as escort to the artillery, the cavalry escort can be
dispensed with. This will increase the effective strength of the
cavalry and also give the artillery a wide choice of position and
great security, thus increasing its efficiency. Even if at the
beginning the cavalry commander himself directs the working of the
machine guns, the officer commanding the latter will have to act
on his own initiative later on, in accordance with the tactical
situation of the moment.
GREAT BRITAIN
ORGANISATION.--Great Britain was one of the earliest countries to
adopt machine guns, and the Maxim has been in use for the last
twenty years. Machine guns are organised in sections of two guns,
and a section forms part of each regiment of cavalry and battalion
of infantry, who provide and train the personnel.
The organisation is as follows:--
A SECTION WITH A CAVALRY REGIMENT
---------------------------+--------------+---------------
Personnel. |Riding horses.|Draught horses.
---------------------------+--------------+---------------
Lieutenant 1 | 3 | --
Sergeant 1 | 1 | --
Corporal 1 | 1 | --
Privates 12 | 12 | --
Drivers 8 | -- | 16
Bâtman 2 | -- | --
---------------------------+--------------+---------------
25 (1 officer) | 17 | 16
---------------------------+--------------+---------------
_Equipment._--6 pack-saddles (the two lead horses of each wagon are
provided with pack saddlery); 4 G.S. limbered wagons (2 for guns
and 2 for ammunition); 2 machine guns with tripods and pack-saddles
on limbered G.S. wagons, each drawn by 4 horses.
_Ammunition._--3,500 rounds with each gun; 16,000 with regimental
reserve; 10,000 with brigade ammunition column; 10,000 with
divisional ammunition column for each gun respectively.
SECTION WITH AN INFANTRY BATTALION
---------------------------+--------------+---------------
Personnel. |Riding horses.|Draught horses.
---------------------------+--------------+---------------
Subaltern 1 | 1 | --
Sergeant 1 | -- | --
Corporal 1 | -- | --
Privates 12 | -- | --
Drivers | |
(1st-line | |
transport) 2 | -- | 4
---------------------------+--------------+---------------
Total 17 (1 officer) | 1 | 4
---------------------------+--------------+---------------
[Illustration: MACHINE GUN ON ADJUSTABLE TRIPOD BEHIND COVER.
FRONT VIEW.
_By Permission of Messrs. Vickers, Sons & Maxim, Ltd._]
[Illustration: MACHINE GUN ON ADJUSTABLE TRIPOD BEHIND COVER.
VIEW FROM REAR.
_By Permission of Messrs. Vickers, Sons & Maxim, Ltd._]
_Equipment._--2 machine guns with tripods on 1 limbered G.S. wagon
drawn by 2 horses.
_Ammunition._--3,500 rounds with each gun; 8,000 with regimental
reserve; 10,000 with brigade ammunition column; 10,000 with
divisional ammunition column for each gun respectively.
TERRITORIAL FORCE: SECTION WITH AN INFANTRY BATTALION
---------------------------+--------------+---------------
Personnel. |Riding horses.|Draught horses.
---------------------------+--------------+---------------
Subaltern 1 | 1 | --
Sergeant 1 | -- | --
Rank and | |
File 15 | -- | 2
---------------------------+--------------+---------------
| |
Total 17 (1 officer) | 1 | 2
---------------------------+--------------+---------------
_Equipment._--2 machine guns on field carriages each drawn by 1
horse.
_Ammunition._--4,000 with the guns; 6,000 with regimental reserve;
10,000 with brigade ammunition column.
SECTION WITH A YEOMANRY REGIMENT
----------------------+------------------+----------------
Personnel. | Riding horses. | Draught horses.
----------------------+------------------+----------------
Subaltern 1 | 2 | --
Sergeant 1 | 1 | --
Corporal 1 | 1 | --
Privates 12 | 12 | --
Drivers 4 | -- | 8
Bâtman 2 | -- | --
----------------------+------------------+----------------
Total 21 | 16 | 8
----------------------+------------------+----------------
_Equipment._--2 carts for guns, tripods, and 2 sets of
pack-saddlery; and 2 carts for machine-gun ammunition.
_Ammunition._--3,500 rounds with each gun; 6,000 with regimental
reserve; 10,000 with brigade ammunition column.
MOUNTING.--There are five English patterns of tripods in use and
one Indian. Marks I. and II. English pattern and the Indian pattern
are exceedingly clumsy, and have been largely replaced by Marks
III., III.A, and IV. Mark III. weighs 49 lb., and consists of a
crosshead and pivot mounted on three legs with a saddle for firer,
and has elevating and traversing gears. A traverse of 25 degrees
can be obtained. The two front legs of the tripod are pivoted in
sockets and secured by wing nuts, and can be splayed to lower the
gun, and fold up for transport. The legs are fitted with shoes
to steady the mounting by gripping the ground. When firing, the
ammunition box is placed on the ground on the right side of the gun.
On the pack-saddle the gun and tripod are carried on either side
of the saddle on hooks and secured by straps. The tool box is
carried on the top of the saddle. With this mounting 4,000 rounds
of ammunition are carried in eight boxes, four on each side of the
ammunition pack-saddle on a second animal.
Mark III.A tripod weighs 56 lb., and differs from Mark III. as
follows:
1. The pivot has a bearing surface to support the rear end of
crosshead arm.
2. The hand nut of elevating gear is formed with four small radial
holes.
3. The rear leg is telescopic, and consists of an inner and outer
tube. The inner tube has a shoe, and the rear end of the outer tube
has a bracket for the saddle and a handle to clamp the inner to the
outer tube.
The Mark IV. tripod weighs 48 lb., and the mounting consists of
a crosshead, elevating gear, and socket mounted on three legs.
It has 13 degrees elevation and 25 degrees depression, but by
arranging the position of legs 43 degrees and 55 degrees can be
had. It has an all-round traverse. The elevating gear is actuated
by a hand-wheel, which consists of an inner and an outer screw.
The legs are of tubular steel, the lower ends being fitted with
shoes to steady the mountings, and the upper ends have a joint
with serrations; the rear leg has a joint pin with nut and jamming
handle. Joint studs with disc springs and jamming handles are fixed
to the front legs, by which the legs are securely clamped in the
required position. Numbers are stamped on the legs to show the
relative position of the legs to their normal position. The legs
are secured by a leather strap for transport. When firing, the
ammunition box is placed on the ground on the right side of the
gun. The gun can be fired at heights varying from 14½ inches to 30
inches above the ground.
