been the danger of fire from Chapultepec. In reply it was said that
(as had been seen at Cerro Gordo) a plunging fire did little harm.
The distance of Chapultepec seems almost to nullify this reply; but
as a matter of fact the cannon of Chapultepec appear to have done no
execution in the battle. Worth's officers met him after dark, Sept.
7, and later one of them submitted his general plan of operations to
Scott, who discussed it at considerable length and finally (virtually
admitting that a night attack was not advisable) approved all of
it except the following point. Worth strongly desired to effect a
lodgement in the grove of Chapultepec, which he believed he could take
at a cost of fifty men (=364=Worth to S., Dec. 27). (Indeed, he pushed
some of his troops several hundred yards that way: Sen. 1; 30, 1, app.,
138; Davis, Autobiog., 271). But Scott refused positively to have
this done. Semmes (Service, 447) says that Worth desired to capture
Chapultepec at this time because with his remarkable intuitive judgment
he saw, as Scott saw later, that this was the true approach to the
city; but Scott's later opinion was due to a study of the ground which
neither he nor Worth had at this time been able to make and to Mexican
fortifying not yet done. Even if Worth could have carried Chapultepec
rather easily, the prudent maxim that one should not buy (because it
can be got cheaply) what one does not want, appeared to apply with
especial force after losses that could be so ill afforded had been
suffered; and it was not certain that the castle could be taken without
a struggle. One costly surprise was enough for one day. Engineer
Stevens (Stevens, Stevens, i, 206) thought an attempt should have
been made to reconnoitre the Mexican right with a view to turning the
position; but to push a reconnoitring party between the Mexican right
wing and the cavalry of Alvarez must have looked extremely hazardous.
Clarke's brigade consisted of the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Infantry,
it will be recalled. Cadwalader had the Voltigeurs and Eleventh
and Fourteenth Infantry. C. F. Smith being ill, his battalion was
commanded by Captain E. K. Smith, who was mortally wounded. Semmes
(Service, 445) says that Cadwalader's brigade and Drum's guns had been
added at Worth's request, but Hitchcock (Fifty Years, 296) and Scott's
general orders of Sept. 7 show that Scott originally intended to give
Worth one of Pillow's brigades. Worth could no doubt have had more
light guns, but it was said that projectiles for the heavy guns were
so few that it was necessary to husband them closely. Scott, however,
stated (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 377) that he had plenty of such ammunition.
Ripley (_op. cit._, ii, 461) says that "the nature of the orders [given
to Worth] forbade an attack by artillery"; but (1) there is no evidence
to prove this; (2) artillery was used on Casa Mata, only not long
enough; (3) it was used again later with success (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p.
527; Sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 136). See Stevens, Stevens, 206. Indeed, it
seems to have been unnecessary to attack Casa Mata. It could not have
held out long after the fall of El Molino. Ripley admits (p. 462) that
the battle "was confused," but adds, "storming is always a work of
confusion." Here he confounds occurrences with management. The former
must involve noise and confusion in such an affair, but the latter
should not.
Sumner had one troop of the First Dragoons, six troops of the Second,
part of a troop of the Third, and a company of Mounted Rifles. Foster
had ten pioneers. Drum had three guns, but one of them was sent out
on the road to Mexico, and during the battle one of the others became
disabled by the breaking of a priming wire. Semmes--determined, as
usual, to defend Worth at all hazards--says that during McIntosh's
charge Duncan's battery was called away to repel the Mexican cavalry;
but Duncan's report (Sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 136) shows that his guns did
not turn against the cavalry until masked by McIntosh's troops. The
part of Cadwalader's brigade that moved to the left was the Voltigeurs.
After the repulse of Clarke's brigade some of the Voltigeurs went
into the ravine and moved toward the rear of Casa Mata. This perhaps
helped to force the Mexicans out, and certainly resulted in the capture
of many prisoners. Vigorous pursuit of the Mexicans was in general
impracticable on account of the character of the ground and the fire
from Chapultepec. Finding the engagement far more serious than he had
expected, Scott summoned forces from the southern front of the city and
from Mixcoac, but these could not arrive soon enough to give material
assistance. Jackson's section of Magruder's battery came from Mixcoac
in time to contribute a little to the final repulse of the Mexican
cavalry. Worth blamed Scott for saying in his report that Pierce's
brigade interposed between Garland and the Mexicans, and asserted that
it did not arrive until a considerable time after the battle ended (Ho.
