EMPLOYMENT IN THE FIELD WITH THE INDEPENDENT CAVALRY
The Germans have resolutely adopted the plan of attaching machine
guns to cavalry, and they seem thus to understand the modern
combination of fire and shock tactics. To the machine gun the
fire action, to the horseman the morale action--so much the more
easy and productive of results, as the machine gun is the more
powerful.--CHIEF OF 2ND BUREAU, French General Staff.
Since this was written it has been generally recognised by the
leading military authorities of the world that the machine gun
is essentially a cavalry weapon; and Colonel Zaleski in a recent
article on the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War goes so far as to
say, “Even their addition to squadrons cannot be carried out too
rapidly, and this weapon would now appear to be indispensable to
cavalry.”
The truth of this statement is obvious to the student of modern
tactics who is also acquainted with the machine gun as organised
and equipped on the Continent and in the United States, where it
is as mobile as the cavalryman himself and as quick in coming into
action.[7] When its true rôle is understood and its tremendous
fire power made full use of, it will go far to render cavalry
independent of the rifle, and to restore to them that dash
and independence of action which made them the terror of the
battlefields of the past.
The following extract from an article in _The Times_ newspaper
of August 23rd, 1905, by their special correspondent with the
Japanese Army in Manchuria, shows the necessity for machine guns by
emphasising the danger of training cavalry to fight as infantry.
“The prime value of cavalry lies in its mobility. As an actual
fighting unit in battle a body of cavalry is much inferior to an
equal body of infantry. The discrepancy is less marked if the
cavalryman carries a rifle, but there is always the encumbrance of
the horses, which require the attention of one man in every four
when the rifle is employed. It being postulated that tactics evolve
themselves into the effort to obtain a superiority of rifle fire,
it is evident that the necessity of dispensing with one quarter of
a body of mounted riflemen before their weapons can be brought to
bear greatly lessens the value of that body. On the other hand, the
mobility of the mounted rifleman compensates for his comparative
ineffectiveness to such a degree, it is believed in the British
Army, that elaborate arrangements have been made for the provision
and training of what is known as mounted infantry. Granted the
value of mounted and mobile men as an auxiliary to infantry, the
question arises, What is the weapon with which they shall be
armed, and what the nature of the training to which they shall
be subjected? These things depend upon whether the mobility of a
mounted man is regarded as secondary to his function as a rifleman,
or whether his weapon be merely adapted to his mobility. In other
words, are mounted men wanted for their riding or their shooting?
The arming of our cavalry with rifles, and certain modifications
in its training, together with the formation of corps of mounted
infantry, show that those who held the ear of the Secretary of
State for War a few years ago pinned their faith to the superior
value of shooting, and regarded mobility in a mounted man only as
a means to an end. If we turn to the conflict now proceeding in
Manchuria, it is found that in one respect it differs considerably
from other great wars, particularly those which have been fought
on level ground. Cavalry has been conspicuous not by its absence,
but by its utter and astonishing ineffectiveness. From Liao-yang
northwards both armies have occupied part of the level plain
traversed by the Liao River. The right of the Russian Army and
the left of the Japanese have faced each other for nearly twelve
months, in country as flat as a billiard-table and as suitable for
cavalry evolutions as any of the low countries in which the famous
leaders of last century made their reputations. Here have been
conditions ideal for the employment of shock tactics; a veritable
jousting-ground where the vaunted Russian cavalry might have run
a-tilt at the sword-worshipping Japanese. Yet no single instance
has been recorded of combat between mounted men, and to the best
of my belief none has occurred.
