men, though astonished and for a time dismayed, had no thought
of giving up. "Victory or death" was not a phrase to them, but a
conviction. Though dikes, ditches, bad ground, corn higher than their
heads, and the Mexican artillery fire broke up their organization,
personal courage and personal leadership survived. In smaller or larger
groups they fought on. Santa Anna, by taking the Fourth Ligero from
Pérez to defend the rear, deducted half the strength of his left wing,
and no doubt Shields's operations, very suggestive of the American
methods used in previous battles, tended to make the troops at the
bridgehead nervous. Gradually a part of the unlucky Sixth and men of C.
F. Smith's and Garland's commands, working toward the extreme American
right, out-reached the enemy, crossed the river, turned the Mexican
line, and moved on toward the highway. This created great alarm. The
fate of Valencia was recalled. Many of the officers wilted. Ammunition
seems partially to have failed; and at length, under a still galling
fire, some of the Eighth Infantry, followed by more of the Fifth, waded
the ditch of the bridgehead--twenty feet broad it was--climbed over the
parapet or pushed through the embrasures, and settled the question hand
to hand.[26.15]
At once Duncan planted two of his guns on the highway near the
convent, and for ten or fifteen minutes, aided by a piece or two
at the bridgehead, he fired with a judgment, rapidity and accuracy
that delighted the on-lookers. By this time two of Rincón's guns
at the right of the convent and one of the other pieces had become
unserviceable; the ammunition, so lavishly expended, had failed the
infantry; and the loss of the bridgehead, which stood on higher and
commanding ground, was recognized as a most serious blow. The artillery
commandant began to move a cannon from the front side to the right.
Only two guns were in play on the front; and our Third Infantry, noting
the slackened fire, dashed over the parapet at the left of the convent.
Still the American deserters would not permit a white flag to be shown,
and the garrison retired sullenly to the interior of the building. But
Captain J. M. Smith, seeing that active resistance was over, now put up
a white handkerchief himself to prevent further bloodshed. The signal
of surrender stopped Duncan's work, too; and the Mexicans, astonished
by the consideration shown them, laid down their arms.[26.18]
Pérez and Bravo with a large part of the troops were now on the way to
Mexico _via_ Mexicaltzingo and Old Peñón, and others were taking flight
along the highway, pursued by Worth's division. Shields perceived what
was occurring, and harangued his brigade. "The South Carolinians will
follow you to the death," answered the "Tigers," as they were called
by Scott. Many, if not all, of the New Yorkers joined them; Pierce's
officers mustered pluck enough to guard the left; and once more a
charge was made. It proved no easy work, though, even now. First and
last more than a third of Shields's brigade were killed or wounded.
Brave, handsome Butler, commanding the Tigers, and his lieutenant
colonel went down, and Colonel Burnett of the New Yorkers fell. But at
last Shields carried the day, captured nearly four hundred Mexicans,
and met Worth's cheering van on the highway.[26.17]
All joined then in the pursuit, supported with a captured 6-pounder
and a howitzer, and took liberal toll as they went, until, after
charging nearly two miles, they were halted by Worth. Orders from the
commander-in-chief to the same effect soon arrived. Four companies of
dragoons under Harney were permitted, however, to keep on, and when
the sight of a battery led him to pull up, Captain Kearny of the First
resolved to charge the guns, and galloped ahead.[26.19]
"Oh, what a glorious sight it was to see Phil Kearny riding into them!"
