split by preventing the emergence of a slavery issue, the "patriotic
sublimity" of the Whigs evolved another idea. This was the proposition
of Senator Berrien that no territory should be taken from Mexico, and
that while it would be "desirable" to have the Texas boundary settled
and our claims paid, we should always be ready to make terms that
would leave Mexican honor "inviolate." Here was truly a remarkable
proposition. By voting three millions to facilitate a settlement with
Mexico, in full view of Polk's grounds for proposing that measure,
Congress had already committed itself to the principle of acquiring
territory.[34.31]
But other objections to Berrien's plan far outweighed the point of
consistency. If the United States was to decide what would satisfy
Mexican honor, the plan could only have proved futile--even insulting;
and if Mexico herself, it was ludicrous. Nothing would have satisfied
Mexico's ideas of honor except the evacuation of her territory and the
surrender of Texas. When convinced by the passage of this resolution
that she had nothing to lose in the end, she would have felt still
less anxiety to sacrifice her daily golden egg--the money that our
armies paid out--by ending the war. Implying that she had done nothing
worthy of stripes, Berrien turned the war Message and the war bill into
falsehoods, and accused the United States of a horrible crime--the
crime of warring upon an innocent neighbor merely to do havoc. He
reduced the minima of our solemn demands to mere desiderata. He
represented our expenditures, our dead and our victories as elements of
a senseless farce, and left us no respectable excuse for having troops
in Mexico, except that we sent them down to scatter silver dollars
and study the fandango. He proposed to make this nation unique in
history as combining the villain, the ruffian, the simpleton and the
comedian. He attempted to revive the unendurable _status quo ante_,
leave the United States without indemnity for the past or security
for the future, stimulate Mexican vanity and self-confidence, and
weaken the prestige of our arms in Europe. In order to preserve Whig
solidarity he aimed to deprive us, not merely of California, but of
self-respect.[34.31]
All this Berrien proposed. Yet Webster, dreaming still of the
Presidency, endorsed the plan. He was put up as a candidate by the
Massachusetts Whigs on that basis; and his party, hoping to win spoils
in the approaching national election by this device, quite generally
accepted it. Said a correspondent of the _National Intelligencer_,
vouched for by the editor as a Whig statesman, "_No Mexican territory_.
Let this be the issue. Let this be the motto inscribed on the Whig
banner, and victory is certain."[34.31]
All these manoeuvres of the Whigs, aided by the Democratic
underworking, resulted, of course, in the protraction of a war which
they posed as hating. The first seven weeks of the session were almost
thrown away. The opposition hung back from granting needed troops for
reasons already suggested, and also lest the administration should
turn the appointments to party account. Democratic dissensions and
probably a wish to annoy Whig generals had a similar effect. Grudges on
account of the tariff and the river and harbor veto played their part
against war legislation. Men stooped so low as to argue that Polk, the
President of the United States, could not be trusted with $3,000,000,
when customhouse officials had larger sums in their keeping. And then
his "imbecile" administration was charged with permitting the war to
drag, "when by a few vigorous blows it could have been ended long
since." Its course exhibited "unsurpassed inefficiency," declared the
Boston _Atlas_, as well as "one unrelieved picture of wrongdoing,
corruption, weakness and blunders." Indeed, the government, "rolling
this war, as a sweet morsel, under its tongue," was detected in
wilfully doing "everything in its power to prevent" the energetic
operations upon which, as any one could see, its financial, political
and personal credit vitally depended.[34.32]
[CLAY'S LEADERSHIP]
In November, 1847, Henry Clay, the plumed leader of the national Whig
party, celebrated also as the man who elected Polk, after taking even
a longer time than others to consult the omens, gave out a speech and
a set of resolutions. These were intended as a chart for the party to
be guided by under the pilotage of that distinguished though unlucky
navigator. The author forgot having said in 1813, "an honorable peace
is attainable only by an efficient war," but he remembered to condole
with suffering Ireland. He forgot that a country engaged in hostilities
of uncertain duration and cost cannot wisely bind itself to specific
terms of peace, but reiterated the favorite Whig taunt that it was a
blind war, without known aim. Historically too, he wandered a little,