“Is it, then, that those who advocate the substitution of mounted
infantry for cavalry are in the right; that the lancer, hussar,
and dragoon of picturesque memory have become obsolete in these
days of the breechloading rifle? Almost it would seem so. But
for two important considerations, the case for mounted infantry
might well be deemed as proved. These considerations, however,
are of such a nature as to lead the observer to directly opposite
conclusions: to conclude actually that cavalry pure and simple is
as useful to the army of to-day as it was to the army of Napoleon’s
day; and that it is totally erroneous to suppose that mounted
infantry can be an efficient substitute for cavalry. The cause of
the effectiveness of Japanese cavalry is not far to seek. The men
are the most intelligent of Japanese soldiers, and their many fine
patrol performances are evidence of the sound methods in which
they have been trained. Their weakness lies in the poor quality
of the horses, and the fact that the Russian cavalry outnumbers
them by six to one. Marked inferiority of force, in all forms of
rivalry, is a fatal disadvantage, and it is for this reason that
the Japanese have failed to shine in the rôle which experience has
assigned to cavalry. The Russian cavalry, on the other hand, is
estimated to number 30,000 sabres, a force of mounted men which, in
the circumstances, ought to have made the lives of the Japanese
commanders on the flank of the army a burden to them. Instead of
which, life in the rear of the Japanese front has been a sinecure,
a positive _dolce far niente_, undisturbed even by the distant
flash of any of these sabres. Is this a proof that, if the sabres
had been rifles, something could have been accomplished? Very far
from it. It is because the Russian cavalry, armed as it is with
rifle and--shade of Seydlitz!--bayonet, is trained to fight only
on foot, thereby throwing away its most valuable weapon, mobility,
that it has proved no more effective in the field than a flock of
sheep. That the microscopic force of Japanese cavalry has held
the Russian throughout the campaign--an exceedingly remarkable
performance when it is remembered how indifferently the Japanese
are mounted--testifies clearly enough that there must be something
futile about the arming and training of the Russians.... They
failed as cavalry and they failed as riflemen, and the reason of
the failure was that they are neither fish, flesh, fowl, nor good
red herring. They are organised as cavalry, but have been trained
to dismount on service. In peace they are armed with lance and
sword, and in war they are asked to fight with rifle and bayonet.
Truly an absurdity, worthy of one of those nebulous units evolved
by our own Parliamentary reformers. Last month Mishchenko, marching
forty-five miles in four long summer days, again descended on
the Japanese flank, accounted for a couple of companies and a
field hospital, frightened a number of Chinese carters, and
stopped before a thin line of infantry guarding the approaches
to Hsin-minting, where Japanese supplies are stored sky-high.
Had he known it, he was within an ace of picking up a number of
distinguished British officers, besides newspaper correspondents,
and a famous general whom the Emperor William has specially
delighted to honour. But an inferior number of riflemen checked the
advance, and no use was made of the mobility of the column, except
to retire by a circuitous route.... So far as my information goes,
the Russian cavalry west of Mukden never once took the offensive
during the battle. Strapped up with rifle and bayonet, they are
incapable of wielding the sword; their lances, except in the case
of a small proportion of the Cossacks, have been left in Russia.
So it was useless to contemplate old-fashioned cavalry work. But
the Japanese communications were an easy mark, and it is one of the
most singular features of Russian tactics that they did not avail
themselves of so glaring an opportunity. Even as mounted infantry
they should have been able to destroy Nogi’s communications. Yet
they never made a single attempt at interference.
“The deduction is obvious: either the training or arming must be at
fault. When a mounted man dismounts he sacrifices his mobility to
become a weak infantryman. The Russian cavalry has been trained to
fight dismounted, and the result is that the Russians have divested
themselves of the one arm which, many keen observers believe,
might have availed to turn the tide in their favour. The battle of
Mukden was a great defeat, though not an overwhelming disaster.
At one period the result hung in the balance, and it is no wild
statement to say that if the Russian cavalry had been trained
and armed in orthodox cavalry fashion, and handled in a manner
consistent with cavalry tradition, Mukden would have proved a drawn
battle. It is my firm belief--a belief shared with many others more
competent to judge--that if French, with 10,000 British cavalry,
had been given a free hand early in the war on the Russian side,
there would have been no necessity for Kuropatkin to retire from
his strong position at Liao-yang, and I have no less hesitation in
saying that if the same able commander, with such a cavalry force
as I have mentioned, had been attached to the Japanese side at
Liao-yang or at Mukden, there would be no Russian army in Manchuria
to-day. _En passant_ it may be remarked that if the Japanese
cavalry had been capable of pursuit at Mukden, it would have proved
a terrible thorn in the already bleeding Russian side. As it was,
the Japanese were out-numbered and hence completely ineffective.”
