through Congress had to face Winthrop and a galaxy of other Whigs,
who admitted that war did already exist. Congressmen denouncing the
Executive for sending Taylor to the Rio Grande were unable to deny that
notice of his march from Corpus Christi had been given on the floor
of the House (March 23) long before the outbreak of hostilities, and
nothing had been done about it; that on May 12 Whigs of the Senate,
led by Crittenden, had recognized that American territory extended to
the Rio Grande; and that after the army could safely have withdrawn
from that vicinity no serious attempt had been made to bring about its
recall. Partisans of the unoffending Mexicans were startled to hear the
impeccable Boston _Atlas_ confess in a moment of candor: "The conduct
of that government towards us has been such as might have justified
the extreme resort to war"; and those eager to berate Polk for
unconstitutional aggressiveness had to digest a similar lapse on the
part of the _National Intelligencer_, which conceded that Congress had
thrown round him a mantle of indemnity by a vote "implying confidence
in the rectitude of the President in beginning this war."[34.16]
While Polk was roundly taken to task for appointing so many Democratic
generals, Whig journals boasted that most of the leading officers
belonged to their party. The military operations afforded numerous
opportunities for invectives against the administration, but ere long
a number of the invectives came home to stay. Taylor, it appeared,
had recommended the advance to the Rio Grande; he protested against
embarrassing the prosecution of the war by discussing its genesis;
and the smallness of his army at the critical time, his waiting so
long after the occupation of Matamoros, the terms given at Monterey,
his peril at Buena Vista, Kearny's off-hand annexation of New Mexico,
Scott's discharging volunteers after the battle of Cerro Gordo, and his
famous Jalapa proclamation, all brought up against the administration,
proved in every case chargeable to the Whig commanders.[34.16]
[WHIG ORATORS]
Orators caused as much pain as generals, perhaps. "Black Tom" Corwin's
brilliant advice that American soldiers in Mexico should be welcomed
to hospitable graves, though it gained high rank in the nightmare
school of literature, overshot the mark. It scandalized the nation. It
staggered patriotism. It shocked humanity. Most of all it infuriated
the troops, battling for their country in a foreign land. The speech
arrived at Buena Vista soon after the struggle with Santa Anna. A rude
effigy of Corwin was made up of the vilest materials, dressed in a
Mexican uniform and burned; and over the ashes these lines were posted
up:
"Old Tom Corwin is dead and here he lies;
Nobody's sorry and nobody cries;
Where he's gone and how he fares,
Nobody knows and nobody cares."
The soldiers had friends at home, and of course made their sentiments
known. The speech sounded the knell of its author's great political
hopes; and there is reason to believe that its reception frightened
into dumbness a number of his colleagues, who had arranged to follow
his lead.[34.17]
But other styles of oratorical attack were still feasible. Just before
Congress met in December, 1846, the Whigs hung out at the Chinese
Museum, Philadelphia, their Great Blue Light. In other words a powerful
orator, a powerful lawyer, a powerful statesman--Daniel Webster by
name--after studying on the problem for half a year, undertook, if one
may quote an admirer, to "knock the sand" from under the government.
Hour after hour he talked on, till he mortgaged fourteen columns of the
_United States Gazette_, and the reporters fled; but he came far short
of making out a case. Other efforts of his proved no more successful.
Before the Whig convention at Springfield he argued in a tedious,
prosy, court-room style. This is "a war of pretexts"--three of them,
he asserted: first, that Mexico invaded American territory; secondly,
that she would not receive Slidell; and thirdly, that she would not pay
our claims. Did Webster fail to see that a _casus belli_ recognized
almost unanimously by our Executive and Congress was for this country
at least more than a "pretext"? Did he fail to see that his other
"pretexts" had not been offered by Polk as grounds for passing the war
bill? And how could he say the pretexts were "all unfounded"? Did he
suppose that Mexico had paid our claims? Did he suppose that she had
welcomed Slidell? Of course not; but he was the attorney of New England
Whiggism, trying to make a good case out of a poor one.[34.18]
His really effective contributions to the polemics consisted, not
of arguments, but of impressive hints: "I am greatly deceived, Mr.
