of Mexico, leading almost inevitably to either our absorbing millions
of undesirable aliens or our becoming involved in a general state
of irritation and hostility liable to end in a national outburst of
hatred and fury against us. To avoid these deplorable alternatives
Polk thought of practically setting up a government with which to make
peace. But such an organization--even if really feasible, which Polk
himself doubted--would have required protection for a length of time
that no one could forecast, would very likely have ended in the same
dilemma as undisguised occupation, and, if at all successful, might
have given the world a pretext for saddling Mexico's future upon us.
How to escape from the predicament Polk and his advisers discussed
anxiously but without success.[32.3]
President Peña y Peña, however, supported by his Cabinet, by a group of
true, honest patriots and by the Moderado party in general, determined
to end the war; and Trist, who understood their sentiments, reopened
the subject on the twentieth of October. Within a fortnight he was
informed that Mexico desired peace, and would appoint commissioners in
a few days. November 2 Congress met. Letters in favor of concluding
the hostilities poured in upon the members and had their effect. The
Puro-Santannista league attacked the government promptly on the ground
of remissness in conducting the war, but a resolution calling upon the
ministry to state what military steps it had taken failed by more than
two to one. Senator Otero offered a motion, forbidding the authorities
to consider the cession of any territory held without question by
Mexico before the war; but this was rejected, to the surprise of all,
by a vote of 46 to 29. Señor del Rio then summoned the administration
to state whether negotiations with Trist had been resumed, and he also
went down.[32.4]
On the eleventh came the election of an interim President, and again
the peace party triumphed. The opposition--which had found Almonte
too unpopular, especially among the Santannistas--gave their votes
to Cumplido, on the basis of an understanding that Santa Anna should
neither be reinstated nor be put on trial, but Anaya was chosen by 42
against 31. About a week later the representatives of seven states met
at Querétaro by invitation of the government, and after a desultory but
illuminating discussion of nearly ten days agreed, with the exception
of San Luis Potosí, to support a movement for peace. Even the war party
felt the strength of the current.[32.5]
Some action in that sense looked almost sure; and, as a new Congress
was expected to assemble at the beginning of the year, the present
members, partly in consequence of intrigues and partly from a fear
of responsibility, slipped away in such numbers as to conclude the
session, leaving the government a free field. The opposition then
came to a head in an insurrection at Querétaro. But Anaya brought
out artillery and some reliable troops, particularly 200 American
deserters, and announced that he would not only fight in deadly earnest
but make examples of the chief rebels. To the insurgents these ideas
were novel and shocking, and they declined to play the game out. The
road to peace then seemed to be open.[32.5]
[TRIST RECALLED]
But the marplot had been at work. Finding he could not control Scott's
policy with reference to the armistice and probably wishing to
undermine the general-in-chief, Pillow had written to the President.
Exactly what he said cannot be stated, but probably he described the
armistice as a gross blunder, and accused our peace commissioner of
acting as a tool of Scott for the injury of Polk's friends--especially
Pillow; and on October 4 Polk ordered the recall of Trist. In his
despatch Buchanan intimated that our envoy's presence might encourage
the Mexicans to insist upon insulting terms, like those tendered
by them on September 6, and--probably with a view to hardening our
conditions--announced that Mexico must sue for peace at Washington.
By the twenty-first came news that Scott had entered the capital, and
that Trist had fallen short of obedience by intimating that possibly
we might not insist upon the Rio Grande line. Polk's feelings grew hot
as he reflected, and on the twenty-fifth a special messenger set out
with a reprimand and a repetition of the order to leave Mexico. Both
despatches reached their destination on the same day, November 16.[32.6]
On receiving them Trist decided to inform the Mexican authorities of
his recall and go home at the first opportunity. Indeed it seemed to
him the best policy to return and lay before his government some of the
information it lacked. But a special escort could not be spared, and,
as no train was to go down until December 4, he could be deliberate.
By Thornton, therefore, who was temporarily in charge of the British
legation and set out for Querétaro the next day, he sent merely an
informal notice of what had occurred, with a request that some proposal
be sent on to Polk. By the day Thornton arrived (November 21) Mexican
peace commissioners had been appointed; and Peña, minister of relations
under the interim government, listened to his news with signs of
emotion painful to witness. No Mexican felt ready to sue for peace at
Washington, and Polk's demand signified the failure and political ruin
of the peace men.[32.7]
Peña took the ground that Trist's proposal to reopen the negotiations
bound his government, and implored the chargé to urge upon him the
sincerity and the difficulties of the Mexican authorities. He also
begged Thornton for an intimation, to be used against the war party,
that England could not be counted upon for assistance; and the chargé
complied promptly with both requests. Fortified also by the action of
Congress and the sentiment of the governors, and believing that in view
of Mexico's present attitude the United States would shortly cancel its
orders of recall, Peña then officially notified Trist that negotiators
had been appointed.[32.7]
Our commissioner now found himself in a most extraordinary position.
