about a mile of pedregal, Riley's brigade crossed the stream and the
turnpike, formed in the orchard of Ansaldo, routed small bodies of
lancers, passed through San Gerónimo--an Indian village lying amid
trees and ravines a quarter of a mile west of Ansaldo and about three
times as far from Valencia--had a stiff but victorious brush with
Torrejón and three regiments of cavalry, defied Valencia's cannon, some
of which now faced this way, found cover at length in broken ground
between the village and his camp, and waited for the Mexicans to be
routed. But the major general commanding failed in the prime essential
of his plan, for he did not induce Valencia to retreat. Badly crippled,
the American batteries became silent after an hour or so, the brigades
that had expected to charge saw clearly they could accomplish nothing,
and Riley found himself isolated. So ended wretchedly the first phase
of the battle of Contreras,[26.8] Pillow's phase.[26.11]
But by this time a second phase was taking shape. Pillow himself
perceived that Riley had been thrown into imminent peril, and sent
Cadwalader's brigade, which was followed by the Fifteenth Infantry,
to his support. Smith, useless where he was and probably feeling
little confidence in Pillow or Twiggs, decided to regard himself as
the senior officer present, gathered his men, except those employed
in skirmishing, and, with a yell of endorsement from them, proceeded
in the direction that Riley had taken--not, however, primarily to
intercept Valencia's retreat or reinforcements, but with a direct
view to attacking his left flank. At about the same time--probably
by half-past three o'clock--Scott himself joined Pillow and other
officers on Zacatepec, viewed with his usual battlefield equanimity
the desperate state of things, now spread before him like a map on a
table, studied Valencia's batteries, the heavy ranks of supporting
infantry and the long lines of cavalry in the rear, and soon fixed upon
woody San Gerónimo--marked at a line distance of about a mile and three
quarters by its white steeple--as the key to the situation, since it
both flanked and isolated Valencia, and ordered Shields's brigade also,
which had followed him from San Agustín, to that point.[26.11]
Smith, arriving at San Gerónimo about an hour before sunset, found all
of the commands, except Shields's, that had been ordered to go there;
and he also found that Santa Anna, after hurrying from San Antonio
through Coyoacán and San Angel, had placed himself with Pérez's brigade
and seven or eight hundred cavalry and artillery on low hills about
one half or three quarters of a mile behind San Gerónimo, and--though
checked by Cadwalader's brigade--was making ready to attack. Smith
at once began preparing to dispose of him, while the Mexicans on the
hills, after four or five guns arrived, indulged in vivas, music and a
little harmless cannonading; but both commanders finally concluded that
the hour was now too late for a battle. Santa Anna also decided that an
impassable ravine separated him from the Americans, and that he could
not prudently expose his men and arms to the rain then imminent; and
therefore, leaving his cavalry and artillery behind, he put the rest of
his forces under cover at San Angel.[26.11]
Night and a storm now set in, but behind the curtain of darkness four
striking scenes were presented. Scott, the general who seemed to have
lost half his army all at once without a battle, sat at headquarters
anxious and helpless. Seven times he despatched an officer to his
isolated right with orders, and seven times the officer failed to get
through. But still he waited--patient, considerate for those about him,
hopeful and alert, reflecting no doubt that brave men, skilful officers
and the natural strength of San Gerónimo would count. Valencia, on the
other hand, feeling that at last he had proved Santa Anna a blunderer,
and had forced him into the position of a mere assistant, was jubilant,
boastful and literally intoxicated. He reported grandly on his
"brilliant day," and scattered promotions as if already head of the
state.[26.11]
Santa Anna, devoured by passions and perplexities, now sent José Ramiro
to Valencia by a circuitous route with orders to retreat at once. Not
long afterwards two of Valencia's aides reached San Angel, bringing
news that, instead of being exterminated, thousands of Americans were
established in the San Gerónimo woods. Don't talk to me, Santa Anna
cried to the aides, who endeavored to excuse the situation; Valencia is
an ambitious, insubordinate sot; he deserves to have his brains blown
out, and I will not expose my men to the storm for him; let him spike
his guns, make the ammunition useless, and retreat. When Ramiro arrived
at the camp, Valencia would not listen to his message, and fiercely
demanded ammunition and men; but when his aides reported, he saw his
doom.[26.9] "Traitor, he has sold us!" he cried, storming like a madman
in the midst of his troops. Soldiers heard and echoed the cry. Women
shrieked. Frightened horses broke loose and galloped into the night.
