secret, lest Whigs should defeat the plan (Polk, Diary, Apr. 16), but
a member of the Cabinet betrayed the fact (=335=Trist to Mann, Dec.
--, 1853). Scott had been given some reason to expect that he would be
(as he naturally desired to be) one of a peace commission (Mems., ii,
576), as would have been very proper, and no doubt he was not pleased
to find he had been ignored. He was further exasperated at this time
by the arrival of Lieut. Semmes, as a representative of the navy, to
see about the case of a naval prisoner (Rogers: chap. xxx, p. 444), as
if Scott had not been able and willing to attend to the business, and
in fact had not already attended to it (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 989), and
by Semmes's demand (which had to be refused) for an escort (Semmes,
Service, 198, etc.; Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 977-92). It would not have been
proper to detach one soldier unnecessarily. May 31 Marcy wrote to Scott
that Trist was "directed" to show the General his instructions (Sen.
52; 30, 1, p. 123); but Buchanan used the word "authorised" (=52=to
Trist, July 13). So did Polk (Message, December 7, 1847) and Marcy to
Scott on July 12 (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 133). Polk and the Cabinet were
greatly disturbed by the quarrel between Scott and Trist, blaming both
but of course blaming Scott most. Polk proposed to recall them, but
Marcy said Scott could not be spared at that time, and the rest of the
Cabinet agreed with him (Polk, Diary, June 12, 14; July 9). Polk said
Scott had thrown away "the golden moment" to make peace. But, as Scott
knew (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 120), the Mexican Congress by its law of April
20 (vol. ii, p. 81) had made peace negotiations practically impossible.
A military officer is not expected to execute an order if the condition
of things when he receives it is essentially different from that known
or assumed by his superior at the time of issuing it. Trist admitted
later that he had been misinformed about the Mexican situation, and was
not sorry Scott did not promptly forward the despatch (Ho. 60; 30, 1,
pp. 819, 825). As for the power to grant an armistice, Scott held that
the army, cut off without supplies in the heart of a hostile country,
must be free to take military security for its own safety (Sen. 52;
30, 1, p. 121). Trist was given authority to draw any part of the
three millions appropriated to facilitate making a treaty. Buchanan to
excuse himself wrote (=52=to Trist, June 14) that Scott would not have
replied to Trist as he did, had he waited to see Trist's instructions.
This amounted to saying that, since Scott knew nothing about those
instructions, his letter was natural. Marcy admitted (May 31: Sen.
52; 30, 1, p. 122) that Scott ought to have seen the instructions,
the projet and Buchanan's despatch, of which Trist had a copy. Dec.
26 =256=Scott had written privately to Marcy that he had heard from
Congressmen of a plan to place Benton over him, but did not believe
a word of it; and Jan. 16 he again had expressed his gratitude and
loyalty to the President. But it should not be forgotten that while
the administration was entitled to full credit for its meanness and
blundering, the trouble arose primarily from Scott's having gone deeply
into politics. He was not politically active now. Jan. 16 he =256=wrote
privately to Marcy, "On setting out, on my present mission, I laid down
_whiggism_, without taking up _democracy_," but the politicians were
not fitted to believe this manly and truthful declaration. The Whigs
insisted that Trist had been sent to embarrass and perhaps to ruin
Scott.
27.10. Thornton, later Sir Edward Thornton, British minister to the
United States, saw Scott also, who gave him to understand that he
should advance against Mexico July 1 or 2 unless a reply to Buchanan's
despatch should seem probable (=13=T. to Addington, June 29). Thornton
believed that Rejón was intriguing with Scott to have the Americans
come to Mexico, install the Puros and make peace with them, and that
Rejón's party were insisting upon war for this reason (_ibid._).
Baranda had tried to catch Scott in some entanglement by means of
secret negotiations through the British legation, but had failed
(=13=Bankhead, nos. 47, 54, 1847). Bankhead exerted all his influence
with the government in favor of negotiations. June 22 the minister
of relations replied politely to Buchanan that his despatch had been
referred to Congress, with which the settlement of the matter rested
(_Diario_, June 26).