for he charged the President with ordering Taylor to plant cannon
opposite Matamoros "at the very time" when Slidell was "bending his
way" to Mexico; but Polk was unpopular, and few thought it necessary
to speak the truth about him. We oppose the annexation of Mexico,
Clay proclaimed, which, on the other hand was perhaps too true to be
interesting; and we demand only a proper boundary for Texas, which bore
him a long distance toward Berrien.[34.33]
But here was the master stroke: We desire to acquire no foreign
territory "for the purpose" of extending slavery to it. This had
the threefold merit of completely "dodging" the great question of
principle, giving the northern Whigs a graven image to worship, and
conceding to their southern brethren a full privilege to do anything
possible in the acquired territory, after it should be ours. But
unfortunately for his party the Navigator admitted that Congress had
made the conflict a national war, that a long series of "glorious"
victories had been won, and that since Congress had formulated no
declaration regarding the objects in view, Polk--frequently accused by
Whigs of carrying on the war for diabolical purposes both abhorrent and
fatal to the Constitution--had been free to use his judgment. In Mexico
Clay's speech was widely circulated, and a competent observer thought
it might delay peace one or two years. Such was the highest Whig
leadership in what Webster called a "dark and troubled night."[34.33]
One idea in the minds of not a few who endorsed the "no territory"
plan was that its adoption would render the prosecution of the war
aimless, and so check it abruptly. Others favored gaining the same
end by stopping supplies. Ex-Senator Rives, a leader of prominence,
advised Crittenden to concert measures for this purpose with Democratic
"patriots"; and in fact an understanding on the point seems to have
been reached. "Be prompt, when you are wrong, to back straight out,"
urged the New York _Tribune_, demanding the recall of our troops.
Other Whigs, after doing all they could to make the war aimless,
argued, We are fighting for nothing, why persist? "Let us call home our
armies," insisted Corwin. "Stop the war. Withdraw our forces," cried
Sumner; and Corwin believed, early in February, 1847, that only two
more votes would commit the Senate for this plan of complete national
stultification, and for bringing back in a keenly aggravated state all
our Mexican difficulties. Practically nobody dreamed of offering to
Mexico the reparation that such an idea of dropping the war implied.
The proposition was therefore hollow and insincere; little more than
politics weakly flavored with sentimentality.[34.34]
The month after Clay's chart appeared, the first session of the
Thirtieth Congress assembled. About half the Representatives were new
men, a majority belonged to the Whig party, and all had been chosen
during the gloomy autumn of the previous year. By the Navigator and
by other party leaders their work had been mapped out for them. The
objects of the war were to be defined as at most a settlement of the
Texas boundary at the Rio Grande, or a little farther north, and
payment of the old American claims; supplies were to be qualified
and limited accordingly, or entirely cut off; and in this manner
hostilities would be ended.[34.35]
But politics, not principle, still dominated most of the Whigs. They
viewed everything with reference to the impending election of a
President; and public sentiment regarding the war had now changed. The
battle of Buena Vista had aroused extraordinary enthusiasm; Scott's
victories, refuting the charges of inefficiency and silencing the
prophets of calamity, had been decisive as well as brilliant; the
expenses of the war were far less burdensome than its opponents had
prophesied; Mexico had proved stubborn and unreasonable; the sort of
opposition that had been practised was seen to be aiding the enemy, and
hence fell somewhat into disfavor; and the people, believing peace and
a reward for their sacrifices within reach, had made up their minds
to carry the business through. Besides, many of the Whigs themselves
were too proud to "back out," and many at the north--high-tariff
men--wished the war to continue. By a rather small vote and a very
narrow margin--85 to 81--it was duly branded as unnecessary and
unconstitutional, and Webster, now an out-an-out opposition candidate
for the Presidency, approved of this little black "blister-plaster";
but in view of national sentiment "patriotic sublimity" of a practical
sort now looked expensive, and a motion contemplating the withdrawal of
our troops perished in the House under a vote of 41 to 137.[34.35]
[THE OPPOSITION FAILS]
It was perfectly feasible, however, to snarl, nag, procrastinate
and work for personal aims; and few opportunities passed unheeded.
