May 7, stated in the most distinct manner that according to this plan
El Telégrafo was not to be attacked before the highway in its rear
should have been occupied in strength, and that insistence upon this
point constituted the essential difference between this plan and the
operations previously suggested by Beauregard. Scott wrote to Marcy
(Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 261) that he had intended to turn the Mexican
position and attack in the rear. He clearly indicated as much in his
Memoirs (ii, 432), and his orders for the battle were that Twiggs's
division, supposed to be already near the highway, should move before
daybreak to occupy it, while the orders only contemplated an attack in
front as likely to be made before 10 o'clock. It was well understood
in the army that his plan was to bag Santa Anna's army, and this
implied--since some of the Mexicans were likely to retire early--that
the way of escape must be cut off before a frontal attack should be
launched. Stevens tried to reach the highway via the Mexican right, but
was taken ill and had to return (Stevens, Stevens, i, 124).
23.23. _Scott's operations, Apr. 12-16._ Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 261 (Scott).
_Picayune_, May 1, 2. =217=Henshaw papers. A Soldier's Honor, 24.
Trans. Ills. State Hist. Soc., 1906, p. 181. =159=Narrative based on
the papers of F. Collins. Scott, Mems., ii, 432. Hitchcock, Fifty
Years, 250. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, ii, 56-8. Davis, Autobiog.,
144-8. Bishop, Journal. =322=Smith, diary. =112=Beauregard to
Patterson, Apr. 20. =111=Stevens to J. L. Smith, May 7. =111=G.
W. Smith to Stevens, Apr. 23. =111=Tower to J. L. Smith, undated.
=111=Mason to J. L. Smith, Apr. 24. =65=Scott, gen. orders 105, 111.
=332=Tennery, diary. McCabe, Lee, 19, note. =12=Loch to Lambert, Apr.
9. Oswandel, Notes, 113-5. Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i, 122-4. Ho. 60;
30, 1, pp. 929 (Scott); 939 (Twiggs); 940 (Pillow).
23.24. The range had to be estimated (=322=W. B. Smith, diary), and
perhaps it was not easy to rectify the estimate by seeing where the
shot struck. Many of them flew much too high.
23.25. Scott's orders for the battle gave no directions for such a
charge. His plan was to place Twiggs's division and Shields's brigade,
supported by Worth's command, on the highway in Santa Anna's rear and
attack from that quarter. From one of his reports it appears that he
made some suggestion to Twiggs about the possibility of a frontal
attack on El Telégrafo--presumably in the case of some unlooked-for
turn of events; but he did not expect that officer to create the
turn. The charge seems to have been ordered by Scott during the night
(=213=Hatch to father, Apr. 21). To be sure, Scott's orders spoke of a
frontal attack, but evidently the reference was to Pillow's movement.
The officers of the Rifles were taken by Polk from civil life. Scott
offset this by having Major Sumner of the Second Dragoons, a veteran
and able soldier, command the corps; but as Sumner had been disabled on
Saturday, Major Loring was now at its head. When moving from shelter
he exposed his men to being enfiladed by the enemy's cannon, and
the other troops actually cried out, "That's the way to murder men"
(=218=Henshaw). This illustrates how political appointments are likely
to work on the firing line. The Rifles were expected to join in the
attack on El Telégrafo after repulsing the enemy on the left, but a
part of them were unable to do so (p. 352).
23.26. _Events of Apr. 17-18 {except Pillow's operations)._ Sen. 1; 30,
1, pp. 255-95, 298 (Scott's orders; reports of himself and officers).
Maury, Recolls., 37, 44. Hartman, Journal, 11. M'Sherry, El Puchero,
221-3. _Picayune_, May 1, 6, 9, 19. _Delta_, May 1, 15; June 18.
=252=Mackall to father, Apr. 18. =335=Trist, May 7, 25. =217=Henshaw
papers. Trans. Ills. State Hist. Soc., 1905, p. 213; 1906, pp. 182-3.
=159=Narrative based on F. Collins papers. =6=Riley court of inquiry.
=60=Plympton to Scott, July 27. =60=E. K. Smith to Plympton, July 23.
