supernal truths from the region of abstract speculation, he resembled
the gazing astronomer who walked into the ditch; and a deep, sticky
ditch lay just before him. Cordial coöperation with Scott was almost
indispensable for the proper execution of his work; but he thought
he disliked the man, he knew that Polk and the Cabinet disliked him,
and his chiefs--probably afraid that he might be overpowered by the
Whig general--took superabundant pains to brace him. Polk urged
him to consort with Pillow, whom he represented as a Cincinnatus
compounded with a Scipio Africanus; and Buchanan, uprearing his big
person impressively, expanding in his courtly, diplomatic style, and
beaming upon the artless, ethereal chief clerk with his uncommunicative
blue eyes, intimated that by faithfully carrying out the wishes of
the government he might become the next Democratic nominee for the
Presidency![27.8]
[NEGOTIATIONS OPENED]
Trist was equipped with a commission, credentials, letters from the
secretaries of the war and the navy departments to Scott and Perry, a
draft or _projet_ of a treaty, instructions directing him to inform our
military and naval commanders, if Mexico should make and ratify the
treaty, and a sealed despatch to the minister of relations, in which
Buchanan pointed out that an evacuation of Mexican territory would be a
surrender of all our costly gains, but announced that a commissioner,
ranking second in our state department, would attend the army, and
be ready at all times to negotiate. Ostensibly a mere bearer of
despatches, the chief clerk hastened incognito to New Orleans, reached
Vera Cruz on May 6, fell very sick there, and forwarded to Scott both
Marcy's letter and Buchanan's despatch, which was to be placed at once
in the hands of the Mexican commander. He was authorized--not ordered,
as he should have been--to let the General see his own instructions and
his copy of the sealed despatch, which would have explained the plans
of the government; but instead of doing this he merely wrote a letter
of his own.[27.9]
What that letter said was never disclosed; but we know that it
proceeded from a truly amiable but high-strung, "top-lofty" man, who
felt expressly Called by Destiny to perform a Great National Act and
incidentally to put Winfield Scott where he belonged.
The General's reply, on the other hand, is extant, and can readily
be understood. He was already in a state of mind regarding the
administration. Friends had warned him against it since his departure
from the United States, and the warnings had seemed to be coming
true. After Polk had promised him confidence and coöperation, and
after he as a grateful return had assisted Polk with the Whigs, the
President had immediately branded him before the world as unfit, and
outraged his natural pride as a military man, by trying to have a
civilian placed over him. Polk had infringed upon his rightful power to
discipline unruly subordinates; his requisitions for vessels, troops
and supplies had not been met; and now, though general-in-chief, he
was required to transmit a despatch, doubtless bearing seriously upon
the war, without knowing its contents or using a proper discretion as
to its opportuneness--a requirement that Marcy did not undertake to
defend; and he read in the Secretary's letter these words: "Mr. Trist
is clothed with such diplomatic powers as will authorize him to enter
into arrangements with the government of Mexico for the suspension of
hostilities." This looked mysterious and, in view of Polk's course
toward him, alarming. He believed that in a highly important respect
the management of the campaign had been taken from him, and he felt
that he was to be degraded before his army, the Mexicans and the public
at large by a clerk from the state department, of whom he had known at
Washington just enough to believe he disliked him.[27.9]
It seemed unjust and insulting; and being an irascible, overworked,
over-worried soldier and master of language, seven of whose regiments
had just gone home unexpectedly, he answered as might have been
foreseen. Trist, angry, ill, conscious to his pen's point of every
convolution, involution, evolution, ramification and complication of
his mental processes, and unaware of Marcy's blundering phraseology,
replied at a length and in a tone that were enough to drive Scott
wild; and when he finally reached headquarters on May 14, though
Scott provided amply for his dignity and comfort, the two were not
on speaking terms, and further epistolary exchanges only widened the
breach. I fear Scott and Trist have got to writing, groaned Marcy,