wrote a soldier. His own troop were picked men; they rode picked
horses--all iron-gray--that now seemed endowed with supernatural
strength; and his other troop were fit comrades. Standing quite upright
in the stirrups they looked like centaurs. Little by little the rear
fours, hearing the trumpet sound the recall, dropped off; but the
leader and about a dozen others kept on like a swift vessel, dashing
the billows of humanity right and left. The battery, which stood at the
garita, fired upon friend and foe alike. Still the little group arrived
there, leaped from their horses to carry it, and found--that they were
alone. The panic of the enemy, however, saved them. Tearing loose and
springing into the saddle, they got away. But a grape-shot was faster
than Kearny; and so, losing an arm but winning a brevet, he finished
valiantly the battle of Churubusco.[26.19]
[AFTER THE BATTLE OF CHURUBUSCO]
Santa Anna's total loss for the day--the killed, the wounded and
especially the missing--may be roughly estimated as 10,000. He
admitted that he lost more than a third of his men. After he was able
to find where he stood (August 30) the Army of the East contained
11,381 privates. Alvarez had 2447 privates (August 26); and, besides
remnants of Valencia's troops, there were doubtless many small bodies
of militia. Scott estimated the Mexicans killed and wounded as 4297,
and 2637 prisoners, including eight generals, were reported; while
the American ordnance was more than trebled, and the scanty stock
of ammunition enormously increased. Out of 8497 engaged in the two
battles, we lost fourteen officers and 119 privates killed, sixty and
805 respectively wounded, and some forty of the rank and file missing,
who probably lost their lives.[26.20]
The high moral qualities displayed by our troops made the day glorious,
as Hitchcock said, "in the highest degree"; and the army, naturally
overestimating the numbers of the enemy, felt exceedingly proud. Scott,
riding about the field, gray and massive, was hailed by the troops as
the very genius of power and command.
"Never did mightier man or horse
Stem a tempestuous torrent's course,"
they felt; and when he addressed them with the eloquence of a soldier's
heart, it seemed as if the cheers that followed must have shaken the
"Halls." Nature, however, appeared to view the situation differently.
The mountains above Padierna wrinkled their foreheads with still
deeper furrows, or knit them with still darker scowls. Dense black
clouds, preceded by gleaming heralds, rushed suddenly across the sky.
Lightning flashed in sheets. Thunders rolled until the earth seemed to
tremble. Torrents of rain deluged the ground; and in a little while,
almost like something heavy and solid, night swiftly and prematurely
descended.[26.21]
XXVII
NEGOTIATIONS
May, 1846-September, 1847
After fighting ceased, the Americans found temporary quarters wherever
they could. Most of Shields's command occupied Los Portales "in a
most deplorable condition," and Worth's division remained at the same
point or in Churubusco. Some of Pillow's men retired to San Antonio,
and there passed the night without rations, blankets, fires or lights,
while others moved across to Mixcoac. A part of Twiggs's lay in a muddy
field without shelter, while the rest made their way to Coyoacán or
San Angel. Some of the troops, covered with sticky mud, slept in a
barn on straw, and acquired an extremely curious appearance. For all
it was a hard night, and perhaps hardest for the officer on guard. The
hours crawled. Thoughts of the battle, the morrow and the distant home
barely stirred his leaden brain. Every instant, drowsiness threatened
to become stupor. Now and then a sentry's challenge, the snort of a
horse, the blast of a bugle roused him with a start. At last came a
streak in the east. He called the drummer, and ordered him to "beat
off." Instantly the sharp roll was taken up by others. The bustle of
men awoke; and the troops were alive again. Joy and pride welled up
in their hearts, but the sadness of bereavement also and a sense of
disappointment. They seemed to have won the race but lost the prize.
Why had they not slept in the city?[27.1]
There were adequate military reasons for this. It was believed that
Santa Anna still had some 20,000 men, and what fortifications defended
the interior of Mexico no one pretended to say. Three surprises had
met the Americans during the past forty-eight hours. They had sick and
wounded, prisoners, wagons and captured material to look after. They
were scattered, unmunitioned, spent. Not a few had become ill. In
spite of Scott's precise orders to carry rations a large number had
gone hungry for about a day, and many had fasted longer. The stock of
provisions had practically been exhausted. If repulsed, the troops
would have faced starvation; if successful, they would have been a
disorganized mass of ravenous, infuriated soldiers in a hostile city.
Almost all, even officers, were eager for a revel in the "Halls";
they would largely have scattered for something to eat and something
to drink; many would soon have been intoxicated; and fearful scenes,
costly alike to them and the inhabitants, would have disgraced the
victory and imperilled the army.[27.1]
[AMERICAN EFFORTS TO MAKE PEACE]
Besides, the aim of the United States was peace; it appeared certain
that in view of the battle just won the Mexicans would be disposed to
offer acceptable terms; and resident Americans as well as neutrals had
assured Scott that by taking the city, breaking up the government,
dispersing the sensible and substantial men who desired a settlement,
and perhaps rousing the people to desperation, he would be defeating
his own government. On the other hand, as the General had reckoned
before leaving Puebla, the presence of a victorious American army
waiting at the gate seemed likely to excite intense fears of slaughter
and sack, and prove a most effective argument for negotiation.
