pp. 332-45) on the testimony of such men as Lee (p. 78), Smith (p.
102), Riley (p. 147) and Shields (p. 268), did not devise the plan on
which this victory was gained; and when Lee brought word to Scott of
Smith's plan he washed his hands of it (=335=Trist, draft of address;
Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 333); but he had the audacity to claim that Smith
merely executed the precise plans and views laid down by Pillow for
his guidance (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1018). Pillow could claim the credit
only on the ground that he was the senior officer on the field, and
that Smith's operations were a logical consequence of the events; but
Scott was the senior of Pillow, and all that occurred was--as Smith
pointed out (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 104)--the logical consequence of
Scott's order to gain possession of the San Angel road. The consensus
of opinion was expressed by Twiggs: "General Smith deserves the whole
credit" (Stevens, Stevens, i, 196). Moreover the famous letter signed
"Leonidas"--prepared at Pillow's quarters doubtless with his connivance
(Hitchcock in _Mo. Republican_, Oct. 2, 1857; _Republican Banner_,
Feb. 23, 1858), conveyed by his agency (Davis, Autobiog., 285) to
the New Orleans _Delta_, which published it Sept. 10 (chap. xxix,
note 29.31), and fathered (when exposed) by an untruthful subordinate
of his--"puffed" Pillow in the most extravagant manner for this
"unparallelled victory," and represented Scott not only as leaving
everything to Pillow but as blundering sadly. _E.g._ it said, "The
army had been marching through marshes and almost impassable roads,
nearly half around the city, to find some points upon the enemy's works
that could be successfully assailed," the provisions had been nearly
exhausted, and the mountains prevented going farther; Pillow's "plan
of battle [at Contreras], and the disposition of his forces were most
judicious," and he "achieved this signal and brilliant victory." (For
the letter signed "Leonidas" see Sen. 65; 30, 1 (pp. 385-9, and the
testimony of Pillow, Burns, Freaner, Trist); =335=Pillow to Trist, Aug.
31, private; St. Louis _Evening News_, Oct. 2, 1857; chap. xxix, pp.
435-7.)
Pillow's design in having such a statement prepared and placed
before the people in advance of the official reports was probably to
influence public opinion in the United States so as to make him an
available candidate for the Presidency or enable Polk to put him in
Scott's place. As Pillow was known to have great influence with the
President, and was an active, affable, plausible man, he naturally had
a following; but the sentiment of the able and honest officers towards
him was one of contempt. "The ass Pillow," "that consummate fool," said
the future General D. H. Hill (diary) of Pillow as he showed himself
on Aug. 19. A sensible Pennsylvanian wrote in his diary, Aug. 10, that
Pillow was without question "the poorest and most unpopular" of the
generals (Oswandel, Notes, 249). Col. W. B. Campbell characterized him
as light, impetuous, of little military judgment and no skill (=139=to
D. Campbell, Mar. 20, 28; Apr. 18, 25); and a correspondent of the
future Gen. W. T. Sherman described him as "a mass of vanity, conceit,
ignorance, ambition and want of truth" (=316=Judd, Feb. 26, 1848). The
doings of the Pillow court of inquiry (Sen. 65; 30, 1) were carefully
digested and analyzed by the author; but as the subject concerns only
incidentally the history of the war, space cannot be taken to present
this analysis.
26.9. Valencia could see that retreat meant his personal ruin, and he
preferred to argue that honor required him to hold his ground.
26.10. Persifor F. Smith, a graduate from Princeton, was admitted
to the bar at Philadelphia, practised law at New Orleans, and had
considerable military experience in the Florida war. He was a simple,
scholarly, unassuming man; but all ranks appreciated his ability,
attainments, clear perception, valor, promptness and steadiness.
26.11. _The battle of Contreras._ Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 303, etc.; app.,
pp. 66, etc. (reports of Scott and his officers). S. Anna, Apelación,
52-5; app., 154-6, 160. _Id._, Detall, 12-4. _Picayune_, Sept. 8; Oct.
21. =221=Hill, diary. =61=Twiggs to Marcy, Feb. 7, 1848. =66=Lee to
Smith, Aug. 21, 1847. =60=Riley to Westcott, Nov. 30. Semmes, Service,
381, 385, 392. =224=Intercepted letters (14, L. V. to M. O.; 25, note
by E. A. H.; 28). Apuntes, 237-43. McSherry, El Puchero, 73, 76.