who knew them both; if so, all is over. As for the sealed despatch,
on the grounds that it was doubtful whether the present circumstances
warranted its presentation, and that anyhow a proper escort for
protection against guerillas could not then be afforded, it was
returned to the commissioner.[27.9]
On the sixth of June, therefore, Trist wrote a letter to Bankhead,
explaining the character of Buchanan's despatch, asking him to make
known the existence of the despatch and Trist's presence with the army,
and inquiring whether at a proper time that minister would transmit
the paper to the Mexican government. Bankhead, as we know, strongly
desired peace. The interests of the British merchants at Puebla and the
capital and of consul-general Mackintosh, who not only was in business
but had made large advances to Santa Anna, lay in the same direction;
and hence Edward Thornton, a member of the British legation, called on
Trist at Puebla five days later.[27.10] Trist's verbal explanations
of his government's aims proved satisfactory, and soon the despatch
arrived at its destination.[27.12]
The law of April 20 had forbidden, however, all negotiations with
the United States. Ibarra, the minister of relations, therefore,
replied to Buchanan that his communication would be laid before
Congress, and Santa Anna promised Bankhead that he would use his
best efforts to have it considered promptly and favorably. Meantime
the public disputed fiercely whether an American proposition should
be heard. Many of course denounced the idea, but others said it
would place Mexico in a better position to listen, than to reject a
proffer of peace without knowing its terms. The _Diario_--that is to
say, the President--advocated this opinion, and the peace feeling,
represented by the most sober and intelligent citizens, especially of
the mercantile class, and supported by the sensible arguments of _El
Razonador_, showed no little strength.[27.12]
June 24 Thornton visited Puebla again, delivered Ibarra's reply to
Buchanan, stated that Santa Anna had openly declared in favor of
negotiations, and added that Santa Anna felt--as did Bankhead--that
an immediate attack upon the capital would be most unfortunate for
the cause of peace. Trist, therefore, perhaps having had pains in
the head for some time that were growing pains, addressed Scott on
the subject, and sent him the official documents that explained his
mission. The General replied in a friendly and high-minded style.
The two met. Each discovered that his impression of the other had
been radically incorrect. When Trist became very ill again, as he
soon did, Scott anxiously went through his personal stores for guava
marmalade; and they became intimate and mutually admiring friends. The
commander-in-chief cordially proposed to disregard for the sake of his
country every thought of personal glory, and he was ready to assume all
needful responsibility.[27.]
[SANTA ANNA'S EMBARRASSMENTS]
In Mexico, however, a lubricant almost always had to be applied in
government affairs, and that lubricant was gold. Knowing that the
United States eagerly desired peace and had already appropriated
millions to gain it, not a few Mexicans would have felt they sinned
against nature and custom had they been willing to oblige us for
nothing. Santa Anna's greed overtopped the mountains. Rejón was well
understood to be corrupt. Valencia, one of the loudest declaimers
against peace, had a large family, was old and was poor; and in Santa
Anna's opinion he desired to be a little more comfortable. Numerous
minor figures, more or less prominent in Congress, also appreciated
comfort. The British merchants, with whom "arrangements" were a regular
feature of dealings with the government, believed the Americans would
have to apply the lubricant. Such was Bankhead's opinion, and on his
second visit Thornton intimated as much. Scott, though he would not
have attempted to corrupt an honest person, considered it no worse to
employ a "statesman" than a spy, if the statesman desired to serve him;
and he believed that without the use of money a year of bloodshed would
not force Mexico to sign an acceptable treaty. He offered, therefore,
to provide the requisite funds for carrying out Thornton's idea, and
Trist welcomed his assistance.[27.12]
Santa Anna doubtless felt eager to obtain peace provided he could
remain in authority, and that proviso was natural, for otherwise he
would have lost a position he loved, and exile or death would have
been his early portion; but it was not easy to calculate the chances.