=60=J. R. Smith to Polk, Nov. 30, 1848. =60=Twiggs to J. R. Smith, Nov.
9, 1848. =60=Morris to J. R. Smith, Nov. 15, 1848. =66=Russell court of
inquiry: orders 155. =223=Hirschorn, recolls. Negrete, Invasión, iii,
app., 46-52, 98-114. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 251-2. Grant, Mems., i,
132. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, ii, 59-84, 88, 90-1. Davis, Autobiog.,
148-52, 155-8. Apuntes, 175-83. Tributo á la Verdad, 42, 49, 62, 136.
S. Anna, Apelación, 34-41. _Id._, Manifiesto, 1847, 7. Eye witness,
Complete History, 79-80. Robertson, Remins., 248-52. Lawton, Artill.
Officer, 137-40, 267. Engineer School, U. S. Army, Occas. Papers, no.
16. N. Y. _Times_, July 16, 1916 (Worth). Bishop, Journal. Nebel and
Kendall, 24-5. S. Anna, Mi Historia, 67-8. =66=G. W. Smith to Stevens,
Apr. 23. Mansfield, Mex. War, 195. =210=Bragg to Hammond, May 4, 1848.
=254=McClellan, diary; to sister, Apr. 22. _Diario_, Apr. 28, 30; May
20; June 10, 23, 30. _Republicano_, Apr. 21, 23, 27; June 9; July 10.
=84=Ampudia to gov. S. L. Potosí, Oct. 10. Gamboa, Impug., 30. Kenly,
Md. Vol., 337. Ramírez, México, 227-9, 231, 261. =298=Porter, diary.
London _Times_, June 15. Wash. _Union_, May 10, 11; Oct. 23. _Monitor
Repub._, Apr. 20, 23, 24, 27; May 3, 6; Nov. 1, 30. _Spirit of the
Times_, May 29; June 5. =124=Blocklenger, recolls. =327=Sutherland to
father, Aug. --. _Vedette_, ii, no. 2. =322=Smith, diary. =307=Roberts
to wife, Apr. 21. =178=Davis, diary. =270=Moore, diary. =358=Williams
to father, Apr. 21. =152=Claiborne, memoirs. =112=Beauregard to
Patterson, Apr. 20. =66=Stevens to J. L. Smith, May 7. =66=Tower to
J. L. Smith, undated. =66=Mason to J. L. Smith, Apr. 24. Arnold,
Jackson, 87. =66=G. W. Smith to Lee, Apr. 20. =66=Lee to Twiggs,
undated. =65=Scott, gen. orders 249. =60=Riley to Westcott, Nov. 30.
=332=Tennery, diary. Giménez, Apología. Ho. 85; 30, 1. _Journal U. S.
Artill._, 1892, pp. 419-20. Lee, Gen. Lee, 38. Oswandel, Notes, 116,
122-8. Semmes, Service, 178-81, 183. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 887-94.
=82=Soto to gov. Puebla, Apr. 18. =82=Pavón to Puebla sec. state, Apr.
29. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1089 (Hitchcock). _Niles_, May 22, pp. 183, 188.
=148=Chamberlain, recolls. Elderkin, Biog. Sketches, 66. _Journ. Mil.
Serv. Instit._, xlii, 128. Henderson, Science of War, 215. Stevens, I.
I. Stevens, i, 126. Smithwick, Evolution, 286. =76=S. Anna, Apr. 17,
21; May 7. =76=Canalizo, Apr. 18, 21. =76=Carrera, May 1. =76=Circular,
Apr. 20. =76=Ampudia, Apr. 25. =76=To Brito, May 25. =76=Alvarez,
Oct. 28. =76=Canalizo to Villaba & Co., Apr. 24; to son, Apr. 24.
=76=Memorias by heads of depts., Nov., 1847.
REMARKS on the battle (April 18). The perfect confidence displayed in
Scott's orders for the battle is noteworthy. No doubt it had a great
effect on the troops. The orders to Worth were rather vague. Probably
this was because the course of the battle was expected to indicate
how his division could be used to the best advantage, but possibly on
account of his intense jealousy of Twiggs it was not deemed wise to
say clearly that he was to support Twiggs. In fact he followed Twiggs,
ascended El Telégrafo, saw the white flag at the tongues, and sent
Harney and Childs (Ripley, War with Mexico, ii, 74) to accept the
surrender of the Mexican right wing. The movement assigned to Twiggs
was hazardous, but the military quality of Santa Anna and the Mexican
troops was now well understood.
