base, and the higher of its two summits reached an elevation of about
400-450 feet (=66=reports of Lee, Stevens and Mason, Aug. 12, 26).
The work of fortifying it was skilfully as well as thoroughly done.
Engineer I. I. Stevens made out nearly forty guns. Topog. Engineer M.
L. Smith thought there were about sixty (Sen. 19; 30, 2, p. 4). A large
stock of rations was placed here (=76=acuerdo, Aug. 5).
25.11. _Santa Anna's preparations (see note 25.1)._ =66=Stevens to J.
L. Smith, Aug. 12, 26. =66=R. E. Lee, J. L. Mason to J. L. Smith, Aug.
12. S. Anna, Apelación, 44-7. _Id._, Detall, 8-11. =60=Patterson to
Marcy, Oct. 26. _Picayune_, June 30; Aug. 8. Donnavan, Adventures, 29.
Pacheco, Exposíción. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 91-4, 123-5. Scott,
Mems., ii, 466. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 274. =224=Intercepted Letters
(ed. by Hitchcock). (Embezzlement) Consideraciones, 25; Apuntes, 207.
Sen. 19; 30, 2 (M. L. Smith, E. L. F. Hardcastle). Apuntes, 205-10,
223-8. Molina, El Asalto. Raleigh _Star_, Sept. 1. =13=Thornton, June
29. =178=Davis, diary. Portrait of Lombardini: city hall, Mexico.
=350=Weber, recolls. N. Orl. _Delta_, July 18. _Verdadero Liberal_,
May 20. (San Patricio cos.) Dublán, Legislación, v, 290; _Diario_,
July 15. México á través, iv, 668-71. =70="Guerra," no. 1120. London
_Times_, May 10; Sept. 6. Semmes, Service, 348-9. Dublán, Legislación,
v, 280, 284, 289, 294. =73=Bermúdez de Castro, nos. 517, June 29;
534, res., July 28. =73=Lozano, No. 2, Aug. 24. Gamboa, Impug., 51.
Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 205-6. =335=Thornton to N. P. Trist,
July 29. Encarnacion Prisoners, 69. =60=Wilson to Marcy, Aug. 1. N.
Y. _Sun_, Aug. 23. _Diario_, May 24; June 5-10, 14-6, 18, 20, etc.
_Monitor Repub._, May 31 (Eleventh Inf.); June 13-5, 18, etc.; Dec. 12
(S. Anna, Nov. 19). _Niles_, June 19, p. 251. =13=Bankhead, no. 74,
1846. (Honduras) =60=Patterson to Marcy, Oct. 26, 1847. (Powder from N.
Orl.) =166=Consul McFaul to ----, Nov. 12, 1846. Ramírez, México, 268.
The following from =76= are cited for particular reasons. Valencia,
proclam., May 14. Estado of garrison, May 13. Ayunt., Mexico, June 3.
Recommended measures, Apr. 6, 14. Circulars, June 12; July 24. S. Anna
to Alcorta, June 12; Aug. 3. Valencia, July 19. Statement, lines of
defence, June 29. J. Terrés, report on cavalry [Nov.]. J. de D. Peza,
report on infantry, Nov. 29. Acuerdos, May 21, 23-4; June 5, 6, 8, 19,
25; July 17, 18, 19, 28, 30; Aug. 2, 3, 5, 6. To Alvarez, June 3, 30,
etc. To Mora, June 26; July 2, 20, 23, etc. To Lombardini, June 26;
July 2, 5, 7, 11, 22, 31, etc. Alvarez. May 29; June 9, 16; July 5,
etc. Mora, July 9, 19, 20, 22, etc. Lombardini, July 6, 7, 10, 12, 14,
15, etc. Olaguíbel, Aug. 20. Decrees, June 5, 8; July 10, 12; Aug. 8,
etc.
Among other preparations were the following: information about the
defence not to be published, and no communication to be had with points
occupied by the Americans; the troops to be trained in firing (June 6);
the state of siege to be rigorous (June 28); as much wheat as possible
to be ground and stored in the city, and the rest to be removed from
the Valley; all Americans, even if naturalized, to leave the city
(July 12); the American prisoners (_e.g._, from La Encarnación) to
go to Toluca; prices of provisions fixed; no persons to be tried for
acts not injurious to a third party. Naturally there was much evasion
of these edicts. A Council of Defence composed of the heads of the
executive departments most concerned in the work began to meet on July
2 (=76=acuerdo, June 29; Lombardini, July 6). After the near approach
of the enemy the shops (excepting those selling provisions and those
of the Plaza del Mercado) were to close, civilian horses and carriages
to keep off the streets, and no civilian to leave the city [without
a pass] except those who had brought in coal and provisions [but on
August 13 permission was given old men, women and children to go out].