If the writer of this article is correct in his deduction of the
lesson to be learned by cavalry from this war--and his opinion
has since been confirmed by military opinion generally,--it
would appear that the machine gun is just the one thing needed
to give cavalry the fire power of infantry, while retaining
mobility and their proper rôle in all the circumstances of the
modern battlefield. It will therefore be instructive to study
the possibilities of machine guns with cavalry in the various
situations which may arise in the course of a campaign.
The use of machine guns in certain stages of an action is similar
whatever the scale of the operations may be; and to avoid
unnecessary repetition, such phases as the Pursuit, the Retreat,
etc., have only been dealt with once. The tactics of the various
bodies of cavalry are based on the principles laid down in the
Training Manuals, the Independent cavalry being treated in this
chapter, the Divisional and Protective in the next.
While the opposing armies are still at a considerable distance
apart, the Independent Cavalry will gain touch with the enemy
and endeavour to find out such information as may clear up the
strategical situation and afford the main army strategical freedom
of action; they may also carry out special missions such as
cutting the enemy’s communications, carrying out raids, or seizing
important strategical points. This can usually only be accomplished
when the enemy’s cavalry has been defeated. It will therefore be
the first duty of the Independent Cavalry to seek out and defeat
the cavalry of the enemy in order to be free to carry out its
mission.[8]
This Independent Cavalry will never be less than a Division,
while it may consist of two or three Divisions in the case of
a war between any of the Great Powers. The nation that is weak
in cavalry will therefore do well to make up for this deficiency
by the employment of great numbers of machine guns so organised
and equipped that they will be able not only to accompany their
cavalry anywhere, but, in addition, to operate and manœuvre as
self-contained units. They will thus free the cavalry from the
necessity of dismounted action when met by superior numbers,
and from being compelled to detach squadrons to secure tactical
positions to check the enemy, or strategical points of importance
which it may be vital to possess. In addition to this, detached
machine guns may be used in the place of mounted escorts to the
Horse Artillery, and to enable single troops to be used in the
place of contact squadrons without detracting from their offensive
or defensive strength.
The Divisional General of Cavalry will have 24 machine guns under
the present organisation, viz. two guns with each regiment; and
it must be assumed that they have been organised and trained to
work together, as suggested in Chapter I., in order to enable them
to be used as fire units in co-operation with their brigades or
the Division. It will depend upon the nature of the country, the
tactical situation and the strength and morale of the opposing
cavalry, whether the G.O.C. retains all four batteries in his
own hands or gives one or more to the brigade commanders. Every
situation requires its own special treatment, and the following is
only given as one of many possible methods of using machine guns in
the preliminary stages of the cavalry combat. We will assume that a
Cavalry Division is acting as Independent Cavalry and is operating
against an unknown but superior force of cavalry as yet unlocated,
in country such as will be met with in a European campaign.
The formation for the march towards the enemy will of course depend
on the roads available and the general nature of the country, but
an advanced guard of one brigade would be sent out with orders to
push forward tactical reconnoitring patrols supported by contact
troops or squadrons. This brigade might be given two batteries of
machine guns, while the G.O.C. retained two batteries with the
main body, which would probably move as concentrated as possible
in two wings with flank guards, and a battery of machine guns on
each flank. The advanced guard commander would use one battery
of machine guns to give each “contact squadron” a section of two
guns and thus enable it to retain its mobility if held up by rifle
fire. He would keep one battery intact to use in the manner to be
indicated later with his main guard.
We will follow one of these “contact squadrons” and see how the
machine guns may be employed to assist it. In the first place the
squadron now possesses the fire power of an extra hundred rifles
and can therefore afford to send out stronger patrols and give
them more support. The contact squadron, having sent out its
patrols and any detachments necessary for special services, will
sooner or later be called upon to afford active support to one of
its patrols when the latter come in touch with the enemy. Upon the
information furnished by this patrol, as to the strength of the
enemy and the nature of the country, will depend the action to be
taken.