Consequently, though sure he could break his way in, Scott deliberately
sacrificed military glory, and halted. The wish to end hostilities was
the dominant consideration; and, fully to understand this, we must now
place ourselves at Washington, and then return to our present point by
a singularly winding route.[27.1]
Both in his war Message of May 11, 1846, and later, Polk announced
that he would be ready to negotiate whenever Mexico would make or even
hear propositions; and he sought a listening ear with a persistence
due to several causes: a real desire to end the war, a naïve ignorance
of Mexican psychology, the exigencies of home politics and foreign
relations, a natural predilection on his own part and on Buchanan's
for schemes and tactics, and behind all a sincere wish, in accordance
with our long-standing sentiment and policy, for the prosperity and
friendship of the sister republic. Taylor was therefore instructed
to place himself on confidential terms, if possible, at the Mexican
headquarters with a view to bringing about negotiations; and in line
with this policy Worth, while at Saltillo, offered pleasant sentiments
to Santa Anna on the subject of peace.[27.2]
The battles on the Rio Grande and the unwelcome effects of the blockade
tended to sober Mexico, as did the aloofness of Great Britain; and
Marcy counted not a little on the settlement of the Oregon question.
Intimations were received from Consul Black in June and July, 1846,
that not only all thoughtful citizens but Paredes himself desired to
reach an agreement. Bravo and his Cabinet, who temporarily assumed the
reins of government, felt more strongly in the same way, and were more
free to act; other signs also pointed in that direction; and it was
hoped that Santa Anna, should he regain power, would favor peace. The
American administration, on the other hand, felt much embarrassed by
the unexpected seriousness of the problems involved in the conflict.
So on the twenty-seventh of July Buchanan addressed the Mexican
minister of relations, waiving as undesirable all discussion upon the
causes of the war, and inviting negotiations in the most conciliatory
manner.[27.4]
But the government of Salas, which received this overture, had attacked
Paredes for slackness in prosecuting the hostilities; and he now
counted upon this issue for maintaining the power it had given him.
Besides, wrote Bankhead, the Mexicans were still confident they could
hold their own against the United States; and the war spirit ran so
strongly that Santa Anna, returning from exile to treat, remained
to fight.[27.3] Rejón, therefore, answering Buchanan in a lofty and
cutting strain, refused to ignore the causes of the war, and only
promised that Congress, on meeting in December, would take the matter
up. In other words, as an American newspaper observed, he said in
effect: We are sorry that you feel so tired of the campaign; as for
ourselves, we are quite comfortable. The reply was not one to fire the
popular heart of the United States; and without committing Mexico to
anything, it required our Executive to prepare for a long and arduous
contest. Nor was Salas reassuring when he laid the subject before
Congress. "If Mexico fights with constancy and courage, hers will be
the triumph," he proclaimed, and therefore the government has not
desired to hear proposals of peace. Polk answered Rejón by ordering
the hostilities to be conducted more harshly, and by announcing in his
Message at the beginning of December that an indemnity covering the
costs of the war, as well as our claims, would be required; but the
Mexican Congress did nothing.[27.4]
About a week after Buchanan addressed the minister of relations in
July, Polk recommended to Congress a naïve measure admirably fitted to
embarrass peace negotiations as much as it was intended to facilitate
them. This was an appropriation of $2,000,000 to be used in that
business for "extraordinary expenses." Probably the measure, vigorously
though confidentially pressed by the Executive, would have passed; but
Senator Davis killed it by speaking against time. In the following
session a similar proposition granting three millions came up about
the middle of January, 1847, and on March 3, after every Congressman
with a voice had talked himself out, it was carried. The natural result
followed. Even at our Capitol there were open though false charges that
bribery was contemplated, and to the Mexican that design seemed of
course transparently plain. No public man who cares for his reputation
can vote for peace now, said the _Diario_.[27.5]
The sentiment in favor of offering to treat with our weak and
unfortunate neighbor--as illustrated by formal action in Rhode Island
and New York, for example--was in fact strong. Even the British
minister at Washington recognized that the feeling in the Senate was
"entirely in favor of generous and pacific measures towards Mexico."
