occurred. From a military point of view he was now prostrate. He
saw it himself, and knew that the country would see it. Evidently
his countless political enemies would make the most of his complete
failure, and he was doubtless aware that his military reports had
offended many officers. His chief executive merits--decision and
activity--had led only to a useless expenditure of life and money,
it was now pointed out, and his ostensible patriotism was attributed
to passion and obstinacy. Even his confidence in himself broke down.
Unable to understand why failure had attended all his efforts, he fell
into a sombre depression, and without a struggle he placed his troops
at the orders of General Reyes, who joined him on October 11 with
about 1000 men. His part in the war was over; and in the following
January, realizing that nothing could be gained through intrigue or
conspiracy and fearing the Americans would make him a prisoner, he
asked for permission to leave the country. Both his own government and
our authorities consented. And after giving a dinner at El Encero
to the American officers of that vicinity, who had treated him with
distinguished consideration, he sailed once more, about the first of
April, from what he regarded as an ungrateful country.[29.21]
Santa Anna being now eliminated, the government had to face its
military difficulties without his assistance. In general the problem
was to make bricks with neither straw nor clay. Almost every good
cannon had been taken by the Americans, and the muskets had nearly
all been captured, thrown away or sold. Ammunition was almost wholly
wanting. The engineering material had been lost or destroyed. Vast sums
of money were needed to provide fortifications as well as replace all
this equipment, and the government could hardly obtain enough, day by
day, to cover its minimum expenses. Even officers had to sell their
shoes for bread.[29.22]
As for an army, Santa Anna and Alvarez together had some 2000 troops
the first week of October, Reyes had about 1000, about 3000 from Mexico
City concentrated at Querétaro under Herrera, about 1000 from Jalisco
were on their way to the same point, and small detachments existed
at various other places. But nearly all of these men were utterly
demoralized. "Almost useless," they were officially termed; and the
army as a whole felt the crushing weight of general contempt. Herrera,
the commander-in-chief, became so disgusted over the uncontrolled
excesses of the troops that he resigned. Rincón declined on the ground
of ill-health to serve. Arista, when summoned to Querétaro, declared he
would not command a soldier until exonerated for his conduct on the Rio
Grande. No officers of high distinction, indeed, were available except
the aged, torpid and infirm Bustamante and "the old woman," Filisola,
as Bancroft described him.[29.22]
Attempts were made to lay plans of campaign, but an expert summed up
one of them by saying it appeared excellent--only it was based upon
things as they should have been, not as they were; and all the others
had the same defect. Schemes were devised to reform, reorganize and
build up the forces, and quotas amounting to 16,000 were assigned to
the states; but México, which had been expected to furnish nearly a
quarter of these men, promptly answered that she could not, and other
states did not even reply. In fact, the regular forces decreased
instead of multiplying, for sometimes a general could not feed his
troops, and frequently, when soldiers were let out of the barracks on
service, they vanished; and the people, instead of helping to support
the Mexican troops, even dreaded to see them approach, for their coming
was liable to draw an American attack, and more than liable to mean
extortion, outrage and robbery. Nowhere on the military horizon could a
glimmer of light be seen.[29.22]
[THE AMERICAN POLICY]
Over against this pitiful government stood the United States--wealth
against poverty, strength against weakness; and the antithesis was
complete, for while the Mexicans could only plan, that was the hardest
thing for us to do. The idea of retiring to a defensive line still
persisted. Taylor himself adhered to it. But in addition to the other
overwhelming objections to this project, it seemed improbable that a
majority in Congress could agree where to draw the line. Even Calhoun,
though qualified to make a better argument for an untenable proposition
than any other man in the country, was unable to present this policy
in such a manner as to satisfy either the friends or the opponents of
the war. Some advised holding, in addition to the territory thus to be
cut off, the chief ports of Mexico; and some advocated retaining the
capital also, and the line to Vera Cruz. Others favored the occupation
of still more cities; and many were for subjugating and holding the
entire country.[29.23]
To this last plan, however, even had it been practicable to levy all
the costs upon Mexico, there were tremendous objections. It would
have involved keeping under arms 80,000 or possibly 100,000 young
men, seriously needed at home for the most part, in order to be sure
of having effectives enough at the front. The troops in Mexico would
have become corrupted both physically and morally; and the commanders
would have acquired the ideas and vices of proconsuls. It seemed to
be almost an insoluble problem. No final decision was made. But the
government determined to occupy the capital, hold the line to Vera
Cruz, retain the chief ports, and extend our holdings according to
circumstances.[29.23]
To Scott, however, the lack of a definitive plan signified little.