27.11. Scott =335=wrote to Trist, July 17, to the following effect: I
concur with you, several of my generals and many foreigners of high
standing here and at Mexico in believing that our occupation of twenty
principal towns, besides those we already hold, probably would not
within a year or more force the Mexicans to accept a peace on terms
honorable to the United States without the pledge in advance or the
payment of money to some of the principal authorities. This is expected
as a preliminary to any negotiation. We must pay $10,000 down to one
high official, and $1,000,000, probably to be divided among many, on
the ratification of a treaty. With your concurrence I sent $10,000
to Mexico yesterday, and at the proper time I will unite with you in
pledging $1,000,000. I have no question as to the morality of this
course, nor have you. We have tempted the integrity of no one. The
overture, if corrupt, came from parties already corrupted. We merely
avail ourselves of that corruption to obtain an end highly advantageous
to both countries. Such transactions have always been considered
allowable in war. We do not know that this money would not go into the
same channels as that which our government is willing to pay publicly
for territory would go into.
June 4 Poinsett said he should be "surprised" if the Mexicans could
be made to accept the terms of the United States (=345=to Van Buren).
June 11 Buchanan said privately he should not be "much disappointed"
should the war continue for years (=132=to Frémont). July 16 Marcy
could see no hopes of terminating it (=256=to Wetmore). Hence the fears
of Trist and Scott do not seem unreasonable. The $1,000,000 was to have
been deducted from the sum to be paid by the United States government
(=224=Hitchcock, memo.) Who the intended go-between was cannot be
stated, though on settling his accounts Scott told confidentially who
received the $10,000 (Scott in N. Y. _Herald_, Nov. 3, 1857); but there
is reason to believe that it was Miguel Arroyo, who will presently
appear as secretary to the Mexican peace commissioners. It has been
said (Rives, U. S. and Mexico, ii, 501) that Scott acted as he did with
reference to peace because anxious to get back to the United States
for personal political reasons. Had this been true, Scott would have
resigned under the cloud of glory rising from his capture of Mexico
City. We have political letters written by Taylor at this period, but
Scott seems to have shown no such activity. On the other hand he wrote
to Marcy (note 27.9), "On setting out, on my present mission, I laid
down _whiggism_."
July 16 Scott mentioned the subject of paying for a treaty to a
number of his principal officers at what came to be called improperly
a council, stating (_cf. supra_) that he felt no scruples about it
(Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 257). Pillow, who had already assented
heartily to the plan (Claiborne, Quitman, i, 317), supported that
view of it strongly (=68=Shields to Marcy, Mar. 11, 1848). Quitman,
Shields and Cadwalader opposed it. Probably their opinions had no
practical effect, for Scott had already committed himself, and the
Mexicans soon ceased to desire peace. July 7 Trist sent to Buchanan
a copy of a note written by him (=52=to Thornton) which could hardly
fail to suggest to a politician that something peculiar was afoot,
and early in August "Gomez," an army correspondent of the St. Louis
_Republican_, gave some account of the negotiations (published Nov.
22, republished by the Baltimore _Sun_, Dec. 6). Polk and the Cabinet
made no sign, however. But on Oct. 28 and January 18 Pillow, now a
bitter enemy of Scott, wrote to Polk about the affair (Polk Diary, Dec.
11, 18, 20, 28, 1847; Feb. 16, 19, 1848), pretending (=224=Hitchcock,
memo.) that Scott had beguiled him into supporting the plan, and that
his better nature had almost immediately reacted against it. Pillow
and Polk doubtless thought that here lay an opportunity to do Scott a
great injury, and took the matter up with much apparent indignation;
and in March, 1848, Marcy confidentially ordered the officers sitting
in the Pillow court of inquiry to make an investigation (Polk, Diary,
Mar. 14, 16; =68=Marcy, Mar. 17). They did what they could, but the
investigation came to nothing, for Trist and Scott would not implicate
the British legation. See =68=proceedings of the court and statements
of generals; _Daily Democrat_, Chicago, Sept. 15, 1857; =256=Marcy to
Towson, Mar. 17, 1848; =68=Scott to Marcy, Jan. 28, 1848, and Shields
to Marcy, Feb. 12, 1848; Davis, Autobiography, 177; =224=Hitchcock,
memo.; Claiborne, Quitman, i, 326; =256=memo. Scott overlooked the
facts that such a bargain could not be kept secret indefinitely, and
that, even if ethically justifiable and in accordance with the practice
of giving presents to Indian chiefs and Barbary pirates, it would give
great offence to American pride. The latter point was urged forcibly by
Shields. To buy peace of a vanquished enemy seemed to him and Quitman
humiliating and degrading.