President, if we shall not ere long see facts coming to the light, and
circumstances found coinciding and concurring, which will fix on the
government" its alleged guilt; and a President bringing on war in the
manner charged against Polk, would commit "an impeachable offence,"
as if Polk might have been impeached after Congress had assumed the
responsibility for his acts. But unhappily Father Ritchie offered
another citation, "Well, well, we know; or there be, and if there
might; or if we list to speak."[34.18]
And not only did Webster disappoint, but he mortified Whig friends.
Texas had been an independent state as early as 1840, he said; our
annexing it gave Mexico no just ground of complaint; she was "entirely
unreasonable and senseless" in rejecting our offer to treat; if she
preferred war to peace we could but fight; and now the war must be
vigorously prosecuted. He squarely refused to call the invasion of her
territory unjust. He seemed to approve of his son's going to the field
in the "unholy" cause of his country. He admitted that Whig policy in
Massachusetts was in some respects "quite narrow." "I am tired--and
disgusted--as much as you possibly can be, with the fanaticism and
narrowness of some of our People," he wrote; and no doubt it made him
still more tired to hear Lowell's captivating but wayward muse advise
young fellows, on grounds of personal advantage, to keep out of the
army, and suggest that, should they get seduced by some "strutting"
sergeant into taking up arms for the country, insubordination and even
desertion would become them.
"Thrash away, you'll _hev_ to rattle
On them kittle-drums o' yourn,--
'Taint a knowin' kind o' cattle
That is ketched with mouldy corn."[34.19]
While such were the troubles of waking hours, the bedchamber, too,
of many Whigs had its troubled moments. Ghosts walked. John Jay,
a sincere opponent of our second war against England, came back,
holding out a scroll that bore these words of his, "As the war has
been _constitutionally_ declared, the people are evidently bound
to support it." Came back the Rev. David Osgood, D.D., of Medford,
Massachusetts, with his sermon of June 27, 1812: "My mind has been in
a constant agony, not so much at the inevitable loss of our temporal
prosperity and happiness, and the complicated miseries of war, as at
its guilt, its outrage against heaven, against all truth, honesty,
justice, goodness, against all the principles of social happiness."
Came back another Federalist, the Rev. Elijah Parish, D.D., with a
sermon recommending treason as a pious duty: "New England, if invaded,
would be obliged to defend herself. Do you not then owe it to your
children, and owe it to your God, to make peace for yourselves?" Unlike
Jay, these men appeared to be unhappy; and then certain patriots of the
Hartford Convention filed by with averted eyes, each dragging after him
a blasted reputation.[34.20]
In one thing, however, the opponents of the war succeeded. Going far
beyond the limits of reasonable criticism and helpful suggestions,
and indulging in language calculated to dishearten and hamper the
administration, they encouraged the enemy. It is merely Polk's war,
announced the Boston _Atlas_, quoted in the _Monitor Republicano_.
Mexico would have disgraced herself by receiving Slidell, declared the
same journal. Her spirit, proclaimed the _National Intelligencer_, was
fitted to "command the admiration of all men capable of appreciating
the virtue of courage and fortitude under the most disastrous
circumstances." Severance, a member of Congress, openly applauded her
resistance. We cannot beat her without ruining our finances, maintained
Waddy Thompson. The destruction of her national independence was "the
true issue," one sheet falsely assured her, as if to whet her sword. It
was entirely uncertain, proclaimed Calhoun in February, 1847, whether
our army could reach Mexico City or dictate a peace if it should. She
cannot be conquered, it was often said.[34.21]
Magazines of epithets and arguments, that became gunpowder the moment
they crossed the Rio Grande, poured from the Whig presses. Leading
papers invoked foreign intervention. The official journal of the
Mexican government offered the thanks of the nation to Webster for
threatening our President with impeachment. "If there is in the United
States a heart worthy of American liberty, its impulse is to join the
Mexicans," exclaimed a Boston journal; "It would be a sad and woeful
joy, but a joy nevertheless, to hear that the hordes under Scott and
Taylor were, _every man of them, swept into the next world_." No
wonder that Polk dropped a hint about aiding and abetting the enemy.
