afternoon of the 6th his commissioners, arriving late and agitated at
the rendezvous, presented Trist with a counter-projet, which they knew
he would reject, and an argumentative note intended for the Mexican
public. No discussion took place. Evidently the time for words had
passed. Scott then sent a letter charging that Santa Anna had violated
the armistice, and announcing that unless complete satisfaction
should be made before noon the following day, hostilities would be
resumed. Santa Anna's ingenious reply was mainly a counter-blast of
accusations designed to rouse what he called "the first city of the
American continent"; and again it was war.[27.18] Yet something had
been accomplished. The word "peace" had been uttered and seriously
considered; it was Trist's firm belief that not only the commissioners
but most of the Cabinet were for accepting the American terms; in a
measure this attitude on the part of leading Moderados committed their
party; and the Mexican plenipotentiaries retired from the meetings
filled with cordiality and even admiration for Trist.[27.19]
In the United States great disappointment was felt over the issue of
these negotiations. The general view of the armistice was the easy,
superficial one that all Mexicans were rascals, and that Santa Anna
had shamelessly tricked our good faith. Marcy, not seeing that the
counter-projet was a political ruse, gravely pronounced it "extravagant
and inadmissible." Polk, whose knowledge of the Mexicans was revealed
by his quaint idea that an extension of the American ægis over New
Mexico might be welcomed by them, condemned the armistice as if peace
had not been his avowed aim; and the administration organ, besides
representing Scott and Trist as dupes, described it as contrary to the
intentions of the government, when in fact a commissioner had attended
the army for the express purpose of negotiating at the earliest
possible moment. Mexico rejects peace, proclaimed the _Union_; let
us give her war. "Burn the olive branch and whet the sword," was the
popular cry; let her be humbled in dust and ashes![27.20]
[THE AMERICAN VIEW]
To the army the respite of a fortnight proved a physical, mental and
moral blessing. San Agustín, buried in orchards, umbrageous Coyoacán,
cozy San Angel and lively Mixcoac had each its charms; and Tacubaya,
where the palace, embowered in blossoms and fragrance, crowned a hill
gently--even pensively--shaded by silvery old olives, was lovelier
yet, and afforded the noblest views. Here the brilliant sunrise, first
lighting up the distant white volcanoes that propped the sky, and then
stooping to brighten the near-by villas of the city merchants, ushered
in gorgeously the perfect day. After noon black, jagged clouds could be
seen gathering quickly in the soft and luminous blue; the edge of one
would melt into a slender gray shadow, dripping to the earth; and in
a few moments the grandest artillery of the heavens would be at work.
Then sometimes a rainbow followed; the sunset was fair; the moon rose
clear and full; and the white houses, massive towers and brilliant
porcelain domes of the city appeared to be afloat in a magical radiance
toned with slumber and with dreams. "Heaven help those at home," wrote
a soldier, "who think they know what moonlight is!"[27.21]
Amid experiences like these it seemed hard, almost impossible, to
contemplate war and bloodshed. But the troops felt thoroughly angered
by what they looked upon as Mexican treachery--first in pretending to
negotiate, and then in violating the armistice; and they quickly nerved
themselves, not without satisfaction, for the coming struggle. All
realized that only triumph could save them now from destruction.[27.21]
XXVIII
MOLINO DEL REY, CHAPULTEPEC, MEXICO
September, 1847
Rather more than half a mile west of Chapultepec and still farther
north of Tacubaya stood a complicated range of low stone buildings
known as El Molino del Rey (The King's Mill). They extended in a
rambling fashion approximately north and south more than 300 yards,
and consisted essentially of a flour mill and a foundry for bronze
cannon. The heavy walls and the parapets of the flat roofs, reinforced
with sand-bags, made these buildings almost a fort. Nearly half a mile
from them toward the northwest lay a very solid stone edifice, at one
time a powder magazine, called the Casa Mata, protected now with a
small, dry fosse and light, incomplete breastworks. Along the west
front of El Molino extended a somewhat irregular drainage ditch, or
series of ditches, at this critical time free from water, which then
made a bend, passed some twenty-five yards from the south face of Casa
Mata, continued in the same direction nearly one fourth of a mile, and
finally joined a deep, wide ravine, that ran for a long way northeast
and southwest, and could not easily be crossed except (at X) near this
junction. For military uses the ditch gained strength from dirt thrown
up in front of it and a line of maguey growing some thirty yards back.