Buchanan's letters of recall proved that peace was desired and the
situation misunderstood by our Executive, but these facts could not
obliterate certain others. Trist was not merely a private citizen but
a discharged official under the frown of his government. Dealings with
Peña could be described as traitorous. A warning against confidence in
Mexican pretences and a notice that harder terms would now be exacted
by the United States had been served upon him; and what those terms
would be he could only imagine. Yet he fully believed in the sincerity
of Peña and his associates. Thornton confirmed this opinion, and
adjured him to improve the opportunity. No one on the ground could see
any other way to peace. General Scott favored negotiating and probably
expressed the opinion to Trist, as to Mexicans, that, should he make
a treaty, it would be accepted by the United States. But on him,
Nicholas P. Trist alone, it depended to say whether two nations were to
be miserable or happy, to keep on cutting at each other's throats or
enjoy the blessings of peace; and on him it rested to assume, should
he take humanity and patriotism for guides, a most arduous task at the
gravest personal risk and with no substantial profit in view. At noon
on December 4 he decided aright, and it was a truly noble act.[32.8]
Trist now had it intimated to the Mexican commissioners, that if they
were disposed to accept a boundary line traced up the Rio Grande to
thirty-two degrees of latitude and thence west, he would meet them
privately to make further arrangements. The outcome was a strong
recommendation from the Mexican commissioners, presented and urged by
Thornton, that Peña consent. Peña did so; but he pointed out that it
would be necessary to defer action until the new Senate should confirm
the nomination of the commissioners. Encouraged, however, by advices
from Thornton, Trist revoked his official notice that Polk had recalled
him, and waited, with feelings that can be imagined, for the waters to
move.[32.9]
[THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS]
The negotiations stood in fact at a graver crisis than he thought.
News that leading Whigs talked of settling with Mexico on terms far
easier than Trist proposed caused hesitation at Querétaro, and fresh
hopes of English assistance had a still greater effect. But fortunately
Doyle arrived at this juncture to take charge of the British legation,
and promptly directed Thornton to state that nothing more than good
offices could be expected of his government. The support of these
British diplomats, one at the capital and the other at Querétaro,
proved most helpful; but then came Polk's Message, which encouraged
the Eventualists by saying that, should Mexico continue the war, our
protection might be given to any party able and willing to set up a
republican government and make peace. Trist grew more and more anxious,
and on the day after Christmas expressed his desire to proceed.
In consequence of Doyle's attitude all Mexican scruples about the
confirmation of the commissioners vanished. On January 1 their full
"powers" reached the capital; and, beginning on the second, Couto,
Cuevas and Atristain met there secretly with Trist almost every day.
Rincón, the other member of the board, did not serve.[32.9]
Trist was prepared to stimulate his colleagues with news that a
sentiment in favor of pushing the war through without delay had now
become pronounced in the United States. At the same time his letter
of September 7 provided them with a most convenient position, for it
maintained that all the districts now held by American troops were ours
by right of conquest, and that by accepting our terms Mexico, instead
of selling lands and population, would recover a large amount of both.
He gave them, too, an agreeable surprise by proposing substantially the
same terms as during the armistice.[32.10]
They for their part knew California and all of Texas were lost;
but their instructions were exacting, and they struggled for all
conceivable advantages. Foreign arbitration and a European guaranty of
the boundary were promptly demanded, and were as promptly refused. It
was proposed that on the signing of the treaty all American forces in
the country should retire to within fifty leagues of the coast; but
this and other unreasonable conditions met the same fate. Anticipating
sharp and captious criticism from opposing lawyers in Congress, the
Mexicans devoted the most wearisome care to phraseology. Cordiality
prevailed, however. Trist's good-will, self-sacrifice and courtesy
received full recognition, and he seems to have been rather intimate
with Couto, the ablest of his colleagues. Doyle and Thornton, though
always respecting the line of strict neutrality, assisted materially in
removing difficulties.[32.10]
Trist felt intensely anxious to save time, and for good reasons.
Orders might arrive any day--and eventually did arrive--making it
absolutely impossible for him to act as an American representative.
Scott was placed by his orders under a military obligation to drive the
government from Querétaro, and though he granted a _de facto_ truce,
thinly disguised by occupying a few places and intimating a desire for
new instructions, a positive despatch might at any hour end that state
of things.[32.11]
Yet day after day passed. The Mexican government and commissioners
felt obliged to stick at everything and to confer often by letter.
January 8 Anaya's term expired by limitation; and, as Congress had not
assembled, his predecessor became once more the provisional executive.
