even anticipated his thought of reducing the compensation. Congress
had voted men and money on the basis of Polk's professions and terms;
and, should he now raise his demands, all his enemies would say their
charges of greed, falsehood, injustice, o'ervaulting ambition and
bloodthirsty wickedness had been proved. Hostilities might continue,
the Whigs might carry the election, the war might end in disaster and
ignominy, and all the gains now embodied in the treaty might be lost.
Even should these perils be avoided, it seemed extremely doubtful
whether Mexico would ever accept by treaty a more encroaching boundary,
and quite possible that an endeavor to obtain it would open a long
vista of expenses, guerilla warfare, foreign complications and Heaven
only knew what. Extension toward the south was liable to kindle the
fires of an anti-slavery agitation and perhaps disrupt the Union. The
treaty and the victories that it consummated meant enough glory for any
President. Finally, Polk, now moving about with dragging steps, dry,
brown face, gray hair and sunken eyes, perhaps felt weary of battling
both abroad and at home; and at the very least, should he endorse
this paper and lay it before the Senate, his responsibility would
cease.[32.19]
Buchanan and Walker opposed the treaty; but the former, as well as
Polk himself, recognized that any personal misconduct of Trist, a mere
agent of the Executive, had no proper bearing on the question. The rest
of the Secretaries favored placing the document before the Senate.
On February 22, after full debates in the Cabinet, Polk did this,
recommending by implication the acceptance of it; and so a paper which
had been simply a memorandum drawn up by a private American citizen
and several Mexicans holding official positions, became a real treaty,
merely awaiting confirmation.[32.20]
Among the Senators the treaty met with jeers and scowls. "Great
Jehovah!" exclaimed Lieutenant W. T. Sherman on learning its terms; it
is "just such a one as Mexico would have imposed on us had she been
the conqueror"; and so thought a number of the Senators. It is a mere
piece of waste paper, cried many; the impudent, perhaps traitorous,
work of a discredited agent, whom the President had ordered out of
Mexico; and it would be undignified, ridiculous, degrading, to accept
such a thing. The war party opposed it. The annexationists opposed it.
The no-territory men opposed it. The Little Unionists, who thought
the country too big already, opposed it. Not a few hated to think of
letting Polk elude them so easily.[32.21]
But suddenly the head of John Quincy Adams, as he sat in the House,
dropped. He was borne to the Speaker's room. "This is the last of
earth; I am content," murmured the venerable statesman. For two days
he lingered, unconscious; and then he passed away. This tragic event
had a deep effect. There fell a hush, as when snow descends upon the
city pavement. The sessions of Congress were suspended. Senators were
prevented from announcing their positions hastily. And when discussion
began once more, it was resumed with a new feeling of seriousness, a
new sense of responsibility.[32.21]
[THE TREATY BEFORE THE SENATE]
If the President could put up with Trist and his work, surely the
Senate could, one began to think; and in every way Polk's virtual
endorsement gave the paper enough respectability. Politics played a
leading rôle in almost every mind, but after a little it seemed like
bad strategy to vote against the glory and the territory ensured by its
terms. The committee on foreign relations, which decided to throw the
treaty aside and send an "imposing" commission to do the work over,
dropped the scheme when Polk told them bluntly this would be "worse
than an idle ceremony." Benton, thoroughly angry at the administration
because Frémont, his son-in-law, had been condemned for insubordination
in California; Berrien, wedded to his "no-territory" idea; Corwin,
anxious perhaps to have more Americans find hospitable graves in
Mexico; Webster, who asserted that California and New Mexico were "not
worth a dollar"; and certain other Senators, committed for this or that
reason, were beyond argument; but all their hopes failed.[32.22]
The deep current set against them. "What better can we do?" became an
unanswerable argument for the treaty. The people wanted peace. They
desired no more bloodshed, no more costs. One could not be sure of
obtaining another treaty from chaotic Mexico, or sure that any treaty
differing from the present one could have as good a chance in the
American Senate. To reject the work of Trist was understood more and
more clearly to involve, perhaps, not only interminable fighting, but
a train of moral, political, industrial, commercial and financial ills
of which no one could see the end. Already enough generals had built up
reputations, thought many of the politicians. It would be of priceless
advantage, urged some of the finer men, to supplement our military
triumphs with a great act of magnanimity. By March 7 ratification,
which had been for a time extremely doubtful, appeared probable.