From it an easy slope, clear of trees but somewhat obstructed with
cornfields near the bend, rose toward the southwest for about 600 yards
and culminated in a ridge, which overlooked Tacubaya; while west of the
ravine and a mile or so from Casa Mata stood the hacienda buildings of
Los Morales.[28.1]
[Illustration: BATTLES OF MEXICO]
[SCOTT'S PREPARATIONS]
Inferring from supposed signs of American activity, and also from
Scott's peremptory letter, that on the afternoon of September 7 a
determined effort would be made to seize Chapultepec and attack the
defences of the city, which had not become very strong in this quarter,
Santa Anna made special efforts during the sixth to place his most
serviceable troops on the terrain just described; and the next day,
taking command there in person, he posted and instructed them with
particular care. León's and Rangel's brigades were stationed in El
Molino; the best of Pérez's brigade garrisoned the Casa Mata; Ramírez's
occupied the intermediate space; four guns were placed a little
in front of the bend; 3000 or 4000 horse under Alvarez--the first
division commanded by him and the second by Manuel Andrade--proceeded
to Los Morales; reserves of infantry and artillery lay in the rear,
and the cannon of Chapultepec were made ready to sweep the ridge and
slope.[28.2]
At the same time pains were taken to rouse Mexico City. Suspicion of
Santa Anna persisted, but his credit had been improved not a little by
Valencia's conduct, and the public felt inclined to believe in him once
more. The image of the Virgin of Guadalupe, the Patroness of Mexico,
now passed through the streets. Under orders from Tornel the clergy
preached a crusade against the heretical invaders. Tales of alleged
American atrocities supplemented their exhortations. People were
ordered to sharpen their daggers, and make ready to throw paving-stones
from the azoteas. That Scott's handful--only some 8000 available men
and supposed to number even less--could beat 18,000 or 20,000 valiant
Mexicans, protected by strong defences, and capture a city still
occupied by perhaps 200,000 persons, appeared incredible. Citizens as
well as troops grew confident. When the bells began to ring at about
half-past nine on the morning of the seventh, all welcomed the alarm;
and when Santa Anna visited the chosen terrain during the afternoon to
issue his orders for battle, he was received with applause.[28.3]
[BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL REY]
Scott also prepared. September 7 the engineer company and Cadwalader's
brigade advanced from Mixcoac to Tacubaya, the rest of Pillow's
division and one of Twiggs's brigades moved toward the city as a
feint, and Twiggs's other brigade and Quitman's division were ordered
to concentrate at Mixcoac. Captain Mason and Lieutenant Foster of
the engineers daringly reconnoitred the Mexican position, and,
although Casa Mata--standing on low ground and partially masked by its
earthworks and the maguey--was not adequately made out, they analyzed
the situation correctly otherwise. Then, to prevent errors, Brevet
Lieutenant Colonel Duncan and two engineers did the work a second time;
and Scott and Worth also made observations. Information that he deemed
thoroughly safe led the commander-in-chief to believe that guns needed
for the defence of the city were now under construction at El Molino,
and he desired Worth to have a party destroy the works and material
during the coming night--in his opinion an easy task--and immediately
retire. At Worth's request, however, a daybreak attack and, as the
natural consequence, a broader plan were decided upon.[28.4]
[Illustration: BATTLE OF EL MOLINO]
Accordingly, the first gray light of September 8 found the Americans
waiting to assault the position. One cannon guarded the road from
Mexico to Tacubaya. Brevet Colonel Garland's brigade and Captain Drum
of the Fourth Artillery with his two Buena Vista 6-pounders were
directly south of El Molino, at a distance of about 400 yards from it,
to ward off a flank attack from Chapultepec, threaten the mill, and
be ready to assist as might be necessary. On the ridge, not far to
their left, stood Captain Huger with two 24-pound siege guns, Brevet
Major Wright's party of stormers--twelve officers with five companies
of 100 men each, drawn during the night from the six regiments of
Worth's division--and a supporting body composed of Brevet Lieutenant
Colonel C. F. Smith's light battalion. Some 500 yards farther to the
