convent did not begin until the afternoon of Aug. 18 (=76=Rincón
to S. Anna, Aug. 26); one gun arrived there on the morning of the
twentieth and the rest were left by Santa Anna later that day (Apuntes,
252); and hence Scott could not well have learned from spies what
the situation was in that quarter. It is bootless to say (Calderón,
Rectificaciones, 43) that Santa Anna should have prevented Scott from
reaching Coyoacán. Neither he nor his army was in a condition to fight
without fortifications, and they could not have stopped the Americans
anywhere if not at Churubusco. On the Mexican right at the convent
were two 8-pounders and a 4-pounder; in embrasures at the front, an
8-pounder and a 4-pounder; _en barbette_ at the left an 8-pounder; and
in an embrasure defending the left flank a 6-pounder. A detachment
of the Independencia battalion under Peñúñuri occupied Coyoacán when
the Americans approached, and retired with some loss. The fight at
Churubusco convent was actually begun by the Mounted Rifles, but their
orders were merely to escort the reconnoitring party, and the First
Artillery was expected to clear the way by turning the supposed one-gun
battery (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 330). Riley had only the Second and Seventh
Infantry at Churubusco. The Fourth Artillery was on guard at Valencia's
camp. Scott ordered that Worth should attack and turn San Antonio
after finding the Americans were in its rear, but when he sent Lee to
give the signal to Worth, Lee found Worth had already done this.
Ripley (War with Mexico, ii, 250-1) says that Scott ordered Pillow
to do what Twiggs did and _vice versa_. But (1) nothing of this is
found in Scott's or Pillow's report; (2) Scott would not have been
likely to order two bitter enemies (Worth and Twiggs) to coöperate
in an indefinite manner, and (3) H. L. Scott testified at the Pillow
trial that he carried from Gen. Scott to Twiggs the order to attack
the convent (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 98). Davis, Shields's aide, says on
the other hand (Autobiog., 199) that Scott knew by reconnaissances of
a remarkably strong fortification at Churubusco, and ordered Twiggs
to take the route actually taken by Shields. But (1) Davis's first
statement is not correct; (2) Scott was at Coyoacán, where the roads
forked, and would have recalled Twiggs, had he seen that officer take
the wrong road; (3) Scott felt in haste to strike the retreating
Mexicans, and the quickest way to do that was apparently by the road to
Churubusco; and (4) H. L. Scott's testimony, supported by the reports
of Gens. Scott and Twiggs, seems to be decisive. Davis's account
contains other errors, and appears to have been written long afterwards
from memory.
What Scott intended to do after concentrating we do not know. Probably,
as was his custom, he held several plans in suspense, awaiting
developments and fuller information regarding the enemy, which the
delay expected in Worth's operations would have given him time to
acquire. But his promptness in sending off Pierce and Shields, and
his attempt to hold back one of Smith's and one of Pierce's brigades,
suggest that he aimed to get behind Santa Anna himself and force
a decisive battle. Gen. U. S. Grant endorsed Scott's strategy at
Churubusco as faultless and said the engineers served him perfectly
(Mems., i, 145); but Stevens's confession is decisive on both points
(Stevens, Stevens, i, 180, 184, 196, 199). Stevens states expressly
that Scott had intended to reconnoitre before attacking at Churubusco.
Worth's attacking the bridge without reconnoitring was mainly due to
over-confidence and eagerness; but the intense ambition and rivalry of
Worth and Twiggs probably had something to do with the undue haste of
both. Of course Semmes (Service, 398, 446) asserts that Worth advanced
with deliberation and reconnoitred the bridgehead, but the evidence,
especially that given at the trial of Major Bonneville, is decisively
against him. Ripley, on the other hand, states that a reconnaissance
was not practicable (War with Mexico, ii, 267); but while a complete
reconnaissance could not be made, the cornfields on the right would
have enabled an officer to advance unseen, and at a glance learn
something regarding the obstacle in front. This would have been to
save, not lose, time.
