unnecessary (Mems., i, 154). But here, as elsewhere in referring to
the Mexican War, he seems to have been merely recording youthful
impressions. He says that, had Scott gone round those positions, the
Mexicans would have evacuated them; but Scott did not wish the Mexicans
to evacuate El Molino and Casa Mata, taking with them their gunpowder
and (supposed) foundry material: _i. e._, Grant failed to understand
the question. With regard to Chapultepec also it is an issue between
a lieutenant and the major general commanding. Scott did not overlook
the idea of going round (Worth: Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 199); and hence, as
he understood the case far better than Grant did at the time or when
he wrote his Memoirs, one concludes that his judgment was correct. He
stated (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 377) that [Grant's] plan would have required
too wide and hazardous a circuit. The following other objections
against it may be suggested. Grant's plan would have required the
army to abandon the roads for difficult fields and marshes, limited
the practicability of defending the rear in case of attack, weakened
greatly the effective feinting upon which Scott counted (_ibid._,
376), produced a bad moral effect--especially in view of the recent
battle--by suggesting that he dared not attack Chapultepec, exposed our
assaulting troops to a cannonade from the rear, and left behind them a
menace of other uncertain but alarming possibilities. The capture of
Chapultepec, on the other hand, worked morally as well as physically
in our favor, and was thought by Scott likely to have an even greater
effect than it had (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 169); and it was stated by our
engineers that mortars planted there would command a large part of the
city. It has been said that our batteries were too far from the target;
but it was not known what guns Chapultepec had, and no doubt our
engineers and artillery officers ventured as far as appeared expedient.
Clearly, however, too much was expected of our batteries.
Battery No. 1, to play on the south side of the fort, was laid out by
Lee; No. 2, opposite the southwest angle of the fort, by Huger. The
batteries did not fire accurately at first (=179=Diario Esactísimo).
This seems to have been due to a lack of platforms for the guns.
Quitman's division supported No. 1, which was particularly exposed, and
in the afternoon he made a bold reconnaissance of the road, discovering
artillery and a ditch in his front (Claiborne, Quitman, ii, app., 308).
The Mexicans made advances toward No. 1 on Sept. 12, but canister
repelled them. To hinder reinforcements from reaching Chapultepec,
Quitman by Scott's order placed fifty men well forward on the road in
the night of Sept. 12-13, and some skirmishing occurred. A 9-pounder
protected with sand-bags was planted just in front of No. 1. The
intention had been to establish an advanced battery, but the Mexicans
prevented this. Two New York companies supported No. 2. Battery No.
3 had a brass 16-pounder. This, becoming unserviceable, was replaced
with an iron 24-pounder. Batteries 1, 2 and 3 commanded the south and
west fronts of Chapultepec fort, and No. 4 commanded its interior. No.
1 stood about 1000 yards from the south front of the fort; No. 2 about
1400 yards from its southwestern angle; No. 3 about 1140 yards from its
west front; and No. 4 a little nearer than No. 3 (Hardcastle's map in
Sen. 1; 30, 1).
Pillow reoccupied El Molino early Sept. 12 and his division slept
there the following night. Early Sept. 13 Twiggs resumed operations
at La Piedad, and the Mexicans endeavored to draw him on. Steptoe had
two 12-pounders and two 24-pound howitzers. The weakness and gradual
discontinuance of his fire and the fact that Twiggs did not expose his
infantry rendered this feint ineffective. Scott states that Taylor's
battery also was at La Piedad, but it does not seem to have been used
at this time. Perhaps, as the Mexicans were likely to attack, it was
held in reserve.
The storming parties were composed of volunteers. In some and possibly
in all cases some slight reward was offered. In a number of regiments
so many volunteered that it became necessary to draw lots. Scott
thought Pillow would need one brigade; but Pillow sent for Worth's
whole division and received one (Clarke's) brigade of it. Ripley (_op.
cit._, ii, 420) states that Pillow asked for only one of Worth's
brigades, but against him is the testimony of Scott, of Worth and of
Semmes, who bore Pillow's message. Some of Clarke's men arrived in
time to fight. After the battle Pillow admitted that not over 1000 of
his men took part in the assault (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 408). He had too
many. They were in one another's way. Pillow stated that the garrison
was 6000, thus probably reckoning almost every Mexican soldier within
a mile of the hill. Pillow wrote (=180=Oct. 18): I led "to the very
Cannon's mouth, where I was cut down--Then my men picked me up and
carried me forward under my orders and with a shout of exultation
and triumph, scaled the ditches and wall." In fact he seems to have
received a painful wound on the ankle from a glancing grapeshot at the
foot of the hill (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 378), and was not carried to the
summit until serious fighting had ended (Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 156, 172,
204, 217, 222, 224). Cadwalader succeeded him in command. Lt. Col.