General Shields was struck by a grape shot that passed through the
upper part of his body; and his recovery, due to high surgical skill
and the most devoted nursing, seemed almost miraculous. When Shields
fell, Col. E. D. Baker took command. Canalizo was ordered to charge
Shields's brigade; but the ground was only partly cleared, and Santa
Anna reported that a charge was not practicable. Canalizo was, however,
accused by many of causing the Mexican defeat by letting the Americans
reach the highway. He could have dismounted all his cavalry, as he
did his cuirassiers, and 2000 fresh troops--especially if aided by
those at the tongues--might have done a good deal; but probably he
believed that the battle had already been lost. When Shields's men
approached the highway they came upon a party of Mexican surgeons, and
on learning their business became instantly, according to the surgeons,
their friends and protectors (_Diario_, Apr. 30). The chief Mexican
surgeon stated that the Americans made no distinction between the two
nationalities in bringing wounded men to the hospitals (_Courrier
Français_, May 5). Worth's command, deprived of its expected share in
the battle through Twiggs's departure from Scott's plan, played the
part of a reserve. Harney's charge may have been launched just when
it was because a thinning out of the summit of El Telégrafo (probably
due to sending troops against Riley) led to the belief that the La
Atalaya guns were doing great execution (Ballentine, Eng. Sold., ii,
81). Harney placed the Seventh Infantry on his right, deploying some
of the men as skirmishers to guard that flank, and the Third on his
left, protected by the Rifles. (In consequence of Loring's incompetence
(=213=Hatch to father, Apr. 21) the Rifles did not charge in a body or
effectively.) This line was supported by the First Artillery. Some of
Harney's men joined with Riley's in capturing the minor crest. The La
Atalaya battery fired over the heads of the charging Americans as long
as this appeared to be safe. Vázquez died bravely at his post, whereas
a number of high Mexican officers proved recreant. After the fighting
began near the summit of El Telégrafo the Mexican cannon placed there
could not be used, for they would have injured Mexicans as well as
Americans. Santa Anna appears to have done all in his power to stem the
tide of defeat. About 1000 Puebla men under Gen. Arteaga arrived during
the battle. They were placed at the headquarters battery, but took
flight early. S. Anna's line was about a mile and a half long.
23.27. It has been argued that Pillow's attack should have been a
"mere feint," _i.e._ threat. But (1) Scott had reason to fear that
the purpose of a "mere feint" would be detected as soon as the grand
battle should begin, and that the feint would fail of its purpose
(see Donaldson and Becke, 387); and (2) Pillow had troops of superior
mettle, who probably would not have been satisfied to make a mere
threat (Nebel and Kendall, 25, note). In ordering this attack Scott
violated Napoleon's principle, which was to turn the enemy's flank
without dividing his own army (Johnston, Foundations, 180), but the
circumstances warranted doing so. In particular Santa Anna had shown
that he did not wish to be aggressive, and Scott intended to keep him
busy (see Hamley, Operations, 160).
23.28. Pillow had also a few Tennessee horse and (attached to Haskell's
regiment) a Kentucky company--in all about 2000 men (Robertson,
Remins., 244).
23.29. The text is based primarily on the full and minute account
given in the diary of George B. McClellan (who accompanied Pillow and
whose integrity and technical ability will not be questioned) and the
following documents: reports of Engineers Stevens (=66=May 7) and
Tower (=66=undated); Haskell and sixteen officers (_Picayune_, May
29); Haskell (_ib._, June 28); Pillow, reply (_ib._, June 9); _Id._,
=61=substitute report, May 29 (to take the place of his published
report, which he admitted was not correct); =139=letters of Col.