Such Whigs as Webster and Winthrop demanded that a commission be sent;
Benton favored that idea; and about the middle of January, 1847, it
was powerfully supported by Atocha, who presented himself at the
capital. This cunning and perfectly unscrupulous intriguer, who had
been expelled by Santa Anna's enemies in 1845 because he represented
the dictator's corrupt financial methods and then by Santa Anna himself
in September, 1846, because he knew too much about the Liberator's
dealings with Mackenzie, readily proved his intimacy with leading
Mexicans, created the belief that he was the government's peace agent,
induced our administration to propose on January 18 a meeting of
American and Mexican commissioners at Jalapa or Havana, and was made
the bearer of Buchanan's despatch to the minister of relations.[27.6]
Undoubtedly, though invested with no diplomatic functions, Atocha was
expected to do much personally; but in this he totally failed. At Vera
Cruz the people attempted to murder him. At Mexico he was ordered to
leave almost immediately, and was prevented from talking with any
person of influence; and such use as he contrived to make of the pen,
in suggesting terms of peace to Rejón, proved utterly fruitless. In
short, the American messenger was handled with tongs, and he was back
at Washington about the twentieth of March with an offensively worded
note, refusing to treat until all Mexican lands and waters should be
evacuated by our forces. Clearly this was a most unhappy overture.[27.6]
[WHY MEXICO WOULD NOT TREAT]
Many circumstances combined to inspire such boldness on the part
of our antagonist. Aside from the personal interest of many public
men in continuing the war, and the belief, prompted by vanity and
encouraged by specious arguments, both domestic and European, that
natural defences, latent resources and the military ardor of brave
citizens fighting for their homes would enable her to beat untrained
money-grubbers and "cowardly adventurers," operating far from their
base--aside from all this, hatred of "the rapacious invader," a fear
that peace would only lead to fresh demands and fresh encroachments,
and the fine theory that no people struggling for their independence
could be vanquished exerted a strong influence.[27.7]
The fact that an actual occupation of California would have to be
reckoned with could hardly be faced. To make peace without first
gaining a victory seemed humiliating, sure to be disadvantageous, and
likely to make dispirited Mexico the sport and prey of the whole world;
and Santa Anna in particular felt strongly on this point, because
his personal future as well as the cause of the nation required some
show of success. No peace is possible now except the peace of the
grave--national and racial extinction--it was insisted. Many reasoned
that Polk, to satisfy the United States, would have to demand, as
matters stood, a huge indemnity. Why regret a war that is bringing
so much gold into the country; a war that will overthrow Santa Anna,
the corruptionists, the intriguers, the military men and the sham
patriots; a war that will put an end to extortion and finally unite
all the good elements of the nation, demanded not a few; and why make
sacrifices to stop it, when peace will bring civil wars, which are
worse?[27.7]
Better subjugation than surrender, cried some in desperation; while
others believed that an American conquest and annexation would
extinguish privilege and monopoly, set up a pure democracy, ensure
stability and order, bring in a flood of enterprising northerners, and
make the country prosper. The clergy in particular, anxious to preserve
their property and their ease, felt rather more than willing to accept
such a dénouement. On the other hand, many believed that our people
neither would nor could bear for any length of time the expense of the
contest. This was the key to Rejón's policy, as he told the Spanish
minister. It was, therefore, only necessary to protract the war a
little--meanwhile allowing the wrath of Heaven time to pass away--in
order to reach the very pinnacle of glory.[27.7]
European journals offered much encouragement. Mexico need only be
obstinate, advised the London _Times_, and it seemed a most agreeable
prescription. The United States cannot long maintain the necessary
troops, predicted the _Globe_. The Americans are tired of the war, need
peace more than Mexico, have no disciplined soldiers, cannot follow
up their successes, and with good reason dread British interference,
remarked some of the French papers. Even more significant were
expressions coming from the United States. Hold fast, and you can
make "a brilliant treaty," said a letter. All are disgusted with the
hostilities, and in four years this country will kneel and pray for