Murphy, Hungerford, 99. _Delta_, Sept. 9; Nov. 12; Dec. 1. _Monitor
Repub._, Sept. 27 (Salas); Dec. 12 (S. Anna). _Porvenir_, Aug. 26,
supplem. (Valencia). =65=Scott, gen. orders 258. Balbontín, Invasión,
111-8. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 276-8, 281. Ballentine, English Soldier,
ii, 207, 218-20, 223-6, 228-9. Davis, Autobiog., 196-8. =66=Foster
to Smith, Aug. 23. =66=McClellan to Smith, Aug. 23. =66=Beauregard
to Smith, Aug. 25. =66=Tower to Smith, Aug. 25. =66=Mason to Smith,
Aug. 24. Prieto, Mems., ii, 222-7. López, Décimo Calendario, 58.
=80=Olaguíbel, Aug. 20-1. =199=Anon. MS. written by a person of
importance. =307=Roberts, diary. Gamboa, Impug., 42-3. =350=Weber,
recoils. =70="Guerra," no. 30 (F. Pérez). Ramírez, México, 298. México
á través, iv, 677. =217=Henshaw to wife, Aug. 21. =327=Sutherland to
father, Nov. 28. Jackson, Memoirs of Jackson, 41. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p.
188. Long, Memoirs, 54-9. Wash. _Union_, Sept. 20. _Diario_, Aug.
24; Sept. 1. _So. Mag._, July, 1874, p. 75. =204=Gouverneur, diary.
=277=Burnett, statement. _United Service_, June, 1896 (Lane). Sen. 65;
30, 1, pp. 62 (H. L. Scott); 68-9 (Williams); 72-4, 298, 300 (Gen.
Scott); 75-9, 463 (Lee); 81-6 (Cadwalader); 97 (Deas); 99-106 (Smith);
137-8 (Canby); 147-51 (Riley); 162 (Hooker); 180 (Hodge); 182-4, 188
(Ripley); 208-9 (Rains); 230-1 (Beauregard); 232-3 (Hitchcock); 246
(Morgan); 267 (Shields); 270 (Howard); 283, 286-7 (Twiggs); 334-5
(verdict); 570. Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i, 174-9, 196. Carreño,
Jefes, ccxc (Pérez), ccxciv (Torrejón). _Niles_, Oct. 30, pp. 138-9.
_Cong. Globe_, 34, 1, p. 105 (Foote). Lancaster Co. Hist. Soc. Mag.,
Mar. 6, 1908. Giménez, Mems., 266. =291=Pierce to Appleton, Aug. 27.
=291=Gardner to Canby, Aug. 30. =291=Pierce to Hooker, Aug. 22.
Engineer School, U. S. A., Occas. Papers, No. 16. Valencia, Manifiesto.
=178=Davis, diary. Stevens, Vindication, 4-7. Negrete, Invasión,
iv, app., 281-3. =76=Tornel, Aug. 19. =76=Orders to Valencia, Aug.
26. Kenly, Md. Vol., 421. =73=Lozano, No. 2., Aug. 24. =210=Bragg
to Hammond, Dec. 20. =125=Bonham to wife, Aug. 24; to adj. gen.,
Feb. 26, 1849. _So. Qtrly. Rev._, Apr., 1852, pp. 415-26. Calderón,
Rectificaciones, 41. S. Anna, Mi Historia, 72-3. =112=Beauregard to
Smith, Aug. 25. =76=Valencia, Aug. 19. =76=J. B. Argüelles, Aug. 22.
=76=Alcorta to Alvarez, Aug. 21. =76=Alvarez, Aug. 21.