Hébert with the Eleventh Infantry, assisted by Sumner's dragoons and
in effect by Trousdale and Jackson, kept off a strong force of lancers
that menaced the American rear from the direction of Los Morales.
Sept. 13 when Santa Anna finally sent the San Blas battalion (perhaps
400) toward the summit, the approach of the Americans forced it to
halt--apparently at the entrenchment (D) near the _glorieta_. The Third
Ligero was ordered to reinforce this battalion, but the college fell
before it arrived, and it retired. Other troops were sent to the lower
parts of the hill. Some perished, some retreated, some were captured.
The Hidalgo battalion fought on the Tacubaya road. Reserves of 2-5000
were on the Belén causeway near Chapultepec.
A Mexican lieutenant of engineers named Alemán had charge of firing
the mines, and he was ordered to do his work. At his trial he said
that he found his way blocked by Mexican troops, and that before he
could reach his post the Americans were there. Some, if not all, of the
canvas pipes containing the trains had already been found and cut by
our troops. The Americans got over the fosse by laying ladders across
it. The man who first reached the Mexican flagstaff appears to have
been Capt. Kimball, a Vermonter but born in New Hampshire. He stood on
guard there till Seymour, who commanded his regiment after Ransom's
fall, arrived. Sept. 13 the Americans took revenge for the atrocities
perpetrated upon our wounded on the eighth.
The second in command in Casey's party was Capt. Paul, but Capt. B.
S. Roberts, whose company stood at the head of it, led the successful
charge. Gen. Rangel reported that by this time the Mexican muskets had
become useless and the one cannon that directly enfiladed the road had
been accidentally disabled. It is quite clear, particularly in the
light of Mexican evidence, that the fort on the summit was carried
before the gateway batteries. Quitman rendered no essential service in
the capture of Chapultepec, though he kept many Mexicans occupied. His
troops that went up the hill were not needed. (Even Clarke's brigade
was a greater reinforcement than the situation called for.) Shields
states that the three regiments turned off to the left because the
Mexicans in Quitman's front were found too strong, and if these could
not be beaten before those three regiments were detached, evidently
the remainder of Quitman's command was not strong enough to beat them.
When Roberts led the successful charge, Worth (whom Clarke rejoined),
Trousdale and Jackson had appeared at the northeast of Chapultepec
and menaced the rear of the gateway batteries. Except thirty to fifty
under Capt. Terrett the Marines did not distinguish themselves. Their
commander, however, said that their ammunition failed, and other
officers stated that Quitman ordered the corps to halt. This was their
first battle.
P. F. Smith had the Mounted Rifles (minus two companies detached),
First Artillery and Third Infantry (minus two companies detached). It
was hoped that he could strike the Belén aqueduct, break through, and
take the Mexican flank and rear. Smith's brigade not being strong
enough--under the difficulties of the ground and in view of Quitman's
halt--to attack Santa Anna's reserves, veered toward the causeway, and
under the partial shelter of maguey opened fire. His right companies
took part in the final charge against the gateway batteries. Had
Quitman given Smith the pioneer party with planks, etc., for bridging
the ditches, and a storming party, and supported him with two of the
regiments that went up the hill, Smith could have struck the Mexicans
effectively on the Belén route, while Quitman himself was doing what he
could on the Tacubaya road with the rest of his command. A great number
of prisoners could probably have been captured in this way (Stevens,
Stevens, i, 214-5). Gen. Rangel reported that the corps which defended
the work on the Tacubaya causeway lost one third, and that almost every
member of his staff was wounded Sept. 8 or 13. The serious fighting
inside the fort lasted only four or five minutes. When the final
assault occurred, the effective defenders, all told, probably did not
number more than 275. Bravo's sword was returned to him. He was charged
by Santa Anna with bad conduct, but when tried was fully exonerated.
