upon our treaties and the obligations of neutrality. Polk's annual
Message of December, 1846, denounced the Mexican plan as inviting
"all the freebooters upon earth," who felt like paying for the
privilege, to cruise against American commerce, announced that our
own courts would say whether such papers could protect them from the
pirate's doom, recommended that Congress provide at once for the
trial of Spanish subjects caught in such business, and suggested
American privateers--intended mainly to recapture vessels taken under
Mexican letters. An American force hastened to the Mediterranean,
and our squadrons were expected to seize all the rovers putting
out, as well as intercept all prizes on their way to the enemy's
ports. These precautions looked rather discouraging to enterprising
desperadoes.[30.6]
In England there was a feeling, as will appear later, that Mexico
should be allowed the utmost license against us, and the Mexican
minister at London received many applications for letters; but Great
Britain did not really wish her supplies of cotton to be endangered,
and all the seas to be filled with corsairs preying upon the trade of
the world; and in October, 1845, her minister to Mexico was instructed
to prevent that country, if he could, from issuing letters of marque
indiscriminately. Bankhead protested also, as did the Spanish minister,
against important features of the regulations. Palmerston himself,
though he acted in a languid fashion, and gave notice at Washington
that British subjects, found on Mexican privateers, could not be
treated as pirates, announced that his government would faithfully do
its duty.[30.7]
France was prompt and active in responding to our demands. Spain,
placed under stringent obligations by the treaty of October, 1795,
promised full compliance with its requirements, captured _El Unico_,
punished its crew, pursued _La Rosita_, and ordered O'Donnell, the
captain general of Cuba, to act as her obligations required; but she
accepted Pareda, the colporteur of what was piracy under her agreement,
as consul of Mexico; and the captain general, while he convinced
the American representative of his good-will and in fact would not
permit an open violation of the treaty, suggested to the Mexicans
ways--fortunately impracticable--of evading his own rules. But the
risks of privateering under so many embarrassments and the virtual
impossibility of converting a prize into cash, prevented all attempts
except the feeble ones already mentioned. In this field, consequently,
our navy, though incessantly watchful, could acquire no laurels.[30.7]
[THE BLOCKADE]
Another aspect of the situation concerned it more seriously. On the
day Congress passed the war bill (May 13, 1846) orders were issued
to blockade the ports of Mexico. Several definite aims prompted this
action. Primarily, of course, it was desired to prevent supplies of
all kinds from reaching the enemy, and to deprive them of the almost
indispensable revenues obtained in peace by taxing imports; but there
were also hopes that loss of business would induce Great Britain and
France, which had a profitable trade in that quarter, to urge upon
Mexico the acceptance of our terms. The blockade was therefore to be
enforced vigorously. At the same time neutrals were to be treated
with all reasonable indulgence. Theoretically only their war vessels
had the right of entering closed ports, but practically the intention
was to broaden that narrow door considerably. Toward itself, however,
the United States determined to be strictly faithful in observing its
declared principles. Merely those ports where the order could become
effective were in view. The announcement of blockade was to be made as
public as it could be; and in particular the government required that a
full warning should be given to neutral ships.[30.8]
For the work thus imposed upon him Conner had ample time to prepare.