TACTICAL.--Directions for the use of machine guns are found in the
various textbooks issued for each arm. Training is dealt with in
the _Handbook for ·303 Machine Guns_, 1907, and in the _Training
Manuals Appendix_, 1905. The following directions for their
employment in the field are from the latter, ch. vi. pp. 157-63:
_Para. 2._--Surprise is a powerful factor in the effective
employment of the machine gun; every effort must therefore be
made to avoid the enemy’s observations both when advancing to a
position and when in action. The machine gun possesses the power of
delivering, from a very narrow front, a practically uninterrupted
volume of closely concentrated rifle fire, which can be directed
against any desired object with the least possible delay. The
delivery of such fire cannot, however, be long sustained, because
of the heavy expenditure of ammunition involved and the difficulty
of replacing it.
It is necessary, therefore, for its effective use, that its
movements and fire action should be so regulated as to enable it
to open fire rapidly whenever a favourable target presents itself,
for the losses inflicted on an enemy will affect him in proportion
to the suddenness and rapidity with which they are experienced.
As the rôle of machine guns is to assist the particular body of
troops to which they belong, the machine-gun commander should be
fully acquainted with the orders issued to such troops. He should
also carefully watch and conform to their movements, and assist
them by every means in his power. As a rule the guns belonging to a
unit will be employed singly in order to obviate the concentration
of hostile fire against them, the most favourable position being
sought for each weapon with regard to fire effect and cover; this,
however, should not prevent the guns being used together when the
circumstances of the moment demand the adoption of such a course.
The massing of guns should be rarely resorted to. When it is
desired to bring an overwhelming fire to bear on any locality, it
should be accomplished by the concentration of fire from dispersed
guns. The selection of a fire position should be preceded by
careful reconnaissance on the part of the machine-gun commander.
The following points should be looked for:
(_a_) A good field of fire.
(_b_) Concealment.
(_c_) Cover from the hostile fire.
(_d_) Possibilities for advancing to the position unobserved, and
facilities for ammunition supply.
(_e_) Security against a covered hostile approach.
If a position affording concealment is not available, one should
be selected which from the nature of its background will be
difficult for the enemy to locate. As the opportunities for the
effective action of machine guns will often be very brief, and as
the guns will usually be employed singly, the non-commissioned
officer in charge of each gun will, as a rule, have to act on
his own initiative in choosing the objective, judging the range,
and in deciding when to open fire. As a general rule, machine
guns are best adapted for action at effective ranges; at these it
is usually possible to distinguish the target, to ascertain its
range, and to observe the effects of the fire. When, however,
concealment and protection from fire exist, it may sometimes be
advisable to bring machine guns into action at decisive range. If
a sufficiently large target be offered and the range be known, the
concentration and rapidity of their fire will enable guns to be
employed, with considerable effect, at long ranges. Machine guns
should seldom engage artillery at long rifle range, for in such
circumstances superiority of fire will always rest with the latter
if the machines are located. Within effective range, however,
machine guns, if concealed, should inflict considerable loss on
hostile artillery. Engagements with their lines of skirmishers
should be avoided, for the risk of disclosing the position of the
guns and the heavy expenditure of ammunition involved will rarely
be justified by results. Since the gun is not well adapted for
keeping up protracted fire, it may be often expedient to withdraw
it from action, move it elsewhere, or hold it in reserve for a more
favourable opportunity.
The selection of a target upon which to fire should be governed
by (_a_) its tactical importance; (_b_) its dimensions and
vulnerability. It is essential that due regard to economy of
ammunition should be observed. When, however, it is decided to
open fire, the ammunition necessary to secure the results sought
must be expended without hesitation. “Deliberate fire” will rarely
be resorted to. In cases where a favourable target is offered,
prolonged “rapid fire” may be employed, but the most suitable
description of fire will usually be “rapid” in series of from 25 to
30 rounds.
The range should be taken by a range-finder or ascertained from
neighbouring infantry or artillery. Ranging by observation of
fire should be employed only when the nature of the soil is very
favourable and when no other method is practicable. When a reserve
ammunition cart is provided for the machine guns it will be under
the orders of the machine-gun commander, who will arrange that
it is placed where it can most conveniently supply the guns with
ammunition; it should be screened from view, and if possible
sheltered from fire. All belts shall be refilled as soon as
possible after they are emptied. Should the machine-gun commander
consider an escort necessary, he will at once bring the fact to the
notice of his commanding officer.
_With Infantry in the Attack_
_Para. 3._--The machine guns will cover the advance of the firing
line by engaging the enemy from positions in close support of it.
In ordinary open ground it would rarely be advisable to push them
into the firing line, where they would offer a conspicuous target
to the enemy; but in a broken or enclosed country, where the guns
can be brought up under cover, occasions may arise when they can
be usefully employed in a forward position. When the ground is
favourable the gun may with advantage accompany that portion
of reserves told off to cover the advance of the remainder by
long-range fire. Machine guns will co-operate with the attacking
infantry in the decisive fire action in endeavouring to obtain
a superiority of fire. Positions on the flank of the attacking
battalions or on commanding ground, if available, should be
selected, as they admit of the guns remaining in action whilst
the firing line is pushing forward. A position on the flank of
the attacking infantry has the further advantages that oblique or
flanking fire, which from machine guns is particularly effective,
can be brought to bear against the enemy, whilst guns so placed are
less likely to draw fire upon the attacking infantry. A change of
position during the decisive fire action interrupts the fire and
entails fresh laying and ranging, and therefore should be seldom
resorted to unless an increased fire effect is to be obtained. At
the decisive stage of the attack, fire of the greatest intensity
should be continued as long as is compatible with the safety of
the advancing firing line. In the event of the attack succeeding,
the guns should be pushed forward at once in order to pursue the
retreating enemy with their fire. In the event of failure, every
effort should be made to cover the retirement of the firing line.
They will assist in repelling counter-attacks to which the firing
line may suddenly become exposed, and in the protection of the
flanks against cavalry or counterstroke. They may be employed to
give effect to holding attacks or feints, by rapid fire directed
against successive portions of the enemy’s line; also to make good
positions secured in the course of an action.
_In the Defence_
_Para. 4._--It is more important to shield machine guns from
artillery fire than to obtain a long range for them. Their
position, therefore, should be always concealed, and cover from
fire should be provided. They are best utilised to sweep with
their fire spaces which are particularly exposed, but which the
enemy is compelled to cross; to flank salients, cover obstacles,
deny the passage of roads and defiles, or to guard the flanks of
the position. It will be at times expedient to retain the guns in
reserve until the enemy reaches effective ranges. In such cases,
emplacements should be prepared previously and covered approaches
provided. Machine guns may also be held as a reserve of fire to
check the advance of hostile reinforcements, to meet turning
movements, or to prepare and cover the counter-attack. When their
retirement is not likely to be compromised, machine guns may be
utilised in positions in front of the main line to delay the
enemy’s advance.