In reference to Chapultepec the author was kindly assisted by Señor
D. Ignacio Molina, head of the cartography section of the Mexican
government, who was a student at the military college in Sept., 1847,
and, being an engineer by profession, could be relied upon.
28.18. Pillow estimated the Mexican killed, wounded and captured at
Chapultepec at about 1800 (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 408), and mentioned that
the prisoners included Gens. Bravo, Noriega, Monterde [Dosamantes,
Saldaña], three colonels, seven lieut. colonels and 40 captains. The
actual number of Mexicans captured in the operations of Sept. 13-14 was
125 officers, 698 men besides about forty students (Hitchcock in Sen.
1; 30, 1, p. 430). As to their killed, wounded and missing, one can
only guess. The American loss on Sept. 12-14 was: killed, 10 officers,
128 rank and file; wounded, 60 officers, 613 rank and file (Ho. 24;
31, 1). What part of this loss was incurred at Chapultepec cannot be
stated. (Black) McSherry (M'Sherry), El Puchero, 108.
28.19. _The Belén operations._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1019, 1021-5. Sen.
1; 30, 1, pp. 381-3 (Scott), 398 (Twiggs), 414-6 (Quitman), 423
(Huger); app., 180 (Bonneville), 184 (Smith), 191 (Beauregard), 215
(Seymour), 223 (Smith), 225 (Shields), 230 (Porter). Sen. 65; 30,
1, pp. 188 (Ripley). 633 (Pillow). Carreño, Jefes, 166. _Niles_,
Oct. 30, pp. 137-8. Sen. Report 32; 34, 1. Brown, Ninth Inf., 62.
Haskin, First Artill., 115. _So. Qtrly. Rev._, Jan., 1853, pp. 43-4.
Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 133, 145-9; iv, app., 304-8. Balbontín,
Invasión, 132. Davis, Autobiog., 209-10, 232-4, 262-3. =376=Nicholson,
recolls. =218=Henshaw narrative. =69=Dimick to Woodbury, Dec. 1,
1848. =69=Childs to Dimick, Dec. 2, 1848. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 347,
364, 367-9, 372, 385-6. =151=Reports and letters. City of Charleston,
S. C, Year Book, 1883, p. 523. Rowland, Miss. Register, 418.
=113=Beauregard, remins. =357=Wilcox, diary. =303=Reports. =60=Loring
to P. F. Smith, Sept. 27. =60=Dimick to _Id._, Sept. 20. =60=_Id. et
al._ to P. F. Smith, Oct. 19, 1848. =60=_Id._ to adj. gen., Nov. 30,
1848. =69=Williams to Porter, Apr. 11, 1857. =65=Adj. gen., orders
7, Feb. 20, 1847. Rodriguez, Breve Reseña, 870. Gamboa, Impug., 56.
=70="Guerra," no. 155 (trial of Terrés). _Picayune_, Nov. 20. _Delta_,
Oct. 14, 26, 1847; Jan. 11, 1848. México á través, iv, 695. Dunovant,
Battles, 11-17. Wash. _Union_, Sept. 11. _Monitor Repub._, Nov. 3;
Dec. 16. _South. Mag._, July, 1874, p. 78. =364=Worth to daughter,
Sept. 28. Ramsey, Other Side, 249, note. Prieto, Memorias, ii, 246.
=270=Moore, diary. =335=Statement _re_ Quitman by Trist. =80=Relac. to
Olaguíbel, Sept. 14. Statements to the author from Quitman's daughters.
=327=Sutherland to father, Aug. --. =178=Davis, diary. =269=Molina,
recolls. Reynolds, Exculpation. Stevens, Vindication. S. Anna, Detall,
21, 29-32. Raleigh _Star_, Nov. 3. =76=Tornel to Carrera, Sept. 9.
Apuntes, 309, 317-22. Diccionario Universal (_México_). =68=Bonneville
court martial. Semmes, Service, 457. _Monitor Repub._, Nov. 3 (Terrés).
Stevens, Stevens, i, 210-1. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 492-3.