Scott was accused of having no plan and leaving his generals to attack
as they saw fit, and was criticized especially for fighting to gain
a road neither needed nor used by him, from which the enemy could
easily have been manoeuvred, had they cared to hold it (Roa Bárcena,
Recuerdos, 378); but the text explains these apparent errors. The
battle was, however, in effect a blunder, even though not chargeable
to Scott as such. Still, the ardor of the army was something not to be
thrown away by delaying, and the promptness of the Americans prevented
Santa Anna from completing his preparations. (Greene, Russian Army,
433: Excessive prudence has a bad effect on the morale of the men.)
Perhaps Scott gained as much as he lost in this way. Moreover, had
he manoeuvred the Mexicans out of Churubusco, it would have been
necessary to fight them elsewhere, when they would probably have been
more ready to fight; the moral effect of this victory on both armies
would not have been gained; and our military annals would not have
contained this page. The moral effect on the Mexicans, however, was
largely offset by pride in the stubborn resistance they had offered,
and by the armistice that Scott immediately offered. One could not
always determine just where firing, heard from a distance, was taking
place. Probably for this reason we have inconsistent reports that make
it impossible to determine precisely where and when the battle began.
The Sixth Infantry, moving toward the bridge a considerable distance
in advance of Worth himself, were said to have received the first fire
from the convent (Hoffman: Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1076), but Scott reported
that the attack upon the convent began some time before that upon the
bridgehead. Stevens (I. I. Stevens, 198) supports him. The writer in
"Apuntes" says that Worth was checked by ammunition wagons in the road,
and that Santa Anna, seeing this, recalled Pérez to defend the bridge;
but the wagons appear to have caused no such delay as this writer
assumed. The rest of Santa Anna's force (which this writer says kept
on towards Mexico) was mainly cavalry, and presumably this cavalry
assisted in flanking Shields. Brev. Lieut. Col. C. F. Smith's battalion
consisted of two companies from the Second Artillery, one from the
Fifth Infantry and one from the Eighth Infantry (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 316).
The Fifteenth, but only one battalion (commanded by Capt. Wood) of the
Twelfth Infantry was with Pierce, and a battery of mountain howitzers.
Pierce, who had been thrown from his horse the day before, fainted
and fell out before coming into action, so Shields commanded both
brigades. Lee was the engineer officer with Shields. Seeing the need
of more troops, he went back to Scott and obtained the Mounted Rifles
and a troop of the Second Dragoons, but these men did not reach the
spot in time to fight. Scott has been criticized for not sending a
stronger force in this direction; but in fact he did not even retain
an escort, and the Rifles were Twiggs's reserve (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p.
309). The South Carolina regiment, commonly known as the "Palmettoes,"
was made up of superior material. Men fit to be officers were in the
ranks. Shields's movement was partly based on a misapprehension, for
the Mexicans could retreat from Churubusco _via_ Mexicaltzingo; but
anyhow it was wise to aid the frontal attack on the bridge by applying
pressure on the flank. Shields seems to have marched too far north to
coöperate effectively with the attack upon the bridgehead. Presumably
he did so in order to reach Santa Anna's rear. The combined effect of
this movement and the outflanking of the Mexican left was to extend the
American line enormously, and expose it to a (happily very improbable)
counter-attack. At about three o'clock the Americans were in three
sections, badly separated by distance or by the enemy, while the
Mexicans, besides fighting behind strong defences, were all actually or
virtually in touch one with another, and able to give mutual support.
Shields naturally overestimated the numbers opposed to him. Perhaps
the Victoria and Hidalgo battalions from San Antonio passed along the
highway to Mexico at this time. They would not fight. They thought
hunger, sunburn and blistered feet bad enough. The Americans believed
that they fought at least 32,000 men on Aug. 20 (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p.