_In Pursuit and Retreat_
_Para. 5._--In pursuit machine-gun commanders should act with great
boldness, and it should be their endeavour to come into action
against the enemy’s flanks at decisive range. In retirements they
should avoid close engagements, and should take up successive fire
positions, from which to delay the enemy’s advance and protect the
flanks of the rear guard.
_With Advanced and Rear Guards and with Outposts_
_Para. 6._--With an advanced guard machine guns may often be
pushed forward to assist in dispersing small bodies of the enemy
who might delay the advance; they may also be employed in opposing
the enemy’s advance and in preventing the occupation of important
positions until the arrival of the main body. With the outposts
they may be used to sweep the approaches, and to dominate certain
points which an enemy, in advancing, is likely to pass or to occupy.
_With Cavalry_
_Para. 7._--As a general principle machine guns should be employed
to supplement the fire action of cavalry. During the cavalry
combat they may be suitably employed in protecting the flanks or
in directing an oblique fire against the hostile cavalry. When
the charge is successful they should press forward and engage the
hostile cavalry at close range. In event of defeat they should form
rallying points and endeavour to check the enemy’s pursuit. In
reconnaissance, or other detached duties, the machine guns should
be retained by the commander of the unit as a reserve, ready to
move to any point where their presence may be required. They may
be utilised for such purposes as to induce the enemy to expose his
position; to drive in hostile patrols; to check the pursuit of
victorious cavalry; to delay the enemy’s infantry, etc. When their
fire has achieved its object they should be withdrawn temporarily.
In other circumstances their action should be guided by the
principles set forth in the case of infantry.
_From_ “FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS,” _Part I., Operations_, 1909
The machine gun possesses the power of delivering a volume of
concentrated rifle fire which can be rapidly directed against
any desired object. Rapid fire cannot be long sustained, owing
to the expenditure of ammunition involved, and it is therefore
necessary that the movements and fire action of the weapons should
be regulated so as to enable them to open fire immediately a
favourable opportunity arises. Surprise is an important factor in
the employment of machine guns, which should be concealed, and
whenever possible provided with cover from fire. The massing of
machine guns is likely to attract hostile artillery fire. For this
reason it is usually better to employ them in pairs in support
of the particular body of troops to which they belong. When an
overwhelming fire on a particular point is required it can be
provided by concentrating the fire of dispersed pairs of guns. The
guns of two or more units may, if required, be placed under the
command of a specially selected officer and employed as a special
reserve of fire in the hands of a brigade commander. Machine guns
are best adapted for use at effective infantry ranges, but when
good cover from view and fire exists they may be usefully employed
at close infantry ranges.[62]
_With Outposts_
Machine guns with outposts may be employed to sweep approaches, and
to cover ground which an enemy in advancing may be compelled to
pass or occupy.[63]
_During the Battle_
Machine guns will be especially valuable in bringing a sudden fire
to bear from such positions, both in order to cover a further
advance and to assist in defeating counter-attacks. Machine guns
can normally support an attack most efficiently from well-concealed
positions provided with good cover, and within effective infantry
range of the enemy. Occasionally, when good opportunities for a
concealed advance present themselves, they may be established
within close infantry range of the objective.[64]
_From_ “CAVALRY TRAINING,” 1907
Machine guns afford a means of developing fire without dismounting
men from the squadrons. During the cavalry fight they will usually
be massed under one commander, but may be employed in pairs when
necessary. They will co-operate with the horse artillery, the
great volume of fire which they are able to bring to bear from a
narrow front being particularly effective. Their presence with the
artillery will often admit of the latter dispensing with any other
escort.[65]
_Position of Machine Guns_
During the approach march the machine guns will usually accompany
the artillery, to whom they may act as escort when necessary.[66]
_From_ “INFANTRY TRAINING, 1908” (AMENDMENT, AUGUST, 1909)
_General Characteristics_
1. The machine gun possesses the power of delivering rapidly from
a narrow front a volume of closely concentrated fire which can be
controlled easily, be turned readily in any desired direction, or
be distributed by traversing.
2. The effective range of machine guns is the same as that of the
rifle; they are therefore not suited for employment in place of
artillery. On the other hand, the effect of machine-gun fire at
effective infantry and close infantry ranges is very great, and
at close infantry ranges it may, with favourable conditions, be
annihilating. Machine guns are very suitable for the development of
covering fire within the limits of effective rifle range. They can
accompany the troops to which they may be attached over any country.
3. The action of the mechanism is liable to temporary interruption
by jams. Machine guns should not therefore be used singly under
normal conditions. They are organised in sections of two guns,
which should rarely be broken up.
4. Machine guns are essentially weapons of opportunity. The
expenditure of ammunition involved and the nature of the mechanism
make long periods of rapid fire unsuitable. The power of the gun is
best used to develop unexpected bursts of fire.
_The Organisation and Training of Infantry Machine-Gun Sections_
1. The strength and composition of a machine-gun section are shown
in War Establishments. An infantry machine-gun section is an
integral portion of an infantry battalion, but two or more sections
may be brought together by the brigade commander and used under the
command of a brigade machine-gun officer.
The two non-commissioned officers and twelve privates shown in the
establishment will be trained as first-class machine gunners.
Two non-commissioned officers and twelve men will be trained, as
opportunity offers, as second-class machine gunners to replace
casualties among first-class machine gunners.
2. A subaltern officer, other than the assistant adjutant, will be
selected in each battalion to command and train the machine-gun
section, under the orders of the commanding officer. Should a
brigade commander desire to train the machine guns of his brigade
to act together when massed, an officer, who is not the machine-gun
officer of one of the battalions of the brigade, may be selected to
supervise the firing practice and to conduct the brigade training
of machine-gun sections.
3. Officers, non-commissioned officers, and men detailed for
machine-gun training should be changed as little as possible; the
two non-commissioned officers and twelve men trained as first-class
machine gunners will fire the practices prescribed in the Musketry
Regulations with one of the companies of the battalion,[67] but
will at other times be at the disposal of the machine-gun officer
for instruction.
4. Details as to the mechanism of the gun, and the drill of
machine-gun sections are contained in the handbook of the gun.
Instructions as to the course of firing are contained in the
Musketry Regulations.
5. The preliminary training, which may be carried out in the
neighbourhood of barracks, will consist in instruction in the
mechanism of the gun; in the drill and methods of laying, ranging,
and firing; in packing and unpacking with limbered wagons.