Houston of Texas, a leading opponent, concluded to visit New Hampshire.
And on the tenth by 38 against 14--a narrow margin, since a majority of
two-thirds was requisite--the treaty won. A transfer of four votes from
the affirmative to the negative would have defeated it.[32.22]
There were a few amendments. Article X, which might have revived
extinct Mexican claims to lands in Texas now occupied by _bona fide_
settlers, went overboard at once. The provision of security for the
Roman Catholic church in the acquired territory (Art. IX) fell out as
unnecessary, as reflecting on the good faith of the United States,
as suggesting government interference with religious affairs in this
country, and as tending to confirm the Mexican pretence that we
entertained hostile feelings toward that communion. The Senate refused
to agree that California and New Mexico should be made into states
"as soon as possible" (Art. IX), regarding that as a step to be taken
with deliberation, and only when, in the judgment of Congress, all the
prerequisites of statehood should exist. Instead of allowing Mexico
to choose between payment by instalments and payment in securities
convertible at once into cash (Art. XII) it was decided to offer
only the former method, as a veiled hint that an infraction of the
treaty would cause a suspension of the instalments. Another amendment
permitted the Indians to have firearms, which, as they lived by the
chase, had to be done. A further modification, intended to hasten
the conclusion of peace, authorized the exchange of ratifications at
Querétaro whenever Mexico should accept the amended treaty; and it was
also provided by the Senate that evacuation could then begin. Finally a
secret article, which permitted Mexico to consummate the ratification
of the agreement at any time within eight months, instead of the four
months of Article XXIII, was cancelled, because it seemed to encourage
procrastination, and allow her time to escape from the treaty, while
compelling us to bear great expenses. But none of these changes touched
the essentials.[32.23]
[THE TREATY IN MEXICO]
It now became necessary to have some one explain the amended treaty to
Mexico, bring about her acceptance of it, and, should it be confirmed,
exchange the ratifications. This gave Polk a chance to prove himself a
large man. Scott, though not without serious grounds of offence against
Hitchcock, Harney and Quitman, had forgiven and honored them, because
they deserved well of the country. Trist, the bringer of peace, the
negotiator of its terms, high in the favor of the Mexican government,
and able to exert much influence on the Mexican Congress, deserved
the appointment. If the treaty represented a great national service
and had merit enough to be accepted, its maker had merit enough to be
recognized. But the President was only Polk the Mediocre after all.
His plumage had been ruffled; and instead of giving Trist this high
and lucrative post, he relegated the peacemaker to a dishonorable
oblivion, and would not even pay him for the time actually spent in the
negotiations. To think that a President of the United States could be
so small![32.24]
Aside from this petty meanness and spite, however, Polk selected a
man worthy, both personally and officially, of the position. This was
Sevier, chairman of the Senate committee of foreign relations and
leading champion of the treaty in that body. Then, as Sevier became
suddenly though temporarily ill and no delay could be risked, Clifford,
the attorney general, was appointed associate commissioner with
equal powers; and eventually the two--both arriving at Mexico by the
fifteenth of April--acted in concert.[32.24]
Mexico now became the scene of action again. February 6 the government
announced what had been done about peace. Knowing how loud an outcry
had been raised against even considering a treaty, one can imagine what
occurred, now that a treaty had been made. The old objections were
reiterated. Trist's lack of authority was dwelt upon. Secret, despotic,
illegal, treasonable, shameful, ruinous, were a few of the everyday
epithets that bombarded the government. It had no power to alienate
Mexican territory. It should have waited for the American friends of
peace to act. Even "the sepulchral comfort" of temporary subjugation
was described as preferable to such a peace. "Approval of the treaty,"
exclaimed Rejón, "is the political death of the Republic." Another
insurrection broke out at San Luis Potosí, and all the comandantes
general were notified to expect revolts.[32.25]
The peace men, however, stood firm. Honor has been saved, they
insisted. The United States has recognized Mexico as an independent
nation. There has been no suing for terms at Washington. Territory has
been regained, not sold. To speak properly, indeed, this is a "treaty
of restitution"; fifteen millions are to be paid for injuries done
us; the territory acquired by the United States costs her more dearly
than Louisiana; and full rights have been secured for all Mexicans
adopted by another government. Whatever harshness can be found in the
conditions is due to the circumstances, not the government. War has
no respect for justice. Besides, in case of need a nation, like an
individual, may find amputation expedient, and be the stronger for it.