As early as August, 1845, he was directed to blockade the Gulf ports
in case of war; early in 1846 he knew of Mexico's attitude regarding
Slidell; before the end of March his vessels occupied convenient
positions; and promptly on the outbreak of hostilities a blockade
was announced at the chief harbors. By July, with some assistance
from the revenue service, it extended from the Rio Grande to the
Goatzacoalcos.[30.9]
But the difficulty of making it continuously effective proved to be
extraordinary. There were not vessels enough of the proper kind;
occasionally a more or less complete concentration became necessary;
and accidents of many sorts occurred. Uncharted shoals and rocks,
currents of unknown direction and force, the frequent haze, and the
darkening of the lighthouses made extreme caution imperative. The
suddenness and violence of the storms almost surpassed belief. At
Vera Cruz the _Somers_ was blown over and sunk before Semmes, her
able commander, could take steps to avert the disaster. Even at the
anchorages one would suddenly hear on a calm afternoon the clarion
orders of the speaking trumpet; the ship would quiver and reverberate
as the cable of the heaviest anchor ran swiftly out; in a moment the
storm would burst; and for days it might be a question almost hourly of
going ashore. At such times all sailing vessels on patrol duty had to
make instantly for the open sea, and before they could return to their
stations a lurking blockade runner could perhaps enter the port. Owing
to such difficulties Alvarado and Frontera, for instance, could not be
watched continuously.[30.9]
Embarrassments also of a minor yet serious character had to be
encountered. Our vessels, unlike those of England, were designed
exclusively for war, and long confinement impaired the efficiency of
the men. The government supplies of eatables needed to be eked out from
New Orleans huckster boats and European merchant ships. Water could
not be obtained readily from a hostile shore. At the Antigua River, in
July, 1846, the boats going up with casks were fired upon, and such
affairs had to be expected. Vessels were despatched long distances
occasionally to obtain fresh provisions, but even then scurvy of a most
serious nature broke out in the summer of 1846, disabling some of the
largest and most efficient ships for several months. The _Raritan_
had more than 200 cases. Nearly all on the _Potomac_ suffered. The
_Falmouth_ had to go as far north as Boston to throw it off. Swampy
shores and kelp rotting under the torrid sun produced myriads of
poisonous as well as otherwise annoying insects. During a brief stay in
the river off Tampico nearly all the officers and men contracted ague,
and the yellow fever scourged a number of the vessels. More than two
thirds of those on the _Saratoga_ had the latter disease. In August,
1847, the _Mississippi_ left her station with some 200 men suffering
from it.[30.10]
Being strangers and enemies, the Americans labored under peculiar
disadvantages. The people gladly assisted blockade runners in every
possible way. Spanish captains in particular, having friends on shore
and pilots thoroughly familiar with the coast, could not be prevented
from reaching harbor at night or in thick weather by way of the shoals.
Sometimes it looked, for one or another of these many reasons, as
if our officers were careless or incompetent. Army observers, not
well informed regarding the conditions, felt disposed now and then
to pronounce the blockade a humbug, and naturally some foreigners
did so. This opinion had neither truth nor probability in its favor.
But naturally, in view of all the circumstances, it proved more
satisfactory to occupy the ports, and open them to commerce on the
basis of a reasonable contributory tariff.[30.11]
[OFFENSIVE NAVAL OPERATIONS]
Besides cruising to watch for privateers and hovering off the chief
harbors to maintain a blockade, our fleet was expected to share in
the general offensive. For one thing Bancroft ordered Conner to seize
all the Mexican war vessels that he could reach. But here a singular
difficulty arose: none of that sort existed. The navy of Mexico, aside
from small craft in the Pacific, included nine vessels amounting to
about 3200 tons. The most important were the steamers _Guadalupe_ and
_Moctezuma_, built in England, which made up nearly two thirds of
this meagre total; but as these had never been paid for, they were
easily transferred to a British firm, and in consequence of a calm
succeeded in escaping to Havana. The rest of the vessels--a small brig,
which changed its name too often to have one, and six even smaller
craft--took refuge early in the Alvarado River. The commander sank
three of them to obstruct the channel, and when Hunter took Alvarado
in April, 1847, the rest were burned.[30.12]
Conner's only chance for offensive work, therefore, aside from
capturing a merchant vessel occasionally, was to engage in shore
operations; and while the officers and men felt eager to get a
nearer view of the scenery, as they said, and rival the glories of
the army, they found themselves embarrassed by the same difficulties
that attended blockading and by others also. The want of tenders
and storeships proved especially serious when hostilities were in
view. Each vessel had to obtain supplies at the Pensacola navy yard;
the round trip cost a month or so; and that base lacked the needed
equipment. Once it spent about four weeks in supplying the _Potomac_
with bread for a three-months cruise, and in July, 1846, the yellow
fever broke out there. A point of capital importance was to reach the