6. As soon as the men of a section are thoroughly conversant with
the mechanism, are able to recognise without delay the cause of
any failure and to remedy it at once, and can drill and handle the
gun with precision, their further training will be carried out in
open country away from barracks. During this training the sections
should be practised in bringing the gun into action; in fire
discipline; in fire control; in laying and ranging in every variety
of country; in utilising natural cover when advancing into action;
and in constructing cover from both view and fire. The men should
also be trained in range-finding, judging distance, and in the use
of field-glasses.
7. When the section is proficient in these branches of training,
the commanding officer will arrange for it to be trained with one
or more companies which have reached the more advanced stages of
company training, in order that it may be practised in co-operating
with other troops and in dealing with such situations as would
confront it in war. The periods of preliminary training should
be arranged so that the section may be ready for this training,
without hurrying through the more elementary work. To enable this
to be done it will usually be necessary to begin the preliminary
training during the winter training season.
_General Principles of the Employment of Infantry Machine Guns_
1. The normal duty of the infantry machine gun in war is to
assist infantry in every way by its fire, but it may be given an
independent rôle at any time, if the tactical situation makes it
advisable to do so.
2. The effective use of a machine gun depends largely upon the
skill with which it has been brought into action. Surprise and
concealment are very important factors in its employment; for the
effect of the gun is much increased by sudden bursts of fire from
concealed positions. The tripod mounting makes it possible to take
advantage of small features of the ground to obtain cover and to
escape an enemy’s observation. In order to develop the power of the
gun to the utmost the fullest use should be made of natural and
artificial cover.
3. The depth of the beaten zone of the machine gun is small as
compared with that of collective rifle fire. This makes the effect
of small errors in sighting for elevation proportionately greater.
A section of machine guns cannot therefore be relied upon to make
its fire effective when first opening fire, at distances beyond
about 1,000 yards. If observation of fire is possible, elevation
may be rapidly corrected, and the fire of the two guns may in
that case be very effective up to 2,000 yards, or up to the limit
of observation. If there is no observation it will be necessary to
employ several guns and expend a large quantity of ammunition in
order to obtain adequate assurance of effect beyond about 1,000
yards.
4. By massing the machine guns of a brigade the assurance of fire
effect at ranges beyond 1,000 yards is increased, and it is easier
to control and direct fire. At shorter ranges massed machine guns
may form a conspicuous target, and the control of more than two
guns then becomes difficult. Occasions will, however, often arise
when the massed guns of a brigade can be brought into action in a
well-concealed position within the limits of effective rifle range.
Under such circumstances massed guns may produce great effect both
in attack and defence.
5. The general considerations which govern the selection of a
target for machine guns are--its tactical importance, its range,
and its vulnerability.
Machine guns should seldom engage artillery with direct fire beyond
effective rifle range, for in such circumstances superiority of
fire will always rest with the artillery if the machine guns are
located. Within effective range machine guns, if concealed, should
inflict considerable loss on artillery, while oblique fire may be
usefully employed up to the limits of long rifle range.
Engagements with thin lines of skirmishers should be avoided
unless the range is accurately known, as the risk of disclosing the
position of the gun and the expenditure of ammunition involved will
rarely be justified by results.
6. It is very important that fire should not be opened until
there is a reasonable probability of obtaining the desired
result. A section commander must have a thorough knowledge of
the capabilities of his guns to enable him to decide when he is
justified in opening fire.
7. Machine guns should as a rule only open fire upon targets which
are sufficiently large and dense to promise an adequate return
for the ammunition expended. Special circumstances may, however,
warrant the opening of fire upon less favourable targets. When a
machine-gun commander has decided to open fire, the ammunition
necessary to secure the results sought should be expended without
hesitation.
8. If there is no satisfactory indication of effect, and no special
justification for firing at long range exists, it will usually
be better to withdraw from action and to await opportunities for
effective intervention.
9. A machine-gun commander should be given definite orders as
to his action, but should be allowed full liberty, within the
limits assigned to the commander of the body of troops with whom
he is co-operating, in carrying out his orders. He should be kept
informed of all changes and developments of the situation which may
affect his action. Initiative and enterprise are essential to the
effective handling of machine guns.
10. Machine guns will usually be sufficiently protected by the
dispositions of the troops with whom they are acting. Should a
machine-gun commander find himself in an exposed position, he
should consult the nearest infantry commander, who is responsible
for providing a suitable escort, if in his opinion one is necessary.
11. When a machine gun is in action only those numbers required to
work the gun should be with it. Spare numbers, when not employed as
range-finders, ground scouts, ammunition-carriers, or on similar
duties, should be in covered positions in the vicinity. Groups of
men close to machine guns do not facilitate the working of the gun,
and make a vulnerable target.
The limbered wagons will be unloaded in positions where they are
screened from the enemy’s fire and observation.
The commander of the machine-gun section will select a covered
position for his small-arm ammunition cart, as close to his guns as
possible. (see Section 174).
_Choice of Fire Positions_
1. Reconnaissance is of special importance in the handling of
machine guns. Before bringing his guns into action the brigade
machine-gun officer if the machine guns are brigaded, or the
battalion machine-gun officer if the sections are working
independently, accompanied by range-takers and orderlies, should
usually be well in advance of his guns, where he can observe the
action of the body of infantry with which he is co-operating. He
should carefully reconnoitre suitable fire positions and make all
preparations for bringing his guns rapidly into action. During
this reconnaissance the machine guns should normally be placed
in concealed positions. In any case they should not follow the
machine-gun commander so closely as to expose their movements.
Alternative positions to which the guns may be moved to meet
changes in the situation or to avoid artillery fire should always
be prepared.
2. The choice of a fire position must depend upon the tactical
requirements of the situation, and upon the object in view; for
example, it must depend upon whether it is desired to use covering
enfilade or flanking fire, or to act by surprise.
A commanding position is favourable for the development of covering
fire, while for other purposes the gun should be sited as low as is
compatible with obtaining the necessary field of fire.
3. A clear field of fire, facilities for observation, a covered
approach, concealment and cover for the guns and their detachments,
and facilities for ammunition supply are advantages to be looked
for in a good fire position, but one position will rarely unite
them all. In arranging for the concealment of the guns it is
important to consider the background. The neighbourhood of
landmarks and the tops of prominent features should be avoided.
4. Their power of all-round traversing and their great effect
against deep targets make machine guns specially suitable for
position on a flank, whence they can bring enfilade fire to bear. A
position in the firing line is rarely suitable, as the fire of the
guns may be masked and the enemy’s fire drawn on the firing line.
5. The interval between guns in action should be as large as is
compatible with effective control, but the front occupied by the
massed guns of a brigade should rarely exceed 150 yards.
