a deep interest in the contest; but Mexico had been a rebellious
daughter, had treated the Spanish subjects within her borders with
cruel unfriendliness, and had recently shown a fierce aversion to the
scheme of subjecting her to a Spanish prince. For commercial reasons
that power desired an early termination of the hostilities, and
signified as much to our government;[35.8] but at the same time she
pledged herself to "the strictest neutrality," and she refrained from
even offering mediation. Her minister at Mexico, Bermúdez de Castro,
assisted the authorities there with advice, but before the war ended he
turned over the legation to a chargé, and went home. A band of Carlist
officers talked of going to the scene of action in May, 1847; but if
their plan was carried out, they successfully avoided publicity. About
the same time _El Heraldo_ of Madrid asked whether Europe would permit
the United States to absorb, little by little, all of America; but this
was academic, and the journal admitted that Mexico was then practically
beyond relief.[35.9]
Baron von Canitz, the Prussian minister of foreign relations, when
officially notified of the war, said it must be far from easy to live
on amicable terms with a country like Mexico, "where anarchy reigns
and where the Supreme power was constantly contested by a succession
of military chieftains, who were compelled to maintain their usurped
authority by the same unworthy means by which they had obtained
it." Aided by Alexander von Humboldt, who had lived in Mexico, King
Frederick William followed the operations of the war attentively; but,
happy enough that we were not his own neighbors, he felt no concern
about a possible enlargement of our territory at the expense of Mexico.
Indeed, he looked upon our success as in the interest of civilization,
and at a distinguished public meeting one of the ministers referred
to our future power on the shores of the Pacific with hope and
approbation. For the rest, as the Zollverein had little direct
commercial business with the region blockaded, Prussia busied herself
with her own affairs.[35.10]
[SENTIMENT IN ENGLAND]
At London the announcement of hostilities was both unexpected and
unwelcome. Ostensibly they grew out of the annexation of Texas, and
for that reason were a disagreeable reminder. They took place in spite
of earnest efforts to prevent Mexico from challenging the United
States, and hence recalled another diplomatic failure. They seemed
almost certain to injure British interests, and increase the territory
and prestige of the United States. There was a notion, voiced in
Parliament by Disraeli, that success might be followed by an attack
upon Canada or the British West Indies. It seemed highly probable that
had England postponed for a few days the offer which finally settled
the Oregon dispute, better terms might have been extorted from the
United States. Her policy had been to have our difficulties with Mexico
kept alive until after an adjustment of that affair, and now it was
thought possible that we might bring Mexico to terms at once, and use
in some other unpleasant way our military preparations. The war, so
much regretted by her, was seen to be largely, if not mainly or wholly,
due to this policy and that of the British newspapers, which had urged
Mexico to despise our military power, and to rely upon the difficulty
of invading her territory successfully; and finally an uncomfortable
fear prevailed that in some way the peace of the world might be
imperilled.[35.11]
Hence disappointment and irritation were felt at the British Foreign
Office. Aberdeen warned our minister that dangers of collision would be
involved in a blockade and in any project of acquiring territory; and
he said frankly that he could not be expected to contemplate with any
pleasure the disastrous injuries the war might very probably inflict
upon the Mexican government and people. Only one cause of satisfaction
could be seen by the British Cabinet. An apprehension had been felt
that France might be induced--through her friendship for the United
States or the idea that American control of Mexico would be for her
diplomatic and commercial advantage--to join us; and the French king,
confirming an anticipatory declaration already made by Guizot, took
position at once for strict neutrality.[35.11]
In the press and the commercial circles of London sympathy with Mexico
was general, said our minister; and the news that Americans were
fighting aroused no sentiment in our favor. Of course little could be
expected of "that Napoleon of the backwoods," as _Britannia_ called
our President. The defeat of Taylor on the Rio Grande was hoped for
and counted upon; and even after his overthrow of Arista the _Times_,
which had already predicted that our operations, in the case of
hostilities, would be "utterly uninteresting and inglorious"--even
"disgusting"--concluded that we should probably fail. "Bluster does not
win battles, though it may begin brawls," the editor moralized. All
Europe must consider the war "an insulting and illegal aggression,"
said the _Chronicle_; and the _Post_ attributed our course to "the
angry passions of the untamed democracy of the States," which Polk was
ready to gratify at any cost.[35.11]
The press of France, on the other hand, was in general friendly.