27.12. _The Puebla negotiations._ =52=Trist to Buchanan, nos. 7, June
13; 9, July 23 (and P. S., July 25); 12, Aug. 22. =52=Thornton to
Trist, July 29. =13=Thornton to Bankhead, June 14; to Addington, June
29. =13=Pakenham, no. 116, Sept. 13, 1846. =335=Trist to Scott, June
25, confidential; July 16, confidential. =335=Worth to Trist, July
2, 22. =132=Atocha to Buchanan, July 3. =335=[Thornton] to Hargous,
undated. =335=Trist to Thornton, July 3. =335=Scott to Trist, July
17; to P. F. Smith, July 6. =335=Trist to Buchanan, no. 8, July 7.
=335=---- to Trist, July 8. St. Louis _Republican_, Nov. 22. Baltimore
_Sun_, Dec. 6. _Diario_, May 21, 23-5; June 8, 26, 27; July 2, 18,
24-6; Aug. 18. _Monitor Repub._, May 13; June 18, 25, 27-8. =335=----
to ----, July 21. =335=Otero to Pesado, July 13. _Picayune_, June 30;
Aug. 8; Oct. 1, 15. _Republicano_, June 24-5. Scott, Mems., ii, 579.
=47=Semmes to Perry, July 28. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 314-21, 326. Polk,
Diary (see note 27.11). =68=Quitman to Marcy, Mar. 9, 1848. =68=Pillow
to Marcy, Jan. 18, 1848. =52=Buchanan to Trist, no. 7, Dec. 21, 1847.
=68=Shields to Marcy, Mar. 9, 1848. Raleigh _Star_, Aug. 25, 1847.
=60=Wilson to Marcy, July 31; Aug. 1. London _Times_, May 10; Aug. 6;
Sept. 6. Ramírez, México, 239, 255-6, 263, 271. Davis, Autobiography,
177-8, 207-9. =224=Hitchcock, Memorandum. N. Y. _Courier and Enquirer_,
Mar. 1, 2, 1848. _Missouri Republican_, Sept. 16, 1857. =68=Scott to
Marcy, Jan. 28, 1848. =68=Shields to Marcy, Feb. 12, 1848. Sen. 1; 30,
1, pp. 38, 40. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 44. Sen. 34; 34, 3, pp. 21, 37-9.
Lawton, Artill. Officer, 144, 150, 229, 232, 235, 238, 240, 259-61,
269-70. =335=Trist to Thornton, July 30. =335=E. E. Smith to Trist,
Aug. 31. =335=Trist to Scott, Sept. 30 (draft). =256=Marcy to Wetmore,
July 16; Oct. 21. Otero, Comunicación. Dictamen de la Comisión,
etc., 29, 30. _Republicano_, May 8, 21; June 9, 28. =82=J. J. Otero,
proclam., Apr. 25. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 115-20. =52=J. A.
Jones to Polk, May 2. _Delta_, July 15. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 260-1,
264-9, 326. =60=Scott to Marcy, Apr. 5. =13=Bankhead, nos. 184, Dec.
30, 1846; 6, Jan. 29; 34, Apr. 1; 42, 46, Apr. 30; 47, May 6; 54,
58-60, May 29; 61, June 26; 67, June 29; 75, July 29, 1847. =68=Scott
to Towson _et al._, Apr. 17, 1848. =335=H. L. Scott to Trist, May 29,
1852. Wash. _Telegraph_, Oct. 13, 22, 1852. London _Chronicle_, Aug.
6. =335=Trist to Scott, Sept. 1, 1861. Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 524-5.
=56=M. Y. Beach, June 4. Wash. _Union_, June 2; July 10; Aug. 5, 20.
N. Y. _Sun_, May 22, Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 830 (Trist); 945, 1011, 1085
(Scott); 922 (Marcy). =132=Atocha to Buchanan, July 3; Aug. 1; Sept.
4, 21. =132=Dimond to Buchanan, Aug. 2. Klein, Treaty, 255. Buchanan,
Works (Moore), vii, 484. N. Y. _Herald_, Nov. 3, 1857 (Scott). Furse,
Organization, 143. Réplica á la Defensa. Semmes, Service, 310, 413.