_Machine Guns in Attack_
1. Since machine guns are unsuited for maintaining a continuous
fire, they will usually best assist the infantry by withholding
their fire during the earlier stages of the battle, so as to be
able to intervene at more critical periods. Machine guns allotted
to a protective detachment will, however, always be employed so as
best to assist the detachment in its special duties (_Field Service
Regulations_, Part I., Chap. V.).
2. It will depend upon the general situation whether the machine
guns should be placed under the control of the brigade machine-gun
officer or left with the battalions to which they belong. When
the facilities for concealment and control at effective range are
good, and the brigade is engaged in a decisive attack, the best
results will usually be obtained by unity of command. By a timely
concentration of fire machine guns may thus be the deciding factor
in the struggle for superiority of fire.
When control is difficult, or when the brigade is extended over
a wide front, it will usually be better to leave guns with their
units.
3. It will often be advisable to employ both methods and to leave
their machine guns with the battalions which are first extended,
while those of reserve battalions are placed under the command of
the brigade machine-gun officer.
4. Although machine guns can move with deployed infantry under
fire, they should rarely attempt to keep pace with attacking
infantry. When they have gained a position from which they can
effectively support their infantry in the struggle for fire
superiority and in the assault, they should only be moved for
good and sufficient reasons. The difficulties of ranging and
of concealment on the move usually outweigh the advantages of
decreasing the range.
5. Machine guns will usually find opportunities for employment
in the attack in assisting the advance of their infantry by
means of covering fire; in protecting attacking infantry against
counter-attack or against cavalry; in assisting the infantry in the
fire fight, and in preparing for the assault by sudden bursts of
converging fire against the objective of the attack. They will also
be of value in securing localities which have been seized during
the advance, and can assist local reserves in acting as points of
support to the attack.
_Machine Guns in Defence_
1. In defence, as in attack, the fire of machine guns should
usually be withheld until the more critical stages of the battle.
Premature opening of fire is liable to expose the position of the
machine guns to the enemy’s artillery.
2. Machine guns may either be dispersed to command approaches,
defiles, exits from woods, etc., by which the enemy may advance,
to occupy advanced posts, and to bring enfilade fire to bear
upon salients and upon the ground in front of weak parts of the
position, or they may be massed and employed under the orders of
commanders of sections.
3. When the guns are massed the alternative positions, Sec.
167 (D) 1, should be such that the firing line can be assisted
during the crisis of the fight, and the advance of local and
decisive counter-attacks can be covered and prepared. When covered
approaches can be provided, massed machine guns should usually be
withdrawn, after they have achieved their immediate object, and
should await another favourable opportunity for action.
ITALY
GUN.--The Perino machine gun has been adopted. The barrel is
surrounded by a cooling tube containing water, and the gun fires
the same cartridge as the infantry rifle. It is regulated to fire
425 rounds a minute, and has a maximum rate of 500 rounds. It can
be fired continuously with the automatic action, or intermittently.
It is loaded by a ridged metal clip containing 25 cartridges, 10
of which clips are formed into a magazine. It is claimed that this
clip is superior to the belt on account of the ease with which
it can be recharged. The gun weighs 27 kilograms, which will be
reduced to 23 in future manufacture. It is mounted on a provisional
tripod, which is of a good pattern, but is said to be too heavy,
and the weight is to be reduced to 20 kilograms.
The gun can be fired from any height above the ground by moving the
legs of the tripod.
The mechanism is strong and simple, the range is the same as the
rifle, and it is very accurate at all ranges.
The Perino machine gun was adopted on the recommendation of a
Commission, who tested it against the Maxim and reported it to be
more efficient.
They recommended the following organisation:
ORGANISATION.--Four machine guns are attached to each regiment of
cavalry and infantry, and two guns to each Alpine battalion. The
detachments recommended are:
For cavalry: 1 N.C.O., 5 men, 7 horses, per gun.
For infantry: 1 N.C.O., 4 men, 2 mules, per gun.
_Ammunition._--No details have been settled as to the amount or
method of carrying.
TACTICAL.--No official instructions for the tactical handling of
machine guns have yet been issued.
JAPAN
GUN.--The Japanese have adopted the Hotchkiss,[68] the barrel of
which is air-cooled, having seven radiating gills on the breech to
absorb the heat. The bore is ·256, being the same as the rifle;
the weight is 70 lb. It is regulated to fire at a maximum rate of
600 rounds a minute. It is loaded by brass clips containing 30
cartridges inserted into the left side of the gun. The empties are
ejected on the right side. The gun is sighted up to 2,187 yards,
with a tangent sight, and is mounted on a tripod weighing 40 lb.,
which has an all-round traverse, and can be adjusted to fire from
two heights. Shields were used in the late war, but were discarded
on account of the weight. It is probable that detachable shields,
large enough to cover the detachment, will in future be issued with
machine guns for use as the situation requires.
[Illustration: DIAGRAM VI
_Diagram of Japanese Machine Gun--Tripod Mount._
_a-b Front and Rear Sights._
_A Piston rod._
_m Gas Vent._
_e Gas chamber._
_d Regulating nut._
_e Strong spiral spring._
_s Feed Slot._
_R Radiator._]
The Japanese machine gun is of home design and manufacture, and
belongs to that class in which the mechanism is actuated by the
action of gas pressure operating upon a plunger or piston and not
by the direct force of recoil as in the Maxim. It uses the same
ammunition as the infantry rifle (murata calibre ·256), and is
rated as firing 600 rounds a minute. Two forms of mountings are
employed, the tripod and the wheeled; the former for fortress use,
and the latter for mobile troops. Referring to the plate, a gas
vent _m_ communicates with a gas chamber _c_ attached laterally to
the barrel. The pressure in the gas chamber is regulated, within
limits, by the nut _d_, which varies the capacity of the chamber.
The piston-rod _A_ is acted upon by the gas pressure at its forward
end, and is driven to the rear against a strong spiral spring _o_,
which moves the piston end forward after the gas pressure has
ceased to act. The reciprocating motion of the piston-rod actuates
the mechanism, which is entirely enclosed in the housing, and
performs the various operations of feeding, firing, and ejecting
through a suitable train of gearing. Cooling is effected by the
radiator _R_, a circumferentially grooved mass of metal attached to
the barrel. The cartridges are mounted on a strip of sheet brass
from which clips are punched and bent round the cartridges to hold
them in position. A series of holes along the edges of the brass
strip engage the teeth of pinions which feed the strip forward as
the piston _A_ moves backward and forward. The cartridges are fired
from their clips by fingers, and drop into position when the bolt
is withdrawn. Thirty cartridges are mounted on one strip, which
is fed into the slot _s_, from the left side. The trigger must
be kept down by pressure all the time, otherwise the spring _o_
cannot operate to return the block forward. The gun is provided
with a shoulder piece and gunner’s seat, as shown. The gun alone
weighs about 73 lb., and with tripod 115 lb. It is sighted to 2,000
metres. The gun is stated to work very satisfactorily, and, owing
to the positive motions, jamming does not occur easily.