REMARKS on the Belén operations. The Mexicans retiring by this road
were commanded by Gen. Lombardini. The principal corps was the Activo
regiment of Morelia. The ditch across the Tacubaya causeway at the
gateway batteries was promptly filled in by the Americans to permit
passage. A part of the men who captured the gateway batteries pursued
the fleeing Mexicans, but not far. A part of the Sixth Infantry, having
gone astray, joined Quitman. It has been suggested that Scott made
a mistake in not giving orders, before the attack upon Chapultepec,
for subsequent operations, and thus left the troops to their own
devices; but it was impossible for him to calculate in advance what
the situation would be, and he went as soon as possible to the summit
of the hill, which was the proper place for surveying the field and
issuing suitable commands.
The Belén garita presented a hard problem because, having been more
threatened than the San Cosme garita, it seemed likely to be more
strongly guarded, because, being nearer to the forces protecting the
southern front, it could be more quickly and effectively reinforced,
and because it was supported by the citadel, which could only be
approached over open ground. Scott, therefore determined to make only
a feint at Belén (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 382). Quitman, however, owing to
the abortive Alvarado expedition, had not figured at Cerro Gordo.
Aug. 20 and Sept. 8 his duty had been to guard the rear. Hence he had
won no éclat under Scott, and, feeling that Scott was unfriendly to
him, he apparently resolved at this time to take the bit in his teeth
(Davis, Autobiog., 232). During his operations against the city Scott
repeatedly signified his disapproval of them, but Quitman refused to
retire without a positive order (Claiborne, Quitman, i, 386), and,
since Quitman had committed him, Scott, although extremely annoyed
(Davis, Autobiog., 234-5), wisely refrained from giving this. Gen. U.
S. Grant said, "It is always, however, in order to follow a retreating
foe, unless stopped or otherwise directed" (Mems., i, 152). This
principle authorized Quitman's moving toward the city but not the
later part of his operations. At the expense of his men, therefore,
Quitman was guilty of virtual insubordination--though not of positive
disobedience--for personal reasons. This fact it is necessary to
make clear. But his men were no doubt as willing as he to risk their
lives, and it was only natural that Quitman should seek to distinguish
himself. That motive had to be recognized, for without it probably few
volunteer officers would have been in the field. Ripley (_op. cit._,
ii, 549) says that according to Scott's report orders were repeatedly
sent to Quitman to prevent his too rapid advance, but Quitman did
not receive them and could not find the staff officer who had borne
them. What Scott said (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 382) was that he repeatedly
communicated his "views" to Quitman, and Davis (Autobiog., 234-5)
supports this statement. The purpose of Ripley's remark apparently was
to hint that Scott's statement was untrue.
The intermediate battery (at what was called the Bridge of the
Insurgents) seems to have been built for four guns but to have had
only one, two, three guns in place, or perhaps none. The accounts
disagree. Quitman and Smith, both of them volunteer officers, appear
distinctly to have colored their reports in favor of the Palmetto
regiment, which was second to none in gallantry, but was not enabled
by circumstances to do all it would gladly have done here. The First
Artillery, on the other hand, did not receive the credit it deserved.
It was merely a question of precedence, not of courage, but vigorous
protests against their reports were the consequence. Perhaps, however,
the real explanation of their inaccuracies is that the reports
represent orders of which circumstances (unknown or forgotten by them)
prevented the execution.
Sept. 9, believing Scott would attack the southern side, Santa Anna had
two guns removed from the Belén garita. The "citadel" had originally
been a tobacco factory. Terrés was treated by Santa Anna with the
utmost contempt and even subjected to personal violence, but a court
martial exonerated him, and he was regarded by Scott with marked
respect (_Delta_, Jan. 11, 1848).
28.20. _The S. Cosme operations._ Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 381-2 (Scott),
391-3 (Worth), 421 (Sumner), 424 (Huger), 428-9 (J. L. Smith); app.,
166 (Huger), etc. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1072-3, 1077, 1079. _Journ. Milit.
Serv. Instit._, v, 46; xxxiii, 444. Wilson, Grant, 63-7. Stevens,
Stevens, i, 211-2, 215. _So. Qtrly. Rev._, Jan., 1853, p. 44. Negrete,
Invasión, iii, app., 430-41, 450; iv, app., 305-8. Grant, Mems., i,
150, 155-9. Ballentine, Eng. Sold., ii, 249. =66=Lee to J. L. Smith,
Sept. 15. =66=McClellan to G. W. Smith, Sept. 14. =66=Stevens to J.