Campbell, an able and fair man (who said privately the affair was most
badly managed; also that Pillow was no general, and on the field had
no judgment or decision); =224=Williams to Hitchcock, June 4, 1849;
Wynkoop, July 16, in _Picayune_, Sept. 19; Stevens, I. I. Stevens, i,
125 (Stevens says, _e.g._, that Pillow's attack failed because "made
prematurely, with great precipitation, without order in the assaulting
columns, and before the supporting columns were in position, and at the
wrong point," and that it, "both as to time and as to direction, was
earnestly remonstrated against by the engineer officer directing the
attack, by the personal staff of the general, and by Col. Campbell,
second in command"). Of course Ripley, who wrote his history of the war
in consultation with Pillow, gives a misleading account of this affair
as of others.
The author used also the following sources: Sen. 51; 32, 1. Sen. 1; 30,
1, pp. 257 (Scott); 258 (orders 111); 294 (Patterson); 296 (Pillow).
=217=Henshaw papers. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 109. =69=Pillow to adj.
gen., June 25, 1848. =69=Ripley to adj. gen., June 25, 1848. =66=Tower
to Twiggs, Apr. 16. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 50. Hitchcock, Fifty
Years, 251. Furber, Twelve Months Vol., 593. Grant, Mems., i, 133.
Davis, Autobiog., 146. Apuntes, 173, 181. _Weekly Courier and N. Y.
Enquirer_, Mar. 2, 1848. Robertson, Remins., 244-8. Lawton, Artill.
Officer, 139. =293=Pillow to wife, June 9. =293=Rains to Mrs. Pillow,
Apr. 18. _Republicano_, June 9, 24. _Picayune_, May 9; Sept. 11. México
á través, iv, 654. Hillard, McClellan, 18, 19. _Nat. Intelligencer_,
June 11. _Monitor Repub._, June 24. =358=Williams to father, Apr.
21. _Vedette_, viii, no. 5. Oswandel, Notes, 110-1, 122-35. Semmes,
Service, 182-3. Hitchcock in semi-weekly _Courier and Enquirer_, Mar.
1, 1848. =100=Mata, Apr. 18. =82=Pavón to Puebla sec. state, Apr. 29.
=288=Tapper to wife, May 3. _Niles_, June 5, p. 219; Oct. 2, p. 75.
Boston _Atlas_, Dec. 13. Griepenkerl, Applied Tactics, 116. =316=Judd
to Sherman, Feb. 26, 1848. Johnstone, Foundations, 180. _So. Qtrly.
Rev._, Jan., 1852. =181=Armstrong to Donelson, July 4. =139=Cummings to
Campbell, May 12; June 13. =76=Carrera, May 1. =76=S. Anna, May 7. The
reason why reversing the regiments caused trouble seems to have been
that infantry were accustomed to man[oe]uvre and fight in a certain
formation, and felt awkward if the right was unexpectedly brought out
on the left. As Wynkoop had farther to march than Haskell and did not
wish to attack before his support was in position, placing Campbell
third in the line of march involved a delay. One derives a lesson on
the value of official reports from Patterson's representation that
Pillow was wounded while gallantly leading his brigade (Sen. 1; 30, 1,
p. 295).
23.30. The American soldiers were not pleased with this policy. The
American government expressed itself against it and, placing an
undeserved value on Mexican officers, ordered that no more of them
should be paroled except for special reasons. It is probably enough to
say that Scott was in the best position to judge; but one may remark
that Santa Anna's difficulty was not so much to obtain men as to obtain
arms. Further grounds for releasing them are mentioned in Sen. 1; 30,
1, p. 257. According to Gen. Pavón, Gen. La Vega and twenty-four other
officers were not paroled. Some six declined to give their paroles.
Among the spoils were a large amount of ammunition, $11,791.19 in cash
(Sen. 34; 34, 3, p. 24), and a wooden leg (supposed to have belonged to
Santa Anna) now preserved in the capitol at Springfield, Ill.
23.31. _Pursuit, losses, prisoners, spoils._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, 948, 1012,
1221 (Scott); 1089 (Hitchcock); 1233 (Marcy). Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 258
(gen. orders 111); 262 (Scott); 276, 278, 283, etc. Scott, Mems., ii,
443. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 253. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, 86-7,
106-7. Tributo á la Verdad, 62. Bustamante, N. Bernal, ii, 189. S.