Not one reinforcement entered the capital until after the first of
November, and even at the end of that month he was barely able to
garrison Mexico and Chapultepec. December 4 his army included only
about 8000 privates, of whom a quarter were sick. During the next three
weeks Generals Patterson, Butler and Cushing, Colonel Hays, Lieutenant
Colonel Johnston and Major Lally, each with troops, arrived; and the
forces then numbered about 11,000 effectives and 3000 sick.[29.24]
Scott therefore announced, with no doubt a strategic purpose as well as
a rhetorical flourish, that our army was "about to spread itself over
and to occupy the Republic of Mexico." What he really intended was to
take possession successively of the principal mining regions--those
of Zacatecas and San Luis Potosí--and the capitals of such important
states as lay within easy reach. Even for the former purpose, however,
two columns of some 5000 effectives each were needed, and the men as
well as clothing for them could not be provided. The only immediate
operations, therefore, aside from the establishment of new posts on the
road to Vera Cruz, were the peaceful occupation of Pachuca, a mining
town about fifty miles northeast of Mexico, Toluca, about thirty-eight
miles distant in the opposite direction, and Cuernavaca, the key to the
Acapulco region, a little farther away toward the southwest.[29.24]
February 6, 1848, an expedition of more consequence marched, by Scott's
orders, from Vera Cruz. Most of the guerillas who infested the road to
the interior lived and found a market at or near Córdoba, a city about
sixty-five miles to the southwest, and Orizaba, sixteen or eighteen
miles beyond it in the same direction; and Bankhead was instructed
to occupy those towns. Very different from Lane's rough trips on the
plateau was this march. Near Córdoba flourished such genuine tropical
wonders as the bread tree, the butter tree, the milk tree, and a kind
of palm called "the traveller's friend," which covered the wayfarer's
head with a tent, and quenched his thirst with abundant sap. Going on,
one found enormous masses of vegetation--thick, matted, boundlessly
prolific--moulded into astonishing yet harmonious forms by the bays
and promontories of the rapidly mounting foothills; terraces of
luxuriant foliage piled on sheer cliffs, castles on the terraces, and
cathedrals on the castles; verdure, verdure everywhere, dripping,
flowing, spurting, tumbling in every hue and shade of green, with a
dark, velvety mist in the gorges that became clear sapphire when the
sun touched it, and here and there a cascade letting fall its crystal
thread from a mossy crag.[29.25]
Then came the rich Orizaba valley, hemmed in with jungles, and winding
off between sombre, precipitous mountains until lost in the dreamy
distance; and above it the sparkling snows of the vast peak sent down
a torrent of gray glacier water, that leaped into mid-air, and then,
gathering itself below, wound on through splendid, odorous trees full
of parrots, canaries and mocking-birds, hurried past fragrant orange
groves and still more fragrant blossoms, poured through the arches of a
noble old bridge, and buried itself in the woods. But the Americans did
not forget their orders. Both cities were occupied without resistance,
and both were garrisoned; and the guerillas now found their proceedings
considerably hampered.[29.25]
[THE REMOVAL OF SCOTT]
The final military operations of Scott seemed thus rather tame, as
was natural; but Polk executed one that could be termed startling, if
not exactly brilliant. His principal assistants were Pillow, Worth
and Duncan; and in different ways each had excellent qualifications
for the work. Pillow was not "The Lie Incarnate," as Trist believed,
nor even "a perfect ass," as many thought; but vanity, ambition, lack
of probity, and a gift for dark and cunning methods characterized
him. His instincts and talents, indeed, were those of the criminal
lawyer who minds nothing about his case except the verdict. When the
President's brother shot a man down in the street at Nashville, Pillow
got him off. With reference to his work in helping bring about Polk's
nomination at Baltimore he wrote, "The fatal blow was given, but it
was not seen nor known what produced such a result--nor where the blow
came from." "I feel as boyant as the air," he said in December, 1846,
when great dissatisfaction with Taylor prevailed at Washington, because
I know "that _I have done the work_.... I have paid him in full" for
his treatment of me. And one could seldom get a finger on Pillow's
back, when he was not wriggling actively toward some object of selfish
desire.[29.26]
Without a particle of real military ability or success to his credit,
he now stood second in our army, and hence logically enough saw no
reason why he might not, by some devious path, arrive at the first
position and even at the Presidency. "Modesty," said Burke, "does
not long survive innocence." To plant such a person, with urgent
recommendations, at open, big-hearted Scott's right hand, to win his
confidence, to spy upon, criticise and undermine him, and inevitably to
scheme for his place, was indecent; but Polk did it.[29.26]
Very unlike Pillow was the courtly and fascinating Worth; but his mind
was intense, narrow and self-centred. After the battle of Monterey
he exclaimed, "I am satisfied with myself. The most vindictive foes
crouch at my feet, and my friends choke with joy and delight." And
there is one sin of which even angels are capable, we have been told.