L. Smith, Sept. 25. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 379. =113=Beauregard,
remins. =60=Paul to Lovell, Sept. 20. Semmes, Service, 457-61. Apuntes,
316-22. Rangel, Parte (with notes). =70="Guerra," no. 273 (trial of
Bravo). _Delta_, Oct. 14. S. Anna, Detall, 30-2. México á través, iv,
695. _Monitor Repub._, Dec. 16 (S. Anna). =76=Mora to Lombardini,
Aug. 9; to Guerra, July 22. =76=Lombardini, Aug. 22. Jackson, Mems.,
43. =80=Relac. to Olaguíbel, Sept. 14. G. W. Smith, Co. A, Corps of
Engins. =51=Letter from Marine officer, Oct. 20. =51=Terrett, undated.
=51=Henderson to sec. navy, May 12, 1848. Stevens, Vindication. Raleigh
_Star_, Oct. 27. Arnold, Jackson, 130, 177. Dabney, Jackson, 47-9.
Murphy, Remins., 69. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 496-502.
REMARKS on the San Cosme operations. The Mexicans retreating by this
route were commanded by Gen. Rangel, assisted by Gen. Peña y Barragán
and Lt. Col. Echeagaray. It is impossible to be as precise as would
be desirable in describing the first part of Worth's advance, for the
reports are both vague and inconsistent. This is mainly, no doubt,
because the officers wrote from memory and without the aid of a map.
Ripley observes (_op. cit._, ii, 484) that Worth's movement "had the
great element of success, celerity." In reality, it was very slow,
but unofficial accounts and the Mexican reports contain evidence that
the resistance was not only vigorous but more than once temporarily
triumphant. The one-gun redoubt seems to have been abandoned when the
hill yielded. Ripley observes also (_op. cit._, ii, 485) that Worth
did not need to advance rapidly: "Time was not immediately pressing."
But this is a mistake, for substantially all the Mexican preparations
at the S. Cosme garita were made after Worth's advance began. The
fortification (unarmed) near the English cemetery was at the bridge
of Santo Tomás. The Mexican infantry was withdrawn from this position
because the Americans could have struck the S. Cosme highway (by a
cross-road) between it and the city; but a large body of cavalry under
Torrejón remained and charged in order to gain time for Rangel to make
preparations at the garita.
While Quitman was struggling with the intermediate battery, Duncan of
Worth's command sent a gun from La Verónica causeway into a road that
extended some distance toward the right, and fired at the Mexicans.
He and Worth believed they gave Quitman material assistance, but this
does not appear to have been the fact, for the distance was found to
be much greater than they supposed (=113=Beauregard). The better way
to aid Quitman would have been to press forward without loss of time,
and threaten the rear of the Mexicans opposing Quitman. Later some of
Worth's guns did aid Quitman by firing at the garita.
With remarkable daring Capt. Terrett of the Marines, Lieuts. Gore and
U. S. Grant of the Fourth Infantry, a few other officers and a small
party of men captured the unarmed work near the junction of La Verónica
and San Cosme roads by moving to the left round the English cemetery,
and took the parapet on the San Cosme highway. From the latter Worth
recalled them because the American guns behind them were about to open.
Cadwalader, sent to Worth by Scott, was placed by the former at the
English cemetery to guard Worth's left and rear. Sumner, after pursuing
the Mexicans for some time, was detached to protect Tacubaya. Scott
joined Worth near the English cemetery and directed him to carry the
garita (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 392), but he soon returned to the base of
Chapultepec so as to be within easy reach of all his scattered forces
(_ibid._, 382). By Scott's order Huger sent to Worth four siege guns
and a mortar, but on account of the nature of the ground none of these
pieces was used against the garita (_ibid._, 424). Santa Anna brought
four guns to the garita, but only three of them were available. The
stampede from the garita seems to have been due in part to a cornet
signal for retreat, meant for a single corps. The cavalry under Alvarez
entered the city during the afternoon of Sept. 12. Grant was assisted
by Lieut. Lendrum of the Third Artillery in handling the mountain
howitzer.