Americans with lights are creeping in behind us, reported Torrejón. The
army understood. Scouts were feeling the way. The price had been paid
to Santa Anna. Their blood would soon be claimed.[26.11]
[Illustration: BATTLE OF CONTRERAS]
In ignorance of all these outside events the Americans at San Gerónimo,
too exhausted to eat, bore the torrents of chilling, beating rain
without fires and in darkness as best they could. Some found huts,
but most of them lay in the mud or stood up under trees. Smith's and
Riley's men occupied the lanes, and Shields's brigade, which stumbled
in at about midnight, put up in the road and an orchard. Officers fared
like privates. In such a plight, the troops listened for hours to the
music and vivas of the enemy, and for their own part could only reflect
on the painful and fruitless exertions of the day and on the prospects
of the morrow. Without cavalry, without cannon, without reserves of
provisions or ammunition, without hope of quarter, they felt that
with some 4200 men they might have to face 25,000 exultant Mexicans
and any amount of artillery at daybreak. But everybody believed in
General Smith.[26.10] "Here he is!" "Now we'll have them!" Riley's
soldiers had cried on seeing Smith arrive; and the confidence was not
misplaced.[26.11]
During the afternoon a ravine leading toward Valencia's rear had been
found. Smith seized upon the hint at once, and proposed to attack by
that route before daybreak with bayonets only; a conference of officers
agreed to his plan; it was decided to notify Scott, and suggest that
a diversion be made on Valencia's front at the proper time; Lee
undertook the almost impossible feat of carrying this message across
the pedregal; and Officers Tower and Brooks, whose lights--probably
occasional matches--Torrejón had reported, were sent off to study
the ravine, and prepare to be the guides. As Santa Anna was expected
to attack early, Shields accepted the charge of building fires in
the morning as if no Americans had left the ground, and holding San
Gerónimo.[26.11]
Two hours after midnight the troops were roused, and at three o'clock
Riley began to move. But it was tedious work to marshal the scattered
corps in the darkness and rain by touch and whisper, and morning
broke before the last were out of the village. The ravine branched
deceptively; it was full of rocks, too; and the watery clay, a soldier
said, slipped like "soft soap." Finally, however, the units closed up
at about a mile from San Gerónimo, and, partially hidden in a fog,
scrambled up to firm ground behind a low hill. As it was now light,
the firearms were put in order; and with quick adaptation to the
topography, the present arrangement of the Mexicans and their probable
movements, General Smith marshalled and instructed the troops.[26.11]
Riley's brigade, about 1300 strong, was to be the storming party.
Cadwalader's in halves formed a wing on each side to keep off cavalry.
A part of Smith's, together with the engineer company, was directed to
slip along behind elevated ground, and fall upon the flank or rear of
a Mexican force posted in advance; and the rest of it, marching by the
left, was ordered to strike the camp and a large body of lancers on the
flank. Even the possibility of a rear attack from Santa Anna, supposed
to be still where he had been seen the evening before, was provided
against. Meanwhile the troops that had remained in the pedregal,
assembled as well as possible by Twiggs and Lee during the latter part
of the night, in accordance with orders from Scott, watched and waited
near Padierna under Colonel Ransom of the Ninth Infantry.[26.11]
Finally a slightly round-shouldered man, with blue eyes, a sandy
mustache and sandy hair, walked slowly to the front and looked at his
watch. It was about six o'clock. "Are you ready?" he asked in a cheery
voice. "Ready!" the troops answered with a meaning smile. He gave them
a keen glance. "Men, forward!" he then ordered, for it was General
Smith. "Forward, forward!" flew the command through the ranks, and
ahead they went.[26.11]
Struck on front and rear General Mendoza's advanced corps fired without
aiming, turned and bolted; but Ransom's men, darting across the ravine,
gave Valencia something else--something he fancied more serious than
Smith's approach--to think about. Only a pair of 6-pounders bore on
Riley, and they fired high. Soon the Mexicans at the breastwork,
exchanging shots wildly with Ransom, found that bullets were coming
from behind, leaped over the parapet and fled. Attacked by Smith's
men, the lancers gave way and upset the rest of the infantry; and
Riley's column, deployed as well as time and the ground would allow,
bore down like a flood. All was now confusion in the camp: infantry,
horse, artillery, mules, women, laborers in a mob. Some of the gunners
remained at their pieces--chained to them, it was said--but, like the
infantry, they aimed little; and almost in a moment, like a bag turned
upside down, the camp was empty of all the Mexicans who could get away.