It was proper. In 1813-14 the _National Intelligencer_ had stigmatized
those who denounced the country's war after its own present fashion as
"traitors in thought and purpose."[34.21]
[THE DEMOCRATS IN CONGRESS]
Early in December, 1846, amidst feelings of depression, dissatisfaction
with the government and opposition to the war, the second session of
the Twenty-ninth Congress opened. The Democrats of that body found
themselves in a general state of dissension. At the beginning of the
year Marcy had written privately, "Our noble party [is] on the brink of
ruin," and there it still hung.[34.22]
Van Buren's implacable followers nursed a grudge against Polk for the
intrigues that had led to his nomination; and the partisans of Cass
nursed one against them for their votes at the Baltimore convention.
New York Barnburners and Old Hunkers glared at one another. Calhoun's
friends were sour because of his exclusion from the Cabinet. The
old free-traders cursed Walker in their hearts for stealing their
tariff hobby. The westerners had no thought of forgiving the South
for dropping Oregon, and the South refused to be scared by those
"Big Braggarts" of the west, who seemed to want all the funds in the
treasury for their internal improvements. Many wore crape and hatchets,
one might say, for the river and harbor bill. Everybody wished to blame
somebody for the recent election returns. Some were quite ready to
break openly with the administration. The partisans of Buchanan and
those of Dallas marched with daggers drawn. "All around is dissension
and distrust. Gloom overspreads the party," wrote G. W. Thompson of
Wheeling.[34.22]
The best of leadership was needed, and it could not be found. If a
person did not understand the situation, he wondered; if he did, he
wondered more. Nobody credited Polk with possessing the rod of Moses.
Many disliked the man too much to respect the official. He could
inspire neither love nor fear. While at one end of the avenue sat a
party without a President, at the other sat a President without a
party. With a large Democratic margin in each chamber, he admitted that
he was practically in the minority; and at first sight this appeared
the more surprising because Polk, knowing Congress and not knowing the
country, labored with his eye on the former. But the explanation could
easily be found. The people were not believed to be standing behind
him. Within a month he was to be rebuffed three times in the House on
important matters during as many days. One of his favorite measures
was to go down amid shouts of laughter without a single friendly vote.
The Cabinet enjoyed no greater respect. Walker seemed to be regarded
as its leading spirit, but men distrusted his character as much as
they admired his talents and energy. Moreover, in spite of Polk's
determination to shut Presidential aspirants from his council, both
Walker and Buchanan probably felt less interest in the war than in
personal schemes.[34.23]
These circumstances left the party to find such leadership as it
could in Congress, and the leadership it found was a triangular
fight--Benton, Cass and Calhoun. Benton had remarkable powers and
seldom failed to be a Democrat, a Senator and a patriot, but he was
egotistical, moody, overbearing, passionate; he despised Cass, he more
than hated Calhoun, and he treated his fellow-Democrats in general as
minions. Cass, a courtier and somewhat a scholar, lacked parliamentary
experience, drew more timidity than courage from his Presidential
hopes, and possessed no political convictions to reinforce his talents.
Calhoun's high character, rare intellectual strength and frank, affable
manners made him personally the most influential man at the capital;
but his judgment was erratic, and he aimed to stand aloof, with a
following of about four Senators, as a balance-of-power faction.
He was intensely narrow, too. For him there seemed to be only one
region in the world; only one state in the south, and only one public
man there. Cass was loyal to the administration, Benton helpful but
domineering, and Calhoun unfriendly. Not a very firm tripod, this, to
support a government engaged in war. With almost all the Democrats,
politics--that is to say, offices--held the stage, and country occupied
the background. Dissatisfaction with Polk's appointments increased the
confusion. Indeed, a "passion" for getting jobs invaded the sacred
halls of legislation, and the President found not less than twenty men
voting against his measures to avenge personal disappointments.[34.24]
[THE WHIGS IN CONGRESS]
Whig harmony and efficiency were happily not impaired by these
allurements of the fleshpots, for the Executive did not belong to their
party; but their numberless inconsistencies proved most embarrassing,
and the necessity of satisfying public sentiment, and throwing the
responsibility upon the administration, by voting supplies for
hostilities they denounced, weakened them. No absurdities, however,
were too glaring, no contradictions too thorny for what they termed
their "patriotic sublimity" to ignore or surmount. They denounced the
war enough to incriminate themselves when they supported it, and they
supported it enough to stultify themselves when they condemned it.