"Tiger hunts"--ambitious members attacking rivals--used up much time.
Cliques locked horns over pressing military needs. Webster seemed to
forget everything except his ambition. Benton raged over the fate of
the Lieutenant General bill and the censure of Frémont for disobeying
Kearny. Calhoun, having allowed his hair to grow, resembled a porcupine
less than before, but felt no less anxious to prove himself the sole
hope of the South. Polk, instead of gaining popularity from the
success of his administration, was looked upon as intoxicated by its
fumes, and a section of his party advised throwing him openly to the
sharks. Congressional resolutions were aimed at him. All the dying
embers of controversy were solicitously fanned. The causes of the
war, the conduct of the war, the instructions to Slidell, the return
of Santa Anna, the occupation of New Mexico, the tariff in Mexican
ports and the treatment of Taylor and Scott furnished themes for stale
speeches. To chill the growing popularity of the war, direct taxes
were suggested; and the chairman of the ways and means committee piled
up the prospective costs far above the estimates of the government.
After some two months of it Marcy gave up hope. But the Whigs knew they
must do nothing serious against the war, and before long it happily
ended.[34.36]
The results of all this personal, designing or factious opposition to
the government and the war proved most unfortunate. The administration
could never be sure what action Congress would take, nor when; and
therefore its course was necessarily timid, weak and hesitating. Time
and strength had to be consumed in foreseeing and in meeting captious
objections, and in battling against public prejudices that hampered
both military and financial efficiency. "We shall have three months of
turmoil--our errors exposed, our good deeds perverted," wrote Marcy to
a friend at the beginning of December, 1846; and such an expectation
did not conduce to satisfactory work. Bold, rapid strokes could not be
ventured; caution and cheese-paring had to be the rule. In the field
all this bore fruit in vexation, delay, expense and loss of life. "In
the name of God," exclaimed a man at the front, "will the politicians
of our country never cease gambling for the Presidency upon the blood
of their countrymen?"[34.37]
And the uproar had another consequence. When the treaty was ratified
the government organ referred to the conflict with Mexico as "one of
the most brilliant wars that ever adorned the annals of any nation";
and the chief Whig journal placed these words without criticism in its
own editorial column. The trial was over, and the fiercely contesting
lawyers walked off, arm in arm, to dine. The inefficient and shameless
war was now brilliant and most creditable. Indeed, the Whigs chose
for standard-bearer a man who represented professionally the military
spirit they had raised pious hands against, who belonged to the
slaveholding order so plainly viewed askance by the New Commandment,
who had recommended the advance to the Rio Grande, who had aimed the
cannon at Matamoros, who had advised appropriating Mexican territory
by force of arms, and who owed in fact all his prominence to playing a
leading rôle in the "illegal, unrighteous, and damnable" war. Nobody
thought of impeaching Polk, or of bringing home to him the guilt that
was to have sunk him to the bottom of the bottomless pit.[34.38]
[RESULTS OF THE OPPOSITION}
Yet all the Whig journalism and oratory stood in the record. Hosea
Biglow became an immortal.[34.39] New Englanders gained the ear of
reading people. Keen young radicals of the northeast, where the muse of
history chiefly dwelt, dominated to a great extent the public thought.
Polk retired from power and from life, and nobody cared to defend,
or even to hear defended, a creature so unpopular and so generally
denounced. Declamation that well-informed men of the day had rated at
its true value came to be taken seriously. One side of the case faded
from sight, the other was engraved on bronze. And so the patriotic
habit of eagerly throwing stones at the Mexican War and its backers
became traditional.[34.40]
This has been a mistake. No doubt, as we have seen, errors and
misdeeds enough must be charged to the administration. All the actors
were vessels of clay, like the rest of us. But in reality the least
creditable phase of our proceedings was the conduct of the opposition.