60; 30, 1, p. 1079); and it was felt by others, too, that Scott erred
here. But from the =178=diary of a man in the Ninth Infantry it seems
clear that that regiment--a part of Pierce's brigade--did as Scott
stated.
The number of Americans actually engaged was 3251 (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p.
369). Our loss was 116 (including nine officers) killed, 665 (including
forty-nine officers) wounded, and eighteen privates missing (_ibid._,
384). We captured 685, including 53 officers. One third of Clarke's
brigade, including one half of the officers, were killed or wounded
(Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 145). The Fifth Infantry seemed little more than a
company after the battle (Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 297).
Santa Anna stated later (Mi Historia, 75) that Iturbe, a wealthy
resident of Tacubaya, notified Tornel that Scott intended to enter
the city during the night of Sept. 7 by the San Lázaro garita, on the
eastern side of Mexico, and that for this reason he (Santa Anna) took
troops away from El Molino; but Santa Anna always laid the blame for
his mistakes upon some one. No doubt Scott's feint against the southern
side of the city and his not attacking during the afternoon were enough
to cause alarm, but Santa Anna blundered in going to the southeast
corner of the city, for an American attack there must have developed
slowly owing to the swamps, whereas an attack upon El Molino could be
made quickly. He reached the scene of the battle at about half-past
nine, and claimed that, but for his arrival, Chapultepec might have
been lost (Apelación, app., 111). The government represented that he
was in command during the battle (Apuntes, 304). By Scott's orders
Casa Mata was blown up. The Mexicans believed that a shot of theirs
exploded the magazine. Andrade was tried and acquitted. Had he been as
much at fault as Alvarez alleged, the latter should have replaced him
on the spot with another officer. About noon the Mexican cavalry (or at
least Andrade's division) were ordered to charge, but on reaching the
battlefield found the Americans had retired. It has been suggested (Roa
Bárcena, Recuerdos, 448) that a part of the Mexican cavalry should have
been dismounted and placed between El Molino and Casa Mata; but one may
feel sure that Alvarez would not have consented to that arrangement.
One hesitates to think what the results of the battle might have been,
had not Santa Anna withdrawn previously with a considerable part of his
troops; and of this movement Scott was not aware, though he may have
hoped that his feint against the city would have an effect of that sort.
After the battle the American troops reoccupied in general the
positions held by them before it.
28.6. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 297-9, 303. =224=_Id._, introd. to
intercepted letters. =217=Henshaw to wife, Sept. 13. =73=Lozano, no.
7, 1847. Raleigh _Star_, Oct. 27. =221=Hill, diary. Semmes, Service,
447-9. London _Times_, Nov. 13. =76=Ortega, Sept. 13. =100=Guerra,
circular, Sept. 11. =76=J. Y. Gutiérrez, proclam., Sept. 11. Apuntes,
303-4. =199=Anon. MS. _Picayune_, Oct. 14. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 361
(Worth), 430 (Hitchcock); app., 156 (Cadwalader). Sen. 19; 30, 2
(Smith to Abert, Nov. 30, 1848). =69=Huger, Sept. 9, 1847. Ho. 24;
31, 1. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 145 (Lee). Negrete, Invasión, iii, app.,
468. N. Y. _Tribune_, Dec. 17, 1882 (Mayne Reid). S. Anna, Detall, 24.
=70="Guerra", no. 273 (trial of Bravo). Stevens, Stevens, i, 206.
28.7. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 375 (Scott) and map. =73=Lozano, no. 7, 1847.
Semmes, Service, 430. _So. Qtrly. Rev._, Jan., 1853, 2-3. _Niles_, Oct.
9, p. 89. =92=Piedad judge, Sept. 9. Diccionario Universal (_México_).