By August 24 nearly all civilians [of any importance] left the city
(=73=Lozano, no. 2). After the Americans came within easy reach the
usual efforts to cause desertion among them were made by the Mexican
government. The Paixhan guns cast by the Mexicans were believed by them
to equal the American ordnance (Apuntes, 207).
25.12. _Diario_, Aug. 10-13. =77=Relaciones, circular, Aug. 9.
=73=Lozano, no. 2, Aug. 24. Apuntes, 206-8, 210-20. México á
través, iv, 671-2. Ramírez, México, 296. =76=To Basadre, Aug. 10.
=76=To Alvarez, Aug. 12. =76=Relaciones to gov. Zacat., Aug. 11.
=76=Olaguíbel, Aug. 11. =76=Decree, Aug. 8.
25.13. April 30 Marcy had promised that by the end of June, Scott
should have about 20,000 men (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 922). Scott felt he
needed that number in addition to the garrison of Puebla (Sedgwick,
Corres., i, 141). He has been criticised for having his small army
march in four divisions a day apart. Twiggs and Quitman together had
only about 4000 men and it has been represented that, even had they and
the cavalry combined, Santa Anna could have crushed them before Worth
could have reached the scene (Semmes, Service, 326); but, as a day's
march was only 12-15 miles (Hardcastle in Sen. 19; 30, 2, p. 10), Worth
was but five hours (in case of emergency much less) behind Quitman, and
an attack strong enough to crush Harney, Twiggs and Quitman, provided
as they were with heavy ordnance, could not have taken place in a
moment nor without warning. Scott expected to be attacked on the march
(Scott, Mems., ii, 466). He might have avoided the high mountains by
taking the route _via_ Tlaxcala and Apam; but this route was long and
unsuitable for his trains. There were nearly 1000 wagons (=335=Trist to
Buchanan, Aug. 22).
25.14. These works were abandoned because not in keeping with Santa
Anna's plan. Very likely the fact that it would not have been easy to
subsist a large force here counted also. Many of the Americans believed
Santa Anna had built the works in the expectation of using them to cut
Scott off after defeating him in the Valley, and set their teeth the
harder. All felt that they must conquer or die.
25.15. _Scott's march to Ayotla._ Scott, Mems., ii, 465-7. Hitchcock,
Fifty Years, 266, 271. Grant, Mems., i, 164-5. Ballentine, Eng.
Soldier, ii, 190-3. Davis, Autobiog., 192. _Missouri Republican_, Nov.
3, 1857 (Hitchcock). =217=Henshaw papers. =218=Henshaw narrative.
Haynes, Gen. Scott's Guide. =183=Drum, recolls. =376=Nicholson,
recolls. Donnavan, Adventures, 98. =159=Collins papers. (Route) Lyon,
Journal, ii, 106; Thompson, Recolls., 33; Velasco, Geografía, i,
25; Cardona, Méx. y sus Capitales, 129; Robertson, Visit, i, 321;
Ruxton, Adventures (1847), 33-4; Tudor, Tour, ii, 211; LeClercq,
Voyage, 178-9; Mason, Pictures, ii, 6; Bullock, Across Mex., 67-8.
Lawton, Artillery Officer, 274, 281-7. =65=Gen. orders 246, Aug.
5. =291=Pierce papers. Sen. 11; 31, 1 (map). Sen. 19; 30, 2 (M. L.
Smith, E. L. F. Hardcastle). G. W. Smith, Co. A. Carleton, Address.
=178=Davis, diary. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 124 (Scott); 186-8. Sen. 1; 30,
1, pp. 303 (Scott). app., 37. Kenly, Md. Vol., 344. Rosa, Impresiones
Nebel and Kendall, 27. Brackett, Lane's Brigade, 280-1. Colección de
Itinerarios. Oswandel, Notes, 242, 245. Semmes, Service, 235, 286-9,
325-8, 452-3. =73=Bermúdez de Castro, nos. 534, res., July 28; 550,
Aug. 21. =73=Lozano, no. 2, Aug. 24. =335=Trist, statement, July 25,
1849. =236=Judah, diary. _Diario_, July 2. Sedgwick, Corres., i, 108,
141. Smith, To Mexico, 188-93. Wilson, Mexico, 168. _Niles_, Oct.
30, p. 138. Sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 37. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1032 (Scott).