The necessity for brushing aside all opposition and pushing forward
will probably cause the commander of the contact squadron to attack
with vigour, and such a course will compel the enemy to accept the
engagement mounted, or if inferior in strength or morale, to take
up a position for dismounted action and hold the squadron by rifle
fire.
In the first case the squadron with scouts in front will move in
column of troops ready to wheel into line for the attack. The
machine guns should move in line immediately in rear of the rear
troop and as close as possible, so as not to be seen from the
front. The subsequent action of the machine guns must of course
depend on the method of attack of the squadron and the nature of
the country; but the objects in view will be (1) to support the
attack by fire up to the moment of the collision, and then to
bring fire to bear upon the retreating enemy and prevent their
rallying; (2) to take up a position to cover the retirement of the
squadron and enable it to re-form if worsted in the encounter. It
is likely that if the first object is successfully attained and
the fire of the section brought to bear on the enemy’s squadron,
from any range under 800 yards, for only 30 seconds, the effect on
the closed body of horsemen, whether in column or line, would be
such as to throw them into considerable confusion at the moment of
the charge, while any attempt to charge the guns, even by a second
squadron, must be abortive and result in disaster. The squadron
leader should have arranged beforehand with his machine-gun
commander to manœuvre with a view to this co-operation, and will
give the signal a few moments before wheeling into line to attack,
when the machine guns will gallop out to the most suitable flank,
and come into action as rapidly as possible so as to enfilade the
enemy’s advance. The moment the charging squadrons mask the fire
of the guns, they must remount and gallop to a fresh position in
anticipation of the pursuit, in order to bring fire to bear on the
retreating enemy and prevent a rally; or to cover the retirement
of the squadron and enable it to rally and reform. The effect of
his fire and the success or otherwise of the first collision will
enable the section commander to decide instantly which of these
two actions will be necessary. It will be seldom that the country
is so flat that some feature cannot be found giving a good field
of fire or commanding a road, or bridge, or other defile by which
the enemy must retreat, or which they must pass in pursuit, and the
use of such features will greatly assist the action of machine
guns. Although both guns will fire together before the collision,
their subsequent action must be made in mutual support, one gun
firing while the other races to a new position from which it can
overtake and flank the retiring enemy, so that, if possible, one
gun is always firing at effective range while the other is moving.
In the same way, if covering the retreat of their own squadron, one
gun will fire while the other retires to a second position and in
turn covers the retirement of the first. The guns must not hesitate
to separate widely in order to obtain unseen the best possible
positions from which to fire, but must always be able to support
each other. If the country is much broken, opportunities will be
found for concealing the gun in a position from which to enfilade
the pursuing cavalry at short range, or for bringing a cross fire
to bear from both guns on a defile. Such an opportunity skilfully
utilised, when the range has been accurately taken, and fire
reserved until the main body is within close range (600 yards or
less), should be so decisive in its result as to check the pursuit
altogether and possibly turn defeat into victory, if the retiring
squadron has had time to re-form and is in a position to launch a
counter-attack at this moment.
To make full use of machine guns with a squadron, it is necessary
for the squadron leader thoroughly to understand their power and
capabilities, and to anticipate their action and the result likely
to ensue; otherwise he will be unable to do more than passively
accept their support, and will fail to reap the advantage of their
principal characteristic--their ability to surprise and their power
suddenly to overwhelm with fire a superior body of troops.
Should the enemy’s squadron be reinforced or be so superior in
numbers that an attack appears inadvisable, it may be possible with
the assistance of machine guns to equalise matters by concealing
the guns in a donga or behind a ridge, a clump of trees, or group
of rocks, and then manœuvring the squadron so as to draw the enemy
across the front of the guns at close range. The best method of
doing this is to lead the squadron, formed in column of troops,
past the cover selected at a sharp pace, the guns being concealed
on the outer flank or behind the rear troop as circumstances may
require. As the squadron passes the selected spot, the machine guns
will be dropped; and the squadron at the same moment wheeling into
line towards the enemy, will hide the guns from view until they are
concealed by the cover.
The gun horses and the rest of the detachment not actually required
to fire the guns should move on with the squadron, so that no
indication is given the enemy that the guns are not still with the
squadron. If this manœuvre is successfully accomplished, it will
not be difficult to draw the enemy across the guns at close range.