XXXV
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE WAR
1846-1848
At the time our difficulties with Mexico approached their climax,
the popularity and prestige of the United States abroad were not the
highest possible. England, our gentle mother, showed a particular want
of regard for us.[35.1] Herself recently weaned from slavery, she
viewed with a convert's intolerance our adhering to that institution.
Having just cured her most outrageous electoral abuses, she enjoyed
hearing the London _Times_ describe our government as "a polity
corrupted in all its channels with the foulest venality." Ever
scrupulous and self-denying when a question of gaining territory was
concerned, she felt shocked by American "rapacity"; and the _Times_,
while infinitely proud that England's banner waved in every quarter
of the globe, ridiculed American "imperial pretensions" as echoed and
re-echoed "in a nasal jargon, compounded at once of bad grammar and
worse principle."[35.3]
[THE UNITED STATES CRITICIZED ABROAD}
The disposition of certain states to repudiate bonds held in Great
Britain, and their tardiness in paying interest, excited all the
righteous indignation of the creditor. The descriptions of this country
put forth by honored guests like Dickens and Mrs. Trollope, who made
themselves merry and popular at our expense, furnished excuses for
countless jibes; and in September, 1845, the _Times_ discovered "great
danger" that the nightmare of an old English writer would come true in
the United States: "No arts, no letters, no society, and, what is worst
of all, continual feare and danger of violent death, and the life of
man solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short."[35.3]
If one aspect of our civilization appeared more laughable than all
the rest, it was the military side. The title of General, observed
the _Times_, was "legitimately common to the greater part of the
respectable male population," and _Britannia_ outdid this excellent
jest by telling of "majors who serve out beer, and colonels who rub
down the heels of one's horse." Literary men were angered by our
failure to amend the copyright law as they desired; and our pronounced
republicanism, trumpeted by Polk in his annual Message of 1845,
irritated almost everybody. The plain intimation of the same Message
that European monarchies were not expected to interfere in America
seemed even worse; and the President was represented as meaning that
we intended to get Mexico into a dark alley alone, and rob her. The
annexation of Texas, which England had exerted all her diplomatic
strength to prevent, could not be forgiven, and the Oregon difficulty
threatened war.[35.3]
Even Englishmen who believed in the rights of the people, said the
_Times_, turned from us with "indignant scorn;" and in another of
its many outbursts, which would have been terrible had they not been
ludicrous, that paper warned us that, as we followed the example, we
invited the punishment of self-willed Corcyra. "The most impudent,
bullying, boasting nation of mankind," was _Britannia's_ genial
description of us; and she loved to parade "our national scorn of
America and her statesmanship." In short, McLane, the American minister
at London, reported privately--with some exaggeration, one desires to
believe--that a deep-seated dislike, "amounting almost to hate, of our
people, of our country and of our Institutions," prevailed universally
in England.[35.3]
On the continent these opinions were more or less distinctly reflected.
In France the heart of the people beat warmly for us and against
their neighbors across the Channel; but the court and the government,
regarding a close alliance with Great Britain as of cardinal
importance, and the newspapers which, like the _Journal des Débats_,
represented them with more or less fidelity, exerted a strong influence
the other way. At the end of 1845 Polk deepened this, for his Message
referred in cutting terms to the interference of that country on the
side of Great Britain[35.2] in our business of absorbing Texas.[35.3]
The French government occupied a weak position in reference to that
affair, for Guizot, the chief minister, believing that Henry Clay
would be elected President and shelve it, had thought he could safely
gratify England. Thiers, ardent and eloquent, now attacked his course
in Parliament, insisting that an ally had been sacrificed to an enemy.
Guizot, pale, scholarly and calculating, said in reply, Thiers has
appealed to your instincts, I will appeal to your judgment; and pressed
his theory of an American balance of power. But good-will for the
United States and hatred for England were too strong for him. "What
empty vocalization!" exclaimed _Le National_; "What unhappy exertions!
What reverberating accents, like echoes in the desert! It was poor.