small harbors and cut off all trade; but until the last of September,
1846, Conner had not a vessel that could cross the bars, tow boats
over, and operate in the rivers; and the first load of coal reached him
two weeks later. A shortage of officers and men hampered operations;
and Mason, besides failing to anticipate such a case, failed to be
awake when it occurred. By December, 1846, the Home Squadron included
a substantial flotilla of small craft, mounting from one to four guns
each; but the difficulty of obtaining supplies and making repairs on a
hostile coast in a season of storms almost paralyzed it.[30.13]
Another embarrassment existed. Conner was a brave, able, accomplished,
excellent man, but for a generation his business had been that of
a navigator. His duty had been to go his rounds in safety, and he
did it well. Nobody could handle a frigate better in a storm. He
looked carefully after the health of his men, too. In thoughtfulness,
prudence, judgment and fidelity he left nothing to be desired. But
his constitution had never been robust, and the effects of an old
wound, thirty years of service in a southern climate and the torture
of neuralgia had now made him a confirmed invalid, worn and wasted,
and subject at intervals to almost maddening pain. His powers both of
thought and of execution were impaired. Naturally such a man did not
wish to risk either men or ships; and, lacking the vigor for quick
decisions and powerful action, he could not wisely involve himself in
dangerous complications. On the outbreak of war he should have retired;
but he knew that he stood high in favor at Washington, Bancroft had
assured him that he could retain the command indefinitely, and no doubt
he failed to realize the situation. More or less well, however, shore
operations were carried on, and our next business will be to trace them
from the beginning.[30.14]
[THE HOME SQUADRON]
Owing to the state of our relations with Mexico the Home Squadron
concentrated at Vera Cruz in February, 1846, and later, in accordance
with instructions to coöperate with Taylor, Conner presented himself
at Point Isabel in time to safeguard that position during the battles
on the Rio Grande, and assist in occupying Burrita. When the war bill
passed, his forces consisted of the steamer _Mississippi_, which could
tow a number of small craft at full speed, the steamer _Princeton_, a
swift vessel designed by the celebrated Ericsson, the handsome frigate
_Raritan_, which flew the broad blue pennant of the Commodore at the
main, the frigates _Cumberland_ and _Potomac_, the sloops _Falmouth_,
_John Adams_ and _St. Mary's_, the brigs _Porpoise_ and _Somers_ and
the schooner _Flirt_, with probably some 2700 men. Leaving the Brazos
about the twentieth of May Conner sailed with a part of the squadron
for Pensacola, while other vessels did blockade work or scouted along
the coast as far as Yucatan. In June Captain Saunders of the _St.
Mary's_, lying off Tampico bar, opened fire twice on the Mexicans,
who seemed to be erecting works, and made a bold, well-planned effort
against three gunboats anchored inside the mouth of the Pánuco, which
only circumstances defeated. By August the composition of the squadron
and its distribution changed somewhat; three small schooner-gunboats
had arrived; but there was no material difference in strength.[30.15]
Meanwhile Conner had in mind the small, handy Mexican vessels then
lying in Alvarado River, which did nobody any good there, and were
capable of assisting in his work materially. It seemed very proper to
seize or at least destroy them. From residents of Alvarado, who traded
with the Americans, useful information was doubtless obtained; and the
master of a captured launch, well fed and well frightened, gave correct
details regarding the bar, channel and shipping. A redoubt stood near
the beach, but it contained no large guns; and, although warned by the
questioning of the launch's master, the Mexicans gathered no forces
except some 200 militia in the town and about as many more several
hours distant up the river. The situation invited a bold stroke.[30.16]
Accordingly the _Mississippi_ and _Princeton_, two frigates and the
schooner-gunboats--each of these mounting one piece--dropped anchor
in line opposite the fort at eleven o'clock in the morning, August
7, 1846, and the steamers opened a fire, to which the lightness of
the Mexican ordnance permitted no reply. The bombardment continued
more or less actively for about six hours, but without effect. Owing
to the swift current of the river, swollen by heavy rains, it seemed
hardly possible to row up to the town, and finally the gunboats were
placed within musket range of the shore some distance north of the
fort. Apparently the intention was to land under the protection of
our artillery. The Mexicans therefore opened a small-arms fire from
the sand-hills, to which our cannon and the muskets on the gunboats
replied; but in about half an hour darkness put an end to the
operations. Bad weather came on immediately; the open roadstead was
unsafe; and after nightfall, although it had been proposed to resume
the attack the next day, Conner withdrew with his disgusted men to
Antón Lizardo.[30.16]
[Illustration: Alvarado, Mexico]
The following month one of the bureau chiefs gave him to understand
that the administration wished something done for the newspapers to
make a "noise" about, and another attempt upon the same position was
planned. By this time the enemy had improved the defences, and mounted
a heavy pivot gun on a high knoll; and a letter from one of our
sailors, picked up on the beach, gave them ample notice of the attack.