peace, declared others. Persistent American denunciations of the war
as dishonorable made the idea of submission look shameful to our
enemies. No nation as brave and numerous as the Mexicans have ever been
conquered, announced the New York _Express_. The American treasury
will soon be empty, predicted the _National Intelligencer_; and that
influential paper endorsed the view that our antagonist could wear us
out. Calhoun used all his powers to show that it would be "folly" to
push the war, and ruin to push it successfully. Still more encouraging
were the Whig orators. In the voice of doom Webster threatened the
President with impeachment; and Corwin exclaimed, "Call home your army;
I will feed and clothe it no longer." Reports of a Whig revolution
circulated at Mexico; and the belief, accepted by many in Europe also,
that at any rate the Whigs would soon come into power and reverse the
policy of the American government, was confidently entertained by our
foes.[27.7]
But nothing proved so comforting, so cheering, as the conduct of our
government. The call for 12-months volunteers appeared to indicate the
limit of our endurance, and invited procrastination. Polk's assurances,
following so many earlier assurances from American Presidents, that for
our own sake we desired Mexico to be strong, prosperous and friendly,
implied that we did not intend to crowd her far. Our conciliatory
language and repeated efforts to negotiate were noted as clear signs of
weakness. The employment of an agent like Atocha seemed a confession of
impotence; and the appropriation of three millions for secret expenses
in order to obtain peace, as _El Republicano_ put it, looked like
throwing up the sponge. Polk wishes to exchange a bad war for a good
bargain, sneered _Le Constitutionnel_ of Paris. An extension of our
boundary was believed to be one aim of the negotiations we urged; and
the Mexicans felt, said Pakenham, that we should not think of buying
territory, if able to take it by force. The idea of selling it under
such circumstances was viewed as doubly degrading.[27.7]
Happily saved by his ignorance of Mexican character and sentiment from
the mortification of knowing all this, fully conscious that the war was
unpopular even with his own party, and hopeful that Buena Vista and the
capture of Vera Cruz had affected Mexico, Polk favored the idea of a
commission. Benton, however, would not have Slidell on the board; the
President could not well ignore Slidell unless a higher official--the
secretary of state himself--should be made sole representative; and no
first-class man could go to Mexico and dance attendance on the whims,
delays and insults of a government that scornfully held off. Indeed,
the nation could not afford to place the head of our state department
or a commission of leading public figures in such a predicament.[27.8]
[TRIST APPOINTED PEACE COMMISSIONER]
At length, however, Buchanan's resourceful mind thought of sending
Nicholas P. Trist, a protégé of his own and now chief clerk of the
state department. Trist's dignity, it was doubtless thought, would not
be too delicate; his action, it seemed evident, could be controlled;
and the glory of success, if a treaty should be made, would belong to
the administration--particularly the secretary of state--and not exalt
the agent in any dangerous political sense. Besides, the chief clerk
was a man of agreeable and impressive appearance, admitted talents,
unusual industry and the highest character; he had studied at West
Point; he knew diplomatic business; as consul at Havana for a term of
years, he had become acquainted with Spanish-American traits; and he
spoke the language of Mexico fluently. He was therefore immediately
appointed as Polk's agent--though officially styled "Commissioner
Plenipotentiary"--to be paid, not as a diplomatic representative,
but from the appropriation for the contingent expenses of foreign
intercourse.[27.8]
The appointment was not, however, entirely felicitous. Trist,
associated with Jefferson as law-student and as grandson by marriage
and associated with Jackson as private secretary, had sojourned on
Olympus and tasted the ambrosia of the gods; but he did not possess
their divine constitution, and ambrosia disagreed with him. It gave him
queer feelings in the head that were not exactly growing pains, and
produced a state of mind that was neither of heaven nor of earth. The
Declaration of Independence was always resounding in his thoughts, and
mentally he was always walking up the stairs of the White House arm in
arm with a hero, sage and prophet; but he overlooked the foundation of
downright common sense on which great men build, and lacked the humor
that might at least have kept him near the ground.[27.8]