=132=Atocha to Buchanan, Aug. 1. Ripley, War with Mexico, ii, 187.
Michigan Pioneer Soc. Colls., vii (Toll). _So. Qtrly. Rev._, Apr.,
1852, pp. 406-7. =316=Judd to Sherman, Feb. 26, 1848. Ramírez, México,
239. _Monitor Repub._, Oct. 1 (Gamboa). Manifiesto que dirige ...
Alvarez.
25.16. S. Anna, Apelación, 44; app., 146-50, 157-61. Sen. 52; 30, 1,
pp. 186-7. =73=Bermúdez de Castro, no. 534, res., July 28. _Monitor
Repub._, Dec. 12 (S. Anna, Nov. 19). And from =76= the following. To
Canalizo, June 30. To Alvarez, June 29, 30; July 13, 28; Aug. 6, 9,
12, 14, 21. To Valencia, Aug. 9, 11, 13, 14, 15. Canalizo, June 23;
July 19; Aug. 9, 10, 11. Alvarez, July 5, 8; Aug. 6, 8, 8, 9, 9, 10,
10, 11, 12, 12, 25. Valencia, Aug. 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14. Expediente
against Valencia. Acuerdo, Aug. 13.
25.17. _The choice of approaches._ Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 272-4.
Grant, Mems., 164-5. _Mo. Republican_, Nov. 3, 1857 (Hitchcock).
Weekly _Courier and N. Y. Enquirer_, Mar. 2, 1848 (letter from
Hitchcock). =217=Henshaw to wife, Aug. 21. Haynes, Gen. Scott's Guide.
=61=Hamilton to Scott, Oct. 17, 1850. =66=R. E. Lee, I. I. Stevens,
J. L. Mason to J. L. Smith, Aug. 12, 26. Chase, Polk Admin., 225.
Claiborne, Quitman, i, 333-7. =221=Hill, diary. =159=Collins papers.
Lawton, Artill. Officer, 289. Sen. 11; 31, 1 (M. L. Smith). Sen.
19; 30, 2 (M. L. Smith, E. L. F. Hardcastle). =178=Davis, diary.
=136=Butterfield, recolls. S. Anna, Detall, 11. =52=Trist nos. 11, 12,
Aug. 14, 22. =185=Letters from Worth, Duncan and others. =335=H. L.
Scott to Worth, Aug. 13. _Picayune_, Oct. 8. Nebel and Kendall, 27.
Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 303, app., 27. Apuntes, 208, 225. Semmes, Service,
348-52, 355-8. Ramírez, México, 293. Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 461-2 (Lee);
522-7 (Hitchcock). =68=Charges against Duncan (Scott). =236=Judah,
diary. Wash. _Union_, Nov. 3. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Nov. 12. _Diario_,
Aug. 18. =377=Capt. Willing (paper published by Engineer School,
Washington). Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i, 148-9, 190. _So. Qtrly. Rev._,
Apr., 1852, p. 412. =76=Order to Lombardini, June 19. =76=To Mora, July
2. =76=Acuerdos, Aug. 5, 8. =76=Mora, Aug. 2. =76=Gugerson to Alvarez,
Aug. 10. =76=(Spies) Alvarez, Aug. 12; Valencia, Aug. 13, 14; Becerril,
Aug. 13; spy, Aug. 12; etc. =76=Bravo, Aug. 13. =76=To Bravo, Aug. 13.
The Mexicaltzingo plan was said to be, that while the rest of the
troops should force their way between Lakes Chalco and Xochimilco by
a broken causeway commanded by five batteries on a hill, Worth should
pass round or across the latter lake and coöperate with them wherever
he could do so to the best advantage (Davis, Autobiog., 193; etc.).
Under orders from Scott (Hitchcock in _Mo. Republican_, Nov. 3, 1857;
=377=paper; =335=H. L. Scott to Worth, Aug. 13; =68=charges against
Duncan) to examine the Chalco route, Worth (at Duncan's suggestion)
had Duncan, supported by strong detachments, reconnoitre that route
on August 14 under the pretence of obtaining provisions. Duncan, who
reported (=305=Aug. 14) favorably, was sent to Scott late that day to
give an account of the reconnaissance and deliver a =305=letter from
Worth, which argued against dividing the army. Not receiving credit in
Scott's report Duncan published (_Picayune_, Oct. 8; Dec. 18) a letter
claiming in effect to have caused the change of plan (chap. xxix, p.