Buchanan's despatch seemed to many a fresh sign of weakness. Scott had
less than half the numbers that Marcy had promised, and many inferred
that no more good troops could be sent. For a nation to succumb before
less than 10,000 isolated men, poorly trained and poorly supplied,
seemed ridiculous and even irrational. Trist's lack of prestige was
another offence to Mexican pride. The charge of collusion, supported by
the known fact that an American officer had visited Santa Anna in Cuba,
manacled him; his countless enemies were awake and implacable; and he
found it necessary to deny that he thought of treating.[27.12]
The Coalition opposed all thoughts of peace. Fearful of responsibility
and paralyzed by personal and factional intrigues, Congress would not
assemble. Nobody of influence had the courage to advocate what all
knew to be necessary. Each party held back, hoping the other would
make a tactical blunder of that sort. The law of April 20 towered
squarely in the way. A caricature represented Polk amputating Santa
Anna's remaining leg, and the ether sponges were labelled "3,000,000
pesos." As the President and his friends could see no way out of the
predicament, he decided--so the Spanish minister reported--to smash his
army against Scott's, hoping that a treaty would then be acceptable to
the nation. But the loss of his troops would have left him powerless;
and he confined himself now to advising, as did the British, that Scott
should alarm the capital by advancing toward it.[27.12]
At length, however, an arrangement for a meeting of Congress was made
by the factions, and on July 13 that august body convened; but it
referred Buchanan's letter back to the administration as executive
business, declaring at the same time against an "ignominious" treaty,
and leaving untouched the law of April 20; and then practically, though
not in form, it broke up. Santa Anna was now inclined to hold that
Congress had abandoned him, negotiate a treaty of peace as a military
act, and carry it through by means of the American lubricant. Three
days later, therefore, after discussing the matter with Pillow and
the commander-in-chief, Trist formally asked the coöperation of Scott
in providing $10,000 at once and promising to hand over a million
whenever a treaty should be ratified by Mexico; and Scott not only
assented,[27.11] but paid the smaller sum that day, as bread upon the
waters, out of his fund for secret expenses.[27.12]
The outlook seemed favorable. Pedraza and Baranda, both of them
in favor of a settlement, were virtually decided upon as the
Mexican commissioners, and July 27 Santa Anna called his generals
together--presumably to bring them round. But Valencia arrived that
day from San Luis Potosí with his army, loudly declaiming for war
and closely watching for a slip on Santa Anna's part; Scott's delay
about advancing weakened the plan; and so the council of generals
did nothing. Santa Anna now hesitated more and more. Both he and his
officers became encouraged by the accumulation of troops and war
material. Finally they concluded that a triumph lay within their
reach, and the idea of making peace lost its attractiveness. Scott for
his part allowed the negotiations to have no influence on his military
plans. He doubtless hoped that a white flag and an offer to treat would
meet him on the way to Mexico; but as they did not come, those plans
were unflinchingly executed, and our arms triumphed.[27.12]
Soon after the battle of Churubusco ended, he returned to San
Agustín, and as the initial step toward peace negotiations wrote a
note summoning Mexico City to surrender. But Santa Anna did not wait
for it. The town was in a dreadful state of confusion and panic.
Wounded or demoralized soldiers could be seen everywhere. Many roamed
about the streets, crying out at the slightest alarm, "Here come the
Yankees!" Astounded by the American victories and utterly disheartened
by the incompetence, cowardice and quarrels of their leaders, many
felt that God had pronounced the doom of Belshazzar against "this
accursed Babylon." Hence, though Santa Anna rallied troops as well as
possible, he felt that an assault could not be repulsed, and at about
midnight had Pacheco, then minister of relations, address a despatch
to Buchanan proposing the negotiations requested so many times by
the American government.[27.13] The purpose of the despatch, which
Bankhead transmitted open to Trist with an appeal from himself to
heed it, was to prevent the Americans from entering the city; and the
Spanish minister, who was consulted with reference to it, agreed that
in view of Polk's repeated assurances it could not fail to have that
effect.[27.14]
[AN ARMISTICE]
Thornton and Mackintosh also brought their influence to bear; and
the next morning, while Scott was preparing to take up battering or
assaulting positions to warrant the summons, General Mora met him at
Coyoacán with a proposal for a truce. The terms of this proposal were
not satisfactory; but Scott sent back by him an overture for a short
armistice. This was accepted by Santa Anna as a gift from heaven.
Commissioners to arrange the terms were appointed the next day, and on
the twenty-fourth ratifications of their agreement settled the matter.