Four days later an abortive insurrection at San Luis Potosí frightened
the timid Peña nearly out of his wits, for it seemed like the prologue
of a revolution, and he demanded that before signing a treaty he should
have sufficient American funds to provide adequate support against
malcontents; but at length his commissioners, insisting that such a
proposal would be indecorous, eliminated this difficulty. Finally the
government stopped short at the financial consideration. It asked for
thirty millions, and our commissioner, in view of the expenses already
caused by the protraction of the war, would give but fifteen. On the
twenty-ninth of January, therefore, Trist, in very considerate but very
positive language, officially declared the negotiation ended.[32.11]
[A TREATY SIGNED]
By arrangement, however, Doyle informed the Mexican commissioners that
enough time to communicate once more with Querétaro would be given.
Through the same channel they received a hint from Scott, that he
would protect the authorities against the dreaded revolution, should a
treaty be signed, but would otherwise have to dislodge the government,
and thenceforth hunt it like a deer on the mountain. Doyle talked with
British directness and good sense. The commissioners brought all this
pressure to bear on their government. It yielded; and, on the second
of February, at the suburb of Guadalupe Hidalgo, seat of the most
venerated shrine in Mexico, in the profound secrecy that had shrouded
all these negotiations, the treaty was at last signed.[32.12]
By its terms Mexico appeared to sacrifice, independently of Texas,
an immense area; but she really suffered little, for she had no
grip--and deserved to have none--upon California and New Mexico.
Indeed she had found those distant regions merely embarrassing. Nor
did she really cede any territory. As Trist contended and our Supreme
Court has in effect decided, the only cession was that made by the
United States in surrendering districts then in our hands. Our real
title was conquest--conquest from those who had taken the country by
conquest from its conquerors. What Mexico granted us was peace and an
acknowledgement of our title. In return we gave her not only peace,
which meant vastly more to Mexico than to us, but extensive lands, the
renunciation of all American claims antedating the treaty, and fifteen
million dollars in money--a wealth of gold that her treasury had never
seen before. On both sides the treaty conferred benefits; on our part
it was magnanimous; and to settle the matter in this way gave the
United States a feeling of satisfaction worth all it cost.[32.13]
[Illustration: TERRITORY ACQUIRED FROM MEXICO]
The wish of the Mexican government had been to open the peace
negotiations by making an armistice. To the Americans this could offer
little advantage, for the only enemies they now had to fear were
guerillas, and these recognized no laws. To Peña, on the other hand, it
meant security from hostile expeditions, larger revenues, diminished
expenses, Congressional elections in the territory under American
control, and hence the political support of those who felt the burdens
of war. But Scott, while ready to grant a virtual immunity from attack
during the negotiations, was neither authorized nor willing to sign an
armistice at that stage; and to have done so, indicating that peace was
contemplated, would have endangered the plans of the Mexican government
itself. In order, however, to bring about the execution of the treaty
our commissioner had to demand of Scott a pledge that he would send out
no more expeditions until new instructions, issued after the arrival
of the treaty at Washington, should reach him. In short, he requested
the General to disregard the orders of a government eager to put him
in the wrong; and Scott, placing the public weal above all personal
considerations, promptly consented.[32.14]
The second article of the treaty provided expressly for a suspension
of hostilities, and in view of its previous anxiety to obtain that
concession, the Mexican government was expected to act in the matter
at once; but it procrastinated so much as to excite suspicions of
bad faith at the American headquarters. This conduct, however, was
merely owing to its constitutional apathy; and on the twenty-second
of February, 1848, Generals Mora and Quijano opened negotiations with
Worth and Smith at the capital. True to the Mexican practice, followed
on almost every occasion since the first of our dealings with Mexico,
they began with what Doyle fairly characterized as "exorbitant"
demands. For example, they asked for the evacuation of the capital,
Puebla, Jalapa and Vera Cruz, and for concessions incompatible with the
treaty of peace itself.[32.14]
But Worth and Smith, assuming promptly a just and firm attitude, as
our civil officials ought to have done from the beginning, refused to
consider such demands, and the Mexicans then withdrew them. Everything
within reason, however, was granted. Doyle called the armistice,
indeed, "very favourable" to the weaker side, and the ratification of
it on March 4 and 5 by the Mexican and American commanders-in-chief
supplemented happily the treaty of peace. Not only that, but it
stopped for the time being every attempt at revolt, for under one
of the articles insurgents were to be opposed by the armies of both
nations. Paredes and Almonte found it wise to be quiet, and--as we have
observed--Santa Anna sailed away.[32.14]
[AMERICAN IDEAS ABOUT MEXICO]
The treaty, conveyed with extraordinary speed, reached the White
House on February the nineteenth, but whether it did well to arrive
so soon--or even to arrive at all--appeared extremely doubtful. As we
have learned, a strong appetite for territory had existed in the United
States before the war, and Mexico had looked inviting. In January,
1846, Baker of Illinois suggested in Congress the absorption of that
country. By the following July a somewhat organized annexation party
existed at New York, and later Senator Dickinson became its champion.