ORGANISATION.--At the close of the war each of the two cavalry
brigades was equipped with 6 machine guns and each infantry
regiment with 3 guns, and it was contemplated to increase the
allowance to 6 guns for each regiment, infantry or cavalry. The
guns are served by infantrymen who are extra-regimental and
selected from men having mechanical knowledge.
Guns are organised as follows:
_Infantry._--Batteries of 6 guns, each subdivided into 3 sections;
each infantry regiment has one battery attached to it.
The personnel of the battery consists of 1 captain (or lieutenant),
1 W.O., 1 bugler.
Each gun has 1 commander (sergeant or corporal), 1 firer, 1 loader,
3 ammunition carriers.
TACTICAL.--Tactically, the guns are used primarily for defence,
and reserve their fire for short ranges up to 600 or 800 metres.
On the defensive line of the Third Army after the battle of Mukden
many machine-gun emplacements were noted. These consisted mainly of
blinded casemates, 8 ft. wide, 10 ft. deep, and 3 ft. 6 in. high,
and from 18 to 24 in. of overhead cover. Importance is attached to
concealing the guns, and it was claimed that none had been knocked
out by Russian artillery. In the cavalry brigades the machine guns
were organised into sections of 2 guns under an officer, so that
sections could be detached with squadrons.
In the First Cavalry Brigade, General Akiyama, 4,000 rounds per
gun per day was the greatest rate of fire attained. Machine guns
were popular in the Japanese army, and were highly spoken of by the
officers.[69]
_Cavalry._--Each cavalry brigade has an 8-gun battery, which
is divided into half batteries of 4 guns each. The personnel
of the battery consists of 1 captain, 2 subalterns, 1 W.O.
(sergeant-major), 2 N.C.O.’s, 2 trumpeters. The gun detachments are
the same as for infantry, with 3 mounted men per gun in addition.
TRANSPORT. _Infantry._--30 horses, 6 of which carry guns and
tripods, and 24 carry the ammunition. One ammunition horse follows
each gun, and the remaining 18 under the W.O. form the battery
ammunition column. Each ammunition horse with the guns carries
15,000 rounds in two boxes, and each horse with the ammunition
column 2,160 rounds in four boxes.
_Cavalry._--Guns and tripods are carried on horses with 32
ammunition horses, each carrying 2,400 rounds.
Total establishment: 3 officers; 87 rank and file.
NOTE.--The organisation during the war was as follows:
Each cavalry brigade had a battery of 6 guns (Hotchkiss pattern
made in Japan). These were mounted on a heavy limbered carriage
with pole draught and 4 horses; these carriages were clumsy, heavy,
and conspicuous, and weighed 15 hundredweight. There was a fixed
shield on each carriage and a rough tripod was also carried.
_Tactical_
The Japanese have issued a well-illustrated drill book for the
use of machine-gun batteries, with cavalry and with infantry
respectively, with a view to enable them to manœuvre accurately and
easily in all situations. Their tactics are at present (1909) under
revision, and it is understood that there are likely to be many
changes introduced owing to the lessons of the late war.
The following is the most recent summary of the principles of their
tactics:
Machine guns are used as batteries, but may be broken up into
sections or even single guns. It is thought wrong to employ
“slow” fire, and 800 yards is considered the most useful range.
Well-hidden lines of skirmishers and other machine guns are
unsuitable targets, and they are never to be used to replace
artillery or to fire at artillery at long range, though they may do
so at close range or from the flanks or rear. Concealed positions
are recommended, and the use of alternative positions advocated,
and change of position should be made on the initiative of the
commander. Wide intervals between the guns should be used, but the
battery front should not exceed 110 yards. The guns should be used
on the flanks or rear of the enemy when possible. All ranges should
be measured.
Machine guns should be used in the attack just before the final
assault, and in the defence when repelling the assault or to
reinforce a threatened flank. In both attack and defence they are
to be held back, and fire reserved for the crisis of the action.
Use with the advance guard is not desirable as a rule. It is
strongly advocated with a rear guard, owing to their intense fire,
rapidity in ceasing fire (breaking off action), and mobility.
The officer commanding machine guns must be accurately acquainted
with the plans of the G.O.C., but must act on his own initiative
in forwarding the general scheme according to the situation.
Communication with the G.O.C. is considered vital. The guns are
considered especially valuable in covering the retreat of infantry.
Concealment from the enemy while manœuvring and surprise by sudden
fire are considered essential to their success.
_Regulations with the Infantry, 1907_
_Art. 67._--In the offensive the battery is at first kept in
reserve; but when its intervention becomes necessary during the
general engagement, to prepare the assault on a point in the
enemy’s position, they will be given orders to come into action.
The employment of machine guns is especially advantageous to
prepare an infantry attack. They can co-operate with this attack
even under heavy fire, without, however, being obliged to follow
the infantry. The battery ought often to change its position,
at the discretion of its commander, to lend its support to the
infantry. The battery will, if possible, take up a dominating
position or will establish itself on a flank in order to open fire
on the selected point of attack, in such a way as not to be marked
by its own infantry.
_Art. 69._--In the offensive in case of success: The machine guns
will rapidly and boldly move to a favourable position to pursue
the enemy with their fire and to make their infantry powerless to
attempt a counter-attack. The energetic action of the machine guns
after the position has been carried will force the enemy to scatter.
_Art. 70._--In the offensive in case of failures: The machine guns
will sacrifice themselves, if necessary, to cover their infantry.
They will break down the morale of hostile troops by riddling
them with fire without care for their own losses, and will thus
facilitate the retreat of their own infantry.[70]
_Machine Guns in the late War_
All officers are enthusiastic about machine guns. All agree that
their chief rôle is defence, even at night, and they are extremely
useful in attack. During the battle of Mukden machine guns were
used very much in the attack by the Japanese, but it seems that the
casualties of the machine-gun detachments were very heavy indeed;
one commander thought them especially useful in pursuit.[71]
_Remarks by Lt.-Gen. Sir C. J. Burnett, K.C.B._
The value of machine guns is fully recognised. I had a long
conversation with the brigade machine-gun officer. He has six
machine guns formed as a separate detachment, extra-regimental,
and attached to the brigade. Two guns under an officer form the
subdivision of his command, and can be detached at will, but no
machine gun is ever employed singly. The guns are usually kept
at the disposal of the brigadier, and have been used more in
defence than attack; they seldom open at long ranges unless on an
exceptionally good target. It is rather the rule to reserve the
machine-gun fire for decisive ranges. In many actions which cavalry
officers described to me, the practice has been to allow the enemy
to come within 600 yards before opening fire, and then suddenly
to overwhelm him. The principle with such well-trained troops is
sound, for the morale “knock-out” of a 10-per-cent. loss suffered
in a few minutes is far greater than a similar loss spread over the
advance from 1,000 to 600 yards, and the expenditure of ammunition
is less. Concealment is an essential feature of the Japanese
machine-gun tactics, and the officer told me he had not a single
gun put out of action by opposing artillery. The guns have shields;
the manipulators of the machine guns are very expert, and there is
now seldom a jam. Like a good _chauffeur_, the Japanese machine
gunner knows all the peculiarities of the weapon he fires, and can
almost tell by instinct when anything is going wrong. Four thousand
rounds is the most that has been fired in a day by three machine
guns of the 1st Cavalry Brigade; the number is now increased to
six. Throughout the Japanese Army the machine guns introduced
during the war are very popular, and instead of three per regiment,
six per regiment are being provided.