Let the Americans have Mexico, and a prodigious development of the
country will follow, urged _Le National_; would not that be preferable
to seeing the English get it? To support the United States is to
strengthen an ally against Great Britain, it added. _Le Correspondant_
said, "The Anglo-Saxon race will flow unchecked over the fair provinces
where the people, descendants of the conquering Spaniards, have allowed
themselves to slumber in corruption"; and it argued that such a change
would benefit the Roman Catholic church in Mexico by purifying and
energizing it. Even _Le Journal des Débats_ admitted that our invasion
"would be something which humanity would have to applaud, in spite of
the just reprobation attached to a spirit of conquest." In view of
such public sentiment W. R. King, our minister at Paris, had reason to
predict, that no trouble was to be apprehended from the government,
since the country would restrain it.[35.12] Even Guizot, when bitterest
at heart, found it necessary to profess high respect for that "great
nation," the United States.[35.13]
[ENGLAND DISPOSED TO INTERVENE]
June 6, 1846--that is to say, without loss of time--Aberdeen, the
British minister of foreign affairs, intimated to McLane in a private
conversation, unofficially, and upon his personal responsibility, that
should Polk desire it, "he would be happy, in a more formal way, to
propose a mediation."[35.14] This proposal, received by McLane in his
private capacity only, was duly made known to our government, but it
elicited no reply. Our silence did not please Palmerston, who succeeded
Aberdeen about the beginning of July; and that young "fop with grey
hair," as _Le Journal des Débats_ described him, resolved to propose
mediation in such terms as to require an answer.[35.17]
Soon after the middle of August, therefore, he instructed Pakenham to
ascertain whether a formal offer of mediation would be acceptable, and
if so to make it in "the form which might be agreed upon" by Pakenham
and Buchanan.[35.15] The only result, however, was a memorandum
received from our government on September 11, which said that it
duly appreciated the friendly spirit of the British Cabinet, that it
desired to make peace upon just and honorable terms and had therefore
made an overture to Mexico on July 27, and that it thought the formal
mediation of a foreign power unnecessary and inexpedient, but would
regard with favor any influence used to induce Mexico to accept this
overture.[35.16] Later Pakenham improved every opportunity to remind
Buchanan of the British government's "anxious desire ... to be useful
in bringing about a reconciliation between the two Republicks," but he
found himself unable to accomplish anything in this direction.[35.17]
The real question, however, was whether Great Britain would forcibly
interpose. Such a policy she forbade Mexico to count on, saying
that she could not be expected to assume the chief burden of a war
which had resulted from the failure of that country to act upon her
advice;[35.18] but this did not bind her own hands, and no doubt
the government felt a pressure, if not a leaning, in the direction
of interference. Both certain interests and certain passions
demanded such a course. The _Times_ and other newspapers pointed that
way,[35.19] and in the House of Commons Disraeli and Bentinck spoke on
that side. "A pretence only is wanting," wrote McLane. This, however,
was not precisely correct. Aberdeen told Murphy, the Mexican minister,
that it would be Quixotic to take up arms on the simple ground that
Mexico had been wronged; and in view of England's own course, it would
also have been ridiculous. "Scinde is ours," exclaimed _Britannia_
at about this time, thus announcing one more step in the conquest
of India, "and we pay the penalty of the treachery by which it was
acquired in the curse of possession." What Great Britain wanted was a
substantial advantage in prospect.[35.20]
For a time it looked as if California might provide this. Peel himself
was rather dazzled by the idea of gaining San Francisco, and Aberdeen
viewed with "the utmost repugnance," wrote Murphy, the likelihood that
we should acquire the province. During the last three months of 1845
the subject was thoroughly discussed by Murphy and Aberdeen, and the
latter's mind appeared to be "tormented" for a solution of the problem.