All his military recognition he owed to Scott, but probably the debt
weighed heavily on his proud and restive nature; and, while apparently
reciprocating the genuine affection of his chief, he had inwardly
rejected Scott's principles and methods nearly thirty years before
the Mexican war. Regarding his friend, fellow New Yorker and brother
Democrat, Marcy, an adroit politician, he felt very differently. "I
would not give an ounce" of his wisdom, he wrote in June, 1846, for all
Scott's glory; Scott "is determined to sink and draw his friends down
with him."[29.27]
At Vera Cruz the commander-in-chief, relying on their long intimacy,
told Worth frankly that he believed the administration intended to ruin
him, and the subordinate officer evidently determined not to be drawn
down. At the same place a brother officer suggested to Worth a higher
position than was even the highest in the army. The suggestion appears
to have struck root. All military men believed the next President
would be one of them, and what commander had acquired a more brilliant
reputation? The New York _Sun_ recommended him for the place; and the
idea of his candidacy was favorably received by many. This prospect
naturally turned him still more against his old friend, for either
Scott or Taylor seemed almost certain to be the Whig nominee. Through a
series of clashes, for which little--if any--justification can be seen,
and in spite of Scott's efforts to conciliate him, Worth proceeded then
to gain emancipation from his burden of gratitude, and place himself in
open antagonism to his former patron.[29.28]
[THE REMOVAL OF SCOTT]
Duncan's motives were different again. He was intimate with Worth;
and Pillow, who offered to marry the Colonel to a rich and handsome
widow, doubtless promised him the post of inspector general. At any
rate he urged Polk to make the appointment, hinting at other reasons
than mere qualifications, and it was made; and we know that Duncan gave
himself much trouble to assist Pillow as a partisan supporter. The
power of such a combination, headed by the President himself, to gather
adherents from the many ambitious officers hardly needs to be pointed
out; and finally there were, of course, jealous and envious men. "Since
we cannot attain to greatness, let us revenge ourselves by railing at
it," said Montaigne for the benefit of such persons; and many of the
officers knew that greatness was beyond their powers. None of them
could monologue as Scott did; none could look in a cocked hat as he
looked; none had won the Mexican war; and, moreover, he was the sole
general-in-chief.[29.29]
The result was a powerful movement against the prestige and authority
properly belonging to Scott. Pillow's reports on the battles of
Contreras and Chapultepec tended to represent the General as a
nonentity; and Worth not only did somewhat the same, but referred to
the Commander in terms of ridicule and contempt. A letter, doubtless
written directly or indirectly by Pillow over the signature of
"Leonidas," extolling Pillow shamelessly and belittling Scott, was
trickily worked into the New Orleans _Delta_ of September 10, 1847; and
another letter, containing a passage intended to show that Worth and
Duncan had saved Scott from choosing the wrong approach to the capital,
appeared in the United States, then in a Tampico newspaper and finally
at Mexico City. Both letters were grossly improper, especially since
the army lay in the enemy's country; and Scott found it necessary to
act. As he well said, "The general-in-chief who once submits to an
outrage from a junior, must lay his account to suffer the like from
all the vicious under him," and "even the great mass of the spirited,
intelligent, and well affected, among his brothers in arms, would soon
reduce such commander to utter imbecility, by holding him in just scorn
and contempt" for his recreancy to himself and the country.[29.30]
On November 12, therefore, he issued his General Orders 349, which
aimed to stigmatize these offences in such a way as to prevent a
recurrence of them. Duncan then assumed in a plainly defiant manner the
paternity of the Tampico letter, although in fact the offensive passage
had not been written by him. His primary object in doing this was
evidently to give Worth a handle, and the handle was promptly seized.