187). But the letter proved that he knew less about the matter than
he supposed (=68=charges); it did not prove that the change of orders
resulted from his report; and there is no proof that Scott intended to
divide the army--though he collected boats enough for about 2000 men
with a view to crossing or to making the Mexicans believe (Claiborne,
Quitman, i, 335) he intended to cross the lake and it was thought
that as many more could be obtained--or definitely decided to attack
Mexicaltzingo. On the other hand Scott stated (=68=charges) that he was
himself investigating (=305=Mackall to ----, May 10, 1848) the Chalco
route while Duncan was doing so, and that a spy sent from headquarters
reported favorably upon it (=68=charges); and he denied squarely that
he gave up the Mexicaltzingo for the Chalco route in consequence
of Duncan's report (=68=charges). Extreme secrecy and all possible
mystification of the enemy were necessary, and on account of Worth's
unfriendliness Scott had special reasons for not opening his mind fully
to him. Other generals have purposely kept their subordinates in the
dark (see Henderson, Jackson, i, 421, 441; _Id._, Science of War, 42).
Instead of proving that Worth was the better general, Worth and Duncan
proved the opposite, for they showed that Worth committed himself to
the Chalco route on very incomplete data, whereas Scott studied three
routes and reserved his decision until, as far as was possible, he
had full information before him. As usual, when Worth's relations
with Scott were concerned, we find Semmes inaccurate and biassed
here. Ripley uses the incident against Scott at great length and very
unfairly. Facts regarding the Mexicaltzingo route are brought forward,
though not known to the Americans at the time (Ripley, War with Mexico,
194). We are told (p. 191) that Scott ordered Duncan to study the
Chalco route after Duncan had proposed to do so, as if Scott had not
previously ordered Worth, Duncan's commander, to investigate the route.
It is alleged that the case did not warrant "a departure from the
rules of the [military] art to so great a degree" [as was proposed by
the Mexicaltzingo plan]; yet Ripley shows that the Texcoco route was
impracticable (pp. 179, 186), that El Peñón was virtually "impregnable"
(p. 188), and that the Chalco route was considered out of the question
(p. 190). This was a situation clearly warranting extraordinary
measures. On p. 202 Ripley seems to argue that the orders to attack
Mexicaltzingo cannot have been given to conceal the movement that Scott
actually made, since any movement against that point would have caused
Santa Anna to place troops in that vicinity, detect promptly Scott's
real intention, and defend the southern line, and so the ruse would
have defeated itself. But (1) the question concerns orders, not--as
Ripley assumes--an actual movement toward Mexicaltzingo; (2) Santa
Anna had troops in the vicinity of Mexicaltzingo, but the results
anticipated by Ripley did not follow; (3) indeed, though Ripley was
not aware of the fact, Santa Anna concluded Aug. 14 (=76=to Valencia)
that Scott was going to S. Agustín, and merely had the reserves at S.
Antonio garita go with five 4-pounders to S. Antonio hacienda (=76=to
Valencia, Aug. 14), for he was relying on his fortified points; and
(4) since the same troops could not defend at the same time the works
near Mexicaltzingo and also the road to S. Agustín, orders involving
a threat against the former would have tended, without costing Scott
anything, to keep the latter clear.
The vulnerable point of El Peñón Viejo was that owing to its steepness
the cannon could have little action on the slopes (=66=Stevens to
Smith, Aug. 26). A particular disadvantage in attacking Mexicaltzingo
would have been that (Santa Anna said) such a movement could have been
detected in good season, and reinforcements could have been placed
there promptly (=76=to Bravo, Aug. 13). As the American generals needed
information that could only be obtained from Mexicans, they were
peculiarly exposed to the artifices of spies, and some of these gained
a confidential footing with Worth and even with Scott.
25.18. _To S. Agustín._ =218=Henshaw narrative. S. Anna, Apelación,
47, 50; app., 146-51. _Id._, Detall, 12. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, ii,
195. Davis, Autobiog., 192-5. =217=Henshaw to wife, Aug. 21. =221=Hill,
diary. =159=Collins papers. Latrobe, Rambler, 121. Lawton, Artill.
Officer, 290, 293. Sen. 34; 34, 3, p. 37. Sen. 11; 31, 1 (map). Sen.
19; 30, 2 (M. L. Smith, E. L. F. Hardcastle). G. W. Smith, Co. A.