_Report by U.S.A. Officers on Russo-Japanese War_
These guns were highly thought of in the Japanese Army, and the
propriety of attaching them to the infantry was never questioned.
Four or six guns per battery and one battery per regiment were
usually suggested, although good arguments have been heard for
eight guns in a battery, and the wish for twelve was sometimes
expressed.... On the outbreak of war the Japanese expected
largely to limit the use of the machine gun to the defensive,
but experience soon taught them to widen its field, and later it
was used to great advantage on the offensive. Their rapid fire
frequently silenced the fire of the Russian infantry, and caused
the latter to crouch down in their trenches. When the guns stopped
firing the Russians could be seen again popping their heads above
the parapet. If the flanks of a line be weak, these weapons can be
used advantageously to strengthen them. Six guns were generally
recommended for a battery, thus permitting an assignment of two
per battalion. One officer of high rank, however, who was heard
to discuss this question ably, said he preferred eight guns, and
that he would divide these into two equal sections and assign
each section to a battalion, thus leaving the third battalion
without any. His idea was to use these guns both on the offensive
and defensive. On the offensive he would send them forward among
the first lines of the battalion to which they were attached,
or reinforce these lines by the guns at an early stage of the
action. In this way he would use them as a substitute for infantry
reinforcements. This system will enable the regimental commander to
hold the third battalion much longer intact for a decisive effort
when an opportunity offers. Officers who have had experience with
machine guns were opposed to using them singly, saying that never
less than two should be at any position not only to obtain volume
of fire, but also because a gun can so easily be put out of action.
In order to reduce the losses among the men from shrapnel fire to
a minimum, they recommend that the guns in a platoon be separated
by 20 metres and the platoons by 100 to 200 metres. Artillery
fire is looked upon as the most dangerous foe of the machine gun,
and in fact the most effective use of the latter on the offensive
presupposes the enemy’s artillery has been silenced, or at least
that its attention is well occupied by friendly batteries. The
machine gun is believed to be especially useful in mountainous
districts, where the elevated ground often discloses the close
formation of the enemy. The Japanese frequently fired it from an
elevated position over the heads of their infantry, and in this
way, as their battalions advanced, they at times kept down the fire
from the Russian trenches.
An officer who commanded one of these batteries at the battle of
Mukden, and who later was detailed to lecture to the attachés with
the First Army, said that on one occasion there he continued this
fire until the advancing infantry had arrived within 30 metres
of the enemy’s position. It is claimed the fire should almost
invariably be directed against the opposing infantry. The gun is
comparatively heavy, and when in action the battery is advancing
with the infantry it is sometimes difficult to keep up with the
latter, and moreover the men carrying the gun offer a good target;
and for these reasons the guns should frequently remain in position
as the echelons make their rushes, provided cover is provided
and a free field of fire secured. It is not essential that they
should be at all times immediately on the line occupied by the
infantry, although when the latter, after a considerable advance,
meets with determined opposition, some guns should be brought up.
This will give a feeling of confidence, and if need be help to
check a counter-attack. When advancing under fire, it is often a
good plan to move one gun at a time. Battery commanders report
good results when firing at long ranges--that is, between 1,200
and 1,800 metres. One thousand five hundred shots per gun is the
greatest number I heard of being fired in one hour. These guns were
sometimes attached to outposts. The loss among men serving machine
guns is usually great, and this requires that a large number be
trained in each regiment to use them. One officer of experience
with these weapons thought all officers and men selected to work
with them should be trained at division headquarters, or at some
other central point, in order to secure uniformity of instruction
and service.
On a previous occasion I reported that the shield was not generally
desired. I wish to modify this statement, as further investigation
showed that while different views were entertained on this subject,
the consensus of opinion was favourable to the retention of the
shield. The objections to it are that it offers a good target
and is more or less difficult to handle on the offensive. Some
officers were in favour of using it on the defensive, but not on
the offensive. In general, however, it was thought that both on the
offensive and defensive it gives material cover and adds confidence
and composure. The guns were almost invariably transported on
pack-ponies, except, of course, when effecting changes of position
under heavy fire, when they were carried by hand. It is understood
wheels were occasionally used in some parts of the army, but I
never saw the guns transported that way....
Machine guns were also added to the cavalry after the outbreak of
the war, there being six to each brigade, divided into sections of
two guns under one officer. Sections may be attached to squadrons
as required. The guns are used primarily for defence, and their
fire reserved for short and mid ranges....
Machine guns played an important part in the siege of Port
Arthur, being freely used by both sides. The Japanese gun was a
single-barrelled gun of home manufacture, while the Russians used
mainly the Maxim automatic. The Russian guns were used with telling
effect against the Japanese in the numerous bloody assaults, being
trained to cover all the approaches with a murderous fire.
PORTUGAL
On mobilisation machine-gun foot batteries are formed, the
personnel being provided from the division to which the batteries
are subsequently attached. Each battery consists of 6 guns, and is
commanded by a captain. It is subdivided into 3 sections of 2 guns
each, commanded by a subaltern.
The gun is provided with a shield and has a tripod mounting, the
whole being carried on a wheeled carriage on the march. When coming
into action the gun and tripod are taken out of the carriage and
carried into position by 4 men.
The weight of the gun, tripod, and shield, amounting to about 175
lb., is unevenly distributed and renders rapid marching impossible,
as it must be carried as one piece owing to the complicated
attachment of gun and tripod.
The tripod is heavy and rather high, making the gun conspicuous in
action, and on steep slopes the mounting is unstable.
The elevating and traversing gear do not give sufficient scope.
The cartridge belt contains 250 rounds. Each section (2 guns) has
an ammunition wagon carrying 14,000 rounds for each gun.
