EMPLOYMENT IN THE FIELD WITH THE PROTECTIVE CAVALRY
Each army will usually be divided into several columns, each
preceded by its advanced guard, the whole covered by the Protective
Cavalry. The bulk of the latter will be scattered or remain
concentrated according to the size of the zone in which it is to
operate, the nature of the ground, and the first dispositions of
the enemy. The veil thus formed will only be torn aside when the
artillery and infantry of the advanced guards open fire.[11]
It is probable that the side which is weak in cavalry will dispense
with Independent Cavalry altogether, and will meet the Independent
Cavalry of the enemy with their Protective Cavalry supported by
machine guns. The Japanese, who were outnumbered by six to one,
were unable to use Independent Cavalry, and during the early stages
of the war supported their cavalry by infantry. The Russians, who
possessed masses of cavalry, used them principally as Protective
Cavalry, if we except the raids made by the Division under
Lieutenant-General Mishchenko after the fall of Port Arthur. The
Protective Cavalry will therefore, in such a case, not only have to
prevent the enemy’s Independent Cavalry from obtaining information
by penetrating their screen, but will also have the task of
obtaining information as to the enemy’s numbers and direction of
march. That they are able to do this even in the face of greatly
superior numbers has been proved by the Japanese, whose cavalry,
outnumbered and badly horsed as they were, succeeded throughout the
war in a remarkable degree in penetrating the enemy’s screen and
obtaining information. The Russians, on the other hand, in spite of
their masses of cavalry, failed not only to destroy the diminutive
force opposed to them, but even to penetrate their thin veil or
obtain any information of what was taking place behind it.
Are we not in precisely the same position as the Japanese in our
numerical weakness in cavalry, and should we not be confronted by
the same problem in the event of war with a military nation?
Let us, then, see how the Japanese Protective Cavalry was able to
fulfil its mission in spite of the vastly superior numbers of its
opponents. In the first place the Japanese cavalry is trained in
the orthodox cavalry spirit, which is highly developed; suppleness
and power to manœuvre for the delivery of the attack is the chief
aim, while the charge is regarded as the culmination of manœuvre.
Swordsmanship, horsemanship, and independent scouting are the
features of individual training, while only thirty rounds per
annum are fired in the musketry course, from the carbine with
which they are armed in addition to the sword. The consequence is
that the whole cavalry is saturated with a spirit of enterprise
and daring, and a firm belief in its superiority to all other arms
in manœuvre and offence. It was this spirit and confidence that
enabled them, when outnumbered and deprived of their swordsmanship,
to retain their dash and mobility, while using their carbines from
behind village walls against the hosts they were unable to ride
down. It must be remembered that the Japanese had practically
no machine guns at the beginning of the war, and those hastily
purchased after hostilities broke out were required at Port
Arthur. Consequently, the Japanese had to solve the problem of
how to oppose the masses of Russian cavalry with their few but
highly trained squadrons, and their solution was to hold up the
Russian cavalry by fire on every possible occasion, and to be
held up by them as seldom as possible. For this purpose they were
closely supported by infantry; and it is of interest to remember
how our own light infantry were used in much the same way in the
Peninsula--the 13th Light Infantry being actually mounted for the
purpose. Can we ignore the lesson? Is it not plain that machine
guns would not only have done the work of the carbine and rifle
far more effectively, but instead of depriving the cavalry of much
of their mobility and preventing them from being made full use
of--as undoubtedly was the case--they would have enabled them to
go anywhere with the certainty of being able to defend themselves
against a greatly superior force of cavalry.
The action of Protective Cavalry on a large scale is so similar to
that of Independent Cavalry--especially in the matter of patrols
and contact squadrons--that it will be unnecessary to reconsider
these duties. In speaking of the duties of the Protective
Cavalry, _Field Service Regulations_, 1909, Part I., Chapter V.,
observes: “These functions of the Protective Cavalry will entail
principally defensive action, and will necessitate extension over
a considerable front; but the commander must dispose his force in
sufficient depth to enable it, with the assistance of the advanced
guards of the columns in rear, to check any attempt to break
through and surprise the main body.”