left and higher up the ridge the guns of Duncan, who had charge of all
the artillery, bore upon the Mexicans near Casa Mata, about 700 yards
distant, with Colonel Clarke's brigade--now commanded, on account of
Clarke's illness, by Brevet Colonel McIntosh--on the left of the pieces
and General Cadwalader's brigade, acting as a reserve, at their right
and rear. And finally, near the ravine, Major Sumner of the Second
Dragoons with some 270 mounted men occupied our extreme left under
orders to hold the Mexican cavalry in check and coöperate wherever he
could. In all there were 3447 officers and men.[28.5]
Apparently Worth's dispositions had been wisely planned, and a scrutiny
of the Mexican position, could it have been made, would have confirmed
the expectations of a quick victory. Deceived by Scott's feint against
the southern front of the capital, Santa Anna had broken up his army
during the night, and now, with a considerable part of it and some of
the guns, he was fully two hours distant. No one officer commanded the
troops before Worth. Only a sharp, strong thrust was required.[28.5]
As soon as Huger could make out the low, white walls of El Molino,
about a third of a mile distant, he opened fire; and at the same time
Engineers Mason and Foster advanced some 350 yards. All was perfectly
still in front. Both of them believed the position had been abandoned,
and Mason sent Foster back to have Wright's party--now deployed in
line--advance. Consequently, instead of waiting, as had been the plan,
until the 24-pounders had perceptibly shaken the mill, the stormers
advanced and masked those guns when some ten rounds had been fired.
The Mexican pieces, which had been moved nearer the mill during the
night, at once opened furiously with canister from an unexpected
quarter, and soon a terrific fusillade burst from the parapeted azoteas
of El Molino. In spite of it all, three of the pieces were taken,
however.[28.5]
But the American spearhead--Wright's party--was merely glued fragments
of steel, not a forged blade. A large part of the men were separated
from the comrades and officers whom they knew and relied upon, and all
from the colors they adored. Mason, Foster, Wright and eight other
officers out of fourteen went down. The column broke. Nearly a third
of the men, whose comrades fought later in the engagement, under their
proper colors and officers, like heroes, absolutely bolted. The enemy
saw that only a handful were persisting, and promptly rallied. Without
orders brave Lieutenant Colonel Echeagaray brought from Chapultepec the
Third Ligero. "At them!" he cried; and instantly a counter-attack was
launched. The guns were recaptured. The Americans had to retreat. And
the pursuing Mexicans butchered and robbed our wounded.[28.5]
Smith's battalion rapidly advanced, however, though possibly not quite
soon enough. Drum directed a quick, accurate fire upon the Mexican
battery. Garland moved up by a road that sheltered his command until
it came within some 200 yards of the mill. Drum followed him, stopping
at intervals to deliver canister. Cadwalader sent aid. Tall, swarthy
León crumpled suddenly with a bullet in his side; valiant Balderas
fell over into the arms of his son; and for these ardent leaders the
Mexicans had no substitutes. Ramírez took flight. The Mexican reserves
would not budge. The Americans captured the enemy's guns, penetrated
into the buildings, and forced their way to the azoteas. Close fighting
then settled the issue; and before very long, under the fire of their
own pieces, as well as Drum's and one from Huger, the Mexican left wing
and the troops coming to its aid from Chapultepec were in precipitate
retreat.[28.5]
Casa Mata, still held by the excellent men under Pérez but wholly
destitute of artillery and feebly protected by its earthen enclosure,
might have been cleared of defenders by a vigorous application
of artillery. Duncan began work. But Worth believed in brilliant
operations, and ordered McIntosh to assault the position. With a
smile that beautified his rugged face, the old warrior set out; and
soon, bleeding from two wounds, he was lying on the slope. The second
and the third in command fell. Officer after officer was struck
down. The men toppled over by the wholesale. Wild with enthusiasm
some of the Mexicans leaped over the defences and came to meet their
assailants.[28.5]
In spite of their well-aimed and murderous volleys, however, they were
soon punished and driven back. But what more could be done? The walls
of Casa Mata had not been breached, and there were no ladders. So