Again General Smith drew out his watch. "It has taken just seventeen
minutes," he remarked.[26.11]
Riley's brigade halted to secure the prisoners and the spoils, among
which--to the frantic delight of the soldiers--were the two cannon
lost so nobly at Buena Vista; but the rest of the victorious troops
pursued the enemy to San Angel; and the Mexicans fleeing by the
turnpike toward Ansaldo, cannonaded from their own camp and running the
gantlet of Smith, Ransom and even Shields, who had moved down toward
the road, fared badly. Others, including Torrejón and a large part of
the cavalry, managed by taking rough paths to reach San Gerónimo and
the hills. Valencia also escaped; but Salas, who tried to check the
flight, was captured. Seven hundred Mexicans fell, it was estimated;
over eight hundred were made prisoners; the captured cannon, including
the best that Santa Anna had, and the captured ammunition proved
invaluable; and the cost, as reported by Scott, was not over sixty
Americans killed and wounded.[26.11]
[AFTER THE BATTLE OF CONTRERAS]
Nor were such the only consequences of this lightning-stroke. Santa
Anna, having at length decided to rescue Valencia and raised his forces
to at least 7000 by drawing Rangel's reserve brigade from the city,
had set out at daybreak for his position of the night before; but
when in sight of Valencia's camp he learned from flying soldiers that
all was over, and that his outer line of defences had failed. Angrily
striking at fugitives with his whip he turned back, and waited near San
Angel for a while, unable to decide anything. Then he sent Rangel to
guard the southwest section of Mexico, despatched orders to evacuate
San Antonio and Mexicaltzingo, and marched with the rest of his
forces to Churubusco. Here priceless time was spent in raving against
Valencia--whom he ordered shot at sight--in a passion that almost
crazed him. His dominant idea now, so far as he could think at all, was
to make the capital a second Troy; and, probably with that in view, he
set Pérez's brigade in motion toward the city.[26.12]
After a time, however, reason gained the better of desperation, and
seeing the necessity of protecting the retreat of the San Antonio
garrison, he ordered General Rincón, who was ably seconded by Anaya,
to hold the Churubusco convent as long as possible, garrisoned the
bridgehead with one of Pérez's regiments, extended two others far
down behind the embankment of the river eastwardly, used a part of
the remaining two as a line from the bridgehead to the convent, and
stationed the rest on the highway behind.[26.12]
The convent position included, besides the building proper, a strong
church with a parapeted roof, a high stone enclosure provided on the
inside with scaffolds for troops, a broad, wet ditch, two outside
bastions facing Coyoacán, unfinished but strong breastworks on the
west and south, two detached adobe huts pierced with embrasures on
their southwest sides, four 8-pounders, three smaller guns, and for
garrison some 1500 or 1800 men, consisting of the Mexico battalions
named Independencia and Bravos, the San Patricio contingent of American
deserters or most of it, and some detachments of other corps; while the
bridgehead, a powerful, scientifically constructed work, with four feet
of water in the ditch and three heavy cannon, appeared to defy attack.