The method of interposition followed in the war between Buenos Aires
and Montevideo appealed to him, but he felt that France could not
easily be drawn into it. The Mackintosh plan of British colonization
received careful attention as possibly the means of creating a British
interest in California; but Aberdeen thought it would be unbecoming,
and would give the United States a just ground of offence, to put
the plan in operation at so late a day, evidently for the purpose of
blocking us (_á propósito para las circunstancias_), and he feared it
would not be effective after all against American immigration. The
Mexican decree of April, 1837, which mortgaged a certain quantity of
lands (for instance, in California) to the bondholders appeared to
promise better, and on that basis a scheme was actually drawn up at
London in October, 1845, for submission to the government of Mexico.
But at this juncture Herrera was overthrown, the British Cabinet felt
profoundly disgusted, and Murphy's position became uncertain.[35.21]
After Aberdeen retired from the Foreign Office in 1846, the suggestion
of Paredes that Great Britain take military possession of California
seems to have tempted Palmerston; but, aside from other objections,
he shrewdly suspected that Mexico had by this time lost control of the
territory. In December, 1847, Dr. Mora, who succeeded Murphy, proposed
on his own responsibility a sale of California to England, arguing that
by our endeavor to purchase it the United States had confessed we had
no claim there; but Palmerston, though evidently tempted again, merely
decided that any authorized communication on the subject should receive
the attention justly due to its importance, and soon the treaty of
peace put an end to the matter. No "substantial advantage" had seemed
to come within reach.[35.21]
Nor had even a satisfactory pretext for intervention been found. McLane
had urged our government to give none, and in particular to avoid all
infringement upon the rights of neutrals.[35.22] The policy of our
blockade was extremely liberal. British mail packets were exempt from
its restrictions, and they were permitted to embark specie and land
quicksilver at Vera Cruz and Tampico. During the blockade of Mazatlán
British subjects were treated with such consideration that our courtesy
was formally acknowledged, and it was admitted that Scott "invariably"
guarded their interests in the sphere of his operations. Our opening
the ports to all nations, establishing a low tariff, and endeavoring
to protect commercial relations with the interior were boons that
foreign powers had no reason to expect, and British traders appreciated
our attitude.[35.23] By December, 1847, the merchants of London were
distinctly opposed to intervention; and when the Duc de Broglie
demanded in astonishment why England had viewed our military operations
with such indifference, he was told that Mexico in the hands of the
United States would be of far more value in regard to commerce and
investments than ever before. At the same time persons of less narrow
views hoped to see that country regenerated through us.[35.24]
[BRITISH INTERVENTION NOT FEASIBLE]
On the other hand embarrassments of the most serious character stood
in the way of interposition. As the _Globe_ said, the project of
annexing Texas had afforded better grounds, yet England had looked
aghast before the prospect of losses and risks involved in a collision
with this country. So had she done in the case of Oregon; and the
advantages of remaining at peace with the United States were still
obvious. There were other considerations also. She wanted time to
readjust her business under the régime of free trade, and _Le National_
thought she desired to develop her India cotton fields before severing
her relations with us. The political situation in Ireland and the
Irish famine were grave embarrassments, and the generous aid given by
the United States to the starving population of that island excited
gratitude. British mercantile finances proved to be unsound, and a bad
panic occurred; and manufacturing interests awoke to the fact that
many rivals threatened them. The profound unrest which precipitated
Europe into the revolutionary convulsions of 1848 could already be
felt;[35.25] and finally the relations of England to France occasioned
a grave sense of uncertainty.[35.26]
With the support of that power, said Murphy, Aberdeen would have been
willing to fight.[35.27] Her military assistance did not particularly
matter, but he was afraid that popular unfriendliness toward the
government--already shown by a violent opposition in the press and the
parliament--and the scarcely slumbering hatred of England might drive
the country into active support of the United States, and bring on a
general conflagration.[35.28] Such was the situation when Peel, whom
Louis Philippe leaned heavily upon, stood at the head of the British
government; and after he resigned at the end of June, 1846, it became
far more difficult. For the new administration Louis entertained no
such regard. The marriage of the Duc de Montpensier, his son, to a
Spanish princess destroyed the _entente cordiale_. Harsh language was
exchanged. Guizot and Palmerston endeavored to overthrow each other,