Above all, the administration has merely done its duty in treating
according to its best judgment. It has determined nothing, settled
nothing. The facts of the case will be laid before Congress, and the
representatives of the people shall decide.[32.25]
Here, then, came the real crisis: would Congress ratify the treaty? At
Washington, in spite of some encouraging reports, the impression gained
ground that it would not. The amendments appeared to cause little
excitement, but they were not the real issues. Opponents of peace had
the speeches of American statesmen printed, and hawked them about the
streets. Prudent Mexicans demanded an end of the uncertainty, disorder
and chaos that was paralyzing the country; but so had they always
demanded it. The government exhibited little activity, while the Puros
and the friends of Santa Anna did not sleep. The especially important
elections in the occupied territory did not end until April 23, and
by that date one could see that something else was to be feared even
more than opposition. As on every other occasion demanding a patriotic
stand, most of the decent men felt afraid to assume responsibility.
Another difficulty was that money for their travelling expenses had
customarily been advanced to the members by the government, and now
it had no money for the purpose. Finally, however, said an American
who did not precisely understand the affair, merchants at the capital
subscribed a large sum to hunt up the Congress and feed it long
enough to ratify the treaty; severer measures also were taken to
ensure attendance; and early in May a quorum of shaking legislators
convened.[32.26]
In opening Congress Peña stated the grand question ably. Honor, union,
independence and the hope of national prosperity and felicity have been
saved, he pointed out; the United States made the proposals, and Mexico
has obtained all the advantages possible under the circumstances; we
have given up some territory, but the foremost nations of the world
have done the same at one time or another; every one sees that we
should have adjusted our difficulties in 1845, but it is now possible
once more to settle them, and the opportunity to do so should not
again be lost. The ministers of war and finance presented statements
proving the impossibility of continuing the war successfully, and the
peace commissioners justified the terms of the treaty. The prospect
of recovering the Mexican customhouses and receiving the American
millions looked highly attractive. No less telling, doubtless, were
the preparations of the United States to resume hostilities with fresh
energy, and to tax Mexico rigorously. The most efficient American army
that had yet been seen in the country awaited Butler's orders, and
large reinforcements had been voted by Congress. No responsible men in
their senses could resist such arguments. The treaty, as amended by
the American Senate, was promptly ratified, and by June 9 Washington
had the news. With all speed it ran from city to city, from town to
town, from vale to vale; and everywhere it was greeted with quiet but
heartfelt rejoicings.[32.27]
By an arrangement already made, Sevier and Clifford, after learning
what had been done by the Mexican Congress, proceeded to the seat of
government. It was a tiresome journey of about 145 miles; but at last,
from the summit of a high ridge, they saw domes and spires two miles
or so distant, glittering on a low eminence in a fine valley, which
was enclosed by parallel ranges of mountains. The town was Querétaro;
and on May the twenty-sixth, in the President's rather plain reception
room, dignified with crimson curtains and with chairs of state,
Clifford presented their credentials.[32.28]
[THE TREATY RATIFIED BY MEXICO]
Peña, tall and benign though sadly worn, Rosa, the minister of
relations, rather short and swarthy but with large, thoughtful eyes
lighting up his countenance, and Anaya, the minister of war, tall and
gaunt, with high cheek bones and a face of Indian stolidity, received
them with all due courtesy. "Sister republics, may the two countries
ever maintain the most friendly relations," was the American greeting;
and Peña replied, "As the head of this nation, I desire nothing more
ardently than that our treaty may prove the immutable basis of that
constant harmony and good understanding which should prevail sincerely
between the two republics." Conversations and formalities ensued, and
on May 30 an exchange of the ratifications concluded this momentous
business.[32.28]
In the execution of the treaty a few misunderstandings arose, but none
of serious importance; and the minister of relations attested the
good faith of the United States.[32.29] Orders for the evacuation of