It was cold. It was null." Yet no doubt the sting of Polk's rebuke
lingered, though Guizot intimated in bitterly sweet language that it
should not be resented, since he knew no better; and many Frenchmen who
condemned their government's policy, condemned the United States for
publicly recalling it.[35.3]
Mexico, however, stood in a much worse position abroad than we. For
many years, it is true, she had been representing herself as Andromeda,
shivering at the American crocodile or what-not that was approaching
to devour her; and at the end of July, 1845, in announcing to foreign
governments that hostilities were shortly to begin, she repeated
that while she had done everything honorable to preserve peace, the
United States had exhibited "no rule of conduct toward Mexico except
a disloyal and perfidious policy, and no purpose except to seize
successively every part of her territory that it could obtain."[35.4]
By such reiterated protestations considerable sympathy was aroused
at London and Paris. Englishmen holding Mexican bonds naturally had
tender feelings on the subject. British capitalists involved in
Mexican silver mines and other investments, and British merchants and
manufacturers, who enjoyed the lion's pre-eminence in Mexican commerce,
felt deeply interested. British finances required silver bullion, and
British statesmen dreaded a further extension of our boundary toward
the southwest. But the politics of Mexico excited such contempt, her
financial conduct such disgust, her restrictions upon foreign trade
such irritation, and her treatment of foreign powers such resentment
that she could not be viewed with cordiality, confidence or even
respect.[35.4]
[MEXICO UNPOPULAR IN EUROPE]
Disraeli spoke of every government of Mexico as "born in a revolution
and expiring in a riot." The chargé d'affaires of Spain told Santa
Anna that, on account of the instability of chiefs and systems, it
was impossible to have a settled policy toward his country. In twenty
years British imports did not increase, and the number of British
houses engaged in Mexican business diminished. The treaty made with
France after the war of 1838 was not carried out by Mexico; and at
the beginning of 1846, owing to a long-standing quarrel, which France
would have settled on reasonable terms, that country was represented
by the Spanish minister. Mexico has "wilfully incurred the odium of
foreign Nations," declared the British Foreign Office; and the Mexican
correspondent of the _Times_ was permitted to say in its columns that
an American absorption of Mexico would be greatly for the advantage of
humanity. The London _Athenæum_ expressed the same opinion. Even _Le
Journal des Débats_, besides complaining that every nation in Europe
had been treated outrageously by Mexico, admitted that she had "sunk
to the lowest point of weakness and folly." The country "is destitute
of intelligence, of energy, of principle," said that paper; "it is a
government of barbarians, but of barbarians enervated by the corrupting
vices of civilization."[35.4]
To conciliate public opinion abroad, our state department on May 14,
1846, one day after Congress authorized war, issued a circular to
the American ministers and consuls.[35.5] "It is our interest, as it
has ever been our inclination," said Buchanan, "that Mexico should
be an independent and powerful Republic, and that our relations with
her should be of the most friendly character"; but "the avaricious
and unprincipled men who have placed themselves at the head of her
Government" have prevented her from acting the part of a stable and
orderly nation. "For some years, in our intercourse with her, we have
incurred much of the expense, and suffered many of the inconveniences
of war whilst nominally at peace. This state of things had, at last,
become intolerable. We go to war with Mexico solely for the purpose
of conquering an honorable and permanent peace. Whilst we intend to
prosecute the war with vigor, both by land and by sea, we shall bear
the olive branch in one hand, and the sword in the other; and whenever
she will accept the former, we shall sheathe the latter." This
despatch and the President's recent Message[35.6] were to guide our
foreign representatives in conversation about the war.[35.7]
By the Spanish-Americans the outbreak of hostilities was received
with surprising calmness. Mexico endeavored to make them feel
that a conflict of races had begun, and that she was leading the
van in a common cause; but whether dissatisfied with her course
in the past--especially with reference to preferential trade
relations--thankful to the United States for the shelter of the "Monroe
Doctrine," or simply indifferent to outside concerns, they held aloof.
Guatemala alone displayed a strong sympathy. The official gazette
of New Granada printed Polk's war Message in full without a word of
criticism.[35.9]