313); but this was a great exaggeration. Rangel's brigade was in
town; Alvarez's was far away; and there must have been a large number
of soldiers guarding the fortifications, and attending to the general
requirements of the service. The number fighting that day on the
Mexican side seems to have been about 16,000, though Mexican authors
have tried to reduce it to 12,000 or 13,000 (_e.g._ Roa Bárcena,
Recuerdos, 375).
Scott's dragoons were divided and assigned to special duties at this
time (Sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 38). Pillow and a part of his troops joined
Worth, but figured very little in reports of the fighting. The Eleventh
and Fourteenth Infantry attempted to cut the Mexican line from the
bridge to the convent, but on account of the heavy fire were ordered to
lie down. Col. Andrews explained that his regiment (Voltigeurs) came
up later than Worth's division, and could not fire without endangering
troops ahead of him (Sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 122); but this is not
convincing, for he must have left Coyoacán at about noon, and there was
room enough at the front.
It was stated at Puebla in October, 1847, that 260 Americans fought
with the Mexicans at Churubusco (_Flag of Freedom_, i, no. 1). Some of
these men cut their way through (=70="Guerra," no. 30, Perdigón Garay),
and reached Mexico (_ibid._, Rangel). Some eighty appear to have been
captured. They were fairly tried. A number were found not guilty of
deserting, and were released. About fifteen (Hartman, Journal, 18), who
had deserted before the declaration of war, were merely branded with a
"D," and fifty of those taken at Churubusco were executed (=65=Scott,
gen. orders 296). There was bitter complaint because any were spared,
but Scott declared he would rather be put to the sword with his whole
army than do an injustice in the matter (Davis, Autobiog., 226), and
urged the courts to find grounds for reducing the number of executions
(=335=notes on letter to Ho. of Repres.). It was said that more than
once the American deserters killed Mexicans who tried to raise a
white flag at the convent. For the deserters and their fate consult:
=12=Caryton to Lambert, Sept. 1; _Picayune_, Sept. 8; Sen. 1; 30, 1,
pp. 319, 344; Ballentine, Eng. Sold., ii, 230; =70="Guerra," no. 30
(Rangel, Perdigón Garay); Judah, diary; _Amer. Star_, Mexico, Sept. 20;
_Diario_, Sept. 2; _Flag of Freedom_, Puebla, i, no. 1; =178=Davis,
diary; Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 452; Hartman, Journal, 17-8;
Scott, =65=gen. orders 281-3; Davis, Autobiog., 224-7). Hancock and
Longstreet, destined to be on opposite sides at Gettysburg, here fought
together. Twiggs was at this time under fire (Stevens, Stevens, i,
199). Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 493) explains the stiff defence of
the convent as due to the presence of "men of Spanish (not Indian)
descent"; but (1) the Victoria and Hidalgo battalions, which would not
fight (_supra_) were still more truly "Spanish" (vol. ii, p. 3), and
(2) the nearly worthless officers were always of such descent.
26.20. Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 465, 478. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 313-4, 348,
384. Ho. 24; 31, 1. =76=Rincón to S. Anna, Aug. 26. =76=Quijano, Sept.
3. =76=Olaguíbel, Aug. 27. Ramírez, México, 299. _Monitor Repub._, Dec.
17 (S.Anna). =76=Alcorta, Aug. 30. =12=Caryton to Lambert, Sept. 1.
Semmes, Service, 408. =76=Report, Aug. 21. =224=Intercepted letters,
_passim_. =76=Cuerpo Médico, report, Aug. 24.
26.21. Mich. Pioneer Soc. Colls., ii, 173. Stevens, Stevens, i, 199.
Encarnacion Prisoners, 55. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 278-80. Sen. 1; 30,
1, p. 331. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 464 (Lee). Apuntes, 247. Roa Bárcena,
Recuerdos, 377.
XXVII. NEGOTIATIONS
27.1. _The American situation after the battles of Aug. 20._
=260=Henshaw, comments on map. =61=Trousdale, Aug. 22. =217=Henshaw
to wife, Aug. 21, etc. =218=Henshaw narrative. Vedette, vii, no.