Mexican territory were promptly given to our commanders in the various
fields of operation, and were promptly obeyed.[32.30] Even before the
last formalities occurred, in fact, Butler called in his outposts, and
as the sun rose on the twelfth of June it shone upon the arms of his
rejoicing troops, drawn up--facing the palace--in the grand plaza of
the capital. Housetops, balconies and the near streets were full, but
perfect order and stillness prevailed except for the sharp commands of
our officers. Thirty guns saluted the American banner on the palace,
and then it was lowered. The Mexican flag took its place on the staff
and received the same honors. An American band struck up gaily. The
unconquered ranks wheeled, marched and left the city. Herrera, the new
President, returned to the chair from which Paredes had ejected him,
and the proud capital rejoiced to be free once more. But it rejoiced
soberly. "I question," said U. S. Grant, "whether the great majority
of the Mexican people did not regret our departure as much as they had
regretted our coming."[32.31]
The plan of evacuation was to let the troops wait near Jalapa until
transports could be provided and their baggage go aboard, and then
march to the unhealthy coast and sail away as quickly as possible. For
some time General Smith had now been making preparations at Vera Cruz
with his characteristic efficiency; and soon the army, the sick, the
wounded and the many who attended to their needs, took ship rapidly
for New Orleans. By the twelfth of July more than 25,000 embarked, and
on the last day of the month all the fortifications of Vera Cruz and
frowning Ulúa, the symbol of Mexican pride, were given up. Stirred by
feelings deep and strong, the departing soldiers looked round them
with a farewell gaze--at the low white walls, at the exotic vegetation
that had now come to be familiar, and at the gleaming, snowy peak of
Orizaba, towering above its belt of dark evergreens. They had trodden
the soil of that wonderful country with the stern, proud foot of the
conqueror, but they now left it full of sympathy and good wishes; and
one of the number put his feelings into terse and soldierlike rhymes:
"The stranger parting from the shore,
Thy glories to behold no more,
Bids thee farewell with swelling heart
As his swift bark leaps o'er the sea,
And, as the truant tear-drops start,
Prays God that thou mayst yet be free."[32.32]
XXXIII
THE FINANCES OF THE WAR
1846-1848
Mexico, as we have learned, entered upon the contest with neither money
nor revenues nor credit. From nothing, nothing comes; and many supposed
she was too poor to fight. But she did fight--or at least men fought in
her name--and one cannot help asking how they contrived to do so. In
full the question cannot be answered, but some of the facts lie within
our view, and these are not only valuable in themselves but highly
suggestive.[33.1]
Aside from loans, the income of the government in 1844 was figured
roughly as follows: import duties, seven million dollars; duties on
commerce in the interior, four and a quarter millions; profits from
the monopolies of the mints, tobacco, stamped paper, playing cards,
national lottery, post-office, etc., two and a quarter millions;
miscellaneous taxes and revenues, three millions; total, sixteen and
a half millions net. But the American blockade cut off nearly fifty
per cent of this income at one stroke; and not only our progressive
occupation of territory, but the dislike of the people for national
taxes, their growing dissatisfaction with Santa Anna's régime,
and their increasing destitution caused a rapid shrinkage of the
residue.[33.2]
It was proposed to contrive a general plan of taxation for the
emergency; but probably the interests principally threatened put a stop
to it, and at all events it mysteriously disappeared. The government
was given ample authority, but could do nothing. A war tax was laid on
house-rents, for example; but it could not be collected everywhere, and
probably its net proceeds amounted to little. In November, 1846, it was
decided to issue drafts for two millions, to be accepted by the clergy
and then purchased by designated citizens; but the scheme, though
actually decreed, proved a failure, and the famous laws of January 11
and February 4, 1847, were no more successful. June 17, 1847, a special
tax of one million was assessed upon the entire population; but only a
small fraction of this appears to have been paid. In November, 1847,
the government offered to deduct one half of the pending national taxes
levied before May 1, 1846, if citizens would pay them by February
1, 1848; and this indicates clearly how the people had been acting.