It is a manœuvre well worth practice in peace, but an opposing
squadron should always be used to try to detect the guns and thus
ensure that the concealment is properly carried out.
We will now suppose a case where the enemy takes up a defensive
position and the contact squadron has to force its way through.
The squadron leader’s method of attack must entirely depend on the
strength of the position, the force holding it, and the natural
features of the country in the immediate vicinity; and on his plan
of attack must depend the details of the action of the machine
guns. The general principles governing their employment will remain
the same, however much they may vary in the method of carrying out:
the first is to supplement the rifle fire of the squadron so as to
enable as many men as possible to remain mounted, while holding
the enemy to his position; and the second is to gain superiority
of fire for the squadron at the time and place selected by the
squadron leader. We will suppose the position to be strong and
the enemy to possess machine guns, and that the squadron leader’s
plan is to hold the enemy to his position by a vigorous frontal
attack, while he turns the weaker flank. To do this he may decide
to use his guns for the containing attack supported by a troop,
or to use his squadron for the containing attack and his guns to
turn the flank. Having machine guns in position against him, it
might be advisable to choose the latter course, because machine
guns are less effective against a skirmishing line of attackers,
while his own machine guns are more effective if they can gain the
flank or rear of the enemy’s position and thus enfilade them, and
any movement of mounted troops to repulse the turning movement,
or take their attackers in flank, will afford the machine guns
an opportunity for decisive fire action. Should the machine guns
or one of them succeed in stalking the led horses of the enemy,
their action will probably be decisive, as nothing affords a
machine gun such an easy and effective target as the horses of a
dismounted squadron, while the effect of fire on them is to render
the squadron immobile and to place them out of action as cavalry
altogether.
The method of attack will probably be as follows. Scouts
(dismounted) having been sent forward to reconnoitre and draw fire
to disclose the extent of the position, two troops dismounted and
widely extended will advance to the attack and open a heavy fire
and push the attack as hotly as possible; at the same moment one
troop (mounted) will move slowly round the flank which it is not
intended to attack, keeping wide of the position and closed up,
and in signalling communication with the squadron leader. This
will probably draw attention to this flank, and the troop should
report by signal any movement made by the enemy to check them.
Rapid fire should now be ordered all along the line, and the troop
on the flank should wheel and open out towards the enemy, but not
approach within range if it can be avoided. Under cover of this
demonstration, the machine guns with the remaining troop will work
round the flank selected for attack, the guns being concealed on
the outer flank of the troop and using every bit of cover possible
to prevent being seen. Scouts must precede them, and the troop
should screen their movements and engage the enemy with fire if
opposed. Engagement with the enemy should be avoided as far as
possible until the place selected for attack is reached, and the
position turned. Even now the machine guns must avoid opening fire
with the troop, and must endeavour to find a position from which an
enfilading fire can be brought to bear at close range. Under cover
of the surprise caused by the sudden burst of machine-gun fire, the
second gun must push farther round to the rear, and try to fire on
the led horses or catch the enemy’s guns on the move, for they will
certainly be moved to meet this fresh attack. If the horses cannot
be reached, the second gun must seek the best position to bring a
reverse fire in support of the first gun; and unless a really good
target is obtained, fire should be reserved until the first gun is
discovered and attacked, when its intention to retire must be the
signal for a burst of heavy fire which must be kept up until the
first gun is in a fresh position and ready to open fire to cover
the retirement of the second.
This action will enable the squadron leader to use the troop
feinting on the other flank, which he will have recalled on the
first sign of firing by the flank attack, in order to reinforce the
point where the attack can be pressed home.
The machine guns must avoid engaging those of the enemy, while
always endeavouring to catch them limbered up, _i.e._ when
changing position or while coming into or going out of action, for
then they are most vulnerable. The situation at the moment of the
flank attack is this: The front of the position is attacked by a
strong but widely extended firing line which overlaps the flanks
and compels a strong defensive firing line to check its advance.