the Americans lay down behind the embankment of the ditch, and coolly
picked off Mexicans at Casa Mata and behind the maguey. After a time
their muskets became foul. Their ammunition began to give out. Somehow
an order to retire got started; and finally the shattered remnants of
the brigade fell back to the rear, followed by miscreants who glutted
their fury on our wounded. But Duncan, whose guns had been masked by
McIntosh's advance, now resumed his work upon Casa Mata, and in a short
while the Mexicans were in flight, pursued by the unerring missiles of
the battery.[28.5]
Yet there were still 3000 or 4000 horse at Los Morales. These troops
had been expected by Santa Anna to sweep the field, and he had
personally given their commander his instructions. But a mere partisan
fighter like Alvarez did not know what to do with two divisions of
cavalry, an arm that it requires distinctive qualifications and
much experience to handle well. Besides, his division included no
artillery, and he probably felt no more anxious than before to help the
President at his own expense. He followed but carelessly Santa Anna's
instructions. His orders to Andrade were more or less confused and
impracticable; and that officer, who was at odds with his commander and
felt that Santa Anna had overlooked his achievements at Buena Vista,
concluded to keep himself and his men out of danger.[28.5]
At length, however, while McIntosh was charging, Alvarez advanced in
brilliant array with his own division. Sumner at once dashed hotly
across the ravine and at them, passing the Mexican infantry within
pistol range and losing forty-four men and 104 horses in perhaps ten
seconds. Duncan turned his now unemployed guns in the same direction.
One of Alvarez's brigades, made up of untrained guerillas, broke
immediately under the cannon fire; and the whole division soon
retreated in disorder upon Andrade's men, fiercely pursued by the
riderless horses of Sumner's command, as if to get revenge for the loss
of their masters. Later some of the cavalry undertook, or so pretended,
to cross the ravine at another point. But Sumner dashed at them again,
a part of Cadwalader's brigade was now in that quarter, and both Duncan
and Huger--the latter being at present near the American centre with
one gun-- sent their compliments; the Mexicans retreated; and at about
seven o'clock the battle ended.[28.5]
"A sad mistake," said Hitchcock, and he was right. A few cannon
moulds were found. The partial destruction of El Molino and Casa Mata
cancelled the military value of the position, and facilitated later
American operations; but such operations were not contemplated at
this time. A few small cannon and a quantity of more or less valuable
ammunition fell into our hands, and a heavy gun at Chapultepec became
disabled. Probably 2000 Mexicans were killed or wounded, and perhaps an
equal number deserted. Nearly 700 prisoners were taken. The loss of two
excellent officers meant still more, perhaps. Intrenching implements
needed at Chapultepec were lost. The want of coöperation among the
Mexican generals and especially the total failure of the cavalry to
meet expectations disheartened the capital. But the casualties in
the little American army amounted to 124 killed and 582 wounded. The
confidence of the officers, if not the men, in their leaders faltered
at the evident mistakes of Scott and Worth. Each of those generals
blamed the other, and the discord between them, which reached down to
the private soldier, became worse than ever. No American could find
satisfaction in a barren victory gained with such difficulty and at
such a cost; and the Mexicans, believing we had aimed to accomplish far
more, exulted over their imaginary triumph. Scott faced the situation
with unshaken fortitude, but those who knew him intimately saw that he
felt anxious.[28.6]
[THE GREAT PROBLEM]
However, the great problem before them soon occupied the minds of all.
Mexico, lying on a very slight elevation or swell, could be entered on
its western side by the garita of San Cosme and at the southwest by the
garita of Belén, to each of which led a causeway from the fortified
hill of Chapultepec, about a mile and a half southwest of Belén. From
this garita a second causeway ran south about an equal distance to the
picturesque chapel of La Piedad, where it was crossed by one extending
eastwardly from Tacubaya to the San Antonio or Acapulco highway,
which--it will be recalled--led south to Churubusco and San Agustín.