It is obvious that fire action is here indicated, and a preceding
paragraph states that mounted infantry will usually accompany the
Protective Cavalry, though it is to be doubted if it will be found
possible to provide horses for this purpose in time of war.
Machine guns, however, will provide the necessary fire power
without requiring many men or horses, and the use of a few extra
batteries of machine guns with the Protective Cavalry would give
them all the stiffening and defensive power of infantry without
detracting from their mobility as cavalry. If the Japanese have
taught us anything, it is this--that our cavalry, small as it is,
if properly supported by strong and well-trained batteries of
mobile machine guns, will be able to more than hold its own against
greatly superior numbers in a European campaign. To attain such an
end we should at once organise cavalry machine-gun batteries, and
attach two batteries to each brigade in addition to the guns they
already possess. This would give each cavalry brigade the fire
power of a battalion of infantry (900 rifles), while in no way
detracting from their mobility, as they would only occupy the road
space of two extra squadrons, and move just as rapidly over any
country. The alternative is to follow Colonel Zaleski’s advice and
attach two machine guns to each squadron, which would give the same
number of guns, but would be likely to detract from the efficiency
of both guns and squadrons. We are, however, dealing with existing
organisation, and, however much we may desire to increase the
efficiency of our Protective Cavalry, we have only one battery of
six guns with each brigade instead of the visionary three. Let us
see how we may use them to the best advantage.
Supposing the Protective Cavalry to consist of one brigade, they
will probably be extended to form a screen over a considerable
front. The exact formation and method of advance will entirely
depend upon the proximity of the enemy, his strength, and the
nature of the country. We will suppose the country open and both
flanks exposed and the enemy in the immediate vicinity, the
contact squadrons or patrols having gained touch with him. The
duties of the Protective Cavalry are the tactical reconnaissance,
and the occupation of positions of tactical importance to the
infantry and artillery.
With so small a number of machine guns as a single battery, it will
be necessary to decide where they may be most usefully employed,
and a great deal must depend on the particular situation. If the
tactical reconnaissance is incomplete, they may be used in the
first instance to hold the enemy in front while the squadrons move
round the flanks to complete the information required. If used in
this manner, they must be handled with dash, and, working in widely
extended pairs--two in the centre and two on each flank--must push
forward and try to surprise the enemy in close formation, moving
from position to position and never remaining stationary after
fire has been opened, provided cover exists to hide movement. Six
guns co-operating in a vigorous offensive, unopposed by artillery,
can push up to close range and do immense damage, while the enemy
should be quite unable to decide what numbers are opposed to him.
A ridge, a gully, a road with good hedges parallel to the front,
is sufficient to conceal the movement of machine guns; and as they
have nothing to fear from cavalry and can always retire if galled
by rifle fire, they can dominate the situation if handled according
to the principles already laid down for them.
Where the tactical reconnaissance has already been completed and
the principal object is to protect the force covered, machine guns
will be found most valuable to support the flanks should an attempt
be made to turn them, as their mobility enables them to be sent to
a distant point with great rapidity, and their concentrated fire at
once makes itself felt at a threatened point and turns the scale
in a fire fight with astonishing suddenness. This mobility renders
them particularly suitable for seizing and holding positions until
the main body comes up.
When used for this duty the battery or section commander, as the
case may be, should receive definite orders as to the importance
of the position he is sent to hold and how long he is expected to
remain there. The position should be carefully reconnoitred by
scouts before the guns approach it, and steps should be taken at
once to entrench the guns and teams against artillery fire if the
position is to be held for any time. Alternative positions for
each gun, with concealed approaches, should be constructed, and
the guns carefully hidden by erecting screens in front of them, or
by placing them behind bushes, which are then cut almost through
the stem, so that they can be instantly removed to open fire.
Ranges must be taken and carefully written down, with their compass
bearings to conspicuous marks. The flanks must be protected, and
dead ground made good by posting one gun to sweep it. The gun
horses and detachment not on duty should be posted well to the
flank and rear where they can obtain the best shelter from view and
fire. Signalling communication should be established with the rear
and flanks when possible.