Surveying this excellent position Santa Anna recovered some of his
courage, and began work actively to complete the fortifications near
the bridge. The untried militia at the convent were almost in despair
when they found themselves in the forefront, but he promised to aid
them at the critical time.[26.12]
[Illllustration: BATTLE OF CHURUBUSCO]
Scott, for his part, left San Agustín before he knew how Smith's plan
had worked out, met the news on the pedregal, kept on to San Angel, and
near that place, amid tumultuous cheering, took command of Pillow's
and Twiggs's divisions.[26.13] The road to Mexico by way of Tacubaya
lay open, but he could not move now in that direction and leave Worth,
Quitman, the artillery, the baggage, the stores and the sick to join
him as best they could, exposed--as it was believed--to some 25,000
Mexicans. The first needful step was to capture San Antonio and reunite
his army. Worth had already been directed, after the rout of Valencia
became known, to attack and also turn that position whenever he should
learn that Pillow and Twiggs had gained its rear; and as a cross-road
led from San Antonio to Coyoacán, Coyoacán was the proper point of
concentration. Scott therefore went there with his troops, and sent
Lee, strongly escorted by dragoons and Mounted Rifles, to reconnoitre
the enemy and give the preconcerted signal for Worth's advance. Further
to assist that general, Pillow with Cadwalader's brigade was now
ordered down the cross-road.[26.14]
[Illustration: The Tête de Pont, Churubusco]
[THE BATTLE OF CHURUBUSCO]
Worth did not, however, wait for assistance. At about eleven o'clock
he sent Colonel Clarke's brigade--the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth
Infantry--and Brevet Colonel C. F. Smith's battalion from Cuapa to
turn San Antonio by the path on the left hand and cut off retreat,
and placed Garland, accompanied by Duncan's battery, in a somewhat
sheltered spot, as near as possible to the fortifications, with orders
to advance on hearing the other brigade at work. Clarke's tortuous
path seemed to be three miles long, and as it lay for two thirds
of the distance in the pedregal, where the troops had to slide and
scramble in single file, two hours were occupied in the march. The
Mexicans, therefore, warned by seeing this movement--which they vainly
attempted to check--as well as ordered by Santa Anna to retire, made
the utmost efforts, after spiking some of their guns, to escape with
the rest of them. But the garrison of San Antonio and the neighboring
fortifications, which consisted of the Hidalgo and Victoria battalions
of Mexico and some other militia, were wholly unfitted to execute a
difficult retreat in the face of the enemy. Not far from its middle
Clarke struck their column; and while the first part, led by General
Bravo, kept on toward Churubusco bridge, the second broke up and
scattered.[26.15]
By this time Garland, having found by pushing a company forward that
San Antonio had been evacuated, hastened on to unite with Clarke. The
enemy were quickly driven from fortifications of a minor importance at
Sotepingo, and the division then rushed forward after Bravo, while the
Mexicans--a mass of cavalry, infantry and artillery, wagons, mules,
women, servants, carriages and camp-followers--made all possible speed.
Owing to the effects of the rains, two Mexican guns and a number of
wagons were mired on the way; and near the Churubusco bridge Pérez's
brigade, hard pressed by the Americans from San Angel, crowded in upon
the stream of fugitives.[26.15]
[Illustration: TÊTE DE PONT. Profile of east curtain.]
So it happened that when Engineer Stevens climbed the church tower of
Coyoacán at about noon to reconnoitre, he observed a large body of
Mexican troops pouring along the highway from San Antonio. Apparently
Santa Anna was drawing all his forces to the city. Dense fields of corn
six feet high or more almost hid the works at the convent. Perceiving,
however, the nose of a bastion, Stevens concluded there might be one
gun at that point, which he thought could be rushed; and a prisoner
mentioned only two guns. The entire American army, reacting from the
gloom of the previous evening, exultant over Smith's victory, and
almost intoxicated by the change from storm to splendid sunshine, was
now feeling invincible, eager and over-confident. Stevens merely shared
the contagion; his report--precipitate and misleading, as he fully
admitted later--signified that without loss of a moment the San Antonio
garrison ought by all means to be intercepted; and so Scott did what we
know it had not been his intention to do: ordered Twiggs immediately
to the convent and highway by the direct road. "Make haste, my sons,"
he called to the troops, "or they will be gone before you reach
them!"[26.16]
At his instance and by way of precaution, engineers were sent on to
make investigations; but, as the case appeared simple and urgent, the
investigating and the fighting began hastily together. In a haphazard
way the Mounted Rifles, or at least a part of them, became engaged;
then the First Artillery advanced; and soon the rest of Smith's
brigade--the Third Infantry--besides the engineer company and Taylor's
battery were thrown in. Rincón, a gray-haired Spanish veteran, deceived
our generals, for he desired to save ammunition, and therefore did
not open his artillery fire till the Americans had come within musket
range. To pause after the conflict began would have chilled the ardor
of the troops and encouraged the enemy. Victory or defeat were the only
alternatives, and a defeat could not be thought of.[26.16]
[Illustration: The Fortifications of Churubusco Convent]
Victory did not arrive, however; so now the Second and the Seventh
Infantry, led by Riley, attacked the Mexican right. Amidst the corn
the American infantry became scattered, yet in the same haphazard
way fought on; and Taylor, placed in a very exposed position before
the state of things was understood, fired at short musket range with
beautiful precision and rapidity. But the Mexicans, inspired by good
leaders and by the example of the American deserters, who aimed the
cannon, stood their ground. From parapets and bastions poured sheets
of unceasing flame, sally followed sally, and guns at the bridgehead
coöperated. In an hour and a half Taylor drove the enemy from the
walls and from the roof of the church, but he lost twenty-four men and
fourteen horses killed and wounded. The battery had to be withdrawn,
and victory seemed almost beyond reach.[26.16]
Worth had now been attacking the bridgehead for half an hour or more.