Robertson, Visit, ii, 344.
28.8. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 376 (Scott), 425-7 (Smith). Sen. 65; 30, 1,
pp. 77 (Lee), 185 (Ripley), 579 (Pillow says he reported to Scott on
Sept. 9 that the Mexican works opposite Piedad, where Pillow then was,
could be carried easily). Davis, Autobiog., 223. Hitchcock, Fifty
Years, 298-300. _So. Qtrly. Rev._, Jan., 1853, pp. 4-5. =66=Lee to J.
L. Smith, Sept. 15. =66=Beauregard to _Id._, Sept. 20. =111=_Id._ to
_Id._, Sept. 27. =218=Henshaw narrative. =76=To Olaguíbel, Sept. 11.
Ripley (_op. cit._, ii, 470) and Rives (_op. cit._, ii, 528) reflect
upon Scott for having no reconnaissances made between Aug. 20 and
Sept. 7. But to make them would have violated the meaning and spirit
of the armistice, which prescribed an "absolute cessation of
hostilities" (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 310), and it was highly important
to show the strictest good faith during the delicate negotiations.
Rives (_ibid._) says "no preparation whatever had been made for the
contingency of renewed hostilities." This statement results from a lack
of information. Numberless things had been done to put the army and
its equipment into fighting trim. Rives says also (_ibid._) that the
Mexicans, had they been enterprising, could easily have beaten our army
in detail at this time. This seems to be a mistake (see Sen. 19; 30, 2,
p. 8). A frontal attack upon Worth could certainly have been repulsed,
and an attempt to strike Pillow, Twiggs or Quitman would have exposed
their own flank and rear. Moreover it was clear that Santa Anna had no
intention of assuming the offensive. Rives says himself he had none
(_op. cit._, 466), attributing his decision to "well-justified distrust
of his own army"; and since the decision was made (July) nothing had
occurred to reassure him. Napoleon said, "A well-established maxim of
war is, not to do anything which your enemy desires."
28.9. Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 77-8, 145 (Lee), 81 (Cadwalader), 112-3
(Beauregard), 123 (Trist), 169 (Hooker). Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 375
(Scott), 427 (Smith). Exposición dirigida, 6. _So. Qtrly. Rev._, Jan.,
1853, pp. 6-15. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 300. =113=Beauregard, remins.
=66=_Id._ to J. L. Smith, Sept. 20. =111=_Id._ to _Id._, Sept, 27.
=69=Letter of Sept. 11 from Mexico. Semmes, Service, 430. (Gunners)
=76=Carrera, report, Dec., 1847. (Key) Apuntes, 304, 317. Wash.
_Union_, Dec. 9. =210=Alvord to Hammond, Feb. 21, 1848. Rodríguez,
Breve Reseña, 870. Stevens, Stevens, i, 207.
Ripley (_op. cit._, ii, 472) remarks that even after taking Chapultepec
Scott was "yet at a distance of two miles from the city, with the
positive certainty of running upon the citadel if the direct route were
pursued." But two miles on a broad, good causeway signified little, it
was unnecessary to take the direct route, and Scott had no intention of
taking it. Ripley admits (p. 473) that Scott reasonably supposed that
the defences at S. Cosme were comparatively weak.
28.10. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 428 (Smith). Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 77 (Lee),
112 (Beauregard), 169 (Hooker), 257 (Quitman). =113=Beauregard,
remins. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 300. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 353-5. The
description of Lee is based principally upon a picture (seen at the
Confederate Museum, Richmond) made soon after the Mexican war. The
weather was still unusually favorable for military operations.
28.11. Negrete, Invasión, iv, app., 294-6. Evidence at the trial of
Bravo (=70="Guerra," no. 273). S. Anna, Detall, 22. =76=To Monterde,
May 24. =76=Monterde, June 18, 21-2. =76=To Lombardini, July 6, 23;
Aug. 3. =76=Tornel, Sept. 12. =76=To Bravo, Sept. 10. =76=Bravo, Sept.
14. =76=Liceaga to Lombardini, Aug. 22. =76=Reports on Bravo's conduct,
July 21, 24, 1848. Apuntes, 317. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 459.