28.21. _The night of Sept. 13-14._ Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 383 (Scott), 393
(Worth), 416 (Quitman), 424 (Huger), 429 (J. L. Smith); app., 168,
etc. (officers). Ho. 60: 30, 1, pp. 1077-9 (Worth), 1079 (Scott).
=179=Diario Esactísimo. Stevens, Stevens, i, 213, 215. Sen. Rep. 32;
34, 1. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 129, 450; iv, 108, 116-22; app.,
309-10. _So. Qtrly. Rev._, Jan., 1853, p. 49. Davis, Autobiog., 235-7,
287-90. =217=Henshaw to wife, Sept. 13 [partly later]. =218=Henshaw
narrative. =61=Gates, Oct. 6. =376=Nicholson, recolls. =151=Steptoe to
Lovell, Sept. 16. London _Times_, Nov. 13. =92=S. Anna to Mex. ayunt.,
Sept. 15. =80=Fernández to gov. Michoacán, Sept. 13. =80=Relac. to
Olaguíbel, Sept. 14. S. Anna, Mi Historia, 83. Gamboa, Impug., 57-8.
=70="Guerra," no. 954 (trial of Bonilla). =366=Ayunt. poster, Sept.
25. _Monitor Repub._, Sept. 27 (Pacheco); Oct. 2 (S. Anna). S. Anna,
Contestación. Lawton, Artill. Off., 315. =73=Lozano, nos. 4 and 8,
res., 1847. Ramírez, México, 318. =92=Mex. ayunt. to Scott, Sept.
13, 11 P.M. S. Anna, Apelación, 58-9. Calderón, Rectificaciones, 48.
Giménez, Memorias, 114. Stevens, Vindication. Raleigh _Star_, Oct. 27.
=112=Beauregard to Quitman, Sept. 17. =113=_Id._, remins. Rangel, Parte
(with notes). Claiborne, Quitman, i, 370. =221=Hill, diary. Semmes,
Service, 463. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 304. S. Anna, Detall, 32-3.
Apuntes, 334-5. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 503-4.
Quitman sent to Scott for heavy cannon and ammunition, and the latter,
though offended by Quitman's course, had them supplied. During the
night, under Beauregard's direction, two batteries inside the Belén
garita (for a 24-pounder, an 18-pounder and a 24-pound howitzer) and
a breastwork on the right for infantry were made ready. Steptoe, sent
here by Scott, was on hand to superintend the firing. To assault the
citadel across about 300 yards of open ground, even with the aid of
these pieces, would have been a very serious affair, and it was most
fortunate for Quitman that Worth's entering the town where no citadel
existed made it unnecessary.
It has been supposed that Huger's brief bombardment caused Santa Anna
to evacuate the city (Semmes, Service, 463); but Santa Anna knew,
without being shown again, what the American artillery could do, and
he seems to have decided upon his policy before this firing occurred.
Santa Anna's chief published reasons for the evacuation were that he
wished to save the city from bombardment, assault and sack, and save
the army, arms and cannon for future operations. Gamboa complained that
no provision was made before the evacuation for the security of the
people, the archives, etc. But Scott's previous conduct was an adequate
pledge, and the council relied upon his regard for international
law. Considering Santa Anna's known love of money, the vast Mexican
interests now imperilled, and his summary manner of deciding the
question of evacuation, one cannot help suspecting that inducements
were offered him. The council was probably held merely to divide the
responsibility for what he had resolved to do.
It was charged that Santa Anna let the criminals out of jail expressly
to attack the Americans, and to bring odium upon us by committing
outrages that could be attributed to our troops. One cannot be sure
about this matter; but it is noticeable that Gamboa, in piling up all
possible charges against the President, only accused him of failing
to prevent the criminals from getting free. Santa Anna must have been
completely exhausted, but it seems to be true, as was stated by the
British minister (Bankhead, no. 86, 1847), that some one in authority
let about 2000 men out of confinement. Very likely it was hoped that
the Americans would be guilty of disorder; but the palace at least
was sacked before they entered it. Some of the Mexican soldiers acted
like brigands, it was reported--even robbing the British consul. No
preparations to evacuate the town had been made. Some one might and
should have had sentinels posted at the public buildings and offices
ready to surrender them in a proper manner. See chap. xxix, note 29.2.