If the defender decides to put his machine guns into position here
and to reserve half the squadron for defence of the flanks, the
great extension of the attack renders their fire of little effect
as long as the attack utilises cover and advances by rushes from
the right or left of sections; on the other hand, if he decides to
put the squadron into the firing line and to use his machine guns
to protect his flanks, he has either to divide his guns or wait
till he can see which flank is threatened, and he cannot ignore the
troop which is moving against one. Consequently, he must either
be weaker than the flank attack--in which case it is likely to
succeed; or he must withdraw troops from his position to strengthen
the threatened flank--in which case there should be no difficulty
in pushing home the front attack with the aid of the extra troop;
while the position of the machine guns on the flank and rear
should render his retirement from the position very costly. In all
probability the threat of turning a flank either by mounted troops
or by machine guns will compel the enemy to abandon the position in
the case of a minor engagement between squadrons--especially where
a counter-attack is rendered impossible by the strength of the
frontal attack.
When touch has been gained by the contact squadrons and the enemy
found in force, they will either be compelled by superior numbers
to fall back or they must be at once supported; in either case the
advanced guard will now become engaged and will endeavour to break
through the advanced guard of the enemy, or, if in touch with the
main body of the enemy’s cavalry, will endeavour to prevent him
breaking through till their own Cavalry Division comes up.
If it is decided to attack, the action will follow much the same
lines as that of the contact squadrons, but on a larger scale and
with the addition of artillery; and the machine guns will be used
in much the same way to support the mounted attack up to the moment
of the charge, for which purpose the machine guns working in pairs
on the opposite flank to the artillery must be pushed forward to
occupy positions from which to bring fire to bear on the hostile
squadrons while manœuvring prior to the attack. The whole battery
may be used for this purpose if the ground favours their action;
or a single section only, while the remainder are held back as a
reserve to complete a successful charge or to cover the retirement
of the brigade in the event of failure.
The officer commanding the machine-gun battery will remain with the
brigadier and must be perfectly acquainted with his plans, and will
receive from him direct orders as to the way the guns are to be
employed to support the attack. The details for carrying out these
orders should be left to the battery commander, who will issue his
own instructions to the section commanders, who should also be
told the brigadier’s plans. The section commanders must be given a
free hand in selecting fire positions and in all details relating
to coming into action and opening and ceasing fire--the battery
commander’s orders only indicating the flank and extent of the
positions of observation for each section, the method of action and
the object to be attained. Under special circumstances he may order
certain specific action such as reservation of fire, simultaneous
fire on a given signal, or concentration of fire of a certain
target; but it must be remembered that definite orders of this
nature tie the hands of section commanders, and tend to paralyse
their action and destroy initiative, and can be justified on rare
occasions only. Should the enemy take up a defensive position,
the machine guns will be used to economise dismounted men and to
bring a sudden and intense fire to bear on the defenders when they
attempt to retire from the position. Cavalry will not “assault” a
position, but rather try to compel the defender to retire from it
by turning a flank and threatening his led horses or his line of
retreat, while he is held to his ground by fire. Some guns should
also be held in reserve to meet a counter-attack or to be launched
in pursuit when the enemy attempts to retire. The machine guns
with the contact squadrons will be available, as these squadrons
become merged in the main guard, and they must now be used to hold
tactical positions of importance and to hinder the march of the
main body of the enemy by seizing all rising ground in front or to
a flank of the approaching cavalry.
The Division will now have concentrated and joined the advanced
guard, and will be manœuvring in anticipation of the cavalry
combat. All the machine guns, except those holding positions in
front, will now be concentrated under the Divisional General. They
will be used at this stage in conjunction with the artillery--but
not in their vicinity--to support the deployment of the Division
by their fire, and they must necessarily be concentrated and
employed as batteries in order not to hinder the deployment and
free manœuvre of their own cavalry. The flank opposite to that of
the artillery must be used, and “positions of observation” must be
maintained where the guns are concealed from view and if possible
from artillery fire.
The officer commanding the machine guns of the Division should
remain with the G.O.C., and must be perfectly acquainted with his
plans and intentions. As a rule fire will not be opened in the
first instance except by his order. Officers commanding batteries
must be where they can best direct their fire and at the same time
be in signalling communication with their Chief. Ranges will be
taken from the “position of observation,” but should the guns have
to gallop to a fresh position and fire at once, the opportunity
for using combined sights by the battery if the range be unknown
and the time limited should not be neglected. Rising ground is very
important at this stage, for it enables fire to be maintained until
just before the collision.