Combining the views of several groups, one discovered a line of policy
truly remarkable: the attack upon Mexico was unconstitutional and
wicked, but it should be carried on; so let us halt, send an embassy,
and proffer again the negotiations that Mexico has repeatedly and
recently spurned.[34.25]
The success of the government's military and fiscal policies in
comparison with what had been predicted, and the freedom of our
commerce from Mexican and European molestation were troublesome facts;
but hopes of disaster could still be entertained, and prophecies of woe
still be chanted. Constructive statesmanship, they held, was not their
affair. The country's difficulties occasioned them but slight concern.
On that score their detachment was charming.
"I heard a lion in the lobby roar;
Say, Mr. Speaker, shall we shut the door
And keep him out, or shall we let him in
And see if we can get him out again?"
In fact they found it most agreeable to hear savage growls and roars,
and proclaim that all responsibility belonged to the Democrats. To
heighten the turmoil Taylor and Scott were in politics, where they
should not have been, and they had active and hopeful friends in
Congress. Many of the Whigs, indeed, felt quite ready to put up "Old
Zack" for President and "Old Whitey" for Vice President, if only they
could injure Polk and whip the Democrats thereby; and their opponents,
understanding the game, fended off with no more scruple.[34.25]
The speeches, which ran on almost interminably, were often able,
sometimes eloquent, almost always prejudiced, and quite always
deficient in information. Indeed, a multitude of essential or important
data were wholly unknown. The same facts, the same errors, the same
arguments, the same epithets, the same laudable sentiments and the same
ignoble aims presented themselves over and over again. Assertions and
denials, proofs and refutations, accusations and answers, flings and
retorts pursued and were pursued. There was what the _Public Ledger_
called "an everlasting begging of the question"--taking premises
for granted and reaching conclusions that any one could accept, if
he pleased. "How glad I shall be when I escape from the region of
speeches--and get into the region of [undisguised] pigs and calves,"
Senator Fairfield had exclaimed a few months earlier; and no doubt many
felt in the same way now.[34.26]
Naturally the genesis of the conflict proved to be a favorite object of
contemplation, and almost every complaint against the administration
that wit could invent or stupidity fall into was brought forward.
The fact that the action of the same Congress at its first session
had turned the leaf upon that subject made no difference. The fact
that Polk's newspaper organ challenged in his name "the most rigorous
investigation--not at any future time, but _now_"--into the Executive's
"whole conduct of our Mexican relations" did not signify. No such
investigation was attempted, but invective continued. The opposition
merely cocked its eye suspiciously at everything, and found everything
iniquitous.
"He must have optics sharp, I ween,
Who sees what is not to be seen,"
but the feat was now accomplished.[34.27]
[OPPOSITION SCHEMES]
For example, Congress had scarcely assembled when attacks began on the
establishment of civil governments in California and New Mexico. With
such unusual strength of vision it could readily be seen that Polk had
been indulging in some villainy there. For a week or so excitement
raged. But after a while several things appeared. Our only aim had been
to mitigate the harshness of military rule, about which the kindly
Whigs had felt much exercised. The action complained of had been taken
under a military sanction, and was proper legally as well as by common
sense, for the Executive, as commander-in-chief, possessed the fullest
military authority in regions occupied by our arms. Harrison, a Whig,
had proceeded after a similar fashion in Canada during the War of 1812;
and our Supreme Court had even endorsed the view of a Whig lawyer,
Daniel Webster by name, that British occupation of Castine, Maine,
during the same war gave England rights of sovereignty there for the
time being. So far as Kearny, a Whig officer, had gone wrong, the fault
had been his own; and, finally, the unholy word "conquest," which had
made the Whigs most unhappy when applied by Polk to the occupation of
New Mexico, was found to have been applied to the British occupation of
Castine by our own Supreme Court.[34.28]
Behind idealistic declamation lay schemes that were distinctly
practical. It was thought, for example, that if the war could be made
odious, and the government's measures be hindered in Congress, Polk
would have to placate the Whigs by restoring the protective tariff.