These facts did not signify materially, however, for the Americans
realized they must positively win a victory this time, and braced
themselves for whatever might occur. A little after sunrise, October
15, the _Mississippi_, the _Vixen_ (a small steamer carrying three
guns which had recently joined the squadron), the _McLane_ (a steamer
loaned by the revenue service), the three gunboats, the _Nonata_ (a
prize schooner mounting four guns), and a revenue schooner named the
_Forward_ arrived off the bar. The plan was to have the _Mississippi_
cannonade with shells, and the other steamers, towing the gunboats,
ascend the river.[30.17]
Everything went wrong, however. The _Mississippi_ produced no effect.
Owing to the strength of the current it seemed necessary to have wind,
and Conner waited in vain until about 2 o'clock for the usual sea
breeze. The bar stood higher than it ordinarily did; and although he,
aboard the _Vixen_, crossed with two gunboats, the _McLane_ grounded,
and her section--the larger section--of the force was thrown into the
utmost disorder amidst the breakers. Not only did the Mexican fire
prove serious, for a shot struck near the wheelhouse of the _Vixen_,
but up the river could be seen another fort, and also Mexican vessels
carrying more metal than Conner now had available. He therefore retired
across the bar, touching twice; and when at length his other section
found itself ready to try once more, he deemed the hour too late.
Besides, he now believed the _McLane_ would be unable to go up the
river with even one gunboat in tow. Again bad weather came on, and
again the expedition withdrew. Officers and men were angry this time
as well as disgusted; and although the Mexicans on the ground realized
that accidents had saved them, a shout of triumph and encouragement
rang through their country.[30.17]
[OPERATIONS AT THE SOUTHEAST]
The _Mississippi_ now bore the red pennant of Matthew C. Perry, who was
to have command of the squadron on Conner's retirement, and meantime,
feeling anxious to serve, contented himself with the dignity of a vice
commodore and acted as a captain; and since not only the _Vixen_ but
coal to make her effective were at last on hand, Conner despatched his
energetic lieutenant southeastward, on the next day after the second
Alvarado fiasco, with all the vessels employed in that affair except
one of the gunboats. After seizing on the way an American barque,
found in communication with Mexicans, Perry entered Tabasco River on
the twenty-third, took possession of the town (Frontera), and the next
day--transferring men from his flagship, which drew too much water for
the bar, to the captured _Petrita_, a small but swift American-built
steamer--he proceeded about seventy-five miles up the rapid and
winding stream through heavy and splendid forests, disabling the guns
of a small, deserted fort on the way, and reached San Juan Bautista,
capital of the state of Tabasco, and seat of an active commerce in
munitions and other goods, that reached as far as Mexico City. Here
five merchant vessels fell into his possession. But now, unfamiliar
with Mexican tactics, Perry blundered into peremptorily summoning the
town, which J. B. Traconis, the comandante general, refused to give
up.[30.18]
San Juan Bautista was a small, dull city of broad streets and one-story
brick houses, lying in a wide plain. In spite of scandalous desertion
Traconis probably had about 400 men supported by two small guns. These
forces he broke into a number of parties and placed in the outskirts.
Perry opened fire on the town with cannon, and after a time sent a
party ashore. A skirmish followed, but nothing decisive could be
accomplished, and after sunset, fearing the sailors would be shot down
in the streets during the night, he recalled them.[30.18]
On the following day the foreigners protested against the bombardment.