The army, though its entire confidence in Scott prevented all trouble,
felt profoundly dissatisfied; but with a total disregard of personal
considerations the General took what reasonably seemed to him the wise
course.[27.14]
Scott, who was now at Tacubaya with Trist, held his troops at
command--Worth and the dragoons at Tacubaya, Pillow at Mixcoac, Twiggs
about four miles farther out, and Quitman at San Agustín--in such a
manner as to be fairly safe himself, and to threaten the western and
southern approaches of the city. The well men cleaned their clothes
and arms, and the sick and wounded soon found themselves comfortable
and cheerful. Several Mexican Congressmen among the prisoners were
set free. About half a million of needed specie was obtained from
the city--principally and perhaps entirely by cashing drafts on the
United States government. A large quantity of provisions, contracted
for while the Americans lay at Puebla, was brought out, and a train of
wagons proceeded for the same purpose to the valley of Toluca, where
Olaguíbel, ostensibly the implacable enemy of the Americans, helped
them to obtain supplies. Apples, pears and peaches of an indifferent
quality were now ripe, and the soldiers lived fairly well.[27.15]
Santa Anna was even busier than Scott. Measures were taken to collect
all missing soldiers, reorganize and rearrange the corps, maintain a
state of defence, and revive morale by removing disaffected officers as
well as by punishing conspicuous delinquents. All American prisoners in
the city were freely given up. Gamboa, a politician of México state,
caused some trouble by critically reviewing Santa Anna's course during
the war, and formally charging him with treason. Far more serious
was the combination of Valencia--who was still regarded by many as a
martyr, had gathered a small army, and had pronounced against Santa
Anna--with Olaguíbel, who stood on confidential terms with Alvarez;
and to make this combination still more threatening, it seemed to be
supported by Paredes, now at the head of a small force, by Almonte
and by Canalizo. All possible care was taken to guard against the
movement. Every officer known to have been associated with Valencia
was imprisoned or at least cashiered; every hint of intrigue excited
attention; and the government heard with deep concern that somebody on
a sorrel horse had carried letters from Toluca to Querétaro. Naturally
Santa Anna did not fail to assemble the generals, and offer his place
to any one who would take it; and of course none of them had the bad
taste--not to say imprudence--to come forward. Moreover behind all the
military disaffection, rejoicing over it as a threat against Santa
Anna, though unwilling to join forces with the army in any cause,
towered the Coalition, justly regarded as even more dangerous.[27.15]
[NEGOTIATIONS]
But obviously the chief business of the government was the negotiation
with Trist. Here Santa Anna acted sincerely--as sincerely as the
drowning man who clutches at a plank, no matter how great a rascal he
has been. On this point we have a superabundant amount of evidence, and
in particular the full reports of Lozano, chargé d'affaires of Spain,
with whom Santa Anna talked explicitly and at great length. Texas and
upper California could be given up, the General thought, as territory
already lost. The region between the Rio Grande and the Nueces, it
was hastily inferred from a vague remark dropped by Trist at Puebla,
could be made neutral, perhaps under a European guaranty; and with that
barrier established against smuggling and the dreaded encroachments
of the United States, and with millions of shining American dollars
pouring into the treasury for the benefit of those supporting him and
the treaty, Santa Anna felt he could meet all opponents. In his own
mind, though he intended to get still better terms if possible, the
bargain was as good as made. He therefore placed on the commission
superior men, disposed to effect an amicable settlement, and not mere
partisans of his own: ex-President Herrera, J. B. Couto, a man of
the highest integrity and leader of the Mexican bar, General Ignacio
Mora, chief of the military engineers, and Miguel Atristain, a lawyer
supposed to represent British commercial interests; and he put forth
a manifesto entirely satisfactory from the American point of view, in
which he declared openly for peace, and, holding that Congress on being
duly consulted had referred the subject back to the Executive, brushed
aside the law of April 20.[27.17]
Trist, for his part, stated promptly the full demands of the United
States, which required that Mexico should not only accept the Rio
Grande line but cede New Mexico and upper California; and three or four
days later, in the hope of removing difficulties, he decided to inform