This came out beautifully in the treatment of the proposal to lay
a duty on tea and coffee, which even the _National Intelligencer_
endorsed. A Democrat, "Long John" Wentworth of Illinois, fully as noted
for corporeal as for spiritual grandeur, and wrathful over Polk's
course in the Oregon and river and harbor affairs, moved the rejection
of the plan, and the Whigs fell into line.[34.29]
It was a noble scene. Regard for the poor man filled the mouths of the
orators. Though his cottons, his sugar and his salt had been cheerfully
made to pay, this duty would be "inhuman," a "tax on poverty," a tax
"against the fireside and against woman," a tax "against the wages of
weary labor" to support the "extravagance" of the "Tiberius" in the
White House. But almost in the same breath came the hint, "If the
administration needs money, let it re-enact the [protective] tariff of
1842." "The first condition [of Whig support] is," explained the Boston
_Atlas_, "repeal the _British Bill_. Repeal the bantling of the House
of Lords. Repeal the offspring of British paternity and precedent."
"Should they be in want of money," proclaimed Webster, "I would say to
them--restore what you have destroyed." A fairly definite understanding
to this effect seems to have existed among the Whigs; malcontents on
the other side gave them help; and the proposed duty was rejected in
the House by a vote of 115 to 48. Partly for the same reason troops
were not promptly voted. If the government does not need money, it does
not need men, said the opposition. Thus the "patriotic sublimity" of
the Whigs again commanded admiration, and some of the Democrats now had
a share in it. [34.29]
Another illustration of sublimity was the "Wilmot Proviso," that
"firebell in the night," as Alexander H. Stephens called it, which no
doubt some Congressmen accepted at its face value, and a multitude of
honest citizens regarded as a New Commandment revealed on a new Sinai.
The introduction of this measure, which prohibited slavery in territory
acquired from Mexico, was both unnecessary and unwise. It blocked
needed war legislation, added to the prevailing discord, and weakened
the government in the face of the enemy.[34.30]
But reasons of state outweighed all such trifling considerations.
The northern Whigs, to hurt their opponents and gain recruits, had
for some time been taunting the northern Democrats with subserviency
to the slave power, and it seemed to the latter that a declaration
of independence would help their electioneering. Van Buren men,
especially in the state of New York, desired to annoy Polk in return
for his beating their favorite, and taking an Old Hunker instead of a
Barnburner into the Cabinet. Wilmot, the only Pennsylvania Democrat
that had voted for the new tariff, did not feel precisely happy about
his action, and was anxious to repel the charge of truckling. His great
state and New England considered the "Southern" tariff an abomination,
and longed to retaliate. Many felt that Walker and Tyler had used sharp
practice in the annexation of Texas for the advantage of their section.
The West believed the South had actually broken a bargain by getting
its help in that matter and then dropping the Oregon issue. A general
sense that southern politicians had been overbearing prevailed above
the line. The fear that southern domination would blight interests dear
to the North exerted its usual strength; and as a final merit, the
Proviso helped to make the war odious by suggesting that it aimed to
extend slavery.[34.30]
So without regard to the logic of the situation, the welfare of the
country or the needs of our armies it was urged; and then Calhoun made
a profit in his turn by bringing in a series of pro-slavery dogmas
to rally the southerners under his banner. The northern Whigs, for
reasons just mentioned, and particularly to save themselves at home,
took up the Proviso, and it fared well; but after a time the party
discovered that favoring it might cost them several states in the next
Presidential contest, and so the New Commandment was quietly filed
away.[34.30]
[BERRIEN'S PLAN]