REMARKS. This engagement was called by the Mexicans the battle of
Padierna. At first Valencia had a reserve under Salas at Ansaldo, but
he drew this in at about the time when the battle began. He then placed
Torrejón's cavalry between Ansaldo and his main position. A turn in the
road near his position enabled him to command the turnpike for some
distance. For further details regarding his dispositions see Apuntes,
236. During the afternoon of Aug. 19 the Ninth Infantry (Ransom)
and a battalion of the Twelfth under Lieut. Col. Bonham crossed the
ravine and remained about 200 yards from Valencia's camp until 9 or 10
o'clock, partly occupying usefully Valencia's attention. When these
troops retired, Mexicans attacked the guard at Padierna, but American
reinforcements defeated them. R. E. Lee and G. B. McClellan helped
set up Magruder's battery, and T. J. ("Stonewall") Jackson commanded
one section of it a part of the time. These officers distinguished
themselves highly. Riley understood he was "sent across the pedregal to
cut off the retreat of the enemy and check reinforcements" (Sen. 65;
30, 1, p. 148). When Smith moved to the right, he had Magruder resume
firing to divert attention from that movement. Magruder's men tried
to save themselves by falling flat at each Mexican discharge, and the
ground sheltered them somewhat, yet fifteen were killed or wounded. His
guns were withdrawn over the rocks after nightfall.
It has been said with force that it would have been better had Scott
been on the ground from the first. But he did not wish or expect to
fight; no doubt he had much administrative work on hand; he was not
far away; and he believed that his instructions to Pillow provided for
all probable contingencies. It seems to be true that Pillow, a most
plausible and insinuating talker, had gained a certain ascendency over
him. Probably for this reason, as well as owing to his general wish
to gratify his officers, Scott permitted Pillow to make statements in
his report on the battle, which, as the trial of Pillow showed, ought
not to have been there (=210=Bragg). Pillow later urged the point
that Scott approved of his dispositions; but it was Scott's practice
to accept what his officers did, and make the best of it. Scott was
slightly wounded in the leg during the afternoon of August 19 but did
not mention the incident at the time. Later the wound made him trouble.
The Fifteenth Infantry (Morgan) did not act with the rest of Pierce's
brigade on Aug. 19, for Pillow had detached it as a reserve. Pierce was
injured by falling from his horse, and hence Col. Ransom took command
of the brigade. Late in the afternoon Valencia placed a 4-pounder and
two battalions of infantry on the turnpike toward Ansaldo to prevent
more Americans from reaching San Gerónimo (Balbontín, Invasión, 114),
but this force accomplished nothing. At first he had thought the
Americans crossing the pedregal in groups, partly concealed by the
ground and trees, were mere scouting parties. It was found impossible
at the Pillow trial to decide at just what time Scott arrived on the
lookout hill (the lower summit of Zacatepec). The variation of careful
witnesses was an hour and twenty-five minutes. Watches appear to have
been out of order, and therefore one cannot be positive regarding the
precise time of any event.
Smith's plan to attack Santa Anna on Aug. 19 has been criticised as
unsound (Claiborne, Quitman, i, 339, note). But he believed a repulse
of Santa Anna would ensure the defeat of Valencia; he wanted to
dispose of Santa Anna before his forces could become stronger; he did
not wish (having no artillery) to let him cannonade at his leisure;
and probably the situation of the American right appeared to require
unusual boldness. Lee (=66=to J. L. Smith, Aug. 21) attached less
importance to this operation. Tower (=66=to J. L. Smith, Aug. 25)
said the inexperience of the new troops, particularly Cadwalader's,
had something to do with leading Smith to give up the plan. Doubtless
Pillow's fiasco, Aug. 19, tended to inflate Valencia's confidence and
so to ensure his destruction. Valencia's artillery accomplished nothing
against the Americans at San Gerónimo, partly because the trees and
rough ground hid and protected them, and partly because the guns he
used were not very powerful. Smith supposed he was Shields's senior,
and retained the command after the latter's arrival at San Gerónimo.
Shields refrained from claiming it, knowing that Smith had made
preparations to attack and understood the situation best. Cadwalader,
as well as Shields, outranked Smith; but doubtless he felt unequal to
the situation, and he did not assert his rights. During the night the
few houses at San Gerónimo were required for the wounded.