28.12. Sen. 1; 30, 1, map; pp. 400 (Pillow), 410 (Quitman). =76=Bravo,
Sept. 14. Negrete, Inv., iv, app., 294-6. Semmes, Service, 450-1.
Tornel, Sept. 12. To Bravo, Sept. 10. Apuntes, 307-8. =357=Wilcox,
diary. =70=Evidence at the trial of Bravo ("Guerra," no. 273). Ripley,
War with Mexico, ii, 396-8. (Impreg.) =221=Hill, diary. Hitchcock,
Fifty Years, 285, 302.
The southeastern corner of the rectangle was irregularly cut off. A
bullet-proof wall, about fifteen feet high, protected the eastern end,
and ran along the southern line of the rectangle with platforms or
scaffolds for infantry on its inner side, while a stone aqueduct--its
arches filled in here with heavy masonry--extended (in the Anzures
causeway) along the northern side of the rectangle, and continued
_via_ S. Cosme to the city. Cultivated fields, adjacent to El
Molino, occupied about a third of the rectangle. On each side of the
north-and-south drainage ditch there was an embankment. The next
section--perhaps one sixth--of the rectangle was occupied by the swamps
and cypresses, and then came the hill--extremely steep except at the
west, and steep there. A road or wide path led east through the grove
to the foot of the hill. The opening in the south wall, covered by
the exterior, unarmed redan (_B_), had a ditch outside of the redan
for additional protection. The road that went up to the college was
defended inside the main gateway with a 9-pounder (placed here Sept.
12). The circular (arc of a circle) redoubt (_C_) was at the _glorieta_
(an open space furnished with seats, etc.). One or two other slight
fortifications probably existed.
The south wall of the terre-plein had a parapet except near the
southeast corner. Along the base of the west wall ran a fosse about
twelve feet wide and ten deep. Rather extensive mines (to be fired by
powder-trains laid on or just under the surface of the ground) lay
below the fosse; and beyond them--about half-way down the slope--stood
a redan (_E_) for some fifty men, which seems to have been about 125
feet from the wall. This west wall was a priest-cap: _i.e._, it was
indented like a shallow V, so that its two halves could afford support
to each other. In the central portion of the terre-plein stood the
masonry edifice of the military college with an open terrace at its
eastern end and some stone buildings with flat, parapeted roofs, at its
western end. A half-round bastion on each of the long sides afforded
room for a heavy gun commanding in each case a semicircle. (The one
in the southern bastion seems to have been disabled on Sept. 8.) East
of the southern bastion, in a smaller projection, stood a lighter
gun looking toward the lower gateway; behind the somewhat zigzag
parapet westward two or three smaller pieces covering the road and the
southwest approach; on the terre-plein commanding the upper gateway a
couple of light howitzers; and at the western end, specially screened
with timber and sand-bags, two heavy pieces, which swept the approach
from El Molino. (One of the pieces was a 68-pound howitzer. Ripley is
precise in his account of the size and the placing of the guns, but
the evidence is against him. He says there were eleven. There seem to
have been thirteen; but one of them was not mounted, and two were now
disabled.) Timbering, proof against bullets, covered much of the lower
story, the parapeted azotea of the main edifice and some other parts
of the buildings; and sand-bags afforded further, though inadequate,
protection at a number of peculiarly exposed points.
28.13. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 377 (Scott), 397 (Twiggs), 399 (Riley),
400 (Pillow), 410 (Quitman), 422 (Huger); app., 197 (Pierce),
201 (Cadwalader), 230 (Porter). Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 185 (Ripley).
=260=Henshaw, comments on map. =217=_Id._ to wife, Sept. 13. =66=Lee to
J. L. Smith, Sept. 15. =66=McClellan to Smith, Sept. 20. =66=Beauregard
to Smith, Sept. 20. =111=_Id._ to _Id._, Sept. 27. =304=Andrews to
Lovell, Sept. 19. =304=Hunt to _Id._, Sept. 15. =304=Steptoe to _Id._,
Sept. 16. =304=Porter to _Id._, Sept. 16. =304=Wilcox, diary. Ramsey,
Other Side, 457. =327=Sutherland to father, Aug. --. =178=Davis, diary.
Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 426. =76=Carrera, Sept. 1.
28.14. Negrete Invasión, iv, app., 299-300. =61=Letter from Mex., Sept.
11. Apuntes, 305-6, 309-10, 314. Ramírez, México, 307-8. _Diario_,
Sept. 11. =73=Lozano, no. 7, 1847. S. Anna, Apelación, 57. _Id._,
Detall, 25. =76=To Bravo, Sept. 10. =76=Bravo, Sept. 11. =76=Tornel
to Carrera, Sept. 9. =92=Ayunt. to S. Anna, Sept. 11. =92=Letter from
Piedad, Sept. 11. =199=Anon. MS.
28.15. =76=Bravo, Sept. 14. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 427; iv,
app., 299-300. =179=Diario Esactísimo. London _Times_, Nov. 13. S.
Anna, Detall, 26. =76=To comtes. gen. Querétaro and Guanajuato, Sept.
12. _Arco Iris_, Nov. 30. Apuntes, 310-2. =70=Trial of Bravo ("Guerra,"
no. 273). =70=Trial of Terrés ("Guerra," no. 155). Molina, Asalto.
=269=_Id._, recolls. Prieto, Memorias, ii, 241-3. Rangel, Parte (with
notes).
28.16. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 377 (Scott), 410-2 (Quitman); app., 231
(Mackenzie). Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 143 (Lee), 193, 200-1 (Worth),
259 (Quitman). Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 301-2. Henshaw narrative.
=376=Nicholson, recolls. =221=Hill, diary.
28.17. _The battle of Chapultepec._ Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 375, 391-425;
app., 169-231 (reports of Scott and officers). Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp.
119 (Tilton), 146 (Lee), 155-6, 158 (Bennett), 170, 172 (Hooker),
204-9 (Rains), 217-8 (Drum), 219 (Bates), 220-1 (Johnston), 222-4
(Loeser), 270-5 (Howard). Stevens, Stevens, i, 208-10. _Niles_, Oct.
30, p. 137. _Cong. Globe_, 34, 1, pp. 105-7. Sen. Report 32; 34, 1.
Brown, Ninth Inf., 70. Henderson, Science of War, 97 ("The issue of
battle"). _So. Qtrly. Rev._, Jan., 1853, pp. 15-42. =76=Bravo, Sept.
14. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 428-9; iv, app., 300-4. Balbontín,
Invasión, 131. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 302-3. Ballentine, Eng. Sold.,
ii, 242-7. Davis, Autobiog., 231-2. Henshaw narrative. =180=Pillow
to wife, Oct. 18. Weekly N. Y. _Courier and Enquirer_, Mar. 2, 1848.
=61=Seymour, Oct. 31, 1847. =69=H. V. Johnson _et al._ to Polk, Apr.
6, 1848. =376=Nicholson, recolls. =183=Drum, recolls. =223=Hirschorn,
recolls. =66=G. W. Smith to Stevens, Sept. 20. =66=Tower to J. L.
Smith, Sept. 23. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 361-2, 380-6. Raleigh _Star_,
Oct. 27. =221=Hill, diary. =200=Reid to Gladden, May 27, 1849. S. Anna,
Detall, 16, 26-9, 38-42. =151=Numerous reports and letters regarding
Quitman's operations. =113=Beauregard, remins. (based on diary and
notes). =151=Wilcox, diary. =303=Quitman papers. _National_, Nov.
14. =179=Diario Esactísimo. =60=Riley to Westcott, Nov. 30, 1847.