Should the ground permit of the machine-gun batteries approaching
the enemy unseen, and enable them to reserve their fire from a
concealed position until the closed bodies of the enemy’s squadrons
come within effective range, the result should be so decisive as to
render the attack of the Division successful, even against greatly
superior numbers. The machine guns should render the envelopment of
a flank by a superior force impossible, and their great mobility
will enable them to meet easily any movement of this kind.
They should avoid the enemy’s artillery, which alone can put them
out of action, but they must boldly engage it within effective
ranges should it open fire on the cavalry.
The defeat of the independent cavalry alone will be of little
value, and it will be necessary to ensure their complete
destruction to enable the exact situation of the enemy’s forces
to be discovered. A close and relentless pursuit is therefore
imperative, and it must be remembered that machine guns with
cavalry are far more effective in the pursuit than cavalry alone,
because they move with the same speed; but whereas cavalry can only
use the sword or lance against others similarly armed and capable
of defending themselves, and both men and horses are equally
subject to exhaustion, the machine guns on overtaking the enemy
are able to shoot down men and horses without any more effort than
is needed to set up the guns and work the elevating and traversing
gear. The exhaustion of men and horses has no effect upon the
accuracy or intensity of the fire, while the result is further to
scatter and disperse bodies that may still retain any cohesion.
IN THE PURSUIT
There are many instances in war when cavalry flushed with victory
and exhausted in the pursuit have been themselves caught and ridden
down by troops that have rallied or by fresh supports; but machine
guns have nothing to fear from cavalry, and can confidently await
their attack while covering the retirement of their own cavalry.
The longer they are in action, the more time there is for their own
horses to recover their “wind,” and be ready to carry their guns
out of action at a speed which renders pursuit useless. It must
be remembered also that the machine guns with cavalry cannot be
distinguished from that arm at a distance even when moving alone,
while it is impossible to do so when they are with their regiment
or brigade.
The machine guns must anticipate the pursuit and race off to
positions on the flanks and rear from which they can best cut off,
and if possible annihilate, the retreating squadrons; no effort
must be spared to inflict the maximum loss, and guns must be
pushed up to close range even at the risk of being ridden down.
The troops reserved for the pursuit should have their machine guns
with them, as their co-operation will be of the greatest service,
and regiments will probably act separately, and may be directed to
special points to intercept the enemy or prevent reinforcements
coming up.
The Independent Cavalry, having defeated and scattered the enemy’s
cavalry, are now in a position to send out strategical patrols;
and having “torn aside the veil” are able to see the dispositions
of his main armies, and are free to undertake raids on his
communications and to harass and delay the march of his columns.
Raids are only justified when some specific object can be
attained, and are only likely to be effective during the course
of operations, when both armies are in touch and awaiting
reinforcements to renew hostilities.
The cavalry will in most cases be more profitably employed in
attacking the enemy’s main columns in flank or rear, and thus
hindering their march by causing premature deployment. This action
will bring the independent cavalry in contact with infantry. The
machine guns can now be used to supplement the fire action and
to enable as many squadrons as possible to remain mounted. They
should be employed as separate units or attached to squadrons
according to the nature of the engagement and the force to which
they are opposed. Usually they will be held back in the preliminary
stages of the dismounted fight, until the action has developed
sufficiently to enable the general situation to be seen, when they
will be sent forward under cover to positions from which they can
develop superiority of fire, by concentrating against the enemy’s
strongest points. This will not prevent the use of a few guns with
the advanced guard to seize and hold important points, and nothing
should prevent machine guns from seizing the key of the position,
the moment this can be discovered.
The four batteries of machine guns of the Division may be allotted
as follows: With the advanced guard, one battery; with the main
body (for use in firing line), two batteries; with the G.O.C. (in
reserve), one battery.