Santa Anna has been too much criticised for his course. Valencia did
not see the Americans in force, Aug. 19, until after one o'clock, and
we do not know how promptly he reported the fact. Santa Anna stated
that at about two o'clock he received word from Valencia that cannon
fire had begun. He was then at San Antonio, yet in about four hours he
had a considerable force near San Gerónimo. He reasonably hesitated
about attacking an unknown number of Americans in an admirable
defensive position. His cavalry could have done nothing in the ravines,
lanes and woods which composed it, and his artillery little. Had he
attacked, as he threatened to do, late on Aug. 19, he would have been
beaten. After Riley joined him, Smith had about 3600 men (Sen. 65;
30, 1, p. 105). Had Santa Anna advanced by the turnpike he would have
exposed his flank to Smith. Valencia had got himself into a hopeless
impasse, and the best thing he could have done was to tear himself out
of it, as Santa Anna ordered. Santa Anna sent orders to Pérez in the
afternoon to help Valencia, but overtaking that brigade (which had set
out for the purpose) took charge of it. Shields brought about 600 men
(Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 344).
Smith's plan of attack against Valencia was not perfectly safe, for,
as Napoleon said, the ground of a night attack should be thoroughly
known; but the circumstances warranted the risk. Friday morning Tower,
who had discovered the ravine (=66=Tower to J. L. Smith, Aug. 25), led
Riley's brigade, and Beauregard led Smith's. As soon as Valencia was
routed, orders were given to complete the road begun Aug. 19, but this
was soon found to be unnecessary. The Fifteenth regiment, on account
of its distance from Riley, reached Valencia's camp too late to take
part in the battle. It should be remembered that Smith's troops did not
know of the demoralization of the Mexicans, and expected to find them
elated and confident. Apparently Shields made a mistake in leaving
San Gerónimo to go to the road on Friday morning, but the mistake was
natural. Valencia went to Toluca with a few troops. He was notified
to present himself for trial, which would have meant death. Some
irregulars made a trivial attack upon Quitman (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 347),
but Alvarez's troops did not come near San Agustín. Twiggs had a lame
foot at this time, and he was not under fire Aug. 19. Brookes (Brooks)
was on his staff.
Ripley (War with Mexico ii, 291) intimates that Scott sent Pillow and
Twiggs forward, Aug. 19, without taking much into account Valencia's
army and cannon, and permitted the Mexicans to open the battle when
they pleased. This seems careless on Scott's part; but, as the text
shows, Scott did not know Valencia had marched to Padierna, and had
no reason to suppose (particularly in view of the threat against S.
Antonio) that large Mexican forces would be there. Ripley suggests (p.
292) that it was improper to let Valencia see the road-building, learn
the Americans were moving that way, and prepare to receive them; but
road-building ceased when the Americans came in view of Valencia, and
after that time he had little opportunity for preparations. Ripley
complains (p. 293) that it was confusing to have Twiggs open the
battle, Pillow take charge of it, and Scott supersede Pillow; but it
is not customary for the general-in-chief to ride at the head of his
forces on a road-building expedition, and under the circumstances
the above arrangement was natural. He remarks (p. 297) that Riley's
reconnoitring with a view to assaulting Valencia's rear proves that he
understood his mission was more than to occupy S. Gerónimo and await
orders [_i.e._ understood that Pillow sent him to do what Smith did];
but Riley testified that he had no such understanding, and reconnoitred
on his own responsibility to obtain information that might prove useful
(Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 147-8). Ripley, in his efforts to sustain Pillow's
claims, says (p. 297) that Riley fell back because of his "believing
himself unsupported," yet says that Riley "relied" on being supported.
He explains (p. 298) Pillow's not informing Riley of the despatch of
Cadwalader by saying that a single mounted officer could not cross the
pedregal; but an officer could cross on foot, and all or most of the
officers were afoot (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 304). Rives (U. S. and Mexico,
ii, 488) observes that placing four brigades successively between
superior forces of the enemy involved a great risk; but it should be
remembered not only that it was worth while to take the risk and that
the American troops were of superior quality, but that Santa Anna was
not present when Riley went to S. Gerónimo, Valencia could not see what
was taking place in that quarter, he was expecting a frontal attack all
the afternoon, S. Gerónimo was a splendid defensive position, and the
Mexicans could not see how large forces occupied it.