=60=Loring to P. F. Smith, Sept. 27. =68=Testimony at Bonneville
court martial. =60=Miller to sister, undated. =60=_Id._ to mother,
Mar. 24, 1848. London _Times_, Nov. 13, 1847. =335=Reynolds to Trist,
Sept. 27. Oswandel, Notes, 426. Semmes, Service, 453-5. _Arco Iris_,
Nov. 30. Apuntes, 311, 314-6. =199=Anon. MS. Rangel, Parte (with
notes). _Eco del Comercio_, May 1, 1848. Sen. 11; 31, 1 (M. L. Smith,
Nov. 30, 1848). Gamboa, Impug., 55. =70="Guerra," no. 1044 (trial of
Alemán). =70="Guerra," no. 273 (trial of Bravo). _Monitor_, Apr. 27,
1848. =70="Guerra," no. 155 (trial of Terrés). Statue of Bravo at
Puebla. _Delta_, Oct. 14, 26; Nov. 3, 20. México á través, iv, 690-5.
=76=Bravo, Dec. 27. Dunovant, Battles, 5-10. Wash. _Union_, Nov.
3. _Monitor Repub._, Oct. 24; Dec. 16 (S. Anna). Nashville _Repub.
Banner_, Oct. 28, 1857. =292=Pillow to wife, Oct. 18. _Spirit of the
Age_, Feb. 10; July 29, 1848. Pacheco, Exposíción. Wise, Gringos (N.
Y., 1849), 257-9. Calderón, Rectificaciones, 47. _Vedette_, iv, nos.
3, 8, 12. =327=Sutherland to father. Aug. --. =178=Davis, diary.
_Flag of Freedom_, Nov. 27. Molina, El Asalto. =269=_Id._, recolls.
=291=Pierce to Appleton, Sept. 26. =51=Marine off., Oct. 20. Reynolds,
Exculpation. =131=Brindle, statement. Ripley, War with Mexico, ii,
396-402. Encarnacion Prisoners, 84. _Hist. Teacher's Mag._, Apr., 1912
(Vieregg).
REMARKS on the battle of Chapultepec. Chapultepec had been a protected
summer palace, not a fortress. At this time the upper stories that one
sees now did not exist. There were perhaps three times as many large
trees in the grove as at present. For military reasons the small trees
had recently been cleared away. Scott had a small map of the city,
apparently purchased from the British courier (Sen. 34; 34, 3, p. 25).
The Twelfth Infantry guarded the stores at Mixcoac, and Sept. 10 Harney
was sent there with a body of dragoons. Sumner was then placed in
command of all the dragoons at Tacubaya (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 421). P. F.
Smith's brigade remained at Mixcoac until the morning of Sept. 13. Lee,
Beauregard, Stevens and Tower reconnoitred the southern front. Scott
was there nearly all day Sept. 9, and on the morning of the eleventh.
The purposes in view were to study the Mexican preparations, ascertain
the nature of the ground, and find places for batteries. In general the
ground, even where covered with water, appeared to be firm enough for
infantry, and suitable places for batteries were found.
Bravo was appointed to the command of Chapultepec on August 27. Sept.
9 Alvarez was ordered to take the cavalry to Guadalupe. According to
=76=Bravo, Sept. 14, the garrison of Chapultepec on the morning of
Sept. 12, aside from gunners and engineers, was the Tenth Line Infantry
(250), Mina battalion (277), Unión battalion (121), Querétaro battalion
(115), Toluca battalion (27), Patria battalion (42). These 832 men were
disposed as follows: defending the road to Tacubaya, 160; redoubt on
south side of hill (apparently at B), 215; _glorieta_ redoubt (C), 92;
entrenchment at the right of the _glorieta_ (D), 42; north side of the
hill, 80; buildings at summit, 243 (=76=Bravo, report, Sept. 14). The
buildings near the gateway batteries were defended principally by the
Matamoros de Morelia battalion.
At the conference of Sept. 11 Engineers Smith, Lee, Stevens and Tower
favored attacking San Antonio, and Quitman, Shields, Cadwalader and
Pierce took that view. Pillow did the same. Riley and Twiggs sided
with Scott though not for positive reasons. Hitchcock and Trist do not
seem to have expressed opinions. Worth and P. F. Smith were engaged
elsewhere. Scott's attacking Chapultepec against the advice of Lee
illustrated the fact that his success in Mexico was not due to that
officer, as the value of Lee's services and his later fame have led
some to imagine.