Anna, Apelación, 40. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 140, 179. Ho. 24; 31,
1. Sen. 34; 34, 3, p. 37. _Republicano_, Apr. 27.; June 9. Sen. 52;
30, 1, pp. 122, 136. _Courrier Français_, May 5. México á través, iv,
655. _Monitor Repub._, Apr. 24; May 6. =322=Smith, diary. Williams to
father, Apr. 21. =152=Claiborne, mems. =332=Tennery, diary. =82=Pavón
to Puebla sec. state, Apr. 29. N. Y. _Sun_, Aug. 16. _Niles_, May
15, p. 164; May 29, p. 201. McClellan, diary. Nebel and Kendall, 25.
Robertson, Remins., 249, 253. =76=Carrera, Apr. 27; May 1. =76=Ampudia,
Apr. 25. =76=Canalizo, Apr. 18. =76=_Id._, undated. =76=S. Anna, May
7. =76=Junta directiva, May 3. =76=G. Gómez to Gaona, Apr. 18. The
cavalry appear to have been late in beginning the pursuit. Ripley (War,
etc., ii, 75) says Scott was so busy that he forgot to send for the
cavalry, but Scott's orders for the battle put the responsibility on
the commander of that corps, which was placed in reserve on the highway
with a field battery (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 259). In places, too, they
found the highway cut or blocked.
23.32. A deputation of the ayuntamiento met Patterson (Sen. 1; 30,
1, p. 296), and were promised protection on condition that no liquor
should be sold to the troops. The term "nondescript costumes" applies
primarily to the volunteers, but probably some of the regulars had lost
parts of their outfits.
23.33. Scott's report was a model in concealing facts; and Worth,
writing to a member of his family, called it "a lie from beginning to
end." Gen. U. S. Grant, doubtless recording without investigation his
early impressions, wrote in his Personal Memoirs (i, 132): "Perhaps
there was not a battle of the Mexican war, or of any other, where
orders issued before an engagement were nearer being a correct report
of what afterwards took place," and such has been the accepted opinion,
though a thoughtful comparison of the orders with Scott's own report
(Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 258, 261) is enough to disprove this view. For
example, Scott in his orders, intending to attack from the enemy's
rear, assigned no troops to the frontal attack on El Telégrafo, which
was the main feature of the actual battle. Unpublished documents of
a wholly unbiassed character disprove it still further. As two more
illustrations, the artillery, for which infinite trouble was taken
to make a passable road, did not figure at all in the battle (though
a section of Taylor's battery went that way in season to join in
the pursuit), and a court of inquiry declared that Riley's brigade,
which played a most important rôle, was diverted from its original
destination--a finding approved by Scott (=65=gen. orders 249). Robert
Anderson said that if Scott's orders had been carried out, not a
Mexican would have escaped (Lawton, Artillery Officer, 137); and Davis,
Shields's aide, stated that Twiggs failed to execute Scott's orders
and disappointed Scott's expectations (Autobiography, 148). See also
notes 22 and 25. It is possible that one reason why Scott in his
report commended Twiggs's course was that, even if satisfied as to the
practicability of his own plan, he did not care to raise an issue on
that question. Obviously it would have been impossible to prove now
that the plan was practicable, and a bitter, harmful controversy would
have resulted. That on general principles such an exposure of the
American flank was very hazardous could not be denied.
23.34. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 296 (Patterson). =217=Henshaw papers.
=159=Narrative based on F. Collins papers. Robertson, Remins.,
253-7. Ruxton, Adventures (1847), 16. (King Death) Griffis, Perry,
217. =298=Porter, diary. _Monitor Repub._, Apr. 24, 27. =322=Smith,
diary. =66=G. W. Smith to Stevens, May 1. Oswandel, Notes, 140.
=256=J. Parrott to Marcy, Apr. 19. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 948 (Scott).
=254=McClellan, diary. Ramírez, México, 260.
XXIV. PUEBLA
24.1. _Worth's advance._ Henshaw narrative. Hitchcock, Fifty Years,
255. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, ii, 154. Davis, Autobiog., 173. _Delta_,
July 8. _Picayune_, May 19. =159=Collins papers, Apr. 21; June 19.