The wish to acquire soon became strong. Perhaps Moses Y. Beach visited
Mexico in this cause. Certainly Mrs. Storms, who accompanied him,
worked actively for it, and his paper ardently recommended annexation
as not only advantageous for the United States but sure to benefit
Mexico.[32.15]
Other papers warmly took up this idea, arguing that Providence called
upon us to regenerate her decadent population. "The Spanish have ceased
to rule in Mexico," announced the _Democratic Review_ as its watchword
in February, 1847. Secessionists like Simms of South Carolina thought
the proposed confederacy would need that country to give it bulk; and
by a different route Senator Hannegan of Indiana, representing the
strong expansionist sentiment of the West, arrived at the same point of
view in regard to annexing Mexico.[32.15]
The recall of Trist, which seemed to give the United States a free
hand, and also the plan to extend our occupation of her territory,
which logically pointed that way, strongly promoted the idea, for
besides the obvious tendency of these measures they were supposed to
mean that Polk had that end in view. The attitude of men high in the
administration circle produced a similar effect. Bancroft held that we
should "rescue a large part of Mexico from anarchy." Cass used language
that suggested rescuing the whole, and followers of his talked that way
explicitly. Apparently he thought he could win the next Presidential
election on this issue; and the war party at his back offered Mexico
as a reward for supporting its views. Buchanan, at first opposed to
the acquisition of any territory, trimmed his sails to the rising
breeze, and wrote that if Mexico did not conclude the war, it would be
necessary for us to "fulfill the destiny" assigned to us by Providence.
Walker, who knew more about the far southwest than any other man at
Washington, favored annexation strongly, and even tried to drag the
subject into his annual report. Indeed, the financial editor of the New
York _Herald_ saw in him the regenerator of Mexico; and very likely he
himself, as head of the treasury, dreamed of winning immense economic
triumphs in that field.[32.16]
Soon after 1848 came in, the annexation cause began to put on a bold
front. Naturally the younger element in the party and the country
felt inclined to take it up. Crocodile tears were shed over the "poor
foundling"--though a future heiress--placed by Divine Providence at our
threshold. The danger that England or France might ravish it away from
us came to the fore. Conquest was pronounced in the Senate a legitimate
method of expansion. Orators in both Houses pointed more plainly toward
an extension at the cost of Mexico. Declarations in the contrary
sense indicated the force of the current. Senator Niles believed that
substantially all of the Democrats among his colleagues would fall in
with the plan. Enthusiastic citizens acclaimed it. Speculators fancied
it would help their schemes in various ways. Capitalists believed that
by stimulating enterprise it would enlarge and continue the demand for
money. Manufacturers and high tariff men argued that it would increase
the national expenses and therefore the duties. Army officers could
see a wide field for them; and the opponents of slavery, led by the
_National Era_, felt that Mexican plantations would draw away the
negroes--now understood to be unprofitable--of Kentucky, Tennessee and
Virginia. Public meetings became excited on the subject. The country is
going mad for Mexico, inferred Buchanan; and Walker believed that only
a systematic newspaper agitation was needed to ensure success.[32.17]
[THE QUESTION BEFORE POLK]
Polk moved in the same direction. In September, 1847, he concluded
that, should the war continue, he might demand Tamaulipas and the
line of thirty-one degrees, and reduce the compensation to fifteen
millions; and before the end of January, 1848, he felt inclined to
throw aside entirely the terms offered through Trist. Besides, he
loathed the treaty on account of the man who made it and the man who
gave assistance. After his recall, considering himself a private
citizen, Trist reported with a free hand, criticising the President's
recent Message as encouraging the Eventualists, and expressing his
opinions on the business without much reserve. Naturally Polk the
Mediocre, guided by Pillow the Cunning, totally misconceived the spirit
of Trist and Scott. In his eyes they had contrived a wicked political
"conspiracy" against Him, His administration, His party and His Pillow.
Both had proved "utterly unworthy," and on January 25 the "arrogant,
impudent" and "very base" Trist was ordered to leave headquarters. To
accept, approve, endorse, recommend and support the work of such a
scoundrel seemed impossible.[32.18]
But Polk had professed to be considerate and forbearing toward our
erring sister, and to seek only redress, indemnity, security and
peace. His terms had been officially stated; and while his Message of
December, 1847, had suggested that a continuance of the war might be
expected to modify them, no real fighting had occurred since then,
and--although Polk had known for about six weeks that negotiations
on virtually the old basis were afoot--no modification of them had
been announced. That Message had expressly disclaimed all thought of
making "a permanent conquest" of Mexico; and on the fourth of this
very February Sevier, chairman of the committee on foreign relations,
had stated in the Senate that Polk was anxious for peace, desired only
indemnity, and wanted to preserve Mexican nationality.[32.19]