and the British ambassador at Paris had a personal difficulty with
Guizot.[35.29]
As for France herself, the premier's loud advocacy of an American
balance of power compelled him logically to prevent the United States,
if he could, from acquiring new territory. Influential writers--Gabriel
Ferry, for example--insisted that French interests, principles and
prestige in Mexico demanded protection. _L'Epoque_, which many
regarded as Guizot's personal organ, took that ground firmly in a long
and studied article, and called for joint intervention. _Le Journal
des Débats_, our persistent enemy, suggested the same view. But the
diplomatic journal, _La Portefeuille_, was resolute for neutrality,
and the other leading papers reiterated the familiar objections against
playing the British game; and hence, while it appeared reasonable to
expect that Guizot would aid England more or less in a diplomatic way
to limit the extension of our boundaries, no other sort of French
intervention seemed at all probable.[35.30]
[EFFECTS OF AMERICAN SUCCESS]
The success of our armies clinched the argument. From the first,
McLane urged that a vigorous campaign should be waged. That, he said,
would be the best way to prevent interference, and he predicted that
victories would overcome sympathy with Mexico. Had Taylor been defeated
on the Rio Grande, as Londoners expected, those ill-disposed toward us
in Europe, wrote our minister at Paris, "might have been emboldened
to unfriendly or offensive demonstrations"; but as it was, reported
McLane, the conduct of the American army and the magnanimity of the
American general served to "inspire a respect for our country and our
cause which was not felt before, and which nothing less could have
produced." The failure of Ulúa to detain Scott until the yellow fever
should force him to decamp had no slight effect; and the victories at
Vera Cruz and Cerro Gordo, reported Bancroft, who succeeded McLane at
the court of St. James, totally changed the complexion of sentiment
in Europe regarding the United States. After the battles of Contreras
and Churubusco the same minister said to a friend, "You should be here
to see how our successes have opened the eyes of the Old World to our
great destinies." In England racial sympathy, too, could not wholly be
suppressed. Scott received very handsome compliments from the commander
of the British fleet at Vera Cruz and from a son of Sir Robert Peel,
who was aboard one of the vessels; and Robert Anderson remarked in his
diary: When our arms do something glorious, "jealousy, for the moment,
is conquered by pride." Indeed Lord Palmerston himself spoke most
warmly to Bancroft of our victories as illustrating the superiority of
the Anglo-Saxon.[35.31]
King believed they "secured a perhaps doubtful neutrality." "Let
Mexico show the determination and the power to resist," remarked
_Le Journal des Débats_ significantly, and a way to aid her will
doubtless be found, but "Europe cannot intervene effectively in behalf
of a people who throw themselves away." It is impossible to help
those who will not help themselves, admitted the London _Times_; and
Palmerston--disgusted, no doubt, like every one else, with Mexico's
failure to achieve anything except fresh revolutions--admitted to
Bankhead that it would be very imprudent to break with the United
States for the sake of a country which did nothing effectual to defend
itself.[35.31]
Some things, however, it was possible to do against us. At the
beginning of the conflict our minister observed in London a systematic
endeavor to break down American credit, and so embarrass our military
operations. Viscount Ranelagh proposed to bring over enough British
officers for some four or five thousand men, and it was not their
fault nor his that Murphy said the Mexicans would not serve under
foreigners. A captain employed by the highly favored company of English
mail packets landed Paredes, an avowed enemy of the United States,
at Vera Cruz. Mexico is "the very country for the guerilla," hinted
_Britannia_; it "has ready-made guerillas by the ten thousand or the
hundred thousand; it has hills and hollows where ten men might stop the
march of 50,000." And the same journal went still farther. In the case
of an invasion, it proclaimed, "the soldier is a soldier no more; he
is a burglar, a robber, a murderer"; and should foreign troops invade
England, "No quarter!" ought rightfully to be the cry.[35.32]
But the special delight of unfriendly journals was to misrepresent our
military operations.[35.33] Apparently Taylor's battles on the Rio
Grande surprised the editorial mind so much that few comments were
ready, but after a while the _Times_ remarked, "No hostile army has
been really beaten"; and it described our success at Monterey as merely
occupying "a town of log-huts." That paper long professed to regard the
war as "a border squabble," "ridiculous and contemptible," "justified
by hypocrisy," "carried on with impotence," and sure to end "in some
compromise more humiliating to the United States than to Mexico." "The
Americans who have to conduct this most wearisome of wars," it assured
its gratified readers, "are least of all nations competent to the task.