=73=Bermúdez de Castro, no. 517, June 29. Apuntes, 199. =185=---- to
Lewis, July 20. =335=Trist, marginal notes on Sen. 52; 30, 1. Sen. 52;
30, 1, pp. 135, 172 (Scott); 181-6, 231-46, 306 (Trist); 194 (S. Anna).
=76=Orders for Guzmán and Avila. =76=Alvarez, July 16.
Ripley (War with Mexico, ii, 149) represents Scott as desiring a
reconciliation with Trist in order to play a brilliant part in bringing
about peace and so increase his political popularity. This view,
which befits a pupil and friend of Pillow and furthers the purpose of
both to injure Scott, is disproved by a number of circumstances and
particularly by the fact that, after the reconciliation took place,
Scott, while ready to do all in his power for peace--even at the
sacrifice of military glory--kept himself entirely in the background
so far as that business was concerned. July 23, 1847, Trist wrote to
Buchanan: Scott's whole conduct with reference to the duties with which
I am charged "has been characterized by the purest public spirit, and
a fidelity and devotion which could not be surpassed, to the views of
the government, in regard to the restoration of peace" (Ho. 60; 30,
1, p. 831). Aiming to further the negotiations with Santa Anna, Scott
sent from Puebla to Mexico a =335=Memorandum that he would advance
and would either defeat the Mexicans in view of the capital (if they
would offer battle) or capture a strong position, and then, if able to
restrain his troops, would halt and give the Mexicans an opportunity to
save the capital by making peace (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 524). Ripley (War
with Mexico, ii, 167-9) endeavors to relate this honorable incident in
a way to represent Scott as the dupe of Santa Anna and to compliment
Pillow. But the fact that for good and purely American reasons the
general-in-chief pursued this very course after the negotiations had
ended, refutes Ripley; and it also proves that in offering to make that
agreement Scott did not allow his military plans to be influenced by
the enemy, as was charged, for by the morning of Aug. 20, as no sign of
a disposition to treat had met Scott, he regarded the Memorandum and
every other vestige of an understanding as no longer binding upon him
"in any degree" (=68=Scott to court, Apr. 17, 1848, confid.). Scott was
ready, in the interest of his country and humanity, to do anything,
compatible with his duty, to obtain peace.
Rives (_op. cit._, ii, 445) states that in consequence of a letter of
July 16 from Pacheco, minister of relations, to Congress a committee
of Congress reported that the restrictions placed by the law of Apr.
20 on the prerogatives of the Executive had been removed by the recent
"Act of Reforms" of the Constitution. This would have been an important
point; but the facts are that the committee's report, now lying before
the author, was dated July 13 and did not mention the law of Apr. 20,
and that Congress was not in session to receive Pacheco's reply of July
16 to its report (=52=Trist, no. 9, July 23).
27.13. Pacheco asked Bankhead to use his good offices with Scott to
save the city from sack; but as neither the United States nor Mexico
had shown favor to the offer of British mediation, he would not act.
It is hard to see how, with due regard to Polk's declarations and the
real desire of the United States for peace, Scott could have taken the
risk of scattering the Mexican government and the elements of peace by
refusing to remain outside the city for a time; and remaining outside
involved an armistice, because--for one thing--the only large stock
of provisions on which he could count lay in town. Hence censure of
Scott for making the armistice came from Polk with a very bad grace
(=52=Trist, no. 22; =221=Hill, diary).
27.14. _The making of the armistice._ Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 186, 190,
231-2 (Trist); 189 (Pacheco), 192 (Scott). =52=Trist to Buchanan,
no. 12, Aug. 22. =52=Bankhead to Trist, Aug. 20, 21. Contestaciones
Habidas, 3-7, 11-19. _Picayune_, Sept. 9. Apuntes, 260-3, 268-9. Sen.
1; 30, 1, p. 314 (Scott); 356-9. Kenly, Md. Vol., 350. =68=Scott,
statement to court, Apr. 17, 1848, confid. =13=Bankhead, nos. 76, Aug.
21; 82, Aug. 29. Raleigh _Star_, Sept. 22. =221=Hill, diary. México
á través, iv, 681. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 279-80, 284-6. Davis,
Autobiog., 189, 207, 215-6. =224=Intercepted letters (Hitchcock, ed.).