9 (Toll). St. Louis _Republican_, Sept. 27. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 314
(Scott). Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 284-5, 294. McSherry, El Puchero, 88,
100. =364=Worth to daughter, Sept. 2. =61=N. C. to Elizabeth Miller,
Nov. 30. Semmes, Service, 413. London _Chronicle_, Nov. 12. N. Y.
_Herald_, Feb. 5, 1848 (Pierce). =236=Judah, diary. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p.
129 (Scott). Semi-weekly N. Y. _Courier and Enquirer_, Mar. 1, 1848.
=358=Williams to father, Oct. 1. =291=Pierce to wife, Aug. 23. Davis,
Autobiography, 189. =350=Weber, recolls. =303=Shields to Quitman, Aug.
21. =221=Hill, diary. =68=Scott's statement to court of inquiry, Apr.
17, 1848. Gamboa, Impug., 49. _Picayune_, Sept. 9. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p.
460 (Turnbull).
Semmes (Service, 413) says that eventually Scott had to disperse the
elements of peace, and incorrectly adds that they seemed to reassemble
all the more rapidly. But Scott had reason to believe that what it
required months to do later could be done now in only a few weeks. He
reported that understanding his nation's desire for peace and "Willing
to leave something to this republic--of no immediate value to us--on
which to rest her pride, and to recover temper--I halted our victorious
corps at the gates of the city" (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 314). Even the
fiery Worth deemed it best not to enter Mexico at this time (=364=to
daughter, Sept. 2).
27.2. =108=Marcy to Bancroft, Apr. 28. Polk, Messages, May 11; June 16,
1846; Feb. 10, 1847 (Richardson, iv, 437, 451, 511). Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp.
328 (Scott); 334 (Marcy). =297=Benton MS. (with Polk's notes) received
by Polk, July 4, 1846. =69=Worth to Bliss, Nov. 29; Dec. 14, 1846.
27.3. Bankhead reported, Oct. 10, 1846, that he was weary of arguing in
favor of treating with the United States; that the dominant faction,
positively refusing to negotiate, were crying, "A levy of 40,000 and
make terms only on the other side of the Nueces!"
27.4. _The overture of July, 1846._ Sen. 107; 29, 2, pp. 1-3. Sen.
1; 29, 2, pp. 43-4. =13=Pakenham, nos. 93, July 13; 107, Aug. 13;
119, Sept. 28; 130, Nov. 12, 1846. =13=Bankhead to Pakenham, Oct.
10. =256=Marcy to Wetmore, June 13. _Locomotor_, June 27. =158=Cobb
to wife, June 4. _National_, June 22. _Pregonero_, June 11. _Monitor
Repub._, June 22. =162=Buchanan to Conner, Oct. 1. =162=Conner, July
19. =13=Bankhead, nos. 92, 104, 105, June 29; July 30; 125, Aug. 31;
128-30, Sept. 7, 1846. Rejón to Buchanan, Aug. 31 (in Memoria de ...
Relaciones, 1846). Polk, Diary, Sept. 19, 20, 26. Buchanan, Works
(Moore), vii, 40, 82, 87. _Indicador_, Aug. 27. _Nat. Intelligencer_,
Sept. 28. _Diario_, Dec. 6, 13, 25. =52=Black, May 21; June 9; July 4.
=166=_Id._ to Conner, July 9; Aug. 1. =166=Pommarès to Gregory, July
2. =166=_Id._ to Conner, July 4, 21; Aug. 12. Reeves, Amer. Diplomacy,
298. Polk, Message, Dec. 8 (Richardson, iv, 494). =297=Mackenzie, July
7. =76=Comandante, V. Cruz, Aug. 26. See vol. i, pp. 217, 502, 504.
