It must be acknowledged, that the political code from which the
stratagems of Chanakya emanate, exhibits a morality not a whit superior
to that of the Italian school; but a remarkable, and in some respects a
redeeming principle, is the inviolable and devoted fidelity which
appears as the uniform characteristic of servants, emissaries, and
friends.
The play is wholly of a political character, and represents a series of
Machiavellian stratagems, influencing public events of considerable
importance.
The Mudrarakshasa is, in sundry respects, a very unique work in Sanskrit
literature. Its plot is not a pure invention, but on the other hand, it
is not derived from the usual storehouse of legends on which Sanskrit
authors have generally drawn for their materials. It has no female among
its prominent _dramatis personæ_, and the business of the play,
accordingly, is diplomacy and politics, to the entire exclusion of love.
There is, in truth, but one female character, with one little child,
introduced into the play, and these are Chandanadasa's wife and son, who
come in at the beginning of the last act. But even their appearance
introduces no passages suggestive of tenderness or the purely domestic
virtues, but only of sacrifice--a stern sense of duty.
In the minor characters we see the principle of faithfulness to one's
lord, adhered to through good report and evil report. In the more
prominent ones, the same principle still prevails, and the course of
conduct to which it leads is certainly quite Machiavellian. And all this
is brought out in a plot put together with singular skill.
In the seventh act we have a remarkable stanza, in which the conduct of
Chandanadasa, in sacrificing his life for his friend Rakshasa, is stated
to have transcended the nobility even of the Buddhas. It seems that
this allusion to Buddhism belongs to a period long prior to the decay
and ultimate disappearance of Buddhism from India. In the time of
Hionen-Tsang--_i.e._ between 629-645 A.D.--it was, however, still far
from being decayed, though it appears to have fallen very far below the
point at which it stood in Fa-Hian's time, to have been equal in power
with Brahminism only where it was supported by powerful kings, and to
have been generally accepted as the prevailing religion of the country
only in Kashmir and the Upper Punjab, in Magadha and in Guzerat. In this
condition of things, it was still quite possible, that one not himself a
Buddhist--and Visakhadatta plainly was not one--should refer to Buddhism
in the complimentary terms we find in the passage under discussion.
The late Mr. Justice Telang observes:--"The policy of Chanakya is not
remarkable for high morality. From the most ordinary deception and
personation, up to forgery and murder, every device is resorted to that
could be of service in the achievement of the end which Chanakya had
determined for himself. There is no lack of highly objectionable and
immoral proceedings. It must be admitted that this indicates a very low
state of public morality, and the formal works on politics which exist
certainly do not disclose anything better. With reference to the
criticisms which have been based on these facts, however, there are one
or two circumstances to be taken into account. In the first place,
although this is no excuse, it may be said to be an extenuation, that
the questionable proceedings referred to are all taken in furtherance of
what is, in itself, a very proper end. Chanakya's ambition is to make
his protegé, Chandragupta firm upon his throne, and to bring back
Rakshasa to the service of the king who properly represented those old
masters of his to whom Rakshasa's loyalty still remained quite firm. If
the end could ever be regarded as justifying the means, it might be so
regarded in this case. And, secondly, it must not be forgotten, that the
games of diplomacy and politics have always been games of more or less
doubtful morality. When we hear of one great politician of modern days
declaring another to be a great statesman, because, as I believe he
expressed it, the latter lied so cleverly, we cannot say that the world
has risen to any very perceptibly higher moral plane in the times of
Metternich and Napoleon, than in those of Chanakya and Rakshasa. Nor are
suppressions of important passages in despatches for the purposes of
publication, or wars undertaken on unjustifiable and really selfish
pretexts, calculated to convince one, that even in Europe in the
nineteenth century, the transaction of political affairs has been purged
of the taint of immorality, however different, and I may even add,
comparatively innocent, may be the outward manifestations of that
taint."