They have no army, and have constitutional objections to raising one.
They have no money, and are resolutely determined to find none. They
have no General, and have just agreed [by rejecting the plan of a
lieutenant general] never to have one."[35.34]
[VIEWS OF OUR MILITARY OPERATIONS]
"The military tactics of the Americans," remarked the _Examiner_ at the
same stage, "have displayed an equal want of talent and of purpose";
while its fair colleague, _Britannia_, exclaimed: The hostilities
against Mexico are "at once wretched and ridiculous.... So much for
the boasting of Jonathan!" With unwinking and unsuspecting humor the
_Times_ commented thus on the fight at Buena Vista: "Beyond the fact
that the Americans undoubtedly beat off, though from a strong position,
a force nearly quadrupling their own, they seem to have no great
grounds for triumph." In fact they were now "worse off than ever"; they
had actually lost prestige; and all the Mexicans needed to do was "to
sit still and be sulky."[35.34]
Scott fared no better than Taylor. His bombarding Vera Cruz was
characterized as "revolting," as an "infamy," as "one of the most
atrocious and barbarous acts committed in modern times by the forces
of a civilized nation," as "degrading to mankind." Somehow the _Times_
was repentant enough to publish a reply, which said: "The first
broadside of Lord Exmouth's guns at Algiers destroyed a greater number
of unoffending, unarmed people, than the bombardment of Vera Cruz,"
and pointed out that Scott was under some obligation to treat with
humanity his own troops, whom delay would have exposed to the yellow
fever. Compassionate John Bull! exclaimed the _American Review_; "Is
it true that the English bombarded Copenhagen? Is Hindostan more than
a fiction? Had Clive and Hastings any substantial bodily existence?
Is not Ireland a _mythe_" and of course it might have added that an
assault would have caused immensely more loss of life at Vera Cruz than
did the bombardment.[35.35]
According to the _Times_ our contemplated advance against Mexico
City was "the mere dream of an ignorant populace"; while the more
prudent _Morning Chronicle_ termed it "about as visionary as that of
Napoleon upon Moscow." "There is but one thing we know of," added the
_Chronicle_, "that is more difficult than for the United States army to
get to Mexico, and that would be to get back again to Vera Cruz." When
the Americans triumphed at Cerro Gordo over both nature and man, the
_Chronicle_ itself had to admit that our courage was "unquestionable,"
but it consoled itself by placing the American and Mexican armies on
the same level as partaking "pretty considerably of the nature of
mobs." The victories of Contreras and Churubusco were viewed by the
_Times_ as calculated "to raise the confidence" of our enemy, and the
editor announced that Scott, after these disastrous triumphs, was
"much more likely to capitulate" than to capture Mexico. Naturally
_Britannia_ pronounced our invasion of the country "a great mistake,"
and asked in deep concern, How are the Americans going to get out of
it?[35.36]
The occupation of the capital was regarded as only one misfortune
more. "The Americans have played out their last card," roared the
Thunderer, "and are still as far as ever from the game." Worse yet, it
foresaw, we were now going to crown our outrages. The churches would
be robbed, and "when churches are ransacked will houses be spared?
When saints are despoiled will citizens be spared?" The war never can
end, added the same paper, for "the invaders of Mexico ... are not
the men to build the temple of peace"; and retribution is inevitable,
since the passion for conquest, which has already "extinguished" the
political morality of the United States, will eventually impair their
political institutions, and the annexed provinces will be an American
Ireland.[35.36]