Had Santa Anna and Valencia coöperated with judgment and good-will,
Scott's army would perhaps have been crushed; but had the Mexicans been
sensible and patriotic, we should have had no war. How much Scott knew
about the mutual relations of Santa Anna and Valencia one cannot say,
but in all probability he was well informed regarding them. As scarcely
needs to be pointed out, this battle and that of Churubusco had a great
effect in discouraging, not merely the Mexicans in the vicinity but
those at a distance. Men intending to fight or to provide money drew
back at once (_e.g._ =76=Isunza, Aug. 24).
26.12. _Santa Anna's course after the battle of Contreras._ Sen. 19;
30, 2 (Smith to Abert). =224=Intercepted letters (14, L. V. to M. O.;
22, diary; 23, narrative; 26, to Old Gentleman). Apuntes, 209-10,
241, 244, 250-4. Semmes, Service, 396-7. _Picayune_, Oct. 8. Sen. 1;
30, 1, pp. 306, 315, 325; app., 69 (reports of Scott and others). S.
Anna, Apelación, 53 _Id._, Detail, 14-5. Balbontín, Invasión, 120-1.
=217=Henshaw to wife, Aug. 21. =61=Huger, Aug. 22. =70="Guerra," no. 30
(F. Pérez, Rangel, Argüelles, Zenea). México á través, iv, 678. Wash.
_Union_, Nov. 3. _Diario_, Sept. 1, 2. _Monitor Repub._, Oct. 24; Dec.
13, 17. Carreño, Jefes, ccxc (Pérez), ccciv, cccvi. Negrete, Invasión,
iii, app., 446; iv, app., 283-4. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 295. Remarks
on Mason and Hardcastle's Plan of Worth's operations (Sen. 1; 30,
1). =76=Report of losses, Churubusco, Aug. 21. =76=Rincón, Aug. 20.
=76=Argüelles, Aug. 22. =76=Rincón to S. Anna, Aug. 26.
26.13. To guard against contingencies Scott had ordered Worth with
Garland's brigade and Quitman with his troops to proceed toward San
Gerónimo on Friday morning, leaving San Agustín guarded by Harney (Sen.
1; 30, 1, pp. 306-7). This has been thought risky. But Scott had no
doubt learned from Lee that Santa Anna was operating in the vicinity
of San Gerónimo, where was evidently the critical field, and hence
probably he felt that there was little danger of an attack upon San
Agustín that Harney aided, if necessary, by Clarke's brigade (not far
distant) could not meet.
26.14. _Scott's course after the battle of Contreras._ Sen. 1; 30,
1, pp. 306-9, 338, 344; app., 36 (reports of Scott, Pillow, Shields,
Kearny). Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 278, 281-2. Davis, Autobiog., 199.
_Picayune_, Sept. 8. =66=Lee to Smith, Aug. 21. =335=Trist, draft of
address. Wash. _Union_, Sept. 15. Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 74, 632 (Scott);
77 (Lee). _So. Qtrly. Review_, July, 1852, pp. 81-2. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p.
1018 (Scott). Smith, To Mexico, 199.
26.15. _Worth's operations at Churubusco._ Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 306, 315,
333; app., 36,41-2,44-65 (reports of Scott and officers). =221=Hill,
diary. =68=Bonneville court-martial (testimony of Hoffman, Nelson,
Pemberton, Worth, Armistead, Ruggles, etc.). =335=Trist, draft of
address. Semmes, Service, 394-400. Sen. 19; 30, 2 (Smith to Abert).
Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 464 (Lee). =224=Intercepted letters (14, L. V. to M.
O.; 23, narrative; 26, to Old Gentleman). Apuntes, 244-6. _Picayune_,
Sept. 22; Oct 8. _Delta_, Sept. 26. =76=Zerecero to Guerra, Aug. 25.
=76=Rincón to S. Anna, Aug. 26. Balbontín, Invasión, 120-2. Hitchcock,
Fifty Years, 278, 282. =260=Henshaw, comments on map. Stevens, Stevens,
i, 198. =61=Huger, report, Aug. 22. =65=Scott, gen. orders 327, Oct.