=204=Gouverneur, diary. =178=Davis, diary. Gamboa, Impug., 38-9. México
á través, iv, 672. Apuntes, 220, 229. Arróniz, Manual, i, 243. Semmes,
Service, 352-5, 370-5. Nebel and Kendall, 28. =12=Caryton to Lambert,
Sept. 1. Steele, Campaigns, i, 123. =236=Judah, diary. Hitchcock,
Fifty Years, 275. Moore, Scott's Camp., 129. Wash. _Union_, Nov. 3.
Stevens, I. I. Stevens, 168. _Niles_, Oct. 30, p. 139. Sen. 1; 30,
1, pp. 303 (Scott); app., 28 (Twiggs); 37 (Sumner); 39 (McKinstry).
=76=To Alvarez, Aug. 11, 21. =76=To Valencia, Aug. 14, 15. =76=To
Lombardini, Aug. 14. =76=Acuerdos, Aug. 15, 16. =76=To Herrera, Aug.
15. =76=Becerril, Aug. 15. =76=Valencia, Aug. 14, 15. =76=Alvarez,
Aug. 16, 17, 19, 22, 25. =76=To Alvarez, Aug. 14, 15. Ripley, War with
Mexico, ii, 647 (Lee to Mason).
Santa Anna's policy seems to have been wise. Any detachments that he
could have thrown hastily in front of Worth must have consisted of
inferior troops, and would no doubt have been routed. The last portion
of the Chalco route was over ground which, though in part hilly,
was firm (T. F. Davis, diary). The brush with Twiggs was greatly
exaggerated by the Americans, some of whom estimated the enemy as
12,000 strong, and felt that a victory was gained, whereas Alvarez had
no intention of fighting, and did not come within musket range. It has
been said (Ripley, War with Mexico, ii, 289) that Scott should have had
the cavalry, Worth and Pillow advance without heavy baggage, and reach
S. Agustín in twelve hours. But (1) there was a distinct advantage in
keeping Worth's division intact, (2) Scott's van was less likely to be
attacked than his rear, (3) Scott probably understood that Santa Anna
intended to rely on his fortified positions, for he was well posted
about affairs at the capital (=13=Thornton to Bankhead, June 14),
nothing could be kept secret there, and Santa Anna's Plan was known to
many, (4) Scott's judgment on the point was likely, especially in view
of his fuller knowledge of the facts, to be better than Ripley's, and
(5) it was justified by the event. The Chalco route was the one taken
by Cortez (Gamboa, Impug., 38). In leaving Peñón Viejo Santa Anna had
money and provisions remain there for a prospective "distant march"
(=76=to Herrera, Aug. 15). Whether this referred to a pursuit of the
Americans or his own flight can only be guessed, but as the order was
addressed to Herrera, one inclines to the former view.
25.19. =52=Trist, no. 11, Aug. 14. México á través, iv, 672-3. Apuntes,
220-2, 230. S. Anna, Detall, 11-2. =95=Notice to first alcalde, Aug.
19. _So. Qtrly. Rev._, Apr., 1852. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 446.
=73=Bermúdez de Castro, no. 445, Mar. 2. =76=To Valencia, Aug. 14,
15, 16. =76=To Lombardini, Aug. 14. =76=Valencia, Aug. 15, 16. =76=To
Alvarez, Aug. 16. =76=Acuerdo, Aug. 16.
XXVI. CONTRERAS, CHURUBUSCO
26.1. The basis for distances is Smith and Hardcastle's map of the
Valley (Sen. 11; 31, 1). A garita had to be a somewhat formal place,
for municipal duties were levied and collected there, and some
accommodations for the officials and the guards were necessary. The
last word of "S. Antonio Abad" was commonly omitted. For the sake of
distinction the Acapulco road will be called the "highway" and the road
_via_ Tacubaya, San Angel and Ansaldo the "turnpike" (Trist's word for
it). The name Contreras was applied by Americans to three places, to
none of which it belonged. Contreras was a village on the turnpike
some distance south of Padierna. San Agustín was also known as Tlálpam.
26.2. August 14 Valencia's =76=return (_estado_) included 486 officers,
5078 rank and file, 1447 horses, one siege 16-pounder, three siege
12-pounders, five 8-inch (68-pound) howitzers and fifteen smaller guns.
One of the guns was assigned to Torrejón and he saved it. Another small
one disappeared. The name of the rounded hill where Valencia took post
was Peloncoahutitlán.