TO COVER RETIREMENT
This reserve battery will enable the G.O.C. not only to reinforce
a particular point or cover the retirement with a rapidity and
effectiveness that no other form of reserve could do, but to use
it to turn a flank or to meet a counter-attack without exposing
his squadrons to fire during the movement. The security they
are able to afford to the horses of the squadrons in the firing
line will justify their occupying “positions of observation” on
the rear flanks, from which they can protect them while waiting
other employment. The deployment of the enemy’s infantry and the
development of his fire will compel the cavalry commanders to
break off the engagement; and to do this without loss under the
heavy rifle fire to which he will now be subjected, this fire must
be temporarily checked or rendered ineffective. Every machine gun
will therefore be brought up to such positions as will enable them
to sweep the enemy’s firing lines, and under a simultaneous fire
from the 24 guns the dismounted men will be able to retire from
the firing line and regain their horses. The retirement of the
machine guns must be effected in the usual way, each section acting
independently and retiring by alternate guns--no gun moving till
the other is ready in a fresh position to open fire. The sections
on the flanks should retire first, as they are better able to
protect the centre by a cross fire.
COVER IN FIRING LINE
When the country is flat or the features devoid of natural
cover, it will be necessary to provide pits for the machine guns
practically in the firing line. If this is carried out with skill,
the guns may be perfectly concealed, and protected even from
artillery fire. These pits should be made along the whole front and
as widely scattered as possible, and when a gun is discovered by
the artillery it should immediately be lowered into the pit, out of
sight, where it will be perfectly safe, until the artillery directs
its fire elsewhere. The following instance from the Russo-Japanese
War is an illustration of the skilful handling of machine guns
under such conditions.
EXAMPLE FROM RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
On June 8th, 1905, at Wan-ching, General Samsonov had two cavalry
regiments and a machine-gun section of four guns. During the
dismounted action these machine guns were concealed in the firing
line, two in the centre 100 yards apart, and one on each flank
about 400 yards away. When the firing line retired, the machine
guns opened fire and held the position alone; and so well had they
been posted, that although attacked by infantry, which advanced
to within 300 yards of the position, supported by artillery which
brought a heavy fire to bear on the front occupied by the machine
guns, they were able to hold their ground for nearly three hours,
when the Japanese abandoned the attack and fell back. It would be
interesting to know if this astonishing success of machine guns,
enabling the cavalry to defeat infantry supported by artillery in a
fight of several hours’ duration, without risking their personnel
or abandoning their mobility, was due to the use of natural cover
or, as seems more probable, to the use of pits which would have
afforded protection from artillery fire as well as concealment.
IN THE BATTLE
The hostile columns having arrived within striking distance, the
battle will now take place, during which the Independent Cavalry
will usually occupy a position in front and on the flank of the
main line of battle. From here they will be able to co-operate by
attacking on the flank, from which they can bring fire to bear
concentrically with the main attack, while such a position favours
pursuit on parallel lines, and is also a suitable one from which to
prevent pursuit in the event of a retreat.[9] The machine guns will
now assemble in batteries under their G.O.C., who will use them,
as the occasion may demand, to hold “positions of observation,” to
protect his front and flank in the early stages of the battle, and
later, in conjunction with a few dismounted squadrons, to envelop
the enemy’s flank and bring a powerful volume of fire to assist
the main infantry attack, or to draw troops away from the point
selected for assault.
“The climax of the infantry attack is the assault which is made
possible by superiority of fire,”[10] and the cavalry commander
will be justified in using his 24 machine guns in assisting to
attain this object, provided that in doing so they remain under his
immediate orders and in a position from which they are instantly
available for the pursuit.
We have already seen how machine guns should co-operate in
the pursuit, and their mobility will render them even more
effective when pursuing infantry. The following example from the
Russo-Japanese War may be of interest in this connection.
EXAMPLE OF MACHINE GUNS USED IN PURSUIT
A Russian infantry battalion which was retreating by a pontoon
bridge across the Taitzu River was almost annihilated by a Japanese
cavalry regiment, accompanied by machine guns, which swept the
bridge; “and for the first time in this war,” adds the _Standard_
correspondent with Kuroki’s army, “a machine gun was used with
decisive effect.”