Very definite instructions must be given as to when and on what
targets fire is to be opened, and the temptation to fire at patrols
or small bodies of the enemy must be resisted. Fire should only be
opened in the first instance by the order of the senior officer
present, and in all cases should be reserved as long as possible.
The battery of machine guns may also be used during the cavalry
combat as already described in the last chapter, and when used as
a reserve on a flank, should take up “positions of observation” if
the ground permits, from which they can repulse a flank attack,
while remaining ready to move off at a moment’s notice to any point
where they may be required.
Machine-gun commanders with the Protective Cavalry must bear
in mind that their object must always be to help their cavalry
in attaining the end in view, be it reconnaissance, attack, or
resistance, and that close co-operation with the cavalry commander
is essential. The most brilliant action causing loss or defeat to a
portion of the enemy is useless if it does not directly further the
object of the Protective Cavalry; and if we are unable to give here
many examples from recent campaigns, it is principally due to this
want of co-operation and consequent inability to make effective use
of the machine guns.
The report made by Captain Golochtchanov, who commanded a
detachment of six machine guns attached to the 11th Orenburg
Cossacks during the last few months of the war, contains a vivid
description of the reconnaissance of the Japanese position made on
August 14th, 1905, at Sitasi, by the regiment forming the advanced
guard of Major-General Grêkow. “At about 4 a.m. the Russian cavalry
attacked the Japanese outposts, consisting of three companies of
infantry and two squadrons. While waiting for the situation to be
cleared up, the machine guns were kept in reserve. Two and then
four were sent against the enemy’s flank; the Japanese retired
from position to position. At one o’clock the fight stopped; the
Russians had carried three villages and determined the line and
direction of the enemy’s trenches. Their task was accomplished. On
the Russian side there were only 100 rifles in the firing line,
with four machine guns.”[12]
“Instead of marching at a uniform rate and distance in front of
the main army it may be advantageous at times for portions of the
Protective Cavalry to move rapidly forward to some natural feature,
such as a ridge or river, along which it will establish posts of
observation, the intervening country being watched by patrols, the
line being divided into sections with suitable supports for each.
The remainder of the force will continue to maintain a line of
observation in rear, until the new line of observation is taken
up; it will then concentrate and move up to support the latter, or
pass through it to form a more advanced line.”[13]
When this method of advance is used the machine guns working as
independent sections should be used to hold important features,
such as bridge-heads, defiles, passes, and villages in the line of
observation. If positions are carefully selected whence effective
fire can be brought to bear on points which the enemy must pass in
close order, and the usual procedure as to cover, concealment, and
range-taking is observed, the mounted troops may be spared much
fatigue and given opportunities for resting men and horses.
USE OF MACHINE GUNS IN A RETREAT
During the battle the Protective Cavalry will be used in the way
already described in the previous chapter, in which we also dealt
with the Pursuit; we will therefore now see how they may be used to
assist a Retreat.
“When retreat appears inevitable the routes to the rallying
position should never be so close to the battlefield as to come at
once under the fire of the enemy. It should be occupied as soon as
possible by some portion of the artillery, and by complete infantry
units. _The cavalry and other mounted troops, aided by a strong
force of artillery, will meanwhile check the enemy’s advance_,
and the remainder of the force, with the exception, if possible,
of a rear guard in support of the mounted troops, will move as
rapidly as possible to the shelter of the rallying position and
there reorganise. Steps should be taken immediately to secure any
bridges, defiles, or other vital points on the line of retreat,
at which the enemy’s mounted troops might intercept the force.
Commanders of retreating troops must recognise that their greatest
danger will arise from attacks in flank delivered by the enemy’s
mounted troops and horse artillery; if possible, therefore, they
should take precautions that _all ground commanding their line
of retreat is occupied by flank guards_.”[14] The action of the
Protective Cavalry is indicated in the first paragraph quoted in
italics, while the second gives the only method by which a retreat
can be rendered successful or secure. In no phase of modern war
are machine guns so valuable as during a retreat, and it is quite
probable that, properly organised and handled, they may make the
pursuit so difficult and costly as to render the retreat a far
less dangerous undertaking than it has been in the past. It is not
difficult to realise that an arm possessing such great mobility,
together with rapidity and concentration of fire, before which no
closed bodies can exist at effective range, will be able not merely
to check and delay pursuing cavalry, but may even prevent any
effective pursuit by mounted men alone.