28. Gamboa, Impug., 47. =70="Guerra," no. 30 (Pérez, Perdigón Garay).
Ramírez, México, 299-301. =73=Lozano, no. 2, Aug. 24. =236=Judah,
diary. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1018 (Scott); 1076 (Hoffman). Carreño, Jefes,
cccvi (Pérez). _So. Qtrly. Review_, July, 1852, pp. 82-4, 90-1. Lawton,
Artill. Officer, 294-5, 298. Smith, To Mexico, 199-202. Negrete,
Invasión, iv, app., 284. S. Anna, Detall, 15. _Monitor Repub._, Dec. 17.
26.16. _Twiggs's operations._ Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 306, 315, 322,
325, 348, etc.; app., 69-82, 85-8, 96-7, etc. (reports of Scott and
officers). =221=Hill, diary. =12=Caryton to Lambert, Sept. 1. Apuntes,
246, 250-3. Ballentine, Eng. Sold., ii, 230. =66=Stevens to Smith, Aug.
24. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 98 (H. L. Scott). Stevens, Stevens, i, 180-4,
199. Stevens, Vindic., 4-7. Carreño, Jefes, 29. Michigan Pioneer Soc.
Colls., ii, 173; vii, 117. _So. Qtrly. Review_, July, 1852, pp. 87-90.
Engineer School, U. S. A., Occas. Papers, no. 16. _Journ. Milit. Serv.
Instit._, xvii (Van Deusen). =76=Argüelles, Aug. 22. =76=Rincón to S.
Anna, Aug. 26. Davis, Autobiog., 199. =70="Guerra," no. 30 (G. Pérez).
Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 447. Calderón, Rectificaciones, 43. S.
Anna, Mi Historia, 73-4. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 278-9, 282.
26.17. _Shields's operations._ Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 303, 306, 315,
325, 333, 342; app., 76, 106, 113, 118, 128, 130-4 (reports of Scott
and officers). =66=Lee to Smith, Aug. 21. Claiborne, Quitman, i,
342-3. City of Charleston, Year Book, 1883, p. 523. =303=Shields to
Quitman, Aug. 21. =221=Hill, diary. =335=Trist, draft of address.
Semmes, Service, 402. =224=Intercepted letters (22, diary; 25, to
E.). Hawthorne, Pierce, 100. Apuntes, 246-7. Murphy, Hungerford,
102. =76=Zerecero to Guerra, Aug. 25. Balbontín, Invasión, 121-2.
Davis, Autobiog., 200-1, 286. =70="Guerra," no. 30 (F. Pérez).
Stevens, Stevens, i, 198. Ramírez, México, 300. Carreño, Jefes, ccxciv
(Torrejón), cccvii (Pérez). =170=Crooker to mother, Sept. 1. _So.
Qtrly. Review_, July, 1852, pp. 93-9. Oil painting of Butler: sen.
chamber, Columbia, S. C. Sen. 19; 30, 2 (Smith to Abert). =291=Pierce
to Appleton, Aug. 27. _Monitor Repub._, Dec. 17. =125=Bonham to adj.
gen., June 15, 1848. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Jan. 3, 1848. Stevens,
Vindication, 4-7. Negrete, Invasión, iv, app., 285. =277=Burnett,
statement. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 279. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 464. S.
Anna, Detall, 15.
26.18. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 306, 315, 325, etc.; app., 35, 42, 46, 49,
64, 77, 127, etc. (reports of Scott and officers). Semmes, Service,
397, 401-2. =224=Intercepted letters (17, J. U. to J. P. F.). Apuntes,
254-8. =76=Argüelles, Aug. 22. =76=Rincón to S. Anna, Aug. 26.
Balbontín, Invasión, 122. Ballentine, Eng. Sold., ii, 233. Carreño,
Jefes, cccvii (Pérez). _Niles_, Jan. 22, 1848, p. 323.
26.19. S. Anna, Detall, 15-6. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 313, 318, 340, 347;
app., p. 36 (reports of Scott and officers). _Picayune_, Oct. 21.
Apuntes, 247. Charleston _Courier_, Oct. 2. Balbontín, Invasión, 123.
Fate of F. D. Mills. Grant, Mems., i, 146. Davis, Autobiog., 202.
=223=Hirschorn, recolls. De Peyster, Kearny, 140, 142-5. _Journ. U. S.
Cavalry Assoc._, Mar., 1911, p. 841. Ramsey, Other Side, 287, note.
Negrete, Invasión, iv, app., 285-6.