26.3. Valencia had one excuse, for very possibly he believed (in view
of Santa Anna's delay at San Luis Potosí, abandonment of Tampico,
apparent neglect of Vera Cruz, etc.) that the President traitorously
intended to leave open a door by which Scott could reach the capital;
but none the less he was a conscienceless conspirator and the mortal
foe of Santa Anna, disgusted with subordination, and eager to overthrow
his chief. His past conduct had been thoroughly suspicious, and his
manifiesto of August 22 does not bear analysis well. To remove him
would have seemed an act of jealousy, if not treason, and very likely
have caused a mutiny. Santa Anna hoped that the national crisis would
hold him in line for the time being. Besides, Santa Anna did not know
precisely where Valencia proposed to make a stand (_Diario_, Sept.
1). When he learned, he sent General Mora to reconnoitre the position
(=76=to Valencia, August 19). Again, he could not afford to raise an
issue with Valencia now, for the latter (doubtless with the help of
his engineers) had divined Scott's plans better than the former, and
undertaken to guard a quarter left open by the President. Finally it
was quite possible that Santa Anna thought Valencia would be taught a
lesson by the Americans. It is unnecessary to discuss the merits and
disadvantages of Valencia's position, for they will appear plainly in
the narrative (see Balbontín, Invasión, 110-11). Had the Americans
been willing to do as he wished, the hill would have been entirely
satisfactory. Of Valencia's intellectual quality the following specimen
is suggestive: "Soldiers of Liberty, anarchy put out its head, but your
arms drowned it in a moment."
26.4. _Mexican preliminaries._ Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 304, 306 (Scott);
348-9 (Smith); app., 80 (Alexander). Collins papers. =66=Lee to Smith,
Aug. 21. Semmes, Service, 393. Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 276 (Longstreet);
570. =224=Intercepted Letters (14, L. V. to M. O.; 26, to Old
Gentleman). Apuntes, 221, 230-6. Balbontín, Invasión, 111. Gamboa,
Impug., 41. =70="Guerra," no. 30 (F. Pérez). México á través, iv,
672-3, 677. Long, Memoirs, 54. _So. Qtrly. Rev._, Apr., 1852, pp.
408-9. Latrobe, Rambler, 90. Sen. 19; 30, 2 (Hardcastle to Smith; Smith
to Abert). Valencia, Manifiesto. Calderón, Life, i, 314. =178=Davis,
diary. Prieto, Mems., ii, 213. =73=Bermúdez de Castro, no. 534, res.,
July 28. S. Anna, Apelación, 51-2; app., 140-54, 157-60. _Id._, Detall,
12. _Monitor Repub._, Dec. 17, 1847. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 276.
Negrete, Invasión, iv, app., 279-83. =76=Acuerdo, Aug. 16. =76=To
Lombardini, July 22. =76=To Alvarez, Aug. 21. =76=Zerecero, Aug. 25.
=76=To Valencia, Aug. 16. =76=Expediente contra Valencia.
The defences of Valencia's camp were somewhat extended later, but not
enough to render them formidable.
26.5. According to a topographical officer (Washington _Union_, Nov. 3,
1847) the only route from San Agustín to Mexico of which the Americans
knew when they reached the ground was the highway. This surprises one
at first. But the turnpike beyond San Angel was a local road serving
only a few farms, the small villages of San Gerónimo and Contreras,
and a manufacturing establishment near Contreras. It seemed to be
of no strategic significance, and was not likely to be heard of at a
distance. The fortifications along the highway were largely developed
after Scott turned toward San Agustín. Valencia's movements were
impromptu. Scott had an Englishman residing at Mexico in his pay, and
we know that two persons brought data on Aug. 19 (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p.
162). Apparently Scott did his duty as to seeking information.
26.6. _American preliminaries._ Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 304, 307, 315,
348-50 (reports of Scott, Worth and Smith); app., 41 (Mason); 66
(Smith); 101 (Magruder); 118 (Cadwalader). Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., ii,
307. _Picayune_, Sept. 8; Oct. 21. =66=Lee to Smith, Aug. 21. Semmes,
Service, 380, 393. =224=Intercepted Letters (26, To Old Gentleman).
Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 275. Grant, Mems., i, 142. Sen. 52; 30, 1,
p. 188 (Trist, no. 12). =76=Expediente contra Valencia. =236=Judah,
diary. Sen. 19; 30, 2 (Hardcastle to Smith). _Monitor Repub._, Dec. 17.
_Diario_, Aug. 19.
26.7. Quitman had only the Second Pennsylvania, the Marines, Steptoe's
battery and a troop or two of dragoons (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 341); but
Worth's division was available in case of need. See Claiborne, Quitman,
i, 347.