The lack of machine guns on the side of the Russians in the late
war renders this point still to be proved by a future campaign; but
it is well known that the machine guns with the 1st Siberian Army
Corps constantly checked the Japanese pursuit, and more than once
rendered a flanking movement abortive.
The moment that it is evident that a retreat is necessary it
will be the duty of the Protective Cavalry commander immediately
to collect all his cavalry, with a view to checking the enemy’s
advance, and at the same time he should apply to the G.O.C. for
as many machine guns as he can spare, and this is certainly the
occasion when all the mounted machine-gun batteries should be sent
to the commander of the rear guard.
The first step will be to allot one or more batteries to the troops
forming the two flank guards and to the main guard covering the
centre. The general situation at this moment will of course govern
their use. “The commander will determine, in accordance with the
features of the ground, whether delay is best brought about by
the occupation of positions blocking or flanking the enemy’s line
of advance and the employment of fire action, or by a vigorous
and timely attack by a body of horsemen. Frequently, however,
opportunities may be offered for acting wide on the flanks, where
even the threat of a mounted attack or a sudden dash from ambush
may cause the enemy’s pursuit to be delayed without the force
becoming too deeply committed.”[15] In either case the important
thing for machine guns to do at this stage is quickly to seize
ground from which to bring effective fire to bear across a wide
extent of front. Dealing first with the commander of the batteries
allotted to the centre, he will consult the O.C. cavalry and
arrange with him his plan of action. It is of the first importance
to stop the forward movement of the enemy on the direct line of
retreat, as this is the easiest line of pursuit and the one upon
which the most shaken portion of the troops will be found. The
probable course of action for the machine guns here will be to
break up into sections and form a line along the nearest feature of
ground immediately in rear, from which fire can be brought to sweep
the front and check direct pursuit. The more broken the country and
the more commanding the ridge or other features, the more effectual
will be the check, for at this stage guns will certainly be
prominent in the pursuit and shelter from their fire will be very
necessary.
The fact that the machine guns are working in pairs on a very wide
front should make it exceedingly difficult for artillery to locate
them, except singly, and thus it will take them a considerable time
to silence more than one or two of the scattered line of guns.
Alternative positions and the constant change to a fresh one after
opening fire will render the majority of the machine guns capable
of remaining in action until closely engaged by the infantry. This
will cause considerable delay, and by the time a serious infantry
attack develops the machine guns will be able to retire to a fresh
position. In anticipation of this, the battery commanders will have
sent scouts to the rear directly the guns are in position, and they
should personally examine the new line to be taken up, and select
the gun positions for each section. One scout should remain in the
new position of each section and the other return to the gun horses
of his section, to guide them when the moment for retiring takes
place.
The gun horses should be as near the guns in action as possible;
but should the position be such that this is impossible without
exposing the horses to fire, then all the spare rifles of the
gun-team must be used to open rapid fire to conceal the fact that
the gun is being moved. The guns of each section must arrange with
each other to cover their own retirement, but the battery commander
must issue the order in the first instance and will arrange which
sections move first.
Where the pressure is great and co-operation difficult, it may
be advisable to retire by half sections along the whole front at
the same moment; thus the right guns of sections may be ordered
to retire on a given signal, while the left guns cover them by a
heavy continuous fire. If this method of retirement is adopted, it
will be necessary for the second position to be within long range
of the first, which is not always advisable in covering a retreat.
It will seldom be possible to select a concealed position in the
early stages of the retreat, but it must be borne in mind that if
a concealed position can be occupied, and fire reserved until the
pursuing cavalry are at close range, the effect of such a surprise
will do much to check the pursuit, and impose such caution on the
enemy that they will hesitate to press on without those precautions
which necessitate deployments and thus cause much delay.