=259=Intercepted letter. Chicago _Democrat_, Sept. 15, 1857. =61=Gates
to adj. gen., Aug. 31. Henshaw narrative. S. Anna, Apelación, 61-2.
=291=Pierce to wife, Aug. 23; to Appleton, Aug. 27. =335=Trist, memo.,
July 29. Semmes, Service, 412, 415-9, 427, 446. N. Y. _Courier and
Enquirer_, Mar. 1, 1848. Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 170, 178, 191, 196-8,
204, 281, 288, 460, 465, 543. =80=Relaciones, circulars, Aug. 23,
30. =80=Relaciones to Olaguíbel, Aug. 31, res. =73=Lozano, no. 5,
res., Aug. 28. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 447-8; iv, app., 286.
=335=Trist, notes on a letter to Ho. of Repres., Feb. 12, 1848. Wash.
_Telegraph_, Oct. 13, 1852. =236=Judah, diary. Sedgwick, Corresp., i,
114. _So. Qtrly. Review_, July, 1852, pp. 112-6. S. Anna, Detall, 16.
_Monitor Repub._, Dec. 12 (S. Anna, report, Nov. 19). =70="Guerra," no.
30 (F. Pérez, statement, June 17, 1853). Ramírez, México, 301. Wash.
_Union_, Nov. 3. =76=To Lombardini, Aug. 21. =76=Tornel to Lombardini,
Aug. 24. =76=Circulars, Aug. 26; Sept. 1, 6, 7. =76=Many others. Mora
was accompanied by Arrangóiz, lately Mexican consul at New Orleans.
Quitman and Pierce, who had not been able to distinguish themselves
in the recent battles, and P. F. Smith were armistice commissioners
for the Americans and Generals Mora and Quijano for the Mexicans. They
met at Mackintosh's house. In brief the terms, as drawn up, were as
follows: 1, cessation of hostilities; 2, to continue while the peace
commissioners are negotiating or forty-eight hours after one of the
commanders-in-chief gives formal notice of its termination; 3, during
the armistice no military work, offensive or defensive, shall be
begun, enlarged or reinforced; 4, neither army shall be reinforced;
troops and munitions _en route_ shall stop twenty-eight leagues [about
seventy-five miles] from Mexico; 5, no troops of either side shall
advance "beyond the line now actually occupied"; 6, the intermediate
ground shall not be trespassed upon by military men except when acting
as messengers or engaged under a white flag on other business; 7,
neither side shall prevent the other from receiving provisions; the
Americans may obtain supplies from city or country; 8, prisoners
shall be exchanged; 9, Americans residing at Mexico and banished
thence may return; 10, either army may send messengers to or from Vera
Cruz; 11, the Americans will not interfere with the administration of
justice when Mexicans are the parties; 12, they will respect private
property, personal rights and trade; 13, wounded prisoners shall be
free to move for treatment and cure; 14, Mexican army health officers
may attend on such Mexicans; 15, commissioners shall superintend the
fulfilment of this agreement; 16, the agreement is to be approved by
the commanders-in-chief within twenty-four hours (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p.
310). Santa Anna struck out article 9, but through passports the same
end was reached (=52=Trist, no. 13); and it was agreed that "supplies"
(_recursos_) in article 7 should cover everything needed by the army
except arms and munitions. For Scott's draft see Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 543.
