SECOND MODE OF ATTACK

In the night, the ships under way, calm, or light breezes of not more

than four knots an hour. Ships of the line, that are under way, seldom

approach nearer each other than a cable's length; this precaution, is

to prevent their running foul and causing confusion; when expecting an

enemy of equal force, the custom is to form one line; admitting, that

to oppose the Torpedo boats, they preserved this usual order of battle,

close hauled and under easy sail, to let the boats come up, here, as in

the case of being at anchor, each ship must apply her whole fire against

the division of boats which attack her; she cannot aid the ship next to

her. As the boats, advancing under cover of the night, each division

will, in three minutes from the time they arrive within danger of cannon

shot, be in with the bow of the destined ship, and fire their harpoons

into her. Therefore it appears, that her chance while under way is very

little better than when at anchor. If, as the boats advance, a ship turns

her bow to meet them, she facilitates their harpooning her. Will any

other order of battle than one right line, give more security? Would two,

three, or four parallel lines, give better protection? In such case, the

line nearest the boats would be attacked first, and the other lines taken

in succession. Were the ships to form a crescent, the headmost vessels

would be first attacked, in this form, they might surround a number of

boats and get them between two fires; but whatever situation the boats

may be in, after they arrive within the range of grape-shot they can, in

a few minutes, be under the bow of the ship, where they will be safe from

all fire except small arms; but to arrive under her bow, amounts to a

moral certainty of effecting her destruction. Therefore, with the immense

advantage which Torpedoes give to an attack with boats, it is of little

consequence whether it be made in the night or day, in a calm or a breeze

of from four to six knots. If the ships engage with the boats, their case

will be desperate. In all my reflections on this kind of war, I see no

chance for their escape other than by retreat; and the moment English

ships of war retreat before Torpedo boats, that moment the power of the

British marine is for ever lost, and with it the political influence of

the nation.

In this view of chances, I have calculated the number of men in the boats

equal to the number in the ships, and estimated five thousand boats to be

brought into action; but in all cases when there are sufficient Torpedo

boats to drive in the boats of the ships, there will be sufficient to

attack the fleet; the one hundred ships could not put six hundred good

boats in motion, therefore, one thousand Torpedo boats would suffice for

the attack; they could be formed into fifty divisions of twenty boats

each; they would have every advantage, in a calm, of directing fifty or

one hundred boats against one vessel, while the ships would not have the

power to concentrate their fire on the boats; the ships could not be

defended, unless there were transports or ordinance vessels expressly

for carrying good row-boats, the number of which should be sufficient to

repel the Torpedo boats; but if ships can only be protected by boats,

it follows, that they will cease to be of use, and the contest for the

command of the channel must be decided by boat fighting. In such case,

the nation which could put in action the greatest number of boats, and

was least dependent on commerce, would have a decided advantage. England

is more dependent on commerce than France; her merchant vessels could be

attacked, destroyed, and her trade ruined; yet the commerce of France

could not be more, nor so much, injured as it is at present. In such an

event, England, who has usurped the dominion of the ocean and laid all

nations under contribution, would be the most humble supplicant for the

liberty of the seas. And then the Emperor of France would have a noble

opportunity to display a magnanimity of soul, a goodness of heart, which

would add lustre to his great actions, and secure to him the admiration

of the civilized world, by granting to so ingenious, industrious,

enterprising, and estimable a people, a perfect liberty of commerce.[M]

[Footnote M: A government, and particularly a monarchy or aristocracy,

may be in the habitual practice of vice, while the people are in the

habitual practice of virtue. In an aristocracy, where the army, navy,

places, and pensions, are in the power of the few, the voice of the

people has little or no influence. The genius, industry, and enterprise

of the English, have converted a barren island into the most fruitful and

beautiful spot on earth; their improvements in the useful arts, have made

them the greatest and most useful manufacturing people that ever existed.

In proportion as the people, by their industry, increased the riches of

the nation, the government found a facility in raising revenue, and have

loaded the virtuous people with taxes to the amount of twenty-five or

more millions a year, to pay for ruinous wars, the conquest of America,

the establishment of the Bourbons, and the balance of Europe.]

I have now run this subject to a conclusion, in which I do not hesitate

to say, that two thousand Torpedo boats and twenty-four thousand men,

would take the command of the British channel from Boulogne to Romney,

from Calais, Gravelines, Dunkirk and Ostend, to the mouth of the Thames,

and that the command of the commerce of those narrow seas, would command

the British nation; but there the power of Torpedo boats must cease--a

nation cannot send such boats to sea to depredate on commerce, nor to

foreign countries on expeditions of conquest, and therefore the seas must

be free.

Torpedo War, and Submarine Explosions · 第 29 / 36 题