The machine guns allotted to the flanks should form the supports
to the cavalry there; and if two batteries are available on each
flank, one should accompany the cavalry to enable it to remain
mounted, while they provide the fire action necessary to support it
in the attack and to cover its retirement in the face of superior
numbers. The detail of such action has already been given with
the Independent Cavalry. The other batteries will break up into
sections and move parallel to the line of retreat in single file
at wide intervals, keeping touch with the cavalry by scouts on the
outer flank. The object of this battery is to seize and hold good
positions on the flank of the line of retreat until the main body
has passed. The scouts of the rear section of this battery should
get into touch with the scouts of the flank gun of the centre
battery from time to time, to ensure proper co-operation between
the various batteries.
The importance of concealed positions from which to ambush the
pursuers must not blind machine-gun commanders to the necessity
for seizing and holding to the last possible moment, even at
the risk of capture, every position from which the retreat can
be effectually covered and the pursuit delayed. Should a river
or other natural obstacle be encountered on the line of retreat,
machine guns must freely sacrifice themselves in covering the
retirement of the cavalry across the bridge or beyond the obstacle.
Cavalry is the most costly of all arms, and cannot be replaced
during a campaign; machine guns are the least expensive in
proportion to their fire value, and the easiest to renew; they must
consequently save the cavalry when they can, even if they sacrifice
themselves in doing so.
ESCORT TO ARTILLERY
There is one important duty which machine guns are able to perform
better than any other arm, and that is escorting artillery, but
more especially horse artillery. When cavalry are detailed for
this purpose they not only deprive squadrons of much-needed men,
but can only provide three rifles in action to every four men of
the escort, owing to the necessity of providing horse-holders. In
addition to this drawback, the horses provide a costly fire-trap
for the shells of the enemy’s guns which may go wide of the
battery. For these reasons, where it is possible to spare them,
a section of machine guns should be allotted to each battery of
artillery when an escort is necessary.
They should march in the rear of the battery when on a road, and
on the outer flank when in open country and away from cavalry.
The sole object of the machine guns is to afford protection to
the battery from cavalry, and to prevent rifle fire from being
brought to bear on them from effective range; therefore the section
commander must devote his whole attention to this object, and he is
not justified in opening fire on any target that does not directly
threaten the battery--this especially applies to that stage of the
mounted combat immediately before the collision, when the guns are
firing on the opposing squadrons.
The section commander will be under the immediate orders of the
battery commander, and should be acquainted with his plans and
intentions. He should remain with him until the position for
action has been selected, when he will immediately seek the best
position from which to cover the guns, taking particular care
not to mask or limit their radius of fire nor hinder their line
of advance or retreat. This will necessitate a careful but rapid
survey of the ground in the vicinity of the position, in which
good ground scouts, who have been previously trained in this work,
will materially assist. The most suitable positions will usually
be found well to the front and on the inner flank of the battery
from 200 to 600 yards’ distance. It may be occasionally possible to
place a machine gun on each flank from which a cross fire can be
brought to bear on ground in front of the guns; but such a position
on either side of the battery, unless the ground is particularly
favourable, has the disadvantage of rendering fire control
difficult, and may hamper the fire or movement of the battery.
The principal considerations which should govern the choice of a
position are as follows:
(1) Good field of fire to protect the battery from attack.
(2) Position clear of the fire and movement of the battery.
(3) Immunity from artillery firing on the battery.
(4) Concealment.
(5) Cover from fire.
There should be no dead ground in front or on the flanks of the
battery, and with two machine guns this condition can generally be
satisfied. In cases where one flank remains exposed and cannot be
protected by the fire of the machine guns, or where a portion of
the front or one flank cannot be seen, scouts must be placed well
out in this direction, where they can see anything approaching
and signal timely warning of it, and a position must be selected
beforehand to which to move a machine gun should the warning be
given. It has already been pointed out in a previous chapter, and
may be repeated here, that machine guns have nothing to fear from
cavalry under any circumstances, and when in a selected position
with ranges accurately known, as they would be in this case, a
single gun properly handled could easily stop a squadron. When
selecting the place for the led horses, it must be remembered that
fire from the enemy’s guns is likely to search the reverse slopes
of the position immediately in rear of the battery.
The machine guns must not be re-horsed until after the battery
has limbered up and moved off, as they are then most vulnerable.
They should endeavour to come into action before the battery
unlimbers--though this will seldom be possible with horse
artillery.