A few of the states, besides maintaining National Guards, erecting
fortifications and manufacturing cannon, remitted some cash to the
central government; but when we find the richest of them all, Mexico,
boasting that she had sent the insignificant sum of about $160,000,
we have reason to place a rather slight value upon this kind of
assistance. Moreover, accepted drafts on that state, payable in one,
two and three months, could not be sold--even at a discount.[33.3]
The clergy gave nominally a million and a half, but they appear to have
taken up indirectly, at a discount of forty per cent, the drafts of
which this donation consisted. Citizens provided a large part of the
new ordnance, but aside from this we hear of few substantial gifts.
Just after the battle of Molino del Rey, in order to obtain bread for
the army, the government requested the bakers of the capital to meet,
but only a part of them came. A "positive supreme order" then brought
them together, and they promised contributions; yet the promises were
not kept.[33.4]
Every possible effort was made to borrow. Once the treasury offered
a national loan of two and a half millions, but it fell flat in the
states that might have paid the most. Just before the battle of Cerro
Gordo there was a door-to-door canvass at Mexico; but only small sums
can have been picked up. About three months later the government
imposed a forced loan, of which more than $280,000 were assigned to
the capital; but the Mexicans had learned to evade such extortions,
and it proved hard to collect the allotted amounts. In July, 1847,
the British consul general, Mackintosh, loaned $600,000 in exchange
for the ratification of an arrangement negotiated with the British
bondholders. In four loans the clergy furnished some three millions,
all told. The President raised money, it was reported, on public and
private securities, sold bonds freely at very low rates, and borrowed
in effect by giving contracts on terms favorable enough to make the
transactions worth while as gambling propositions. The principal mint,
for example, was turned over to the British consul general for a period
of ten years in February, 1847, in exchange for some $200,000 in cash
and a promise to pay one per cent on the amount coined; and on similar
principles arms and other necessaries were sometimes obtained.[33.4]
All of these financial operations were at least ostensibly lawful, but
Santa Anna did not pause here. Wherever money could be found, he seems
to have taken it, holding that the exigency outweighed all rights and
all pledges. Funds belonging to the tobacco revenue were illegally
seized, for instance; and a large sum due the Academy of Fine Arts
fell into this voracious maw. Not only cash but everything needed
for the army went the same way. At Jalapa early in April, 1847, for
example, all the owners of horses received orders to bring them in.
Grain, forage, lead, lumber, arms, ammunition, tools, cattle, mules and
laborers were taken by force; and sometimes military officers exhibited
the burglar's predilection for a midnight hour. Here was a kind of
finance that saved the expenses of accounting, and without it even the
low cost of the Mexican soldier would not explain Santa Anna's holding
out so long.[33.5]
[THE AMERICAN FINANCIAL OUTLOOK]
The United States, happily, stood far above this level, but not so far
that probably mere good luck did not save us from grave trouble; and it
was easy to foresee many dangers--all the worse because they naturally
made capital timid--when the hostilities began. The total receipts of
the treasury for the fiscal year ending with June 30, 1845, were nearly
thirty millions and the ordinary expenditures $22,935,828. It was
estimated that during the next year the receipts would fall about three
millions, and Walker--allowing the munificent amounts of something more
than two and a half millions for the army and something less than five
for the navy--expected to reduce the total disbursements a little,
anticipating for the period ending with June, 1847, a further saving of
more than four millions. The receipts for July-September, 1845, proved
to be more than two millions below those of the corresponding months of
1844, and the customs income for the fiscal year 1845-46 was $815,445
less than for the preceding twelve-month. In a word, shrinking revenues
and curtailed outlays were the prospect.[33.6]
In this condition of things, not only had the unpredictable costs
and embarrassments of war to be faced, but those of war in a distant
land. Money was to be sent out of the country, never to return, and
the bills for supplies to be increased by the burdens of marine
transportation, insurance and losses; while risks from privateers and
European complication could be seen. Before such an outlook business
men shrank from large enterprises. People with money felt disposed to
keep it.[33.7]