Sept. 26 Buchanan replied to Rejón that the United States did not wish
to ignore in the _peace negotiations_ the causes of the war, since to
do that would be to abandon the just claims of the United States (Polk,
Diary, Sept. 26; Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 44). The necessity of explaining
his previous despatch illustrated once more the Mexican superiority in
diplomatic fencing. Buchanan added that delay would make it the harder
to end the conflict. Polk regarded the Mexican reply as a refusal
to treat (Diary, Sept. 19). In consequence he proposed aggressive
operations in Tamaulipas (chap. xiii, p. 263) and the imposition of
contributions in lieu of paying for needed supplies (chap. xxxiii, p.
264). Buchanan, however, directed Conner to notify Slidell, who was
still on waiting orders at New Orleans, whenever the Mexican government
should announce that it was "disposed" to treat (=162=Oct. 1).
27.5. Polk, Diary, July 26, 30, 31; Aug. 1, 4, 7, 8, 10, 1846. _Id._ to
Senate, Aug. 4, 8 (Richardson, Messages, iv, 456, 466). _Id._, Message,
Dec. 8, 1846 (_ib._, 494-5). Benton, View, ii, 681-2. _Cong. Globe_,
29, 1, pp. 1211-21. See also the long debates on the subject in Senate
and House, Jan. and Feb., 1847 (_Cong. Globe_). Von Holst, United
States, iii, 293. Benton, Abr. Debates, xvi, 40, note, 45 (Sevier),
60 (Cass). Boston _Atlas_, Feb. 17, 1847. =13=Mora to Palmerston, May
26, 1847. _Diario_, May 24; June 8, 1847. _Republicano_, June 11,
1847. =13=Thornton to Bankhead, June 14, 1847. (Consul Black notified)
=13=Pakenham, no. 40, Mar. 29, 1847. Wash. _Union_, Aug. 12, 1846.
=108=Polk to Bancroft, Jan. 30, 1847. _Daily Telegraph_, Oct. 16, 1852.
The request for two millions apparently grew out of the negotiation
with Santa Anna; see chap. ix, note 9.38. Polk's object was probably to
be able to supply funds promptly to the Mexican administration making
a treaty, and to satisfy it that it would be able to gain the needful
military support. The three millions could not be used until after
Mexico should have ratified the treaty (Benton, Abr. Deb., xvi, 46
(Berrien), 60 (Cass); Washington _Telegraph_, Oct. 18, 1852), and the
government was required to account for the expenditure of the money (U.
S. Stat. at Large, ix, 174; Benton, Abr. Deb., xvi, 45). An improper
use of it was therefore impossible.
27.6. _The overture of January, 1847._ Ho. 85; 29, 2. Washington
_Union_, Oct. 9, 1846 (N. Y.); Apr. 22; June 11, 1847. =162=Matson to
Conner, Feb. 20, 1847. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 36-7. =162=Conner to wife,
Feb. 17. =132=Benton to Buchanan, Jan. 14. =132=Atocha to Buchanan,
July 3. =132=Buchanan to Atocha, Jan. 18; to Scott and Perry, Apr. 23.
_Niles_, May 1, p. 129; May 15, p. 162. Von Holst, United States, iii,
332. _Courrier des Etats Unis_, Aug. 15, 1846. Buchanan, Works (Moore),
vii, 198, 211. =13=Bankhead, nos. 141, Sept. 29, 1846; 16, Mar. 2,
1847. =73=Bermúdez de Castro, no. 444, res., Mar. 1. Tributo á la
Verdad, 26. =58=Dobson, Feb. 14. _Epoca_, Feb. 23. =86=Gefe V. C. dept.
to gov., Feb. 9. _Don Simplicio_, Feb. 17. _Diario_, Aug. 18. Webster,
Writings, ix, 158. =52=Black, Feb. 24. =13=Pakenham, nos. 107, Aug. 13,
1846; 40, Mar. 29; 56, Apr. 28, 1847. _Nat. Intelligencer_, June 10,
1845; May 3, 1847. =52=Shannon to Cuevas, Mar. 1, 1845. =69=A clipping
from _Republicano_. Polk, Diary, Nov. 7, 1846; Jan. 12-19; Mar. 20,
1847. _Picayune_, May 6, 1847. _Delta_, Mar. 13. =76=Morales, Feb. 9.