One thing led to another; and in the end formal charges were brought by
the commander-in-chief against Pillow, Worth and Duncan, and by the two
generals against him; appeals--insulting to Scott--were made by Pillow
and Worth to the government; and the technical "arrest" of the three
officers followed.[29.31]
The government then stepped in. Scott had no doubt given it offence
during the campaign, for his letters had plainly enough revealed a
conviction that Polk had broken faith with him, and purposely thrown
difficulties and annoyances across his path; but the circumstances
had appeared to warrant his complaints, and Marcy had at least "got
even" by administering liberal censures in reply. The balance in
fact--aside, perhaps, from a mere acerbity of language--was against
the administration. Besides, having served the country well and saved
the government from disaster, Scott was entitled to some indulgence
for irritation caused by the peculiarly trying circumstances that
surrounded him. He was a large man, had done a large work and merited
large treatment. But there was nothing large about the administration.
The confines of mediocrity hemmed it in. Pillow and Duncan were
therefore by its orders relieved of arrest; Worth was not only
released, but assigned to duty according to his highest brevet rank;
and "in view of the present state of things in the army," chiefly or
entirely caused by Polk's agent and Marcy's friend, Scott was deposed.
He had performed his task, said Robert E. Lee, and now was "turned
out as an old horse to die." April 22, 1848, amidst the lamentations,
cheers and blessings of the army as a whole--trembling himself with
emotion--he took his leave, and Major General Butler, who was a
Democrat and looked well on a horse, bore sway at headquarters.[29.32]
XXX
THE NAVAL OPERATIONS OF THE WAR
1845-1848
In January, 1846, the United States had available for naval
hostilities one ship-of-the-line, seven frigates and razees, fifteen
sloops-of-war, six brigs, one schooner and three steamers--that is to
say, thirty-three war craft. As ships-of-the-line carried more than
seventy guns, frigates about forty-four to fifty, sloops twenty, brigs
ten and other vessels in proportion, this fleet had 1155 cannon. Two
of the vessels, under Commodore James Biddle, were on the coast of
Asia; several occupied the Brazil station; and five cruised in African
waters to check the trade in slaves. The Pacific squadron, commanded
by Commodore John D. Sloat, comprised on July 1, 1846, the frigate
_Savannah_, the sloops _Portsmouth_, _Levant_, _Warren_ and _Cyane_,
the schooner _Shark_ and the storeship _Erie_, to which the frigate
_Congress_, the razee _Independence_ and the sloops _Dale_, _Saratoga_
and _Preble_ were added later in the year, while the _Levant_ went
home; and substantially all the rest of the fleet, known as the Home
Squadron, attended to the West Indies and Gulf service, under Commodore
David Conner.[30.1]
The appropriation for the year ending with June, 1846, was a little
less than ten millions, but only about six and a half millions were
expended. The war bill of May 13 permitted the completion of all
vessels then building and the purchase of others; and by November,
1847, after suffering a number of losses, the navy had in commission
five ships-of-the-line, one razee, four frigates, thirteen sloops, six
brigs, eleven schooners, four bomb-vessels, twelve steamers and six
storeships.[30.1]
The peace establishment created by Congress in 1844 provided for 7500
petty officers, seamen, landsmen and boys, and in August, 1846, this
number was raised to 10,000 for the period of the war; but owing to
the remarkable activity of the merchant marine and the consequently
high wages, men could not easily be obtained. During the most important
year--November, 1846, to November, 1847--not over 8000 were in the
fleet at any one time. The whole number of seamen employed in the
course of the war did not exceed 7000; and hence plans to strengthen
our forces in the Gulf and the Pacific had to be curtailed. The
service, too, did not enjoy unqualified popularity. In the sailor's
decalogue appeared this commandment:
"Six days shalt thou work
And do all thou art able,
On the seventh thou shalt holystone
The deck and scrape the cable";
and the cannon had to be rubbed with fragrant "sea pitch" from the
bottom of the ocean until they shone like Japanese lacquer. Discipline,
therefore, not reinforced by the enthusiasm and the necessities of war,
fell considerably below its reputation, and the crews were eager to be
free when their time expired. The officers, even, had become lax after
thirty years of peace, and in too many instances their standards of
conduct had given way.[30.2]
In the administration of the navy, also, the effects of a long peace
could be seen. The control of matters had fallen, though not by
accident, into the hands of shrewd officers deeply interested in
themselves and their friends. Supernumeraries abounded. Those who drew
the most pay often rendered the least service. The pet ambition was
for a safe, quiet and easy position. Shore billets were too numerous.