Not far north of the latter junction and about a mile from the city
proper stood the garita of San Antonio; while, intermediate between the
San Antonio and the Piedad routes, the Niño Perdido causeway, coming
from San Angel, connected with Niño Perdido garita, which stood at the
edge of the city. Finally, a road leading nearly east from San Antonio
gateway conducted one to La Viga garita and La Viga canal, a deep and
broad waterway, which, since it could not well be bridged in the face
of the enemy, practically bounded Scott's field of operations. There
were thus four garitas--Belén, Niño Perdido, San Antonio and La Viga in
this order from west to east--each guarding an approach to the capital
from the south.[28.7]
Scott's expectation was to break the south front, and after the
armistice ended, his engineers, assisted to some extent by himself
and a Mexican officer in his pay, reconnoitred it actively and boldly
except on the forenoon of the eighth. Had it been feasible to strike
immediately on the resumption of hostilities, the enemy's lines would
have been found poorly fortified and armed. But this could not well
be done with Santa Anna's principal forces menacing our flank; the
American army was not yet in position; and Scott desired first of
all to destroy El Molino. After the battle of the eighth half of his
troops imperatively required a breathing space. The wounded had to be
given attention. The army still needed to be placed. It was necessary
to protect hospitals, baggage and stores--especially since Governor
Olaguíbel and about 700 militia, supposed by Americans to be Alvarez
with his two divisions, were approaching the rear, and according to
reports Valencia had 8000 men in that vicinity. Moreover Scott's
information was not complete. The eighth of September, following the
twentieth of August, had proved the danger of rashness; and the fresh
losses made extreme caution absolutely necessary. Finally, Scott felt
a suspicion that the Mexicans expected and wished him to attack their
apparently unfinished works covering the south front.[28.8]
On the morning of the eleventh he inspected these once more, and then
had a conference of generals and engineers at La Piedad. It was a
solemn gathering. Before them lay the fortified capital of Mexico, a
hopeful army of perhaps 15,000, a good equipment of artillery, nearly
700 trained gunners, and a large population, somewhat disillusioned,
but excited and vengeful; and in view of the American situation it was
essential, as the commander-in-chief clearly indicated, to strike a
vital blow at once.[28.9]
But where? Point by point Scott fully and fairly stated the case: at
the southwest the mighty porphyritic hill of Chapultepec to carry, but
a clear problem, hard ground, excellent places for batteries, Huger's
opinion that in one day the fortified college on the top of the hill
could be demolished, in the event of success a position from which to
operate freely, and at least a possibility that, after losing what was
commonly deemed its key, Mexico would listen to terms; on the southern
front marshes, inundations, large ditches full of water everywhere,
causeways already cut by the enemy, bridges destroyed, a topography
that made rear and flank attacks impossible, an extensive series of
well-planned and well-armed fortifications crossing their fires and
commanding one another, and an enemy apparently eager to have the
attack made here. Scott, while disclaiming any wish to influence the
judgment of others, pronounced frankly for Chapultepec.[28.9]
Then one of the engineers--a tall, handsome young man, with a positive
chin, a strong nose, a dark, closely trimmed mustache, dark hair
clustering above his ears, and a fresh, clear color in his face--stood
up and reported crisply on the work of reconnoitring. His name was
Robert E. Lee, and he recommended approaching by the southern front.
Three other engineers concurred with him. Four generals, doubtless
influenced by these experts, took the same view. Twiggs and Riley
inclined the other way. The fifth engineer present was then called
upon, and he--Beauregard--in a long, technical statement argued for
the Chapultepec route. Pierce changed his opinion. A silence followed;
and then Scott, drawing up his magnificent figure to its full height,
announced in his grand way: "Gentlemen, we will attack by the western
gates. The general officers present here will remain for further
orders--the meeting is dissolved." And so the die was cast.[28.10]
[CHAPULTEPEC]