At Atocha's suggestion the American commissioners were to have power
to suspend hostilities after actually meeting Mexican commissioners.
Such was Webster's idea (Writings, ix, 158). The plan would have given
Mexico a fine opportunity to protract the negotiations, let our war
expenses accumulate, and cause our war spirit to languish. The Mexican
reply said that the Texas affair [besides being atrocious in itself]
was "a cover to ulterior designs, which now stand disclosed" (Sen.
1; 30, =1=, p. 37). The failure of the overture naturally angered
Polk, and he declared for a most energetic military movement against
the capital (Diary, Mar. 20). In April Atocha, who loved to represent
himself as "sole agent for Santa Anna's gamecocks and all, and his
particular friend in every respect" (=162=Conner, Feb. 17), returned
to Mexico ostensibly on private business, but with =132=letters of
introduction from the government to Scott, Shields and Perry. "O God",
exclaimed _El Republicano_, "send unto us shells, rifles, shot and
every kind of projectiles and misfortunes; burn and destroy us, reduce
us to ashes, annihilate us, but ... permit not that Atocha be the
broker of a treaty of peace!"
27.7. _The Mexican attitude._ Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 190, 205-12
(Trist), 174. _Picayune_, May 12; July 8; Oct. 15, 17. Apuntes, 264.
=13=Bankhead, nos. 42-3, Apr. 30; 58, May 29; 83, Aug. 29. Polk,
Diary, Apr. 16. Ramírez, México, 224, 234, 239, 248, 263, 271, 275.
Meade, Letters, i, 180. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 44. México en 1847, 34.
=77=Undated clipping from N. Y. _Sun_ describing a Mexican society
to promote annexation to U. S. =47=Mexican letter, Orizaba, [Sept.,
1847]. =13=Pakenham, no. 40, Mar. 29. =13=Bankhead to Pak., Oct.
10, 1846. Semmes, Service, 426. =335=Belton to Hitchcock, Aug. 23.
Ocampo, Obras, 263. _Republicano_, Oct. 24, 1846; May 8, 11; June 9,
11, 1847. _Esperanza_, Aug. 8, 1846. _Eco de Tampico_, Nov. 11, 1846.
_Zempoalteca_, July 15, 1847. =80=Speaker in México legislature, Apr.
21. London _Times_, July 15; Oct. 27; Nov. 6, 16, 1846; Jan. 8, 13;
Feb. 9; Mar. 15; May 10, 1847. Tributo á la Verdad, 27. M'Sherry, El
Puchero, 189. =73=Bermúdez de Castro, no. 332, res., Sept. 24, 1846.
Encarnacion Prisoners, 83. _Opinion del Ejército_, Nov. 13, 1846.
_Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, app., 211 (Corwin); 323 (Calhoun). =335=Eayres to
S. Anna, Oct. 10, 1846; reply, Oct. 21. =52=Black, Sept. 22, 28, 1846.
=92=Mex. ayunt. to gov. Fed. District, Sept. 3, 1847. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p.
36. Wash. _Union_, Sept. 28; Oct. 6, 27, 1846; Apr. 22; May 22; July
10; Aug. 5; Oct. 5, 1847. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Nov. 7, 1846; Feb. 5,
1847. N. Y. _Express_, Nov. 12, 1846. _Iris Español_, Oct. 30, 1846.
_Regenerador Repub._, Dec. 23, 1846. Benton, Abr. Debates, xvi, 58-9
(Calhoun). =132=Cushing to Buchanan, Oct. 31, 1847. _Constitutionnel_,
Nov. 10; Dec. 5, 1846; Aug. 17, 1847. _Correspondant_, Sept. 15, 1846.