No field officer of the Marines had cruised since his promotion, and
one of them had been in the service more than a generation without
going to sea. Secretary Bancroft, eager for distinction, undertook to
eliminate the abuses, but only succeeded in eliminating himself. He had
taught Greek, and was ridiculed by the naval men as undertaking to play
the pedagogue over them. Having no dominating force of character nor
even a commanding presence, he could not stand against the governing
clique. The requirements of the war, which might have assisted an
abler administrator to win the day, only increased his difficulties.
The Senate refused to confirm some of his appointees; and early in
September, 1846, he became our minister to England.[30.3]
J. Y. Mason, who succeeded him, was a fat, easy, agreeable man, quite
innocent of the desire to achieve reforms. Nobody disliked him, but
nobody felt obliged to obey him; and as late as the twentieth of
February, 1847, suddenly discovering that Scott had mentioned certain
designs of the army against Vera Cruz, he awoke to the fact that his
department had failed to give the anticipated assistance. Just what
could be expected of the navy under all these prejudicial conditions
was, therefore, in some minds, a little uncertain.[30.3]
[PRIVATEERING]
One of the most serious duties imposed upon it was to guard against
privateering, for not only our commerce but the supplies required by
our troops depended upon free lanes. About the middle of 1845 the
government issued orders that any activity of such a kind on the
part of Mexico should be considered the signal for war; and as a
deterrent it was announced by the newspapers, though incorrectly, that
privateersmen were to be regarded as pirates. Crews not predominantly
composed of Mexicans, it was often asserted, could legally be "strung
up to the yard-arm," since we were understood to have treaties that
sanctioned this principle with most countries.[30.4]
After the war actually began, a great deal of danger was apprehended.
Desperate characters were believed to be waiting at New Orleans, and
"piratical gangs" in the ports of Cuba, where Almonte seemed to be at
work. News arrived early in August, 1846, that privateering regulations
had been issued by Mexico, and suspicious craft soon appeared off Key
West. In December the Mexican minister of war openly avowed that great
hopes of injuring the United States in this manner were entertained.
Blank certificates and commissions reached Washington; information
regarding efforts to set vessels at work in various quarters arrived
there; and finally the _Carmelita_ of Bangor, Maine, was captured near
Gibraltar by a felucca named _El Unico_, fitted out at Oran, Algeria,
and run by Spanish desperadoes.[30.4]
Mexico had not in reality, after studying the subject with deep
interest, much expectation of accomplishing any large results by
issuing letters of marque, and the regulations of July, 1846, were
intended principally or wholly to annoy this country; but in September
and October she took the matter up rather seriously. A new law
provided that any foreigner entering her naval service might become a
Mexican at once, and blank naturalization papers as well as thousands
of privateering commissions, duly signed but not filled out, were
carried by agents to the West Indies, Great Britain, France and Spain.
Almonte did his best at Havana. J. N. Pareda, appointed Mexican chargé
d'affaires at Madrid, appears to have circulated the documents actively
in the Peninsular ports; and another privateer, a Spanish steamer named
_La Rosita_, put out from Oran.[30.5]