Negotiations were then tried; but the Comandante General, who cared
much for his dignity and nothing for the people, insisted on playing
out his rôle of the fearless patriot. Since it was impracticable to
garrison the town, Perry decided to retire. But as one of the prizes
grounded near the shore and a party of the Mexicans--although a white
flag could be seen on the _Vixen_ and other vessels--fired on the
Americans who were aboard, causing the death of one and injuring
two more, he resumed the cannonade. Of course the enemy gracefully
withdrew; and then Perry did the same, leaving Traconis to magnify his
triumph. The _McLane_ and _Forward_ were left at Frontera to blockade
the river and protect neutrals; and after burning four vessels and
capturing one more on the way, Perry rejoined Conner on the last day
of the month with nine prizes. In its real aim the expedition had
succeeded; but the affair at San Juan Bautista had been so indecisive
and murderous that even American soldiers, eager to claim credit and
inured to the chances of war, felt humiliated.[30.18]
The fortnight of activity and excitement cheered the men of the
squadron a great deal, however, and then followed the capture of
Tampico, which delighted Secretary Mason beyond measure, and gave the
newspapers genuine material for a "noise." When this affair, including
the trip up the Pánuco, ended, Conner despatched his lieutenant
southeastward in the _Vixen_, accompanied by two gunboats. December
21, at the town of Laguna on El Carmen Island, Yucatan, Perry seized a
couple of small forts, garrisoned by a few timid soldiers, and disabled
the guns; and after reinforcing the blockade of Tabasco River, looking
into the coastal waters, and making two prizes on his return voyage,
he joined the squadron two days after Christmas. A visit of Conner's
to the same point the following month ended important operations in
this quarter for some time. The occupation of Laguna checked a thriving
illicit commerce by the river that entered the Gulf here.[30.19]
All this while the haughty, outstanding challenge--the scalp-lock, so
to speak--of Mexico, the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa in Vera Cruz
harbor, remained secure. The capture of it, many of our citizens felt,
would wrap the Gulf in a blaze of American glory; and young Porter,
young Farragut and other possible Decaturs had plans of attack ready.
But older men thought the enterprise impracticable for the navy alone.
At the beginning of the war Bancroft expressly notified Conner that his
forces were not deemed adequate for such an undertaking. Not only had
the fortress been strongly and shrewdly constructed, but the channel
that led to it was narrow and winding, so that a mishap would have
endangered all of the attacking vessels. The French had taken it in
1838, but only by good luck and a sort of treachery, and since that
year it had been greatly strengthened. Conner and Scott agreed that
it could not be captured by the fleet. But in March, 1847, misfortune
overtook Ulúa, for Scott, supported brilliantly by the naval forces,
laid siege to Vera Cruz.[30.20]
[PERRY SUCCEEDS CONNER]
To the Home Squadron and its commander as well as to the "castle"
this event signified a great deal. In fact it brought Conner both to
the climax and to the tragedy of his professional career. It enabled
him to display in the debarkation his real abilities; and then
precipitated him on the eve of a triumph into oblivion. His regular
term as commander had expired in November, 1846, and Perry notified him
that a successor was ready. But Conner held Bancroft's promise of an
indefinite continuance in his position; he doubtless felt that after
long withholding needed means, the department owed him a chance to do
something worth while; and when he found that Scott was to move against
Vera Cruz, he saw his opportunity. Unfortunately for him the change of
secretaries, the complaints and bold proposals of young officers, and
the clamor of the public, ignorant both of what had been possible and
of what had been accomplished, had undermined his position.[30.21]
In January, 1847, Slidell informed the government that Conner had
lost not only his physical and mental vigor but the confidence of
his men. The following month Perry, whose ship had gone to Norfolk
for repairs, visited Washington frequently; and how that ambitious,
coarse-grained, wilful man talked, one can readily imagine. Besides,
while Perry's outfit of Christian graces was noticeably defective, it
could not be denied that he possessed energy and a fighting temper. The
government therefore decided that Conner had not "shown himself equal
to the crisis." March 3 a change of commanders was ordered; and when
the dénouement of the operations at Vera Cruz approached, instead of
gracefully permitting Conner to finish what he had begun, "Old Bruin,"
as the sailors called Perry, insisted upon his rights. March 21,
therefore, his broad blue pennant went up on the _Mississippi_, and in
a few days his name shone forth in the capitulation of Vera Cruz and
Ulúa. "Poor Commodore Conner," said Marcy.[30.21]