London _Globe_, Nov. 16, 1846. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 270. Lawton,
Artill. Officer, 144. _Monitor Repub._, Sept. 2; Nov. 14, 18, 1846;
Apr. 21, 29; May 15, 17, 27, 1847. _Diario_, Oct. 8; Nov. 21; Dec. 20,
23, 1846; Feb. 13, 14; Mar. 31; Apr. 11; May 5, 21, 23, 25; June 10,
18; July 8; Aug. 29, 1847. =76=Mora, Apr. 23, 1847. See also chap.
xxxiv, note 34.21, and the corresponding text.
27.8. _Appointment of Trist._ Polk, Diary, Dec. 3, 4, 9, 1846; Jan. 18;
Apr. 10, 14, 16, 21-2, 1847. =335=Buchanan to Trist, July 13, 1847.
Mansfield, Mexican War, 275. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 310. =52=Trist to
Buchanan, July 31, private. Ho. 69; 30, 1, p. 43 (Buchanan). =57=Trist,
reports. Polk, Message, Dec. 7, 1847 (Richardson, iv, 536). Benton,
View, ii, 704. Chase, Polk Administration, 215-6. =335=Mrs. Trist to
T., July 13. =345=Blair to Van Buren, Dec. 26, 1846; July 7, 1847.
_Delta_, May 1, 1848. =335=Trist to Mann, Dec. --, 1853 (draft).
=335=Document by Trist _re_ his wife. =335=Trist, draft of letter to
the _Times_. _Amer. Hist. Review_, x, 312-4 (Reeves). =335=Trist to
Felton, June 14, 18--. =335=_Id._, memorial (draft). =335=Buchanan,
Aug. 28, 1845 (appointing Trist chief clerk). For Buchanan: =354=Welles
papers; _Monitor Repub._, Mar. 10, 1848 (Landa); Poore, Perley's
Remins., i, 332.
27.9. _Trist's early relations with Scott in Mexico._ =335=Trist's
credentials, etc. =335=Walker to Trist Apr. 15. =335=Buchanan to
Relaciones, Apr. 15. _Pennsylvanian_, Apr. 18. Boston _Post_, Apr.
15. =335=Trist to wife, Apr. 18, 25, 28; May 4, 8, 15, 21, etc.; to
Buchanan, May 21. =335=Trist's sister to T., May 22. =335=Trist, drafts
and memoranda. Scott, Mems., ii, 399-401, 576, 579. Sen. 52; 30, 1,
pp. 150, 153, 159, 181 (Trist); 126, 135, 157, 172 (Scott); 123, 128,
131 (Marcy); 108-9. =335=Buchanan to Trist, July 13, private. Ho. 69;
30, 1, pp. 43, 47, etc. =52=Trist to Scott, May 9. Ho. 60; 30, 1,
pp. 940 (Marcy); 993, 1218 (Scott). Kenly, Md. Vol., 336. Mansfield,
Scott, 364. Polk, Diary, Apr. 15, 16; June 12-15; July 9, 13, 15, 17;
Aug. 24. =52=Buchanan to Trist, July 13. London _Times_, July 15; Aug.
16 (Genevese traveller: Scott warned). Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 38. Polk,
Message, Dec. 7, 1847 (Richardson, iv, 535). =47=Scott to Semmes, May
9. =48=Mason to Perry, Apr. 15, confid. =335=Trist to Scott, Sept. 30
(draft). Oswandel, Notes, 155-6. Semmes, Service, 197-201. =345=Blair
to Van Buren, Mar. 3, 1848. =335=Trist to Ho. Repres., Feb. 12, 1848
(draft). Sen. 107; 29, 2, p. 3 (Buchanan to Conner, July 27, 1846).
=132=Mason to Buchanan, June 28. N. Y. _Courier and Enquirer_ in
_Niles_, July 10. Buchanan, Works (Moore), vii, 270-9. _So. Qtrly.
Review_, Apr., 1852, pp. 386-93. (Semmes episode) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp.
976-92. =335=Trist to Felton, June 14, 18--.