México á través, iv, 655. Tornel, Breve Reseña, 345. Robertson, Visit,
i, 303. Orbigny, Voyage, 411. Lyon, Journal, ii, 181. Balbontín,
Estado, 22. Velasco, Geografía, iii, 97, 99. Lawton, Artill. Officer,
141-4. Robertson, Remins., 276. =68=Scott to Worth, May 6. Colección
de Itinerarios. _Revue de Paris_, Dec., 1844. Oswandel, Notes, 162.
Semmes, Service, 217-22. =139=W. B. to D. Campbell, Apr. 25. =185=Memo.
Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 261 (Scott); 300 (Worth). Ramírez, México, 228-9.
Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 236-9. =254=McClellan to sister, Apr. 22.
=236=Judah, diary. Moore, Scott's Campaign, 10-2. Norton, Life.
Diccionario Universal (_Las Vigas_ and _Perote_). =327=Sutherland
to father, undated. Ward, Mexico, ii, 193-5. Green, Journal, 238.
Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 944-6, 948 (Scott). =364=Worth to daughter, Apr.
30. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 58, 60, 110. Tributo á la Verdad,
43-6. =76=Gaona, Mar. 4, 8, 15; Apr. 8, 19. =76=To _Id._, Apr. 17.
=76=Canalizo, Apr. 21, 24, etc. =76=Baneneli, Apr. 24. =76=Bravo, Apr.
23. =76=S. Anna, Apr. 27. The distance from Jalapa to Perote was called
about thirty miles.
24.2. "Convoy" will be used to signify a line of wagons or pack-mules
or both transporting merchandise or supplies under escort. Among the
difficulties in getting articles from the coast were the sandy road,
the heat, the weakness and insufficient number of animals, the shortage
of wagons, and above all the want of good drivers and conductors (Sen.
52; 30, 1, p. 127). Scott had supposed that successive bodies of new
troops would escort the convoys up, but the diversion of these to the
Rio Grande for some time (in consequence of S. Anna's advance against
Taylor) made it necessary to weaken his forces by sending escorts from
Jalapa (=61=Scott to Wilson, Apr. 26). The policy of treating the
Mexicans kindly required more self-support and therefore larger trains
than would otherwise have been necessary. Moreover, in order to avoid
a reverse, which would have had consequences of peculiar gravity in
Mexico, Scott had to avoid risks.
24.3. It has been argued (_e.g._ by Semmes) that Scott was in fact able
to obtain subsistence from the country all the spring and summer, and
therefore the matter involved no difficulties (Service, 208); but Scott
had to ascertain beforehand through agents (_Delta_, May 18) both that
subsistence existed and that it could be obtained; and to make the
success of his precautions a basis for asserting that he should not
have waited to take them, is unreasonable. Scott said later that he
might have rushed ahead by depending upon the provisions near at hand,
but that within a week the army would have had to scatter and fight
for supplies (Mems., ii, 553). The resources of the country were found
to be mostly at a distance from the line of march (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p.
949). Time was required to select intelligent, reliable agents, and
they needed time to go and come. A particular reason for deliberation
lay in the fact that the new crops would not be ready before about the
middle of June. It should be added that some statements of Semmes and
others regarding material elements of the situation are contradicted by
Scott's reports written at the time. Semmes was probably influenced by
Worth, whose aide he was.
24.4. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 904. Marcy forgot this when he severely
censured Scott for dismissing the men before their time was out
(_ibid._, 1245).
24.5. By the =61=field return of May 7 Scott had: Engineer Co. (Smith),
43; Ordnance Co. (Huger), 60; First Div. (Worth), 2331; Second Div.
(Twiggs), 2216; Dragoons (Harney), 433; volunteers (Quitman), 2030.
The disparity between Scott's numbers as figured at Washington and his
numbers as counted at the front is suggested by the fact that on April
26 his volunteers (aside from those now discharged) were estimated by
the adjutant general as 4994 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 928). The regiments
that went home were the Georgia, the Alabama, the Third and Fourth
Illinois, and the First, Second and Third Tennessee.