RUSSIA
GUNS.--Rexar and Maxim, but the former are being discarded and
Maxims alone will be used in future. They are sighted up to 2,000
yards.
ORGANISATION.--Each regiment (4 battalions) has 4 machine guns, and
it is intended to increase this to 8 in the future.
The detail of the personnel to each battery of 4 guns is as
follows: 2 officers, 50 N.C.O.’s and men, and 35 horses if the guns
are on wheeled carriages (36 horses if the guns are carried on
pack-horses).
The detachment is armed with the carbine.
For each gun 13 belts of ammunition are carried, each belt
containing 450 rounds.
The weight of the gun is 68 lb., and of the tripod 45 lb.; the
total weight carried by the pack-horse being 198 lb.
SPAIN
has 6 groups of Maxim and Hotchkiss guns, which have been recently
subdivided into 2 sections. Two new sections were raised in
September 1908.
The 14 sections are attached to the infantry brigades.
Pack transport has been adopted.
SWITZERLAND
There are 4 companies, each having 8 guns, which are subdivided
into sections of 2 guns each.
The detachments are mounted and the guns are allotted to the
cavalry.
The Maxim is the gun adopted by the Swiss Army, and in the
Regulations three kinds of machine-gun fire are recognised, viz.:
(1) _Salvoes, for range-finding._--The 2 guns of a section fire
short salvoes of 20 to 25 rounds alternately to get the right range.
(2) _Quick fire._--This is the normal method, and consists in
firing about 100 rounds at a time.
(3) _Rapid fire by individual guns._--Each gun fires as rapidly
as possible; used only as a last resort, or against a specially
favourable target.
The section (2 guns) is regarded as the unit, and the spirit of the
Regulations is that the machine guns are particularly for use with
cavalry, and must possess to the full the mobility and dash of that
arm.
Dismounted action for the cavalry is not favourably regarded, and
the machine guns are expected to relieve the cavalry of this duty.
PRINTED BY
HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD.
LONDON AND AYLESBURY.
[Illustration: A MAP SHEWING
the approximate allotment of Machine Guns for the
DEFENCE OF PORT ARTHUR]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Lieutenant A. E. Phillips, in the _Journal U.S.A. Cavalry
Association_, July 1909.
[2] The Germans consider its fire value equal to 120 rifles.
[3] Balck’s _Modern European Tactics_.
[4] These are still in use in the Territorial Army.
[5] _Journal of U.S.A. Cavalry Association_, July 1909.
[6] United States Official Report of Russo-Japanese War.
[7] See pages 12 and 13.
[8] See Chap. VII., “Cavalry Training.”
[9] _Cavalry Training_, 1907, p. 226.
[10] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I.
[11] _Cavalry Training_, 1907.
[12] _France Militaire_, April 15th, 1905.
[13] _Cavalry Training_, 1907, p. 218.
[14] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I. chap. vii. p. 133.
[15] _Cavalry Training_, 1907, chap. vii. p. 229.
[16] Captain F. Culmann in _R.U.S.I. Journal_, August, 1909.
[17] _Infantry Training_, 1905, p. 116.
[18] The Austrian regulations say 1,000 yards.
[19] Captain von Beckmann.
[20] _Times History of the War in South Africa._
[21] A Japanese machine gun fired 25,000 rounds in one day in
Manchuria.--AUTHOR.
[22] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I. p. 119.
[23] _Mitrailleuses à l’Etranger_, par Lieut. M.
[24] _The Great Siege_, by W. Norregaard.
[25] Captain Niessel in _Enseignements techniques de la guerre
Russo-Japonaise_.
[26] Captain von Beckmann.
[27] Von Ullrich.
[28] _The Great Siege_, by W. Norregaard.
[29] Von Ullrich, War Correspondent of _Gazette de Cologne_.
[30] British Officer’s Report, Russo-Japanese War.
[31] _Ibid._
[32] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 83.
[33] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 83.
[34] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 85.
[35] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 84.
[36] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 86.
[37] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, pp. 87-9.
[38] Between 400 and 500 is the usual rate of fire.--AUTHOR.
[39] See _Handbook for ·303 Machine Guns_, pp. 88-9.
[40] See map; the Japanese name for this work is Ban-ru-san Nishi
Hodai.
[41] See _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 153.
[42] _The Great Siege_, by W. Norregaard.
[43] _Ibid._
[44] _The Great Siege_, by W. Norregaard.
[45] Von Ullrich.
[46] _The Great Siege_, by W. Norregaard.
[47] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 140.
[48] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., p. 141.
[49] A great many machine guns were added to the forts from the
fleet early in June.--AUTHOR.
[50] _Small Wars, their Principles and Practice._
[51] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909.
[52] _Small Wars, their Principles and Practice_, p. 441.
[53] Official Report.
[54] Official History of operations in Somaliland.
[55] Major Gough’s Official Report.
[56] Official History of the operations in Somaliland.
[57] From Staff Diary of 1st Brigade.
[58] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 173.
[59] Callwell’s _Small Wars, their Principles and Practice_.
[60] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, Sect. 157.
[61] This system was adopted; see paragraph _re_ Organisation, p.
189.
[62] Section 7.
[63] Section 77, Para. 4.
[64] Section 150, Para. 5.
[65] Section 150, Para. (iv).
[66] Section 149, Para. (v).
[67] They should fire with their own companies if it can be
arranged that they complete the various parts of the range practice
on approximately the same date.
[68] The Hotchkiss loses accuracy after 600 rounds, and becomes
red-hot after 14,000 rounds.
[69] U.S.A. Official Reports on Russo-Japanese War.
[70] _Revue d’Infanterie_, March, 1908.
[71] Officer’s report, U.S.A., Russo-Japanese War.
TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE
Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been
corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within
the text and consultation of external sources.
Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text,
and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.
Pg 57: ‘moral action’ replaced by ‘morale action’.
Pg 70: ‘should aways’ replaced by ‘should always’.
Pg 114: ‘moral effect’ replaced by ‘morale effect’.
Pg 119: ‘M. Ulrich’ replaced by ‘M. Ullrich’.
Pg 125: ‘moral effect’ replaced by ‘morale effect’.
Pg 133: ‘moral effect’ replaced by ‘morale effect’.
Pg 152: ‘same fate befel’ replaced by ‘same fate befell’.
Pg 173: ‘moral effect’ replaced by ‘morale effect’.
Pg 183: ‘moral effect’ replaced by ‘morale effect’.
Pg 220: ‘moral effect’ replaced by ‘morale effect’.
Pg 222: ‘he held in’ replaced by ‘be held in’.
Pg 258: ‘the moral “knock-out”’ replaced by ‘the morale “knock-out”’.