Santa Anna confidentially that he would pay the highest sum authorized
by his instructions. This course was proper for the representative of
a country that had always loved frank diplomacy, and felt no need of
jockeying in the present negotiations; and it was also prudent, for in
tedious haggling and crafty special pleading no Anglo-Saxon could rival
the Mexicans. September 1 and 2 the terms were fully discussed.[27.16]
Regarding certain minor points that might have entered into an
agreement a mutual disposition to be conciliatory showed itself, but on
the essentials Trist held firmly. Much to his surprise, the pecuniary
consideration appeared to count for little in comparison with the
alienating of territory and its population, and the Mexicans proved
obdurate. At last, therefore, to save the only hope of peace, Trist
proposed that the armistice be extended forty or forty-five days, and
the decision of Washington be obtained as to excluding nationality and
population from the Nueces-Rio Grande district.[27.17]
The proposed extension of time Santa Anna, angry at what he thought
had been a deception on Trist's part with reference to this district,
rejected at once as a scheme to get provisions and reinforcements, and
so he found himself confronted squarely by unexpected and unpalatable
terms. Nor were these his only difficulties. With light-hearted vanity
the people still ignored their long series of defeats. An intense fear
prevailed that Santa Anna, with what military forces remained and the
money coming from Washington, would sweep away republican institutions,
establish himself as autocrat for life, and wreak vengeance on his
enemies. All the standard objections against ending the war marshalled
themselves anew. Arguments, protests and threats, official as well as
unofficial, poured in.[27.17]
Any sale of territory, wrote the governor of Querétaro, would authorize
a general secession. Negotiations not shared in by Congress are
treasonable, proclaimed Farías, Otero, Rosa and other statesmen in
concert. Rejón, who probably wished the Americans to capture Mexico,
install the Puros in authority and make a treaty with them, added his
loud voice to the chorus. The Coalition and the Valencia-Olaguíbel
conspiracy loomed up darker than before. States and citizens who
refused to support the war denounced Santa Anna for proposing to end
it. Many who longed for a treaty would not think of a treaty signed
by him. The friends of peace lacked organization and the courage
necessary to dominate the situation. The members of Congress would
not gather, and it seemed evident that no popular assembly would ever
ratify the "sale" of loyal fellow-citizens, which the New Mexicans were
believed to be.[27.17]
[FAILURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS]
Apparently Santa Anna's one chance was to declare himself dictator
immediately, and, if he cared to make so distasteful a bargain,
ratify it himself; but there were signs that his army--with Valencia
and Paredes, long favorites of the military caste, bidding against
him--would not support his authority against such opposition in such
a cause. Rascally but keen Tornel, who called himself the Rainbow
because he shone in stormy times, but was likened by others to the bat,
poured self-interested counsels against peace into his ear; and from
similar motives Pacheco assisted Tornel. Santa Anna's nerve weakened.
Besides, an alternative offered itself. Had not Scott lost a good part
of his little army in the recent fighting, and made the armistice in
the desperate hope of receiving fresh troops? Might not fickle fortune
change in the next battle? Whatever its result, could the Americans
venture to demand more than was now demanded? Why not have another
throw of the dice, and then make the treaty, if it could not be
avoided?[27.17]
As soon as Trist's persistence in our demands was made known to him,
therefore, although he still felt some hope they would be modified,
Santa Anna began to prepare a line of retreat. Warlike instead of
pacific reasons for agreeing to the armistice made their appearance in
public. Every thought of negotiating a treaty was denied, and papers
were drawn up representing him as a bold and indignant champion of
Mexican rights. At first his orders had been to keep the agreement
with Scott inviolably; but on finding that no acceptable modification
of Trist's demands was in sight, he proceeded to break it--especially
by preventing money and supplies from leaving the city, and by having
work done on the fortifications of Chapultepec--and appeals for troops,
funds and materials were issued. Scott, on the other hand, there is
good reason to believe, adhered to his pledges; but he was alert,
and his paid agents in the city watched Santa Anna's proceedings. On
September 2 he relinquished all real expectation of peace, yet he still
clung to hope.[27.19]