Hurrying the troops along, without giving them definite instructions,
at a speed limited only by their wind and the obstacles in their
way, he had left the Sixth Infantry on the highway, placed the Fifth
and the Eighth at the right of it, and sent the rest of his infantry
obliquely against the Mexican left; and then, without a reconnaissance
of the bridgehead, the Sixth was ordered to charge whatever lay in its
front.[26.15]
Probably the army contained no better corps, but it recoiled twice
in confusion under a terrific storm of iron and lead. Valor was not
lacking, but the men were dumfounded to come "butt-end first," as
a soldier put it, upon such a fort so strongly held, when they had
supposed they were chasing a parcel of rabbits; and their numbers were
unequal to the task. Officers as well as men showed every sign of
panic. The regiment could not be kept on the highway; and the troops
in the tall corn on the right accomplished no more. The ground was
soft there; and it was cut up with dikes and with deep, wide ditches
containing about three feet of water. The men fought, but they fought
in general disorder. C. F. Smith found himself with not more than
twenty of his battalion at hand. Even the artillery, the backbone of
the army, failed now, for Duncan's light pieces could not challenge
the bridgehead squarely on the highway, and the ground beside it was
unsuitable for them; while occasional fire from the convent and the
explosion of an ammunition wagon abandoned by the Mexicans added to the
difficulties.[26.15]
At the same time, besides these two combats which Scott had not
expected, one planned by him was taking place. A few minutes after
sending Twiggs toward Churubusco he ordered Pierce--and presently
Shields also--to follow a road leading north from Coyoacán, cross
Churubusco River, and move toward Santa Anna's rear, so as to protect
the American flank and rear, favor the attack on the convent, and cut
off the retreat of the Mexicans. The route adopted by the troops after
leaving the road took them for a mile and a half through cornfields
and marshes, and placed them near the highway, about three quarters
of a mile north of the bridgehead, not far from the hacienda of Los
Portales. To parry the blow Santa Anna at once moved in that direction
with the Fourth Ligero, the Tulancingo regiment and most of the
Eleventh Line, his finest corps, extending his men--perhaps 2200 in
all--until they almost overlapped the Americans; while some 1500 or
2000 cavalry, probably consisting of the horse that had followed him
to San Angel reinforced by that which had escaped from Contreras,
menaced--though afraid to attack--Shields's left.[26.17]
Precisely what occurred now cannot be stated, for apparently most of
the reporting officers were more anxious to conceal than to disclose
facts; but it seems clear that Shields handled the men clumsily, that
his own regiments fell into disorder when charging and shrank from
the devouring Mexican fire, and that Pierce's brigade, composed of
excellent material but officered to a large extent with political
favorites, actually skulked. The Mexicans, on the other hand, finding
two ditches along the highway to protect them from the dreaded bayonet
and an embankment to screen them somewhat from bullets, fought stiffly.
Shields was therefore unable, with his six hundred good men and two
small howitzers, to make any impression, and after a time his troops
huddled wherever they could in the shelter of some buildings.[26.17]