It is believed that enough has been said in the text to show the
wisdom of making the armistice, and more space cannot be given to the
subject. Any one interested in it should read Trist's =52=no. 22 (most
of it in Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 231-66). It should be borne in mind that
the Mexicans believed the armistice was greatly for the advantage of
the Americans. Alcorta, minister of war, said that Scott's purpose in
proposing it was solely to give his troops a needed rest, collect his
wounded, obtain provisions and prepare batteries (Negrete, Invasión,
iii, app., 448). It was believed that his losses had been severe
(=61=undated Mexican letter). The reasons avowed by Santa Anna for
accepting the armistice were to let the troops rest and recover morale,
to gather the wounded and the dispersed, and in general to undo the
effects of the recent battles; also to show the world that Mexico was
willing to discuss peace, and to convince all that the American demands
were unreasonable. The weakest point about the armistice was Scott's
not requiring that Chapultepec should be surrendered or evacuated,
as at one time he intended to do (Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 285). The
reason for his policy was, in brief, that he believed Santa Anna fully
intended to make peace, and, understanding the immense difficulties
that Santa Anna would have to meet, he did not wish to increase them
(=52=Trist, no. 13). Besides, magnanimity--which is a strong quality,
not a weak one--to a beaten foe often produces good results. Perhaps
Scott erred on this point; but if so, it was a noble error and not
hastily to be censured. Apparently by oversight, neither Scott nor
Trist had been instructed what to do should the Mexicans ask for an
armistice with a view to peace. Hence Scott was left to take the
course that seemed to him best, and that he did. Pillow claimed great
glory for opposing the unsuccessful armistice. Rives says (U. S. and
Mexico, ii, 501) that Scott was too eager for a return to the United
States to be "critical" of Santa Anna's honesty. This is to say that
Scott was unfit to be a corporal. Everybody was suspicious of Santa
Anna. See Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 248-52. Rives further says (p. 507) that
Scott should have seen that Santa Anna, situated as he was, would have
accepted any conditions; but Santa Anna certainly would not. He did
not accept our peace terms. Rives also alludes to Scott's "amiable
weakness" in the matter (p. 508)--very erroneously, the present author
thinks.
27.15. _Picayune_, Sept. 9; Oct. 16, 17. Gamboa, Impug., 49, 50.
Apuntes, 270-1, 286. =13=Bankhead, nos. 77, Aug. 27; 83, Aug. 29.
=221=Hill, diary. Ramírez, México, 275, 303. México á través, iv, 686.
Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 280, 287-92, 294. Grant, Mems., i, 148. Davis,
Autobiog., 211. =224=Intercepted letters (Hitchcock, _ed._). Henshaw
narrative. Haynes, Gen. Scott's Guide. =259=Intercepted letter. Sen.
19; 30, 2 (M. L. Smith, Nov. 30, 1848). =291=Pierce to Appleton, Aug.
27. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 297, 301, 303, 306. =178=Davis, diary.
_Diario_, Sept. 2, 4, 8. =335=Belton to Hitchcock, Aug. 23. =335=E. E.
Smith to Trist, Aug. 31. =335=Memo. in Spanish, Aug. --. Roa Bárcena,
Recuerdos, 415. Semmes, Service, 424. Sen. 11; 31, 1 (Hardcastle).
=80=Relaciones, circular, Aug. 23. =80=Alcalde S. Fe to Olaguíbel, Aug.
29. =80=Olaguíbel to legislature, Aug. 30; reply, Sept. 1. =80=Valencia
to O., Aug. 21, 23. =80=O. to Guerra, Aug. 22. =80=Guerra to O., Aug.
24; reply, Aug. 29. =199=MS. written by leading citizen. =73=Lozano,
nos. 5, res., Aug. 28; 8, res., Sept. 17. Encarnacion Prisoners, 81,
83-4. _Monitor Repub._, Nov. 16 (Alvarez). Carreño, Jefes, cccxv, note.
=260=Henshaw, comments on map. Wash. _Union_, Nov. 3. Apuntes, 271-2.
And from =76= the following (and many others). Alvarez, Aug. 22, 23,
24, 26, 29. To comandante Toluca, Aug. 24. Acuerdos, Aug. 23, 25, 26,
28, 31; Sept. 1, 4. To Alvarez, Aug. 21, 25, 28. Tornel, Aug. 27, 27,
very res., 29. To Ugarte and comtes. gen. Guanajuato, S. Luis Potosí
and Querétaro, Aug. 29. Cosío, Sept. 6. J. Y. Gutiérrez, Sept. 2,
res. To Lombardini, Aug. 9, 22, 24, 25. Alcorta, Aug. 22. Quijano to
Lombardini, Aug. 23, 24. To comte. gen. Mexico, Aug. 27, 29, 30. Bravo,
Aug. 28. To Herrera, Aug. 25. To Relaciones, Aug 27. Tornel to comte.
gen., Sept. 4. Pacheco to Tornel, Aug. 23. Circulars, Aug. 26; Sept. 1,
6, 7. Alvarez to Olaguíbel, Oct. 30. Olaguíbel, Aug. 27.
Paredes, who had been banished, landed at Vera Cruz on Aug. 14
(Paredes, Breve Exposición).